WO2023240934A1 - Procédé et appareil de traitement de sécurité de vecteur de confidentialité - Google Patents

Procédé et appareil de traitement de sécurité de vecteur de confidentialité Download PDF

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WO2023240934A1
WO2023240934A1 PCT/CN2022/135285 CN2022135285W WO2023240934A1 WO 2023240934 A1 WO2023240934 A1 WO 2023240934A1 CN 2022135285 W CN2022135285 W CN 2022135285W WO 2023240934 A1 WO2023240934 A1 WO 2023240934A1
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fragment
scalar
slice
party
difference
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PCT/CN2022/135285
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Chinese (zh)
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李漓春
张祺智
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蚂蚁区块链科技(上海)有限公司
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Publication of WO2023240934A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023240934A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters

Definitions

  • One or more embodiments of this specification relate to the field of computers, and in particular, to methods and devices for secure processing of privacy vectors.
  • the privacy vector is a one-hot encoding vector, which is distributed between two parties in the form of sum and sharing. Either party knows the plaintext vector.
  • the privacy vector needs to be protected, that is, the value of k cannot be leaked, secure multi-party computation needs to be used to achieve it.
  • One or more embodiments of this specification describe a secure processing method and device for privacy vectors, which can reduce communication volume during secure processing of privacy vectors.
  • a secure processing method for privacy vectors is provided.
  • the privacy vector is a one-hot encoding vector, which is distributed between the first party and the second party in the form of sum sharing.
  • the method is used to obtain the The vector inner product result of the privacy vector and the plaintext vector is performed by any party, including:
  • a safe multiplication operation is jointly performed , obtain the first slice of the vector inner product result, which corresponds to the product of the first scalar and the second scalar.
  • obtaining the local slice of the privacy vector in modulo 2 space includes:
  • the fragments of the modulo q1 space of the privacy vector held by the party are converted into the fragments of the modulo 2 space.
  • determining the first sign bit used to identify a positive number or a negative number according to its corresponding index includes:
  • the first sign bit is determined to be -1.
  • determining the first slice of the first scalar according to the first summation result and the first sign bit includes:
  • the first constant is taken modulo to obtain the first slice of the first scalar.
  • the value of the second lowest bit of the first scalar is different.
  • the first constant is a power of 2 and is not less than 4.
  • determining the first slice of the second scalar according to the second summation result and the first sign bit includes:
  • the safe multiplication operation includes:
  • the first fragment of the first random number, the first fragment of the second random number, and the first fragment of the random multiplication result from a third party; the second fragment of the first random number, and the second fragment of the second random number.
  • the second fragment of the fragmentation and random multiplication results is obtained by the other party; where the random multiplication result is the product of the first random number and the second random number;
  • the second fragment of the first difference value is the second fragment of the first scalar and the second fragment of the first random number.
  • the difference between two slices; the second slice of the second difference is the difference between the second slice of the second scalar and the second slice of the second random number;
  • the first difference the second difference, the first fragment of the first random number, the first fragment of the second random number, and the first fragment of the random multiplication result
  • the first The first slice of the product of the scalar and the second scalar; the other party gets the second slice of the product.
  • a secure processing device for privacy vectors is provided.
  • the privacy vector is a one-hot encoding vector, which is distributed between the first party and the second party in a shared form.
  • the device is used to obtain the privacy vector.
  • An acquisition unit used to acquire the local slices of the privacy vector in modulo 2 space
  • An accumulation calculation unit is used to accumulate each bit of the own slice obtained by the acquisition unit to obtain the first summation result
  • the sign determination unit is used to determine the first sign bit used to identify the positive number or the negative number according to the corresponding index of the party;
  • a first scalar determination unit configured to determine the first slice of the first scalar based on the first summation result obtained by the accumulation calculation unit and the first sign bit obtained by the sign determination unit;
  • An inner product calculation unit used to locally calculate the inner product of the local fragment and the plaintext vector to obtain the second summation result
  • a second scalar determination unit configured to determine the first slice of the second scalar based on the second summation result obtained by the inner product calculation unit and the first sign bit;
  • a joint operation unit configured to provide the other side with the first fragment of the first scalar obtained by the first scalar determination unit and the first fragment of the second scalar obtained by the second scalar determination unit.
