BG63887B1 - Method and device for forming a safe connection channel, identification and making of payments - Google Patents

Abstract

By the method a safe channel is formed including encoding of the information at the sender's side and its decoding at the receiver's side. All encoding, decoding and information formation are performed in a physically undismantable device. It keeps the pass-words for forming different type of safe connection channels. The device has a locking system in case of physical intervention. The channels formed in this way can be used for remote representation, electron Internet payments, passing of confidential information across public channels, and other. 27 claims, 4 figures

Description

The invention relates to a method and device for creating a secure channel for connection, identification and payment, applicable for example to banking operations such as encryption of information, user identification, certification of documents, electronic banking, electronic payment devices, transmission of confidential information on public channels, in access control systems.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Secure communication channels are known, which are mainly used in corporate networks. They are built on the basis of different security protocols. Each security protocol somehow encodes the information at the sender and decodes it at the recipient. This is possible if there is a list of predefined passwords at both endpoints of the channel.

An example of a secure channel communication is the ATM connection with the bank. This example also shows one important application of a secure channel, namely remote client identification. The client in this case identifies himself with his payment card and his personal identification code.

If the agreed list of passwords is misused, the secure channel identifies the communicators.

Since secure channels are mainly corporate, there are strict requirements for plugging a device into the secure channel. Security in this type of secure channel is mainly provided by access restriction. Access is only allowed to trustees, often bound by a contract for liability for possible damage to the system from their devices. This is because if a hacker has physical access to a device connected to a secure channel, it could cause serious damage to the system.

The issue of creating a secure channel at any time and anywhere between any two people has not been resolved. This limits the opportunities for e-commerce and use of the World Wide Web.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The implementation of a secure channel is in the classical scheme - encoding at the sender and decoding at the recipient, except that the list of passwords for the connection, together with the encoding mechanisms, is encoded in a disassembled device. Password lists can be added to this device, but an internal password can never be read. In this way, the connection identifies the device and identifies the user through a personal password.

The information packet is coded sequentially with an internal connection password and a personal password. Anonymous secure channel communication is provided, encrypted with an internal password only. There is also the possibility of secure communication on an isolated channel. It is encoded with an internal password for the isolated channel, an internal password of an ID center, a personal password. The Identity Center identifies the user with his or her personal password and the internal password to contact the center if he or she can decode the package. He then encodes it with the password to connect with the other user and his personal password and sends it to him. The package itself remains encrypted all the time with the password for the isolated channel. It is only decoded at the recipient. This guarantees the security of the information, with the center verifying the identity of the correspondents.

It is possible to store not one password but a list of passwords for a secure channel. When encrypted, passwords are changed randomly, which is revealed by the connection protocol.

Each session on the secure channel is made unique by passing a random tag to the coded portion of the packet and expecting the same tag to be returned to the sender in the coded message to the recipient.

An internal password identifies the device if it is not accessible in any way and only reflects the encoded result. Therefore, the method of coding, decoding must be consistent with the repeated use of the same password, as well as the fact that some information is always encoded. Attempts should be made to detect an internal password by statistics and submitting test coding information, such as a block filled with the same symbol, for example. The coding method can deal with statistical danger by including blurring of information in random noise. The danger of test encoding information can be avoided by a method of diversifying the contents of the encoded block. This method is applied when less than the specified number of different characters appear in the block.

Thus, internal passwords are logically protected. By assumption, the physical device that executes the method is indivisible, but nevertheless all passwords are kept encoded with a personal password. The personal password is stored with a random label in a noise file encoded with the personal password itself. Thus, even with physical access to internal memory, no one can use the information contained there without a personal password.

There may be many virtual synonyms for a personal password, whose role is to inform the police that a secure connection has been established against the person against his or her will.

The above described is done through a non-disassembling electronic device, which is a specialized computer. The specialized computer has non-volatile memory, random access memory, processor, bus control module, clock generator, hardware noise generator (random number generator), buffered I / O, and physical breakdown system. The physical breakdown system is essential to the method. It ensures that the device is not disassembled.

The computer is controlled by preinstalled software that executes input / output commands, encryption / decoding, and blocks generation according to the established protocol. This software is installed during the manufacture of the device and cannot be modified or read externally when operating the device.

