BR102017008131A2 - wrapper evidence device and wrapper registration process, validation process and control system to evidence wrapper violation - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a housing tamper evidence device (1) comprising a main body (18) with at least one rotational element (3, 4, 5), at least one drive means (17) which is actuated. through contact with the external environment, wherein each of the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) has a mechanical shaft connected to at least one drive means (17), wherein each of the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) comprises at least one electromagnetic indicator (16), and an electromagnetic reader (15), wherein the electromagnetic reader (15) obtains a security number regarding the number of openings and closings of the enclosure from the electromagnetic indicators (16). generating random indicators. The present invention also proposes a housing registration process for evidencing housing tampering, which comprises the steps of connecting at least one housing in an automated apparatus and verifying the housing serial number. In addition, a validation process is provided for evidencing enclosure tampering, which comprises the steps of connecting the enclosure to a self-service apparatus, verifying the enclosure serial number and verifying the enclosure security number, the present invention defines further a tamper-evident control system comprising at least one housing, each housing comprising: a seal including a sealing number, a serial number and the tamper-evident indicating device (1) previously described; and a control interface comprising means for reading the enclosure serial number; means for entering the serial number of said enclosure at the control interface; means for comparing a housing serial number with the serial numbers entered on the control interface; means for reading the enclosure security number; means for entering the enclosure security number at the control interface; means for comparing a security number of a wrapper with the security numbers registered on the control interface.

Description

(54) Title: EVOLUTION DEVICE FOR INVOLVEMENTS, AND, INVOLVEMENT REGISTRATION PROCESS, VALIDATION PROCESS AND CONTROL SYSTEM TO EVIDENCE INVOLVEMENT VIOLATION (51) Int. Cl .: G06K 7/00; G08B 13/00; G09F 3/03 (73) Owner (s): OKI BRASIL INDÚSTRIA E COMÉRCIO DE PRODUCOS E TECNOLOGIA EM AUTOMAÇÃO S.A.

(72) Inventor (s): CARLOS ALBERTO MINORU YAMASHITA; DIEGO ZANCHI BERCIANO SANJURJO (85) Start date of the National Phase:

04/19/2017 (57) Abstract: The present invention relates to a tamper-evident device (1) of envelopes comprising a main body (18) with at least one rotational element (3, 4, 5), at least a drive means (17) that is driven through contact with the external environment, in which each of the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) has a mechanical axis connected to at least one drive means (17), in which each rotational element (3, 4, 5) comprises at least one electromagnetic indicator (16), and an electromagnetic reader (15), in which the electromagnetic reader (15) obtains a security number referring to the number of openings and closings of the enclosure from the electromagnetic indicators (16) generating random indicators. The present invention also proposes a process of registering envelopes to show violation of envelopes, which comprises the steps of connecting at least one enclosure to an automated device and verifying the serial number of the enclosure. In addition, a validation process is provided to evidence breach of wrappers, which comprises the steps of connecting the wrapper to a device (...)

[<—12 / 37 “INVOLVEMENT BREACH EVIDENCE DEVICE, AND, INVOLVEMENT REGISTRATION PROCESS, VALIDATION PROCESS AND CONTROL SYSTEM TO EVIDENCE INVOLVEMENT VIOLATION”

TECHNICAL FIELD [001] The present invention relates to a device, process and system for detecting tampering with tampering, more particularly, a device, process and system for detecting tampering for wrapping used in automated devices and which are transported from one automated device to another.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF THE TECHNIQUE [002] With the growing demand for products and services, automated devices are increasingly being developed to meet the needs of society. In general, automated devices are devices capable of verifying and controlling their own functioning, making measurements and introducing corrections, without the need for constant human interference.

[003] An example of an automated device is self-service devices. Self-service devices are able to deal directly with a customer without the need for an establishment employee to intermediate an operation. In this way, self-service devices eliminate the need for an employee to be present to serve and serve the customer, which dramatically decreases the operating costs of a business as a whole.

[004] Another great advantage of self-service devices is the possibility of placing them in the most diverse locations, remotely from the service provider offered by the device. In general, ATMs are located inside bank branches, shopping malls, gas stations and establishments in general, or even in kiosks

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 9/64 / 37 external located at strategic points on the streets.

[005] In general, ATMs work with a cash flow of banknotes, so they need a safe and tamper-proof safe inside, to prevent the machine from being easily broken into and your banknote cash carried away by thieves. The need for a security safe is even more critical in self-service devices located in remote places with little movement, since thieves can act in an environment without external security.

[006] The safes present in the self-service appliances, generally have walls made of resistant material and have a single means to access the interior of the safe, usually a door, and a means to restrict the opening of the door only to authorized persons, such as example a lock.

[007] The cash available on self-service machines in general are stored in drawers, commonly known as banknote cassettes or simply cassettes, this commonly also served by access restriction systems, commonly using locks.

[008] Due to the large number of cassettes manufactured, the locks for locking them are generally the same, or at least the same for a given group of cassettes. Thus, a single key is capable of opening several different cassettes.

[009] The cassettes are usually transported closed from a distribution center to be installed in self-service devices. At the distribution center, the cassettes are opened and supplied with a certain amount of banknotes, and this cash is registered in a control system for eventual control of cash flow.

[0010] After the cassette is refilled, it is locked and sent for transportation to the ATMs. However,

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 10/64 / 37 Anyone with a key capable of opening the cassette could open it at any time between the cassette's origin and destination - the self-service device - handling the internal cash of the cassette, removing or inserting cash, consequently, changing the predicted values for that cassette. It is noted that the violation may occur in the transfer of the cassette, or even a person who has obtained the key of the cassette illegally. This problem is aggravated by opening the cassette with the key and removing a quantity of cash from the cassette, without any record of the fraud occurring.

[0011] If the cassette has been opened improperly, that is, tampered with, and the offender has withdrawn a banknote cash from the cassette, the cassette will comprise a different banknote cash from the cash initially supplied in the cassette at the distribution center. In case the control system registers this initial value, the moment the cash of this cassette is counted again, there will be a divergence in the expected cash from the initial record and in the real cash inside the cassette, since an improper operation has occurred not counted in the cassette.

[0012] After detecting the cash flow problem in the cassette, it is very difficult for the system or an employee to identify the cause of the problem: whether it was an occurrence during the filling of the cassette, during the transport of the cassette, or an occurrence during the operation of the self-service machine. [0013] Therefore, it is of utmost importance that a violation of the cassette during its transportation is detected before the cassette is installed and begins to carry out cash inflow and outflow operations.

[0014] One way to detect the violation of the cassette is through the use of seals that are broken when opening the casing. These seals are generally made of plastic and / or adhesive material, which is positioned over the cassette so that the opening movement of the cassette door causes the seal to break before a person has access to the inside of the cassette.

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 11/64 / 37 enclosure. Such seals can also contain a serial number to identify the seal, and the serial number can even be identified electronically by the self-service device, providing greater security to the system.

[0015] However, the use of this type of adhesive seal implies the replacement of the adhesive every time the cassette needs to be opened for an authorized operation. The constant exchange of adhesives incurs additional time and costs for the process as a whole. In addition, adhesive materials tend to leave residues where they were fixed, incurring additional cost and time to perform cleaning and removal of residues when changing the adhesive seal.

[0016] Additionally, anyone who has a copy of the adhesive seal could easily break the wrapper, and consequently break the seal, and then replace the seal with a new one. If both seals have the same properties, it will not be possible to identify that the cassette was opened during transport. Thus, the user would be able to access the interior of the enclosure and remove cash from banknotes without leaving any record of violation.

