WO2023145027A1

WO2023145027A1 - Verification assistance method, verification assistance program, and information processing device

Info

Publication number: WO2023145027A1
Application number: PCT/JP2022/003451
Authority: WO
Inventors: 孝一矢崎; 陸大小嶋; 洋介中村; 泰久奥村; 大山本
Original assignee: 富士通株式会社
Priority date: 2022-01-28
Filing date: 2022-01-28
Publication date: 2023-08-03

Abstract

An information processing device (100) includes a storage unit (101). The storage unit (101) stores a first secret key (132) that corresponds to a third certificate (131) issued for a management subject (130), and a second secret key (122) that corresponds to a second certificate (121) issued for a system (120) in association with each other. The information processing device (100) acquires, in response to a verification request, a combination of a first public key (112) and a second public key (102). The information processing device (100) determines, with reference to the storage unit (101), whether the acquired combination is valid.

Description

Verification support method, verification support program, and information processing device

The present invention relates to a verification support method, a verification support program, and an information processing apparatus.

Conventionally, electronic signatures are sometimes attached to data in order to guarantee the authenticity of data and to express intentions such as confirmation, approval, or consent to data. Here, with the diversification of situations in which electronic signatures are used, it is desired to reduce the costs incurred when using electronic signatures. For example, a method that utilizes a certificate called VC (Verifiable Claim), stores VC issuer information in advance in association with the organization's web server, and verifies the validity of the VC attached to the data. can be considered.

As a prior art, for example, there is a technique in which an end user adds a public key of an arbitrary list that is obtained by a method consistent with a security policy and is determined to be trustworthy to a list of trusted public keys.

U.S. Pat. No. 6,134,327

However, the conventional technology may not be able to accurately verify the validity of the certificate. For example, if an attacker rewrites the VC issuer information stored in the organization's web server, the validity of the VC assigned to the data cannot be verified normally.

In one aspect, the object of the present invention is to improve the accuracy of verifying the validity of a certificate.

According to one embodiment, in response to a verification request for a first public key corresponding to a first certificate, the first public key and a second certificate issued to a predetermined system by a certificate authority. Acquiring a combination with a second public key corresponding to the certificate of, a first private key corresponding to a third certificate issued to the management entity that manages the system, and the second Referencing a storage unit that stores a second private key corresponding to a certificate in association with each other to determine whether or not the acquired combination is valid, and requesting the verification request based on the determined result. A verification support method, a verification support program, and an information processing apparatus for outputting to an original address are proposed.

According to one aspect, it is possible to improve the accuracy of verifying the validity of a certificate.

FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram of an example of a verification support method according to an embodiment. FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the verification system 200. As shown in FIG. FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a hardware configuration example of the information processing apparatus 100. As shown in FIG. FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the contents of the storage destination management table 400. As shown in FIG. FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the contents of the reference destination management table 500. As shown in FIG. FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a hardware configuration example of the verification-side device 201. As shown in FIG. FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration example of the verification system 200. As shown in FIG. FIG. 8 is an explanatory diagram (part 1) showing an operation example of the verification system 200. FIG. FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram (part 2) showing an operation example of the verification system 200. As shown in FIG. FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram (part 3) showing an operation example of the verification system 200. As shown in FIG. FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram (part 4) showing an operation example of the verification system 200. As shown in FIG. FIG. 12 is an explanatory diagram (No. 5) showing an operation example of the verification system 200. As shown in FIG. FIG. 13 is an explanatory diagram showing an example in which the chip 320 outputs a certificate. FIG. 14 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of a registration processing procedure; FIG. 15 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of a verification processing procedure;

Embodiments of a verification support method, a verification support program, and an information processing apparatus according to the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings.

(One Example of Verification Support Method According to Embodiment)
FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram of an example of a verification support method according to an embodiment. The information processing apparatus 100 is a computer for improving the accuracy of verifying the validity of a certificate. A certificate is, for example, a VC. A VC includes a distributed ID (Decentralized Identifier) with an electronic signature. In the following description, the distributed ID may be referred to as "DID".

With the diversification of situations where electronic signatures are used, it is desired to reduce the cost of using electronic signatures. For example, an increase in supply chain attacks may increase the number of people seeking to use electronic signatures to assure the provenance of open source software libraries or updates to libraries. For example, there is a tendency in business to digitize invoices, contracts, and the like, and it is conceivable that the number of people who want to use electronic signatures will increase. Therefore, there is a tendency to desire a reduction in the costs involved in using electronic signatures.

Electronic signatures, for example, tend to be implemented using centralized certificates. A centralized certificate is established, for example, by an audit of a certification authority. Therefore, since there is a cost associated with the audit, it is difficult to reduce the cost associated with using electronic signatures.

In contrast, it is conceivable to utilize VCs that use DID and use electronic signatures. The costs involved in leveraging VCs tend to be relatively small. However, when utilizing VCs, it is considered necessary to be able to establish the reliability of DIDs, to be able to verify the reliability of DIDs, and to be able to verify the legitimacy of VCs including DIDs.

For example, without building a trust chain, a verifier who verifies the legitimacy of a VC may prepare a trust list in which DIDs with relatively high reliability are registered. Specifically, it is conceivable that the verifier determines that the DID has a relatively high degree of reliability based on the experience of meeting the issuer of the DID, and registers the DID in the trust list. With this approach, it may be difficult to determine whether the DID is relatively reliable. This method may increase the workload of the verifier. Therefore, it is difficult for verifiers with relatively low information literacy to use this method. It is difficult for this method to deal with the diversification of situations in which electronic signatures are used, and it is difficult to deal with the increase in the number of people trying to use electronic signatures.

For example, a method of centrally establishing the reliability of DID can be considered. Specifically, a method of building a consortium blockchain and attempting to establish the reliability of the DID along with the admission examination for the consortium blockchain can be considered. With this method, there is a cost involved in admission screening, so even if a VC is used, there remains the problem that it is difficult to reduce the cost involved in using an electronic signature.

For example, it is conceivable to implement a ranking regarding the reliability of DIDs based on the collective knowledge of DID usage records, and to try to establish the reliability of DIDs. In this method, the reliability of the DID cannot be established unless the DID usage record is accumulated. Therefore, there is a problem that the time required to establish the reliability of the DID is increased.

For example, a method of establishing the reliability of the DID with the reliability of the existing system can be considered by storing the DID in association with the existing system. An existing system is, for example, a system managed by a DID issuer. Specifically, a method of pre-associating and storing the DID in the web server can be considered. With this method, the reliability of the DID cannot be verified with high precision, and the validity of the VC cannot be verified with high precision in some cases. For example, if an attacker rewrites the DID stored in the web server, the reliability of the DID cannot be verified normally, and the legitimacy of the VC cannot be verified normally.

Therefore, in this embodiment, a verification support method capable of improving the accuracy of verifying the validity of a certificate will be described.

　In FIG. 1, it is assumed that there are an information processing device 100, a request source 110, a system 120, and a manager 130 of the system 120. Requester 110 is, for example, a computer that receives first certificate 111 . The first certificate 111 is, for example, a legitimate certificate sent from the managing entity 130 . The first certificate 111 may be, for example, an unauthorized certificate sent by an attacker pretending to be the administrative entity 130 . A first certificate 111 may be attached to the data, for example, to ensure the authenticity of the data. For example, in order to verify the validity of the first certificate 111 , the requester 110 transmits a verification request regarding the first public key 112 corresponding to the first certificate 111 to the information processing apparatus 100 . The managing entity 130 is, for example, an organization or an individual.

The system 120 is realized by a computer managed by the management subject 130. System 120 is, for example, a website and implemented by a web server. System 120 has a second certificate 121 issued by a certificate authority. The second certificate 121 is, for example, an SSL (Secure Socket Layer) certificate. System 120 has a second private key 122 corresponding to a second certificate 121 . The system 120 provides the second private key 122 to the information processing device 100 .

The management entity 130 is a computer corresponding to the issuer that issues and uses the third certificate 131 . Management entity 130 has a third certificate 131 . The third certificate 131 can be the first certificate 111, for example. The third certificate 131 may be issued without going through a third party certificate authority, for example. A third certificate 131 is, for example, a VC. A managing entity 130 has a first private key 132 corresponding to a third certificate 131 . The management entity 130 provides the first secret key 132 to the information processing device 100 .

The information processing device 100 has a storage unit 101 . The storage unit 101 stores a first private key 132 corresponding to the third certificate 131 issued to the management entity 130 and a second private key 132 corresponding to the second certificate 121 issued to the system 120 . is stored in association with the private key 122 of . The information processing apparatus 100 associates the provided first secret key 132 with the second secret key 122 and stores them in the storage unit 101 . The storage unit 101 may be, for example, a chip compatible with a TPM (Trusted Platform Module).

