CN100542089C - The method of strengthening universal authority identifying structure used for non-IMS terminal - Google Patents
The method of strengthening universal authority identifying structure used for non-IMS terminal Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides the method for a kind of non-IMS terminal by IMS terminal agent application universal authority identifying structure.This method comprises the steps: step a, non-IMS terminal sends not application request message with the GBA parameter to NAF, and NAF responds this application request message, indicate non-IMS terminal elder generation and guide service functional entity to carry out authentication process, non-IMS terminal sends the GBA request message to IMS terminal agency.Step b, IMS terminal agency is after receiving the GBA solicited message of non-IMS terminal, inquire about a relation mapping table, obtain the device identification of this non-IMS terminal, this relation mapping table is stored the corresponding relation of the device identification of the identification information of non-IMS terminal and non-IMS terminal, and this GBA solicited message comprises the identification information of non-IMS terminal and the sign of the NAF that will visit.Step c, IMS terminal agency generates the derivative key relevant with described device identification for non-IMS terminal, steps d, the guide service functional entity is a NAF generation derivative key, it is identical with the derivative key that generates among the step c.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the 3G (Third Generation) Moblie field, particularly a kind of method of expanding universal authentication architecture.
Background technology
Defined a kind of general authentication framework (GBA) among the 3GPP (3-G (Generation Three mobile communication system)).As shown in Figure 1, general authentication framework is made up of IMS (IP multimedia service subsystem) user (UE), guide service functional entity (BSF), the user attaching webserver (HSS), subscriber location function entity (SLF) and Network application entity (NAF) usually.UE is connected by the Ub interface with BSF, and BSF is connected by the Zn interface with NAF, and UE is connected by the Ua interface with NAF, and SLF is connected by the Dz interface with BSF, and BSF is connected by the Zh interface with HSS.BSF is used for carrying out mutual identity verification with UE, generates BSF and user's shared key K s simultaneously; Storage is used to describe the signed instrument of user profile among the HSS, and HSS also has the function that produces authentication information concurrently simultaneously.SLF is used for when having a plurality of HSS, assists BSF to search corresponding HSS.NAF is used to UE that Network is provided.
When user UE for the first time when NAF sends application request, do not know whether NAF needs the GBA process, just do not carry the GBA parameter.If NAF requires to carry out initial GBA process, can tell in issuing the response message of UE that then UE carries out the GBA process.
When user UE need use certain professional, if knowing this service needed, the user carries out mutual authentication process to BSF, then directly send authentication request and carry out mutual authentication to BSF.Otherwise the user can be at first and the NAF contact of this business correspondence, if this NAF uses the GBA general authentication framework, and finds that this user does not also recognize each other the card process to BSF, and NAF then notifies this user to carry out mutual authentication with identity verification to BSF.
With reference to Fig. 2, the flow process that UE and BSF carry out mutual authentication is described.
At first, in step 710, UE sends the GBA request message to BSF, and this GBA request message comprises this user's sign.
Then, enter in the step 720, BSF obtains Ciphering Key to HSS, BSF by with the authentication vector information of obtaining this UE alternately of HSS, as AUTN, RAND, IK (encryption key), CK (Integrity Key) and XRES etc.
Then, enter step 730, BSF returns challenge responses message to UE, comprises AUTN, RAND in this message.Specifically, BSF with AUTN in the authentication vector information and RAND, is carried in the lump in the challenge responses message, and this message is returned to UE after receiving the authentication vector information of UE.Wherein, AUTN is used to verify the identity of BSF, and RAND is used to make UE to obtain IK and the CK identical with the BSF side.
Then, enter step 740, UE is by operation AKA algorithm, and the validity of checking AUTN obtains IK and CK with the authentication network, and generates RES (Authentication Response value).Specifically, UE by to the identity of the validity check checking opposite end BSF of AUTN wherein, calculates IK and the CK identical with the BSF side according to wherein RAND, and generates RES after receiving the challenge responses message that BSF returns.
Then, enter step 750, UE sends the GBA request message to BSF once more, and carries RES in this message.Wherein, RES is used to verify the identity of UE.
Then, enter step 760, BSF checks that the validity of RES is with authentication UE.Whether BSF is consistent with the XRES that obtains from HSS by judging the RES in the GBA request message, thereby UE is carried out authentication.