The external commands of the device are not designed to display the contents of the nonvolatile memory at all. Nonvolatile memory can only be rubbed. They are deleted after entering a valid password for the file. For some files, this is the personal password, for other files the user does not know the friction password. For example, this is a device and user identification file. Such a file can be deleted by the person who created it, he knows the password. Deleting the password file makes it impossible to connect directly to a secure channel with that person.

The computer has several modes that are controlled by the user.

In anonymity mode, the computer does not legitimize or legitimize its owner. Connects to a previously entered internal password. The recipient may deny the connection to an anonymous sender.

Recording mode prohibits writing to internal non-volatile memory.

In non-erasable recording mode disabled - non-erasable recording in internal non-volatile memory is prohibited. Usually, indelible recording is not allowed.

The computer is powered by a device that connects to it through a special connector. In general, a non-disassembling specialized computer does not matter on its own. It is always used in conjunction with another computer playing the role of a custom server. The user server can be any computer, desktop or portable with communication capabilities. It is possible to create a specialized portable user server with built-in mobile or pseudomobile connection capabilities via infrared or radio communication with a fixed device that connects to a communication center. An infrared modem can be supplied with cash registers, public telephones and more. It is possible to include a multiplex communication server supporting fixed-line radio in fixed-line telephones in order to provide a paid connection to create a secure channel. Such devices may be ordinary cordless phones with a plug-in for secure channel multiplexing. These telephone posts may be private and included as communication servers in the absence of their owners. In this way, owners will receive additional income and the pseudomobile service they provide will be cheap enough to be widely used.

The non-disassembling computer is mounted in a special housing integrated with the plug, making it easy to plug into different devices. In order to prevent internal passwords from being accessed, when booting passwords, the non-disassembling computer connects directly to the boot machine.

Any computer to which the specified device is connected can implement a secure channel for its owner. Some computers are likely to eavesdrop on information while it is still clearly in the process of being created. This is not a secure channel issue. It provides security between two points, not at the points themselves. If strict confidentiality is required, steps must be taken to secure the user's server.

In many cases, the information transmitted over the secure channel is not important, but the identifying function of the channel is important. For example, an invoice is a valid document not when the amount is written on it, but when both a seal and a signature are made. Transmission by secure channel of a document without anonymity gives the same formality of the document as a notarized signature. When correspondents are not registered in the same identification center, a series of identification centers are trusted to trust each other, so that they can verify each other's identity and ultimately identify the two correspondents by their centers. This looks like a notarization of a notarized signature of another country.

The secure channel creation method described here can be used to identify the user. In this way, each bank could authenticate its customer and receive orders through the secure channel. This allows all types of banking operations to be ordered, enabling cashless payments, especially when banking services are available in real time. This payment method is reliable, is made through the service bank after identification procedures, and payment can be verified. However, such a method of payment should not apply to all types of payments as it violates the right to privacy. Purchases made by an individual can be judged by his financial position, habits and more. Sometimes this information can even be used to abuse. When thinking about e-commerce, based on e-money, human rights should not be forgotten. Therefore, anonymous accounts may be introduced to operate through a secure channel associated with the account. These accounts may be limited in volume and may not be associated with the identity of the owner, but only with a secure channel that can be made using the method. If there is an unlimited possibility of opening and closing such accounts by one person, anonymity is guaranteed. This would not change the economic rules, because currently cash holdings in private individuals are anonymous.

In addition to ensuring that human rights are respected, the method of payment with anonymous bills will reduce the information burden on the system, as payment information is only stored for a short guarantee period during which the transaction can be tested. After that period the information is destroyed. There is no need to verify the identity or keep records of the account. There is only an up-to-date amount on the account and it is sufficient for the operation to establish the secure channel associated with the account. In these accounts, by analogy with the cash holdings, the person may not be charged interest from which the bank will be able to finance this service.

For payment, whether on an anonymous or a normal account, one of the paying parties builds a secure channel to the payment center. Contact the other party and make a payment proposal. If the user on the other device confirms the payment, a secure call center is built to his payment service center through the connected device and the communication server of his payment center. The payer commands his secure channel to his payment center to transfer to the payee's account. The Payment Center transfers the requested amount directly or through a clearing center to the specified account. The recipient is waiting for a payment message on their secure channel. When it is received, the transaction is completed. If there is a problem, the deal can be tested during the warranty period. The transaction information is then retained and the ability to change anonymous accounts is automatically blocked until the case is clarified, including in court.

