WO2022135391A1 - 身份鉴别方法、装置、存储介质、程序、及程序产品 - Google Patents

身份鉴别方法、装置、存储介质、程序、及程序产品 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2022135391A1
WO2022135391A1 PCT/CN2021/140073 CN2021140073W WO2022135391A1 WO 2022135391 A1 WO2022135391 A1 WO 2022135391A1 CN 2021140073 W CN2021140073 W CN 2021140073W WO 2022135391 A1 WO2022135391 A1 WO 2022135391A1
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Prior art keywords
authentication
requesting device
message
identity
access controller
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PCT/CN2021/140073
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
铁满霞
曹军
赖晓龙
赵晓荣
李琴
张变玲
王月辉
马丹丹
Original Assignee
西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
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Application filed by 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 filed Critical 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority to US18/259,295 priority Critical patent/US20240064027A1/en
Priority to EP21909387.9A priority patent/EP4270857A4/en
Publication of WO2022135391A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022135391A1/zh

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    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
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    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
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    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
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    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the technical field of network communication security, and in particular, to an identity authentication method, device, storage medium, program, and program product.
  • a requesting device can access the network through an authenticated access controller.
  • the authentication access controller needs to authenticate the identity of the requesting device to ensure that the requesting device accessing the network belongs to a legitimate user.
  • the point-to-point transmission in the blockchain technology also needs to establish a trust relationship between different nodes, so it is also very important for the identification of nodes.
  • the requesting device In the process of performing identity authentication on the requesting device, the requesting device needs to provide its own identity information for identity authentication.
  • identity information generally carries private and sensitive information such as ID number, home address, and bank card information.
  • identity information is usually contained in the entity's digital certificate, and the digital certificate is used as the entity's identity credential. If the identity information of the requesting device is maliciously intercepted and used for illegal purposes during the identity authentication process of the requesting device, it will cause great security risks to the authentication access controller, the requesting device and the network.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide an identity authentication method, device, storage medium, program, and program product.
  • the authentication access controller can implement a single request for a device. To identify.
  • an identity authentication method including:
  • the authentication access controller obtains the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information ciphertext is obtained by using the public key pair of the encryption certificate including the The digital certificate of the requested device and the information including the protection random number are encrypted and generated;
  • the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to its trusted first authentication server, where the first authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message includes the ciphertext of authentication result information and the digital signature of the first authentication server; the authentication result The information ciphertext is generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device using the protection random number obtained by decrypting the identity information ciphertext to encrypt the information including the identity authentication result information of the requesting device; the The identity authentication result information includes the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information;
  • the authentication access controller uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the protection random number obtained from the requesting device to obtain the protection random number, and uses the protection random number to decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication result information to obtain the protection random number.
  • the identity authentication result information of the requesting device; the protected random number ciphertext is generated by the requesting device using the message encryption key to encrypt the information including the protected random number;
  • the authentication access controller verifies the digital signature of the first authentication server
  • the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device in the identity authentication result information .
  • an authentication access controller including:
  • the obtaining part is configured to obtain the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information ciphertext is obtained by using the public key pair of the encryption certificate including all the ciphertexts.
  • the digital certificate of the requesting device and the information including the protection random number are encrypted and generated;
  • a first sending part configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • a first receiving part configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message includes an authentication result information ciphertext and a digital signature of the first authentication server; the authentication The result information ciphertext is generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device using the protection random number obtained by decrypting the identity information ciphertext to encrypt and generate the information including the identity authentication result information of the requesting device;
  • the identity authentication result information includes the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information;
  • the first decryption part is configured to use a message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the protection random number obtained from the requesting device to obtain the protection random number, and use the protection random number to decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication result information to obtain the protection random number.
  • the identity authentication result information of the requesting device; the protected random number ciphertext is generated by the requesting device using the message encryption key to encrypt the information including the protected random number;
  • a first verification part configured to verify the digital signature of the first authentication server
  • the determining part is configured to determine the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device in the identity authentication result information after the verification of the digital signature of the first authentication server is passed.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a requesting device, including:
  • the first encryption part is configured to use the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the information including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protection random number to generate the identity information ciphertext;
  • a first sending part configured to send an identity ciphertext message to the authentication access controller, where the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device;
  • the second encryption part is configured to encrypt the information including the protection random number by using the message encryption key to generate the ciphertext of the protection random number.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a first authentication server, where the first authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, including:
  • the first receiving part is configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information ciphertext is obtained by using an encrypted certificate
  • the public key is generated by encrypting the information including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protection random number;
  • a first sending part configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message includes an authentication result information ciphertext and a digital signature of the first authentication server;
  • the authentication The result information ciphertext is generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device using the protection random number obtained by decrypting the identity information ciphertext to encrypt and generate the information including the identity authentication result information of the requesting device;
  • the identity authentication result information includes the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a second authentication server, where the second authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the requesting device, if the first authentication server trusted by the access controller and the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device are authenticated.
  • the second authentication server includes:
  • the receiving part is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the first authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device; the identity information ciphertext is obtained by using an encrypted certificate
  • the public key is generated by encrypting the information including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protection random number;
  • a decryption part configured to decrypt the encrypted identity information of the requesting device by using the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate to obtain the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protected random number;
  • the generating part is configured to perform legality verification on the digital certificate to obtain the verification result of the digital certificate, generate identity authentication result information according to the information including the verification result of the digital certificate, and use the protection random number to pair
  • the information including the identity authentication result information is encrypted to generate the ciphertext of the authentication result information, and the signature data including the ciphertext of the authentication result information is calculated to generate the digital signature of the second authentication server.
  • a sending part is configured to send the second authentication response message to the first authentication server.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides an authentication access controller, including:
  • a first memory for storing instructions executable by the first processor
  • the first processor is configured to invoke the instructions stored in the first memory to perform the steps performed by the authentication access controller in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a requesting device, including:
  • a second memory for storing instructions executable by the second processor
  • the second processor is configured to invoke the instructions stored in the second memory to perform the steps performed by the requesting device in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a first authentication server, including:
  • a third memory for storing instructions executable by the third processor
  • the third processor is configured to invoke the instructions stored in the third memory to perform the steps performed by the first authentication server in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a second authentication server, including:
  • a fourth memory for storing instructions executable by the fourth processor
  • the fourth processor is configured to invoke the instructions stored in the fourth memory to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, where a computer program is stored on the computer-readable storage medium, and the computer program is executed by a processor to execute the identity authentication method described in the first aspect
  • the steps performed by the access controller, the requesting device, the first authentication server, or the second authentication server are authenticated.