(1-1) The information processing apparatus 100 receives from the requester 110 a verification request regarding the first public key 112 corresponding to the first certificate 111 . The verification request includes, for example, first public key 112 . The verification request may include, for example, a second public key 102 corresponding to a second certificate 121 issued to system 120 by a certificate authority. The information processing apparatus 100 acquires a combination of the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 in response to the verification request. For example, the information processing apparatus 100 extracts the combination of the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 from the verification request, thereby generating the first public key 112 and the second public key 102. get a combination of

(1-2) The information processing apparatus 100 refers to the storage unit 101 and determines whether the acquired combination is valid. The information processing apparatus 100 , for example, determines whether or not the first public key 112 is a valid public key corresponding to the first secret key 132 stored in the storage unit 101 . The information processing apparatus 100 , for example, determines whether the second public key 102 is a valid public key corresponding to the second secret key 122 stored in the storage unit 101 .

For example, if both the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 are valid public keys, the information processing apparatus 100 can use the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 Determine that the combination is valid. For example, if at least one of the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 is not a valid public key, the information processing apparatus 100 uses the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 is determined to be invalid.

(1-3) The information processing apparatus 100 outputs the determined result to the requester 110 of the verification request. The information processing apparatus 100 transmits the determined result to the requester 110, for example. For example, if the result of determination shows that the combination of the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 is valid, the requester 110 determines that the first certificate 111 is valid. I judge. In this case, the first certificate 111 matches the third certificate 131, for example. For example, if the result of determination indicates that the combination of the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 is not valid, the requester 110 determines that the first certificate 111 is not valid. I judge. In this case, the first certificate 111 does not match the third certificate 131, for example.

As a result, the information processing apparatus 100 can improve the accuracy of verifying the validity of the first certificate 111 . For example, even if the system 120 does not have information such as a DID that enables verification of the legitimacy of the first certificate 111, the information processing apparatus 100 can verify the validity of the first certificate 111 at the requester 110. The validity of the document 111 can be made normally verifiable. For example, even if information such as the DID held by the system 120 has been tampered with by an attacker in order to verify the legitimacy of the first certificate 111, the information processing apparatus 100 does not allow the requester 110 to The validity of the first certificate 111 can be normally verified.

The information processing apparatus 100 normally verifies the legitimacy of the first certificate 111 at the requester 110 regardless of whether the first certificate 111 was issued via a third party certificate authority. can be made possible. Therefore, the information processing apparatus 100 can issue the third certificate 131, which can be the first certificate 111, by the management entity 130 without going through a third party certificate authority.

As a result, the information processing apparatus 100 can reduce the costs incurred when the third certificate 131 is issued by the management entity 130, and can facilitate the use of the third certificate 131. . For example, the information processing apparatus 100 uses a specific format such as the third certificate 131 in order to guarantee the authenticity of data and express intentions such as confirmation, approval, or consent to data. It is possible to cope with the diversification of situations in which certificates are used.

The information processing apparatus 100 associates the provided first secret key 132 with the second secret key 122 and stores them in the storage unit 101, so that the request source 110 can validate the first certificate 111. can be successfully verifiable. Therefore, the information processing apparatus 100 can suppress an increase in the time required to enable the requester 110 to normally verify the validity of the first certificate 111 .

Here, the case where the information processing apparatus 100 extracts the combination of the first public key 112 and the second public key 102 from the verification request has been described, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the information processing apparatus 100 may extract the first public key 112 from the verification request and acquire the second public key 102 from the system 120 .

Although the case where the information processing device 100 operates alone has been described here, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, a plurality of computers may work together to realize the functions of the information processing apparatus 100 .

(Example of verification system 200)
Next, an example of a verification system 200 to which the information processing apparatus 100 shown in FIG. 1 is applied will be described using FIG.

FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the verification system 200. FIG. 2, the verification system 200 includes an information processing device 100, one or more verification-side devices 201, one or more issuing-side devices 202, one or more management-side devices 203, and one or more recording-side devices 204. including.

In the verification system 200 , the information processing device 100 and the verification side device 201 are connected via a wired or wireless network 210 . The network 210 is, for example, a LAN (Local Area Network), a WAN (Wide Area Network), the Internet, or the like.

Also, in the verification system 200 , the verification side device 201 and the management side device 203 are connected via a wired or wireless network 210 . In the verification system 200 , the verification device 201 and the recording device 204 are connected via a wired or wireless network 210 . In the verification system 200 , the information processing device 100 and the issuing device 202 are connected via a wired or wireless network 210 . In the verification system 200 , the information processing device 100 and the management device 203 are connected via a wired or wireless network 210 .

The information processing device 100 is a computer used by the user on the providing side. Information processing apparatus 100 has a chip group including a chip that stores a DID private key and an SSL private key in association with each other. The DID private key is a private key used by the issuer of the DID to generate the electronic signature attached to the DID. There is a DID public key corresponding to the DID private key.

The information processing device 100 receives a DID public key and a DID private key from one of the issuing devices 202 . The information processing device 100 receives an SSL public key and an SSL private key from one of the issuing devices 202 . The information processing apparatus 100 associates the DID private key received from one of the issuing devices 202 with the SSL private key received from the issuing device 202, and stores them in one of the chips of the chip group.

The information processing device 100 selects a chip corresponding to one of the issuing devices 202 from among the chip groups, for example, referring to a storage destination management table 400 described later in FIG. For example, the information processing apparatus 100 associates the DID private key received from the issuing device 202 and the SSL private key received from the issuing device 202 with a chip corresponding to one of the selected issuing devices 202. Attach and store.

The information processing apparatus 100 stores information that enables identification of a chip in which a combination of a DID private key and an SSL private key corresponding to the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is stored, which will be described later with reference to FIG. It may be stored in the reference destination management table 500 . For example, the information processing apparatus 100 includes the DID public key received from the issuing device 202 and the It may be stored in association with the SSL private key.

The information processing device 100 receives a verification request indicating the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key from the verification side device 201 . The information processing apparatus 100 selects a chip corresponding to the combination of the DID public key indicated by the verification request and the SSL public key from among the chip group by referring to a reference destination management table 500 described later with reference to FIG. The information processing device 100 determines whether or not the selected chip stores a combination of a DID private key and an SSL private key corresponding to the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key indicated by the verification request. do.

If the selected chip stores a combination of the DID private key and the SSL private key, the information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key indicated by the verification request is valid. do. If the combination of the DID private key and the SSL private key is not stored in the selected chip, the information processing device 100 determines that the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key indicated by the verification request is invalid. do.

The information processing device 100 transmits the result of determining whether or not the combination of the DID public key indicated by the verification request and the SSL public key is valid to the verification side device 201 . The information processing apparatus 100 is, for example, a server or a PC (Personal Computer).

The verification-side device 201 is a computer used by the verification-side user. The verifying device 201 receives the data to which the VC is assigned from the issuing device 202 . Verification-side device 201 acquires the DID public key from recording-side device 204 based on the data to which VC is assigned. The verifying device 201 acquires from the recording device 204 information that enables the management device 203 that manages the system corresponding to the issuing device 202 to be identified based on the data to which the VC is assigned. The system is, for example, a website or the like.

The verification-side device 201 identifies the management-side device 203 based on the information that enables the management-side device 203 to be identified. The verification-side device 201 acquires the SSL public key and the SSL certificate from the identified management-side device 203 . Verification-side device 201 acquires the DID public key from specified management-side device 203 .

The verification-side device 201 may evaluate the reliability of the management-side device 203 based on the SSL certificate and verify whether the DID public key obtained from the management-side device 203 is valid. When the verification-side device 201 determines that the trust of the management-side device 203 is relatively low based on the SSL certificate, the verification-side device 201 determines that the DID public key acquired from the management-side device 203 is not valid, and adds it to the data. It may be determined that the given VC is not valid. When the verification side device 201 determines that the reliability of the management side device 203 is relatively high based on the SSL certificate, it temporarily determines that the DID public key obtained from the management side device 203 is valid. You can leave it.

The verification-side device 201 may compare the DID public key obtained from the recording-side device 204 with the DID public key obtained from the management-side device 203 to verify whether the DID public key is valid. For example, if the DID public key obtained from the recording device 204 and the DID public key obtained from the management device 203 do not match, the verification device 201 determines that at least one DID public key is not valid. You may If the DID public key is not valid, the verifier device 201 may determine that the VC given to the data is not valid. For example, when the DID public key obtained from the recording device 204 and the DID public key obtained from the management device 203 match, the verifying device 201 provisionally determines that each DID public key is valid. You can keep it.

The verification-side device 201 determines whether the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid. Verification-side device 201 transmits, for example, a verification request indicating a combination of a DID public key and an SSL public key to information processing device 100 . The verification-side device 201 receives from the information processing device 100 the result of determining whether or not the combination of the DID public key indicated by the verification request and the SSL public key is valid.

If the combination of the DID public key indicated by the verification request and the SSL public key is valid, the verification-side device 201 determines that the VC given to the data is valid. If the combination of the DID public key indicated by the verification request and the SSL public key is not valid, the verifying device 201 determines that the VC given to the data is not valid.