  • the second slice of the first scalar and the second slice of the second scalar jointly perform a safe multiplication operation to obtain the first slice of the vector inner product result, and the vector inner product result corresponds to the first scalar sum The product of the second scalar.
  • a third aspect provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored.
  • the computer program is executed in a computer, the computer is caused to perform the method of the first aspect.
  • a fourth aspect provides a computing device, including a memory and a processor.
  • the memory stores executable code.
  • the processor executes the executable code, the method of the first aspect is implemented.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an implementation scenario of an embodiment disclosed in this specification
  • Figure 2 shows a flow chart of a security processing method for privacy vectors according to one embodiment
  • Figure 3 shows a schematic diagram of safe multiplication in a fragmented state according to one embodiment
  • Figure 4 shows a schematic block diagram of a security processing device for privacy vectors according to one embodiment.
  • FIG 1 is a schematic diagram of an implementation scenario of an embodiment disclosed in this specification.
  • This implementation scenario involves the secure processing of privacy vectors.
  • the privacy vectors are one-hot encoding vectors, which are distributed between the first party and the second party in the form of sum sharing.
  • the method is used to obtain the privacy vectors and plaintext vectors.
  • the vector inner product result of As shown in Figure 1, the scenario for secure processing of privacy vectors involves party A and party B, or the first party and the second party, or party A and party B.
  • Each participant can be implemented as any device, platform, server or device cluster with computing and processing capabilities. Both parties must jointly determine the vector inner product result of the privacy vector and the plaintext vector while protecting the privacy vector from being leaked.
  • the vector inner product result shall be distributed to both parties in the form of sum sharing. And sharing is a specific form of secret sharing.
  • Secret sharing means that n participants split and share a secret s. After the split, each share is managed by a different participant. The secret can only be fully restored when the number of participants is not less than m.
  • Two-party arithmetic secret sharing refers to the split sharing of a secret information by two participants. A single participant cannot recover the secret information, and the shares held by both parties must be combined to fully recover the secret. Usually the recovery operation is addition on a finite ring.
  • the above secret information can also be called private data, and the secret information shared by two parties is also called private data in the form of sum sharing.
  • p represents an n-dimensional one-hot encoding vector
  • T is a public n-dimensional plaintext vector.
  • Party A holds one shard of p ⁇ p> 0
  • party B holds another shard of p ⁇ p> 1.
  • p ⁇ p> 0 + ⁇ p> 1. Both parties A and B know the plaintext vector.
  • p represents an n-dimensional vector, which is composed of n elements.
  • the slices of p can be regarded as a combination of slices of each element it contains.
  • P is a 4-dimensional vector (0 ,1,0,0), in order from right to left, if the slice of the first element 0 owned by Party A is 1, the slice of the second element 0 owned by Party A is 0, and Party A has The fragment of the third element 1 of is 1, the fragment of the fourth element 0 owned by party A is 1, then party A holds a fragment of p ⁇ p> 0 can be expressed as (1,1,0 ,1),
  • the fragment of the first element 0 that Party B has is 1, the fragment of the second element 0 that Party B has is 0, and the fragment of the third element 1 that Party B has is 0, the fragment of the fourth element 0 owned by party B is 1, then the other fragment ⁇ p> 1 held by party B can be expressed as (1,0,0,1).
  • secure processing of privacy vectors is implemented through secure multi-party computation, which is used to obtain the vector inner product result of the privacy vector and the plaintext vector.
  • Secure multi-party computation is also called multi-party secure computation, that is, multiple parties jointly calculate the result of a function without leaking the input data of each party in the function, and the calculation result is disclosed to one or more parties.
  • the embodiments of this specification propose corresponding solutions in order to reduce the communication volume during security processing of privacy vectors.
  • One-hot encoded vectors are common in statistics and machine learning, and the above calculation to determine the vector inner product result can be used in related fields.
  • the above calculation can also be used for table lookup calculation, that is, the element T[k] of the table T can be found from the input k: first convert the input k into a one-hot encoding vector p with the k-th element having a value of 1, and convert the table T is in the form of a vector, and then calculates the vector inner product result of p and T.
  • Look-up table calculations can be used to calculate functions with a single input and a limited number of input values, such as factorials.
  • Figure 2 shows a flow chart of a security processing method for privacy vectors according to one embodiment.
  • the method can be based on the implementation scenario shown in Figure 1.