  • the embodiments of the present application further provide a computer program, including computer-readable codes.
  • a processor in the computer device executes the program for implementing the first aspect.
  • the steps performed by the access controller, the requesting device, the first authentication server, or the second authentication server are authenticated.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, including computer program instructions, the computer program instructions enable a computer to perform the identity authentication method described in the first aspect to authenticate the access controller, the requesting device, the first The steps performed by the authentication server, or the second authentication server.
  • the identity information of the requesting device is kept confidential, which can prevent the identity information from being exposed in the process of accessing the network by the requesting device, and ensure that the attacker cannot obtain private and sensitive information.
  • the real-time authentication of the one-way identity of the requesting device by the authentication access controller is realized, which lays the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can access the network.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for requesting a device REQ and an authentication access controller AAC to negotiate a message encryption key according to an embodiment of the present application;
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method under a non-roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or an optional operation;
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another identity authentication method under a non-roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or an optional operation;
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method under a roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or an optional operation;
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another identity authentication method in a roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or an optional operation;
  • FIG. 7 is a structural block diagram of an authentication access controller AAC according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 8 is a structural block diagram of a requesting device REQ provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 9 is a structural block diagram of a first authentication server AS-AAC according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 10 is a structural block diagram of a second authentication server AS-REQ provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 11 is a hardware structural block diagram of an authentication access controller AAC provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 12 is a block diagram of a hardware structure of a requesting device REQ provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 13 is a block diagram of the hardware structure of a first authentication server AS-AAC according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 14 is a block diagram of a hardware structure of a second authentication server AS-REQ according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the requesting device can access the network through the authentication access controller.
  • the authentication access controller needs to authenticate the identity of the requesting device.
  • the requesting device can be a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a tablet computer, etc.
  • the terminal device, the authentication access controller can be a network side device such as a wireless access point and a wireless router.
  • the requesting device may be a terminal device such as a desktop computer or a notebook computer, and the authentication access controller may be a network-side device such as a switch or a router.
  • the requesting device may be a terminal device such as a mobile phone or a tablet computer.
  • the authentication access controller may be a network side device such as a base station.
  • the present application is also applicable to various data communication scenarios such as other wired networks and short-range communication networks.
  • the requesting device needs to provide its own identity information for identity authentication.
  • the identity information is usually contained in the digital certificate of the requesting device, and carries private and sensitive information. If an attacker intercepts the identity information and uses it for illegal purposes, it will authenticate the access controller, the requesting device and even the network. cause a great safety hazard.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides an identity authentication method, which authenticates an access controller to obtain an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, where the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information
  • the ciphertext is generated by encrypting the information including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protection random number by using the public key of the encryption certificate; then, the authentication access controller sends the first authentication server including the identity information ciphertext to the first authentication server.
  • the Request message receive the first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, the first authentication response message includes the cipher text of the authentication result information and the digital signature of the first authentication server, and the cipher text of the authentication result information is the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device It is generated by encrypting the information including the identity authentication result information of the requesting device by using the protection random number obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information, and the identity authentication result information includes the number of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information.
  • the verification result of the certificate; the ciphertext of the authentication result information can ensure the security of the transmission of the identity authentication result information of the requesting device between the authentication access controller and the first authentication server.
  • the authentication access controller uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the protection random number obtained from the requesting device to obtain the protection random number, and uses the protection random number to decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication result information to obtain the identity authentication result information of the requesting device.
  • the access controller verifies the digital signature of the first authentication server, and after the verification is passed, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device included in the identity authentication result information.
  • the authentication result information mentioned in the embodiments of the present application may be obtained by an authentication server trusted by the requesting device performing legality verification on the digital certificate of the requesting device.
  • the above are only some examples of the requesting device, the authentication access controller, and the authentication server, and should not be construed as a limitation on the requesting device, the authentication access controller, and the authentication server.
  • the device, the authentication access controller and the authentication server can also be other devices.
  • the identity authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application is to realize the one-way identity authentication (REQ Authentication with an Unauthenticated AAC, RAUA for short) of the authentication access controller to the requesting device.
  • REQ request device
  • AAC authentication Access Controller
  • AS authentication server
  • AS is a trusted third-party entity, holding digital certificates and private keys corresponding to digital certificates that comply with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems.
  • the AS trusted by the AAC is called the first authentication server AS-AAC.
  • the AS trusted by REQ is called the second authentication server AS-REQ, which has the ability to verify the legitimacy of the REQ digital certificate.
  • AS-AAC and AS-REQ are different, AS-AAC and AS-REQ trust each other and know each other's digital certificate or the public key in the digital certificate.
  • the certificate decryption server (Certificate Sever-Decrypt, CS-DEC for short) holds the encryption certificate and the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate in compliance with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, CS-DEC Can be a standalone server or reside in AS-REQ.
  • the REQ can be an endpoint that participates in the authentication process, establishes a connection with the AAC, accesses the services provided by the AAC, and accesses the AS through the AAC.
  • REQ holds digital certificates and private keys corresponding to digital certificates that comply with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, and knows the encryption certificate of CS-DEC or the public key in the encryption certificate.
  • the AAC may be another endpoint that participates in the authentication process, establishes a connection with the REQ, provides services, communicates with the REQ, and has direct access to the AS-AAC. AAC knows the digital certificate of AS-AAC or the public key in the digital certificate.
  • S101 The AAC obtains the identity ciphertext message REQInit sent by the REQ.
  • the REQInit includes the ciphertext EncPub AS of REQ's identity information.
  • the EncPub AS is generated by REQ by encrypting the information including REQ's digital certificate Cert REQ and the protection random number by using the public key of the encryption certificate. Therefore, the identity information of the REQ is kept secret during the process of transmitting the identity information, so as to prevent the identity information of the REQ from being exposed during the transmission process.
  • S102 The AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC it trusts.
  • EncPub AS is included in the AACVeri.