The verification-side device 201 may output the determined result so that the verification-side user can refer to it. If the verification-side device 201 determines that the VC attached to the data is not valid, the verification-side device 201 may discard the data. The verification-side device 201 is, for example, a PC, a tablet terminal, or a smart phone.

The issuing device 202 is a computer used by the issuing user. Issuer device 202 generates a DID private key, a DID public key, an SSL private key, and an SSL public key. The issuing device 202 issues a DID and issues a VC using the DID. A VC includes, for example, a DID with an electronic signature based on the DID private key. The VC contains, for example, the DID public key. Issuer device 202 transmits the DID private key and the SSL private key to information processing device 100 . The issuing device 202 may transmit the DID public key and the SSL public key to the information processing device 100 .

The issuer device 202 provides the management device 203 with the SSL private key and the SSL public key. Issuer device 202 provides the DID public key to management device 203 . The issuing device 202 provides the DID public key to the recording device 204 . The issuing device 202 provides the recording device 204 with information that enables the management device 203 that manages the system corresponding to the issuing device 202 to be specified. The system is, for example, a website or the like. The issuing device 202 transmits the VC-added data to the verifying device 201 . The issuing device 202 is, for example, a PC, a tablet terminal, or a smart phone.

The management-side device 203 is a computer used by a management-side user. The administrative user is, for example, the same user as the issuing user. The administrative user is, for example, a user who has the same attributes as the issuing user. The managing device 203 manages the system corresponding to the issuing device 202 . The system is, for example, a website or the like.

The management-side device 203 receives the SSL private key and the SSL public key from the issuing-side device 202 . The management-side device 203 generates an SSL certificate based on the SSL private key. An SSL certificate contains, for example, an SSL public key. The management-side device 203 stores the SSL public key and the SSL certificate so that the verification-side device 201 can refer to them. The managing device 203 receives the DID public key from the issuing device 202 . Management-side device 203 stores the DID public key so that verification-side device 201 can refer to it. The management-side device 203 is, for example, a server or a PC.

The recording-side device 204 is a computer used by the recording-side user. Recording device 204 receives the DID public key from issuing device 202 . Recording-side device 204 records the DID public key so that verification-side device 201 can refer to it. Recording device 204 receives information from issuing device 202 that enables identification of management device 203 that manages the system corresponding to issuing device 202 . The recording device 204 records information that enables the identification of the management device 203 that manages the system corresponding to the issuing device 202 so that the verification device 201 can refer to it. The recording device 204 is, for example, a server or a PC.

Here, the case where the verification-side device 201 and the issuing-side device 202 are different devices has been described, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the verifying device 201 may function as the issuing device 202 and may also operate as the issuing device 202 .

Although the case where the issuing device 202 and the managing device 203 are different devices has been described here, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the issuing device 202 may have the function of the managing device 203 and be operable as the managing device 203 as well.

(Hardware Configuration Example of Information Processing Device 100)
Next, a hardware configuration example of the information processing apparatus 100 will be described with reference to FIG.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a hardware configuration example of the information processing apparatus 100. As shown in FIG. 3, the information processing apparatus 100 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 301, a memory 302, a network I/F (Interface) 303, a recording medium I/F 304, a recording medium 305, and a chip group 306. have. Also, each component is connected by a bus 300 .

Here, the CPU 301 controls the entire information processing apparatus 100 . The memory 302 has, for example, a ROM (Read Only Memory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), a flash ROM, and the like. Specifically, for example, a flash ROM or ROM stores various programs, and a RAM is used as a work area for the CPU 301 . A program stored in the memory 302 causes the CPU 301 to execute coded processing by being loaded into the CPU 301 . The memory 302 may store a storage destination management table 400, which will be described later with reference to FIG. 4, and a reference destination management table 500, which will be described later with reference to FIG.

The network I/F 303 is connected to the network 210 through a communication line, and is connected to other computers via the network 210. A network I/F 303 serves as an internal interface with the network 210 and controls input/output of data from other computers. Network I/F 303 is, for example, a modem or a LAN adapter.

The recording medium I/F 304 controls reading/writing of data from/to the recording medium 305 under the control of the CPU 301 . The recording medium I/F 304 is, for example, a disk drive, SSD (Solid State Drive), USB (Universal Serial Bus) port, or the like. A recording medium 305 is a nonvolatile memory that stores data written under control of the recording medium I/F 304 . Instead of the memory 302, the recording medium 305 may store a storage destination management table 400, which will be described later with reference to FIG. 4, and a reference destination management table 500, which will be described later with reference to FIG. The recording medium 305 is, for example, a disk, a semiconductor memory, a USB memory, or the like. The recording medium 305 may be removable from the information processing apparatus 100 .

The chip group 306 includes one or more chips 320. Chip 320 stores a combination of a DID private key and an SSL private key. For example, the chip 320 may have a function of determining whether or not a DID private key corresponding to the DID public key exists within the own chip 320 in response to input of the DID public key. The chip 320 may have the capability of outputting a certificate indicating the existence of the DID private key if the DID private key exists. For example, the chip 320 may have a function of determining whether or not an SSL private key corresponding to the SSL public key exists within the own chip 320 in response to the input of the SSL public key. The chip 320 may have the capability of outputting a certificate indicating the existence of the SSL private key if the SSL private key exists.

The information processing apparatus 100 may have, for example, a keyboard, mouse, display, printer, scanner, microphone, speaker, etc., in addition to the components described above. Further, the information processing apparatus 100 may have a plurality of recording medium I/Fs 304 and recording media 305 . Further, the information processing apparatus 100 may not have the recording medium I/F 304 and the recording medium 305 .

(Stored Contents of Storage Destination Management Table 400)
Next, an example of the contents of the storage destination management table 400 will be described with reference to FIG. The storage destination management table 400 is realized by a storage area such as the memory 302 or the recording medium 305 of the information processing apparatus 100 shown in FIG. 3, for example.

FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the storage contents of the storage location management table 400. As shown in FIG. As shown in FIG. 4, the storage destination management table 400 has fields of account, authentication information 1, authentication information 2, authentication information 3, attribute, chip number, and area. The storage destination management table 400 stores storage destination management information as a record 400-a by setting information in each field for each account. a is any integer.

The account field contains an account that identifies the issuer of the DID. In the authentication information 1 field, one of authentication information for authenticating the account is set. In the authentication information 2 field, one of the authentication information for authenticating the account is set. In the authentication information 3 field, one of the authentication information for authenticating the account is set. The attributes of the issuer are set in the attribute field.

In the chip number field, identification information for identifying the chip that stores the combination of the DID secret key corresponding to the issuer and the SSL secret key is set. The identification information is, for example, a chip number assigned to the chip. The area field is set with identification information for identifying the area in the chip where the combination of the DID secret key and the SSL secret key is stored. The identification information is, for example, an area number assigned to the area.

(Stored contents of reference management table 500)
Next, an example of the contents of the reference destination management table 500 will be described with reference to FIG. The reference destination management table 500 is realized, for example, by a storage area such as the memory 302 or the recording medium 305 of the information processing apparatus 100 shown in FIG.

FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the contents of the reference destination management table 500. As shown in FIG. As shown in FIG. 5, the reference destination management table 500 has fields of DID public key, SSL public key, chip number, and area. The reference destination management table 500 stores reference destination management information as a record 500-b by setting information in each field for each combination of a DID public key and an SSL public key. b is any integer.

A DID public key is set in the DID public key field. An SSL public key is set in the SSL public key field. In the chip number field, identification information for identifying a chip storing a combination of a DID private key and an SSL private key corresponding to the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is set. The identification information is, for example, a chip number assigned to the chip. The area field is set with identification information for identifying the area in the chip where the combination of the DID secret key and the SSL secret key is stored. The identification information is, for example, an area number assigned to the area.

(Hardware configuration example of verification-side device 201)
Next, a hardware configuration example of the verification-side device 201 will be described with reference to FIG.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a hardware configuration example of the verification-side device 201. As shown in FIG. In FIG. 6 , verification-side device 201 has CPU 601 , memory 602 , network I/F 603 , recording medium I/F 604 , and recording medium 605 . Also, each component is connected by a bus 600 .

Here, the CPU 601 controls the verification device 201 as a whole. The memory 602 has, for example, ROM, RAM and flash ROM. Specifically, for example, a flash ROM or ROM stores various programs, and a RAM is used as a work area for the CPU 601 . A program stored in the memory 602 causes the CPU 601 to execute coded processing by being loaded into the CPU 601 .

The network I/F 603 is connected to the network 210 through a communication line, and is connected to other computers via the network 210. A network I/F 603 serves as an internal interface with the network 210 and controls input/output of data from other computers. The network I/F 603 is, for example, a modem or LAN adapter.

The recording medium I/F 604 controls reading/writing of data from/to the recording medium 605 under the control of the CPU 601 . A recording medium I/F 604 is, for example, a disk drive, an SSD, a USB port, or the like. A recording medium 605 is a nonvolatile memory that stores data written under control of the recording medium I/F 604 . The recording medium 605 is, for example, a disk, semiconductor memory, USB memory, or the like. The recording medium 605 may be removable from the verification device 201 .