[0017] There are still attempts to identify the violation of the cassette through electronic devices. However, electronic devices require a constant power supply for the functioning of their internal components, such as a battery. Thus, additional care with the device's battery status is necessary, generating additional costs and increasing susceptibility to application failures.

[0018] In addition to the violation control measures applied to the cassette itself, so that a user is able to notice the violation of the cassette when analyzing it, there are control techniques applied to the self-service device that will receive the wrapper.

[0019] The currently known control techniques include a

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 12/64 / 37 control system capable of registering and validating the cassette when it is inserted in an electronic device adapted to receive the cassette, or in a self-service device. The control system consists of software integrated into all ATM machines, which are connected by a network, and capable of obtaining registration information from ATM machines.

[0020] Usually, the cassette that is locked with a lock has a serial number capable of identifying it among the other cassettes. This serial number is registered by the control system and associated with a destination self-service device. Subsequently, when the cassette is inserted into a self-service device, the control system will check through the serial number, whether the inserted cassette is the one associated with and provided for that self-service device, in order to validate the cassette or not.

[0021] However, it is common for the operator responsible for transporting the cassette to have the key required to open it, and thus the cassette can be easily tampered with by such operators. As described above, as a way of avoiding this problem, the cassette is usually sealed with a seal capable of indicating the opening of the cassette, regardless of whether such opening was an authorized opening or a violation. Usually, said seal has an identification number which can be read electronically by the self-service device.

[0022] In this way, the serial number of the cassette and the number of its seal are registered in the control interface during the registration of the cassette. After registration, when a cassette is inserted in a self-service device, it is verified whether the serial number of the cassette corresponds to the number assigned to that self-service device, as well as whether the seal number of the cassette is the same assigned to the said cassette, in order to validate the cassette and identify if the seal was broken.

[0023] However, the registration and validation process can be circumvented

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 13/64 / 37 in case a user has the key to open the cassette and a new seal with the same identification number as the original seal. Thus, the user could open the cassette with the key, remove a cash bank note, replace the broken seal with a new one with the same identification number, and insert the cassette into the destination self-service machine. In this way, the system and / or the user would not be able to detect the violation of the cassette, constituting an occurrence of fraud without evidence of violation.

[0024] It is important to note that the problems related to cassettes for self-service devices mentioned here also apply to casings which have content inside that should not be accessed by unauthorized people.

[0025] Thus, there is a need for a device capable of identifying the violation of a cassette or similar enclosure when it is disconnected from any control system and which does not have access to a network, in which the device is robust and resistant to fraud attempts by bad people.

[0026] In addition, there is a need for a system or process to register a cassette or similar enclosure when it is initially inserted into a self-service appliance or appropriate control equipment, so that the system has additional security measures to enable the effective validation of the cassette or similar enclosure. OBJECTIVES OF THE INVENTION [0027] The objective of the present invention is to provide an essentially mechanical system capable of identifying the violation of a cassette or similar enclosure when it is disconnected from any control system and which does not have access to a network, in which the system is robust and resistant to fraud attempts by people with malicious intent.

[0028] It is another objective of the present invention to provide a system or process for registering and validating a cassette or similar enclosure which

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 14/64 / 37 manipulates the identification information of the cassette or similar enclosure to provide additional security for the system, in which, in case of tampering with the cassette during transport, the system identifies the occurrence of the violation when the cassette is attached to the recording equipment. self service.

[0029] It is yet another objective of the present invention to provide a control or monitoring system or process that is implemented without the need for specific hardware, and yet has a low cost of implementation and installation, so that the system is economically viable and attractive for application in the self-service devices currently used in the market.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION [0030] The present invention relates to a tamper-evident device comprising a main body comprising at least one rotational element, at least one actuating means which is actuated through contact with the external environment, in that each of the rotational elements has a mechanical axis connected to at least one driving means, in which each of the rotational elements comprises at least one electromagnetic indicator, and an electromagnetic reader, in which the electromagnetic reader obtains a security number for the number of openings and closings of the enclosure from the electromagnetic indicators.

[0031] The present invention also proposes a process for registering casings to show violation of casings, in which the casing includes a serial number and a security number, which comprises the steps of connecting at least one casing in an automated device , where the automated device is connected to a control interface, check the serial number of the enclosure, where, if the serial number is not assigned to another enclosure, enter the serial number of the enclosure for at least one device automated control interface; if the serial number

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 15/64 / 37 the wrapper is assigned to another, issue a notification to the user and request corrective action from the same. It is also proposed the step of registering the security number of the enclosure for said enclosure in the control interface.

[0032] Additionally, a validation process is provided to show tampering violation, in which the wrapper includes a seal including a seal number, a serial number and a security number, which comprises the steps of connecting the wrapper in a self-service device, where the self-service device is connected to a control interface; verify, through the control interface, the serial number of the enclosure, in which, if the serial number is not assigned to the enclosure, display a notification to the user and request corrective action thereof; verify, through the control interface, the security number of the enclosure, in which if the security number corresponds to the security number previously registered, validate the enclosure; if the security number does not match the security number previously registered, issue a notification.

[0033] The present invention further defines a control system to detect tampering with envelopes, comprising at least one wrapper, in which each of the wrappers comprises: a seal including a seal number, a serial number, a tamper evidence device violation, the violation evidence device comprising: a main body comprising at least one rotational element; at least one drive means that is driven through contact with the external environment; wherein each of the rotational elements has a mechanical axis connected to at least one driving means; wherein each of the rotational elements comprises at least one magnetic indicator. The system also comprises a control interface, in which the control interface comprises: means for reading the casing's serial number; means for

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 16/64 / 37 register the serial number of said envelope on the control interface; means for comparing a serial number on a wrapper with the serial numbers registered on the control interface; means for reading the casing security number; means for registering the security number of the enclosure at the control interface; means for comparing a security number on a wrapper with the security numbers registered on the control interface.

DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES [0034] The detailed description presented below makes reference to the attached figures, which:

figure 1 shows a longitudinal sectional view of the envelope tampering device;

figure 2 illustrates the tamper evidence device, showing each rotational element separately;

- figure 3 illustrates the tamper evidence device and the drive means used to drive the elements that provide the rotation, illustrating the interaction between the drive means and the rotational elements;

figure 4 shows an example of a binary security number that can be obtained from the tamper evidence device;

- figure 5 illustrates a flowchart showing the steps of the current way of carrying out the use of a new enclosure, its supply and loading in an automated device;

- figure 6 illustrates a flowchart showing the steps of the current mode of exchange of enclosure between automated devices;

- figure 7 illustrates a flowchart showing the steps of the current recognition mode of a cash storage device in an automated device;

- figure 8 illustrates a flow chart showing the steps of the

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 17/64 / 37 process proposed by the invention for the configuration and registration of an enclosure in automated devices;

- figure 9 illustrates a flowchart showing the steps in details of the process proposed by the invention for the step of inserting and registering a new enclosure in an automated device present in Figure 8;

figure 10 illustrates a flow chart for the case where a wrapper is transported from a first automated device to a second automated device, where the process of validating a wrapper inserted in an automated device is described;

figure 11 shows a flowchart of the recognition mode of a cash storage device in an automated device proposed by the present invention;

- figure 12 shows a flowchart of the validation steps of the enclosure in the automated device, where the control interface checks the security number provided by the enclosure;

- figure 13 shows a flowchart of the steps for validating the enclosure in the automated device, where the validation of the enclosure occurs whenever the automated device is initialized.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION [0035] The following description will start from a preferred embodiment of the invention, where the tamper-evident device is applied to a cassette, which have a special application for self-service devices and / or that work with buying and selling products and handling cash.

