AU730730B2 - Control device for an authorisation system - Google Patents

Control device for an authorisation system Download PDF

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Publication number
AU730730B2
AU730730B2 AU54774/98A AU5477498A AU730730B2 AU 730730 B2 AU730730 B2 AU 730730B2 AU 54774/98 A AU54774/98 A AU 54774/98A AU 5477498 A AU5477498 A AU 5477498A AU 730730 B2 AU730730 B2 AU 730730B2
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AU
Australia
Prior art keywords
base station
control device
signals
key code
signals transmitted
Prior art date
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Expired
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AU54774/98A
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AU5477498A (en
Inventor
Heidrun Hacker
Stefan Schmitz
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Robert Bosch GmbH
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Robert Bosch GmbH
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Publication date
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Publication of AU5477498A publication Critical patent/AU5477498A/en
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Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/23—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using manual input of alphanumerical codes
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/28—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00365—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks in combination with a wake-up circuit
    • G07C2009/00373—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks in combination with a wake-up circuit whereby the wake-up circuit is situated in the lock
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00388—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks code verification carried out according to the challenge/response method
    • G07C2009/00396—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks code verification carried out according to the challenge/response method starting with prompting the keyless data carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00412—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmitted data signal being encrypted
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles

Description

WO 98/31900 PCT/DE97/02880 Control device for an authorisation system Prior Art The invention relates to equipment for activating an authorisation system with a control device, a transmitter receiver for communication with a base station of the authorisation system and a coding and decoding device which carries out a coding decoding on the basis of a key code.
Control devices of that kind also known as transponders are known, for example, from EP 0 285 419 A2, and serve quasi as a key, for example for the authorised opening of doors.
In the motor vehicle context, contactless operating authorisation systems are being more and more used for the activating deactivating of a vehicle immobiliser. For the testing of the authorisation, a random number of a certain length is transmitted from a fixed base station to the transponder, is coded there by means of a predetermined key code and is returned to the base station. This procedure, ie. the transmission of a random number and the return of the coded number will, in what follows, be referred to as protocol. By a short protocol, it is meant that the word length of the random number is small and consequently the transmission time is short. A long protocol means that a random number with a long word length is transmitted in one or more blocks. The transmission time of a long protocol is consequently correspondingly longer.
If the comparison of this datum with the expected datum calculated from the random number results in an agreement, an authorisation exists and the desired action, in this case the starting of the vehicle, can be carried out.
In order to obtain as high a degree of security as possible, long protocols are chosen, ie.
the length of the random number word and correspondingly also the key code in the transponder is large. A correspondingly long processing time for the communication and -2the encoding in the transponder is the result which in an authorisation system is uncritical for the turning on of the motor.
This type of contactless operating authorisation system also for right of access to vehicles, that is, for the opening of doors is planned for the future. If the same transponder is used for this as for the authorization to start the motor, the problem which results is that the communication and the processing in the transponder takes a long time because of the length of the word, ie. of the long protocol and will be found to be unpleasant by the user who wants to enter the vehicle.
10 The task of the present invention exists, then, in the creation of a control eog.
device for an authorisation system which enables a rapid processing and communication in time-critical authorisation queries and which nevertheless V* guarantees a high degree of security.
ADVANTAGES OF THE INVENTION 15 According to the present invention there is provided a control device for an authorisation system, with a transmission/reception device for the reception of signals transmitted from a base station and the transmission of signals to the base station, with a decoding device which decodes the signals transmitted from the base station, with a controlling device which processes the input signals via the *q 3 0 transmitter/receiver and the decoder, with an encoder which carries out an encoding of the signals transmitted to the base station by means of a key code, 4 00 wherein a selection device which determines the word length of the transmitted signal the selection device being constructed of at least two key codes of differing lengths for the selection of the key code and the selection device selecting a key 2f code dependent on a signal of the controlling device. The control device distinguishes itself by means of its possessing a selection device which selects one of two protocols of differing lengths, ie. that the control device can return coded random numbers of differing word lengths dependent on the length of the random number received or dependent on commands sent. For this, for a first authorisation step, for example the door lock, a random number and a key code with a short word length and correspondingly short processing time is used, while for a second authorisation step, for example the starting of the motor, a random number and a key code with a longer word length and very high security with RAL,.correspondingly long processing time can be used. A several step, preferably two 29/11/O0,jb10610.np,2 -2a step authorisation system which can be operated by a single transponder without having to sacrifice security or convenience is realised.