The verification-side device 201 may have, for example, a keyboard, mouse, display, printer, scanner, microphone, speaker, etc., in addition to the components described above. Also, the verification-side device 201 may have a plurality of recording medium I/Fs 604 and recording media 605 . Also, the verification-side device 201 may not have the recording medium I/F 604 and the recording medium 605 .

(Hardware Configuration Example of Issuing Device 202)
The hardware configuration example of the issuing device 202 is specifically the same as the hardware configuration example of the verifying device 201 shown in FIG. 6, so the description thereof will be omitted.

(Hardware Configuration Example of Management Side Device 203)
The hardware configuration example of the management-side device 203 is specifically the same as the hardware configuration example of the verification-side device 201 shown in FIG. 6, so the description thereof will be omitted.

(Hardware Configuration Example of Recording Device 204)
A hardware configuration example of the recording-side device 204 is specifically the same as the hardware configuration example of the verification-side device 201 shown in FIG. 6, so description thereof will be omitted.

(Example of functional configuration of verification system 200)
Next, a functional configuration example of the verification system 200 will be described with reference to FIG.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration example of the verification system 200. As shown in FIG. In verification system 200 , information processing apparatus 100 includes first storage section 700 , first acquisition section 701 , registration section 702 , first determination section 703 , and first output section 704 .

The first storage unit 700 is implemented, for example, by a storage area such as the memory 302 or the recording medium 305 shown in FIG. 3, or a storage area of the chip 320. Although a case where the first storage unit 700 is included in the information processing apparatus 100 will be described below, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the first storage unit 700 may be included in a device different from the information processing device 100 , and the information stored in the first storage unit 700 may be referenced from the information processing device 100 .

The first acquisition unit 701 to first output unit 704 function as an example of a control unit. Specifically, for example, the first acquisition unit 701 to the first output unit 704 cause the CPU 301 to execute a program stored in a storage area such as the memory 302 or the recording medium 305 shown in FIG. The network I/F 303 implements that function. The processing result of each functional unit is stored in a storage area such as the memory 302 or recording medium 305 shown in FIG. 3, for example.

The first storage unit 700 stores various information that is referred to or updated in the processing of each functional unit. The first storage unit 700 stores the first public key corresponding to the first certificate. The first certificate is, for example, a valid certificate issued to a management entity that manages a given system. The first certificate may be, for example, a certificate issued without going through a third party certificate authority. Specifically, the first certificate is a VC that uses the DID owned by the managing entity.

A predetermined system corresponds to the management-side device 203, for example. A given system is, for example, a website. The predetermined system may be, for example, DNS (Domain Name System). A management entity corresponds to, for example, a DID issuer. A management entity corresponds to, for example, an organization or an individual. A management entity corresponds to the issuing device 202, for example. The first public key is specifically a valid DID public key.

The first certificate may be, for example, an unauthorized certificate issued to an attacker masquerading as a management entity that manages a given system. The first public key is, for example, a VC using DID owned by an attacker. The first public key is specifically an illegal DID public key. The first public key is obtained by the first obtaining unit 701, for example.

The first storage unit 700 stores the second public key corresponding to the second certificate. A second certificate is, for example, a certificate issued by a certificate authority for a given system. The second certificate is specifically an SSL certificate. The second public key is specifically an SSL public key. The second public key is obtained by the first obtaining unit 701, for example.

The first storage unit 700 stores a first secret key and a second secret key. The first private key corresponds to the third certificate issued to the managing entity. A third certificate may be, for example, the first certificate. The third certificate is specifically a VC using the DID owned by the managing entity. A first private key may, for example, correspond to a first public key. A second private key corresponds, for example, to a second certificate issued by a certificate authority for a given system. The second private key, for example, corresponds to the second public key.

The first storage unit 700 uses the chip 320, for example, to store the first secret key and the second secret key. For example, in response to acceptance of a public key, if the chip 320 has a private key corresponding to the public key accepted by the chip 320, a certificate certifying that the private key exists, The information processing apparatus 100 may have a function of outputting so that it can be referred to. The first secret key and the second secret key are obtained by the first obtaining unit 701, for example. As a result, since the first storage unit 700 uses the chip 320, the first secret key and the second secret key can be easily and securely stored.

The first acquisition unit 701 acquires various types of information used for processing of each functional unit. The first acquisition unit 701 stores the acquired various information in the first storage unit 700 or outputs the information to each functional unit. Further, the first acquisition unit 701 may output various information stored in the first storage unit 700 to each functional unit. The first acquisition unit 701 acquires various types of information, for example, based on user's operation input. The first acquisition unit 701 may receive various types of information from a device different from the information processing device 100, for example.

A first acquisition unit 701 acquires a first secret key and a second secret key. The first acquisition unit 701 acquires, for example, the first secret key and the second secret key from the management entity. Specifically, the first acquisition unit 701 acquires the first secret key and the second secret key by receiving them from the issuing device 202 . For example, the first acquisition unit 701 obtains the first secret key and the second secret key by accepting the input of the first secret key and the second secret key based on the user's operation input. may be obtained. The user is, for example, the issuing user. The user may be, for example, a controlling user who has called or communicated with the issuing user.

The first acquisition unit 701 acquires a verification request regarding the first public key. The verification request, for example, requests verification of whether or not the first public key is valid. Specifically, the verification request requests verification of whether or not the combination of the first public key and the second public key is valid. The verification request includes, for example, the first public key. The verification request may include, for example, information that enables obtaining the first public key. The verification request may specifically include the address of the storage area where the first public key exists. The verification request may contain, for example, the second public key. The verification request may include, for example, information that enables obtaining the second public key. The verification request may specifically include the address of the storage area where the second public key exists.

For example, the first acquisition unit 701 acquires a verification request from the requester. The requester corresponds to, for example, the verification-side device 201 . Specifically, the first acquisition unit 701 acquires the verification request by receiving it from the verification-side device 201 . The first acquisition unit 701 may acquire the verification request by, for example, accepting the input of the verification request based on the user's operation input. The user is, for example, a verification user. The user may be, for example, a controlling user who has called or communicated with the proving user.

The first acquisition unit 701 acquires a combination of the first public key and the second public key in response to the verification request. The first acquisition unit 701 acquires a combination of the first public key and the second public key by, for example, extracting the first public key and the second public key from the verification request. .

The first acquisition unit 701 may acquire the first public key, for example, based on the address of the storage area containing the first public key included in the verification request. The first acquisition unit 701 may acquire the second public key, for example, based on the address of the storage area containing the second public key included in the verification request. As a result, the first obtaining unit 701 can obtain the combination of the first public key and the second public key to be verified as to whether or not it is valid.

The first acquisition unit 701 may accept a start trigger for starting processing of any of the functional units. The start trigger is, for example, that there is a predetermined operation input by the user. The start trigger may be, for example, reception of predetermined information from another computer. The start trigger may be, for example, the output of predetermined information by any of the functional units.

For example, the first acquisition unit 701 may accept acquisition of the first secret key and the second secret key as a start trigger for starting the processing of the registration unit 702 . For example, the first acquisition unit 701 may accept acquisition of the first public key and the second public key as a start trigger for starting the processing of the first determination unit 703 .

Registration unit 702 stores the first secret key and the second secret key in first storage unit 700 in response to acquisition of the first secret key and the second secret key by first acquisition unit 701 . store in association with a key. Thereby, the registration unit 702 can verify whether or not the combination of the first public key and the second public key is valid.

The first determination unit 703 refers to the first storage unit 700 and determines whether or not the combination of the first public key and the second public key acquired by the first acquisition unit 701 is valid. . For example, the first determination unit 703 determines whether the first public key acquired by the first acquisition unit 701 is a valid public key corresponding to the first private key stored in the first storage unit 700. judge. For example, the first determination unit 703 determines whether the second public key acquired by the first acquisition unit 701 is a legitimate public key corresponding to the second private key stored in the first storage unit 700. judge.

For example, if both the first public key and the second public key are valid public keys, the first determination unit 703 determines that the combination of the first public key and the second public key is valid. Determine that there is. For example, if at least one of the first public key and the second public key is not a valid public key, the first determination unit 703 determines the combination of the first public key and the second public key. is determined to be incorrect. As a result, the first determination unit 703 can accurately verify whether or not the first public key is valid, and the first certificate corresponding to the first public key is valid. Whether or not can be verified with high accuracy.

For example, the first determination unit 703 may input the first public key and the second public key included in the acquired combination to the chip 320 . The first determination unit 703 determines, for example, whether the chip 320 outputs a certificate proving that the first private key corresponding to the first public key exists. The first determination unit 703 determines, for example, whether the chip 320 outputs a certificate proving that the second private key corresponding to the second public key exists.