[0036] Similarly, the registration and validation processes described are applied for the validation of cassettes in self-service terminals and devices that work with movement and / or storage of cash. [0037] Finally, the control interface that integrates the evidence of violation device and the registration and validation processes will be illustrated

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 18/64 / 37 also from a preferred embodiment of the present invention, in which the tamper evidence device is applied to a cassette and the registration and validation processes are performed by a self-service device.

[0038] However, as will become evident to any technician in the subject, the invention is not limited to these particular embodiments, let alone an exclusively financial use, and can be used in the most varied wrappings to ensure the inviolability of its content, as well as control devices to receive, register and validate said envelopes.

[0039] Figure 1 illustrates a longitudinal sectional view of a preferred embodiment of the tamper evident evidence device 1 of the invention. Preferably, the tamper evidence device 1 is installed inside the housing, and so that the opening and closing action of the housing is detected by the device.

[0040] According to Figure 1, the tamper evidence device 1 comprises a main body 18 comprising at least one rotational element 3, 4, 5. Preferably, the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 are solid rollers and are made of metallic material.

[0041] Each of the rotational elements comprises at least one electromagnetic indicator 16. The electromagnetic indicators 16 are capable of providing an indication for an appropriate reading device, where the indicated value depends on its position on the rotational element. Preferably, the electromagnetic indicator 16 is a magnetic indicator. However, the electromagnetic indicator 16 could be any one of or a combination of magnetic, electrical conductive, inductive, capacitive, reflective specular elements; diffuse optical reflectors; reflective optical polarizers.

[0042] Optionally, the rotational element 3, 4, 5 and the indicators

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 19/64 / 37 electromagnetic 16 are adapted to provide a binary level of “1” when the reading device is aligned with the magnetic indicator, and a binary level of “0” when the reading device is aligned with main body 18 of device 1.

[0043] Thus, in the event that the breach evidence device 1 includes "n" magnetic indicators, the reading device is able to obtain a binary sequence of "n" bits from a reading from a longitudinal position of the main body 18. The binary sequence of “n” bits produced by the breach evidence device 1 will be referred to throughout this report as a security number.

[0044] For a rotational element 3, 4, 5 comprising four or more magnetic indicators 16, this is capable of producing a binary sequence of four or more bits. Whenever there is an opening or closing of the housing, a driving means 17 will drive the axis of the rotational element 3, 4, 5 so that the rotational movement of the rotational element 3, 4, 5 will change the position of the magnetic indicators 16 with relative to a fixed position.

[0045] In this way, a user or a reading device, observing an aligned sequence of bits of the evidence of violation 1 device, will observe a change in the sequence whenever there is an opening or closing of the enclosure.

[0046] In accordance with the preferred embodiment of the present invention, the tamper evidence device 1 is configured to increment the count by one opening or closing of the enclosure by one bit. In case the breach evidence device 1 contains nine bits, the sequence would be changed from, for example, from ‘000000000’ to ‘000000001’. A rotational element configured to increase its binary sequence in response to an opening or closing of the enclosure will be called a sequential rotational element 3.

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 20/64 / 37 [0047] According to the present invention, the sequence of "n" bits produced by the tamper evidence device 1 is effective to indicate tampering with the tamper. The sequence of “n” bits produced by the magnetic indicators 16 of the tamper evidence device 1 must be read by a suitable device. The suitable device is preferably a user's portable device that checks the count and compares it to an expected predetermined value. Optionally, the device is an integrated device in the device that will receive the enclosure, which can use this value to check the enclosure violation.

[0048] For reading the bits of the tamper evidence device, an electromagnetic sensor 15 with a hall effect can be used, these are widely known in the state of the art, and are used in car speedometers. [0049] However, in case the device contains only the sequential rotational element 3, when the binary sequence of “n” bits, representing the count of openings and / or closings of the enclosure reaches its maximum value (for example, for four bits, the maximum value would be '1111'), the device would no longer be able to increment the count value. [0050] For this case, the device could behave in two ways: 1) restart the count, or 2) interrupt the count. In the first case, the device would not be able to effectively evidence the breach of an enclosure, since a malicious operator could open the enclosure and close it until the count reaches its limit, is restarted, and reaches its limit. initial count value before violation. In the second case, there would be a limit on the opening and closing of the enclosure during its transport and filling before the counting was manually restarted. In addition, there would be a need to include a mechanism capable of resetting the device count.

[0051] In order to overcome this limitation, the present invention proposes the inclusion of a second rotational element. The second element

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 21/64 / 37 rotational is called random rotational element 4, 5, since it is configured to generate random sequences of “n” bits when opening or closing the enclosure, with “n” being the number of magnetic indicators present in the rotational element random.

[0052] Therefore, according to an optional embodiment of the present invention, the tamper evidence device 1 comprises two rotational elements, one of which is a sequential rotational element 3 and the other is a random rotational element 4, 5. The sequential rotational element 3 is configured so that the sequence of “n” bits is incremented by a determined number whenever the housing is opened or closed.

[0053] Optionally, the sequential rotational element 3 is configured so that the sequence of “n” bits is incremented by 1 when the housing is opened or closed. For example, for a sequential rotational element 3 of four sensors, the opening or closing movement of the housing would cause the change as follows ‘0001’, ‘0010’, ‘0011’, ‘0100’. For the case of the random rotational element, the opening or closing movement of the enclosure would cause the sequence to change completely randomly, such as ‘0100’, ‘0111’, ‘1001’, ‘1101’.

[0054] The inclusion of a random rotational element 4, 5 resolves the limitation of the sequence of 'n' bits not being able to reproduce the number of openings or closings. Whenever the enclosure is opened or closed, the sequential number will be increased by ‘1’ and its random number will be assigned a random value. Thus, even when the sequential number reaches its maximum value and is restarted, its random part can guarantee the uniqueness of each sequence.

[0055] However, despite the inclusion of the random rotational element

4, 5, there would be the possibility of the sequence of ‘n’ bits being repeated so much in their

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 22/64 / 37 sequential part as random, so that there would be no possibility of detecting the violation of the enclosure. Obviously, the probability of the random number being repeated during a repetition of the sequential part is very low, and is directly linked to the number of bits produced by the magnetic indicators 16 of the sequential and random rotational elements.

[0056] Thus, to provide even more security with respect to the repetition of the sequential and random number, the present invention provides a third rotational element, this being a second random rotational element 5. The advantage of including a new random rotational element 5 instead of more magnetic sensors 16 in a single random rotational element resides in the possibility of varying the physical properties of the rotational element, such as its material, density and diameter.

[0057] According to another optional embodiment of the present invention, the tamper evidence device 1 comprises three rotational elements, one of which is a sequential rotational element 3 and the other two rotational elements are random rotational elements 4, 5. With the use of three rotational elements, the chance of two sequences coinciding is so low that it is possible to guarantee that a shell has not been breached when the binary number shown by the device corresponds to the expected number.

[0058] Although the present invention describes the breach evidence device 1 with up to three rotational elements, it is important to note that there is no limitation for the use of more than three rotational elements, in which it is obvious for a technician in the subject to include new rotational elements and / or vary the amount of magnetic indicators in each rotational element.

