CN101299856A - Method and apparatus for preventing attack for SIM card decoding - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for preventing attack for SIM card decoding Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for preventing attack for SIM card decoding. The method includes: in the process of receiving the authentication random number transmitted by users, once arriving at a setting time point, the SIM card generates a random number, and figures out at least a random number sample point Pnext in combination with prearranged parameters; when arriving at the Pnext, the SIM card stores the received authentication random number in the prearranged testing ciphering EF encrypted file to update the EF file; the SIM card, in accordance with the EF file, detects the authentication random number received after the Pnext. So that, determination of each Pnext is filled with random, thereby the attacker cannot detect the updating rule of the EF file, is difficult to avoid the SIM card detection process upon transmitting the attack random number, and cannot realize the attack for SIM card decoding, thereby greatly improving the safety of the authentication operation of the SIM card. At the same time, the present invention discloses a SIM card.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of communication, in particular to a method and a device for preventing cracking attack aiming at an SIM card.
Background
Currently, in GSM network, SIM card performs authentication operation on received signals using Comp128-1(A3/A8) algorithm, where Comp128-1 algorithm is an FFT-Hash algorithm and its algorithm structure is: 8 large cycles are embedded in each large cycle, and 5 small cycles are embedded in each large cycle. The Comp128-1(A3/A8) algorithm has a defect in algorithm structure, so that two different authentication random numbers can obtain the same ciphertext after being operated by the Comp128-1 algorithm, and the phenomenon is called collision. The "collision" phenomenon can be used to make a cracking attack on the SIM card to obtain the key KI of the SIM card, so as to clone the SIM card according to the obtained key KI. At present, all attack software carries out cracking attack on the SIM card aiming at 2-5 embedded rounds of small cycles of the 1 st round of large cycle.
In order to solve the above problems, in the prior art, a method of adding a detection module in an SIM card is adopted. Before the SIM card authenticates the received authentication random number, the added detection module adopts a random number detection algorithm to detect the received authentication random number so as to judge whether the authentication random number has aggressivity or not; the detection principle is as follows:
the authentication random number contains 16 bytes, wherein the ith and i +8 (i ≦ 8) bytes are referred to as an authentication random number byte (CBP), so that one authentication random number can be divided into 8 CBPs, for example: 1234567812345678. until now, all attacking software has adopted a common attack pattern: in an authentication random number for attack (hereinafter referred to as attack random number), 7 CBPs are kept unchanged, and only the remaining 1 CBP is changed, and it is desired to obtain two attack random numbers that produce the same result. For example, in 0000000100000001, only the 8 th and 16 th bytes are changed, there is an opportunity to output different attack random numbers that yield the same result, such as: 0000000100000001, 0000000200000001, 0000000100000002, 0000000200000002. In reality, the probability that there are 2 or more than 2 CBPs with the same value and the same corresponding position in two different authentication random numbers is very low, so that when the detection module in the SIM card detects that there are 2 or more than 2 CBPs with the same value and the same corresponding position in two different authentication random numbers, it is determined that an attack random number is found, for example, the values of the seven CBPs with the same corresponding position in "0000000100000001" and "0000000100000002" received by the SIM card are all "0", and obviously, both the two authentication random numbers have an attack.
In the prior art, due to the monitoring requirement, a random number detection Encryption (EF) File, referred to as an EF File for short, is built in the SIM card and is used for storing an authenticated random number that has passed the detection. And the detection module in the SIM card compares each newly received authentication random number with all authentication random numbers stored in the EF file one by one, and if the newly received authentication random number is found to be aggressive, the SIM card is defended by adopting an operation mode of locking the SIM card or sending an error authentication value.