The first determination unit 703, for example, sends both a certificate proving the existence of the first private key and a certificate proving the existence of the second private key corresponding to the second public key. , is output from the chip 320, it is determined that the combination is valid. For example, the first determination unit 703 determines at least a certificate proving the existence of the first private key and a certificate proving the existence of the second private key corresponding to the second public key. If either is not output from chip 320, then the combination is determined to be invalid. As a result, the first determination unit 703 can accurately verify whether or not the first public key is valid, and the first certificate corresponding to the first public key is valid. Whether or not can be verified with high accuracy.

A first output unit 704 outputs the processing result of at least one of the functional units. The output format is, for example, display on a display, print output to a printer, transmission to an external device via the network I/F 303, or storage in a storage area such as the memory 302 or recording medium 305. Thereby, the first output unit 704 can notify the user of the processing result of at least one of the functional units, and the convenience of the information processing apparatus 100 can be improved.

The first output unit 704 outputs the determined result to the requester of the verification request. The first output unit 704 , for example, transmits the determined result to the verification-side device 201 . Accordingly, the first output unit 704 can accurately verify whether or not the first public key is valid at the request source, and the first certificate corresponding to the first public key can be verified. It is possible to accurately verify whether or not is valid.

Also, in the verification system 200 , the requester includes a second storage unit 710 , a second acquisition unit 711 , a second determination unit 712 , and a second output unit 713 . The request source is, for example, the verification-side device 201 . In the following description, the case where the request source is the "verification-side device 201" will be described.

The second storage unit 710 is implemented, for example, by a storage area such as the memory 602 or recording medium 605 shown in FIG. A case where the second storage unit 710 is included in the verification-side device 201 will be described below, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the second storage unit 710 may be included in a device different from the verification-side device 201 and the contents stored in the second storage unit 710 may be referenced from the verification-side device 201 .

The second acquisition unit 711 to second output unit 713 function as an example of a control unit. Specifically, for example, the second acquisition unit 711 to the second output unit 713 cause the CPU 601 to execute a program stored in a storage area such as the memory 602 or the recording medium 605 shown in FIG. 6, or The network I/F 603 realizes that function. The processing result of each functional unit is stored in a storage area such as the memory 602 or recording medium 605 shown in FIG. 6, for example.

The second storage unit 710 stores various information that is referred to or updated in the processing of each functional unit. The second storage unit 710 stores, for example, the first certificate. The first certificate is obtained by the second obtaining unit 711, for example. The second storage unit 710 stores, for example, a first public key. The first public key is obtained by the second obtaining unit 711, for example. The second storage unit 710 stores, for example, a second public key. The second public key is obtained by the second obtaining unit 711, for example.

The second acquisition unit 711 acquires various information used for processing of each functional unit. The second acquisition unit 711 stores the acquired various information in the second storage unit 710 or outputs the acquired information to each functional unit. Further, the second acquisition unit 711 may output various information stored in the second storage unit 710 to each functional unit. The second acquisition unit 711 acquires various types of information, for example, based on the user's operation input. The second acquisition unit 711 may receive various information from a device different from the verification device 201, for example.

The second acquisition unit 711, for example, acquires data to which the first certificate is attached. Specifically, the second acquisition unit 711 acquires data to which the first certificate is attached by receiving it from another computer. The other computer is, for example, publisher device 202 . The other computer may be, for example, a computer possessed by an attacker impersonating the issuing device 202 . Specifically, the second acquisition unit 711 acquires the data to which the first certificate is attached by accepting the input of the data to which the first certificate is attached based on the operation input by the user. may

For example, in response to acquiring data to which the first certificate is attached, the second acquiring unit 711 acquires the first public key and the second public key based on the first certificate. get. Specifically, the second obtaining unit 711 can identify a predetermined system from a predetermined database based on the first certificate in response to obtaining data to which the first certificate is attached. Get information to make. The predetermined database corresponds to the recording device 204, for example. A predetermined system corresponds to, for example, the management-side device 203 . Specifically, the second obtaining unit 711 obtains a first public key owned by a predetermined system and a second public key owned by a predetermined system based on the obtained information.

For example, the second acquisition unit 711 receives from the information processing device 100 the result of determining whether or not the combination of the first public key and the second public key is valid. As a result, the second acquisition unit 711 can accurately verify whether the first public key is valid, and the first certificate corresponding to the first public key is valid. Whether or not can be verified with high accuracy. The second acquisition unit 711 can accurately verify whether or not the data to which the first certificate is attached is valid.

For example, the second determination unit 712 determines whether the first public key is valid, determines whether the first certificate is valid, and determines whether the first certificate is valid. It may be determined whether the data is valid. Specifically, the second determination unit 712 determines whether or not the combination of the first public key and the second public key acquired by the second acquisition unit 711 is valid. , determine whether the first public key is valid. Specifically, if the combination is valid, the second determination unit 712 determines that the first public key is valid. Specifically, the second determination unit 712 determines that the first certificate is valid if the first public key is valid. Specifically, if the first certificate is valid, the second determination unit 712 determines that the data attached with the first certificate is valid. Thereby, the second determination unit 712 can ensure security.

The second output unit 713 outputs the processing result of at least one of the functional units. The output format is, for example, display on a display, print output to a printer, transmission to an external device via the network I/F 603, or storage in a storage area such as the memory 602 or recording medium 605. Thereby, the second output unit 713 can notify the user of the processing result of at least one of the functional units, and the convenience of the verification-side device 201 can be improved.

For example, the second output unit 713 obtains the first public key and the second public key in response to the second obtaining unit 711 obtaining the first public key and the second public key. A verification request containing the information is transmitted to the information processing apparatus 100 . For example, the second output unit 713 allows the user to refer to the result of determining whether the combination of the first public key and the second public key acquired by the second acquisition unit 711 is valid. output as possible. A user corresponds to, for example, a verifying user.

The second output unit 713 outputs, for example, the result of the second determination unit 712 determining whether or not the first public key is valid so that the user can refer to it. A user corresponds to, for example, a verifying user. The second output unit 713 outputs, for example, the result of the determination made by the second determination unit 712 as to whether or not the first certificate is valid so that the user can refer to it. A user corresponds to, for example, a verifying user. The second output unit 713 outputs, for example, the result of the determination made by the second determination unit 712 as to whether or not the data to which the first certificate is attached is valid so that the user can refer to it.

Here, the case where the first determination unit 703 directly determines whether or not the combination of the first public key and the second public key is valid has been described, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the first determination unit 703 indirectly determines whether the combination of the first public key and the second public key is valid, and directly determines whether the combination is valid. may not be executed.

Specifically, the first determination unit 703 may perform processing up to determining whether the first public key and the second public key are valid public keys. good too. In this case, the first output unit 704 verifies the results obtained by the first determination unit 703 determining whether the first public key and the second public key are valid public keys. Send to the side device 201 . Based on the result of determining whether the first public key and the second public key are valid public keys, the second determination unit 712 determines whether the first public key and the second public key are valid public keys. directly determines whether or not the combination with the public key of is valid.

Here, the case where the information processing apparatus 100 includes the first acquisition unit 701, the registration unit 702, the first determination unit 703, and the first output unit 704 has been described, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the information processing apparatus 100 may not include the registration unit 702 . In this case, the verification system 200 may include another computer including the registration unit 702 in addition to the information processing apparatus 100 .

(Example of operation of verification system 200)
Next, an operation example of the verification system 200 will be described with reference to FIGS. 8 to 12. FIG.

8 to 12 are explanatory diagrams showing operation examples of the verification system 200. FIG. In FIG. 8, an information processing apparatus 100 implements a TaaS (Trust as a Service) server. Assume that there are a verification side device 201 corresponding to the B organization, an issuing side device 202 corresponding to the A organization, a management side device 203 serving as a web server that operates the website owned by the A organization, and a recording side device 204. .

(8-1) The issuing device 202 generates a DID corresponding to the A organization, and generates a key pair of a DID private key and a DID public key. The issuing device 202 generates a key pair of an SSL private key and an SSL public key, and uses a certificate authority to generate an SSL certificate corresponding to the website owned by the A organization.

(8-2) The issuing device 202 provides the management device 203 with the DID corresponding to the A organization, the SSL public key, the SSL private key, and the SSL certificate. The management-side device 203 stores the received DID corresponding to the A organization so that other computers can refer to it. The management-side device 203 stores the received SSL public key so that other computers can refer to it. The management-side device 203 securely stores the received SSL private key. The management-side device 203 stores the received SSL certificate so that other computers can refer to it.

(8-3) The issuing device 202 provides the recording device 204 with the DID corresponding to the A organization, the DID public key, and the address of the management device 203 serving as a web server. The recording device 204 associates the DID corresponding to the A organization, the DID public key, and the address of the management device 203 serving as a web server, and stores them in the ledger 801 . Ledger 801 is, for example, a block chain.