Then, enter step 770, BSF generates Ks according to IK that obtains from HSS and CK.In addition, BSF has also defined a valid expiration date for sharing key K s, so that Ks carries out regular update.
Then, enter step 780, BSF is carried at the term of validity of B-TID and Ks in the success response message and sends to UE.Specifically, BSF distributes a B-TID for this authentication interacting transaction between sign and the UE, this B-TID is associated with the private user identity of Ks, UE, so that BSF can find out corresponding Ks according to this B-TID later on, and, for term of validity of Ks definition, so that Ks carries out regular update.BSF is carried at the term of validity of this B-TID and Ks in the success response message.
Then, enter step 790, UE obtains the term of validity of B-TID and Ks after receiving this success response message, and the term of validity of this B-TID and Ks is kept at the UE side, and generates Ks.Should share key K s and use, be used to derive the encryption key when each NAF communicates by letter as root key.
After having finished process as described in Figure 2, just shared a root key Ks between UE and the BSF.And UE can utilize formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id) derive and the NAF that wants to visit between the shared key K s_NAF that derives, wherein NAF_Id can identify and want the NAF that visits, RAND is a random number, IMPI is meant the privately owned identify label of UE, and " gba-me " represents character string, KDF is the abbreviation of key derivative function.Like this, the UE side has just been obtained this shared key K s_NAF that derives.Remaining task is exactly how NAF obtains the shared key K s_NAF that this is derived.Have only NAF and UE all to obtain Ks_NAF, could set up the escape way of both sides' communication.
With reference to Fig. 3, the flow process that NAF obtains Ks_NAF is described:
At first, in step 901, the user generates a request connection message that has carried this B-TID, and issues NAF after receiving B-TID.After NAF receives user's connection request, generate an authentication request information of having carried NAF sign and B-TID, in step 902, inquire about then to BSF.
Then, in step 903, after BSF searches corresponding Ks according to this B-TID, re-use the shared key K s_NAF that the algorithm computation identical with user side goes out to derive, in authentication response message, the time of the mutual authentication between the valid expiration date of Ks_NAF, Ks_NAF, BSF and the UE and other application related information are issued NAF then.NAF is kept at these information on the NAF in step 904.
Then, in step 905, NAF sends to UE with application responds message.
By as above step, NAF confirms that this user is the validated user through the BSF authentication, and NAF and UE have also just shared the key K s_NAF that is derived by Ks simultaneously, thereby the two can carry out secure communication in follow-up communication.
When the user finds that Ks will be soon expired, or NAF requires the user again when BSF carries out authentication, and the user will repeat the processing of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 and carry out mutual authentication to BSF again, to obtain new shared key K s and derivative key Ks_NAF.
The processing of having carried out between UE and the NAF when as shown in Figure 4, having described NAF and find that the shared key K s_NAF that derives is expired.Detailed, UE in step 1001, sends application request message to NAF after, NAF finds that the shared key K s_NAF that derives is expired, then in step 1002, notify UE to re-execute and BSF between the mutual authentication process.
Comprise IP multimedia service identify label module I SIM (IP MultimediaServices Subscriber Identity Module)/Universal Integrated Circuit Card UICC (UniversalIntegrated Circuit Card) on the above UE, and both comprised the GBA client on the UE, also comprise the NAF applications client.But along with the general authentication framework range of application more and more widely, some new application scenarioss appear, for example do not have the ISIM/UICC module thereby just do not possess on the user terminal of ISIM ability yet, perhaps how to use GBA on the terminal (a plurality of peripheral terminal adopt same ISIM/UICC accesses network business) that the NAF applications client is separated with the GBA client traditional.Easy in order to describe, we are referred to as non-IMS terminal at unification.
Define the functional entity of a kind of IMS of being called residential gateway IRG (IMS Residential Gateway) among the TISPAN (the NGN network standard of ETSI), be used to those non-IMS terminals that visit IMS service security passage is provided.
These non-IMS terminals include but not limited to SIP phone, soft phone, PC, PDA etc.Be equivalent to a B2BUA (back-to-back user agent) entity on the IMS residential gateway function, it has one " ISIMON UICC (the IP multimedia service identify label module on the Universal Integrated Circuit Card) " module, be used for to these non-IMS terminals provide visit IMS service security passage, and stored a private user identity (IMPI) and a plurality of public user identity (IMPU) on this module.This IRG may be interfaces such as netting twine, data wire, USB, bluetooth or infrared ray towards the local interface of non-IMS terminal.We also can claim this entity to be IMS terminal agency.