Referring to fig. 1, the storage space size of the EF file is set to k, and the serial numbers are sequentially 0, 1.. k-1, which means that k authentication random numbers can be stored in the EF file, the specific value of k may be preset by a SIM card manufacturer, generally, k is equal to or greater than 50 and equal to or less than 100, and k is set to be 50; meanwhile, an authentication random number extraction interval n is also preset for the authentication random numbers stored in the EF file, where k is not greater than n, and in general, n is 500, which means that every 500 authentication random numbers are detected, the authentication random numbers stored in the EF file are replaced one by one, that is, the 501 th to 550 th authentication random numbers are extracted and stored in the EF file, and the original 50 authentication random numbers are replaced, so as to form one update of the EF file.
As can be seen from the above detection process, the specific values of n and k in the EF file are manually preset and fixed, so the existing detection process has the following defects:
1. if the manufacturing process of the SIM card is leaked or a manufacturer intentionally attacks the SIM card, the specific values of n and k are obtained by an attacker. Then, when an attacker attacks the SIM card through attack software in a cracking way, k non-aggressive authentication random numbers can be sent first, and the attack random numbers are sent for the next n-k times; one cycle every n times. Therefore, the detection flow of the SIM card can be easily bypassed, and the aim of cracking attack on the SIM card is fulfilled.
2. Even if the attacker does not know the specific values of n and k, k and n can be inferred by the binary method.
When a binary method is adopted to carry out cracking attack, k and n need to be detected respectively, and the specific flow is as follows:
1) probing k
Because k is more than or equal to 50 and less than or equal to 100, an attacker firstly sends 100 non-offensive authentication random numbers through attack software, and then repeatedly sends the 1 st authentication random number at the 101 st time.
If the authentication random number sent at the 101 st time is identified as the attack random number by the SIM card, it indicates that k of the EF file in the SIM card is 100.
If the authentication random number sent for 101 times is not identified as an attack random number by the SIM card, performing a binary search by using 50 as a base number, namely sending 75 authentication random numbers without aggressivity again, then repeatedly sending the 1 st authentication random number, detecting whether the authentication random number sent this time is identified as the attack random number by the SIM card, if so, indicating that k is more than or equal to 75, otherwise, indicating that k is less than 75, and continuing the binary search. The heuristic is cycled in such a way that, in general, at heuristic | log2 100After | times, the specific value of k must be obtained.
2) Detecting n
After obtaining the specific value of k, an attacker can send k non-offensive authentication random numbers through attack software, and then fixedly send the same authentication random number, if the sent authentication random number is found to be regarded as an attack random number by the SIM card at the t-th time, the SIM card is stated to perform extraction of the authentication random number at the t-2 th time, that is, n is t-2.
Therefore, an attacker successfully detects the specific values of n and k in the SIM card, so that the detection process of the SIM card can be easily bypassed, and further the cracking attack on the SIM card is realized.
In summary, the existing SIM card has insufficient security of the detection process used for receiving the authentication random number, and cannot effectively prevent cracking attack on the SIM card, which has a great potential safety hazard.
Disclosure of Invention
The embodiment of the invention provides a method and a device for preventing SIM card cracking attack, which are used for effectively preventing an attacker from using the defects of an SIM card authentication algorithm to crack and attack an SIM card.
The specific implementation mode provided by the invention is as follows:
a method for preventing cracking attack aiming at an SIM card comprises the following steps:
in the process of receiving the authentication random number sent by the user, the SIM card generates a random number every time a set time point is reached, and at least one random number extraction point Pnext is calculated by combining preset parameters;
when the Pnext is reached, the SIM card stores the received authentication random number into a preset detection encryption EF file so as to update the EF file;
and the SIM card detects the authentication random number received after the Pnext according to the EF file.
A SIM card, comprising:
a storage unit for storing a random number;
the communication unit is used for receiving the authentication random number sent by the user;
the first processing unit is used for acquiring and generating a random number when each set time point is reached, calculating the random number according to a random function, and calculating at least one random number extraction point Pnext by combining preset parameters;
the second processing unit is used for storing the received authentication random number into a preset EF file when the Pnext is reached so as to update the EF file;
and the detection unit is used for detecting the authentication random number received after the Pnext according to the EF file.
