BR102017006703A2 - identifier, guarantor and integrator method of different applications on the same device or on different processing devices - Google Patents

Abstract

The method ensures confidentiality and integrity in integrating different applications with their unique identities, without requiring costly changes to the domains involved. on first access to an application, a domain server (s1, s2) containing that application defines its security policies, to which set of relationships the application belongs and whether it can be used by a user or is free to use for domain users. each processing device (10,20,30) has unique identification based on its hardware and unique identifier generated by software. Each application, installed on each device, has a unique installation ID, based at least on: a private key from a public / private key pair generated there; at the time of application installation; unique device identification; and at a random value.

Description

(54) Title: IDENTIFYING, EVALUATING AND INTEGRATING METHOD OF DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS IN THE SAME DEVICE OR DIFFERENT PROCESSING DEVICES (51) Int. Cl .: G06F 17/30; G06Q 30/08 (73) Owner (s): SCOPUS SOLUÇÕES EM TI LTDA.

(72) Inventor (s): ADREN SASSAKI HIROSE; WILSON VICENTE RUGGIERO; REGINALDO ARAKAKI (85) National Phase Start Date:

03/31/2017 (57) Abstract: The method ensures confidentiality and integrity in the integration of different applications with respective unique identities, without requiring costly changes in the domains involved. When first accessing an application, a domain server (S1, S2), containing that application, defines its security policies, which set of relationships the application belongs to and whether it can be used by a user or if it is free to use for domain users. Each processing device (10,20,30) has a unique identification, based on its hardware and unique identifier generated by software. Each application, installed on each device, has a unique identification of the installation, based at least: on a private key of a pair of public / private keys generated on it; when installing the application; in the unique identification of the device; and at a random value.

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IDENTIFYING, EVALUATING AND INTEGRATING METHOD OF DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS ON THE SAME DEVICE OR DIFFERENT

PROCESSING DEVICES

Field of the invention [001] The present invention refers to a method to allow a set of procedures to identify, evaluate and integrate applications on the same device or on different processing devices, so that different applications identify themselves and maintain a relationship of confidence, allowing their integration through a secure communication network.

State of the art [002] Currently, applications for processing devices have some standardized communication recipients, such as servers in a given domain and local physical files

Some applications perform additional communication to store information in databases. Security, in terms of communications or even the integrity of the system, is, in general, the responsibility of standardized and generic means of the market, whether in communication or in the protection of entrances and exits. These defense systems include antivirus, SSL communication, anti-Trojans and access policies with different levels of permission per user.

[003] Thus, global and generic defense systems are being considered here, seeking to protect applications and the operating environment as a whole.

[004] Security holes resulting from changes in applications or their proprietary libraries in processing devices are not protected by such global or generic defense systems, as they would need

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2/13 subscription and constant checking of the state of the physical files. As for confidentiality at the time of execution, there are solutions based on SandBox, which partially guarantee confidentiality and integrity when executing an application.

[005] The technological trend, using applications obtained in stores (Stores), allows internet service providers, who own domains, to have features with high execution power, benefiting from all the power of hardware, software and integration of a domain server with external media contained in the clients' processing devices. However, these domains have large investments in legacy parks focused on web technology and the migration to use technologies associated with applications must take into account the costs involved in relation to the functional benefit and security to be obtained.

[006] With the popularization of mobile processing devices, the migration or replication of applications to different devices, operating systems, domains and the specialization of these applications focused on business or purpose, lead to the emergence of multiple different applications that would benefit from an integration between devices, domains, businesses and specialties from a security perspective. However, they do not do so because there is no solution that allows this integration.

Summary of the invention [007] Due to the problems mentioned above, it is the objective of the present invention to provide a method that allows to identify, evaluate and integrate different applications in a

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3/13 in multiples ensuring the integration of the same processing device or different processing devices, confidentiality and integrity in applications, through operations with security and convenience characteristics, without requiring costly changes in the functionalities of the domains involved.