Explanation of the annexed figures

Figure 1 is a diagram of the organization of secure channels.

Figure 2 is a sectional view of a non-disassemble single-chip computer.

Figure 3 is a block diagram of a single-chip computer.

Figure 4 is a demonstration of the construction of:

I. Anonymous Channel.

II. A secure channel with identification.

III. Isolated channel.

Examples of carrying out the invention

The Secure Channel Organization Scheme provides: a protocol server 11 that is physically indistinguishable, a communication and user server 12, a correspondent trust center 13, a trust trust center 14, a secure channel 15 (possibly with identification between its correspondent and trusted center), secure channel between trusted centers 16, direct secure channel between correspondent 17.

The non-detachable single-chip computer contains: pad 21, non-enclosed integrated circuits 22 glued to the pad, inner box of the integrated circuit 23, gap 24 filled with non-homogeneously stable substance, which is heat-conducting, electrical probes 25 for measuring the electrical parameters of the gap, external metal box 26, also for radiator, insulator 27, one of the terminals 28 of the integrated circuit outside the metal box 26, gap 29, filled with a thermally conductive dielectric substance.

The single-chip computer contains: clock generator 31, noise generator 32, non-volatile memory 33, nonvolatile random access memory 34, processor 35, buffered I / O interface 36, physical disabling computer system 37, power supply stabilizer with protection 38 , tire 39.

When constructing an anonymous channel, secure channel with identification or isolated channel is used: return random tag 41, send request to return random tag 42, information block 43, encryption with internal password 44, status byte 45, encryption with personal password 46.

Crucial to the method described for creating a secure channel is the coding method. It must not be subject to statistical processing by repeatedly encrypting known information with the same password. In principle, this possibility is eliminated by enclosing random information in each encoded file, which makes a different encoded file each time.

One exemplary method for such coding is as follows:

Pre-treatment:

1. The file is pre-mixed with noise. This is done whenever the file is too small or requires great security. A random information file is generated (the built-in hardware generator is used), parts of the encoding file, accompanied by a recognition label, are stored in random places.

2. The file so prepared is divided into blocks. For example, they are 248 bytes.

3. Each block is coded separately.

Encoding:

1. The contents of the block are diversified.

2. A block of 256 bytes is filled with random permutation of numbers from 0 to 255, called block noise.

3. Another block of 256 bytes is copied to the block of 248 bytes for encoding. Elsewhere, the transmitted random marker is recorded in the previous message of the correspondent on the secure channel and if there is none, the random value is filled in, then a random marker is recorded, which is expected to be returned at the next message on the channel.

4. The bytes of the coding block are sorted by the number of consecutive permutations.

5. An XOR byte operation is performed between the bytes of the noise block and the permuted output block. The result is recorded at the appropriate location in the permuted output block.

6. Using an internal password of 256 bytes, an XOR byte operation is performed with the block containing noise. Internal password is usually also noise.

This produces a 512-byte encoded block. An open status byte is added to it, indicating the type of channel, whether the information is varied, whether it is supplemented and others.

Decoding:

1. With an internal password of 256 bytes, an XOR byte operation is performed with the block containing noise.

2. An XOR byte operation is performed between the two blocks.

3. The bytes of the information block are arranged in order of their number in the random permutation block.

4. If there is information in the status byte. that information is diversified, it is normalized.

5. If there is information in the status byte. if the block is completed, it is cut to its original size.

Further processing:

1. Joining all decoded blocks produces a noise file of information.

2. The noise information file shall be searched for all blocks of the primary file, identified by their special labels.

3. The decoded file is formed from all its detected blocks.

Diversify the content of the block:

1. The block is crawled and the many characters it contains are located.

2. If the characters are less than a certain number of item 3, otherwise item 20.

3. A recurring pair of identical characters is searched for.

4. If a pair is found, item 5 is executed, otherwise item 10 is performed.

5. One of the unused symbols for the block is selected at random.

6. A table indicates that the generated symbol replaces this pair. For example, S, a - indicates that the symbol S replaces the pair aa.

7. Everywhere the pair is replaced by the selected symbol.

8. The selected symbol is added to the set used.

9. Transition to item 2.

10. A recurring pair of different characters is searched for.

11. A random symbol is selected from unused ones.

12. In the table for substitutions of pairs of different characters it is written that the selected symbol replaces the couple. For example:

S.a, B - the selected symbol replaces the pair of a.c.

