CA3225474A1 - Method for safely operating a rail traffic system and rail traffic system - Google Patents

Method for safely operating a rail traffic system and rail traffic system Download PDF

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Publication number
CA3225474A1
CA3225474A1 CA3225474A CA3225474A CA3225474A1 CA 3225474 A1 CA3225474 A1 CA 3225474A1 CA 3225474 A CA3225474 A CA 3225474A CA 3225474 A CA3225474 A CA 3225474A CA 3225474 A1 CA3225474 A1 CA 3225474A1
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CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
rail
rail traffic
traffic information
vehicle
traffic system
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
CA3225474A
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French (fr)
Inventor
Krzysztof WILCZEK
Wolfgang Schuster
Gottfried Schuster
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Prodes GmbH
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Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
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Publication of CA3225474A1 publication Critical patent/CA3225474A1/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • B61L23/34Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for indicating the distance between vehicles or trains by the transmission of signals therebetween
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0054Train integrity supervision, e.g. end-of-train [EOT] devices
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0058On-board optimisation of vehicle or vehicle train operation
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/10Operations, e.g. scheduling or time tables
    • B61L27/16Trackside optimisation of vehicle or train operation
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/202Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L2205/00Communication or navigation systems for railway traffic
    • B61L2205/04Satellite based navigation systems, e.g. global positioning system [GPS]
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • B61L23/04Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for monitoring the mechanical state of the route
    • B61L23/041Obstacle detection
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/025Absolute localisation, e.g. providing geodetic coordinates

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Traffic Control Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for the safe operation of a rail transport system (1), comprising the steps of: incorporating a first rail transport information (31) correlating with a state variable of the rail transport system (1), transmitting a second rail transport information (32, 42), which correlates with the state variable of the rail transport system (1), between a first rail vehicle (3) and an infrastructure device (2) and/or a second rail vehicle (4), determining a comparative result based on the first rail transport information (31) and the second rail transport information (32, 42), checking the plausibility of the first rail transport information (31) and/or the second rail transport information (32, 42) based on the comparative result, and controlling the rail transport system (1) based on the result of the plausibility check.

Description

CLEAN
METHOD FOR SAFELY OPERATING A RAIL TRAFFIC SYSTEM
AND RAIL TRAFFIC SYSTEM
CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
The application claims priority of Austrian patent application, Serial No.
AT A50578/2021, filed on July 15, 2021, the contents of which are incor-porated herein by reference in its entirety as if fully set forth herein.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The invention relates to a method for safely operating a rail traffic system.
Furthermore, the invention relates to a rail traffic system.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The European Train Control System (ETCS) is intended to advance the standardization of non-uniform train control systems within Europe. Fur-ther, it also prepares the basis for a particularly efficient use of existing rail traffic systems. However, such rail traffic systems have to meet high tech-nical requirements. These relate in particular to the sensory monitoring of the rail traffic system, for example, by means of a measuring arrangement disclosed in WO 2020/108873 Al. In order to achieve the necessary tech-nical expansion level, considerable investments are required, especially in existing rail traffic systems; however, their economic effect only occurs af-ter a large part of the rail traffic system has been modernized. As a result, corresponding modernizations are often carried out too hesitantly.

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-2-WO 2021/121854 Al describes a method for determining the position of a rail vehicle using an optical measuring system, in particular a stereo cam-era system, and a radio-based measuring system, with position data from both measuring systems being generated on the rail vehicle and compared 5 with each another.
A warning system for warning people of approaching rail vehicles is known from WO 2021/121853 Al.

The object of the invention is to create an improved method for safely op-erating a rail traffic system, which, in particular, is particularly economical and flexible to use.
This object may be achieved by way of a method for safely operating a rail traffic system, having the steps:
- collecting first rail traffic information correlating with a state variable of the rail traffic system, 20 - transmitting second rail traffic information correlating with the state variable of the rail traffic system between a first rail vehicle and an in-frastructure facility and/or a second rail vehicle, - determining a comparison result on the basis of the first rail traffic in-formation and the second rail traffic information, 25 - checking the plausibility of the first rail traffic information and/or the second rail traffic information using the comparison result, and - controlling the rail traffic system using the result of the plausibility check.

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-3-According to the invention, it has been recognized that a method for safely operating a rail traffic system can be used in a particularly economical and flexible manner if the plausibility of rail traffic information is checked us-5 ing a comparison result on the basis of a first and a second rail traffic infor-mation, with the rail traffic system being controlled using the result of the plausibility check. By determining the comparison result on the basis of the first and second rail traffic information, incorrect rail traffic information can be recognized and/or compensated for particularly reliably. In particu-10 lar, possible deficiencies when collecting and/or processing the rail traffic information can be compensated for by determining the result of the plausi-bility check. The usefulness of collected rail traffic information for control-ling the rail traffic system can thus be increased. If the plausibility of the rail traffic information is confirmed, it can be assumed with a particularly 15 high probability that this information is correct. Controlling the rail traffic system using the result of the plausibility check therefore leads to a particu-larly high level of operational safety. In particular, this makes it possible to overcome the reliability threshold required for a particularly efficient use of the rail network, in particular for a higher traffic density. A higher traffic 20 capacity of the rail traffic system can be achieved with lower investments.
Both the modernization of existing rail traffic systems and the construction of new rail traffic systems can thus be carried out in a particularly econom-ical and flexible manner.
25 The rail traffic system preferably comprises an infrastructure facility and at least one rail vehicle, in particular a plurality of rail vehicles. The infra-structure facility can have a rail network with a plurality of, in particular interconnected tracks, which is preferably subdivided into several rail line CLEAN
-4-sections. The infrastructure facility, in particular each of the rail line sec-tions, can have a single or a plurality of control centres for controlling the infrastructure facility.
5 The at least one rail vehicle can have at least one, in particular at least two, in particular at least five, in particular at least ten, running trailers.
Prefera-bly, the at least one rail vehicle comprises at least one power wagon with a drive unit for providing the propulsive force required to move the rail vehi-cle along the track.
The correlation between the state variable and the rail traffic information is understood to mean that the rail traffic information depends on the state variable, in particular that they are in a fixed, in particular a linear, relation-ship with each other.
The state variable of the rail traffic system can be, for example, a position, and/or a speed, and/or a drive power, and/or a braking power, and/or a state variable which correlates with the existence of a mechanical coupling be-tween two running trailers and/or with an object located in the area of the 20 track, in particular an obstacle causing a point of danger.
The second rail traffic information is preferably based on a source that is independent of the source of the first rail traffic information. In particular, the second rail traffic information is not determined by means of the first 25 rail vehicle.
The second rail vehicle can be designed in accordance with the first rail ve-hicle or have a higher or lower technical expansion level.