Under this application scenarios, an IMS user may possess a plurality of non-IMS terminal equipments, and all these non-IMS terminals adopt same ISIM/UICC module (being positioned on the IMS terminal agency) accesses network business.In addition, the NAF applications client is positioned on one or several non-IMS terminals beyond the IMS terminal agency, therefore with the client of carrying out GBA (being positioned on the IMS terminal agency) not on same equipment.The GBA framework that we are referred to as to strengthen, as shown in Figure 5.In this enhancement mode GBA framework, have non-IMS terminals such as SIP phone, PC, soft phone, the IMS terminal is acted on behalf of B2BUA and is generated derivative key Ks_NAF for these non-IMS terminals, and these IMS terminals utilize the derivative key Ks_NAF of this generation to communicate by letter with NAF.When the GBA client on the shared UE of a plurality of peripheral terminal equipment, if during the same NAF of two of certain in these peripheral terminal equipment or certain several visit, the situation that a plurality of peripheral terminal equipment adopt same derivative key Ks_NAF to communicate by letter with some NAF also can appear, cause potential safety hazard: if one of them is broken, another one also can be declared its own bankruptcy.
The method for authenticating of existing enhancement mode GBA framework at has as shown in Figure 5 been described as shown in Figure 6.
At first, in step 801, non-IMS terminal sends application request to NAF.NAF indicates non-IMS terminal to adopt GBA in step 802.
Then, in step 803, non-IMS terminal sends a request to UE (IMS terminal), and request UE generates key, comprises the device identification of this non-IMS terminal in this request.
Then, by with Fig. 2 in the similar step 807-808 of step 701-709 generate basic key Ks, and in step 808, generate derivative key according to this basic key Ks and device identification.In step 809, derivative key and B-TID are sent to non-IMS terminal then.
Then, in step 810, non-IMS terminal will comprise that the authentication request of B-TID and device identification sends to NAF.NAF sends a key request to BSF in step 811, request generates derivative key, and this key request comprises device identification, B-TID and NAF sign.
BSF calculates derivative key in step 812, and in step 813 this derivative key is returned NAF.
Thereby, can carry out secure communication by this derivative key between non-IMS terminal and the NAF.
But this scheme has following shortcoming:
1. this scheme is at the 3GPP portable terminal, and is inapplicable for fixed terminal.
2. network side needs to manage all these terminal equipments, need distribute unique device flag for each terminal equipment.Because it is terminal manufacturer and Virtual network operator may not be a family, and terminal type is varied, relatively more difficult in the management.
3. all non-IMS terminals all need to know the device flag of oneself, and initiatively carry this device flag and give UE (comprising the ISIM/UICC module) and NAF.May exist non-IMS terminal to carry out the hidden danger of device flag spoof attack (similar IP address spoof attack) like this.
4. this scheme is not considered the situation of new and old edition intercommunication.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of method of safer strengthening universal authority identifying structure used for non-IMS terminal.
According to the method following steps of non-IMS terminal of the present invention by IMS terminal agent application universal authority identifying structure: step a, non-IMS terminal sends not application request message with the GBA parameter to the Network application entity, and the Network application entity responds this application request message, indicate non-IMS terminal and guide service functional entity to carry out authentication process, step b, IMS terminal agency is after receiving the GBA solicited message of non-IMS terminal, inquire about a relation mapping table, obtain the device identification of this non-IMS terminal, this relation mapping table is stored the corresponding relation of the device identification of the identification information of non-IMS terminal and non-IMS terminal, this GBA solicited message comprises the identification information of non-IMS terminal, step c, IMS terminal agency generates the derivative key Ks_NAF relevant with described device identification for non-IMS terminal, steps d, the guide service functional entity is that the Network application entity generates derivative key Ks_NAF, and it is identical with the derivative key Ks_NAF that generates among the step c.