The basic idea of this two-step authorisation system is that the security requirements at the first step (access authorisation), for example the opening of the doors, be selected lesser than the security requirement at the second step (authorisation to start the car), as the first step can be easily bypassed through the breaking of a window. In the case of the starting of the motor, however, there is no possibility to circumvent the authorisation system.
*O
0Oo a.. a 9 8** *0 *0 a 9 0 *0 0 0 ae *0 go0 29/11/00,jb10610.np,2 WO 98/31900 PCT/DE97/02880 3 Drawing The invention will now be described on the basis of an embodiment with reference to the drawings. Shown in them are: Figure 1 a block diagram of a control device and a base station, and Figure 2 a schematic representation of a selection device.
Embodiments In Figure 1, a base station 10 and an actuating device (transponder) 20 are depicted. The base station 10 concerns, for example an access control device for a vehicle or building, a computer or other consumables. The control device 20 allocated to the base station concerns, for example, a transponder which, in a vehicle, assumes the function of a key.
The base station comprises a transmitter receiver 11 for the transmission or reception of signals transmitted, contactless, via a radio path 30. A decoder 12 is connected to its output which receives the signals received by the transmitter receiver 11 for decoding. A memory 31 with the necessary information for the carrying out of the decoding, especially in the form of a cryptic key code, is allocated to the decoder 12. The decoded signals are fed to a microprocessor 13 upstream which evaluates them and, dependent on the result of the evaluation, introduces following measures. A following measure could, for example, be the release of the start function. By means of a selection device (not shown) allocated to the microprocessor, it is possible to select a protocol of a certain length. Preferably, the length of the word of the random number to be transmitted to the control device 20 can be adjusted. Further, the microprocessor 13 controls, in particular, the transmission of signals via the transmitter receiver 11. A memory 15 is allocated to it also, in which for example, a serial number 16, a manufacturer's code 17 and a directory 18 with the groups of the control device 20 allocated to the base station 10 are stored. The manufacturer's code 17 is provided by the manufacturer of the base station and indicates it clearly. The serial number is characteristic for base stations 10 and control devices 20 allocated to one another, the group numbers serve to distinguish between a control device 20 with identical serial numbers allocated to a common base station 10. The signals to be transmitted from the transmitter receiver 11 are, as a rule, encoded. An encoder is situated between the microprocessor 13 and the transmitter receiver 11 for this reason, which is WO 98/31900 PCT/DE97/02880 4 also connected to the memory 31 for the carrying out of the encoding. Further, the base station 10 has an input 19 to provide a user with access to the microprocessor 13. The input 19 can, for example, be designed as a key panel, as is shown in Figure 1. Of course, any number other designs are also possible.
The control device 20 comprises a transmitter receiver 11 corresponding to the base side transmitter receiver 21 for the reception of signals transmitted by the base station 10 or for the reception of contactless, transmittable signals to the base station 10. A decoder 22 for the decoding of encoded signals is connected upstream of the transmitter receiver 21 analogous to the base station. The decoder 22 with a selection device 29 which has at least one memory 31 whose contents correspond to that of the base station 10 carries out the decoding. The datum in the memory 31 is the cryptic key code in the base station 10. Also connected to the decoder 22 is a microprocessor 24 which processes the signals entering the transmitter receiver 21 and, dependent on the result, carries out following measures.
These following measures consist in particular in the returning of a response signal which is used in the known challenge-response protocol. The word length of the response signal is determined by the selection device 29 dependent on the word length of the challenge signal or dependent on precommands, so that control device 20 is in a position to carry out various protocols previously provided by the base station 10. The microprocessor 24 particularly controls the transmission of signals to the base station 10 via the transmitter receiver 21. It takes place in order to exclude intercepting or copying, as a rule in encoded form. An encoder 23 is connected for this purpose between the microprocessor 24 and the transmitter receiver 21 analogous to the base station which is also connected to the selection device 29 for the carrying out of the encoding function. A memory element 25 is further allocated to the microprocessor. It comprises in particular a memory location 16 for the storage of a serial number, a memory location 26 for the storage of a group number and a memory location 27 for the storage of a manufacturer's code. The latter is given by the manufacturer of the control device 20 and indicates it clearly. The serial number is a code characteristic for the whole device consisting of the base station 10 and the control device It is established by the manufacturer or, if applicable, by the user of the whole device and is identical with the serial number in the base station. The group number serves to distinguish between several control devices 20 having the same serial number. It is established in the use of the device by the user. In the memory 25 is further information 28 for the definition of the extent of the function of the respective control device 20. For example, in the case of use in a vehicle by means of the utilisation information 28, WO 98/31900 PCT/DE97/02880 the range of transmission for the validity of a control device 20 can be limited to a certain value. In an alternative design, the utilisation information 28 can also be stored in the memory of the base station In Figure 1 it can be seen that the selection device 29 alongside the memory 31 has a further memory 31' for the storing of another key code.