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Controlling the rail traffic system using the result of the plausibility check may comprise continuing to operate the rail vehicle, if the plausibility of the rail traffic information is insufficient, with reduced kilometric perfor-5 mance, in particular reduced travelling speed, and/or stopping it, and/or carrying out a maintenance measure on the rail vehicle. Advantageously, this enables the rail traffic system to be operated in a particularly safe man-ner.
10 Determining the result of the plausibility check and/or its further pro-cessing can be done using a consensus mechanism. Thus, the result of the plausibility check can be obtained and handled in a particularly safe and re-liable manner.
15 The different rail traffic information can be weighted uniformly or differ-ently, in particular on the basis of the reliability of the underlying sources, in particular the sensors. For example, the rail traffic information originat-ing from the infrastructure facility may have a higher weighting than the rail traffic information originating from the rail vehicle. Rail traffic infor-20 mation with lower weighting can be corrected, in particular replaced, by rail traffic information with higher weighting in case of insufficient plausi-bility, in particular with a difference between the two rail traffic infor-mation. This makes the method particularly reliable to execute.
25 Preferably, the first and/or the second rail traffic information is determined by means of at least one sensor, in particular a position detection module, in particular a GPS receiver for detecting the position of the at least one rail CLEAN
-6-vehicle, in particular in the rail network; and/or an optical sensor, in partic-ular a camera, for capturing objects on the track; and/or a completeness monitoring device for monitoring the existence of a mechanical coupling between two running trailers. Equally, the second rail traffic information 5 can be determined by means of the second rail vehicle. Alternatively or ad-ditionally, the second rail traffic information can be determined by means of the infrastructure facility, in particular a rail sensor.
The transmission of the second rail traffic information can be wired or 10 wireless. Preferably, the second rail traffic information is transmitted via a wireless signal connection, in particular between a vehicle radio module of the first rail vehicle and a control-centre radio module of a control centre of the infrastructure facility and/or a vehicle radio module of the second rail vehicle. The wireless signal connection may comprise a WiFi signal con-15 nection and/or a 5G signal connection. The signal connection is preferably designed as a peer-to-peer connection.
Preferably, the transmission of data via the wireless signal connection is encrypted. This makes the method particularly safe in operation.
According to a further aspect of the invention, at least one rail traffic infor-mation comprises, in particular the first and the second rail traffic infor-mation comprise, in particular the rail traffic information underlying the comparison result, information on whether objects, in particular people, are 25 located in the area of the track. To warn people of approaching rail vehi-cles, a signal-box controlled crew warning system can be provided. Such a warning system is disclosed, for example, in WO 2021/121853 Al, the dis-CLEAN
-7-closure content of which is incorporated herein by reference. This rail traf-fic information can be detected by means of the optical sensor, for exam-ple. The optical sensor may be a component of the infrastructure facility and/or the at least one rail vehicle.
The first and/or the second rail traffic information may comprise the posi-tion of the at least one rail vehicle, in particular along a track.
Preferably, the position of the rail vehicle is determined by means of a lateration method, in particular by radio trilateration, in particular by WiFi trilatera-1 0 tion. For this purpose, the rail vehicle can have a tracking module, in par-ticular a radio tracking module, in particular for determining the position by means of radio trilateration. The tracking module can also be referred to as the anchor module. The tracking module can be designed to detect sig-nals from stationary and/or movable tracking markers, in particular tran-sponders. Stationary tracking markers can be attached to infrastructure ele-ments. By means of stationary tracking markers, which are arranged in par-ticular at fixed points with a known position, it is possible to determine the position of the rail vehicle, in particular along the track. Movable tracking markers can, for example, be carried by people, in particular track mainte-nance workers. This allows the position of the person to be determined rel-ative to the rail vehicle and/or in the track and/or along the track. With re-spect to the method for determining the position of the rail vehicle and/or person, reference is made to W02021/121854 Al, the disclosure content of which is incorporated herein by reference.
A method, wherein the first rail traffic information is collected by means of the first rail vehicle, and wherein the second rail traffic information is transmitted to the first rail vehicle, ensures the operation of the rail traffic CLEAN
-8-system in a particularly economical and flexible manner. The second rail traffic information is preferably collected by means of the second rail vehi-cle and/or the infrastructure facility, in particular by sensors. The compari-son result and/or the result of the plausibility check can be determined by 5 means of the first rail vehicle, in particular a vehicle control unit. By hav-ing the first and second rail traffic information available on the first rail ve-hicle, the comparison result and/or the result of the plausibility check can be determined by means of the first rail vehicle. The rail traffic information available on the first rail vehicle, in particular on a vehicle control unit of 10 the rail vehicle, can thus be determined with a particularly high degree of reliability. A threshold for a technical expansion level of a rail vehicle, which is required for operating the rail traffic system with a particularly high traffic capacity, can thus be achieved particularly easily. The reliabil-ity of the measuring values that can be detected with the existing sensor 15 system of a rail vehicle can be increased using the comparison result.
For example, the safety integrity level (SIL) required to achieve a correspond-ingly high traffic capacity can be achieved by determining the result of the plausibility check. Accordingly, the effort required to implement the corre-sponding sensor system can be reduced, making the method particularly 20 flexible to use and economical to operate.
A method, wherein the first rail traffic information is collected by means of the infrastructure facility, and wherein the second rail traffic information is transmitted to the infrastructure facility, enables the operation of the rail 25 traffic system in a particularly safe and economical manner. The second rail traffic information is preferably collected by means of the first rail ve-hicle. The comparison result and/or the result of the plausibility check can CLEAN
-9-be determined by means of the infrastructure facility, in particular a con-trol-centre control unit. The rail traffic information received by the first rail vehicle can thus be regarded as accurate with particularly high probability.
The rail traffic information received by the rail vehicle can be used to de-5 termine the plausibility of the rail traffic information collected by the infra-structure facility. In this way, an infrastructure facility of a given technical expansion level can be operated particularly safely and economically. In particular, controlling the rail traffic system using the result of the plausi-bility check can enable a threshold value to be overcome for operating the
10 rail traffic system with a higher traffic capacity.
A method, wherein the first rail traffic information and/or the second rail traffic information is based on a measuring value detected in a sensory manner, ensures the operation of the rail traffic system in a particularly safe 15 and economical manner. For sensory detection of the at least one measur-ing value, the at least one rail vehicle may have the optical sensor, and/or the position detection module, and/or the completeness monitoring device.
For sensory detection of the at least one measuring value, the infrastructure facility may have a rail sensor for detecting a passing rail vehicle, in partic-20 ular for determining the number of running trailers of the rail vehicle, and/or the position, and/or the speed of the rail vehicle. The at least one rail sensor may comprise a point-shaped rail sensor, such as an axle counter, and/or a line-shaped rail sensor, such as a light guide sensor, in particular a glass fibre sensor. Such a rail sensor can be part of a balise or be designed 25 in the form of a sensor coupled to a rail or an overhead line. Such a light guide sensor is disclosed, for example, in WO 2020/108873 Al, the disclo-sure content of which is incorporated by reference herein. By determining CLEAN

