CN101042681A - Digital data transparency protected safety read-write system and method - Google Patents
Digital data transparency protected safety read-write system and method Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
This invention discloses one data transparent protection safety write system and method, which comprises hardware platform, virtual monitor and at least one operation system, wherein, the platform comprises memory device composed of data preservation area to store each data protection point MBR and file align list and status list; the virtual monitor comprises data protection module to set protection points and to store the MBR and list and point status into the preservation area for change operation on the protection point; capture operation system and the program in it visit memory device I/O operation order and directing the orders into accurate position on the memory device.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to data storage safety technique field, particularly relate to a kind of data transparency protected safe read-write system and method.
Background technology
Protect for the data in the fdisk; prevent from deliberately to destroy or the mistake deletion; become a kind of common requirements; particularly under the more and more higher background of unknown new virus occurrence frequency; operating system, application software and the user data of installing in the hard disk carried out real-time guard tangible economic worth has just been arranged; therefore since nearest 10 years; hard disk protection software and hard disk protecting card from specialized application on public computer; trend is applied on the common office computer gradually, even is applied on the home computer.
The employed technical scheme of existing various hard disk data protection systems is all very similar, it is corresponding with existing computer body system structure, it is exactly real mode programs of operation after the BIOS initialization, the interface INT13 function of the access hard disk that replacement BIOS itself provides, the software of intercepting and capturing real pattern operating system DOS and operating on the DOS passes through INT13 access hard disk data, and protection hard disk data with existing is not by real time modifying; Hard disk access filtering of operation drives on the operating system of protected mode in addition, and capturing operation system and the software that operates on the operating system pass through hard drive access hard disk data, thereby protection hard disk data with existing is not by real time modifying.
But this mode has three big problems; problem one is to have no idea thoroughly to stop virus and trojan horse program directly to revise the hard disk sector data by the I/O instruction that hard disk controller itself provides; because having way, the prior art scheme do not go to intercept and capture the I/O instruction from bottom more; just can crack all Hardisk protecting systems such as a kind of hard disk protection jinx software Crdisk that spreads on the present internet; even can also fall the data dump of whole subregion; the countermeasure that the Hardisk protecting system software developer takes also can only be to use for reference the principle of anti-known virus; this known Malware is monitored; stop it in operating system, to move, but software Crdisk is easy to avoid this supervision.
Problem two is a hard disk access filtering need be installed drive on operating system; need be at the dissimilar different filtration drive of operating system exploitation; this is not a kind of transparency protected mode; it directly will limit by the function of I/O instruction access hard disk for some of operating system itself; comprise disk administrator; defragmentation function, the complicacy in this use have just stoped this class function penetration and promotion in the common computer customer group.
Problem three is that this protection software need take Master boot sector (Main Boot Record; MBR) therefore one or several among the reserve sector sector1～sector62 in can have conflict with some other software that also need to take reserve sector that moves in the operating system.
Therefore if the hard disk protection function is applied on the high computing machine of security request data, just must provide a kind of technical scheme really stifled this security breaches.
Summary of the invention
The objective of the invention is to overcome above-mentioned defective, a kind of data transparency protected safe read-write system and method is provided.It makes full use of the innovative space of bringing behind the hardware virtualization, and all that send from this one deck of virtual machine monitor (VMM) are intercepted and captured and conversion process storage I/O instruction of memory device, thereby reaches the purpose of transparency protected storage device data.
Be a kind of data transparency protected safe read-write system that realizes that the object of the invention provides; the hardware platform that comprises the virtual support computations; operate in the virtual machine monitor on the hardware platform; and operate at least one operating system on the virtual machine monitor; hardware platform comprises central processing unit, the storage device controller that memory device and memory device and hardware platform are mutual.
Described memory device comprises the data protection reserved partition, is used to preserve the MBR of each data protection point, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table;
Described virtual machine monitor comprises data protection module, be used to be provided with the protection point of memory device, and will protect a little MBR, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table are saved in described data protection reserved partition, and the protection point of memory device is carried out alter operation; Intercept and capture described operating system itself and operate in the described memory device I of routine access/O operational order on the operating system, and described instruction according to the data that are redirected to position read-write memory device correct on the memory device.
Each bar record is corresponding to each data block in the memory device in the described protection dotted state table; Each bar record in the protection dotted state table includes a false tamper-indicating position.
Described data block be in the memory device subregion bunch;
Each bar record in the described protection dotted state table also comprises a true tamper-indicating position.
Described hardware platform also comprises function key, PORT COM and mainboard, and function key, PORT COM and mainboard link to each other, the control signal to the operation of memory device read-write requests that the virtual machine monitor monitoring is transmitted from described port.
Described function key is for triggering key, preserving key, delete key, back spacer and the key that advances.
For realizing that the object of the invention also provides a kind of data transparency protected safety read-write method, comprise the following steps:
Steps A) initialization memory device marks off reserve area in memory device, set up and initialization protection dotted state table;
Step B) during the protection point of setting operation system, data protection module is with the data block that has has read and write data in the memory device, false tamper-indicating bit flag with this data block correspondence in protection dotted state table is true, and will protect a little MBR, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table are saved in the data protection reserved partition;
Step C) in the operating system, to the I/O solicit operation that storage device requests reads and writes data, this request is intercepted and captured by data protection module, and is redirected to and does not have the data block of protected point protection zone, reads and writes data in this data block zone.