Figure 2a shows a detailed depiction of the selection device 29 in terms of a block diagram.
Both memories 31 and 31' can be recognised, the memory 31 being designed for the storage of a datum with the word length N and the memory 31' for the storage of a datum with the word length M. In the example presented, N is smaller than M. Both memories are connected via lines with the decoder 22 and the encoder 23. Each of the two memories 31, 31' have a control input 33, 33', each of which is connected to an activation circuit The activation circuit 35 receives a control signal from the microprocessor 24. A corresponding signal to one of the control inputs 33, 33' sees to it that the contents of the relevant memory to the encoder 23 and the decoder 22 are transmitted. For the mode of operation of the encoding, it is important that the contents of a memory are transmitted.
Between the base station 10 and the control device 20 is a radio path 30 for the transmission of contactless transmittable signals between the transmitter receiver 11 on the base side and the transmitter receiver 21 on the control device side. The signals emitted from the transmitter receiver 11 on the base side reach all control devices 20 within its range simultaneously. Signals used are infrared signals or high frequency signals.
The exact communication between base station 10 and control device 20, the appropriate choice of one of the addressed control devices 20 and the course of the challenge-response protocol will not be gone into in any detail at this point. Rather, the pertinent information in the application (DE 19645769.6-53) is referred to. This should be understood as part of this description.
After the base station 10 has sent a so-called "wake-up" signal and the relevant control devices 20 have responded, the base station 10 selects a certain control device 20. Then the base station 10 transmits a random number with a word length P, not encoded, via the radio path 30 which is received from the selected control device 20. Corresponding to the challenge-response protocol, this random number is encoded by the encoder 23 by means WO 98/31900 PCT/DE97/02880 6 of a key code and is returned to the base station 10. There, this returned response is compared with an expected response computed from the random number and the key code.
If an agreement is established, it concerns the correct control device so that the authorisation query transmitted from the base station 10 is answered as positive. The base station 10 can then activate the planned following measures.
As has already been mentioned, the control device 20 comprises a selection device 29 made up of several memories 31, 31' with corresponding key codes of various lengths. For the correct coding of the random number transmitted, it is necessary that the key code be called up for encoding which agrees with the key code of the base station 10. For this, before the transmission of the random number, a so-called "precommand" is transmitted which causes the microprocessor 24 of the control device 20 to select a memory 31, 31' via the control circuit 35 and the control inputs 33, 33'.
The use of a selection device 29 with several memories 31, 31' enables it to construct a multiple-stepped control system with several base stations which, however, is served with a single control device 20 although various word lengths are used.
A base station for the access authorisation and another base station for the vehicle authorisation are envisaged if a control system with several steps is used, for example in a truck. The first base station operates with a key code of the word length N, as a rapid processing is necessary, while the second base station operates with a word length M as here high security requirements are required.
As soon as a connection between the first base station and the control device 20 is made, the precommand is transmitted to the control device 20 so that, for example, the memory 31 which stores the identical key code to the first base station with the word lengh N is selected there. If the authorisation query has run positively, the base station triggers the opening of the door lock so that the vehicle can be entered.
If the occupier gives the clear indication that he wants to start the car, the second base station will seek contact with the control device 20 and before starting the challengeresponse protocol give a signal as precommand which causes the microprocessor 24 of the control device 20 to select the memory 31' via the selection device 29. A key code of the word length M which corresponds to the key code of the second base station is stored in WO 98/31900 PCT/DE97/02880 7 this memory. As the starting of the motor involves higher security requirements, the word length M is markedly larger than the word length N of the key code belonging to the first base station.
A reduction of the memory locations 31 can be realised if as is shown in Figure 2b a bit segment of the N length is used for both key codes.
The embodiment referred to comprises two base stations which are served by means of a control device 20. Of course, a control device of this type can be extended to further base stations which operate with various key codes. For this, only additional memory in the control device 20 need be provided and the selection device 29 adapted appropriately.
Further, it is also conceivable that, for an increase in security, a reciprocal identification of the control device 20 and base station 10 be introduced.