the result of the plausibility check, a higher safety integrity level can be easily achieved for the corresponding sensors.
A method, wherein checking the plausibility is done at regular time inter-5 vals, enables the operation of the rail traffic system in a particularly safe manner. Preferably, the determination of the result of the plausibility check is carried out repeatedly, in particular at a time interval in the range from 0.01 s to 300 s, in particular from 0.1 s to 60 s, in particular from 0.5 s to 30 s, in particular from 1 s to 10 s. For this purpose, the transmission of the 10 second rail traffic information can take place with a time interval in the same range, in particular with the same time interval.
According to a further aspect of the invention, it is monitored whether the transmission of the second rail traffic information takes place within a pre-15 determined time range, in particular within the range described above.
If transmission is delayed or fails to occur, safety measures may be taken.
The safety measures may comprise, for example, reducing the travelling speed, and/or stopping the rail vehicle, and/or prohibiting it from entering another rail line section. This makes the method particularly safe in opera-20 tion.
A method comprising controlling the rail traffic system by means of at least one piece of rail traffic information modified using the comparison re-sult, ensures the operation of the rail traffic system in a particularly safe 25 manner. In the case of divergent rail traffic information, the rail traffic in-formation whose origin has a lower safety integrity level, in particular which is based on a measuring value from a sensor with a lower safety in-CLEAN
-11-tegrity level, can be corrected, in particular using the rail traffic infor-mation whose origin has a higher safety integrity level, in particular which is based on a measuring value from a sensor with a higher safety integrity level. Alternatively, both pieces of rail traffic information can be modified 5 and/or discarded, in particular replaced by other rail traffic information, in particular information determined in advance. Preferably, correction data for changing divergent rail traffic information is transmitted between the first rail vehicle and the infrastructure facility and/or the second rail vehi-cle, in particular it is transmitted wirelessly.
For example, the travelling speed of the first rail vehicle is determined based on a measuring value, which correlates with the speed of a rail wheel, and based on the diameter of the rail wheel. As the diameter of the rail wheel decreases with increasing wear, the measured travelling speed 15 deviates from the actual travelling speed. By means of rail sensors, which are arranged at spaced positions along the track, the travelling speed can be determined precisely. The travelling speed detected by the rail vehicle can be transmitted to the infrastructure facility. By means of the infrastructure facility, the comparison result can be determined as the difference between 20 this travelling speed and the actual travelling speed. The infrastructure fa-cility can transmit correction data to the rail vehicle, in particular a cor-rected diameter of the rail wheel, which enables the actual travelling speed to be determined by means of the rail vehicle.
25 A method comprising calibrating the collection of the first rail traffic infor-mation and/or the second rail traffic information using the comparison re-sult, ensures the operation of the rail traffic system in a particularly safe manner. Calibration can be performed using locally determined and/or CLEAN
-12-transmitted comparison results and/or correction data. Calibration can be carried out automatically at regular time intervals or manually.
A method comprising controlling rail vehicles of different control capacity 5 classes in the same rail traffic system in different manners, ensures the op-eration of the rail traffic system in a particularly flexible manner. The con-trol capacity class of the rail vehicle is understood to be a measure of its technical equipment. For example, the control capacity class may correlate with an ETCS classification, in particular corresponding to a specific ETCS
10 level. The technical equipment of a rail vehicle and correspondingly the control capacity class can be decisive for a train control system as to which methods the control of the rail vehicle is based on, in particular which traf-fic capacity can be achieved, in particular to what degree the rail vehicle can move autonomously through the rail network. The control capacity 15 class functions according to the safety integrity level. By controlling rail vehicles of different control capacity classes in different manners, traffic capacity can be increased. Rail vehicles with a high control capacity class, in particular a high technical expansion level, can travel on a rail network, in particular a rail line section, at a higher density than rail vehicles with a 20 lower control capacity class. For example, high control capacity class rail vehicles can be controlled on the basis of moving spatial distances. Rail ve-hicles with a low control capacity class can be controlled on the basis of fixed spatial distances. A higher control capacity class is preferably achieved through higher sensory and/or processor performance. Processor 25 performance is understood to mean the ability to process data, in particular the processing speed and/or the performance of the functions underlying data processing.