(8-4) The issuing device 202 transmits to the information processing device 100 the account owned by the A organization, the authentication information owned by the A organization, the attributes owned by the A organization, and the like. The information processing apparatus 100 refers to the storage location management table 400 and authenticates the organization A based on the account owned by the organization A, the authentication information owned by the organization A, and the attributes owned by the organization A. Select the corresponding chip 320 .

The issuing device 202 transmits the DID public key, the SSL public key, the DID private key, and the SSL private key to the information processing device 100 . The management device 203 may transmit the SSL public key and the SSL private key to the information processing device 100 instead of the issuing device 202 . The information processing device 100 receives the DID public key, the SSL public key, the DID private key, and the SSL private key from the issuing device 202 .

The information processing device 100 uses the chip 320 corresponding to the selected A organization to store the combination of the DID private key and the SSL private key. The information processing apparatus 100 associates the chip number for identifying the chip 320 corresponding to the selected organization A, the DID public key, and the SSL public key, and stores them in the reference destination management table 500 .

As a result, the information processing apparatus 100 can thereafter grasp the valid combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key corresponding to the A organization. The information processing apparatus 100 can specify which chip 320 should be referred to when grasping the valid combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key corresponding to the A organization. Next, the description of FIG. 9 will be described.

In FIG. 9, (9-1) issuing device 202 generates a signature using a legitimate DID private key corresponding to A organization. Issuing side device 202 generates a valid VC using a valid DID corresponding to the A organization to which the generated signature is attached. The issuing device 202 transmits data to which a valid VC is assigned to the verifying device 201 . The data are, for example, valid sentences. The sentences are, for example, sentences related to contracts. Verification-side device 201 receives the text to which VC is assigned.

Here, it is desired that the verification-side device 201 verifies whether or not the data to which the VC is assigned is valid data that has not been tampered with and has been transmitted from the issuing-side device 202 corresponding to the A organization.

(9-2) Verification device 201 transmits an inquiry about VC to recording device 204 based on the VC. In response to the inquiry, the recording device 204 verifies the DID corresponding to the VC and corresponding to the A organization stored in the ledger 801, the DID public key, and the address of the management device 203 serving as the web server. Send to the side device 201 . Verification-side device 201 receives from recording-side device 204 the DID corresponding to organization A, the DID public key, and the address of management-side device 203 serving as a web server.

(9-3) Verification-side device 201 acquires an SSL certificate and an SSL public key from management-side device 203 based on the address of management-side device 203 serving as a web server. Verification-side device 201 determines whether the SSL certificate is valid based on the SSL public key. If the SSL certificate is not valid, the verification-side device 201 determines that the VC-assigned data is not valid, and the verification-side user refers to the result of the determination that the VC-assigned data is not valid. output as possible. Assume here that the verification-side device 201 determines that the SSL certificate is valid.

(9-4) Verification-side device 201 acquires a DID from management-side device 203 if the SSL certificate is valid. The verification-side device 201 determines whether the DID obtained from the recording-side device 204 and the DID obtained from the management-side device 203 match. If the DID acquired from the recording device 204 and the DID acquired from the management device 203 do not match, the verification device 201 determines that the DID is invalid. If the DID is not valid, the verification-side device 201 determines that the data to which the VC is assigned is not valid, and allows the verification-side user to refer to the result of the determination that the data to which the VC is assigned is not valid. Output. Assume here that the verification-side device 201 determines that the DID acquired from the recording-side device 204 and the DID acquired from the management-side device 203 match.

(9-5) The verifier device 201 transmits to the information processing device 100 a verification request including a combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key. The information processing apparatus 100 refers to the reference destination management table 500 and selects the chip 320 corresponding to the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key. The information processing device 100 inputs the DID public key and the SSL public key to the selected chip 320 .

In response to the input, information processing apparatus 100 determines whether chip 320 outputs a certificate indicating that chip 320 stores a DID private key and an SSL private key in association with each other. do. An example in which the chip 320 outputs the certificate will be described later using FIG. When the certificate is output, information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid. The information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is not valid unless the certificate is output.

The information processing device 100 transmits to the verification side device 201 the result of determining whether or not the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid. Verification-side device 201 receives from information processing device 100 the result of determining whether or not the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid. Assume here that the information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid.

(9-6) If the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid, the verifier device 201 determines that the DID is valid, the VC is valid, and the data to which the VC is attached is valid. I judge. Verification-side device 201 outputs the result of determining that the data to which VC is assigned is valid so that the verification-side user can refer to it.

If the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is not valid, the verification-side device 201 determines that the DID is not valid, the VC is not valid, and the data with the VC is not valid. Verification-side device 201 outputs the result of determining that the data to which VC is assigned is not valid so that the verification-side user can refer to it.

Here, since the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid, the verification-side device 201 determines that the DID is valid, the VC is valid, and the data to which the VC is attached is valid. do. Verification-side device 201 outputs the result of determining that the data to which VC is assigned is valid so that the verification-side user can refer to it.

As a result, the information processing apparatus 100 enables the verification-side apparatus 201 to accurately verify whether the DID is valid and to accurately verify whether the VC is valid. Whether or not the data is valid can be verified with high accuracy. Next, the description of FIG. 10 will be described.

In FIG. 10, it is assumed that there is an attacking device (not shown) used by an attacker.

(10-1) The attacking device generates an illegal DID' to replace the DID, and generates a key pair of the DID' private key and the DID' public key. Assume that the attacking device tampered with the DID stored in the management device 203 into an illegal DID'. Assume that the attacking device tampered with the DID stored in the ledger 801 of the recording device 204 to an illegal DID', for example. Assume, for example, that the attacking device tampered with the DID public key stored in the ledger 801 of the recording device 204 into a DID' public key. Next, the description of FIG. 11 will be described.

In FIG. 11, (11-1) the attacking device uses the DID' private key to generate a signature. The attacking device generates an unauthorized VC' using the generated signature-added unauthorized DID'. The issuing device 202 pretends to be the issuing device 202 corresponding to the A organization and transmits the data to which the unauthorized VC' is assigned to the verifying device 201 . The data are, for example, fraudulent texts. The sentences are, for example, sentences related to contracts. Verification-side device 201 receives the text to which VC' is assigned.

The attacking device may capture the data sent from the issuing device 202 corresponding to the A organization. The attacking device modifies the captured data into data corresponding to the fraudulent text. The attacking device alters the VC attached to the captured data to VC'. The attacking device transmits the falsified data to which the falsified VC' is added to the verifying device 201 under the guise of the issuing device 202 corresponding to the A organization.

Here, it is desired that the verifying device 201 verifies whether or not the data to which VC' is assigned is unfalsified valid data transmitted from the issuing device 202 corresponding to the A organization. .

(11-2) Verification device 201 transmits an inquiry regarding VC' to recording device 204 based on VC'. In response to the inquiry, the recording device 204 transmits the DID', the DID' public key, and the address of the management device 203 serving as the web server corresponding to the VC' stored in the ledger 801 to the verification device. 201. Verification-side device 201 receives DID', DID' public key, and the address of management-side device 203 serving as a web server from recording-side device 204 .

(11-3) Verification-side device 201 acquires an SSL certificate and an SSL public key from management-side device 203 based on the address of management-side device 203 serving as a web server. Verification-side device 201 determines whether the SSL certificate is valid based on the SSL public key. If the SSL certificate is not valid, the verification-side device 201 determines that the data to which the VC' is assigned is not valid, and the result of determining that the data to which the VC' is assigned is not valid is sent to the verification-side user. is output so that it can be referenced. Assume here that the verification-side device 201 determines that the SSL certificate is valid.

(11-4) Verification device 201 acquires DID' from management device 203 if the SSL certificate is valid. The verification-side device 201 determines whether the DID' obtained from the recording-side device 204 and the DID' obtained from the management-side device 203 match.

If the DID' obtained from the recording device 204 and the DID' obtained from the management device 203 do not match, the verification device 201 determines that the DID' is invalid. If the DID' is not valid, the verifying device 201 determines that the data to which the VC' is assigned is not valid. Output so that it can be referenced. Here, it is assumed that the verification-side device 201 determines that the DID' obtained from the recording-side device 204 and the DID' obtained from the management-side device 203 match.

Conventionally, the information processing device 100 does not exist. Therefore, when the DID' obtained from the recording device 204 and the DID' obtained from the management device 203 match, the conventional computer corresponding to the verification device 201 mistakenly believes that the VC' is valid. It is conceivable that judgment may be made. Therefore, it is conceivable that conventional computers may erroneously determine that data to which VC' is assigned is valid. Next, the description of FIG. 12 will be described.

In FIG. 12, (12-1) the verifier device 201 transmits to the information processing device 100 a verification request including a combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key. The information processing apparatus 100 refers to the reference destination management table 500 and selects the chip 320 corresponding to the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key. If the chip 320 corresponding to the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key does not exist, the information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is invalid.

Here, it is assumed that the attacking device has already registered the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key in the reference destination management table 500 . On the other hand, it is difficult for an attacking device to rewrite data inside the chip 320 . Also, it is difficult for the attacking device to grasp the SSL private key, and it is difficult for the chip 320 to store a combination of an illegal DID' private key and a valid SSL private key. The information processing device 100 inputs the DID' public key and the SSL public key to the selected chip 320 .