Step D) alter operation is read and write to the data protection point of memory device in trigger protection dot mark position.
Described steps A) can comprise the following steps:
Steps A 1) behind computer starting, memory device is divided into Master boot sector by the computer program initialization, the main partition, and extended partition and data protection reserved partition, and utilize formatted program that each subregion is carried out initialization;
Steps A 2) after the format of data protection reserved partition is finished; on the data protection reserved partition of memory device; set up protection dotted state table, each record in the table corresponding to main partition and each bunch of extended partition bunch number, false tamper-indicating position and true tamper-indicating position set up in each record.
Described step B) can comprise the following steps:
Step B1) when a protection point is set, data protection module stores the file allocation table of memory device into the data protection reserved partition in the virtual machine monitor, the false tamper-indicating bit flag of each bunch correspondence that has has read and write data is 1 in will protecting a little then, and expression is false to be damaged; With the true tamper-indicating bit flag of this bunch correspondence is 0, represents that this bunch do not have physical damage;
Step B2) protection point do not write new data bunch, false tamper-indicating bit flag is 0, expression can write data; If memory device bunch does not have physical damage, then true tamper-indicating bit flag is 0, and expression can write data, otherwise is masked as 1, and expression really damages, and can not write data.
Described step C) can comprise the following steps:
Step C1) the I/O operational order of the data protection module capturing operation system accessing storage device in the virtual machine monitor;
Step C2) data protection module is redirected to the tram to these instructions and reads and writes data;
Described step C2) comprises the following steps:
Step C21) virtual machine monitor is handed to data protection module with this request, the information of protection dotted state table in the data protection module fetch protection point reserved partition;
Step C22) judgement those bunches in memory device are not protected protection a little, can read and write data;
Step C23) with the data protection module that bunch number returns to of read-write data; submit to memory device by storage controller and finish the I/O solicit operation that reads and writes data; data are write in available bunch, i.e. the sign of false tamper-indicating position and true tamper-indicating position all is in 0 pairing bunch in the write protection dotted state table.
Described step D) can comprise the following steps:
Step D1) trigger protection dot mark position, the data protection point of preservation or deletion memory device;
Step D2) by utilizing the function key of data protection, read-write is switched to the data protection point of memory device in trigger protection dot mark position.
Described step D1) comprises the following steps:
Step D11) when trigger protection point is preserved zone bit, data protection module is with the MBR of memory device, the file allocation table of data partition stores in the data protection reserve area, and creates a new protection point, should protect the dotted state table to be kept in the data protection reserve area;
Step D12) when trigger protection point deletion zone bit; data protection module is with the protection point deletion in this operating system; and will protect the corresponding MBR that a little preserves; the file allocation list deletion of data partition; and will protect the false tamper-indicating position of dotted state table correspondence all to be masked as 0, expression can write data.
Described step D2) comprises the following steps:
Step D21) after the data protection module of virtual machine monitor receives switching command, the MBR of fetch protection point, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table, and switch to new protection point;
Step D22) data protection module of virtual machine monitor is according to the protection point MBR that reads, and the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table rebuild new memory device partition table and file allocation table;
Step D23) data protection module of virtual machine monitor is closed the current operating system of moving;
Step D24) virtual machine monitor uses new MBR, and the file allocation table of data partition is replaced original MBR, the file allocation table of data partition, restarting operating systems;
Step D25) data protection module of virtual machine monitor will protect dotted state table and the adjacent protection dotted state epiphase that is kept in the data protection reserve area to compare; with this protection point read and write data bunch; this bunch number corresponding false tamper-indicating bit flag changes into 0 by 1, i.e. the data that this protection point been has has been read and write bunch can continue to read and write data.
Described step D25) comprises the following steps:
Step D251) judge that whether this protection dotted state table is protection point the earliest, the protection point that does not have the last time to preserve is promptly arranged, if not, then forward step D254 to); Otherwise continue;
Step D252) judges that whether this protection dotted state table is for protecting at last a little, the protection point that does not have one time of back to preserve is promptly arranged, if do not have, the false tamper-indicating that then will protect the dotted state table record is that the false tamper-indicating of 1 record all is masked as 0, expression has only a protection point, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data; Otherwise continue;
Step D253) will protect the false tamper-indicating of dotted state table record is 1 record, the false tamper-indicating of the protection dotted state table record of preserving except that one time of back be 1, other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0, expression can except that next protection point read-write bunch, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data;
Step D254) judges that whether this protection dotted state table is for protecting at last a little, the protection point that does not have one time of back to preserve is promptly arranged, if, the false tamper-indicating that then will protect the dotted state table record is 1 record, the false tamper-indicating of the protection dotted state table record of preserving except that last time is 1 the record, and other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0, expression can remove that last protection point reads and writes bunch, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data; Otherwise continue;
Step D255: the false tamper-indicating that will protect the dotted state table record is 1 record; the false tamper-indicating of preserving except that last time and one time of back of protection dotted state table is 1 the record; other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0; expression can except that last protection point and back one protection point read-write bunch; this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data.
Step D256) when the trigger protection point; from the end that reads and writes data of this protection point; when withdrawing from operating system; set up new protection point; preserve new MBR, the file allocation table of data partition, with former protection point read and write bunch and this operation read and write bunch; false tamper-indicating that will this bunch at the protection dotted state table of correspondence is masked as 1 again, preserves new protection dotted state table.