  • the privacy vector is a one-hot encoding vector, which is distributed in the form of and sharing.
  • One party and the second party the method is used to obtain the vector inner product result of the privacy vector and the plaintext vector, and is executed by either party.
  • the security processing method for privacy vectors in this embodiment includes the following steps: Step 21, obtain the local fragments of the privacy vector in modulo 2 space; Step 22, obtain the local fragments of the privacy vectors Each bit is accumulated to obtain the first summation result; step 23, determine the first sign bit used to identify the positive or negative number according to the corresponding index of the local party; step 24, according to the first summation result and the The first sign bit determines the first fragment of the first scalar; Step 25, locally calculate the inner product of the local fragment and the plaintext vector to obtain the second summation result; Step 26, according to the second The summation result and the first sign bit determine the first fragment of the second scalar; step 27, based on the first fragment of the first scalar and the first fragment of the second scalar owned by the party, provide the other party with the first fragment of the second scalar.
  • the second slice of the first scalar and the second slice of the second scalar jointly perform a safe multiplication operation to obtain the first slice of the vector inner product result, and the vector inner product result corresponds to the first scalar sum The product of the second scalar.
  • step 21 obtain the local slice of the privacy vector in modulo 2 space.
  • the privacy vector p is an n-dimensional vector, which is composed of n elements
  • the slices of p can be regarded as a combination of slices of each element it contains, and the slices of each element belong to modulo 2 space.
  • any party holds a fragment ⁇ p> j of the privacy vector p.
  • a fragment of the i-th element of the privacy vector p is recorded as ⁇ p[i]> j , where j is the corresponding fragment of the party.
  • Index, i is the index of the element.
  • the indexes corresponding to the two parties are usually two integers that are adjacent in sequence. For example, the index corresponding to the first party is 0 and the index corresponding to the second party is 1; or, the index corresponding to the first party is 1 and the index corresponding to the second party is 1.
  • the index of is 2.
  • the index of each element is usually in the order of the elements in the vector from right to left, starting from 0 and increasing by 1. For an n-dimensional vector, the index of each element in the vector is from 0 to n-1.
  • obtaining the local slice of the privacy vector in modulo 2 space includes:
  • the fragments of the modulo q1 space of the privacy vector held by the party are converted into the fragments of the modulo 2 space.
  • either the first party or the second party holds the slice of the privacy vector modulo q1 space. If q1 is equal to 2, the own slice of the privacy vector in the modulo 2 space can be directly obtained. ; If q1 is not equal to 2, the fragments of the privacy vector held by the party modulo q1 space can be converted into the fragments of the party modulo 2 space through a locally performed secure modulo conversion operation. Wherein, the above secure modulo conversion operation can be performed separately on the slices of the modulo q1 space of each element of the privacy vector. It will be appreciated that secure analog conversion operations performed locally do not require communication with the other party.
  • Both parties can each determine the lowest bit (bit) of the modulo q1 space fragment of any element of their privacy vector as the modulo 2 space fragment of that element of the privacy vector. For example, if the modulo q1 space fragment of an element of the privacy vector is 1001, and its lowest bit is 1, then the modulo 2 space fragment of the element of the privacy vector is 1.
  • Each element of the privacy vector is one bit in the local slice of modulo 2 space, so the n-dimensional privacy vector is n bits in the local slice of modulo 2 space.
  • each bit of the local slice is accumulated to obtain the first summation result. It can be understood that since the local slice is in modulo 2 space, the above accumulation calculation is also performed in modulo 2 space. Any bit of the local slice has two values, which are 0 or 1 respectively. The summation result also has two values: 0 or 1.
  • any party holds a fragment ⁇ p> j of the privacy vector p, and a fragment of the i-th element of the privacy vector p is recorded as ⁇ p[i]> j , where j is the corresponding index of the party. , i is the index of the element, and the first summation result can be expressed as
  • step 23 the first sign bit used to identify a positive number or a negative number is determined according to the corresponding index of the local party. It can be understood that the indexes of the first party and the second party are different, and their first sign bits are also different.
  • determining the first sign bit used to identify a positive number or a negative number according to its corresponding index includes:
  • the first sign bit is determined to be -1.
  • j is the index corresponding to this party, and the first sign bit can be expressed as (-1) j .
