CN101060696A - A method for ensuring the compatible integrity parameters from both the receiving and sending parties - Google Patents

A method for ensuring the compatible integrity parameters from both the receiving and sending parties Download PDF

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CN101060696A
CN101060696A CNA2006100722677A CN200610072267A CN101060696A CN 101060696 A CN101060696 A CN 101060696A CN A2006100722677 A CNA2006100722677 A CN A2006100722677A CN 200610072267 A CN200610072267 A CN 200610072267A CN 101060696 A CN101060696 A CN 101060696A
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message
msn
round
recipient
flag bit
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CN100581288C (en
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赵军
钟纾
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Datang Mobile Communications Equipment Co Ltd
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Datang Mobile Communications Equipment Co Ltd
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Abstract

The disclosed method for ensuring parameter consistent for both sides comprises: A. the receive side sets mark continually for two stage message to mark whether has been received every message during two stages; and B. the receive side sets the relative mark when receiving one piece message till setting all marks, adds one to HFN value; if receiving the second stage message before complete receiving the message of first stage, adds no to HFN.

Description

A kind of method of guaranteeing receiving-transmitting sides integrity parameters unanimity
Technical field
The present invention relates to the safety communication technology field in the communication system, be meant a kind of two methods of sending out the integrity parameters unanimity of guaranteeing to receive and dispatch especially.
Background technology
Along with the development of mobile communication technology, the confidentiality of wireless transmission and fail safe have become user's demand, and integrity protection just is being based on transmission security and is proposing.Integrity protection is meant that transmitting terminal sends data to receiving terminal, and after receiving terminal was received data, whether the signaling data that check is received was revised, inserts data, repeated to send by unauthorized behavior.Transmitting terminal also can be confirmed the result that receiving terminal obtains, and attacks to prevent false base station, improves security of system.
(Radio Resource Control, RRC) carry out, the same with encrypting, and uses between radio network controller (RNC) and terminal by the sublayer in Radio Resource control for integrity protection.Integrity Key (IK) and encryption key (CK) produce in authentication and cipher key agreement process.
Integrity protection is meant: universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) terrestrial access network (UTRAN) sends safe mode command (Security Mode Command) message to user terminal (UE).After UE received this message, the key that produces according to the parameter of the integrity protection that carries in the message and previous authentication process carried out integrity protection to after this signaling message.
The parameter of integrity protection comprises random number (FRESH), IK, direction position (DIRECTION), integrality sequence number (COUNT-I) and message (MESSAGE).Wherein, FRESH comprises 32 bits, from network side, is carried by Security Mode Command, is that UTRAN is that each user produces at random, and effective in the connection procedure of a signaling; IK comprises 128 bits, block from User Identity (SIM), IK produces and sends to VLR Visitor Location Register (VLR)/Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) in attaching position register (HLR)/authentication center (AuC) when consulting authentication, part as five-tuple is stored among the VLR/SGSN, sends to RNC by VLR/SGSN then; DIRECTION is 1 bit, and 0 expression UE is to UTRAN, and 1 expression UTRAN is to UE; MESSAGE is protected signaling message; COUNT-I comprises 32 bits, and COUNT-I comes from network side, but will set according to the information of network side.
In conjunction with shown in Figure 1, the detailed process of integrity protection is such: the sending direction recipient sends signaling message, wherein carries the message authentication code (MAC) that the recipient utilizes IK and COUNT-I, MESSAGE, DIRECTION and FRESH to produce through the f9 algorithm; After the recipient receives this signaling message, with obtaining expecting message authentication code (XMAC) with the same algorithm computation of transmit leg, and MAC and XMAC compared, if both equate, illustrate that then the signaling message of receiving is complete, in transmission course, be not modified, otherwise, think that then this signaling message is modified in transmission course.In addition, when transmit leg was UE, the recipient was RNC, and vice versa.