Described switching is that the state from normal operation switches to a protection point; Perhaps switch to the protection point of last time from a protection point; Perhaps switch to the protection point of one time of back from a protection point.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: when the user possesses the memory storage of this data transparency protected function in use, just can not worry the virus damage operating system environment, thereby the memory device that causes can't use normally; Do not worry oneself deleting the significant data file by mistake yet, thereby cause the loss of key message assets.Data transparency protected safe read-write system and method for the present invention travels through the characteristic of switching back and forth owing to possessed between difference protection dotted state, therefore with existing protection method of memory device, possesses higher availability and security.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the data transparency protected safe read-write system architecture of a present invention synoptic diagram;
Fig. 2 is memory device subregion synoptic diagram in the data transparency protected safe read-write of the present invention system;
Fig. 3 is protection dotted state table record synoptic diagram in the data transparency protected safe read-write of the present invention system;
Fig. 4 is operating system read-write memory device I/O solicit operation process flow diagram;
Fig. 5 is the data transparency protected safety read-write method handoff procedure of a present invention process flow diagram.
Embodiment
Further describe the transparency protected system and method for storage device data of the present invention below in conjunction with accompanying drawing 1～5.
The present invention particularly is described with the transparency protected system and method for computer data, but the present invention is suitable for equally any device except above-mentioned memory device, as the situation of the memory device of mobile communications device.
Core main points of the present invention are to move virtual machine monitor (Virtual MachineMonitor on hardware platform earlier; VMM); resident service data protection module 1 in virtual machine monitor; operating system is on virtual machine monitor (VMM); data protection module 1 is under the support of CPU; capturing operation system itself and all I/O instructions that operate in the routine access computer memory device on the operating system; and these instructions are redirected to that position correct on the memory device is gone to read or the data block of write storage device in; particularly the storage device data piece of original protection is not made real modification writing data blocks the time; but amended data are write in the another one free space, thereby reach the purpose of protecting storage device data.It owing to any software module need be installed on operating system, also no matter move what operating systems simultaneously, can accomplish that the data block read-write is redirected in whole process, be a kind of transparent operation fully to the user therefore.
As shown in Figure 1; the transparency protected system of the storage device data of the embodiment of the invention is on computer hardware platforms; in existing disclosed virtual machine architecture; realization is virtual for hardware resource; thereby on a computing machine, can move a plurality of operating systems concurrently, because these operating systems are not disturbed each other.
In this virtual machine architecture, by on the hardware view of reality, increasing by one group of instruction, virtual computational resource, storage resources and I/O resource of using for virtual machine monitor (VMM) specially, make operating system just may operate on the virtual machine architecture without any need for revising, this just provides a very wide innovation and application scope.Wherein, Chang Yong operating system of user can comprise Windows98, Windows2000, WindowsXP, Linux, Unix, Mac etc.
In the computer hardware platforms of the embodiment of the invention, comprise port with the computing machine communication, as COM port, USB port, and memory device, as hard disk, and other equipment carry out mutual storage device controller in memory device and the computer hardware platforms, as hard disk controller, be used for I/O operation requests, finish the operation of memory device I/O according to computer operating system, data are read or write storage device in.
In the computer hardware platforms of the embodiment of the invention, also comprise central processing unit (CPU), its virtual support computations when operating system is sent memory device I/O operation requests, is intercepted and captured this operation requests.
As shown in Figure 2, memory device comprises Master boot sector, main partition and extended partition.In the memory device of the embodiment of the invention, also comprise data protection reserved partition 2, be used for memory protection dotted state table and each protection point corresponding M BR, the file allocation table data of data partition.
The present invention is on the hardware platform of supporting VMM, in described virtual machine monitor, comprised data protection module 1, be used to be provided with the protection point of memory device, and will protect a little MBR, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table are saved in described data protection reserved partition 2, and the protection point of memory device is carried out alter operation; Intercept and capture described operating system itself and operate in the described memory device I of routine access/O operational order on the operating system, and described instruction according to the data that are redirected to position read-write memory device correct on the memory device.
Because operating system is based on file system mode accessing storage device; and file system is bunch being that base unit manages data; therefore each bunch comprises the sector of some, can so just can significantly reduce taking of space to bunch unifying protection.
As shown in Figure 3, the transparency protected system of storage device data of the present invention is provided with memory device protection dotted state table, and each bar record is corresponding to each bunch in the memory device file allocation table in the table.
Each bar record in the protection dotted state table includes a false tamper-indicating position and a true tamper-indicating position.
When false tamper-indicating position is 0, represent that this record can write new data for pairing bunch; If false tamper-indicating position is 1 o'clock, represent that this record has write data for pairing bunch, and be protected, can not write new data.
Surely the tamper-indicating position is 0 o'clock, represents that this record does not have physical damage for pairing bunch, can write new data; As if really the tamper-indicating position is 1 o'clock, represent this bunch physical damage, can not write data.
When a protection point is set, virtual machine monitor (VMM) stores the file allocation table of memory device into the memory device reserve area, each false tamper-indicating position that has write bunch correspondence of data is flagged as 1 in will protecting a little then, and expression is false to be damaged, and can not write new data in this bunch; Should true tamper-indicating bit flag be 0, represent that this bunch do not have physical damage.
And protection point do not write new data bunch, false tamper-indicating bit flag is 0, expression can write data; If memory device bunch does not have physical damage, then true tamper-indicating bit flag is 0, and expression can write data, otherwise is masked as 1, and expression really damages, and can not write data.