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-13-A method comprising classifying the at least one rail vehicle in a higher control capacity class due to controlling the rail traffic system using the re-sult of the plausibility check, ensures the operation of the rail traffic system in a particularly economical and flexible manner. Controlling the rail traffic 5 system using the result of the plausibility check enables the rail traffic sys-tem to be controlled on the basis of a particularly reliable information base.

If the validity of the rail traffic information is confirmed by the result of the plausibility check, the at least one rail vehicle can be classified in a higher control capacity class. In the event of a result of the plausibility check 10 which speaks against the validity of the rail traffic information, the control capacity class of the at least one rail vehicle can be downgraded, in particu-lar if the result of the plausibility check speaks against the validity of the rail traffic information several times, in particular several times in succes-sion.
A method comprising classifying the at least one rail vehicle in a higher control capacity class due to continuous transmission of the second rail traffic information, ensures the operation of the rail traffic system in a par-ticularly safe and economical manner. By continuously receiving and pro-20 cessing the rail traffic information, the comparison result and/or the result of the plausibility check can be determined continuously. This can ensure a particularly high reliability of the rail traffic information, allowing the rail vehicle to be classified in a higher control capacity class. Alternatively or additionally, the infrastructure facility may be classified in a higher control 25 capacity class due to the continuous receipt of the rail traffic information from the rail vehicle.

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-14-A method comprising classifying the at least one rail vehicle depending on the result of the plausibility check, ensures the operation of the rail traffic system in a particularly safe manner. If the result of the plausibility check is positive, the control capacity class can be upgraded or remains at an un-5 changed high level. If the result of the plausibility check is negative, the control capacity class can be downgraded or remains at an unchanged low level. In the event of a poor result of the plausibility check, the rail vehicle can continue to be operated at reduced maximum speed, or be stopped, and/or maintenance measures can be carried out on the rail vehicle.
A method comprising transferring at least one rail vehicle on the basis of its control capacity class to a highly utilized rail line section to increase the traffic capacity, ensures the operation of the rail traffic system in a particu-larly economical manner. Preferably, rail vehicles of a high control capac-
15 ity class are transferred to areas of the rail network, in particular to rail line sections that are heavily utilized. Rail vehicles of a low control capacity class can be moved out of these areas. This is advantageous in that heavily utilized areas of the rail network can be travelled particularly densely. The traffic capacity of the rail traffic system can thus be increased in these ar-20 eas. In areas of the rail network in which only rail vehicles of a high con-trol capacity class are arranged, these can, for example, be operated on the basis of moving spatial distances and/or autonomously controlling them-selves, in particular without control commands from the infrastructure fa-cility.
A method, wherein controlling the rail traffic system using the result of the plausibility check comprises the determination of travel parameter ranges CLEAN

to be complied with and/or rail line sections that can be travelled on, en-sures the operation of the rail traffic system in a particularly safe manner.
For example, travel parameter ranges such as the maximum traction drive power, and/or the maximum travelling speed, and/or the maximum braking 5 power can be controlled, in particular limited, based on the result of the plausibility check. Rail line sections can be opened or closed using the re-sult of the plausibility check. For example, heavily utilized rail line sec-tions can be closed for a rail vehicle that delivers a negative result of the plausibility check, in particular does not generate valid rail traffic infor-mation.
A method, wherein controlling the rail traffic system is based at least in part on travelling in moving spatial distances, is particularly economical to execute. Travelling in moving spatial distances ensures a particularly high 15 traffic capacity. Preferably, the control of the rail traffic system takes place depending on the result of the plausibility check and/or the control capacity class either in moving spatial distances or fixed spatial distances. In the rail traffic system, in particular in different rail line sections, the control of the rail traffic system can be carried out uniformly or non-uniformly, in partic-20 ular in moving and/or fixed spatial distances.
A method comprising controlling the infrastructure facility due to a control command of the at least one rail vehicle, ensures the operation of the rail traffic system in a particularly safe and economical manner. Preferably, the 25 at least one rail vehicle can travel on the infrastructure facility, in particular the rail network, completely autonomously, in particular without a control command from the infrastructure facility. For this purpose, the rail vehicle CLEAN
-16-can control the infrastructure facility, in particular rail signals and/or turn-outs, in particular rail adjusting means and/or rail supply means, in particu-lar the electric power provided via an overhead line. For this purpose, the rail vehicle can receive sensor data collected by the infrastructure facility 5 or be controlled exclusively by means of sensor data collected by the rail vehicle itself.
A further object of the invention is to create an improved rail traffic system which is particularly safe, economical, and flexible in operation.
This object may be achieved by way of a rail traffic system having - an infrastructure facility and/or - at least one rail vehicle, - with the infrastructure facility and/or the at least one rail vehicle hay-15 ing at least one control unit for carrying out a method for safely operat-ing a rail traffic system.
The advantages of the rail traffic system according to the invention corre-spond to the advantages of the method described above. Preferably, the rail 20 traffic system is further developed with at least one of the features de-scribed above in connection with the method. The infrastructure facility and/or the at least one rail vehicle may have at least one control unit, in particular a vehicle control unit, and/or a control-centre control unit for car-rying out the method described above.
The invention also relates to a computer program product for carrying out the method described above. The advantages of the computer program CLEAN
-17-product correspond to the advantages of the method described above. Pref-erably, the computer program product is further developed with at least one of the features described above in connection with the method. The com-puter program product can be stored on a storage unit of the at least one 5 control unit and/or on a portable storage unit.
Further features, details, and advantages of the invention result from the following description of an embodiment based on the figures.

Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of a rail traffic system, comprising an infrastructure facility with a first rail line sec-tion, a first rail vehicle entering the first rail line section, and 15 a second rail vehicle leaving the first rail line section, Fig. 2 shows a side view of the first rail vehicle in Fig. 1, Fig. 3 shows a schematic representation of the rail traffic system in 20 Fig. 1, with means for collecting and transmitting rail traffic information being shown in further detail, and Fig. 4 shows a block diagram of the rail traffic information ex-changed in the rail traffic system in Fig. 1 between the re-25 spective rail vehicle and the infrastructure facility.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

CLEAN
-18-Figs. 1 to 4 describe an embodiment of a rail traffic system 1. The rail traf-fic system 1 comprises an infrastructure facility 2 and a plurality of rail ve-hicles 3, 4, in particular a first rail vehicle 3 and a second rail vehicle 4.
5 The infrastructure facility 2 has a rail network 5. The rail network 5 is di-vided into a plurality of rail line sections 6, 7, 8. The rail line sections 6, 7, 8 overlap each other. In such an overlapping area 9, 10, there are tracks 11 assigned to a plurality of rail line sections 6, 7, 8. Alternatively, at least in-dividual, in particular all of the rail line sections 6, 7, 8 can be designed 10 without overlapping, in particular directly adjacent to each other.
The infrastructure facility 2 has rail sensors 12a, 12b, rail adjusting means 13, rail signals 14a, and rail supply means 15 along the tracks 11. The rail sensors 12a, 12b can be designed to detect a measuring value correlating 15 with a passing rail vehicle 3, 4. The detection of a measuring value is also understood to mean the measurement of the measuring value. The rail sen-sors 12a, 12b can be designed as point-shaped rail sensors 12a or as line-shaped rail sensors 12b. Point-shaped rail sensors 12a are understood to be, for example, axle counters. Line-shaped rail sensors 12b are understood to 20 be rail sensors 12b based in particular on light being conducted in a fibre, in particular in an optical fibre. The rail adjusting means 13 can be de-signed as a switch drive. The rail signal 14a can be a switchable light signal or a movable, in particular switchable, semaphore signal. An optical mark-ing 14b, also referred to as a fixed point marker, is attached near the track 25 11. Further, a person 14c, in particular a track worker, is near the track 11.
Preferably, the optical marking 14b is in the form of a QR code. The rail supply means 15 can be an overhead line for supplying the rail vehicles 3, 4 with electric power.

CLEAN
-19-Further, the infrastructure facility 2 comprises a control centre 16, 17, 18 for each rail line section 6, 7, 8. The respective control centre 16, 17, 18 controls the rail traffic within the assigned rail line section 6, 7, 8. For this 5 purpose, the respective control centre 16, 17, 18 is connected in a signal-transmitting manner with the rail sensors 12a, 12b, the adjusting means 13, the rail signals 14a and the rail supply means 15, which are assigned to the respective rail section 6, 7, 8. In particular, these can be controlled and/or read out by means of the respective control centre 16, 17, 18.
Fig. 2 shows the rail line section 8 of the rail traffic system 1 in further de-tail. The first rail vehicle 3 is arranged on the track 11. The first rail vehicle 3 is supplied with electric power via the overhead line 15. The first rail ve-hicle 3 has a vehicle radio module 19 in the form of a 5G radio module, a 15 tracking module 19a, in particular a radio tracking module for radio trilat-eration, a position detection module 20, and a first optical sensor 21a in the form of a camera. Further, the first rail vehicle 3 comprises a vehicle con-trol unit 22 for processing digital data. The vehicle control unit 22 is con-nected in a signal-transmitting manner, in particular wired connection, with
20 the vehicle radio module 19, the tracking module 19a, the position detec-tion module 20, and the first optical sensor 21a. The position detection module 20 is preferably designed as a GPS module and serves to detect the position of the second rail vehicle 4. The first optical sensor 21a is de-signed, in particular together with the vehicle control unit 22, to automati-25 cally recognize rail signals 14a and/or objects in the area of the track, in particular people 14c in the track and/or fixed point markers 14b. The sec-ond optical sensor 21b may be designed according to the first optical sen-sor for detecting objects in the track and/or optical markings 14b.

CLEAN

The control centre 18 comprises a control-centre radio module 23, which is designed as a 5G radio module. Further, the control centre 18 comprises a control-centre control unit 24 for processing digital data. The control centre 5 18, in particular the control-centre control unit 24, is connected in a signal-transmitting, in particular wired, manner with the rail sensors 12a, 12b, the rail adjusting means 13, the rail signals 14a, and the rail supply means 15.
With regard to the mode of operation of the rail sensor 12b, which is based on light being conducted in an optical fibre, reference is made to WO
10 2020/108873 Al. The control-centre control unit 24 is further connected with the control-centre radio module 23 in a signal-transmitting manner.
The first rail vehicle 3 is connected with the third control centre 18 via the vehicle radio module 19 and the control-centre radio module 23 in a signal-15 transmitting, in particular wireless, manner. Wireless signal connections 25 are shown as dash-dot lines in the figures. Wired signal connections 26 are shown as dashed lines in the figures.
The second rail vehicle 4 leaving the first rail line section 6 is connected 20 with the first control centre 16, in particular via a vehicle radio module 19, in a wireless, signal-transmitting manner. Rail vehicles 3, 4 arranged in the overlapping areas 9, 10 can be in signal connection with the control centres 16, 17, 18 of several of the rail line sections 6, 7, 8 at the same time.
25 In Fig. 3, the rail traffic system 1 is shown in further detail with the two rail vehicles 3, 4, which are arranged in the first rail line section 6.