In the embodiment of the invention, in the process of receiving the authentication random number sent by a user, when a set time point is reached, an SIM generates a random number, and at least one random number extraction point Pnext is calculated by combining preset parameters; when the Pnext is reached, the SIM card stores the received authentication random number into a preset detection encryption EF file so as to update the EF file; and the SIM card detects the authentication random number received after the Pnext according to the EF file. Therefore, each Pnext determination is full of randomness, so that an attacker cannot detect the updating rule of the EF file, the detection flow of the SIM card is difficult to bypass when the attack random number is sent, the cracking attack on the SIM card cannot be realized, and the safety of the authentication operation of the SIM card is greatly improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a storage method of an authenticated random number in an SIM card according to the prior art;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a functional structure of an SIM card according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating security detection performed by the SIM card on the received authentication random number according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating updating of an EF file in a SIM card according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to effectively prevent an attacker from utilizing the defects of an SIM card authentication algorithm to carry out cracking attack on the SIM card, in the embodiment of the invention, when the SIM card receives the authentication random number sent by a user, a random number is generated every time a set time point is reached, and at least one random number extraction point Pnext is calculated by combining preset parameters; and when the Pnext is reached, the SIM card stores the received authentication random number into a preset detection encryption EF file so as to update the EF file, and detects the authentication random number received after the Pnext according to the EF file.
Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Referring to fig. 2, in the present embodiment, the SIM card includes a storage unit 100, a communication unit 101, a first processing unit 102, a second processing unit 103, and a detection unit 104; wherein,
a storage unit 100 for storing a random number;
a communication unit 101, configured to receive an authentication random number sent by a user;
the first processing unit 102 is configured to generate a random number when each set time point is reached, and calculate at least one random number extraction point Pnext by combining preset parameters;
the second processing unit 103 is configured to, when the Pnext is reached, store the received authentication random number into a preset EF file to update the EF file;
a detecting unit 104, configured to detect, according to the EF file, the authentication random number received after the Pnext.
In this embodiment, when the detecting unit 104 detects that the authentication random number sent by the user is offensive, corresponding protection measures may be taken, for example, the SIM card is locked after 10 times of attacks are found, the SIM card does not perform normal authentication after being locked, and an erroneous random number is sent to each authentication request to mislead an attacker, so that the attacker cannot continue to perform effective attacks.
Based on the SIM card, in this embodiment, it is assumed that the size k of the EF file storage space in the SIM card is 50, a counter Count is set in the SIM card, the initial value is 0, and the counter Count is used for recording the authentication times of the user, and the SIM card executes the counter Count +1 every time it receives the authentication random number sent by the user; meanwhile, the SIM card is also provided with an authentication upper limit (AuthMax), Count is less than or equal to AuthMax, which is 2,000,000 in this embodiment; in this embodiment, the initial value of PreLock is set to 10, the initial value of LockFlag is set to 0, when the SIM card detects an attack random number, LockFlag is executed as 1, that is, it indicates that a pre-locking mechanism is started for a user sending the attack random number, and then, when the attack random number sent by the user is detected, PreLock is executed as PreLock-1, and when PreLock is less than or equal to 0, the SIM card executes information protection measures, for example: and sending an error random number as an authentication return value to prevent the information in the card from being cracked. Then, taking a detection procedure as an example, referring to fig. 3, in this embodiment, a detailed procedure of performing security detection on the received authentication random number by the SIM card is as follows:
step 300: the SIM card receives the authentication random number sent by the user and executes Count + 1.
Step 301: the SIM card judges whether the authentication times of the user exceed a preset authentication upper limit, namely Count > AuthMax? If yes, go to step 302, otherwise, go to step 303.
Step 302: the SIM card informs the user that the authentication times of the user exceed the authentication upper limit, and ends the current detection process.