[008] In this way, a domain will be able to keep its technology oriented to web pages and also evolve to operate applications on desktops and / or mobile processing devices by choosing the application creation technology that best suits the interests of the business or the desired functionality.

[009] In the present invention, each application will have a unique identity, and applications from a given domain can communicate freely with each other.

[0010] When first accessing an application, the domain server containing that application, defines its security policies, which set of relationships the application belongs to and whether the latter can be used by only one user or if it is free to use for domain users. In the case of a single user, the invention adds to security, the concept of physical possession of the device, allowing the identification of the cloning operation.

[0011] In this way, the applications will have their integrity ensured, which can be verified by any application in the set of applications in the same domain. In internet communications, fate and confidentiality are also ensured.

[0012] Each processing device, for access to domain applications, has a unique identification of the

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4/13 device, based on its hardware characteristics (when possible) and also with a unique identifier generated by software.

[0013] Each application installed on each device has a unique identification of the application installation based on the following factors: the private key of the public / private key pair generated therein; the time of installing the application; the unique identification of the device; a random value and, when applicable, an additional random identifier linked to the user.

[0014] Each application / user has its set of devices and applications identified and integrated in the domain server to be accessed when necessary. [0015] The identification and interrelationship between access devices, applications and domains expand the alternative solutions in authentication and security.

[0016] Briefly, the method comprises the steps of:

- generate a hardware identifier on a processing device, in an application integration operation and store the hardware identifier, on a perennial basis, on an integration server common to different domains;

- generate a unique application installation identifier in use by the user;

- generate, in different applications, a trust relationship and generate, by the requesting application, a pair of keys and an identifier, unique to the request, and send, to the application for which you want to establish a trust relationship, a request containing the public key of the generated pair, the unique identifier, the current moment, its means of access and its information pertinent to the establishment of the

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5/13 trust relationship, this data packet being encrypted and signed with the key shared with the integration server;

- generate, by the desired application and in which the data package was received, a pair of keys and a unique identifier for this relationship and send to the integration server (SI) a new encrypted package signed with its relationship key. the integration server (SI), said data package including its own information, the public key of the initiated relationship and the package received from the requesting application;

- provide, by the integration server (SI), the cryptographic translation of both packages, the verification of signatures, the validation of the relationship, the signature of the two concatenated public keys, contained in the packages of the requesting application and the application that is requesting the conference, defining the endorsement of the integration server (SI) for this relationship, the generation of a final relationship data set, the encryption with the symmetric key common to the requesting application and the sending of the package, encrypted and signed with the private key signature of the integration server (SI), for the requesting application to validate the trust of the applications to be functionally communicated;

- perform, by the validation requesting application, the cryptographic translation of the received package, the verification of the package signature and the verification of the integration server (SI) guarantee for this relationship, the generation of a unique symmetric relationship key, using its private key of the key pair, unique, generated for this relationship, with the key

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6/13 public of the requesting application, the guarding of the data of this relation and the sending of its generated public key for this relation, unique identifier of the relation with the requester, success indicator and the endorsement of the integration server (SI);

- effect, by the requesting application, the receipt of the result of the trust relationship request, check the integration server (SI) endorsement, generate a unique symmetric key of this trust relationship and keep the relationship data;

- carry out future communications directly between applications, using a derived key based on the public key of the recipient application and on your private key for communication with the other application; and

- generate, at the beginning of each communication, a new key pair, the public key being necessary for the generation of the next communication, and the data package encrypted with the current symmetric key.

Brief description of the drawings [0017] The method in question will be described below, with reference to the attached drawing in which:

[0018] Figure 1 illustrates a diagram illustrating a possible operational association between multiple access devices and servers from two different domains, but associated with the same integration server.

Description of the invention [0019] For the integration with the applications, a single and common library, for all applications of the same operating system, is created and made available for all domains that will make use of the invention.