Need to prove that for each Signaling Radio Bearer (SRB), there is a COUNT-I value respectively in the uplink and downlink link, as shown in Figure 2, COUNT-I comprises RRC Hyper Frame Number (HFN) and RRC sequence number MSN.HFN is 28 bits, and MSN is 4 bits.MSN is initially 0, and the initial value of HFN is determined that by the IK state if IK uses first, then HFN is 0, otherwise high 20 START values that calculate for UE of HFN, all the other are 0.MSN increases progressively use from 0 to 0xF, and after circulation one was taken turns, HFN increased 1.The integrity protection of up-downgoing independently carries out.
At present, following explanation is arranged in the 3GPP integrity protection agreement: when the MSN that receives message less than the MSN that successfully received last time in the message, then HFN will increase 1.But because the re-transmission of rlc layer or abandoning of packet, may cause the bigger message of MSN sequence number to arrive first, arrive after the less message of MSN sequence number, like this, after the recipient receives the less message of MSN sequence number, HFN among the recipient increases 1, and the HFN of receiving-transmitting sides loses unanimity as a result, and then the integrity verification that causes the less message of MSN sequence number is carried out is failed.
For example: the integrity protection of UTRAN and UE is enabled, and UTRAN tissue has also sent 3 and measured control messages, is followed successively by 3,4,5 MSN number.The MSN that UTRAN sends is that 3,4,5 message is encapsulated in the different protocol Data Unit (PDU) by UTRAN Radio Link control (RLC) and passes to UE RLC.Wherein, it is 3 service data unit (SDU) that MSN has been adorned in PDU sequence number (SN) little sealing, and PDU SN is big seals that to have adorned MSN be 5 SDU.The little data-bag lost of PDUSN as a result, have only the big encapsulation of PDU SN MSN be that the RLCPDU of 5 SDU has arrived UE RLC, UE RLC is that 5 SDU recombinates and successfully gives the upper strata with MSN, and with STATUS PDU notice UTRAN, the data-bag lost that PDU SN is little.After UTRAN RLC received this STATUS PDU that UE RLC sends, retransmitting the little MSN that comprised of PDU SN was 3, the RLC PDU of 4SDU, and after UE RLC received, the MSN that recombinates again was that 3,4 SDU gives RRC.UE RRC reception SDU is exactly 5 in proper order like this, 3,4, according to existing protocol, UE judges that the MSN less than last a piece of news is 5 when receiving that MSN is 3 message, just think it has been once new samsara, HFN need increase 1, and will cause for MSN is 3 message integrity check failure, so this message is dropped.MSN is that 4 message is dropped too.
Certainly, on up link, also there is same situation in the AM message that sends to UTRAN for UE.
In sum, according to 3GPP prior protocols regulation, because the bottom radio signal quality is bad, rlc layer need retransmit or data packet discarding, in the time of will causing the MSN inverted sequence arrival of RRC message, the integrity parameters of Uu mouth message loses consistency, can't pass through integrity verification.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, the object of the present invention is to provide a kind of two methods of sending out the integrity parameters unanimity of guaranteeing to receive and dispatch, make it when the MSN of message inverted sequence arrives, the inconsistent problem of the integrity parameters of recipient and transmit leg.
In order to achieve the above object, the invention provides a kind of method of guaranteeing receiving-transmitting sides integrity parameters unanimity, the sending direction recipient sends message, and this method comprises:
A. for continuous two-wheeled message the sign amount is set the recipient, in order to indicate each message that whether receives in the two-wheeled, the corresponding flag bit of each message;
B. the recipient whenever receives a message, with the pairing flag bit set of this message, in one takes turns after the whole set of the flag bit of all message correspondences, the value of HFN is increased by 1;
If the recipient receives second message of taking turns during message not harvesting the first round, then the value of HFN is not done to add 1 and handle, utilize HFN to add that 1 value carries out integrity verification to this message.
Described transmit leg is a user terminal, and the recipient is a radio network controller; Or described transmit leg is radio network controller, and the recipient is a user terminal.