  • the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC can be the same or different, when the AS-REQ trusted by REQ and the AS-AAC trusted by AAC are the same authentication server, it is a non-roaming situation.
  • the authentication server mutually trusted by AAC can be represented by AS-AAC (of course, AS-REQ can also be used).
  • the method of processing the EncPub AS in this situation includes: the AS-AAC (also denoted as AS-REQ) decrypts the encryption of the server CS-DEC using the certificate residing in the AS-AAC (also denoted as AS-REQ) The private key corresponding to the certificate decrypts the EncPub AS to obtain the Cert REQ and the protection random number, or, the AS-AAC (which can also be expressed as AS-REQ) sends the EncPub AS to the CS-DEC that has interaction and trust relationship with it for decryption.
  • AS-AAC also denoted as AS-REQ
  • the Cert REQ obtained by decryption and the protection random number then verify the legitimacy of the Cert REQ to obtain the verification result Res REQ , generate the identity authentication result information Pub REQ according to the information including the Res REQ , and use the protection random number to pair the Pub REQ.
  • the information including REQ is encrypted to generate the ciphertext of the authentication result information, and the signature data including the ciphertext of the authentication result information is calculated to generate the digital signature Sig AS_AAC (which can also be expressed as Sig AS_REQ ), and then the ciphertext including the authentication result information and Sig AS_REQ are generated.
  • the first authentication response message ASVeri of AS_AAC also can be denoted as Sig AS_REQ ).
  • the method for processing the EncPub AS in this situation includes: AS-AAC sends AS-REQ an
  • the second authentication request message AS-AACVeri of the EncPub AS is described by the AS-REQ to decrypt the EncPub AS with the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate of the certificate decryption server CS-DEC residing in the AS-REQ to obtain the Cert REQ and the protection random number , or, the AS-REQ sends the EncPub AS to the CS-DEC that has interaction and trust relationship with it for decryption, and obtains the decrypted Cert REQ and the protection random number, and then verifies the validity of the Cert REQ and obtains the verification result Res REQ , Generate identity authentication result information Pub REQ according to the information including Res REQ , use the protection random number to encrypt the information including Pub REQ
  • AS-AAC calculates the signature data including the ciphertext of the authentication result information to generate the digital signature Sig AS_AAC , and generates the first digital signature according to the information including the ciphertext of the authentication result information and Sig AS_AAC .
  • S103 The AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by the AS-AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes the ciphertext of the authentication result information and the digital signature Sig AS_AAC of the AS-AAC.
  • the ciphertext of the authentication result information is generated by the REQ-trusted AS-REQ encrypting the information including the REQ's identity authentication result information Pub REQ by using the protection random number obtained by decrypting the EncPub AS .
  • the Pub REQ includes the verification result Res REQ of the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncPub AS .
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC includes the ciphertext of the authentication result information in ASVeri.
  • S104 AAC verifies Sig AS_AAC by using the public key of AS-AAC.
  • AAC uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the protection random number obtained from the REQ to obtain the protection random number, and uses the protection random number to decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication result information to obtain the identity authentication result information Pub REQ of the REQ .
  • the protected random number ciphertext is generated by REQ using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the protected random number; the message encryption key may be negotiated between REQ and AAC, or REQ and AAC. AAC pre-shared. It should be noted that, the AAC can obtain the ciphertext of the protection random number from REQ in the following ways:
  • the REQInit may further include the protected random number ciphertext, then after S101, the AAC can obtain the protected random number ciphertext in the REQInit.
  • AAC uses the message encryption key to decrypt the protected random number ciphertext obtained from REQ to obtain the protected random number, including: AAC uses the message encryption key to decrypt the protected random number ciphertext in REQInit to obtain the protected random number. the protection random number.
  • REQ can also send an authentication result recovery message REQAuth to AAC.
  • the REQAuth includes the protection random number ciphertext.
  • the AAC can obtain the REQAuth Protect random number ciphertext.
  • AAC uses the message encryption key to decrypt the protected random number ciphertext obtained from REQ to obtain the protected random number, including: AAC uses the message encryption key to decrypt the protected random number ciphertext in REQAuth to obtain the protected random number. the protection random number.
  • S104 and S105 are not limited; of course, S104 can also be executed first, and after the Sig AS_AAC verification in S104 is passed, then the Res REQ in the AAC in S105 and S106 is executed according to the identity authentication result information Pub REQ The step of determining the authentication result of the REQ.
  • the identity information of the requesting device is kept confidential, which can prevent the identity information from being exposed during the network transmission process, and ensure that the attacker cannot obtain private and sensitive information.
  • the real-time authentication of the one-way identity of the requesting device by the authentication access controller is realized, which lays the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can access the network.
  • REQInit of S101 may also include the digital signature Sig REQ of REQ, and the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit, then before S106, AAC also needs to determine whether Sig REQ is verified or not, S106 can be executed only after the verification is passed.
  • AS-REQ and AS-AAC are the same authentication server, the Sig REQ can be verified by AS-AAC (which can also be expressed as AS-REQ) or by AAC; -REQ and AS-AAC are two different authentication servers, then the Sig REQ can be verified by AS-REQ or by AAC.
  • AS-AAC which can also be expressed as AS-REQ
  • AS-REQ and AS-AAC are two different authentication servers, then the Sig REQ can be verified by AS-REQ or by AAC.
  • AAC determines whether the Sig REQ is verified through the following methods:
  • the Sig REQ can be carried in the AACVeri of S102 and delivered to AS-AAC (also expressed as AS-REQ), and AS-AAC (also expressed as AS-REQ) decrypts the EncPub AS using The resulting Cert REQ verifies the Sig REQ .
  • the AAC can determine whether the Sig REQ has passed the verification according to whether it can receive the first authentication response message. If the AAC can receive the first authentication response message ASVeri, the AAC can determine that the Sig REQ has passed the verification.
  • the Sig REQ can be carried in the AACVeri of S102 and the AS-AACVeri sent by the AS-AAC to the AS-REQ and transmitted to the AS-REQ, and the AS-REQ verifies the Sig REQ using the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncPub AS .