Virtual machine monitor operates on the hardware platform, and a plurality of operating systems are moved thereon.When operating system is sent the I/O operation requests that reads and writes data to memory device, at first intercepted and captured by CPU, CPU hands to data protection module 1 in the virtual machine monitor (VMM) to this I/O operation requests.
On the platform of virtual support computations, processor provides two kinds of instruction set, a kind of instruction set offers VMM specially and uses, another kind of instruction set offers operating system specially and uses, the processor of different frameworks is for this instruction set and some associated term address differences, but essential implication is identical, processor with Intel is that example illustrates the whole operation process below, the instruction set that virtual machine monitor (VMM) uses is called VMX root operation, the instruction set that operating system is used is called VMX non-root operation, the instruction that switches to the VMM state from operation system state is called VM-Exit, the instruction that switches to operation system state from the VMM state is called VM-Entry, switch in order to finish this state, need a data structure VMCS (Virtual Machine ControlStructure), have the VMCS pointer of one 64 bit length to control visit for VMCS in the processor, VMM uses VMREAD, VMWRITE and VMCLEAR.When VMM prepares to start an operating system, just carry out the VMXON instruction, in this instruction, can comprise VMXON Pointer parameter, clearly indicate the space that begins to distribute for this virtual machine a 4K size in which address of internal memory, processor can be created a VMCS structure for this virtual machine in this memory headroom then.The structure of VMCS is as shown in table 1:
Table 1 CMCS structural table
| Side-play amount | Content |
| 0 | The version identifier of VMCS |
| 4 | VMX withdraws from indication |
| 8 | The VMCS data |
Wherein the VMCS data are made up of 6 groups of data:
1, Guest-State area (virtual machine state district) when carrying out VM Exit, is kept at the virtual machine state district to processor state, otherwise when carrying out VM Entry, just from virtual machine state district restore processor state.
2, Host-state area (Host Status district) is when carrying out VM Exit, from Host Status district restore processor state.
3, VM-execution control fields (virtual machine execution control zone), this regional parameter has been controlled the behavior of processor under VMX non-root operation pattern, comprising the partly cause that triggers VM-Exit.
4, VM-Exit control fields, this regional parameter has been controlled the behavior of VM-Exit.
5, VM-Entry control fields, this regional parameter has been controlled the behavior of VM-Entry.
6, VM-Exit information fields, the VM-Exit that deposit in this zone triggers information such as reason.
Therefore when operating system is sent a disk operating I/O instruction; processor will be carried out VM-Exit instruction of parameter judgement needs triggering of control zone according to virtual machine; and buffer status from Host Status district restore processor; continue to carry out from state; be that VMM begins to obtain control; and the information of reading the I/O request instruction from VM-Exit information fields; pass to data protection module 1; after carrying out conversion process by this module, submit to hard disk controller again and carry out.
Data protection module 1 according to the protection dot information in the protection dotted state table to the processing that performs an analysis of this I/O operation requests that reads and writes data; judgement those bunches in memory device are not protected protection a little; can read and write data; and read-write data bunch number are returned to data protection module 1; submit to memory device by storage controller and finish the I/O solicit operation that reads and writes data, and then return results is given operating system successively.
The transparency protected system of storage device data of the present invention also comprises five dedicated button:
One is to trigger key, and it is used to trigger a protection point, presses the triggering key the user, when triggering zone bit, and the protection dotted state table of data protection module 1 reading and saving in the data protection reserve area, and will protect some tabulation demonstration, offer the user and select.
One is to preserve key; its data protection module 1 that is used for order virtual machine monitor (VMM) is created a new protection point for current storage device status; the total size of the file allocation table of its calculating MBR and each subregion and the remaining space size of data protection reserved partition 2; judge whether remaining space is enough; copy MBR is to data protection reserved partition 2; the file allocation table that copies each subregion is to data protection reserved partition 2; revise hard disk bunch state table, the false damage that bunch is labeled as that newly takies.
One is delete key; its data protection module 1 that is used for order virtual machine monitor (VMM) is current protection point deletion; and will protect the memory device, stores data area of point protection to discharge; operating system can be read and write data in this zone; it is the file allocation table of all protection points relatively; whether what the protection point that judgement will be deleted took bunch is taken by other protection points; if not occupied words; so just revise hard disk bunch state table; this bunch is labeled as intact; deletion this protection point MBR and each file allocation table occupation space from data protection reserved partition 2; then up-to-date protection point corresponding MBR information and each file allocation table information are returned to the hard disk correspondence position, call VMXRESUME instruction reboot operation system then.
One is back spacer, it is used for the data protection module 1 shutoff operation system of order virtual machine monitor (VMM), current storage device status is switched to previous protection point, and this protection dotted state under restarting operating systems, it returns to the hard disk correspondence position to the protection point before the current protection point corresponding MBR information and each file allocation table information from the protection system reserved area, call VMXRESUME instruction reboot operation system then;
One is the key that advances; it is used for the data protection module 1 shutoff operation system of order virtual machine monitor (VMM); storage device status is switched to a back protection point; and this protection dotted state under restarting operating systems; it returns to the hard disk correspondence position to the protection point after the current protection point corresponding MBR information and each file allocation table information from the protection system reserved area, call VMXRESUME instruction reboot operation system then.
For desk-top computer and notebook, these five dedicated button can increase a zone this function key module is installed on keyboard, and the key of these five keys can be selected the reservation key of keyboard.