Described radio resource control information contains the MSN field, and MSN is that every message cycle of taking turns uses; The corresponding sign position of the MSN of a message in every the wheel,
Then among the step B step of the pairing flag bit set of this message is comprised:
Whether the flag bit of first round message of judging the MSN correspondence of this message is set, if be not set, and then with position, mark position in the first round message of this MSN correspondence, otherwise, second of this message correspondence is taken turns flag bit set in the message.
The recipient receives that second message of taking turns is to determine according to following steps during message not harvesting the first round among the step B:
Whether the flag bit of judging the pairing first round message of MSN of receiving this message is set, and, judge in the first round flag bit whether also to exist and be not set, if be set, and first round flag bit also exists and is not set, and confirms that then the recipient receives second message of taking turns during message not receiving the first round.
When transmit leg sent message failure, this method further comprised:
The rollback that transmit leg notifies the recipient to carry out HFN, the recipient calculates the HFN value that needs rollback according to the number that does not successfully send message.
Described message is radio resource control information.
A kind of methods of guaranteeing to receive and dispatch two integrity parameters unanimities that propose according to the present invention, in the time of can solving the arrival of RRC message inverted sequence, the inconsistent problem of integrity parameters.Whether method of the present invention becomes to submit according to the order of sequence with the RRC message arrangement for network side, can correctly handle.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 shows the schematic diagram that carries out integrity protection;
Fig. 2 shows the structural representation of COUNT-I;
Fig. 3 shows the schematic flow sheet of the inventive method;
Fig. 4 comprises Fig. 4 a, 4b and 4c three parts, shows the schematic flow sheet of the specific embodiment of realizing the inventive method.
Embodiment
For making the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention is described in further detail below in conjunction with accompanying drawing.
In the present invention, for continuous two-wheeled message the sign amount is set, whether receives the message of corresponding MSN in the two-wheeled in order to sign the recipient, and, the corresponding flag bit of each message; The recipient whenever receives a piece of news, on the pairing flag bit of the MSN of this message, put receiving flag, when all message in takes turns are all received, be that the flag bit of first round message correspondence is when all being set, just HFN is increased 1, like this, no matter whether inverted sequence arrives, can not cause recipient's HFN erroneous judgement.If one takes turns also and do not collect, and received some message of next round, so these message have been carried out integrity checking with (HFN+1), itself does not increase HFN.Described transmit leg is a user terminal, and the recipient is a radio network controller; Or described transmit leg is radio network controller, and the recipient is a user terminal.Above-mentioned message can be RRC message.
Referring to shown in Figure 3, realize that method of the present invention may further comprise the steps:
Step 301: for continuous two-wheeled message the sign amount is set the recipient, in order to indicate each message that whether receives in the two-wheeled, the corresponding flag bit of each message;
Step 302: the recipient whenever receives a message, with the pairing flag bit set of the MSN of this message, in one takes turns after the whole set of all message, the value of HFN is increased by 1; If the recipient receives second message of taking turns during message not harvesting the first round, then the value of HFN is not done to add 1 and handle, utilize HFN to add that 1 value carries out integrity verification to this message.
Because in actual application, RRC message contains MSN, MSN is that therefore every message cycle of taking turns uses, the present invention can for one take turns in the MSN of each message a sign position is set, but owing to situation for two flag bits of the possible correspondence of the MSN of continuous two-wheeled, need to judge and whenever receive the pairing flag bit of a message, therefore, in the above-mentioned steps 302 step of the pairing flag bit set of this message being carried out as follows:
Whether the flag bit of first round message of judging the MSN correspondence of this message is set, if be not set, and then with position, mark position in the first round message of this MSN correspondence, otherwise, second of this message correspondence is taken turns flag bit set in the message.
The recipient receives that second message of taking turns also can determine according to following steps during message not harvesting the first round in the step 302: whether the flag bit of judging the pairing first round message of MSN of receiving this message is set, and, judge in the first round flag bit whether also to exist and be not set, if be set, and first round flag bit also exists and is not set, and confirms that then the recipient receives second message of taking turns during message not receiving the first round.