  • AS-REQ verifies the legitimacy of Cert REQ to obtain the verification result Res REQ , generates the identity authentication result information Pub REQ of REQ according to the information including Res REQ , and utilizes the protection random obtained by decrypting the EncPub AS . Pairs of information including Pub REQ are encrypted to obtain the ciphertext of the authentication result information, and then the steps of generating and sending the second authentication response message and generating the subsequent first authentication response message are performed; if the verification fails, the generation and Steps such as sending a second authentication response message and generating a subsequent first authentication response message. Therefore, the AAC can determine whether the Sig REQ has passed the verification according to whether it can receive the first authentication response message. If the AAC can receive the first authentication response message ASVeri, the AAC can determine that the Sig REQ has passed the verification.
  • the identity verification result information Pub REQ of the REQ generated by the authentication server includes not only the verification result Res REQ of the Cert REQ but also the Cert REQ .
  • the identity authentication result information Pub REQ of the REQ obtained by AAC decrypting the authentication result information ciphertext also includes Cert REQ , then AAC uses the Cert REQ to verify the Sig REQ , thereby determining whether the Sig REQ is verified. pass.
  • the REQInit not only includes the protected random number ciphertext, but also the digital signature Sig REQ of REQ.
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit.
  • the identity authentication result information Pub REQ of the REQ obtained by AAC decrypting the authentication result information ciphertext by using the protection random number also includes Cert REQ , then before S106, AAC also needs to use the Cert REQ in the Pub REQ . Verify the Sig REQ , and determine whether the Sig REQ passes the verification according to the verification result, and S106 can be executed only after the verification is passed.
  • the REQAuth not only includes the protected random number ciphertext, but also the digital signature of REQ.
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQAuth.
  • the identity authentication result information Pub REQ of the REQ obtained by AAC decrypting the authentication result information ciphertext by using the protection random number also includes Cert REQ , then before S106, AAC also needs to use the Cert REQ in the Pub REQ . Verify the Sig REQ , and determine whether the Sig REQ passes the verification according to the verification result, and S106 can be executed only after the verification is passed.
  • the message transmitted between REQ, AAC and the authentication server may further include parameter information such as random numbers generated by AAC and/or REQ, and respective identities.
  • parameter information such as random numbers generated by AAC and/or REQ, and respective identities.
  • these random numbers and/or identity identifiers should be unchanged during the transmission of each message, but in the event of network jitter or attack, it may cause errors in the message. Loss or tampering of parameter information such as random numbers and/or IDs. Therefore, when performing identity authentication, the identity identifier and/or the consistency of the random number in the message can also be verified to ensure the reliability and freshness of the authentication result.
  • REQInit of S101 may also include the first random number Nonce AAC generated by AAC and/or the second random number Nonce REQ generated by REQ , where the Nonce AAC is sent by AAC to REQ, then the AACVeri of S102 may also include The ID AAC of the Nonce AAC and/or the AAC, correspondingly, the ASVeri of S103 may further include the Nonce AAC and/or the ID AAC , and the REQAuth sent by the REQ to the AAC may further include the Nonce AAC and/or the Nonce REQ .
  • AAC can also verify the consistency between Nonce AAC and/or ID AAC in ASVeri and Nonce AAC and/or AAC's own identity ID AAC generated by AAC.
  • AAC can also The consistency of Nonce AAC and/or Nonce REQ in REQAuth and Nonce AAC and/or Nonce REQ in REQInit generated by AAC is verified. After the verification is passed, AAC performs the step of determining the identity authentication result of REQ in S106.
  • the REQAuth sent by the REQ to the AAC may further include a second message integrity check code MacTag REQ , where the MacTag REQ is the REQ using the message integrity check key pair to include other fields in REQAuth except MacTag REQ If it is calculated and generated, before S105, AAC can also use the message integrity check key to verify MacTag REQ . If the verification passes, AAC executes S105 again, and if the verification fails, REQAuth is discarded. When AAC verifies the MacTag REQ , it shall use the message integrity check key to calculate and generate the MacTag REQ including other fields in REQAuth except the MacTag REQ , and compare the calculated MacTag REQ with the MacTag REQ in the received REQAuth. Compare, if they are consistent, the verification is passed, and if they are inconsistent, the verification is not passed.
  • the AAC may send the authentication result recovery request message AACAuth to the REQ, where the AACAuth includes the first message integrity check code MacTag AAC .
  • MacTag AAC is calculated and generated by AAC using the message integrity check key pair including other fields in AACAuth except MacTag AAC .
  • REQ sends REQAuth, it can use the message integrity check key to verify MacTag AAC . If the verification passes, it will send REQAuth to AAC. If the verification fails, AACAuth will be discarded.
  • REQ verifies MacTag AAC , it should use the message integrity check key to calculate and generate MacTag AAC including other fields in AACAuth except MacTag AAC , and compare the calculated MacTag AAC with the MacTag AAC in the received AACAuth , if they are consistent, the verification passes; if they are inconsistent, the verification fails.
  • the manner in which REQ and AAC generate the message integrity check key will be introduced in the next embodiment.
  • the message encryption key used by REQ and AAC can be obtained through negotiation between the two. Therefore, this embodiment also provides a method for REQ and AAC to negotiate a message encryption key. Referring to FIG. 2, the method includes:
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes the key exchange parameter KeyInfo AAC of the AAC, and the KeyInfo AAC includes the temporary public key of the AAC, wherein the key exchange refers to a key exchange algorithm such as Diffie-Hellman (DH for short) .
  • the AACInit may further include the first random number Nonce AAC generated by the AAC .
  • the AACInit may also include Security capabilities AAC ,
  • Security capabilities AAC represents the security capability parameter information supported by AAC, including the identity authentication suite supported by AAC (the identity authentication suite usually includes one or more identity authentication methods), symmetric encryption algorithm , integrity check algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm, etc., for the REQ to select and use the specific security policy, then the REQ can select the specific security policy Security capabilities REQ used by the REQ according to the Security capabilities AAC .
  • Security capabilities REQ means that REQ determines the identity authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity check algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm to be used accordingly.
  • REQ performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter KeyInfo REQ including REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate a first key, and according to the information including the first key
  • the message encryption key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm.
  • the REQ can perform the key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo AAC to generate the first key K1, and combine K1 to include Information including Nonce AAC and the second random number Nonce REQ generated by REQ, use the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm to calculate the message encryption key.