CLEAN
-21-In addition to the sensors 20, 21a described above, the first rail vehicle 3 further comprises a second optical sensor 21b, in particular a front camera, a completeness monitoring device 27 for monitoring the completeness of the first rail vehicle 3, in particular the existence of a mechanical connec-5 tion between two running trailers 28a, 28b mechanically coupled to each other. Further, the first rail vehicle 3 comprises a drive unit 29 and a brake unit 30. The completeness monitoring device 27, the drive unit 29 and the brake unit 30 are connected with the vehicle control unit 22 via the wired signal connection 26.
The second rail vehicle 4 has a vehicle radio module 19, a drive unit 29, a brake unit 30, and a vehicle control unit 22. The second rail vehicle 4 does not have any sensors to determine the existence of an existing mechanical coupling between its running trailers 28a, 28b, 28c, or to detect the posi-15 tion, or to detect objects in the track. The first rail vehicle 3 is accordingly grouped in a higher control capacity class than the second rail vehicle 4.
The infrastructure facility 2 comprises the first rail sensor 12a, which is de-signed to detect a passing rail vehicle 3, 4, in particular to detect the num-20 ber of running trailers 28a, 28b, 28c coupled to each other. The second rail sensor 12b, which is designed in the form of the optical fibre sensor, also enables the detection of a rail vehicle 3, 4 that is transferred over the track 11 equipped therewith.
25 The mode of operation of the rail traffic system 1, in particular the control units 22, 24, is as follows:

CLEAN
-22-The first rail vehicle 3 is located in the third rail line section 8. The second rail vehicle 4 is located in the first rail line section 6. The wireless signal connection 25 exists between the first rail vehicle 3 and the third control centre 18. There is also a wireless signal connection 25 between the first 5 control centre 16 and the second rail vehicle 4.
By means of the respective vehicle control unit 22 of the rail vehicles 3, 4 and the sensors 20, 21a, 21b, 27 connected thereto, rail traffic information is collected, in particular continuously. By means of the infrastructure fa-10 cility 2, in particular the first control centre 16, in particular the control-centre control unit 24, and the sensors 12a, 12b connected thereto, further rail traffic information is determined. The rail traffic information describes a current state of the rail traffic system 1, in particular of the infrastructure facility 2, in particular the state of the rail signals 14a as well as of the rail 15 adjusting means 13 and the state of the rail vehicles 3, 4, in particular their position, speed, brake curve, completeness, and/or their drive and braking power.
The two rail vehicles 3, 4 are classified in different control capacity clas-20 ses. The decisive factor for this classification is the ability of the rail vehi-cle 3, 4 to move safely through the rail network 5 to a certain extent, in par-ticular completely, independently of the infrastructure facility 2. In particu-lar, it is decisive whether the respective rail vehicle 3, 4 has the sensory and/or processor capacity required for this. The first rail vehicle 3 is classi-25 fled in a higher control capacity class because it can collect and process a larger volume of rail traffic information compared to the second rail vehi-cle 4. Further, the safety integrity level (SIL) of the respective rail vehicle CLEAN
-23-3, 4, in particular of the sensors 20, 21a, 21b, 27, is decisive. The safety in-tegrity level of a sensor is higher the more precise and robust the measuring values it detects are, in particular the lower its probability of failure is.
5 Fig. 4 shows the exchange of rail traffic information 31, 32 between the first rail vehicle 3 and the first control centre 16. When the second rail ve-hicle 4 enters the first rail line section 6, in particular the first overlapping area 10, a connection 33a is established between the first rail vehicle 3 and the first control centre 16.
By means of the first rail vehicle 3, the first rail traffic information 31 is determined, in particular continuously. By means of the position detection module 20, the position of the first rail vehicle 3 along the track 11, in par-ticular in the rail network 5, is determined. By means of the optical sensor 15 21a, 2 lb, it is determined whether objects that could potentially interfere with the rail traffic are located in the area of the track 11. Further, rail sig-nals 14a are automatically recognized by means of the optical sensors 21a, 21b and the vehicle control unit 22. By means of the at least one optical sensor 21a, 21b, optical markings 14b can further be detected, in particular 20 for determining the position of the rail vehicle 3, in particular along the track 11. The position of the rail vehicle 3 can be determined on the basis of the fixed point markers 14b and by means of the optical sensors 21a, 21b. A signal from the completeness monitoring device 27 is used to detect whether all running trailers 28a, 28b are connected to each other. This data 25 detected in a sensory manner by means of the rail vehicle 3 is referred to as vehicle sensor data 34. Further, the vehicle control unit 22 determines travel parameters 35 that describe the travelling state of the first rail vehicle 3. The travel parameters 35 comprise the drive power provided by the drive CLEAN
-24-unit 29 and the braking power generated by the brake unit 30. The first rail traffic information 31 may further comprise adjusting commands 36 and vehicle correction information 37.
5 By means of the tracking module 19a, which may be designed in particular in the form of an anchor module, the position of the rail vehicle 3, in partic-ular along the track 11, is determined. The tracking module 19b may be de-signed identically to the vehicle radio module 19 or as a separate compo-nent. By means of the tracking module 19a, tracking markers 19b, 19c can 10 be detected, which can be designed to be stationary, as part of the infra-structure facility 2, or movable. Stationary tracking markers 19b can, for example, be attached to infrastructure elements, in particular near the track 11. Movable tracking markers 19c may be carried, for example, by people 14c such as track construction workers. With regard to the mode of opera-15 tion of a monitoring system for determining the position of the rail vehicle 3 and/or people 14c by means of the tracking module 19a, reference is made to W02021/121854 Al. The position of the rail vehicle 3 and/or peo-ple 14c is determined by means of a trilateration method, in particular by means of radio trilateration, in particular by means of WiFi trilateration. A
20 warning signal is preferably transmitted to the person 14c who is in a dan-ger zone, in particular via a radio connection 25, and/or an optical signal, and/or an acoustic signal, in particular by means of the rail vehicle 3.
The second rail traffic information 32 is determined by the infrastructure
25 facility 2, in particular the first control centre 16, in particular the control-centre control unit 24. The second rail traffic information 32 comprises control centre sensor data 38, which are determined on the basis of the rail sensors 12a, 12b, and adjusting parameters 39, which have information CLEAN