Preferably, these five function keys are installed in the front panel or the top of main frame, link to each other the control signal that the special monitoring of virtual machine monitor (VMM) is transmitted from this port to memory device read-write I/O solicit operation with the mainboard of computer hardware platforms by COM port or USB port.When operating system in operation time; that processor is carried out is VMX non-root operation; when function key is pressed; this Input instruction equally still is operated system and at first receives; processor triggers the VM-Exit instruction then; restore processor state from VMCS; take over control by VMM; VMM obtains the details of this Input instruction from VMCS then; judge this instruction and whether come from appointed equipment; if words then further judge the key of this equipment; different keys corresponds to different processing operations, for example can be that key E2 64 corresponds to establishment protection point operation, and key E259 corresponds to deletion protection point operation; key E2 70 corresponds to forward operation, and key E0 33 corresponds to back operation.
When memory device is used for handheld mobile device, during as mobile phone terminal, these five function keys can design the both sides at handheld mobile device, do not need to take the area of handheld mobile device itself like this.
Further describe the transparency protected method of storage device data of the present invention below:
Step 1: the initialization memory device, in memory device, mark off reserve area, set up and initialization protection dotted state table.
Before using memory device to read and write data, carry out initialization to memory device, as utilize the FDISK program to carry out subregion; And utilize the FORMAT program that subregion is formatd.
Step 11: in the embodiment of the invention, behind computer starting, memory device is divided into Master boot sector by the computer program initialization, the main partition, and extended partition and data protection reserved partition 2, and utilize formatted program that each subregion is carried out initialization.
Master boot sector is preserved file allocation table (FAT), and main partition and extended partition are preserved the data of run program file on operating system file and the operating system; Data protection reserved partition 2 preserve each bunch in main partitions and the extended partition bunch number and the protection dotted state table of read-write state, and the file allocation table of each operating system protection point.
Step 12: after 2 formats of data protection reserved partition are finished; on the data protection reserved partition 2 of memory device; set up protection dotted state table, each record in the table corresponding to main partition and each bunch of extended partition bunch number, false tamper-indicating position and true tamper-indicating position set up in each record.
After data protection reserved partition 2 format, set up protection dotted state table, in protection dotted state table,,, set up a record, field 1 expression bunch number in the record corresponding to each bunch in the subregion according to the size of main partition and extended partition; Field 2 is a bit (bit), represent false tamper-indicating position, in the protection point, data have been write at this bunch, in the operation after the protection point, in the time of can not writing new data again in this bunch, false tamper-indicating position is 1, does not write any data in this bunch, in the time of can writing new data in this bunch, false tamper-indicating position is 0; Field 3 is true tamper-indicating position, if this bunch real physical is damaged, can not write data, and then true tamper-indicating position is 1, if this bunch do not have physical damage, then true tamper-indicating position is 0.
When false tamper-indicating position is 0, represent that this record can write new data for pairing bunch; If false tamper-indicating position is 1 o'clock, represent that this record has write data for pairing bunch, and be protected, can not write new data.
Surely the tamper-indicating position is 0 o'clock, represents that this record does not have physical damage for pairing bunch, can write new data; As if really the tamper-indicating position is 1 o'clock, represent this bunch physical damage, can not write data.
Step 2: the user presses protection point hold function key; trigger protection point is preserved zone bit; during the protection point of setting operation system; data protection module 1 with read and write data in the memory device bunch; false tamper-indicating bit flag with this bunch correspondence in protection dotted state table is 1; and will protect a little MBR, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table are saved in data protection reserved partition 2.
Step 21: when a protection point is set, data protection module 1 is with the MBR of memory device in the virtual machine monitor (VMM), the file allocation table of data partition stores data protection reserved partition 2 into, the false tamper-indicating bit flag of each bunch correspondence that has has read and write data is 1 in will protecting a little then, expression is false to be damaged, and can not write new data in this bunch; Should true tamper-indicating bit flag be 0, represent that this bunch do not have physical damage.
Step 22: protection point do not write new data bunch, false tamper-indicating bit flag is 0, expression can write data; If memory device bunch does not have physical damage, then true tamper-indicating bit flag is 0, and expression can write data, otherwise is masked as 1, and expression really damages, and can not write data.
Operating system can be set up a plurality of protection points, and each protection point is preserved in chronological order, and a plurality of operating systems can be set up the protection point of oneself respectively.
Preferably, data protection module 1 can be set, and can preserve 10 protection dotted state at the most.If surpass 10 protection points, the protection point deletion that then will more early preserve.
Step 3: in the operating system, to the I/O solicit operation that storage device requests reads and writes data, this request is intercepted and captured by data protection module 1, and is redirected to and does not have the data block of protected point protection zone, reads and writes data in this data block zone.
Operating system is on virtual machine monitor (VMM); when I/O operation that operating system reads and writes data to storage device requests; the I/O operational order of data protection module 1 capturing operation system accessing storage device under the support of CPU; and be redirected to and do not have the data block of protected point protection zone; judgement those bunches in memory device are not protected protection a little; can read and write data; and read-write data bunch number are returned to data protection module 1; submit to memory device by storage controller and finish the I/O solicit operation that reads and writes data; data are write in available bunch; be that the sign of false tamper-indicating position and true tamper-indicating position all is in 0 pairing bunch in the write protection dotted state table; and then return results is given operating system successively, thereby reaches the purpose of protection storage device data.