  • the negotiated key derivation algorithm may be the key derivation algorithm selected by the REQ according to the Security capabilities AAC sent by the AAC.
  • KeyInfo REQ is the key exchange parameter generated by REQ, including the temporary public key of REQ.
  • the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ is a temporary private key generated by REQ and corresponding to the temporary public key of REQ, that is, the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public and private keys.
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes KeyInfo REQ , so that AAC calculates and obtains the message encryption key according to the information including the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo REQ .
  • the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC is a temporary private key generated by the AAC and corresponding to the temporary public key of the AAC, that is, the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public and private keys.
  • the REQInit may also include Security capabilities REQ .
  • the REQInit may also include the Nonce REQ , so that the AAC calculates and obtains the Nonce REQ according to the information including the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC , the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo REQ , the Nonce AAC and the Nonce REQ .
  • Message encryption key may also include Security capabilities REQ .
  • the REQInit may also include the Nonce REQ , so that the AAC calculates and obtains the Nonce REQ according to the information including the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC , the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo REQ , the Nonce AAC and the Nonce REQ .
  • the REQInit may also include the Nonce AAC , and the AAC may verify the consistency of the Nonce AAC in the REQInit and the Nonce AAC generated by the AAC before calculating the message encryption key, to ensure that the REQInit received by the AAC is a response to AACInit information.
  • AAC performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo REQ to generate the first key, and uses the encrypted key according to the information including the first key.
  • the key derivation algorithm computes the message encryption key.
  • the AAC may perform key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo REQ to generate the first key K1 , combine K1 with the information including the Nonce AAC and the Nonce REQ , and use the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm to calculate the message encryption key.
  • the negotiated key derivation algorithm may be the key derivation algorithm selected and used by the AAC according to the Security capabilities REQ sent by the REQ.
  • REQ and AAC can also generate a message integrity check key.
  • the implementation manner in which the REQ and the AAC each generate the message integrity check key is the same as the implementation manner in which the REQ and the AAC each generate the message encryption key exemplified in the embodiment of FIG. 2 .
  • AAC can use the key derivation algorithm to derive a string of key data in the manner of the embodiment in FIG. 2, and the key data can be used as both a message encryption key and a message integrity check key, or, the key data can be used as a message encryption key and a message integrity check key.
  • a part of the key data in the key data is used as the message encryption key, and the other part of the key data is used as the message integrity check key;
  • AAC can also use the key derivation algorithm to derive two strings of the same value in stages by using the key derivation algorithm in the embodiment of FIG. 2 Or different key data, one string is used as the message encryption key, and the other string is used as the message integrity check key.
  • REQ can use the key derivation algorithm to derive a string of key data in the manner of the embodiment of FIG.
  • the key data can be used as both a message encryption key and a message integrity check key, or the key data can be used as A part of the key data is used as the message encryption key, and the other part of the key data is used as the message integrity check key;
  • the key data, one string is used as the message encryption key, and the other string is used as the message integrity check key.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a method for determining the first authentication server and/or the second authentication server used in this authentication process by utilizing the information exchange between the AAC and the REQ:
  • AAC adds ID AS_AAC of at least one authentication server trusted by AAC in AACInit of S201, and REQ determines ID AS_REQ of at least one authentication server trusted by itself according to the ID AS_AAC .
  • REQ selects at least one identification server from ID AS_AAC and is the identification of the identification server trusted by itself as ID AS_REQ , if the selection fails, then REQ uses the identification of at least one identification server trusted by itself as ID AS_REQ (wherein , select the success corresponding to the non-roaming situation, and select the failure corresponding to the roaming situation), add the ID AS_REQ to the REQInit of S203 and send it to the AAC.
  • AAC can determine the first authentication server according to ID AS_AAC and ID AS_REQ . For example, AAC can determine whether there is at least one identical authentication server identity in ID AS_REQ and ID AS_AAC . If there is, it is a non-roaming situation. In the identification of at least one authentication server mutually trusted by REQ and AAC, determine the first authentication server participating in identity authentication; if it does not exist, it is a roaming situation, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication server AS-AAC participating in identity authentication according to ID AS_AAC . AAC, and sends the ID AS_REQ to the AS-AAC, so that the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ .
  • the AAC may not need to send the ID AS_AAC to the REQ, but the REQ adds the identity ID AS_REQ of at least one authentication server trusted by itself in REQInit of S203 .
  • the specific implementation of determining the first authentication server and/or the second authentication server participating in the identity authentication process according to the ID AS_REQ and the identity ID AS_AAC of the authentication server trusted by the AAC itself is as in the previous embodiment.
  • the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC can be the same or different, when the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC are the same, it is a non-roaming situation; when the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC are different, it is a roaming situation.
  • the verification result obtained by verifying the validity of Cert REQ is represented as Res REQ
  • the identity authentication result information of REQ can be represented by Pub REQ .
  • FIG. 3 it is an embodiment of an identity authentication method in a non-roaming situation, in which AS-AAC (also AS-REQ) can be used to represent the authentication server jointly trusted by REQ and AAC.
  • AS-AAC also AS-REQ
  • the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation.
  • the digital signature Sig REQ of REQ is verified by AAC, and the method includes:
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC , and generates Security capabilities AAC as required.
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo AAC and Security capabilities AAC .
  • Security capabilities AAC is an optional field, indicating the security capability parameter information supported by AAC, including the identity authentication suite, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity check algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm supported by AAC (the same below).
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ , KeyInfo REQ and Nonce REQPub , generates Security capabilities REQ as required, performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate the first key K1, Combine K1 with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) and use the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm to calculate the message encryption key and message integrity check key, and use the public key of the encryption certificate to calculate the ciphertext of REQ's identity information EncPub AS ; calculate Sig REQ .
  • Security capabilities REQ is an optional field, indicating that REQ selects a specific security policy based on Security capabilities AAC , that is, the identity authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity verification algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm that REQ determines to use, etc. (The same below); Whether the REQ generates a Security capabilities REQ depends on whether the Security capabilities AAC is carried in the AACInit sent by the AAC to the REQ.
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , KeyInfo REQ , EncPub AS and Sig REQ .
  • Nonce AAC and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields, and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACInit;
  • the encrypted data of EncPub AS includes Cert REQ and protection random number Nonce REQPub .