According to the present invention, because the device identification relevant with the generation of derivative key Ks_NAF generated by network side entity, therefore non-IMS terminal does not need initiatively its device identification to be sent to B2BUA, thereby has prevented that non-IMS terminal from carrying out the hidden danger of device flag spoof attack.In addition, during the same NAF of different non-IMS terminal accesses, the shared key K s_NAF that derives is different, even a Ks_NAF divulges a secret like this, also can not influence other Ks_NAF, thereby guarantee fail safe.In addition, device identification is to share key K s_NAF by B2BUA together with deriving to pass to non-IMS terminal, has guaranteed that like this being not easy to carry out the puppet sign on the non-IMS terminal attacks.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the frame diagram of GBA framework.
Fig. 2 is the flow chart of UE and BSF mutual authentication in the GBA framework.
Fig. 3 obtains the flow chart of Ks_NAF for NAF in the GBA framework.
Fig. 4 is the flow chart of the processing that UE and NAF carried out when key was expired in the GBA framework.
Fig. 5 is the frame diagram of enhancement mode GBA framework.
Fig. 6 is the flow chart of the method for authenticating of existing enhancement mode GBA framework.
Fig. 7 is the flow chart according to the initial boot process between UA of the present invention and the NAF.
Fig. 8 is the flow chart according to the guiding reciprocal process between UA of the present invention and the BSF.
Fig. 9 is the flow chart according to an execution mode of the guiding reciprocal process between a plurality of UA of the present invention and the BSF.
Figure 10 is the flow chart according to another execution mode of the guiding reciprocal process between a plurality of UA of the present invention and the BSF.
Figure 11 is for setting up the flow chart of Security Association between UA and the NAF.
Figure 12 is the flow chart of the key processing that UA and NAF carry out when expired.
Embodiment
The present invention proposes one or more non-IMS terminal and act on behalf of a kind of solution that the B2BUA entity application strengthens generic authentication architecture (GBA) by the IMS terminal.This B2BUA entity comprises IRG (IMS residential gateway) entity of NGN, or the entity that has similar functions among the 3GPP/3GPP2.This non-IMS terminal can be the non-IMS terminal in mobile network or the fixed network.In the following description, utilize UA to unify to represent various non-IMS terminals.In addition, in the present invention, suppose that the interface between these UA and the B2BUA is safe.And B2BUA can not initiatively be initiated the GBA process, must be triggered by UA.According to the present invention, during the same NAF of different non-IMS terminal accesses,, can not have influence on the fail safe of other non-IMS terminal even the key of one of them non-IMS terminal is divulged a secret yet.
In the present invention, a relation mapping table is set at first, this relation mapping table comprises the mapping relations between the device identification of the user name (perhaps terminal address/terminal prot number) of UA and this UA of unique identification.This relation mapping table can be pre-configured on the B2BUA, also can be configured on the HSS.When this relation mapping table was configured on the HSS, B2BUA perhaps obtained by other modes by when BSF downloads authentication vector this relation mapping table being downloaded.
When UA for the first time when NAF sends application request (perhaps passing through B2BUA), if do not know whether to use GBA parameter and NAF communication or and NAF between shared key expired, just do not carry any GBA parameter.Do not carry the GBA parameter in the application request that NAF discovery UA sends, will indicate UA (perhaps by B2BUA indication UA) to carry out the GBA process.Then, carry out the GBA process between UA request B2BUA and the BSF, BSF generates root key Ks and guiding Transaction Identifier B-TID and returns to B2BUA.Then, B2BUA is found out the corresponding equipment sign by the above-mentioned mapping table of inquiry, and by extends equation Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id, device identification) generate Ks_NAF, wherein NAF_Id is the ID of the NAF that will visit, RAND is a random number, IMPI is meant the privately owned identify label of UA, and " gba-me " represents character string, KDF is the abbreviation of key derivative function.B2BUA is issued UA together with Ks_NAF, B-TID, device identification, the key term of validity.UA (perhaps passing through B2BUA) carries B-TID and the device identification of obtaining in issuing the request message of NAF then.NAF also carries the device identification of obtaining in issuing the request message of BSF.BSF generates Ks_NAF by identical formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id, device identification), and it is issued NAF.Like this, NAF and UA have just obtained a public keys Ks_NAF jointly by B2BUA.And for different UA, as long as the user name of using is different, corresponding Ks_NAF is also just different, even a Ks_NAF divulges a secret like this, also can not have influence on other Ks_NAF.Thereby guaranteed fail safe.