[0020] In the example in figure 1, two

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7/13 domains, Dl and D2, each having a respective server Sl, S2, and also a library or database BD1, BD2. [0021] On operating systems (Windows, Linux and MAC), for desktop 10 and notebook 20, an additional monitoring application and additional security checks can be installed.

[0022] A security integration server SI can be hosted either in one of the D1 or D2 domains, or on a server common to all domains, as is the case of the example illustrated in Figure 1.

[0023] When developing each application version, each Dl, D2 domain must: generate a unique application version identifier and include the SI Integration Server's public key (either by including a provided library or directly in its binary code) and the unique domain identifier next to the SI Integration Server.

[0024] In this way, each application has a public key for the signing of any communications inserted with the Integration Server (SI) and the address of the SI integration server inserted. In a first run, a unique identifier is generated based on the current moment, the domain identifier, the unique identifier of the application version and an additional random number. The application generates a manifest containing the application identifiers, the public key of the generated key pair and, if necessary, data related to the user. This manifest is sent to the domain server that must sign it authorizing the registration of this application with the SI Integration Server (it is up to the domain to decide whether the application needs an authenticated user or not for the consolidation of this subscription of

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8/13 manifest authorization). In this way, we have a unique installation identifier (IDUI) contained in the manifest that will be sent and saved on the SI integration server after checking the domain server signature (using a public signature verification key). The integration server then generates a pair of keys, creates a symmetric key using the public key received by the application, saves this data and returns its public to the pair for the generation of the symmetric key by the application, signs all information, records the relationship and returns to the calling application. To finalize the establishment of the trust relationship, verify the signature, recover the public key and, using your private key from the relationship key pair, generate a shared symmetric key (in future communications this key will be used for the encryption and signature of the communications with the SI Integration Server).

[0025] In a scenario with applications with restricted access to identified users, it is possible to request agency data and account or code activities related to authentication are pertinent to the domain, and it is up to it to use its security policies to authenticate its users. Depending on these policies, the application that we want to trust may authorize or deny that relationship, depending on their own security policies. Then, trust relationships with other applications are registered and established, always with the final check of the Integration Server.

[0026] At the moment when two separate applications process the application identification as login, functional. However, these

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9/13 make their first intercommunication, they must generate a pair of keys for this intercommunication. Then the applications must obtain the trust of the SI integration server, passing, in addition to their own data, the public key of this interrelation and the data of the application with which they wish to intercommunicate. After being certified by the server, applications receive the public key from their recipients for integration, saving this encrypted information with a key derived from their private keys and with the installation's unique identifier (IDUI). For subsequent communications with the destination application, the public key must be retrieved, using the private key and calculating the IDUI again.

[0027] In applications with restricted access to identified users, the password, to reinforce the encryption of the private key, can be used, thus preventing attacks by data cloning and emulation of the IDUI (unique installation identifier) of the set device + app.

[0028] This set of relationships allows the Dl, D2 domain to strengthen or reduce security in its relationship with end users.

[0029] For example, it is possible to consider that, when a given user is already authenticated in a certain application, even if on a different device, he has already proved the set of domains Dl, D2 involved, of the authenticity of his identity. Once a trust relationship has already been established, that set can free access in another application, even if in different access devices, when communicating directly or indirectly.

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10/13 [0030] In this way, if the user typed his identification and password in the mobile device application 20, 30, and at a certain moment he wants to access a group application through the desktop 10, he requests the release through the mobile device 20, 30 and, via NFC, it communicates with the desktop application 10 receiving a symmetric and temporary encryption key. Then it encrypts the user, the password and a timestamp with its private key, generating an identified authentication envelope. The result of this operation is encrypted with the temporary symmetric key received and sent to the application.

[0031] The application decrypts the envelope with the temporary symmetric key and sends the identified authentication envelope to the SI integration server that verifies the identity of the application that generated the envelope, retrieves the data with the corresponding private key and checks whether the data of username and password are correct, then release access to the desktop application 10.