In response to the input, information processing apparatus 100 determines whether chip 320 outputs a certificate indicating that chip 320 stores the DID' private key and the SSL private key in association with each other. judge. An example in which the chip 320 outputs the certificate will be described later using FIG. When the certificate is output, the information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is valid. The information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is not valid unless the certificate is output.

The information processing device 100 transmits to the verification side device 201 the result of determining whether the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is valid. The verifier device 201 receives from the information processing device 100 the result of determining whether or not the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is valid. Here, it is assumed that the information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is invalid because the certificate is not output.

(12-2) If the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is valid, the verification-side device 201 determines that the DID' is valid, the VC' is valid, and the data to which the VC' is assigned. is correct. Verification-side device 201 outputs the result of determining that the data to which VC' is assigned is valid so that the verification-side user can refer to it.

If the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is not valid, the verifier device 201 determines that the DID' is not valid, the VC' is not valid, and the data to which the VC' is assigned is not valid. judge. Verification-side device 201 outputs the result of determining that the data to which VC' is assigned is not valid so that the verification-side user can refer to it.

Here, since the combination of the DID' public key and the SSL public key is not valid, the verification-side device 201 determines that the DID' is not valid, the VC' is not valid, and the data to which VC' is attached is valid. determine that it is not. Verification-side device 201 outputs the result of determining that the data to which VC' is assigned is not valid so that the verification-side user can refer to it.

As a result, the information processing apparatus 100 enables the verification-side apparatus 201 to accurately verify whether or not DID' is valid, and to accurately verify whether or not VC' is valid. It is possible to accurately verify whether or not the given data is valid. The information processing apparatus 100 can adopt, for example, a key pair of an SSL public key and an SSL private key, which are difficult to tamper with, as a criterion for determining whether or not the DID is valid. Whether or not can be verified with high accuracy.

Even if the issuing device 202 uses a certificate that does not involve a third-party certificate authority, such as a VC using DID, the information processing device 100 uses a VC using DID in the verifying device 201. It is possible to accurately verify whether or not is valid. For this reason, the information processing apparatus 100 can suppress an increase in cost incurred when securely exchanging data between the issuing user and the verifying user. In addition, the information processing apparatus 100 can suppress an increase in the time required until data can be securely exchanged between the issuing user and the verifying user.

Further, the information processing apparatus 100 enables the verification user to determine whether or not the issuing user is trustworthy even if the issuing user and the verifying user do not interact face-to-face. can. Therefore, the information processing apparatus 100 can cope with diversification of situations in which data is securely exchanged. The information processing apparatus 100 can cope with an increase in the number of people trying to securely exchange data.

Here, a case has been described where verification-side device 201 receives the DID corresponding to organization A, the DID public key, and the address of management-side device 203 serving as a web server from recording-side device 204 in response to an inquiry. , but not limited to this. For example, when the issuing device 202 sends the DID corresponding to the A organization, the DID public key, and the address of the management device 203 serving as a web server to the verification device 201 together with the text to which the VC is assigned. There may be The verifying device 201 receives the DID corresponding to the A organization, the DID public key, and the address of the managing device 203 serving as a web server from the issuing device 202 .

(An example where the chip 320 outputs a certificate)
Next, an example in which the chip 320 outputs a certificate will be described with reference to FIG.

FIG. 13 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of how the chip 320 outputs a certificate. As shown in FIG. 13, the chip 320 generates an AT private key as an attestation key and an AT public key corresponding to the AT private key. Chip 320 generates a certificate for the attestation key. The certificate of the attestation key contains the Embedded CA certificate.

The embedded CA certificate contains the CA public key. The embedded CA certificate contains a signature by the CA private key corresponding to the CA public key. The Embedded CA certificate is, for example, a certificate corresponding to the vendor of the chip 320. The attestation key certificate contains the AT public key. An attestation key's certificate contains an attribute that allows the existence of other keys to be attested. Attestation is to prove.

When receiving input of a DID public key, the chip 320 determines whether or not a DID private key corresponding to the input DID public key exists within the chip 320 . If the chip 320 contains a DID private key corresponding to the input DID public key, the chip 320 generates Cerify information of the DID private key. The DID private key Cerify information includes the DID public key. The Cerify information of the DID private key includes a signature using the attestation key. The DID private key Cerify information includes an attribute that the DID private key exists.

When receiving an input of an SSL public key, the chip 320 determines whether an SSL private key corresponding to the input SSL public key exists within the chip 320 . If the chip 320 contains an SSL private key corresponding to the input SSL public key, the chip 320 generates Cerify information of the SSL private key. The SSL private key Cerify information includes the SSL public key. The SSL private key Cerify information includes a signature using the attestation key. The SSL private key Cerify information includes an attribute that the SSL private key exists.

The chip 320 associates the certificate of the attestation key, the Cerify information of the DID private key, and the Cerify information of the SSL private key, and outputs them so that the information processing apparatus 100 can refer to them. If both the DID private key cerify information and the SSL private key cerify information include a signature using the same attestation key, the information processing apparatus 100 stores the DID private key and the SSL private key in the chip 320 . It is determined that the private key is stored in association with the private key.

If the chip 320 stores the DID private key and the SSL private key in association with each other, the information processing device 100 determines that the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid. Thereby, the information processing apparatus 100 can securely manage the DID private key and the SSL private key. The information processing apparatus 100 can determine whether or not a combination of a DID private key and an SSL private key corresponding to the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key exists in the chip 320. can.

The information processing apparatus 100 associates the certificate of the attestation key, the DID private key cerify information, and the SSL private key cerify information, and transmits them to the verifier apparatus 201 as information indicating the determination result. good too. Since the information processing apparatus 100 utilizes the certificate of the attestation key output by the chip 320, the reliability of the vendor of the chip 320 can be used as the reliability of the determination result. Therefore, the information processing apparatus 100 can allow the verification user to appropriately determine the reliability of the determination result regardless of the reliability of the own apparatus.

(Registration processing procedure)
Next, an example of a registration processing procedure executed by the verification system 200 will be described with reference to FIG. 14 . Here, it is assumed that there is a issuing device 202 corresponding to the A organization. Assume that there is a verifier device 201 corresponding to the B organization. Assume that there is a management-side device 203 that implements a web server.

FIG. 14 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the registration processing procedure. In FIG. 14, issuing device 202 generates an SSL key pair consisting of an SSL private key and an SSL public key (step S1401). Next, the issuing device 202 sets the generated SSL key pair in the management device 203 (step S1402). The management-side device 203 stores an SSL key pair. The management-side device 203 may generate and store an SSL certificate. The issuing device 202 then transmits a request for selecting the chip 320 corresponding to the issuing device 202 to the information processing device 100 (step S1403).

In response to receiving the selection request, the information processing device 100 refers to the storage destination management table 400, selects the chip 320 corresponding to the issuing side device 202, and sends the wrapping key issuance request to the selected chip 320. is transmitted (step S1404). Chip 320 issues a wrapping key in response to receiving the issue request, and transmits it to issuer device 202 (step S1405). The wrapping key is given a signature using, for example, Embedded CA.

Issuer device 202 encrypts the SSL private key using the received wrapping key, and transmits the encrypted SSL private key=E _{Wrapping key} (SSL private key) to chip 320 (step S1406). The chip 320 decrypts and stores the SSL private key based on the E _{Wrapping key} (SSL private key) (step S1407). The information processing apparatus 100 may acquire the SSL public key, associate the chip number of the selected chip 320 with the acquired SSL public key, and store the result in the reference destination management table 500 .

The issuing device 202 generates a DID and generates a DID key pair consisting of a DID private key and a DID public key (step S1408). Next, the issuing device 202 sets the DID public key to the management device 203 (step S1409). The management-side device 203 stores the DID public key. The issuing device 202 then transmits a request for selecting the chip 320 corresponding to the issuing device 202 to the information processing device 100 (step S1410).

In response to receiving the selection request, the information processing device 100 refers to the storage destination management table 400, selects the chip 320 corresponding to the issuing side device 202, and sends the wrapping key issuance request to the selected chip 320. is transmitted (step S1411). Chip 320 issues a wrapping key in response to receiving the issue request and transmits it to issuer device 202 (step S1412). The wrapping key is given a signature using, for example, Embedded CA.

Issuer-side device 202 encrypts the DID private key using the received wrapping key, and transmits the encrypted DID private key=E _{Wrapping key} (DID private key) to chip 320 (step S1413). Chip 320 decrypts and stores the DID private key based on the E _{wrapping key} (DID private key) (step S1414). The information processing apparatus 100 may acquire a DID public key, associate the acquired DID public key with the chip number of the selected chip 320 , and store it in the reference destination management table 500 . After that, the verification system 200 ends the registration process.