13. Everywhere the pair is replaced by the selected symbol.

14. Transition to item 2.

15. It is checked whether the generated tables plus 3 bytes can be written to the free space in the block.

16. If they can be enrolled, go to item 17, otherwise move to item 20.

17. At the end of the block, record the length of the compressed block, the length of each of the tables. This fills in the last 3 bytes of the block.

18. Before the last three bytes, two tables are placed.

19. The remaining space between the tables and the compressed information is filled with noise.

20. The End.

Finding the original block from a block with diverse content (normalization):

1. Both tables are copied from the block.

2. The block is cut to the amount of compressed information.

3. The block is crawled and any symbol that can be found in one of the two tables is replaced by the corresponding pair.

4. If no replacement symbol is found, go to item 5, otherwise - to item 3.

5. The End.

An economical method of encrypting with a personal password on a block protected by a personal password.

In this case, noise is encoded. Therefore, the simplicity of the method does not reduce security.

The following operations are performed:

1. to: = 1.

2. The kth byte of the encoded sequence is added to the password.

3. The XOR operation of the first byte of the password and the kth byte of the encoded sequence is applied. The result is written to the k place in the coded sequence.

4. The first byte of the password is deleted.

5. If κ-Ν, where N is the length of the encoded sequence, a transition to item 6 is made, otherwise - item 2 (k: = k + 1).

6. The End.

The decoding is done by the same method, except that not the kth byte of the encoded sequence is added to the password, but the result of the XOR operation between the kth byte of the encoded sequence and the first byte of the password.

This method encodes all the internal data, so that even in the case of physical destruction of the disassembled device, a secure channel of the received information cannot be realized without having a personal password.

The method is also used to provide a secure channel that can be authenticated.

The personal password does not appear explicitly in the internal memory. It is contained in a noise-blurry file that is encoded in a cost-effective manner with itself. When a user enters a personal password, the file is decoded and searched for the defined label followed by the password itself. If found, then the password is correct. The password is placed in an energy-dependent temporary buffer and is used to decode any inside information before using it.

If the user enters an incorrect password, the value stored in the non-volatile memory is increased. In a number of consecutive incorrect attempts, the file containing the personal password is filled with noise from the generator, ie. the device is blocked. This becomes unusable because it does not have a password that can be activated. This is very important because otherwise, through an external generator, it is easy to get a personal password that is relatively short. A channel can be blocked in the same way.

Internal memory is organized as a file system. File identifiers are identifiers of secure channels for which information is stored. For each file, information about its type is kept. The file type determines the type of secure channel that is built with it.

For example:

I. File type - anonymous secure channel.

Keep a password or passwords to encrypt the information. It is internally encoded with the stored password 44 by the encryption method. The procedure for passing a random marker 41,42 for a unique session is performed.

II. File type - secure channel with identification.

Keep an internal password to build an anonymous channel. When establishing a secure channel, it first expects a personal password 46 to be entered externally. The information 41,42,43 is encoded with the stored internal password 44 by the coding method and the entered personal password 46 by the economical coding method. It is essentially an anonymous channel with additional coding.

III. File Type Isolated Channel.

Keep an internal password / passwords to build an anonymous channel. A secure channel name with identification is awaiting. It encodes information 41,42,43 as an anonymous channel with an internal password stored 44. Performs secure channel authentication procedures over it.

Clearly, every secure channel has an open section. These are, for example, contact addresses and other information. This information is stored in an external device. The method and the method apparatus form a protocol server 11 of the secure channel. All other actions are performed by the user server 12, which builds the secure channel 15.17.

The device for implementing the method is made compact and non-disassembling, integrated with a plug for connection to different devices. The device is a single-chip computer, preferably based on a single crystal. If not possible, it can be made using hybrid technology, by gluing the crystals 22 of the required integrated circuits directly onto one substrate 21. In both cases measures are taken to make it difficult to destroy and tapping the integrated circuit, for example, to be placed in a metal housing 26. The main guarantee against physical intervention is the computer locking system 37 in the event of physical destruction. This can be achieved by a sensor box 24 housing a single chip computer. The sensor box 24 has a unique construction guaranteed for production. With the electric probes 25, the electrical parameters of the walls are measured in the volume of the walls of the box. The results obtained from the probes 25 are normalized by a numerical method to eliminate possible fluctuations. The values obtained are used to create a password to further encode the information. When attempting physical access, the electrical parameters of the box 24 change and the password becomes inaccessible. It is best to produce the sensor box 24 by pouring a main box 23 with mounted probes 25 with a solidifying agent according to a technology that guarantees wide parameter tolerance. The password protecting the system is formed automatically after the device is started up by digitally measuring electrical parameters between probes via a programmable multiplex channel. Thus, even the manufacturer does not know the password.