  • the status of the first party and the second party is equal, so the opposite method of determining the first sign bit can also be used. For example, if the index corresponding to the own party is an odd number, then the first sign bit is determined. The sign bit is 1; if the index corresponding to the local party is an even number, the first sign bit is determined to be -1. For example, j is the index corresponding to this side, and the first sign bit can be expressed as (-1) j+1 .
  • step 24 determine the first slice of the first scalar according to the first summation result and the first sign bit. It can be understood that the manner of determining the first fragment of the first scalar is related to the desired value of the first scalar.
  • determining the first slice of the first scalar according to the first summation result and the first sign bit includes:
  • the first constant is taken modulo to obtain the first slice of the first scalar.
  • any party holds a fragment ⁇ p> j of the privacy vector p, and a fragment of the i-th element of the privacy vector p is recorded as ⁇ p[i]> j , where j is the corresponding index of the party. , i is the index of the element, and the first summation result is The first sign bit is (-1) j , the first constant is d, and the first scalar is b, then the first slice of the first scalar can be expressed as
  • the value of the second lowest bit of the first scalar is different.
  • the first scalar is b
  • the first constant is a power of 2 and is not less than 4.
  • the specific value of the first constant satisfies the above conditions, but the first constant that satisfies the above conditions does not necessarily have to be the specific value.
  • step 25 the inner product of the local fragment and the plaintext vector is calculated locally to obtain a second summation result.
  • the value of the second summation result not only depends on the value of each bit of the local fragment, but also depends on the value of each element of the plaintext vector.
  • the value of the local fragment The value of any bit can only take two values: 0 and 1, and the value of any element of the plaintext vector is the modulus space in which it is located.
  • any party holds a fragment ⁇ p> j of privacy vector p
  • a fragment of the i-th element of privacy vector p is denoted as ⁇ p[i]> j
  • the plaintext vector is represented by T
  • the plaintext The i-th element of vector T is recorded as T[i], where j is the index corresponding to this side, i is the index of the element, and the second summation result can be expressed as
  • step 26 determine the first slice of the second scalar according to the second summation result and the first sign bit. It can be understood that the manner of determining the first fragment of the second scalar is related to the desired value of the second scalar.
  • determining the first slice of the second scalar according to the second summation result and the first sign bit includes:
  • any party holds a fragment ⁇ p> j of privacy vector p
  • a fragment of the i-th element of privacy vector p is denoted as ⁇ p[i]> j
  • the plaintext vector is represented by T
  • the i-th element of vector T is recorded as T[i], where j is the index corresponding to this side, i is the index of the element, and the second summation result is
  • the first sign bit is (-1) j and the second scalar is c, then the first fragment of the second scalar can be expressed as
  • step 27 based on the first fragment of the first scalar and the first fragment of the second scalar owned by the party, and the second fragment of the first scalar and the second fragment of the second scalar provided by the other party, Safe multiplication operations are jointly performed to obtain a first slice of a vector inner product result, which corresponds to the product of the first scalar and the second scalar. It can be understood that the vector inner product result of the privacy vector and the plaintext vector can be obtained by calculating the product of the first scalar and the second scalar.
  • the privacy vector p is an n-dimensional one-hot encoding vector
  • its k-th dimension element has a value of 1
  • the other dimensional elements have a value of 0.
  • the plaintext vector T is an n-dimensional vector
  • the first scalar is represented by b
  • ⁇ x> j represents the fragment of x in the fragmented state in the jth side
  • ⁇ r> j is the second lowest bit of ⁇ b> j , which is the first bit of ⁇ b> j
  • r ⁇ r> 0 + ⁇ r> 1 .
  • the safe multiplication operation includes:
  • the first fragment of the first random number, the first fragment of the second random number, and the first fragment of the random multiplication result from a third party; the second fragment of the first random number, and the second fragment of the second random number.
  • the second fragment of the fragmentation and random multiplication results is obtained by the other party; where the random multiplication result is the product of the first random number and the second random number;
  • the second fragment of the first difference value is the second fragment of the first scalar and the second fragment of the first random number.
  • the difference between two slices; the second slice of the second difference is the difference between the second slice of the second scalar and the second slice of the second random number;
  • the first difference the second difference, the first fragment of the first random number, the first fragment of the second random number, and the first fragment of the random multiplication result
  • the first The first slice of the product of the scalar and the second scalar; the other party gets the second slice of the product.