[0059] The tamper evidence device 1 further comprises at least one actuation means 17 which is actuated by opening and closing the housing, and is responsible for activating the elements

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 23/64 / 37 rotational 3, 4, 5 of the device. The drive means 17 comprises a drive button 8 and at least one motion transmitter 10, 14, wherein each motion transmitter is connected to a rotational element 3, 4, 5 by means of an axis rotation element 19. According to the preferred embodiment of the present invention, the movement transmitters 10, 14 are driven by the mechanical movement of the opening and closing of the enclosure to be monitored, through actuating axes that drives the rotating movement rotors and the random rollers . Optionally, the driving means 17 further comprises at least one return spring 9 and at least one relief spring 7 of the rotational elements and to provide bit alignment.

[0060] Optionally, the tamper evidence device comprises a push button sensor 6 to detect when the push button 8 is pressed.

[0061] Each of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 has a mechanical axis connected to at least one drive medium 17 (main axis). The mechanical axis of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 is fixed at each end to the main body by means of a bearing 19 and a spacer washer 2. Optionally, spacer washers are also provided between each of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5. Each one of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 comprises at least one magnetic indicator 16.

[0062] Figure 2 illustrates an exploded view of the tamper evidence device 1 according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention, which has a sequential rotational element 3 and two random rotational elements 4, 5. Each of the rotational elements 3 , 4, 5 has a mechanical axis connected to an axis rotation element 19 of the driving means 17. For this, the second and third rotational elements, from left to right, have longitudinal holes so that all can be mounted one across the longitudinal hole of the other, so that the

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 24/64 / 37 rotational elements have concentric axes. In addition, the axes of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 vary in size so that, in the assembled position, all axes are accessible from the right end, where there is interaction with the drive medium 17.

[0063] Figure 3 illustrates the interaction of the drive means 17 with the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 of the tamper evidence device 1. In accordance with the present invention, the tamper evidence device 1 is used to record securely access to an environment or enclosure. Therefore, the tamper evidence device 1 must be installed so that access to the housing presses the trigger button 8. When the trigger button 8 is pressed, it presses the motion transmitters 10, 14 to rotate the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 of the breach evidence device 1.

[0064] Additionally, in order to take advantage of the cylindrical geometry of the rotational elements, each rotational element 3, 4, 5 must have at least one radial sequence of magnetic indicators 16, along a radial length of the cylinder. The presence of several magnetic sensors 15 along a radial sequence makes the rotational element 3, 4, 5 capable of producing a sequence of numbers from one rotation.

[0065] According to the proposed invention, each radial sequence will be responsible for a “bit” of the binary sequence produced by the tamper evidence device. Along the breach evidence device 1, subdivided into at least one rotational element 3, 4, 5 as described above, there will be at least two radial sequences of magnetic indicators 16, with the radial sequences of all rotational elements 3, 4 , 5 are spaced longitudinally from each other. Optionally, and in order to provide greater ease of electronic reading of the tamper evidence device 1, the radial sequences of all rotational elements 3, 4, 5

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 25/64 / 37 are spaced longitudinally with the same distance.

[0066] Optionally, each of the sequential rotational elements has three radial sequences of electromagnetic indicators 16, spaced longitudinally from each other, and in which each of the random rotational elements 4, 5 has nine radial sequences of electromagnetic indicators 16, spaced longitudinally between them. , and in which the longitudinal distance between two sequences of electromagnetic indicators 16 is the same for all sequences.

[0067] Figure 4 illustrates an example of a binary output that can be read by a communication interface 12. According to the preferred embodiment of the present invention, the control interface 12 obtains the binary sequence from the electromagnetic indicators, and can transmit this binary sequence to a suitable reader device. Preferably, the control interface is adapted to transmit the binary sequence to a control interface the moment the enclosure is placed in the self-service apparatus.

[0068] According to Figure 4, from left to right, the first bit corresponds to the indication of the activation button, where, for example, bit '1' would indicate the button is not pressed and bit '0' would indicate the button is pressed. The second bit corresponds to the tamper proof sensor 13, which aims to tamper with the tamper evidence device 1, tamper resistance, tamper detection, tamper response and tamper evidence. The code then has three subsequences of bits corresponding to the sequential rotational element 3 and the two random rotational elements 4, 5, respectively.

[0069] Optionally, the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 have different density from each other, so that from a driving force coming from the driving means 17, each of the rotational elements 3,

4, 5 has distinct angular speeds and, consequently, displacements

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 26/64 / 37 distinct. However, one skilled in the art will notice that the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 can be configured with any different mechanical properties, such as inertia, size.

[0070] Optionally, the breach evidence device 1 includes a display in decimal numbers and an electronic circuit capable of converting the binary count of the magnetic sensors on the said display, facilitating the visualization by a user. The sequential part of the binary number would be shown on the display, indicating the count of openings and closings of the enclosure, while the random part could be displayed as check digits, or could even be displayed. The binary to decimal converter circuit is a circuit widely known in the state of the art, and therefore will not be detailed in the present application.

[0071] Optionally, the main body 18 of the tamper evidence device 1 comprises an external metallic coating to provide magnetic insulation for the interior of the device. Magnetic insulation aims to shield the elements that indicate the external effects of the environment, whether they are magnetic, electrical or optical, in particular external coatings in ferrous and non-ferrous alloys. Magnetic isolation is important because, in its absence, rotational elements 3, 4, 5 could be displaced in the presence of an external magnetic field, modifying the binary sequence produced by the magnetic indicators. Optionally, the metallic outer coating of the tamper evidence device is one of an outer coating of aluminum or aluminum alloys.

[0072] During opening or closing of the enclosure, the drive system 17 causes a rotational movement in all the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 of the device, in which, due to friction, the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 will eventually interrupt the said rotational movement and will come to rest again. However, it is not possible to guarantee

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 27/64 / 37 that the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 will stop at a position where all the magnetic indicators 16 are aligned.

[0073] Thus, it is important that there is a means to ensure that all rotational elements 3, 4, 5 always end in aligned position to provide the binary number capable of identifying the number of openings in the housing.

[0074] In order to overcome this limitation, the present invention proposes the inclusion of a positioning element, which aims to ensure that all rotational elements assume discrete positions determined after the end of the rotational movement, each of which is possible discrete positions correspond to a value, whether sequential or random, predetermined for the rotational elements. Preferably, the positioning element is implemented by magnetic effect or ratchets. [0075] According to an optional embodiment, using relief springs 7 as a positioning element, when the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 are decelerating due to the natural friction of the rotational elements, at a certain moment, the mechanical force of the relief spring 7 in combination with the drive mechanism of the random rollers it will be able to stop the movement of the rotational elements and keep the rotational elements in an alignment position.

[0076] The combination of magnets is capable of turning the set of possibilities of stop positions of the rotational elements, which is normally continuous, with infinite possibilities, in a discrete set, with a certain number of possibilities determined by the number of magnets in the rotational positioning element.

[0077] Thus, the breach evidence device 1 of the present invention solves the technical problem of the lack of a device capable of effectively evidencing the breach of an enclosure. The indication of evidence of violation is given by the sequence of binary numbers that can be

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 28/64 / 37 extracted from the magnetic indicators 16 present in the rotational elements 3, 4, 5, inside the device. The binary sequence can be read by an appropriate device or even converted to a decimal value using a simple circuit known to the state of the art.