Below, with reference to accompanying drawing, describe the method for using enhancement mode GBA according to UA of the present invention (non-IMS terminal) in detail.
The dual mode of the initial boot process between UA and the NAF has been described as shown in Figure 7.
Mode 2 comprises step 101a, 101b, 102a and the 102b among the figure.This mode 2 is basic identical with mode 1, and difference only is described application request message and uses corresponding message and all transmit by B2BUA.
After described arbitrary mode has been carried out initial boot process according to Fig. 7, carry out as shown in Figure 8 UA and the guiding reciprocal process between the BSF.This guiding reciprocal process comprises the steps:
At first, in step 201, UA1 sends GBA and asks B2BUA, carries the user name of this UA1 and the sign ID of NAF in this GBA request.
Then, in step 202, the B2BUA user name that request is carried according to GBA is found out in the relation mapping table on being stored in B2BUA and this UA1 corresponding equipment sign.Certainly, this relation mapping table also can be configured on the HSS, when B2BUA and BSF mutual authentication, BSF inquiry HSS obtains this relation mapping table when obtaining authentication vector (being step 204), then with this relation mapping table together with B-TID, the key term of validity is issued B2BUA (being step 209) together.In this case, this step 202 is between step 209 and step 211.
Then, in step 203-210, carry out the mutual authentication process between B2BUA and the BSF.By these steps, BSF has generated Transaction Identifier B-TID, together issues B2BUA together with the key term of validity, and B2BUA and BSF generate root key Ks.In addition, in BSF, preserve a table (Ks, the key term of validity guides the time started for B-TID, IMPI), thereby can find root key Ks according to this B-TID receive the request of NAF as BSF after.
Concrete, in step 203, B2BUA sends the GBA request message to BSF, and this GBA request message comprises the private user identity of UA1.
Then, in step 204, BSF obtains Ciphering Key to HSS, BSF by with the authentication vector information of obtaining this B2BUA alternately of HSS, as AUTN, RAND, IK, CK and XRES etc.
Then, in step 205, BSF returns challenge responses message to B2BUA, comprises AUTN, RAND in this message.Specifically, BSF with AUTN in the authentication vector information and RAND, is carried in the lump in the challenge responses message, and this message is returned to B2BUA after receiving the authentication vector information of B2BUA.Wherein, AUTN is used to verify the identity of BSF, and RAND is used to make B2BUA to obtain IK and the CK identical with the BSF side.
Then, in step 206, B2BUA is by operation AKA algorithm, and the validity of checking AUTN obtains IK and CK with the authentication network, and generates RES.Specifically, B2BUA by to the identity of the validity check checking opposite end BSF of AUTN wherein, calculates IK and the CK identical with the BSF side according to wherein RAND, and generates RES after receiving the challenge responses message that BSF returns.
Then, in step 207, B2BUA sends the GBA request message to BSF once more, and carries RES in this message.Wherein, RES is used to verify the identity of B2BUA.
Then, in step 208, BSF checks that the validity of RES is with the authentication B2BUA.Whether BSF is consistent with the XRES that obtains from HSS by judging the RES in the GBA request message, thereby B2BUA is carried out authentication.And BSF generates Ks according to IK that obtains from HSS and CK.
Then, in step 209, BSF is carried at the term of validity of B-TID and Ks in the success response message and sends to B2BUA.Specifically, BSF distributes a B-TID for this authentication interacting transaction between sign and the B2BUA, this B-TID is associated with the private user identity of Ks, B2BUA, so that BSF can find out corresponding Ks according to this B-TID later on, and, for term of validity of Ks definition, so that Ks carries out regular update.BSF is carried at the term of validity of this B-TID and Ks in the success response message.
Then, in step 210, B2BUA obtains the term of validity of B-TID and Ks after receiving this success response message, and the term of validity of this B-TID and Ks is kept at the B2BUA side, and generates Ks.
After the mutual authentication process of having carried out between B2BUA and the BSF, in step 211, B2BUA is according to formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id, device identification) derive Ks_NAF, and preserve the relation between Ks_NAF and the private user identity IMPI.
Then, in step 212, B2BUA is issued UA1 with Ks_NAF, B-TID, device identification, the key term of validity.
When exist a plurality of UA to need and BSF between carry out guiding when mutual, can carry out this guiding alternately by the flow process shown in Fig. 9 or 8.