When losing of some message taken place, owing to be the AM pattern, RLC will detect this situation, and for transmit leg, RRC calculates the HFN value that needs rollback according to the not successful RRC message number that sends, and replacement MSN.Accordingly, recipient's all receiving flags of should resetting.
Lift instantiation below in conjunction with Fig. 4 and describe the processing procedure of recipient after receiving message in detail.
For convenience, present embodiment will be made following agreement:
(1) the maximum MAX_MSN of present embodiment MSN is set to 15 (current agreement also is 15);
(2) RLC_BUFFER_MSG_NUM represents also not have on certain RB the RRC message sum that successfully sends, comprises not sending and sending but do not reply;
(3) MSN_ROUND[2* (MAX_MSN+1)], recipient's sign shows whether certain MSN successfully receives;
(4) MSN_ROUND[y] successfully receive MSN_ROUND[y for TRUE represents corresponding message] also do not receive for FALSE represents corresponding message, wherein, y represents that this message is which message in the epicycle, and y=1 represents first, and y=2 represents second.
Table 1 is MSN_ROUND[2* (MAX_MSN+1)] flag bit.Referring to table 1.When resetting, MSN_ROUND[0] put TRUE, all the other put FALSE.In the network of reality, the above possibility of MSN leap two-wheeled that arrives continuously exists hardly, MSN_ROUND[2* (MAX_MSN+1) therefore is set] just can finish the receiving flag effect, this paper back gives the fallback mechanism when information drop-out takes place simultaneously, guarantees the processing of this method under extreme case.
P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP, span is 0..2*MAX_MSN+1, last MSN that recipient's indication has been received continuously, the next one sign MSN_ROUND (P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP+1) of this indication must be FALSE.Take turns at first when new one, the position of P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP indication may be FALSE.When resetting, P_MSC_ROUNID_SKIP=0.
The P rule moves, and the P pointer moves to right one, follows P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP=(P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP+1) mode (2*MAX_MSN) simultaneously, also is TRUE if indicating bit is TRUE and next bit, then continue to move to right, and be FALSE until next bit.If move to low order end, will be circulated to left end.If indicating bit is FALSE, then do not move.
0 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ... 29 30 31
T T T T ... T F F F F F F ... F F F
P
Table 1
Referring to shown in Figure 4, the idiographic flow of present embodiment is as follows:
Step 401: recipient RRC receives a message, and the MSN of this message equals y.
Step 402: detect MSN_ROUND[0...MAX_MSN] and MSN_ROUND[MAX_MSN+1...2*MAX_MSN+1] whether all signs are TRUE, if MSN_ROUND[0...MAX_MSN] be TRUE, expression MSN has finished one and has taken turns, and then execution in step 403; If MSN_ROUND[MAX_MSN+1...2*MAX_MSN+1] be TRUE, expression MSN has finished one and has taken turns execution in step 407; If all signs all are not TRUE, expression is not finished one as yet and is taken turns execution in step 411.
Step 403: all that are provided with that this takes turns are masked as FALSE, and HFN should increase 1.
Step 404: judge MSN_ROUND[y+MAX_MSN+1] whether be TRUE, if, execution in step 405, otherwise, execution in step 406.
Step 405: abandon this message, return to and do not receive this condition of information, process ends.
Step 406: MSN_ROUND[y+MAX_MSN+1 is set]=TRUE, force to move a P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP, press the mobile P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP of P rule.Then the message of receiving is carried out integrity checking, process ends.
Step 407: all that are provided with that this takes turns are masked as FALSE, and HFN should increase 1.
Step 408: judge MSN_ROUND[y] whether be TRUE, if then execution in step 409, otherwise, execution in step 410.
Step 409: abandon this message, return to and do not receive this condition of information, finish.
Step 410: MSN_ROUND[y is set]=TRUE.Force to move a P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP, press the mobile P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP of P rule.The message of receiving is carried out integrity checking, process ends.
Step 411: whether judge P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP more than or equal to MAX_MSN, if then execution in step 412, otherwise, execution in step 423.