[0078] The breach evidence device 1 of the present invention is still advantageous since it uses essentially mechanical components in its construction, providing greater strength to the device and not needing a power supply for its operation.

[0079] It is important to highlight that the breach evidence device 1 can be used in the most diverse applications besides the security of casings for cash transportation, such as, for example, security and / or access control to a casing with content of restricted access, security and / or access control to households and controlled access environments.

[0080] From now on, a process for registering and validating envelopes will be described using an indicative validation number on the same. In this way, the said process will be able to evidence the violation of a wrapper from a previous registration of the indicative number of the wrapper in a system, in which, in the event that the wrapper is disconnected from the system, the system will only validate the wrapper if it indicates an indicative number corresponding to the number previously registered.

[0081] The description that follows will start from a preferred embodiment of the invention, where the registration and wrapping validation process is applied in the exchange of cassettes, which have special application for self-service devices and / or that work with purchase operation and product sales and cash handling.

[0082] However, as will be evident to any technician in the subject, the processes described below are not limited to this achievement

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 29/64 / 37 private, let alone an exclusively financial use, being able to be used in the control of access to the most diverse types casings.

[0083] Figure 5 illustrates the functioning of a process for registering an enclosure in a monitoring system, as it is already known and used by the state of the art. For this illustrative example, the casing is a cash storage device (DAN), such as a cassette, which is inserted into an automated device, such as an ATM terminal, banknote recycling device (DR) or a vending machine. machine.

[0084] The registration and validation of the envelopes will be carried out through a control interface integrated with the automated device, whether such a system is purely software, purely hardware or a combination of hardware and software.

[0085] Initially, an enclosure is opened with a specific key, in which the key can be made to open only one enclosure or a group of enclosures. Opening the casing is necessary to replenish its cash, or to carry out maintenance on the casing.

[0086] Then, the enclosure is inserted into the automated apparatus, with the enclosure and the automated apparatus having a unique serial number capable of identifying them among the other automated enclosures and apparatus, respectively.

[0087] After filling the casing, it is closed with the specific key, in order to prevent its opening by people without the possession of that key. However, it is common for the operator responsible for transporting the enclosure to have the key required to open it, so that the enclosures can be easily breached by such operators. As a way of avoiding this problem, the enclosure is sealed with a seal capable of indicating the opening of the enclosure, regardless of whether such opening was an authorized opening or

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 30/64 / 37 a violation. Usually, the seal has an identification number. [0088] Then, the serial number of the wrapper and the seal number are registered on the control interface, where the system assigns the serial number of the wrapper to the serial number of an automated device and the seal number of the wrapper. to the serial number of the wrapper.

[0089] Figure 6 illustrates a procedure similar to Figure 5, also known from the state of the art, but for the case where a housing can be used by more than one automated device. The procedure in Figure 6 illustrates the initial registration of a wrapper, for example a cash storage device (DAN), in a first automated device, such as a recycling device (DR) and its validation in a second automated device.

[0090] Initially, the enclosure is inserted in a first automated device, where it must be validated according to the process in Figure

5. The casing is then loaded with a cash value, closed and registered to a second automated destination device. The housing is then transported from the first automated device to the second automated device.

[0091] If an operator has opened the casing during its transport, the latter must inform if the cash contents stored in the casing have been changed. If so, the operator must inform the new cash value. This solution is interesting to provide a silent solution for detection, that is, no audible or visual alarm will be triggered when the violation is identified. Thus, when asking the operator if the cash value has been changed, it is possible that a possible fraudster alleges forgetting to inform that there has been a change in value. Thus, if the operator opens the enclosure, he must inform what the new value is, as the system will not indicate that he detected the opening of the cassette, but this verification will occur internally.

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 31/64 / 37 [0092] Another verification performed is that of the security seal. As known from the state of the art, envelopes that carry values, such as cash, usually have seals to indicate that they have not been breached. Thus, an optional embodiment of the process of the present invention comprises the step of verifying the integrity of the seal, which can be done either manually or electronically.

[0093] When inserting the wrapper in the second automated device, the control interface will verify that the serial number of the wrapper corresponds to the serial number assigned to said automated device, as well as will verify that the seal number corresponds to the seal number assigned to the wrapper. If both numbers correspond to the registered values, the enclosure will be validated and made available to the automated device. Otherwise, an error notification will be displayed, which can request the insertion of a new enclosure, or issue an alert to an authorized administrator.

[0094] The process of recognizing the wrapper inserted in a second automated device is illustrated in figure 7. Initially, the operator must inform the seal number or it can be read electronically by a suitable reader. If the seal is the same registered, the system obtains the serial number (Y / N) of the wrapper. The seal registered in the system for the wrapper must be the same informed during the loading. If the serial number of the enclosure corresponds to the seal number previously registered in the system for the respective enclosure, the enclosure is recognized by the system. Otherwise, the system may ask the user to insert the correct wrapper or provide registration options for the new wrapper.

[0095] As previously explained, the current registration and validation process can be circumvented in the event that a user has the key to open the enclosure and a new seal with the same identification number as the original seal. Thus, the user could open the housing with the key, remove

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 32/64 / 37 a cash of banknotes, replace the broken seal with a new one with the same identification number, and insert the wrapper in the destination self-service machine. In this way, the system would not be able to detect the breach of the enclosure, constituting an occurrence of fraud without evidence of breach. [0096] Figure 8 illustrates the operation of the process for configuring and registering an enclosure in a monitoring system proposed by the present invention, which is equipped with additional security measures to detect the violation of the enclosure.

[0097] When configuring a new enclosure, it is opened with a specific key, so that the operator has access to the contents of the enclosure to, for example, supply the enclosure with a number of banknotes. After opening and accessing the contents of the enclosure, it is closed with the specific key. The key can be made to open only one housing or a group of housing.

[0098] After the enclosure is closed, it must be inserted in the automated device to perform its registration on the control interface. As is known from the state of the art, the enclosure and the automated apparatus have a unique serial number capable of identifying them among other automated enclosures and apparatus, respectively.

[0099] Figure 9 illustrates in detail the step of registering the enclosure in the automated device, which is performed by the control interface. After inserting the housing in the automated device, the control interface obtains the housing serial number. If the serial number of the enclosure is assigned to an automated device, the control interface issues an error alert and requests a correction to the system. If the serial number of the enclosure is not assigned to an automated device, the serial number of the enclosure is registered and associated with that self-service device. [00100] Optionally, the wrapper is sealed with a seal capable of indicating the opening of the wrapper, regardless of whether such opening was a

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 33/64 / 37 authorized opening or a violation. Usually, the said seal has an identification number, in which the seal identification number is registered for the wrapper when the wrapper is registered for an automated device.

[00101] The registration process of the present invention requires an additional security number, which is provided by a device positioned in the housing. Preferably, the device positioned in the enclosure is the tamper evident device (DEV) described in the present invention, which is capable of providing a sequence of binary numbers to register openings and closings of the enclosure.

[00102] During the description of the registration and validation processes of envelopes illustrated in the following embodiments, it will be considered that the security number is provided by the breach evidence device. However, any device that provides a sequence capable of being identified by the control interface could be used in conjunction with the processes defined in the present invention.

[00103] Continuing the process described in Figure 9, the security number of the enclosure is obtained electronically by the system. The security number provides additional security for the process, since the security number is modified with each opening or closing of the enclosure.