  • Figure 3 shows a schematic diagram of safe multiplication in the fragmented state according to one embodiment.
  • f0 c0-v0
  • the first party sends e0 and f0 to the second party
  • the second party holds a fragment b1 of b
  • the second party sends e1 and f1 to the first party
  • the second party locally calculates
  • u corresponds to the aforementioned first random number
  • u0 corresponds to the first fragment of the aforementioned first random number
  • v corresponds to the aforementioned second random number
  • v0 corresponds to the first fragment of the aforementioned second random number
  • z0 corresponds to the first fragment of the random multiplication result
  • u1 corresponds to the second fragment of the first random number
  • v1 corresponds to the second fragment of the second random number
  • z1 corresponds to the second fragment of the random multiplication result
  • b corresponds to the first scalar
  • c corresponds to the second scalar.
  • the method provided by the embodiments of this specification first obtain the local fragment of the privacy vector in the modulo 2 space; then accumulate each bit of the local fragment to obtain the first summation result; and then according to the local fragment
  • the corresponding index determines the first sign bit used to identify a positive or negative number; and then determines the first slice of the first scalar based on the first summation result and the first sign bit; and then locally calculates the The inner product of the local fragment and the plaintext vector is used to obtain the second summation result; and then the first fragment of the second scalar is determined based on the second summation result and the first sign bit; finally, the first fragment of the second scalar is determined according to the second summation result and the first sign bit.
  • the first fragment of the first scalar and the first fragment of the second scalar owned by the party are combined with the second fragment of the first scalar and the second fragment of the second scalar provided by the other party to perform a safe multiplication operation, and we get A first slice of a vector inner product result corresponding to the product of the first scalar and the second scalar.
  • the embodiments of this specification only involve local calculations and safe multiplication operations of scalars. No communication is required in local calculations. The communication amount of safe multiplication operations of scalars is very small.
  • a secure processing device for a privacy vector is also provided.
  • the privacy vector is a one-hot encoding vector, which is distributed between the first party and the second party in the form of sharing.
  • the device uses After obtaining the vector inner product result of the privacy vector and the plaintext vector, the device is arranged on either side, and the device is used to perform the actions performed by any one of the methods provided by the embodiment shown in Figure 2 of this specification.
  • Figure 4 shows a schematic block diagram of a security processing device for privacy vectors according to one embodiment. As shown in Figure 4, the device 400 includes:
  • the acquisition unit 41 is used to acquire the local slices of the privacy vector in modulo 2 space;
  • the accumulation calculation unit 42 is used to accumulate each bit of the own slice obtained by the acquisition unit 41 to obtain the first summation result
  • the sign determination unit 43 is used to determine the first sign bit used to identify a positive number or a negative number according to its corresponding index
  • the first scalar determination unit 44 is configured to determine the first slice of the first scalar according to the first summation result obtained by the accumulation calculation unit 42 and the first sign bit obtained by the sign determination unit;
  • the inner product calculation unit 45 is used to locally calculate the inner product of the local fragment and the plaintext vector to obtain the second summation result
  • the second scalar determination unit 46 is configured to determine the first slice of the second scalar according to the second summation result obtained by the inner product calculation unit 45 and the first sign bit;
  • the joint operation unit 47 is configured to use the first slice of the first scalar obtained by the first scalar determination unit 44 and the first slice of the second scalar obtained by the second scalar determination unit 46, Combined with the second fragment of the first scalar and the second fragment of the second scalar provided by the other party, a safe multiplication operation is performed to obtain the first fragment of the vector inner product result, and the vector inner product result corresponds to the first fragment of the vector inner product.
  • the product of one scalar and the second scalar is configured to use the first slice of the first scalar obtained by the first scalar determination unit 44 and the first slice of the second scalar obtained by the second scalar determination unit 46, Combined with the second fragment of the first scalar and the second fragment of the second scalar provided by the other party, a safe multiplication operation is performed to obtain the first fragment of the vector inner product result, and the vector inner product result corresponds to the first fragment of the vector inner product.
  • the acquisition unit 41 is specifically configured to convert the fragments of the modulo q1 space of the privacy vector held by the party into modulo 2 space through a locally performed secure modulo conversion operation. Sharding on our side.
  • the symbol determining unit 43 is specifically configured to determine the first symbol bit to be 1 if the index corresponding to the own party is an even number; if the index corresponding to the own party is an odd number, Then it is determined that the first sign bit is -1.