As shown in Figure 9, at first, first UA1 carries out the GBA process by step 201-212.Afterwards, when other UA also needs with BSF when mutual, it at first is sent to B2BUA with the GBA request in step 301, carry the user name of this UA2 in this GBA request.Then in step 302, B2BUA is found out this UA2 corresponding equipment sign according to the user name of carrying in the GBA request in relation mapping table.According to the local security policy of B2BUA, in the Ks term of validity, can skips steps 203-210.BSF preserves data such as identical B-TID, Ks for all UA.Therefore, direct execution in step 311, B2BUA according to formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id, device identification) derive Ks_NAF, and preserve the relation between Ks_NAF and the private user identity IMPI.In step 312, B2BUA is issued UA2 with Ks_NAF, B-TID, device identification, the key term of validity then.In this process, step 301,302,311,312 with step 201 as shown in Figure 2,202,211,212 similar.
As shown in figure 10, another mutual execution mode of execution guiding between a plurality of UA and the BSF has been described.
This execution mode is identical with as shown in figure 10 execution mode basically, its difference is: after first UA1 had finished the GBA process, other UA also needed with BSF when mutual, according to the local security policy of B2BUA, in the Ks term of validity, need re-execute above-mentioned steps 203-210.In order to allow BSF distinguish is the mutual again of same UA and BSF, and still different UA and BSF's is mutual, need carry the device identification parameter in above-mentioned steps 203.BSF preserves data (as shown in the figure) such as corresponding B-TID_UA, IMPI, KS_UA for each UA.Therefore, these UA will use different B-TID (Ks) and Ks_NAF to visit NAF later on.
When by Fig. 8,7 or 8 described flow processs have been finished after the guiding reciprocal process between UA and the BSF, then carry out process as described in Figure 11, realize that the SA (Security Association) between UA and the NAF sets up.As shown in figure 11, it comprises the steps.
At first, in step 501, UA sends application request message to NAF, carries B-TID in this application request, the device identification parameter.This step 501 also can be replaced by the step 501a-501b among the figure, and in these steps, UA issues NAF by B2BUA with application request message, and B2BUA plays the effect of forwarding here, and this application request message also comprises B-TID and device identification parameter.
Then, in step 502, NAF sends authentication request message to BSF, and this authentication request message carries device identification, B-TID, NAF host name (being the sign ID of NAF).
Then, in step 503, the derivation of equation that the BSF basis is identical with user side goes out Ks_NAF, and in step 504 Ks_NAF that derives is sent to NAF together with other parameters.Concrete, BSF searches the table that is stored among the BSF according to B-TID, obtains Ks and IMPI, according to parameter that obtains and the parameter of sending in step 502, generates Ks_NAF.
Then, in step 504, BSF sends to NAF with Ks_NAF, application associated user attribute data, GBA time started, the key term of validity.In step 505, NAF preserves the relation of parameter such as Ks_NAF and B-TID, device identification.
In step 506, NAF sends application responds message to UA.Accordingly, this step also can be replaced by the step 506a-506b among the figure, and promptly NAF also may issue UA with application responds message by B2BUA.
By top Fig. 8,7, or 8 process, B2BUA is that UA has generated derivative key Ks_NAF, and by processing shown in Figure 11, BSF is that NAF has generated identical derivative key Ks_NAF.Thereby, set up Security Association between UA and the NAF.
After the Security Association of having set up by above-described process between UA and the NAF, carry out safe communication between UA and the NAF, if but NAF thinks that the shared key K s_NAF that derives is expired, can show then that UA need re-execute by step 602 middle finger first finger as shown in figure 12 and BSF between the mutual authentication process.Certainly, this indication also can be by being transmitted by B2BUA according to step 602a and 602b.
Below, analyze the situation that realizes the intercommunication of new and old edition according to above-mentioned method.Therefore consider that BSF is managed by operator, can think that BSF can the device identification parameter be distinguished newly, the situation of legacy version by whether having.
For UE (or B2BUA) or NAF, then may be new, legacy version has.Therefore only need to consider UE (support equipment identification parameter) and the NAF (not support equipment identification parameter) of legacy version, the UE (not support equipment identification parameter) of legacy version and these two kinds of intercommunication situations of NAF (support equipment identification parameter) of redaction of redaction.