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit.
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , KeyInfo REQ , EncPub AS and Sig REQ in sequence
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , KeyInfo REQ and EncPub AS .
  • the signature data of Sig REQ also includes the Nonce AAC field in AACInit.
  • the encrypted object is called encrypted data
  • the signed object is called signed data.
  • the AAC After receiving the REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations (if there is no special description or logical relationship, the actions numbered in (1), (2)... in this article do not have a necessary sequence because of the numbering , the same as the full text), including:
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes EncPub AS , ID AAC and Nonce AAC .
  • EncPub AS shall be equal to the corresponding field in REQInit.
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ Nonce REQPub , and Sig AS_AAC .
  • ID AAC , Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC and Pub REQ Nonce REQPub .
  • the AAC sends an authentication result recovery request message AACAuth to the REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and MacTag AAC .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ in REQInit and Nonce AAC generated by AAC respectively.
  • the calculation process of the MacTag AAC is as follows: using the message integrity check key and the integrity check algorithm to calculate and generate the MacTag AAC for the information including other fields in AACAuth except the MacTag AAC .
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • the verification process is: use the message integrity check key and use the integrity check algorithm to locally calculate and generate MacTag AAC for information including other fields in AACAuth except MacTag AAC (this calculation method is the same as the way AAC calculates MacTag AAC ). same) and compare the calculated MacTag AAC with the MacTag AAC in the received AACAuth.
  • REQ sends an authentication result recovery message REQAuth to the AAC.
  • the REQAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncData REQ and MacTag REQ .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ generated by REQ and Nonce AAC in AACInit respectively.
  • EncData REQ 's encrypted data includes Nonce REQPub .
  • the calculation process of the MacTag REQ is as follows: using the message integrity check key and the integrity check algorithm to calculate and generate the MacTag REQ for information including other fields in REQAuth except the MacTag REQ .
  • the AAC After receiving the REQAuth, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the verification process is: use the message integrity check key and use the integrity check algorithm to locally calculate and generate the MacTag REQ for the information including other fields in REQAuth except the MacTag REQ (this calculation method is the same as the way REQ calculates the MacTag REQ . same), compare the calculated MacTag REQ with the MacTag REQ in the received REQAuth.
  • the identity authentication result of REQ is determined according to the Res REQ in the Pub REQ . If any one of the above checks and verifications fails, REQAuth will be discarded immediately.
  • the Sig REQ may not be included in the REQInit of S304, and the Sig REQ is added to the REQAuth of S312, that is, in S312, the REQ first signs the data including Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , and EncData REQ in REQAuth Calculate and generate Sig REQ ; in this case, the Sig REQ verified by AAC in S313 is the Sig REQ in REQAuth of S312.
  • AS-AAC also AS-REQ
  • AS-REQ AS-REQ
  • AS-REQ the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation.
  • Sig REQ is verified by AS-AAC (also can be represented by AS-REQ), and the method includes:
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC , and generates Security capabilities AAC as required.
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo AAC and Security capabilities AAC .
  • Security capabilities AAC is an optional field.
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ , KeyInfo REQ and Nonce REQPub , generates Security capabilities REQ as required, performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate the first key K1, Combine K1 with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) and use the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm to calculate the message encryption key and message integrity check key, and use the public key of the encryption certificate to calculate the identity information ciphertext EncPub AS of REQ; calculate and generate Sig REQ .
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , KeyInfo REQ , EncPub AS and Sig REQ .
  • Security capabilities REQ is an optional field, and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding field in AACInit;
  • the encrypted data of EncPub AS includes Cert REQ and protection random number Nonce REQPub .
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit.
  • the AAC After receiving the REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes REQInit and ID AAC .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ Nonce REQPub and Sig AS_AAC . Among them, ID AAC and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri respectively.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC and Pub REQ Nonce REQPub .
  • the AAC sends an authentication result recovery request message AACAuth to the REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and MacTag AAC .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ in REQInit and Nonce AAC generated by AAC respectively.
  • the calculation process of MacTag AAC is described in the embodiment of FIG. 3 .
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • REQ sends an authentication result recovery message REQAuth to the AAC.
  • the REQAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncData REQ and MacTag REQ .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ generated by REQ and Nonce AAC in AACInit respectively.
  • the encrypted data of EncData REQ includes Nonce REQPub ; the calculation process of MacTag REQ is described in the embodiment of FIG. 3 .
  • the AAC After receiving the REQAuth, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation.
  • the Sig REQ is verified by AAC, and the method includes:
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC , and generates Security capabilities AAC as required.
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo AAC , ID AS_AAC and Security capabilities AAC .
  • ID AS_AAC and Security capabilities AAC are optional fields;
  • ID AS_AAC represents the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by AAC, which is used to make REQ determine whether there is a mutually trusted authentication server (the same below) according to ID AS_AAC .
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ , KeyInfo REQ and Nonce REQPub , generates ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ as required, performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate the first password Key K1, combine K1 with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) to calculate message encryption using the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm
  • the key and the message integrity verification key are used to calculate the identity information ciphertext EncPub AS of the REQ by using the public key of the encryption certificate; calculate the Sig REQ .
  • ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields; ID AS_REQ represents the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by REQ.
  • ID AS_AAC exists in AACInit
  • REQ tries to select at least one authentication server with ID AS_AAC from its trusted authentication servers. The same authentication server in AACInit is used as ID AS_REQ , if the selection fails, at least one authentication server trusted by itself is used as ID AS_REQ ; when ID AS_AAC does not exist in AACInit, REQ uses at least one authentication server trusted by itself as ID AS_REQ (the same below). ).
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , ID AS_REQ , KeyInfo REQ , Security capabilities REQ , EncPub AS and Sig REQ .
  • Nonce AAC , ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields, and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACInit.
  • the encrypted data of EncPub AS includes Cert REQ and protection random number Nonce REQPub .
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit. When Nonce AAC is not included in REQInit, the signature data of Sig REQ also includes the Nonce AAC field in AACInit.