Step 412: whether judge P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP smaller or equal to y+MAX_MSN+1, if then execution in step 413, otherwise, execution in step 416.
Step 413: judge MSN_ROUND[y] whether be TRUE, if then execution in step 414, otherwise, execution in step 415.
Step 414: abandon this message, return to and do not receive this condition of information, process ends.
Step 415: MSN_ROUND[y+MAX_MSN+1 is set]=TRUE.Press the mobile P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP of P rule.The message of receiving is carried out integrity checking, process ends.
Step 416: whether judge P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP greater than y+MAX_MSN+1, if greater than, then execution in step 417, otherwise, execution in step 420.
Step 417: judge MSN_ROUND[y] whether be TRUE, if then execution in step 418, otherwise execution in step 419.
Step 418: abandon this message, return to and do not receive this condition of information, finish.
Step 419: MSN_ROUND[y is set]=TRUE.By (HFN+1) this message is carried out integrity checking; Press the mobile P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP of P rule.
Step 420: judge MSN_ROUND[y] whether be TRUE, if then execution in step 421, otherwise execution in step 422.
Step 421: abandon this message, return to and do not receive this condition of information, finish.
Step 422: MSN_ROUND[y is set]=TRUE.By (HFN+1) this message is carried out integrity checking; Press the mobile P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP of P rule, process ends.
Step 423: whether judge P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP smaller or equal to y, if then execution in step 424, otherwise execution in step 427.
Step 424: judge MSN_ROUND[y] whether be TRUE, if then execution in step 425, otherwise, execution in step 426.
Step 425: abandon this message, return to and do not receive this condition of information.
Step 426: MSN_ROUND[y is set]=TRUE.Press the mobile P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP of P rule.The message of receiving is carried out integrity checking, process ends.
Step 427: judge MSN_ROUND[y+MAX_MSN+1] whether be TRUE, if then execution in step 428, otherwise, execution in step 429.
Step 428: abandon this message, return to and do not receive this condition of information.
Step 429: MSN_ROUND[y+MAX_MSN+1 is set]=TRUE.By (HFN+1) this message is carried out integrity checking; Press the mobile P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP of P rule.
In the network signal environment of reality, the situation of information drop-out may also can take place, RLCRESET or RLC fatal error appear, and this moment, transmit leg adopted the method for HFN rollback.For the recipient, RLC also should notify RRC this incident, the RRC sign of resetting, MSN_ROUND[0] put TRUE, all the other put FALSE, and P_MSC_ROUND_SKIP is reset to initial position.
Below further with example explanation said method.
It is that 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 message arrives UE RRC that UTRAN RRC has successfully sent MSN, because the re-transmission of rlc layer data, cause message arrival subsequently that inverted sequence has taken place, suppose that it is 13,14,15,0,1,2,3 that transmit leg continues to send MSN, and the order that arrives is 13,15,0,2,1,14,3.
After following form shows that the recipient receives message each time, the situation of receiving flag amount.
UE RRC receives 13 back receiving flag such as tables 3.
0 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ... 29 30 31
T T T T ... T F F F F F F ... F F F
P
Table 2
UE RRC receives 15 back receiving flag such as tables 3.
0 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ... 29 30 31
T T T T ... T F T F F F F ... F F F
P
Table 3
UE RRC receives 0 back receiving flag such as table 4.
0 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ... 29 30 31
T T T T ... T F T T F F F ... F F F
P
Table 4
UE RRC receives 2 back receiving flag such as tables 5.
0 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ... 29 30 31
T T T T ... T F T T F T F ... F F F
P
Table 5
UE RRC receives 1 back receiving flag such as table 6.
0 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ... 29 30 31
T T T T ... T F T T T T F ... F F F
P
Table 6
UE RRC receives 14 back receiving flag such as tables 7.
0 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ... 29 30 31
T T T T ... T T T T T T F ... F F F
P
Table 7
UE RRC receives 3 back receiving flag such as tables 8.
0 1 2 3 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ... 29 30 31
F F F F ... F F F T T T T ... F F F
P
Table 8
Like this, the recipient just can correctly handle the message of all arrival, no matter in proper order how their arrival.