The integrated circuit must have non-volatile memory 33, buffer RAM 34, I / O buffer interface 36, physical random number generator 32, power supply voltage stabilizer 38, data bus 39, processor 35.

In the production of the integrated circuit, control software is installed in the non-volatile memory. The integrated circuit software performs all the functions of encoding, decoding and maintaining the data format by executing external commands or internal procedures. The characteristics of the software are determined by the types of secure channels that are supported and the external commands that are executed. Exemplary channel types have already been considered. The following is an example set of commands:

Command: Delete the file. Input: file name, password. Deletes an internal file.

Command: Save the file.

Input: file name, number of bytes, type, [password], description.

Writes a file to internal non-volatile memory. If the password is missing, the file can be deleted by presenting the personal password. The description is textual information for the file - for example, what it is for.

Command: Send to channel.

Subtypes: - Send via anonymous channel.

- Send by channel with identification.

- Send via isolated channel.

Input: channel name, additional information depending on the channel type, shipping information.

Performs the necessary processing and prepares a block for sending on a communication channel, depending on the type of secure channel.

Team: Receive by channel.

Subtypes: - Receive via anonymous channel.

- Receive by channel with identification.

- Get on an isolated channel.

Input: channel name, information block.

Decodes information.

Data input and output are performed using a buffer. The next two commands are for him.

Command: Enter in buffer.

Input: Number of bytes.

Enters the appropriate number of bytes in the buffer via the I / O interface.

Command: Remove from buffer.

Entrance: None.

Displays the number of bytes in the buffer, followed by the contents of the buffer itself.

Command: Activate the computer.

Login: Personal password.

Activates the computer.

Command: Change your personal password.

Login: Channel name with ID, old password, new password.

Changes the personal password to a secure, authenticated channel. The change is in two stages. Immediately the new password becomes synonymous with the old password. Using the old password is blocked for external use. When a connection is established through the channel, the new password is waiting, the connection is made with the old password and a command is sent on the channel to change the password.

Command: List the names of supported channels.

Entrance: None.

Lists the names of supported channels and their text descriptor.

Command: Stop.

Entrance: None.

Terminates the command immediately, deletes the buffer.

Use of the invention

The secure channels of the type described are suitable for transmitting confidential information and identifying the user, making them applicable in many fields, for example, in combination with a patent application "Method for Human-Machine Interface through Documents" BG Reg. No. 103505 (EN No. 11/1999 and WO 0062242 / 19.10.2000). In order to obtain a coded certificate, such as an electronic document, the user uses a secure channel to contact the certification center. The secure anonymous channel is suitable for pseudo-cash electronic payments through an anonymous account. The secure channel can serve as a notarized remote representation of the person. This includes disposing of property, contracting, and others without the need for physical presence. An obvious application of a secure authentication channel is to serve as an access key.

The device described may also be used for other purposes, such as a supermarket discount card or electronic newsletter. To be used as an election ballot, the device has the ability to create an anonymous secure channel with the CEC. The secure channel may receive the ballot, fill it out and return to the channel, the channel is blocked. The described data protection system through a physical intervention interlock system may also have a standalone electronic data security application. The method and the device can guarantee personal privacy in the context of global information dissemination.

Claims (27)