about the adjusting state of the rail adjusting means 13, the rail signals 14a, and the rail supply means 15. Further, the second rail traffic information 32 may comprise travel commands 40 and control centre correction infor-mation 41.
Via the wireless signal connection 25, the rail traffic information 31, 32 is exchanged between the first rail vehicle 3 and the infrastructure facility 2.
To determine the comparison result, a comparison 33b of the first rail traf-fic information 31 and the second rail traffic information 32 takes place, in particular the information portions of the rail traffic information 31, 32 cor-relating with the same state variable of the rail traffic system 1 are com-pared with each other. For example, it is compared whether the rail sensors 12a, 12b detect the same position and speed of the rail vehicle 4 as the po-sition detection means 20. Further, it can be compared whether the number of mechanically connected running trailers 28a, 28b detected by the com-pleteness monitoring device 27 matches the number of mechanically con-nected running trailers 28a, 28b detected by the rail sensors 12a, 12b. Addi-tionally, it is possible to compare whether the rail signals 14a automatically detected by the optical sensors 21a, 21b match the rail signals 14a actually predefined by the infrastructure facility 2, in particular to the adjusting pa-rameters 39.
Using this comparison result, a result of the plausibility check is deter-mined as a value for the validity of the first rail traffic information 31.
The first rail traffic information 31 is considered plausible and therefore correct if it matches the second rail traffic information 32. For example, the posi-tion of the first rail vehicle 3 determined by means of the position detection CLEAN
-26-module 20 is considered plausible if it matches the position determined by means of the rail sensors 12a, 12b.
The rail traffic system 1 is preferably controlled using the result of the 5 plausibility check. The travel command 40 may comprise position infor-mation if the position detection by means of the position detection module 20 provides plausible vehicle sensor data 34, in particular data matching position information of the infrastructure facility 2. In particular, the travel command 40 may comprise a relative position, in particular a distance, to 10 the first rail vehicle 3 travelling ahead. Based on the plausibility of the po-sition information, the rail vehicles 3, 4 can be safely controlled by means of the travel command 40, in particular moved at a certain safety distance from each other in the rail network 5.
15 There may be deviations between the first rail traffic information 31 and the second rail traffic information 32, in particular with regard to at least one state variable of the rail traffic system 1. Such deviations are recog-nized when determining the result of the plausibility check using a compar-ison result on the basis of the rail traffic information 31, 32. Using the 20 comparison result, the first rail traffic information 31 can be modified. In particular, the rail traffic system 1 can be controlled on the basis of the modified first rail traffic information 31. For example, the position deter-mined by the second rail vehicle 4 can be corrected to match the position of the rail vehicle 4 determined by one of the rail sensors 12a, 12b.
Preferably, the collection of the first rail traffic information 31 is calibrated using the comparison result, in particular the sensors 20, 21a, 21b, 27 can be calibrated using the comparison result. For example, the speed of the CLEAN
-27-rail vehicle 4 detected by the position detection module 20 and the vehicle control unit 22 can be calibrated according to the time period determined by rail sensors 12a, 12b, which elapses between the passing of two succes-sive rail sensors 12a, 12b whose distance along the track is known.
Determining the result of the plausibility check is preferably done at regu-lar time intervals, for example at intervals of 1 s.
Determining the comparison result, in particular the result of the plausibil-ity check, creates the possibility of checking the reliability of rail traffic in-formation 31 determined by means of the respective rail vehicle 3, 4, in particular continuously, and increasing it with regard to its validity. This enables sensors 20, 21a, 21b, 27 of the respective rail vehicle 3, 4 to be classified in a higher safety integrity level. Further, the rail vehicle 3, 4 can be classified in a higher control capacity class. Appropriate use of the com-parison result ensures that measurement inaccuracies can be reliably recog-nized, in particular compensated for.
Determining corresponding correction information can be carried out to compensate for measurement inaccuracies on the part of the rail vehicle 3, 4 by means of the control centres 16, 17, 18. Corresponding control centre correction information 41 can be transmitted to the rail vehicle 3, 4 for cor-recting the vehicle sensor data 34.
In the case of a particularly high control capacity class, in particular in the case of a high safety integrity level of the rail vehicle 3, 4, the second rail traffic information 32 can alternatively or additionally be corrected by means of the first rail traffic information 31 using the comparison result. In CLEAN
-28-particular, the second rail traffic information 32 can be corrected using the comparison result, in particular on the basis of a vehicle correction infor-mation 37.
5 Further rail traffic information 42 is preferably transmitted from the second rail vehicle 4, in particular via the wireless signal connection 25 directly or via the first control centre 16, to the first rail vehicle 3. The comparison re-sult can be determined on the basis of the first rail traffic information 31 and the second and/or the further rail traffic information 32, 42. Advanta-10 geously, this means that further rail traffic information 42 is available for assessing the validity of the first rail traffic information 31 and can be used for an even more reliable result of the plausibility check. Alternatively, the further rail traffic information 42 of the second rail vehicle 4 can replace the second rail traffic information 32, in particular for determining the 15 comparison result.
The control of the rail vehicles 3, 4 is preferably carried out on the basis of their control capacity classes. Rail vehicles 3, 4 of different control capac-ity classes can be controlled in the same rail traffic system 1 in different 20 manners. For example, the first rail vehicle 3 with the higher control capac-ity class can itself provide the travel commands 40 required to travel on the rail network 5 and/or provide adjusting commands 36 to control the infra-structure facility 2, in particular the control centre 16, 17, 18, in particular to control the rail supply means 15, the rail signals 14a, and the rail adjust-25 ing means 13. The second rail vehicle 4 can be controlled exclusively by means of travel commands 40 of the infrastructure facility 2.

CLEAN
-29-Preferably, the control of the first rail vehicle 3 in the rail network 5 is car-ried out according to the principle of travelling in moving spatial distances, and/or the control of the second rail vehicle 4 is carried out according to the principle of travelling in fixed spatial distances.
Using the result of the plausibility check and/or on the basis of the control capacity class, it can be determined which travel parameter ranges, in par-ticular which travelling speed and/or which travel distance to a preceding rail vehicle 3 must be maintained, and/or which maximum drive power must be maintained by the rail vehicle 3, 4, and/or which rail line sections 6, 7, 8 may be travelled on. For example, the maximum permissible travel-ling speed of a rail vehicle 3, 4 can be reduced due to a lack of plausibility with regard to the determined rail traffic information 31.
The traffic capacity, in particular the density of rail vehicles 3, 4, with which a rail line section 6, 7, 8 may be travelled on, depends on how large the travel distances between two successive rail vehicles 3, 4 must be in or-der to reliably ensure safe operation of the rail traffic system 1. The manda-tory minimum travel distance decreases with increasing control capacity class of the respective rail vehicle 3, 4. To increase the traffic capacity of heavily utilized rail line sections 6, 7, 8, rail vehicles 3, 4 can be transferred to heavily utilized rail line sections 6, 7, 8, in particular from less heavily utilized rail line sections 6, 7, 8, on the basis of their control capacity clas-ses. Rail vehicles 3, 4 of lower control capacity classes can be transferred from heavily utilized rail line sections 6, 7, 8 to less heavily utilized rail line sections 6, 7, 8.