Intercommunication between the UE of＜redaction and the NAF of legacy version 〉
Intercommunication between the UE of redaction and the NAF of legacy version has following two kinds of situations:
Situation 1:, when supposing to carry out the GBA process between the BSF of the UE of redaction and legacy version, do not carry the device identification parameter as Fig. 8, shown in Figure 9.After finishing the GBA process, UE can use the key derivation formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id, device identification) of carrying device sign to generate Ks_NAF; UE also carries the device identification parameter in the application request message that NAF sends; But the NAF nonrecognition, so NAF does not carry the device identification parameter in the authentication request message that BSF sends; Thereby can cause BSF to use different key derivation formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id) generation Ks_NAF.Thereby cause intercommunication infeasible.
Situation 2: as shown in Figure 6, when supposing to carry out the GBA process between the BSF of the UE of redaction and legacy version, in step 203, carry the device identification parameter.After finishing the GBA process, UE can use the key derivation formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id, device identification) of carrying device sign to generate Ks_NAF, and BSF also should get off the relation record of B-TID and device identification simultaneously; UE also carries the device identification parameter in the application request message that NAF sends; But the NAF nonrecognition, so NAF does not carry the device identification parameter in the authentication request message that BSF sends; BSF can know that according to B-TID UE is a redaction, thereby can find the corresponding equipment sign, and BSF uses identical key derivation formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id, device identification) to generate Ks_NAF then.Therefore intercommunication is feasible.
Therefore, consider, when carrying out the GBA process between the UE of redaction and the BSF, must carry the device identification parameter from the angle of new and old edition intercommunication.
The intercommunication analysis of the UE of＜legacy version and the NAF of redaction 〉
When carrying out the GBA process between the UE of legacy version and the BSF, can not carry the device identification parameter.After finishing the GBA process, UE can use not the key derivation formula Ks_NAF=KDF of carrying device sign (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id) generation Ks_NAF; UE also carrying device identification parameter not in the application request message that NAF sends; NAF also carrying device identification parameter not in the authentication request message that BSF sends, thus BSF also use identical key derivation formula Ks_NAF=KDF (Ks, " gba-me ", RAND, IMPI NAF_Id) generates Ks_NAF.Therefore intercommunication is feasible.
The present invention is not only applicable to the non-IMS terminal in the fixed network, is applicable to the non-IMS terminal among the mobile network too, and this non-IMS terminal agent entity can be described B2BUA (IRG) entity, also can be the entity that possesses similar functions among the 3GPP/3GPP2.
According to the present invention, during the same NAF of different non-IMS terminal accesses, the shared key K s_NAF that derives is different, even a Ks_NAF divulges a secret like this, also can not influence other Ks_NAF, thereby guarantee fail safe.In addition, device identification is to share key K s_NAF by B2BUA together with deriving to pass to non-IMS terminal, has guaranteed that like this being not easy to carry out the puppet sign on the non-IMS terminal attacks.In addition, during the same NAF of different non-IMS terminal accesses, Ks_NAF difference not only, B-TID also can be different, further guaranteed fail safe.And the present invention is the expansion of carrying out on existing GBA framework, thereby has guaranteed backwards compatibility.
Though the present invention expresses in more mode; but be not in order to qualification the present invention, any those skilled in the art, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention; can do various changes and retouching, so protection scope of the present invention is as the criterion when looking the patent claim person of defining.
Claims (12)
1. a non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal is by the method for IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agent application universal authority identifying structure, and it comprises the steps:
Step a, the non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal sends not application request message with the generic authentication architecture parameter to the Network application entity, and the Network application entity responds this application request message, indication non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal and guide service functional entity are carried out authentication process, the non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal sends the generic authentication architecture request message to IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency
Step b; IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency is after receiving the generic authentication architecture solicited message of non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal; Inquire about a relation mapping table; Obtain the device identification of this non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal; The corresponding relation of the identification information of this relation mapping table storage non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal and the device identification of non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal; This generic authentication architecture solicited message comprises the identification information of non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal
Step c, IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency generates the derivative key Ks_NAF relevant with described device identification for the non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal,
Steps d, guide service functional entity are that the Network application entity generates derivative key Ks_NAF, and it is identical with the derivative key Ks_NAF that generates among the step c,
Step e, the derivative key Ks_NAF that non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal and Network application entity utilize step c and steps d to generate sets up Security Association.