Step 303: the SIM card determines whether the number of times that the user has sent the attack random number exceeds a set threshold, i.e., PreLock > 0? If yes, go to step 304; otherwise, go to step 306.
Step 304: the SIM card determines whether the authentication random number received this time is an attack random number, i.e. whether the authentication random number is aggressive, if so, step 305 is performed; otherwise, go to step 307.
Step 305: the LockFlag is executed as 1 and PreLock is executed as PreLock-1, followed by step 306.
In this embodiment, if the user is the first attack, the initial value 0 of the LockFlag is changed to 1, and if the user is not the first attack, the LockFlag is already set to 1, and the LockFlag only needs to be executed once — 1, which does not need to be changed.
Step 306: and outputting an invalid 16-bit random value as an error authentication result to return to the user, and ending the detection process.
Step 307: the SIM card determines whether the authentication frequency of the user is less than or equal to a preset parameter k, i.e. Count ≦ k? If yes, go to step 308; otherwise, proceed to step 310.
Step 308: the SIM card further determines whether the authentication number of the user is equal to a preset parameter k, i.e. Count? If yes, go to step 309; otherwise, go to step 312.
Step 309: the SIM card reads the random factor Seed preset in the card and executes r ═ Seed, and then, step 311 is executed.
Step 310: the SIM card determines whether the authentication frequency of the user reaches a preset random number extraction point (Pnext), which is also referred to as an extraction point for short, i.e. Count? If yes, go to step 311; otherwise, go to step 313.
In this embodiment, Pnext is not a fixed value, and each time when one Pnext is reached, the SIM card generates a random number using a random function, and obtains the next Pnext by combining preset parameters. The random function may be a Rand () function in C language, a Ran () function in Java language, or a random function in another programming language, and in this embodiment, a Rand () function is taken as an example for description.
Step 311: SIM card executes r ═ rand (r), and
to obtain the next Pnext; wherein r is a random number between 0 and 1 generated by a random function Rand (); s is a preset sampling period, and in the embodiment, s is 20;
is a rounding down operation.
In this embodiment, when the SIM card calculates the next Pnext, there are two cases:
1. in step 309, since P is presentSetting the initial value of the next to k, so that when the SIM card receives the kth authentication random number, the first Pnext is reached, at this time, the SIM card needs to obtain a preset local 16-byte random factor Seed, assigns the Seed to a parameter r, obtains a random number between 0 and 1 through a formula r ═ rand (r), and then obtains a random number through the formula r ═ rand (r)
A second extraction point is obtained.
For example, if r ═ rand (seed) ═ rand (r) ═ 0.356, then
Then the second extraction point
That is, when the SIM card receives the 57 th authentication random number, after performing security detection on the SIM card, the authentication random number is stored in the EF file to replace the original 1 st authentication random number, as shown in fig. 4, so that the EF file is updated once.
2. When the SIM card reaches other Pnext except the first Pnext, the random number r obtained in the calculation of the Pnext needs to be substituted into a formula r ═ rand (r) to obtain a random number between 0 and 1 again, and then the formula is used for obtaining the random number again
The next Pnext is obtained.
For example, when the third Pnext is calculated, r ═ Rand (0.356) ═ 0.722, then
Then the third extraction pointI.e. when the 71 th authentication random number is received by the SIM card, it is securedAfter the detection, the authentication random number is stored in the EF file to replace the original 2 nd authentication random number, as shown in fig. 4, so that the EF file is updated again.
The authentication random number stored in the EF file can be continuously updated by circulating the steps, so that the safety detection effect of the SIM card is improved, and the external cracking attack is effectively prevented.
Step 312: and the SIM card stores the currently received authentication random number to a specified position in the EF file.