[0032] The risk of cloning desktop 10 data and IDUI emulation (unique installation identifier) is thus minimized, as the temporary symmetric key ensures that only the desktop 10 application, which is requesting the request, will be able to interpret the envelope, and only the SI integration server will be able to decrypt the envelope and check the user and password data and verify that the timestamp is within a safe limit with respect to its synchronization with the mobile device.

[0033] Other options without sending username and password can be made. For this, there is a need for communication of the mobile processing device 20, 30, with

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11/13 the SI integration server.

[0034] To request the release of the desktop 10 application, prove the communication, via QRCODE (Quick Response Code), with the desktop 10 application, to receive the identification + timestamp + random value encrypted with the private key of the application from desktop 10. This data is sent to the SI integration server, added to the data of its own identification (and authentication, if desired, such as, for example, user and password entered when accessing the device application). The SI integration server then releases this set to the desktop 10 application as a valid login during a given time window. The desktop application 10 then logs into the Dl, D2 domain by sending its identifier + timestamp + random value. In the same way, the various applications and access devices can log in single using the trust generated by the invention.

[0035] In the case of particular applications that are oriented exclusively for protection in general, a higher level of permission is required in the operating systems, which, in the case of some systems, results in the isolation of these applications with the interface environment with the user. Another important point is the need to integrate web pages with this particular application, which is called a service on the Windows operating system.

[0036] For communication with web pages, a communication service can be used via the tcp / ip port on the service, and the transmitted data can be received using javascript on the web page.

[0037] The service checks the security status of the

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12/13 system, the existence of known threats, redirections to fake addresses and also the identity of the hardware on which it is running.

[0038] For known threats, the service checks the signature and also the HASH of running applications. To do so, it uses a list of signatures and hashes that were signed by the SI integration server, this signature being verified using a public key from the SI integration server, inserted in the service.

[0039] To identify redirects to false addresses, the service verifies that the address of the server Sl, S2, of the domains Dl, D2 involved has not been changed. In case of changes, the service consults the SI integration server, informing the new address. The SI integration server, in turn, has a list of domain server addresses that are in an untrusted status, telling the service whether the domain server is trusted at that time.

[0040] The service checks the consistency of the Scripts for automatic configuration of domain servers, a feature present in market browsers and the focus of malicious attacks in order to redirect the user to fake pages.

[0041] The service also acts as a mediator between web pages and domain applications, present in the user's environment.

[0042] In this way, the web page is able to identify the source hardware, the security status of the system and, if necessary, communicate with other applications, whether they are on the same hardware or on different hardware.

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13/13 [0043] Consequently, using the service's functionalities, operations with different levels of security can be created for web pages. For example, by logging into the mobile device 20, 30 it is possible to access internet banking on an untrusted desktop, sending a QRCODE to the mobile device, requesting the release of a certain operation linked to a Random Identifier added to a Timestamp that can be called IDRT (for example, an extract for printing), allowing the release of the operation by the mobile device, continuing the request for the page, clicking View Extract. The request is sent to the server containing the IDRT (Temporal Random Identifier) which identifies that the request was released by the mobile device and presents the web page containing the extract to the user. [0044] Multiple operations can also be performed. For this purpose, a QRCODE is presented on the web page, which, when read and interpreted by the application on the processing device, obtains a relationship identifier code for the session between the web browser and the web server, allowing the application to be released on the web page. processing device, along with session identification to the mobile device.

[0045] The proposed method thus allows specialized applications to share control, business and security or communication relationships and also increase the local security of an application's environment with a lower level of security, through integration with applications oriented to security, assigning to them the guarding of data, release of access and control of keys.