2. the method for claim 1, wherein
The identification information of described non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal is the user name of non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal, any in the terminal address, terminal prot number.
3. method as claimed in claim 2, wherein,
Described application request message and Indication message are transmitted by IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency.
4. the method for claim 1, wherein
Step b comprises:
Step b1, the non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal sends a generic authentication architecture request message and acts on behalf of to the IP multimedia service subsystem terminal, this generic authentication architecture request comprises the ID of the user name and the Network application entity of non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal, and
Step b2, IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency search the described relation mapping table that is stored on the IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency according to the user name of this non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal, obtain device identification.
5. method as claimed in claim 4, wherein,
Step b2 further comprises,
IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency is in the step of downloading this relation mapping table when the guide service functional entity is downloaded authentication vector.
6. the method for claim 1, wherein
Step c comprises:
Step c0, IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency and the two-way authentication of guide service functional entity generate basic key Ks, Transaction Identifier B-TID, the key term of validity,
Step c1, IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency generates derivative key Ks_NAF according to the ID of device identification, basic key Ks, IP multimedia private identity and Network application entity,
Step c2, IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency sends to the non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal with device identification, Transaction Identifier B-TID, derivative key Ks_NAF and the key term of validity.
7. method as claimed in claim 6, wherein,
In step c0, IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency is user's private user identity, or private user identity and device identification send to the guide service functional entity.
8. method as claimed in claim 6, wherein,
After IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency and guide service functional entity are finished the generic authentication architecture authentication in step c0, when other non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal by this IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency with the Network application entity when mutual, according to local policy, can omit this step c0, the basic key Ks and the Transaction Identifier B-TID that generate when directly utilizing last non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal by this this universal authority identifying structure of IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agent application.
9. method as claimed in claim 7, it further comprises
The guide service functional entity is with basic key Ks, Transaction Identifier B-TID, the key term of validity, IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency's private user identity and the device identification association store of this non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal.
10. the method for claim 1, wherein
Steps d comprises,
Steps d 1, non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal send the application request message of the device identification comprise this non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal and Transaction Identifier B-TID to the Network application entity,
Steps d 2, Network application entity send the authentication request message of ID of device identification, Transaction Identifier B-TID and the Network application entity comprise this non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal to the guide service functional entity,
Steps d 3, inquiry obtains basic key Ks and IP multimedia private identity IMPI to the guide service functional entity according to this Transaction Identifier B-TID, and generate derivative key Ks_NAF together with the ID of the device identification of non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal, Network application entity, and derivative key Ks_NAF, the key term of validity, generic authentication architecture time started, the UAD that generates sent to the Network application entity according to these information.
11. as each described method of claim 1-10, it further comprises
The Network application entity sends message indication non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal and carries out and the two-way authentication of guide service functional entity when described derivative key is expired.
12. method as claimed in claim 11, wherein,
Indication non-IP multimedia service subsystem terminal is carried out with the message of guide service functional entity two-way authentication and is transmitted by IP multimedia service subsystem terminal agency.
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| CN101030862B (en) * | 2007-03-29 | 2010-05-26 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method, network and UE for authenticating non-IP multi-medium service UE |
| WO2009006816A1 (en) * | 2007-07-10 | 2009-01-15 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Policy control method, device and system for application |
| CN101378313B (en) * | 2007-08-31 | 2014-02-19 | 上海华为技术有限公司 | Method for establishing safety association, user equipment and network side equipment |
| CN101394642A (en) * | 2007-09-17 | 2009-03-25 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method, device and system for uploading link exception information |
| CN102299797A (en) * | 2010-06-23 | 2011-12-28 | 财团法人工业技术研究院 | Authentication method, key distribution method and authentication and key distribution method |
| CN103051594A (en) * | 2011-10-13 | 2013-04-17 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method, network side equipment and system of establishing end-to-end security of marked net |
| CN104216693B (en) * | 2013-06-03 | 2017-11-10 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | A kind of method and device that device identification is provided |
| CN113840280A (en) * | 2020-06-04 | 2021-12-24 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | Call encryption method, system, guide server, terminal and electronic equipment |
| CN112311543B (en) * | 2020-11-17 | 2023-04-18 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | GBA key generation method, terminal and NAF network element |
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