The SIM card stores the received authentication random number in two cases:
1. if the Count is less than or equal to k, the storage space is still reserved in the EF file, and the SIM card only needs to store the received authentication random numbers into the EF file according to a set sequence;
2. if Count > k and Count ═ Pnext, it means that there have been k authentication random numbers stored in the EF file, then the SIM card will store the received authentication random number to the designated location to replace an original authentication random number.
Step 313: the SIM card completes the detection process, performs authentication operation on the authentication random number passing the detection, and prepares to receive the next authentication random number.
In the above embodiment, the SIM card does not set a fixed random number extraction interval n any longer, but calculates the next Pnext by a random function in combination with other preset parameters when reaching each Pnext based on a preset random factor Seed; in the process, the random number r between 0 and 1 obtained by random function operation each time is substituted into the random function to obtain a new result when the next Pnext is calculated, so that the random number stored in the SIM card is truly discretized, and the determination of each Pnext is full of randomness; therefore, an attacker cannot detect the updating rule of the EF file, so that the detection flow of the SIM card is difficult to bypass when the attack random number is sent, the cracking attack on the SIM card cannot be realized, and the safety of the authentication operation of the SIM card is greatly improved.
Of course, the SIM card may also select another way to calculate each Pnext, for example, calculating the next Pnext at a certain time point between two adjacent pnexts; alternatively, every 1 Pnext (or 2 Pnext, 3 Pnext, etc.) the same technical effect can be achieved by calculating the next two Pnext, i.e. calculating two Pnext at a time. The method for calculating the next Pnext for every up to one Pnext adopted in the embodiments of the present invention is only a preferred embodiment, and is not described herein again.
Alternatively, the SIM card may select another formula to calculate each Pnext, for example, setting the adjustment factor x (x is a suitable positive integer) as the calculation formula
Or setting an adjusting factor y (y is a floating point number, y is more than 1.0 and less than 2.0), wherein the calculation formula isThe formula used in the embodiments of the present invention is only a preferred embodiment, and is not described herein again.
On the other hand, as can be seen from the above embodiments, the most critical of the whole detection process is the setting of the random factor Seed, which is the key for ensuring the discretization of the subsequent random numbers in the whole security detection process, and therefore, the Seed should be set to a random value written into the secure storage area of the SIM card in the card manufacturing process and is unknown to anyone. The most ideal implementation way is to set the key KI of the SIM card as Seed, and using KI as Seed not only has randomness and security, but also does not need extra storage space, and card manufacturing equipment and process do not need any change. Of course, a Seed can be randomly created and written into the card, but it takes at least 1 byte more space, and the card manufacturing process should be slightly adjusted.
Since Seed is confidential, the series of data generated by rand (Seed) is confidential and an attacker cannot know or predict the authentication random number stored in the EF file. As can be seen from the current "collision" attack pattern: if the KI is successfully cracked, a certain number of attack random numbers are required; if a certain number of attack random sequences are used, the correlation of the attack random sequences needs not to be detected by the SIM card; if the correlation is not detected by the SIM card, the Pnext selection method, namely the updating rule of the EF file, needs to be known; to understand the method of Pnext selection, Seed (i.e. KI) is obtained. Obviously, the above process forms a logic deadlock, the security of Seed is guaranteed by the confidentiality of Seed itself, and even if the manufacturing process of the SIM card leaks or an operator leaks the secret, the preset value of Seed cannot be obtained, so that the SIM card cannot be effectively cracked and attacked.
It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications may be made in the embodiments of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Thus, provided that such modifications and variations in the embodiments of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the embodiments of the present invention are intended to include such modifications and variations as well.