As shown in Figure 4, it comprises the following steps:
Step 31: the I/O operational order of the data protection module 1 capturing operation system accessing storage device in the virtual machine monitor (VMM);
When operating system is sent the I/O request of accessing storage device, at first intercepted and captured by the data protection module in the virtual machine monitor (VMM) 1.
Step 32: data protection module 1 is redirected to the tram to these instructions and reads and writes data;
Step 321: virtual machine monitor (VMM) is handed to data protection module 1 with this request, the information of protection dotted state table in the data protection module 1 fetch protection point reserved partition;
Step 322: judgement those bunches in memory device are not protected protection a little, can read and write data;
Step 323: read-write data bunch number are returned to data protection module 1; submit to memory device by storage controller and finish the I/O solicit operation that reads and writes data; data are write in available bunch, i.e. the sign of false tamper-indicating position and true tamper-indicating position all is in 0 pairing bunch in the write protection dotted state table.
When the I/O that reads and writes data to storage device requests asks; data protection module 1 is in protection dotted state table; search false tamper-indicating position and be 0 bunch bunch number, and will bunch number return to the I/O solicit operation, storage device controller is according to bunch number reading and writing data in corresponding bunch of returning.
Step 4: trigger protection dot mark position, the data protection point of memory device is read and write alter operation.
Step 41: by utilizing the function key of data protection, trigger protection dot mark position, the data protection point of preservation or deletion memory device;
Step 411: the protection point of pressing computing machine as the user is preserved key; when trigger protection point is preserved zone bit; data protection module 1 is with the MBR of memory device; the file allocation table of data partition stores in the data protection reserve area; and create a new protection point, should protect the dotted state table to be kept in the data protection reserve area.
Step 412: the protection point deletion key of pressing computing machine as the user; during trigger protection point deletion zone bit; data protection module 1 is with the protection point deletion in this operating system; and will protect the respective file allocation table deletion of a little preserving; and will protect the false tamper-indicating position of dotted state table correspondence all to be masked as 0, expression can write data.
Data protection module 1 is with the protection point deletion in this operating system; and accordingly; the MBR of the correspondence of deletion in the data protection storage area; the file allocation table of data partition; and be 1 position according to false tamper-indicating position in the corresponding protection dotted state table of protection point, in current protection dotted state table, should be rewritten as 0 in vacation tamper-indicating position.
Step 42: by utilizing the function key of data protection, read-write is switched to the data protection point of memory device in trigger protection dot mark position.
As shown in Figure 5, the process of switching comprises the following steps:
Step 421: after the data protection module 1 of virtual machine monitor (VMM) receives switching command, the MBR of fetch protection point, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table, and switch to new protection point;
Step 422: the data protection module 1 of virtual machine monitor (VMM) is according to the MBR that reads, and the protection dot file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table rebuild new memory device partition table and file allocation table;
Step 423: the data protection module 1 of virtual machine monitor (VMM) is closed the current operating system of moving;
Step 424: virtual machine monitor (VMM) uses new file allocation table to replace original MBR, the file allocation table of data partition, restarting operating systems;
Step 425: the data protection module 1 of virtual machine monitor (VMM) will protect dotted state table and the adjacent protection dotted state epiphase that is kept in the data protection reserve area to compare; the aggregate of data number corresponding false tamper-indicating bit flag of this protection point read-write is changed into 0 by 1, i.e. the data that this protection point been has has been read and write bunch can continue to read and write data.
Step 4251: judge that whether this protection dotted state table is protection point the earliest, the protection point that does not have the last time to preserve is promptly arranged, if not, then forward step 4254 to; Otherwise continue;
Step 4252: judge that whether this protection dotted state table is for protecting at last a little, the protection point that does not have one time of back to preserve is promptly arranged, if do not have, the false tamper-indicating that then will protect the dotted state table record is that the false tamper-indicating of 1 record all is masked as 0, expression has only a protection point, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data; Otherwise continue;
Step 4253: the false tamper-indicating that will protect the dotted state table record is 1 record, the false tamper-indicating of the protection dotted state table record of preserving except that one time of back be 1, other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0, expression can except that next protection point read-write bunch, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data;
Step 4254: judge that whether this protection dotted state table is for protecting at last a little, the protection point that does not have one time of back to preserve is promptly arranged, if, the false tamper-indicating that then will protect the dotted state table record is 1 record, the false tamper-indicating of the protection dotted state table record of preserving except that last time is 1 the record, and other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0, expression can remove that last protection point reads and writes bunch, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data; Otherwise continue;
Step 4255: the false tamper-indicating that will protect the dotted state table record is 1 record, the false tamper-indicating of preserving except that last time and one time of back of protection dotted state table is 1 the record, other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0, expression can except that last protection point and back one protection point read-write bunch, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data;
Step 4256: when the trigger protection point; from the end that reads and writes data of this protection point; when withdrawing from operating system; set up new protection point; preserve the new MBR and the file allocation table of data partition; with former protection point read and write bunch and this operation read and write bunch, false tamper-indicating that will this bunch at the protection dotted state table of correspondence is masked as 1 again, preserves new protection dotted state table.