CLEAN
-30-By controlling the rail traffic system 1 using the result of the plausibility check, it is advantageously achieved that the operation of the rail traffic system 1 can be carried out particularly safely. Comparing 33b different traffic information 31, 32 increases the reliability of the information base 5 for controlling the rail vehicles 3, 4 and the infrastructure facility 2.
The control capacity class of a rail vehicle 3, 4 can be increased due to the higher reliability of this rail traffic information 31, 32. The traffic capacity of the rail network 5 can be increased. In particular, the traffic capacity of certain heavily utilized rail line sections 6, 7, 8 can be increased. The 10 method is suitable for safely operating a rail traffic system 1 with rail vehi-cles 3, 4 that are equipped with the same or different sensors and proces-sors. In particular, the rail traffic system 1 can be used for mixed opera-tions, with rail vehicles of different control capacity classes. The method enables the operation of a rail traffic system 1 in a particularly safe, eco-15 nomical, and flexible manner.

Claims (16)

TRANSLATION
Claims
1. A method for safely operating a rail traffic system (1), having the steps:
5 1.1. Collecting first rail traffic information (31) correlating with a state variable of the rail traffic system (1), 1.2. Transmitting second rail traffic information (32, 42) correlating with the state variable of the rail traffic system (1) between a first rail vehicle (3) and an infrastructure facility (2) and/or a second rail 10 vehicle (4), 1.3. Determining a comparison result on the basis of the first rail traffic information (31) and the second rail traffic information (32, 42), 1.4. Checking the plausibility of the first rail traffic information (31) and/or the second rail traffic information (32, 42) using the com-15 parison result, and 1.5. Controlling the rail traffic system (1) using the result of the plausi-bility check.
2. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the first rail 20 traffic information (31) is collected by means of the first rail vehicle (3), and that the second rail traffic information (32, 42) is transmitted to the first rail vehicle (3).
3. A method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that the first rail 25 traffic information (31) is collected by means of the infrastructure fa-cility (2), and that the second rail traffic information (32, 42) is trans-mitted to the infrastructure facility (2).

TRANSLATION
4. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the first rail traffic information (31) and/or the second rail traffic information (32, 42) is based on a measuring value detected in a sen-sory manner.
5. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that checking the plausibility is done at regular time intervals.
6. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by controlling the rail traffic system (1) by means of at least one piece of rail traffic information (31, 32) modified using the comparison result.
7. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by calibrating the collection of the first rail traffic information (31) and/or the second rail traffic information (32, 42) using the comparison result.
8. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by controlling rail vehicles (3, 4) of different control capacity classes in the same rail traffic system (1) in different manners.
9. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by classifying the at least one rail vehicle (3, 4) in a higher control capac-ity class due to controlling the rail traffic system (1) using the result of the plausibility check.
10. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by classifying the at least one rail vehicle (3, 4) in a higher control capac-ity class due to continuous transmission of the second rail traffic infor-mation (31, 32).

TRANSLATION
11. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by classifying the at least one rail vehicle (3, 4) depending on the result of the plausibility check.
12. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by transferring at least one rail vehicle (3, 4) on the basis of its control ca-pacity class to a highly utilized rail line section (6, 7, 8) to increase the traffic capacity.
13. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that controlling the rail traffic system (1) using the result of the plausi-bility check comprises the determination of travel parameter ranges to be complied with and/or rail line sections (6, 7, 8) that can be travelled on.
14. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that controlling the rail traffic system (1) is based at least in part on travelling in moving spatial distances.
15. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by controlling the infrastructure facility (2) due to a control command of the at least one rail vehicle (3, 4).
16. A rail traffic system (1), having 16.1. an infrastructure facility (2) and/or 16.2. at least one rail vehicle (3, 4), TRANSLATION
16.3. with the infrastructure facility (2) and/or the at least one rail vehi-cle (3, 4) having at least one control unit (22, 24) for carrying out a method according to one of the claims 1 to 15.
CA3225474A 2021-07-15 2022-07-14 Method for safely operating a rail traffic system and rail traffic system Pending CA3225474A1 (en)

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PCT/EP2022/069759 WO2023285603A1 (en) 2021-07-15 2022-07-14 Method for the safe operation of a rail transport system, and rail transport system

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SE536548C2 (en) * 2012-06-14 2014-02-11 Scania Cv Ab System and method for controlling vehicles in a vehicle train
DE102013101927A1 (en) * 2013-02-27 2014-08-28 Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. Device for automatically controlling rolling stock of train e.g. locomotive, has train end monitor attached with rolling stock of train, where device detects whether train end monitor is attached with rolling stock of train
US20180017417A1 (en) * 2016-07-13 2018-01-18 Electro-Motive Diesel, Inc. System and method for identifying and predicting faults in sensors of locomotives
DE102018118661B4 (en) * 2017-08-04 2021-01-21 Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. Method for determining the distance between two trains or two parts of a train
EP3887222A1 (en) 2018-11-26 2021-10-06 Plasser & Theurer Export Von Bahnbaumaschinen Gesellschaft m.b.H. Measurement arrangement for monitoring a section of track
AT17358U1 (en) 2019-12-16 2022-02-15 Plasser & Theurer Export Von Bahnbaumaschinen Gmbh Method and monitoring system for determining a position of a rail vehicle
AT17200U1 (en) 2019-12-16 2021-09-15 Plasser & Theurer Export Von Bahnbaumaschinen Gmbh Signal box-bound gang warning system

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