  • the AAC After receiving the REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • ID AS_REQ is carried in REQInit and the ID AS_AAC is carried in AACInit , then AAC judges whether ID AS_REQ and ID AS_AAC have at least one identical identification server identity. In the identity of an authentication server that REQ and AAC trust together, determine the first authentication server participating in identity authentication; if it does not exist, it is a roaming situation, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication server AS-AAC participating in identity authentication according to ID AS_AAC , and send the ID AS_REQ to the AS-AAC, so that the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ ; or,
  • the AAC determines whether the ID AS_REQ and the authentication server trusted by the AAC have at least one identical ID of the authentication server. If so, it is a non-roaming situation. In the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by REQ and AAC, determine the first authentication server participating in identity authentication; if it does not exist, it is a roaming situation, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication participating in identity authentication according to the authentication server trusted by itself.
  • the server AS-AAC sends the ID AS_REQ to the AS-AAC, so that the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ ;
  • the result determined in this embodiment is a roaming situation.
  • the AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes ID AS_REQ , EncPub AS , ID AAC and Nonce AAC .
  • ID AS_REQ is an optional field, which can make AS-AAC determine the second authentication server used in this authentication process according to ID AS_REQ , and ID AS_REQ and EncPub AS should be equal to the corresponding fields in REQInit. If the ID AS_REQ exists in the AACVeri, the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ . If it does not exist, it means that the AS-AAC has determined the AS-REQ.
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to the AS-REQ.
  • the AS-AACVeri includes EncPub AS , ID AAC and Nonce AAC .
  • the fields in the AS-AACVeri are all derived from AACVeri.
  • the AS-REQ After receiving the AS-AACVeri, the AS-REQ sends a decryption request message AS-REQReq to the certificate decryption server CS-DEC.
  • the AS-REQReq includes EncPub AS , and the EncPub AS should be equal to the corresponding field in AS-AACVeri.
  • CS-DEC After receiving the AS-REQReq, CS-DEC decrypts the EncPub AS with the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain Cert REQ and Nonce REQPub .
  • the CS-DEC sends a decryption response message CS-DECRep to the AS-REQ.
  • the CS-DECRep includes the decrypted Cert REQ and Nonce REQPub .
  • CS-DEC can be an independent device with interaction and trust relationship with AS-REQ, or can be integrated in AS-REQ.
  • AS-REQ the EncPub AS is directly decrypted by AS-REQ to obtain Cert REQ and Nonce REQPub .
  • the AS-REQ After receiving the CS-DECRep, the AS-REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • AS-REQ sends a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC.
  • the AS-REQVeri includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ Nonce REQPub and Sig AS_REQ .
  • ID AAC and Nonce AAC shall be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri
  • Nonce REQPub shall be equal to the corresponding fields in CS-DECRep.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_REQ includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC and Pub REQ Nonce REQPub .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AS-REQVeri, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ Nonce REQPub , and Sig AS_AAC .
  • ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ Nonce REQPub should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ Nonce REQPub .
  • AAC sends an authentication result recovery request message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and MacTag AAC .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ in REQInit and Nonce AAC generated by AAC respectively.
  • the calculation process of MacTag AAC is described in the embodiment of FIG. 3 .
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • REQ sends an authentication result recovery message REQAuth to the AAC.
  • the REQAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncData REQ and MacTag REQ .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ generated by REQ and Nonce AAC in AACInit respectively.
  • EncData REQ 's encrypted data includes Nonce REQPub .
  • the calculation process of MacTag REQ is described in the embodiment of FIG. 3 .
  • the AAC After receiving the REQAuth, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the identity authentication result of REQ is determined according to the Res REQ in the Pub REQ . If any step of the above checks and verifications fails, REQAuth will be discarded immediately.
  • Sig REQ may not be included in REQInit of S504, and Sig REQ may be added to REQAuth of S518, that is, in S518, REQ first signs data including Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and EncData REQ in REQAuth Calculate and generate Sig REQ ; in this case, the Sig REQ verified by AAC in S519 is the Sig REQ in REQAuth of S518.
  • the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation.
  • the Sig REQ is verified by AS-REQ, and the method includes:
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC , and generates Security capabilities AAC as required.
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo AAC , Security capabilities AAC and ID AS_AAC . Among them, ID AS_AAC and Security capabilities AAC are optional fields.
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ , KeyInfo REQ and Nonce REQPub , generates ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ as required, performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate the first password Key K1, combine K1 with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) to calculate message encryption using the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm key and message integrity verification key, and use the public key of the encryption certificate to calculate the ciphertext of REQ's identity information EncPub AS ; calculate Sig REQ .
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , ID AS_REQ , KeyInfo REQ , Security capabilities REQ , EncPub AS and Sig REQ .
  • ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields; Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding field in AACInit;
  • the encrypted data of EncPub AS includes Cert REQ and the protection random number Nonce REQPub ;
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes the data before Sig REQ in REQInit. other fields.
  • the AAC After receiving the REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes REQInit and ID AAC .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to the AS-REQ.
  • the AS-AACVeri includes REQInit and ID AAC .
  • the fields in the AS-AACVeri are all derived from AACVeri.
  • the method for the AS-AAC to determine the second authentication server AS-REQ is the same as that described in Embodiment 5.
  • the AS-REQ After receiving the AS-AACVeri, the AS-REQ sends a decryption request message AS-REQReq to the certificate decryption server CS-DEC.
  • the AS-REQReq includes EncPub AS .
  • EncPub AS shall be equal to the corresponding field in AS-AACVeri.
  • CS-DEC After receiving the AS-REQReq, CS-DEC decrypts the EncPub AS with the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain Cert REQ and Nonce REQPub .
  • the CS-DEC sends a decryption response message CS-DECRep to the AS-REQ.
  • the CS-DECRep includes the decrypted Cert REQ and Nonce REQPub .
  • the AS-REQ After receiving the CS-DECRep, the AS-REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-REQ sends the second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AS-REQVeri includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ ⁇ Nonce REQPub and Sig AS_REQ .
  • ID AAC and Nonce AAC should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri;
  • Nonce REQPub should be equal to the corresponding fields in CS-DECRep.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_REQ includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC and Pub REQ ⁇ Nonce REQPub .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AS-REQVeri, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ ⁇ Nonce REQPub and Sig AS_AAC .
  • ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ ⁇ Nonce REQPub should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri respectively.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ ⁇ Nonce REQPub .