Claims 1. A device for making a secure channel for connection, identification and payment, comprising means for blocking the unauthorized retrieval of information from the device and constructed on the basis of a computer with a standard data and power plug, with an input / output interface, with internal clock generator, with built-in voltage stabilizer with protection, with non-volatile memory for storing information, RAM, with pre-installed software that implements a strictly defined set of external commands, x characterized in that the computer is indivisible, the means of blocking the retrieval of information include: means of data protection, including means for digitally measuring the physical parameters of the device, guaranteed individually and randomly formed by an automatic technological process, which are substantially changed any attempt to disassemble, as well as the ability to encrypt the internal memory of the device with a password formed by digital measurement; means for disallowing direct reading from the internal memory of the device, except for reading results located in the input / output buffer when performing procedures from preinstalled software, and means for blocking loading through the input / output buffer interface of the software and its execution by the device processor, except for command files containing commands executed by the preinstalled software. A device according to claim 1, characterized in that the active information security system is implemented on the basis of a sensor box of material of non-uniform consistency with implanted electrodes in volume. Device according to the preceding claims, characterized in that the means for blocking the information extraction from the device in the analysis of the output data - encrypted and decrypted packets include the use of a random number generator built into the device. A device according to the preceding claims, characterized in that the means for blocking the retrieval of information include means for controlling the modes of operation of the device of the type: disabling / allowing recording in internal non-volatile memory; prohibition / authorization of indelible record; disable / enable identification of the device and the user by internal options that cannot be changed without the knowledge of the activation password. 5. A device according to the preceding claims, characterized in that it is a single-chip computer. A method for making a secure channel for connection, identification and payment according to the preceding claims, comprising digitally encrypting and decrypting the information, characterized in that it includes the use of an encryption password when entering and decrypting for use all stored in device information that a password is formed by digitally measuring the physical parameters of the device, guaranteed individually and randomly generated through an automatic technological process that changes at any attempt of physical intrusion into the device; the use of a personal password to encrypt all the information, storing the password for comparison and being randomly located in a noise file encrypted with it; application of cryptomethods using random information to create individual sessions and diversify the information to be encrypted. Method according to claims 2 and 6, characterized in that it involves the use of a password to encrypt the information stored in the non-volatile memory of the device, which password is formed by measuring the electrical parameters between each two electrodes of the sensor box, as the obtained values are digitally corrected to eliminate drift. A method according to claims 6 and 7, characterized in that the following encryption steps are performed in the implementation of the cryptomethod: mixing the information with noise by placing labeled blocks at random in a noise file; splitting the noise file containing block encryption information; supplementing the blocks with noise as needed; diversify, if necessary, the contents of each block; generating a block containing random permutation of the byte numbers of the encryption block; displacement of the bytes in the encryption block, with the byte of the respective position in the place indicated by the value of that position in the random permutation; applying a reversible byte byte function to mix information from the random permutation block and the encrypted block information; application of reversible byte byte mixing of internal password and block with random permutation. A method according to claims 6 and 7, characterized in that the following decryption steps are performed in the implementation of the cryptomethod: application of the inverse function to separate the internal password from the random permutation block; applying the reverse function to separate the block of encrypted information and the block of random permutation; displacement of the bytes in the encrypted block, putting the byte in the next position, which is in the position specified by the value of the corresponding position in the random permutation; normalization is carried out in the presence of diversified contents of the block; stick all the labeled blocks together to get the file. A method according to claims 6 to 8, characterized in that the following steps are performed to realize the diversity of information: substitution of repeating pairs of identical symbols with a random symbol from unused ones in the block, and recording the substitution in a table for pairs of identical symbols; replacing duplicate pairs of different characters with a random symbol from unused ones in the block and saving the replacement in the table for pairs of different characters; repeating the above steps until the required heterogeneity is obtained; recording the two replacement tables in the block itself, the block also recording the dimensions of the compressed block and the dimensions of the two tables; filling the rest of the place with random information. The method of claims 6, 7 and 9. characterized in that the following steps are performed to achieve normalization of the information: copying of the compressed block by using information about its length present in the block; crawling the block and replacing all characters appearing in the two tables with the corresponding symbol pairs until all occurrences of such symbols are eliminated. A method according to claims 6 and 7, characterized in that the following encryption steps are performed to realize an economical cryptomethod: adding another encryption symbol to the password; mixing the first encryption character with the first password symbol with a reversible function; deleting the first character of the password; repeating the above steps until the encryption characters are exhausted. A method according to claims 6 and 7, characterized in that the following decryption steps are performed to realize an economical cryptomethod: separating the decryption symbol from the first password symbol using the inverse