Claims (12)
1. A method for preventing cracking attack aiming at an SIM card is characterized by comprising the following steps:
in the process of receiving the authentication random number sent by the user, the SIM card generates a random number every time a set time point is reached, and at least one random number extraction point Pnext is calculated by combining preset parameters;
when the Pnext is reached, the SIM card stores the received authentication random number into a preset detection encryption EF file so as to update the EF file;
and the SIM card detects the authentication random number received after the Pnext according to the EF file.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the time points are Pnext; every time one Pnext is reached, the SIM card calculates the next Pnext.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the SIM card, when generating a random number, comprises the steps of:
acquiring a random factor preset in the SIM card, or acquiring a random number generated when Pnext is calculated last time;
and operating the random factor or the random number generated in the last Pnext calculation according to a random function.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the random factor in the SIM card is a SIM card key KI.
5. The method of any of claims 1-4, wherein the SIM card uses a formula
Calculating each Pnext, wherein r is a random number generated by the SIM card, s is a preset sampling period,
is a rounding down operation.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, wherein when the SIM card stores the received authentication random number into a preset EF file, it first determines whether the number of the authentication random numbers stored in the EF file does not reach a set threshold, and if so, stores the received authentication random numbers into the EF file according to a set sequence; otherwise, storing the received authentication random number in the appointed position of the EF file to replace the original authentication random number.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein when the SIM card detects that the authentication random number sent by the user is offensive, the number of attacks of the user is increased by 1, and when it is determined that the number of attacks of the user exceeds the set threshold, a corresponding protection measure is performed.
8. A SIM card, comprising:
a storage unit for storing a random number;
the communication unit is used for receiving the authentication random number sent by the user;
the first processing unit is used for generating a random number when each set time point is reached, and calculating at least one random number extraction point Pnext by combining preset parameters;
the second processing unit is used for storing the received authentication random number into a preset EF file when the Pnext is reached so as to update the EF file;
and the detection unit is used for detecting the authentication random number received after the Pnext according to the EF file.
9. The SIM card according to claim 8, wherein the first processing unit calculates a next Pnext every time one Pnext is reached when the time point is Pnext.
10. The SIM card according to claim 8, wherein the first processing unit obtains a random factor preset in the SIM card when generating a random number, or obtains a random number generated when computing Pnext last time; and according to a random function, calculating the random factor or the random number generated when Pnext is calculated last time.
11. The SIM card according to claim 8, 9 or 10, wherein the second processing unit stores the received authentication random number in a preset EF file, and first determines whether the number of the authentication random numbers stored in the EF file does not reach a set threshold, and if so, stores the received authentication random numbers in the EF file according to a set sequence; otherwise, the received authentication random number is stored to the appointed position of the EF file to replace the original authentication random number.
12. The SIM card according to claim 11, wherein the detecting unit adds 1 to the number of attacks of the user when detecting that the authentication random number sent by the user is offensive, and executes a corresponding protection measure when determining that the number of attacks of the user has exceeded a set threshold.
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Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101998400A (en) * | 2009-08-12 | 2011-03-30 | 中国移动通信集团天津有限公司 | Authentication random number detection method and SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card |
| CN114168947A (en) * | 2021-12-14 | 2022-03-11 | Tcl通讯科技（成都）有限公司 | Attack detection method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| FR2861518B1 (en) * | 2003-10-24 | 2006-01-13 | Gemplus Card Int | METHOD AND ASSOCIATED DEVICE FOR GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS IN A DATA INTERVAL. |
| CN1251470C (en) * | 2003-11-10 | 2006-04-12 | 北京握奇数据系统有限公司 | Anti-cloning method for SIM card |
| CN100574529C (en) * | 2003-11-18 | 2009-12-23 | 中国移动通信集团公司 | A kind of SIM card end subscriber safety right appraisal method |
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101998400A (en) * | 2009-08-12 | 2011-03-30 | 中国移动通信集团天津有限公司 | Authentication random number detection method and SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card |
| CN101998400B (en) * | 2009-08-12 | 2013-04-17 | 中国移动通信集团天津有限公司 | Authentication random number detection method and SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card |
| CN114168947A (en) * | 2021-12-14 | 2022-03-11 | Tcl通讯科技（成都）有限公司 | Attack detection method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
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