The switching read-write of protection point, can be by triggering key, switch to a protection point from the state of normal operation, it presses the triggering key the user, when triggering zone bit, the protection dotted state table of data protection module 1 reading and saving in the data protection reserve area, and will protect some tabulation demonstration, offer the user and select;
It also can be the protection point that switches to the last time from a protection point, it presses back spacer the user, when triggering retreats zone bit, data protection module 1 shutoff operation system in the virtual machine monitor (VMM), current storage device status is switched to the protection point that previous time preserves, and under this protection dotted state restarting operating systems;
The protection point of the last time that data protection module 1 is read and protection dotted state table judge at first whether this protection point exists, if not then end; If should protection point exist, the state table of fetch protection point and protection point then, and protect restarting operating systems under dotted state at this.
It also can be the protection point that switches to one time of back from a protection point; it presses the key that advances the user; when zone bit is advanced in triggering; data protection module 1 shutoff operation system in the virtual machine monitor (VMM); storage device status is switched to the protection point of a back time, and under this protection dotted state restarting operating systems.
The protection point of the back time that data protection module 1 is read and protection dotted state table judge at first whether this protection point exists, if not then end; If should protection point exist, the state table of fetch protection point and protection point then, and protect restarting operating systems under dotted state at this.
The user uses when possessing the computing machine of this data transparency protected function; just not special worry virus damage operating system environment; cause and normally to use a computer; also need not worry especially oneself to delete the significant data file by mistake; cause the loss of key message assets; because the user can create abundant protection dotted state as required; then when meeting this class problem; switch to the protection dotted state of oneself wanting by the back spacer on the computing machine and the key that advances; under this state, kill virus then; the security breaches patch is installed; perhaps certain document copying to exterior storage medium; and other various operations, at last new state is saved as a new protection point.Travel through the characteristic of switching back and forth owing to possessed between difference protection dotted state, therefore this new storage system is compared existing computing machine, possesses higher availability and security.
Present embodiment is in order to understand the detailed description that the present invention carries out better; it is not the qualification of scope that the present invention is protected; therefore, those of ordinary skills do not break away from purport of the present invention without creative work to this bright change of making in protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (18)
1. data transparency protected safe read-write system; the hardware platform that comprises the virtual support computations; operate in the virtual machine monitor on the hardware platform; and operate at least one operating system on the virtual machine monitor; hardware platform comprises central processing unit; the storage device controller that memory device and memory device and hardware platform are mutual is characterized in that:
Described memory device comprises data protection reserved partition (2), is used to preserve the MBR of each data protection point, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table;
Described virtual machine monitor comprises data protection module (1), be used to be provided with the protection point of memory device, and will protect a little MBR, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table are saved in described data protection reserved partition (2), and the protection point of memory device is carried out alter operation; Intercept and capture described operating system itself and operate in the described memory device I of routine access/O operational order on the operating system, and described instruction according to the data that are redirected to position read-write memory device correct on the memory device.
2. data transparency protected safe read-write system according to claim 1 is characterized in that, each bar record is corresponding to each data block in the memory device in the described protection dotted state table; Each bar record in the protection dotted state table includes a false tamper-indicating position.
3. data transparency protected safe read-write according to claim 2 system is characterized in that, described data block be in the memory device subregion bunch.
4. according to claim 2 or 3 described data transparency protected safe read-write systems, it is characterized in that each the bar record in the described protection dotted state table also comprises a true tamper-indicating position.
5. data transparency protected safe read-write system according to claim 1; it is characterized in that; described hardware platform also comprises function key; PORT COM and mainboard; function key, PORT COM and mainboard link to each other, the control signal to the operation of memory device read-write requests that the virtual machine monitor monitoring is transmitted from described port.
6. data transparency protected safe read-write system according to claim 5 is characterized in that, described function key is for triggering key, preserving key, delete key, back spacer and the key that advances.
7. a data transparency protected safety read-write method is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
Steps A) initialization memory device marks off reserve area in memory device, set up and initialization protection dotted state table;
Step B) during the protection point of setting operation system, data protection module (1) is with the data block that has has read and write data in the memory device, false tamper-indicating bit flag with this data block correspondence in protection dotted state table is true, and will protect a little MBR, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table are saved in data protection reserved partition (2);
Step C) in the operating system, to the I/O solicit operation that storage device requests reads and writes data, this request is intercepted and captured by data protection module (1), and is redirected to and does not have the data block of protected point protection zone, reads and writes data in this data block zone.
8. data transparency protected safety read-write method according to claim 7 is characterized in that, also comprises the following steps:
Step D) alter operation is read and write to the data protection point of memory device in trigger protection dot mark position.
9. according to claim 7 or 8 described data transparency protected safety read-write methods, it is characterized in that described steps A) comprise the following steps:
Steps A 1) behind computer starting, memory device is divided into Master boot sector by the computer program initialization, the main partition, and extended partition and data protection reserved partition (2), and utilize formatted program that each subregion is carried out initialization;
Steps A 2) after data protection reserved partition (2) format is finished; on the data protection reserved partition (2) of memory device; set up protection dotted state table; in the table each the record corresponding to main partition and each bunch of extended partition bunch number, false tamper-indicating position and true tamper-indicating position set up in each record.
10. according to claim 7 or 8 described data transparency protected safety read-write methods, it is characterized in that described step B) comprise the following steps:
Step B1) when a protection point is set, data protection module in the virtual machine monitor (1) stores the file allocation table of memory device into data protection reserved partition (2), the false tamper-indicating bit flag of each bunch correspondence that has has read and write data is 1 in will protecting a little then, and expression is false to be damaged; With the true tamper-indicating bit flag of this bunch correspondence is 0, represents that this bunch do not have physical damage;
Step B2) protection point do not write new data bunch, false tamper-indicating bit flag is 0, expression can write data; If memory device bunch does not have physical damage, then true tamper-indicating bit flag is 0, and expression can write data, otherwise is masked as 1, and expression really damages, and can not write data.