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1. Different different method

Claims (6)

CLAIMS identifier, guarantor and application integrator on the same device or on processing devices, using the characteristics of hardware, the operating system and symmetric relationship keys endorsed by a public key inserted in the binary code of a library that will be used by each application, said method being characterized by the fact of understanding the steps of: - generate a hardware identifier on a processing device, in an application integration operation and store the hardware identifier, on a perennial basis, on an integration server (SI) common to different domains (Dl, D2); - generate a unique application installation identifier in use by the user: - generate, in different applications, a trust relationship and generate, by the requesting application, a pair of keys and an identifier, unique for the request, and send, to the application for which you want to establish a trust relationship, a request containing the public key of the generated pair, the unique identifier, the current moment, its means of access and its information pertinent to the establishment of the trust relationship, this data package being encrypted and signed with the key shared with the integration server (SI); - generate, by the desired application and in which the data package was received, a pair of keys and a unique identifier for this relationship and send to the integration server (SI), a new encrypted package signed with its key. Petition 870170021388, of 03/31/2017, p. 21/26 2/4 relationship with the integration server (SI), said data package including its own information, the public key of the relationship started and the package received from the requesting application; - provide, by the integration server (SI), the cryptographic translation of both packages, the verification of signatures, the validation of the relationship, the signature of the two concatenated public keys, contained in the packages of the requesting application and the application that is requesting the conference, defining the endorsement of the integration server (SI) for this relationship, the generation of a final relationship data set, the encryption with the symmetric key common to the requesting application and the sending of the package, encrypted and signed with the private key signature of the integration server (SI), for the requesting application to validate the trust of the applications to be functionally communicated; - perform, by the validation requesting application, the cryptographic translation of the received package, the verification of the package signature and the verification of the integration server (SI) guarantee for this relationship, the generation of a unique symmetric relationship key, using its private key of the key pair, unique, generated for this relationship, with the public key of the requesting application, the storage of the data of this relationship and the sending of your generated public key for this relationship, unique identifier of the relationship with the requester, indicator of success and the endorsement of the integration server (SI). - make, by the requesting application, the receipt of the result of the trust request, check the endorsement of the integration server (SI), generate a key Petition 870170021388, of 03/31/2017, p. 22/26 3/4 symmetrical of this trust relationship and save the relationship data; - carry out future communications directly between the applications, using a derived key based on the public key of the recipient application and on your private communication key with the other application; and - generate, at the beginning of each communication, a new key pair, the public key being necessary for the generation of the next communication, and the data package encrypted with the current symmetric key. 2. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the step of generating a unique application installation identifier in use by the user, uses the current moment in milliseconds, concatenated with: a long random random value; a unique domain identifier; a version identifier of the running application; a public / private key pair generated, if necessary, after authorization from the domain server; and with one of the user's authentication actions when applicable or of generating a shared single key (symmetric key) with a control server, at the moment of the first execution of an application without the user's authentication, being inoculated, in the binary of the library available to the application, a public signature verification key, attesting the authenticity of the integration server (SI). 3. Method, according to either of claims 1 or 2, characterized by the fact that the receiving application uses the current symmetric to translate and verify data consistency, generate a new key pair, use the received public key to generate the symmetric key of the next Petition 870170021388, of 03/31/2017, p. 23/26 4/4 due to the amount of communication, without using it in the current response, process the data, generate the response data, add the public key for the next communication, encrypt and sign with the current symmetric key and send the response package to the requester. 4. Method, according to claim 3, characterized by controlling, for both applications, the communication requests sent and received according to the count of the number of times that a certain key was sent, being that, in failures of operational communication, a pre-defined amount of reuse of the same key indicates a communication failure, breaking the relationship. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized by the fact of including the step of identifying security flaws in the environment of the requesting application or the target application, by the loss of synchronization between the pair of keys of the trust relationship. 6. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized by the fact that it includes the step of identifying different applications with different levels of security through a single relationship, preventing duplication in the response to a relationship, through the identification, by an authentic application, that its relationship was obtained and used by an unauthorized application. Petition 870170021388, of 03/31/2017, p. 24/26 1/1 D1-