function; adding the decrypted character to the password; deleting the first character of the password; repeating the above steps until the decryption characters are exhausted. A method according to claims 6 to 13, characterized in that a byte XOR operation is used as a reversible function to implement cryptomethods. A method according to claims 6 and 7, characterized in that the realization of individual sessions includes the following steps: recording in the encrypted part of the message of the random tag that was received during the last communication; recording in the encrypted portion of the message a random tag that is expected to be returned upon receipt of the next encrypted message; comparing the received with the expected markers and in the event of a mismatch the channel is interrupted and an error is displayed. A method according to claims 6 to 15, characterized in that an anonymous secure channel is maintained by performing the following steps: performing the steps for creating individual sessions; performing steps to encrypt the information block with the internal password; adding a non-encrypted byte status that provides decryption, channel type, and processing information of the type: diversify and complement; transmission via the standard interface of the prepared unit for sending via a communication channel; and when receiving a block from an anonymous secure channel - decryption using the internal password and status byte. A method according to claims 6 to 16, characterized in that a secure identification channel is maintained by performing the following steps: creating an anonymous secure channel using the internal channel password; encrypting the personal password information for the respective channel transmitted through the standard interface, following the steps of a cost-effective cryptometer, and transmitting the prepared block to send via a communication channel; and when receiving a block from a secure identification channel, the personal password for the respective channel is used to decrypt it, if necessary, it is transmitted in advance to the input / output interface of the receiving device, and the channel is locked after a number of unsuccessful attempts to decrypt the received blocks with a personal password apply the steps to decrypt an anonymous secure channel. 18. The method according to claims 6 to 17, characterized in that the following steps are performed to maintain an isolated secure channel: creating an anonymous secure channel with an internal password for an isolated secure channel; creating a secure identification channel, the secure identification channel including the anonymous secure channel. A method according to claims 6 to 18, characterized in that it includes a method of changing the personal password for a secure authenticated channel by performing the following steps: storing the new password and the old password in the non-volatile memory after entering them via the standard interface; refusal to establish a channel when entering the old password: the next time the channel is used, the personal password entered is compared with the new password stored in the non-volatile memory and when a successful comparison the secure channel is carried out with the old password, and a password change command is transmitted via the channel ; both passwords are deleted and the connection is made with the personal password entered. 20. A user server according to the preceding claims, characterized in that it is compact and portable and has payment functionality, remote representation and secure connection; there is a built-in mobile telephone connection, and / or a standard infrared interface for fixed-line devices, and / or a standard PC connection, and / or the possibility of a pseudo-mobile connection on a temporarily leased channel using a private landline telephone through local radio communication. 21. The method according to the preceding claims, characterized in that the pseudomobile connection of the user server is accomplished by performing the following steps: establishing a secure connection to a fixed device; establishing a connection between the fixed device and a specified telephone post for connection to a service communication center via the fixed telephone network; establishment of a secure channel between the fixed device and the communication center; transmitting to the communication center the request for connection requested by the user's device; connecting the communication center to the place of interest through the fixed telephone network or the Internet; establishing a secure channel between the two endpoints; making a real-time payment for the service provided by the landline owner and the communication center. 22. A method according to the preceding claims, characterized in that the pseudo-mobile connection of the user server is made using a fixed device of the type: computer with a communication interface; public payphone with built-in 10 channel secure interface; cash register with built-in interface for secure channel and communication capabilities; private telephone with wireless connection, with multiplexer for secure channels. 15 A method according to the preceding claims, characterized in that it utilizes intermediary centers. A method according to the preceding claims, characterized in that it uses trust centers. 25. A method according to the preceding claims, characterized in that it performs remote representation by creating a secure channel of identification between the device and its trust center and between the second device and its trust center; creating a secure channel, where necessary, through intermediary centers between the two trust centers, each trust center guaranteeing the identity of the contact persons in front of the other center. A method according to the preceding claims, characterized in that it only reads from the input / output buffer of the device at a command transmitted through the input / output interface of the device. A method according to the preceding claims, characterized in that it makes payments through anonymous accounts by: connecting an account to an anonymous channel, making a payment to one of the parties with its payment center; connection between devices on both sides; creation of a secure sub-channel of the unconnected payment center and its payment center through the communication server of the related party's payment center; creating a secure channel of communication between the two payment centers, directly or through mediation; transfer of the required amount of money from one party's account to the other party's account; checking accounts on the country's secure channels; completion of the transaction, which in case of defect has the opportunity to be tested within a certain guarantee period before the payment center. Attachment: 4 figures Publication of the Patent Office of the Republic of Bulgaria 1113 Sofia, 52-Dr. Dr. GM Dimitrov Blvd. Expert: Klazarov Editor: A. Semerdzhieva Cf. № 41801 Circulation: 40 CP