[00104] However, during registration of the enclosure at the control interface, a malicious operator could block obtaining the security number from the tamper evidence device, through, for example, the inclusion of a plate with magnetic indicators indicating a fixed sequence. In this way, the control interface would obtain the security number from the magnetic indicator board, and so the system will require this same number when the enclosure is inserted into the same automated device, or any other device. Thus, operators could open the casing with the key, withdraw cash from banknotes and,

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 34/64 / 37 regardless of the change in the security number arising from the tamper evidence device, operators would include the magnetic indicator plate again when inserting the enclosure into an automated device, which would validate the enclosure and constitute an occurrence of fraud without evidence of violation.

[00105] Thus, the present invention proposes a further improvement of obtaining an identification of the breach evidence device 1 from its serial number. Preferably, the reading of the serial number of the tamper evidence device is performed electronically. For each envelope identification, there are a plurality of security number possibilities previously registered on the control interface. This means that whenever the housing is opened or closed, the tamper evidence device will provide one of the numbers expected by the control interface.

[00106] The identification of the wrapper can be obtained from any manipulation of the serial number of the tamper evidence device. For example, the wrapper identification could be obtained from the sum of the third and fifth digits of the serial number of the tamper evidence device. If, for example, the serial number was ‘256523658’, its third digit is ‘6’ and the fifth digit is ‘2’, the wrapper ID would be ‘8’. Upon obtaining the identification of the enclosure, the control interface would be aware of the plurality of security number possibilities that can be produced by the tamper evidence device installed in said enclosure. The plurality of number possibilities is associated with the positioning of the magnetic indicators on the tamper evidence device, and is defined during the assembly of said device. The table below illustrates an example of expected values for the breach evidence device according to its identification (ID):

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 35/64 / 37

Wrapper ID Seq 1 Seq 2 Seq n 0 001 111 1 011 101 9 000 100

[00107] In case the additional security measure is implemented, the control interface performs, before registering the security number of the enclosure, the verification of said security number. In case the security number does not correspond to one of the security number possibilities among the plurality of security number possibilities, the control interface invalidates the enclosure and issues a notification. If the security number corresponds to one of the security number possibilities among the plurality of security number possibilities, the control interface registers the security number of the tamper evident device for the enclosure and the enclosure serial number for the self-service machine.

[00108] This measure prevents the attempted fraud demonstrated above, since the malicious offender is unaware of the plurality of possible security numbers that the control interface could accept.

[00109] The plurality rules for the possibility of security numbers can be updated remotely if fraud is detected. In this way, if the malicious offender obtains knowledge about the plurality of security numbers, the system can remain secure as its training rule can be changed remotely.

[00110] Figure 10 illustrates a procedure similar to that of Figure

8, but for the case where a wrapper is transported from a first automated device to a second automated device, where the process of validating a wrapper inserted in an automated device will be described.

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 36/64 / 37 [00111] Initially, the enclosure is inserted in a first automated device, where it must be validated according to the process in Figure

8. Then, the casing is loaded with a cash value, closed and registered to a second automated destination device. The housing is then transported from the first automated device to the second automated device. When the enclosure is inserted into the second automated device, the control interface will verify that the enclosure is valid for that automated device.

[00112] If an operator has opened the casing during transport, it must inform whether the cash contents stored in the casing have been changed. If so, the operator must inform the new cash value.

[00113] Figure 11 further illustrates details of a first stage of validation of the enclosure in the automated device, where the control interface will verify the serial number of the enclosure.

[00114] After inserting the housing in the second automated device, the control interface checks the housing serial number. If the serial number of the enclosure corresponds to the serial number associated with the second automated device, the enclosure is validated for the self-service device against its serial number. If the serial number of the enclosure does not match the serial number associated with the second automated device, the control interface will prompt you to insert the correct enclosure.

[00115] Figure 12 illustrates in detail a second stage of validating the enclosure in the automated device, where the control interface will verify the security number provided by the enclosure. In a similar way to the registration process of envelopes described above, it will be considered that the security number is provided by the tamper evidence device located inside the enclosure. However, any device capable of

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 37/64 / 37 providing a sequence capable of being identified by the control interface could be used in conjunction with the processes defined in the present invention.

[00116] According to the flowchart of figure 12, the control interface checks the security number from the tamper evidence device, in which, if the security number corresponds to the security number previously registered, the control interface validates the enclosure with respect to its security number. If the security number does not correspond to the security number previously registered, the control interface invalidates the enclosure and issues a violation notification.

[00117] However, during DAN validation at the control interface, a malicious operator could block the indication of the security number from the tamper evidence device, by, for example, including a plate with magnetic indicators indicating a fixed sequence. In this way, the control interface would register the security number of the tamper evidence device, and so the system will require this same number when the DAN is inserted into the same self-service device, or any other device. However, operators could open the DAN with the key, withdraw a cash of banknotes and, regardless of the change in the security number coming from the tamper evidence device, and operators would include a magnetic indicator board at the time of insertion of the DAN in a self-service device, which would validate the DAN and constitute a fraud occurrence without evidence of violation.

[00118] Thus, the present invention proposes a further improvement for the wrapping validation process described above. According to the improvement, the control interface obtains an identification of the enclosure from a serial number of the tamper evidence device. For each wrapper identification, there are a plurality of

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 38/64 / 37 security number possibilities previously registered in the control interface. This means that whenever the housing is opened or closed, the tamper evidence device will provide one of the numbers expected by the control interface.

[00119] In case the additional security measure is implemented, the control interface performs, before the validation of the security number of the enclosure, the verification of said security number. In case the security number does not correspond to one of the security number possibilities among the plurality of security number possibilities, the control interface invalidates the enclosure and issues an electronic fraud notification. If the security number corresponds to one of the security number possibilities among the plurality of security number possibilities, the control interface proceeds to verify the security number of the tamper evidence device for the enclosure.

[00120] For the verification step, if the security number corresponds to the security number previously registered on the control interface for the enclosure inserted in the ATM, the control interface validates the enclosure for that automated device. If the security number does not correspond to the security number previously registered in the control interface for the enclosure inserted in the automated device, it is concluded that the enclosure was violated during its transportation, constituting a fraud with evidence of violation. Therefore, the control interface invalidates the wrapper and issues a fraud notification with evidence of tampering.

[00121] This measure prevents the fraud attempt shown above, since the malicious offender is unaware of the plurality of possible security numbers that the control interface could accept.

[00122] The present invention is also concerned with having a

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 39/64 / 37 safety mechanism to prevent an invalid enclosure from being inserted into the ATM when it is switched off, that is, without monitoring the control interface. Figure 13 illustrates the proposed solution to avoid this problem.

[00123] According to the flowchart of figure 13, which makes reference to the flowcharts of figures 11 and 12, at least one of the step of verifying the serial number of the enclosure, the step of verifying the security number of the enclosure, and the step of checking the seal number of the wrapper is performed whenever the automated device is started.

[00124] Optionally, at least one of the step of checking the casing serial number, the step of checking the casing security number, and the step of checking the seal number of the casing is performed whenever the control interface is initialized.

[00125] Optionally, the wrapper comprises a seal having a seal number, the process further comprising the step of verifying the seal number of the wrapper. During verification, if the seal number of the wrapper does not match the seal number previously registered on the control interface for the same wrapper, the control interface issues a notification.

[00126] Optionally, the seal used in the wrapper is at least one of a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag and a barcode tag.