Claims (6)

1. A control device for an authorisation system, with a transmission/reception device for the reception of signals transmitted from a base station and the transmission of signals to the base station, with a decoding device which decodes the signals transmitted from the base station, with a controlling device which processes the input signals via the transmitter/receiver and the decoder, with an encoder which carries out an encoding of the signals transmitted to the base station by means of a key code, wherein a selection device which determines the word length of the transmitted signal the selection device being constructed of at least two key codes of differing lengths for the selection of the 960: key code and the selection device selecting a key code dependent on a signal of the controlling device.
2. A control device as claimed in Claim 1 wherein a verification with the base station takes place by means of a challenge-response protocol. 15
3. A control device as claimed in any one of the preceding claims, wherein a reciprocal verification between control device and base station takes place.
4. An authorisation system, including a control device having a transmitter/receiver to receive signals transmitted by a base station and to transmit :o signals to the base station, a decoder that decodes the signals transmitted by the base station, a controlling device that processes the signals arriving via the transmitter/receiver and the decoder, an encoder that carries out the encoding of the signals transmitted to the base station by means of a protocol, and a base S station having a controller, a transmitter/receiver for communication with at least o° o 2 one control device and an encoder/decoder that encodes/decodes by means of the protocol, wherein the base station transmits a command signal to the actuating device, depending on that command signal, a selection device selects a protocol from at least two protocols having different lengths.
A control device as claimed in any one of the preceding claims, wherein the communication between control device and base station takes place contactlessly by means of infrared or high frequency signals.
6. A multi-step authorisation system with a control device as claimed in any one of Claims 1 to 5 and at least two base stations, the base stations storing 29/11/00,jb10610.np,8 'i IN -9- key codes of varying lengths, wherein the control device has one memory for each base station which stores the key code corresponding to the base station. DATED this 2 9 th day of November, 2000 ROBERT BOSCH GMBH By their Patent Attorneys: CALLINAN LAWRIE see 066 *0 0 .0 0 29/1 1/OO0jblO6lO.np,9
AU54774/98A 1997-01-20 1997-12-11 Control device for an authorisation system Expired AU730730B2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19701740 1997-01-20
DE19701740A DE19701740A1 (en) 1997-01-20 1997-01-20 Actuating device for an authorization system
PCT/DE1997/002880 WO1998031900A1 (en) 1997-01-20 1997-12-11 Control device for an authorization system

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
AU5477498A AU5477498A (en) 1998-08-07
AU730730B2 true AU730730B2 (en) 2001-03-15

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AU54774/98A Expired AU730730B2 (en) 1997-01-20 1997-12-11 Control device for an authorisation system

Country Status (6)

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EP (1) EP0954666B1 (en)
JP (1) JP2001509224A (en)
AU (1) AU730730B2 (en)
DE (2) DE19701740A1 (en)
ES (1) ES2229397T3 (en)
WO (1) WO1998031900A1 (en)

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DE19850308B4 (en) * 1998-10-30 2006-07-13 T-Mobile Deutschland Gmbh Method for protecting smart cards against misuse in third-party devices
DE19856282A1 (en) * 1998-12-07 2000-06-08 Bosch Gmbh Robert Radio data transmission device
DE10217533B4 (en) * 2002-04-17 2004-12-02 Dom-Sicherheitstechnik Gmbh & Co. Kg Portable modular wireless identification transmitter and wireless access control system
JP4368882B2 (en) * 2006-10-27 2009-11-18 アルプス電気株式会社 Passive keyless entry device
US20120280788A1 (en) * 2011-05-05 2012-11-08 Juergen Nowottnick Communications apparatus and method therefor
DE102011054637A1 (en) 2011-10-20 2013-04-25 Marc Gaston Zacher Method for configuring an electromechanical lock

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DE3900494A1 (en) * 1989-01-10 1990-07-12 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag SAFETY DEVICE FOR MOTOR VEHICLES
DE4003280C5 (en) * 1990-02-03 2007-06-28 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Safety device for motor vehicles
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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP0954666B1 (en) 2004-10-13
JP2001509224A (en) 2001-07-10
DE59712018D1 (en) 2004-11-18
EP0954666A1 (en) 1999-11-10
WO1998031900A1 (en) 1998-07-23
AU5477498A (en) 1998-08-07
ES2229397T3 (en) 2005-04-16
DE19701740A1 (en) 1998-07-23

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