11., it is characterized in that described step C according to claim 7 or 8 described data transparency protected safety read-write methods) comprise the following steps:
Step C1) the I/O operational order of the data protection module in the virtual machine monitor (1) capturing operation system accessing storage device;
Step C2) data protection module (1) is redirected to the tram to these instructions and reads and writes data.
12. data transparency protected safety read-write method according to claim 11 is characterized in that, described step C2) comprise the following steps:
Step C21) virtual machine monitor is handed to data protection module (1) with this request, the information of protection dotted state table in data protection module (1) the fetch protection point reserved partition;
Step C22) judgement those bunches in memory device are not protected protection a little, can read and write data;
Step C23) read-write data bunch number are returned to data protection module (1); submit to memory device by storage controller and finish the I/O solicit operation that reads and writes data; data are write in available bunch, i.e. the sign of false tamper-indicating position and true tamper-indicating position all is in 0 pairing bunch in the write protection dotted state table.
13. data transparency protected safety read-write method according to claim 8 is characterized in that, described step D) comprise the following steps:
Step D1) trigger protection dot mark position, the data protection point of preservation or deletion memory device;
Step D2) by utilizing the function key of data protection, read-write is switched to the data protection point of memory device in trigger protection dot mark position.
14. data transparency protected safety read-write method according to claim 13 is characterized in that, described step D1) comprise the following steps:
Step D11) when trigger protection point is preserved zone bit, data protection module (1) is with the MBR of memory device, the file allocation table of data partition stores in the data protection reserve area, and creates a new protection point, should protect the dotted state table to be kept in the data protection reserve area;
Step D12) when trigger protection point deletion zone bit; data protection module (1) is with the protection point deletion in this operating system; and will protect the corresponding MBR that a little preserves; the file allocation list deletion of data partition; and will protect the false tamper-indicating position of dotted state table correspondence all to be masked as 0, expression can write data.
15. data transparency protected safety read-write method according to claim 13 is characterized in that, described step D2) comprise the following steps:
Step D21) after the data protection module (1) of virtual machine monitor receives switching command, the MBR of fetch protection point, the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table, and switch to new protection point;
Step D22) data protection module of virtual machine monitor (1) is according to the protection point MBR that reads, and the file allocation table of data partition and protection dotted state table rebuild new memory device partition table and file allocation table;
Step D23) data protection module of virtual machine monitor (1) is closed the current operating system of moving;
Step D24) virtual machine monitor uses new MBR, and the file allocation table of data partition is replaced original MBR, the file allocation table of data partition, restarting operating systems;
Step D25) data protection module of virtual machine monitor (1) will protect dotted state table and the adjacent protection dotted state epiphase that is kept in the data protection reserve area to compare; with this protection point read and write data bunch; this bunch number corresponding false tamper-indicating bit flag changes into 0 by 1, i.e. the data that this protection point been has has been read and write bunch can continue to read and write data.
16. data transparency protected safety read-write method according to claim 15 is characterized in that, described step D25) comprise the following steps:
Step D251) judge that whether this protection dotted state table is protection point the earliest, the protection point that does not have the last time to preserve is promptly arranged, if not, then forward step D254 to); Otherwise continue;
Step D252) judges that whether this protection dotted state table is for protecting at last a little, the protection point that does not have one time of back to preserve is promptly arranged, if do not have, the false tamper-indicating that then will protect the dotted state table record is that the false tamper-indicating of 1 record all is masked as 0, expression has only a protection point, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data; Otherwise continue;
Step D253) will protect the false tamper-indicating of dotted state table record is 1 record, the false tamper-indicating of the protection dotted state table record of preserving except that one time of back be 1, other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0, expression can except that next protection point read-write bunch, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data;
Step D254) judges that whether this protection dotted state table is for protecting at last a little, the protection point that does not have one time of back to preserve is promptly arranged, if, the false tamper-indicating that then will protect the dotted state table record is 1 record, the false tamper-indicating of the protection dotted state table record of preserving except that last time is 1 the record, and other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0, expression can remove that last protection point reads and writes bunch, this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data; Otherwise continue;
Step D255: the false tamper-indicating that will protect the dotted state table record is 1 record; the false tamper-indicating of preserving except that last time and one time of back of protection dotted state table is 1 the record; other false tamper-indicating is that 1 record all is masked as 0; expression can except that last protection point and back one protection point read-write bunch; this protection point read and write data bunch, can continue to read and write data.
17. data transparency protected safety read-write method according to claim 16 is characterized in that, described step D25) also comprise the following steps:
Step D256) when the trigger protection point; from the end that reads and writes data of this protection point; when withdrawing from operating system; set up new protection point; preserve new MBR, the file allocation table of data partition, with former protection point read and write bunch and this operation read and write bunch; false tamper-indicating that will this bunch at the protection dotted state table of correspondence is masked as 1 again, preserves new protection dotted state table.
18. data transparency protected safety read-write method according to claim 13 is characterized in that, described switching is that the state from normal operation switches to a protection point; Perhaps switch to the protection point of last time from a protection point; Perhaps switch to the protection point of one time of back from a protection point.
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