(Verification processing procedure)
Next, an example of a verification processing procedure executed by the verification system 200 will be described with reference to FIG. 15 . Here, it is assumed that there is a issuing device 202 corresponding to the A organization. Assume that there is a verifier device 201 corresponding to the B organization. Assume that there is a management-side device 203 that implements a web server.

FIG. 15 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the verification processing procedure. Verification-side device 201 converts the text with signature and VC into ? Receive from the organization (step S1501). ? The organization is, for example, the A organization. ? An organization may, for example, be an attacker masquerading as the A organization.

Next, based on the VC, the verifying device 201 acquires the VC issuer's DID, the VC issuer's DID public key, and the VC issuer's website address from the recording device 204 having the ledger (step S1502). Verification-side device 201 acquires a DID and an SSL certificate from management-side device 203, which implements a web server that operates the website, based on the website address (step S1503).

Next, the verifier device 201 acquires an SSL public key based on the SSL certificate (step S1504). Verifier apparatus 201 then transmits a request (pub1, pub2) including a combination of pub1=DID public key and pub2=SSL public key to information processing apparatus 100 (step S1505). Also, the verification-side device 201 verifies the DID obtained from the management-side device 203 and the DID obtained from the recording-side device 204, and verifies the validity of the VC issuer (step S1506). Here, it is assumed that the verifier device 201 determines that the VC issuer is valid.

In response to the request (pub1, pub2), the information processing apparatus 100 refers to the reference destination management table 500 and selects the chip 320 corresponding to the combination of pub1=DID public key and pub2=SSL public key ( step S1507). Next, the information processing apparatus 100 transmits to the selected chip 320 a request for generating a certificate corresponding to the inquiry, including pub1=DID public key and pub2=SSL public key (step S1508).

If the chip 320 stores the DID private key corresponding to the pub1=DID public key and the SSL private key corresponding to the pub2=SSL public key in association with each other in response to the generation request, the chip 320 generates the certificate as information. Send to the processing device 100 . The certificate is given a signature using, for example, Embedded CA. The information processing device 100 receives the certificate from the selected chip 320 (step S1509).

The information processing device 100 transmits the received certificate to the verification-side device 201 (step S1510). When the certificate is not sent from the chip 320 , the information processing device 100 may send a notification indicating that the certificate has not been sent to the verifying device 201 . Verification-side device 201 verifies the validity of the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key based on the received certificate (step S1511).

For example, the information processing apparatus 100 determines that the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid in response to receiving the certificate. For example, when the certificate is not received, the information processing apparatus 100 may determine that the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is invalid. If the combination of the DID public key and the SSL public key is valid, the information processing apparatus 100 determines that the DID public key is valid, the VC is valid, and the sentence with the VC is valid. .

As described above, according to the information processing device 100, it is possible to accept a verification request regarding the first public key corresponding to the first certificate. According to the information processing apparatus 100, in response to the verification request, the combination of the first public key and the second public key corresponding to the second certificate issued by the certificate authority to the predetermined system is generated. can be obtained. According to the information processing apparatus 100, the first private key corresponding to the third certificate issued to the management entity managing the system and the second private key corresponding to the second certificate are stored. It can have a storage unit for storing in correspondence. According to the information processing apparatus 100, it is possible to refer to the storage unit and determine whether the acquired combination is valid. According to the information processing apparatus 100, the determined result can be output to the requester of the verification request. As a result, the information processing apparatus 100 can accurately verify the validity of the first public key, and accurately validate the first certificate based on the validity of the first public key. It can be verifiable.

According to the information processing device 100, it is possible to access a chip that implements a storage unit. According to the chip, in response to acceptance of a public key, if a private key corresponding to the accepted public key exists in the storage unit, the computer refers to a certificate proving that the private key exists. It has a function to output possible. According to the information processing apparatus 100, the first public key and the second public key included in the acquired combination can be input to the chip. According to the information processing apparatus 100, according to the input, a certificate proving that the first private key corresponding to the first public key exists, and a second private key corresponding to the second public key. It can be determined whether a certificate proving the existence of is output from the chip. According to the information processing apparatus 100, it is possible to determine that the acquired combination is valid when it is output. Thereby, the information processing apparatus 100 can securely manage the first secret key and the second secret key.

According to the information processing apparatus 100, the first secret key and the second secret key are stored in the storage unit in response to obtaining the first secret key and the second secret key from the management entity. can be associated and stored. Thereby, the information processing apparatus 100 can appropriately manage the storage unit. The information processing apparatus 100 can determine whether the combination of the first public key and the second public key is valid.

According to the information processing device 100, the device can be accessed. According to the device, in response to receiving the data to which the first certificate is attached, the information that enables the system to be specified can be obtained from the predetermined database based on the first certificate. According to the apparatus, it is possible to acquire the first public key possessed by the system and the second public key possessed by the system based on the acquired information. According to the information processing device 100, a verification request including a combination of a first public key and a second public key can be received from the device. According to the information processing apparatus 100, in response to receiving the verification request from the apparatus, it is possible to acquire the combination of the first public key and the second public key based on the verification request. Accordingly, the information processing apparatus 100 can determine whether or not the data to which the first certificate is attached is valid.

According to the information processing device 100, it is possible to adopt the VC corresponding to the DID for the first certificate. Accordingly, the information processing apparatus 100 can allow a certificate generated without a third party's certificate authority to be used as the first certificate.

It should be noted that the verification support method described in the present embodiment can be realized by executing a program prepared in advance on a computer such as a PC or workstation. The verification support program described in this embodiment is recorded in a computer-readable recording medium and executed by being read from the recording medium by a computer. Recording media include a hard disk, flexible disk, CD (Compact Disc)-ROM, MO (Magneto Optical disc), DVD (Digital Versatile Disc), and the like. Also, the verification support program described in the present embodiment may be distributed via a network such as the Internet.

100 Information Processing Device 101 Storage Unit 102 Second Public Key 110 Requester 111 First Certificate 112 First Public Key 120 System 121 Second Certificate 122 Second Private Key 130 Management Subject 131 Third Certificate book
132 first secret key 200 verification system 201 verification side device 202 issuing side device 203 management side device 204 recording side device 210

network

300, 600

bus

301, 601 CPU
302, 602

memory

303, 603 network I/F
304, 604 recording medium I/F
305, 605 recording medium 306 chip group 320 chip 400 storage destination management table 500 reference destination management table 700 first storage unit 701 first acquisition unit 702 registration unit 703 first determination unit 704 first output unit 710 second storage unit 711 2 acquisition unit 712 second determination unit 713 second output unit 801 ledger

Claims

a first public key and a second certificate issued by a certificate authority to a predetermined system in response to a verification request relating to a first public key corresponding to the first certificate; Get the combination with the public key of
A memory that associates and stores a first private key corresponding to a third certificate issued to a management entity that manages the system and a second private key corresponding to the second certificate. section to determine whether the acquired combination is valid,
outputting the determined result to the requester of the verification request;
A verification support method characterized by causing a computer to execute processing.
The computer is
In response to acceptance of the public key, if a private key corresponding to the accepted public key exists in the storage unit, a certificate certifying that the private key exists is output so that the computer can refer to it. A chip that implements the storage unit is accessible, and has the function of
The process of determining
In response to inputting the first public key and the second public key included in the obtained combination into the chip, the first secret key corresponding to the first public key is generated. The combination obtained when a certificate proving the existence and a certificate proving the existence of the second private key corresponding to the second public key are output from the chip 2. The verification support method according to claim 1, wherein is determined to be valid.
Corresponding the first secret key and the second secret key to the storage unit in response to obtaining the first secret key and the second secret key from the management entity store with
3. The verification support method according to claim 1, wherein the processing is executed by the computer.
The computer is
Acquiring information that enables the system to be specified from a predetermined database based on the first certificate in response to receiving the data to which the first certificate is attached, and using the acquired information Accessible to a device for obtaining the first public key possessed by the system and the second public key possessed by the system based on
The acquisition process includes
in response to receiving the verification request including the combination of the first public key and the second public key from the device, based on the verification request, the first public key and the 4. The verification support method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein a combination with the second public key is obtained.
The verification support method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that said first certificate is Verifiable Credentials corresponding to a Decentralized Identifier.
a first public key and a second certificate issued by a certificate authority to a predetermined system in response to a verification request relating to a first public key corresponding to the first certificate; Get the combination with the public key of
A memory that associates and stores a first private key corresponding to a third certificate issued to a management entity that manages the system and a second private key corresponding to the second certificate. section to determine whether the acquired combination is valid,
outputting the determined result to the requester of the verification request;
A verification support program characterized by causing a computer to execute processing.
a first public key and a second certificate issued by a certificate authority to a predetermined system in response to a verification request relating to a first public key corresponding to the first certificate; Get the combination with the public key of
A memory that associates and stores a first private key corresponding to a third certificate issued to a management entity that manages the system and a second private key corresponding to the second certificate. section to determine whether the acquired combination is valid,
outputting the determined result to the requester of the verification request;
An information processing apparatus comprising a control unit.