  • the first scalar determination unit 44 is specifically configured to add the first sign bit to the first summation result, and then modulo the first constant to obtain the first scalar First shard.
  • the value of the second lowest bit of the first scalar is different.
  • the first constant is a power of 2 and is not less than 4.
  • the second scalar determination unit 46 is specifically configured to add the first sign bit to the second summation result to obtain the first slice of the second scalar.
  • the joint operation unit 47 is specifically used for:
  • the first fragment of the first random number, the first fragment of the second random number, and the first fragment of the random multiplication result from a third party; the second fragment of the first random number, and the second fragment of the second random number.
  • the second fragment of the fragmentation and random multiplication results is obtained by the other party; where the random multiplication result is the product of the first random number and the second random number;
  • the second fragment of the first difference value is the second fragment of the first scalar and the second fragment of the first random number.
  • the difference between two slices; the second slice of the second difference is the difference between the second slice of the second scalar and the second slice of the second random number;
  • the first difference the second difference, the first fragment of the first random number, the first fragment of the second random number, and the first fragment of the random multiplication result
  • the first The first slice of the product of the scalar and the second scalar; the other party gets the second slice of the product.
  • the acquisition unit 41 obtains the local slice of the privacy vector in the modulo 2 space; then the accumulation calculation unit 42 accumulates each bit of the local slice to obtain the first and the result; then the sign determination unit 43 determines the first sign bit used to identify the positive or negative number according to its corresponding index; the first scalar determination unit 44 then determines the first sign bit according to the first summation result and the first sign bit to determine the first fragment of the first scalar; then the inner product calculation unit 45 locally calculates the inner product of the local fragment and the plaintext vector to obtain a second summation result; the second scalar determination unit 46 then calculates The second summation result and the first sign bit determine the first slice of the second scalar; finally, the joint operation unit 47 has the first slice of the first scalar and the first slice of the second scalar.
  • the fragments are combined with the second fragment of the first scalar and the second fragment of the second scalar provided by the other party to perform a safe multiplication operation to obtain the first fragment of the vector inner product result.
  • the vector inner product result corresponds to The product of the first scalar and the second scalar.
  • a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, a computer program is stored thereon, and when the computer program is executed in a computer, the computer is caused to perform the method described in conjunction with FIG. 2 .
  • a computing device including a memory and a processor, executable code is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the executable code, the method described in conjunction with FIG. 2 is implemented. method.
  • the functions described in the present invention can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof.
  • the functions may be stored on or transmitted over as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readable medium.

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Abstract

La présente invention, selon ses modes de réalisation, concerne un procédé et un appareil de traitement de sécurité de vecteur de confidentialité, lesquels procédé et appareil sont mis en œuvre à l'aide d'un calcul sécurisé multipartie. Le procédé consiste à : acquérir un fragment de partie présente d'un vecteur de confidentialité dans un espace de module -2 ; cumuler tous les bits du fragment de partie présente pour obtenir un premier résultat de sommation ; déterminer un premier bit de signe conformément à un indice correspondant à une partie présente ; déterminer un premier fragment d'un premier scalaire conformément au premier résultat de sommation et au premier bit de signe ; calculer localement un produit interne du fragment de partie présente et d'un vecteur de texte en clair, de façon à obtenir un second résultat de sommation ; déterminer un premier fragment d'un second scalaire conformément au second résultat de sommation et au premier bit de signe ; et effectuer conjointement une multiplication sécurisée sur la base du premier fragment du premier scalaire, du premier fragment du second scalaire, et d'un second fragment du premier scalaire et d'un second fragment du second scalaire, qui sont fournis par une partie opposée, de façon à obtenir un premier fragment d'un résultat de produit interne de vecteur, le résultat de produit interne de vecteur correspondant à un produit du premier scalaire et du second scalaire. Par conséquent, le volume de communication peut être réduit lors d'un traitement de sécurité de vecteur de confidentialité.
PCT/CN2022/135285 2022-06-14 2022-11-30 Procédé et appareil de traitement de sécurité de vecteur de confidentialité WO2023240934A1 (fr)

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CN202210667898.2A CN114978510A (zh) 2022-06-14 2022-06-14 针对隐私向量的安全处理方法和装置
CN202210667898.2 2022-06-14

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