[00127] In case there is a seal on the enclosure, at the moment of inserting the enclosure in the second automated device, the seal of the enclosure is checked. If the seal has been tampered with during transportation or its identification number does not match the number registered for the second ATM, the wrapper will not be validated and the control interface will indicate that the wrapper has been tampered with.

[00128] Optionally, the enclosure is a device for

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 40/64 / 37 cash storage, such as a cassette, safe or electronic lock case. In the case of a number storage device, the registration process also comprises the steps of accessing the interior of the enclosure, transferring a quantity of cash between the enclosure and an external medium; and inform the control interface of the new cash value inside the enclosure.

[00129] Optionally, the control interface consists of software with a set of instructions capable of making an automated device perform the steps of the registration and validation process of envelopes.

[00130] Optionally, the automated device is at least one of an ATM terminal, a banknote recycling terminal and a vending machine.

[00131] Optionally, all the automated devices that are part of the exchange of envelopes are connected to a network, in which the registration data stored in each of the automated devices are accessible by all the automated devices connected to the network.

[00132] Thus, the registration and validation processes of envelopes defined by the present invention solve the technical problem of the lack of control and monitoring of the entry and exit of envelopes in a control interface. Based on a security number provided by the enclosure, the system is able to register enclosures in a way that is not susceptible to electronic fraud. [00133] In addition, the system is able to manipulate the security number of the enclosure to provide additional security during the validation of the enclosure. The indication of evidence of violation is given by reading and analyzing the serial number and, mainly, the security number provided by the enclosure.

[00134] The security number is preferably provided by a tamper evidence device as defined in the present invention.

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 41/64 / 37

However, any device capable of providing a security number readable by the automated device can be used in the application of the registration and validation processes of envelopes.

[00135] The registration and validation processes of the present invention are still advantageous since they perform the registration and validation of enclosures without the need for specific hardware to be installed. The invention uses the computational power of the automated devices already used in the exemplified operations. The control interface sends machine-readable instructions to the devices, so that the devices carry out all the steps related to the registration and validation processes.

[00136] It is important to highlight that the processes of registration and validation of envelopes can be used in the most diverse applications besides the control of envelopes for cash transportation, being applied in the control of any envelopes that have restricted access content.

[00137] In the following, a preferred embodiment of the present invention will be described, in which a control system is described to detect tampering with envelopes including the tamper-evident device previously described and object of the present invention, and which uses the hardware of an automated apparatus , or external hardware, to perform the steps of the registration and wrapping validation processes described above and also object of the present invention. According to the present invention, the control system can consist of software embedded in the automated device or a set of exclusive hardware plus software embedded in the automated device.

[00138] In accordance with the preferred embodiment, the control system for evidencing tampering with envelopes comprises at least one wrapper, wherein each wrapper comprises a seal including a seal number, a serial number and an evidence device of violation.

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 42/64 / 37 [00139] The tamper evidence device 1 corresponds to the device illustrated in Figure 1 and described above, which comprises a main body 18 comprising at least one rotational element 3, 4, 5, at least one means of drive 17 which is triggered through contact with the external environment.

[00140] Each of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 has a mechanical axis connected to at least one drive medium 17 (main axis). The mechanical axis of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 is fixed at each end to the main body by means of a bearing 19 and a spacer washer 2. Optionally, spacer washers are also provided between each of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5. Each one of the rotational elements 3, 4, 5 comprises at least one magnetic indicator 16.

[00141] The control system also comprises a control interface, the control interface comprising: means for reading the casing serial number; means for registering the serial number of said enclosure for at least one control interface on a storage medium connected to the control interface; means for comparing a serial number of an enclosure with the serial numbers registered on the storage medium connected to the control interface; means for reading the casing security number; means for registering the security number of the enclosure on a storage medium connected to the control interface; means for comparing a security number on a wrapper with the security numbers registered on the storage medium connected to the control interface.

[00142] Optionally, the control interface comprises a means to indicate the validation of a wrapper and a means to indicate the invalidation of a wrapper.

[00143] Optionally, the control interface comprises a means to obtain an identification of the enclosure from its serial number, in

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 43/64 / 37 that each envelope identification comprises a plurality of security number possibilities previously registered in the control interface; means for comparing the security number of the enclosure with the plurality of security number possibilities previously registered in the control interface. The means for comparing being configured for, in the event that the security number does not correspond to one of the security number possibilities among the plurality of security number possibilities, the means for indicating the invalidation of a housing indicates the invalidation of the housing.

[00144] Optionally, the control interface is software embedded in the automated device, the software comprising machine-readable instructions capable of instructing the automated device to function as the means described above. Optionally, the control interface includes specific hardware to perform the functions specified above.

[00145] Thus, the system of evidence of tampering with envelopes defined by the present invention solves the technical problem of the inability to detect tampering with envelopes during transport. Based on a security number provided by the enclosure, the system is able to register enclosures in a way that is not susceptible to electronic fraud.

[00146] In addition, the system is able to manipulate the security number of the enclosure to provide additional security during the validation of the enclosure. The indication of evidence of violation is given by reading and analyzing the serial number and, mainly, the security number provided by the enclosure.

[00147] The security number is preferably provided by a tamper evidence device as defined in the present invention. However, any device capable of providing a security number readable by the automated device can be used in the application of the registration and validation processes of envelopes.

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 44/64 / 37 [00148] The registration and validation processes of the present invention are still advantageous since they perform the registration and validation of enclosures without the need for specific hardware to be installed. The invention uses the computational power of the automated devices already used in the exemplified operations. The control interface sends machine-readable instructions to the devices, so that the devices carry out all the steps related to the registration and validation processes.

[00149] Thus, the control and monitoring system proposed by the present invention becomes economically viable and attractive for application in the automated devices currently spread on the market.

[00150] It is important to highlight that the system of evidence of tampering with envelopes can be used in the most diverse applications in addition to the control of envelopes for cash transportation, being applied in the control of any envelopes that have restricted access content.

[00151] Numerous variations affecting the scope of protection of this application are permitted. The tamper evidence device, wrapper registration and validation processes, and the wrapper tamper evidence system of the present invention have an application of particular interest in cash storage devices, such as cassettes and safes, as well as automated devices. that operate with cash flow, such as ATM terminals, banknote recycling terminals and vending machines. [00152] However, the breach evidence device 1, wrapper registration and validation processes, and the wrapper tamper evidence system of the present invention can be used to indicate the breach of wrappers, homes and restricted access environments, as well as the validation of wrappers with additional security during wrapper exchange operations with restricted access content. Thus, it reinforces the fact that the present invention is not limited to the particular configurations / embodiments described above.

Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 45/64

Claims (29)

1. Device for evidence of tampering (1) in casings, characterized by the fact that it comprises: a main body (18) comprising at least one rotational element (3, 4, 5); at least one drive means (17) that is driven through contact with the external environment; wherein each of the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) has a mechanical axis connected to at least one drive means (17); where each of the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) comprises at least one electromagnetic indicator (16), an electromagnetic reader (15), where the electromagnetic reader obtains a security number referring to the number of openings and closings of the enclosure from the electromagnetic indicators (16). 2. Device for evidence of tampering (1) of enclosures according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the electromagnetic indicator (16) is any one of a magnetic, electrical conductive, capacitive inductive reflective specular sensor; optical diffuse reflective; reflective optical polarizer, or a combination of these. 3. Case tamper evidence device (1) according to claim 1 or 2, characterized by the fact that it comprises three rotational elements, one of which is a sequential rotational element (3) and the other two elements rotational elements are random rotational elements (4, 5). 4. Enclosure tamper evidence device (1) according to any of claims 1 to 3, characterized by the fact that each of the sequential rotational elements (3) has three longitudinally spaced radial electromagnetic indicator sequences (16) each other, and where each of the random rotational elements (4, 5) has Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 46/64 nine radial sequences of electromagnetic indicators (16), spaced longitudinally from each other, and in which the longitudinal distance between two sequences of magnetic sensors is the same for all sequences. 5. Tamper evidence device (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized by the fact that each of the random rotational elements (4, 5) has a different density between them. 6. Case tamper evidence device (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the actuation means (17) comprises at least one actuation button (8) and at least one transmitter of motion (10, 14), in which each motion transmitter is connected to a rotational element (3, 4, 5) by means of an axis rotation element (19). 7. Casing tamper evidence device according to any of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that the drive means (17) comprises at least one return spring (9) and at least one relief spring ( 7) rotational elements (3, 4, 5) and to provide bit alignment. 8. Casing tamper evidence device (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized by the fact that each of the at least one electromagnetic indicator (16) is arranged radially along the circumference of the rotational elements ( 3, 4, 5). 9. Casing tamper evidence device (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that the rotational element (3, 4, 5) consists of at least one of a roller, a bar, a tube and a disc. 10. Case tamper evidence device (1) according to any of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that the main body (18) comprises a metallic outer coating. Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 47/64 11. Casing tamper evidence device (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 10, characterized by the fact that it also comprises a positioning element to mechanically lock the other rotational elements so that they assume certain positions, and where the positioning_ element is a magnet or a mechanical socket. 12. Tamper evidence device (1) according to claim 11, characterized in that the positioning element is integrated with the drive element (17), in which the at least one motion transmitter (10, 14 ) positions the rotational elements at predefined positions. 13. Device for tampering evidence (1) of casings according to any of claims 1 to 12, characterized by the fact that each of the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) has a mechanical axis connected to the drive medium (17 ), in which the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) have longitudinal holes so that the rotational elements are mounted with concentric mechanical axes and one passing through the longitudinal hole of the other. 14. Wrapper registration process to evidence wrapper tampering, in which the wrapper includes a serial number and a security number, characterized by the fact that it comprises the steps of: connect at least one housing to an automated device, where the automated device is connected to a control interface; check the serial number of the enclosure, in which, if the serial number is not assigned to another enclosure, register the serial number of said enclosure for at least one automated device on the control interface; if the serial number is assigned to another wrapper, issue Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 48/64 a notification to the user and request corrective action from the user; register the enclosure security number for said enclosure at the control interface. 15. Registration process to evidence violation of wrappers according to claim 14, characterized by the fact that it also comprises the steps of: obtain an identification of the enclosure from its serial number, in which each identification of the enclosure comprises a plurality of possibilities of security number previously registered in the control interface; and check the security number of the enclosure, where: if the security number does not correspond to one of the security number possibilities among the plurality of security number possibilities, invalidate the enclosure and issue a notification. 16. Registration process to evidence violation of wrappers according to claim 14 or 15, characterized by the fact that the wrapper also comprises a seal having a seal number, in which the process also comprises the step of registering the seal number of the enclosure at the control interface. 17. Registration process to show violation of envelopes according to any of claims 14 to 16, characterized by the fact that the automated device is connected to a network, in which the registration data stored in an automated device is accessible by all automated devices connected to the network. 18. Registration process to evidence violation of envelopes according to any of claims 14 to 17, characterized by the fact that the envelope is a envelope for storing cash, in which the process also comprises the steps of: access the interior of the enclosure; Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 49/64 transferring a quantity of cash between the wrapper and an external medium; and inform the control interface of the new cash value inside the enclosure. 19. Registration process to show violation of envelopes according to any of claims 14 to 18, characterized by the fact that the enclosure is at least one of a safe, a cash cassette and an electronic lock case. 20. Registration process to evidence violation of wrappers according to any of claims 14 to 19, characterized by the fact that the automated device is at least one of an ATM terminal and a banknote recycling terminal. 21. Registration process to evidence violation of wrappers according to any of claims 14 to 20, characterized by the fact that the seal is at least one of a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag and a barcode tag. 22. Validation process for evidencing tampering with envelopes, in which the wrapper includes a seal including a seal number, a serial number and a security number, characterized by the fact that it comprises the steps of: connect the enclosure to a self-service device, where the self-service device is connected to a control interface; verify, through the control interface, the serial number of the enclosure, in which, if the serial number is not assigned to the enclosure, display a notification to the user and request corrective action thereof; verify, through the control interface, the security number of the enclosure, where if the security number corresponds to the number of Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 50/64 security previously registered, validate the wrapper; if the security number does not match the security number previously registered, issue a notification. 23. Validation process for evidencing tampering according to claim 22, characterized by the fact that it also comprises the step of obtaining a wrapper identification from its serial number, in which each wrapper identification comprises a plurality of security number possibilities previously registered in the control interface; where the step of verifying the security number of the enclosure comprises: if the security number does not correspond to one of the security number possibilities among the plurality of security number possibilities, invalidate the enclosure and issue a notification. 24. Registration process to evidence violation of wrappers according to claim 22 or 23, characterized by the fact that the automated device is connected to a network, in which the registration data stored in an automated device is accessible by all devices systems connected to the network. 25. Validation process for evidencing breach of wrappers according to any of claims 22 to 24, characterized by the fact that it also comprises the step of verifying the seal number of the wrapper, in which if the seal number of the wrapper does not match to the seal number previously registered in the control interface, issue a notification. 26. Validation process for evidencing breach of wrappers according to any of claims 22 to 25, characterized by the fact that at least one of the steps to verify the Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 51/64 housing serial number, the step of checking the security number of the housing, and the step of checking the seal number of the housing is performed whenever the automated device or the control interface is initialized. 27. Validation process for evidencing violation of wrappers according to any of claims 22 to 26, characterized by the fact that the seal is at least one of a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag and a barcode tag. 28. Control system to show violation of wrappers, characterized by the fact that it comprises: at least one wrapper, each wrapper comprising: a seal including a seal number, a serial number, a tamper evidence device (1), a tamper evidence device comprising: a main body (18) comprising at least one rotational element (3, 4, 5); at least one drive means (17) that is driven through contact with the external environment; wherein each of the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) has a mechanical axis connected to at least one drive means (17); wherein each of the rotational elements (3, 4, 5) comprises at least one magnetic indicator (16); a control interface comprising: means for reading the casing serial number; means for registering the serial number of said envelope on the control interface; means to compare a serial number of a wrapper with Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 52/64 the serial numbers registered on the control interface; means for reading the casing security number; means for registering the security number of the enclosure at the control interface; means for comparing a security number on a wrapper with the security numbers registered on the control interface. 29. Control system to show violation of wrappers according to claim 28, characterized by the fact that it also comprises: means for obtaining an identification of the enclosure from its serial number, in which each identification of the enclosure comprises a plurality of possibilities of security number previously registered in the control interface; means for comparing the security number of the enclosure plurality of security number possibilities previously registered in the control interface; wherein, if the security number does not correspond to one of the security number possibilities among the plurality of security number possibilities, the means for indicating the invalidation of a wrapper indicates the invalidation of the wrapper. Petition 870170025808, of 4/19/2017, p. 53/64 1/9