In a word, the above is preferred embodiment of the present invention only, is not to be used to limit protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (6)

1, a kind of method of guaranteeing receiving-transmitting sides integrity parameters unanimity, the sending direction recipient sends message, it is characterized in that: this method may further comprise the steps:
A. for continuous two-wheeled message the sign amount is set the recipient, in order to indicate each message that whether receives in the two-wheeled, the corresponding flag bit of each message;
B. the recipient whenever receives a message, with the pairing flag bit set of this message, in one takes turns after the whole set of the flag bit of all message correspondences, the value of Hyper Frame Number HFN is increased by 1;
If the recipient receives second message of taking turns during message not harvesting the first round, then the value of HFN is not done to add 1 and handle, utilize HFN to add that 1 value carries out integrity verification to this message.
2, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, described transmit leg is a user terminal, and the recipient is a radio network controller; Or described transmit leg is radio network controller, and the recipient is a user terminal.
3, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, contains message SN MSN field in the described message, and MSN is that every message cycle of taking turns uses; The corresponding sign position of the MSN of a message in every the wheel,
Then among the step B step of the pairing flag bit set of this message is comprised:
Whether the flag bit of first round message of judging the MSN correspondence of this message is set, if be not set, and then with position, mark position in the first round message of this MSN correspondence, otherwise, second of this message correspondence is taken turns flag bit set in the message.
4, method according to claim 3 is characterized in that, the recipient receives that second message of taking turns is to determine according to following steps during message not harvesting the first round among the step B:
Whether the flag bit of judging the pairing first round message of MSN of receiving this message is set, and, judge in the first round flag bit whether also to exist and be not set, if be set, and first round flag bit also exists and is not set, and confirms that then the recipient receives second message of taking turns during message not receiving the first round.
5, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, when transmit leg sent message failure, this method further comprised:
The rollback that transmit leg notifies the recipient to carry out HFN, the recipient calculates the HFN value that needs rollback according to the number that does not successfully send message.
6, according to any described method in the claim 1~5, it is characterized in that described message is radio resource control information.
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Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102316455A (en) * 2010-06-30 2012-01-11 中兴通讯股份有限公司 Method and device for transmitting completeness protection parameters
CN101360128B (en) * 2008-09-12 2012-11-21 华为终端有限公司 Parameter maintaining method and apparatus
CN106200663A (en) * 2016-08-16 2016-12-07 中国科学院长春光学精密机械与物理研究所 A kind of spaceborne computer controls the timing method of flywheel
CN113612679A (en) * 2021-07-29 2021-11-05 百度在线网络技术(北京)有限公司 Message verification method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium
CN113609532A (en) * 2021-08-13 2021-11-05 阳光电源股份有限公司 Data integrity checking method and device, computer equipment and storage medium

Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101360128B (en) * 2008-09-12 2012-11-21 华为终端有限公司 Parameter maintaining method and apparatus
CN102316455A (en) * 2010-06-30 2012-01-11 中兴通讯股份有限公司 Method and device for transmitting completeness protection parameters
CN106200663A (en) * 2016-08-16 2016-12-07 中国科学院长春光学精密机械与物理研究所 A kind of spaceborne computer controls the timing method of flywheel
CN106200663B (en) * 2016-08-16 2019-02-05 中国科学院长春光学精密机械与物理研究所 A kind of timing method of spaceborne computer control flywheel
CN113612679A (en) * 2021-07-29 2021-11-05 百度在线网络技术(北京)有限公司 Message verification method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium
CN113612679B (en) * 2021-07-29 2023-02-24 百度在线网络技术(北京)有限公司 Message verification method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium
CN113609532A (en) * 2021-08-13 2021-11-05 阳光电源股份有限公司 Data integrity checking method and device, computer equipment and storage medium
CN113609532B (en) * 2021-08-13 2024-04-12 阳光电源股份有限公司 Data integrity checking method and device, computer equipment and storage medium

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