  • AAC sends an authentication result recovery request message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and MacTag AAC .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ in REQInit and Nonce AAC generated by AAC respectively.
  • the calculation process of MacTag AAC is described in the embodiment of FIG. 3 .
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • REQ sends an authentication result recovery message REQAuth to the AAC.
  • the REQAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncData REQ and MacTag REQ .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ generated by REQ and Nonce AAC in AACInit respectively.
  • the encrypted data of EncData REQ includes Nonce REQPub ; the calculation process of MacTag REQ is described in the embodiment of FIG. 3 .
  • the AAC After receiving the REQAuth, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • each message may also carry a hash value HASH X_Y , and the hash value HASH X_Y is calculated by the sender entity X of the message using the hash algorithm on the latest pre-order message sent by the peer entity Y received. obtained, which is used by the peer entity Y to verify whether the entity X has received the complete latest pre-order message.
  • HASH REQ_AAC represents the hash value calculated by REQ on the latest pre-order message sent by AAC received
  • HASH AAC_REQ represents the hash value calculated by AAC on the latest pre-order message sent by REQ received
  • HASH AAC_AS-AAC represents the hash value calculated by AAC on the received Hash value calculated by the latest pre-order message sent by the received AS-AAC
  • HASH AS-AAC_AAC represents the hash value calculated by AS-AAC for the latest pre-order message sent by the received AAC
  • HASH AS-AAC_AS-REQ represents the AS-AAC Hash value calculated for the latest pre-order message sent by AS-REQ
  • HASH AS-REQ_AS-AAC indicates the hash value calculated by AS-REQ for the latest pre-order message sent by AS-AAC.
  • HASH X_Y may not exist in the message or meaningless.
  • entity Y uses the hash algorithm to calculate the hash value locally for the latest pre-order message previously sent to entity X, and compares it with the hash value HASH X_Y carried in the received message. If they are consistent, Then execute the following steps, otherwise discard or end the current authentication process.
  • the pre-order message sent by the peer entity Y to the entity X refers to the received message M sent by the peer entity Y to the entity X before the entity X sends the message M to the peer entity Y.
  • the latest pre-order message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to the latest message sent by peer entity Y to entity X before entity X sends message M to peer entity Y. If the message M sent by entity X to its peer entity Y is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, then there is no peer entity Y to the entity before entity X sends message M to its peer entity Y The preorder message sent by X.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides an authentication access controller AAC, including:
  • the obtaining part 701 is configured to obtain the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information ciphertext is a public key pair using an encryption certificate including: The digital certificate of the requesting device and the information including the protection random number are encrypted and generated;
  • a first sending part 702 configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • the first receiving part 703 is configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message includes the ciphertext of authentication result information and the digital signature of the first authentication server; the The authentication result information ciphertext is generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device using the protected random number obtained by decrypting the identity information ciphertext to encrypt and generate the information including the identity authentication result information of the requesting device; The identity authentication result information includes the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information;
  • the first decryption part 704 is configured to use a message encryption key to decrypt the protected random number ciphertext obtained from the requesting device to obtain the protected random number, and use the protected random number to decrypt the authentication result information ciphertext Obtain the identity authentication result information of the requesting device; the protected random number ciphertext is generated by the requesting device using the message encryption key to encrypt the information including the protected random number;
  • a first verification part 705, configured to verify the digital signature of the first authentication server
  • the determining part 706 is configured to determine the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device in the identity authentication result information after the verification of the digital signature of the first authentication server is passed .
  • the authentication access controller further includes:
  • the second sending part is configured to send a key request message to the requesting device, where the key request message includes the key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller; the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 701 contains Also includes key exchange parameters of the requesting device;
  • the first calculation part is configured to perform key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameter of the requesting device to generate the first calculation part.
  • a key, and a message encryption key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm based on the information including the first key.
  • the key request message sent by the second sending part also includes the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 701 also includes the request device generated. the second random number;
  • the first calculation part is further configured to calculate the message encryption key according to the information including the first key, the first random number and the second random number.
  • the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 701 further includes the first random number; the authentication access controller further includes:
  • the second verification part is configured to verify the consistency of the first random number in the identity ciphertext message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller.
  • the key request message sent by the second sending part also includes the security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller; then the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 701 also includes a specific security policy, The specific security policy is determined by the requesting device according to the security capability parameter information.
  • the identity ciphertext message further includes the protected random number ciphertext
  • the first decryption part 704 is further configured to use a message encryption key to perform encryption on the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device.
  • the protected random number ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the protected random number.
  • the authentication access controller further includes:
  • a second receiving part configured to receive an authentication result recovery message sent by the requesting device, where the authentication result recovery message includes the protected random number ciphertext;
  • the first decryption part 704 is further configured to use a message encryption key to decrypt the protected random number ciphertext in the authentication result recovery message to obtain the protected random number.
  • the authentication result recovery message received by the second receiving part further includes a second message integrity check code, where the second message integrity check code is the message integrity check key used by the requesting device. Calculated and generated by including other fields in the authentication result recovery message except the second message integrity check code; then the authentication access controller further includes:
  • the third verification part is configured to verify the second message integrity check code using a message integrity check key.
  • the authentication access controller further includes:
  • the third sending part is configured to send an authentication result recovery request message to the requesting device, where the authentication result recovery request message includes a first message integrity check code; the first message integrity check code is all
  • the second calculation part of the authentication access controller uses a message integrity check key to calculate and generate other fields including the first message integrity check code in the authentication result recovery request message.
  • the identity ciphertext message acquired by the acquiring part 701 further includes the digital signature of the requesting device, then before the determining part determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, the determining part is further configured to determine Whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed the verification, and if it is determined that the digital signature of the requesting device has passed the verification, then determine the identity authentication result of the requesting device.
  • the determining part 706 is further configured to:
  • the determining part 706 uses the digital certificate of the requesting device to interpret the digital certificate of the requesting device.
  • the signature is verified, it is determined whether the digital signature of the requesting device is verified according to the verification result; or,
  • the second authentication server verifies the digital signature of the requesting device by using the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information, if the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message, the determining section 706 determines that the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified.
  • the authentication result recovery message received by the second receiving part also includes the digital signature of the requesting device
  • the identity authentication result information obtained by the first decryption part 704 decrypting the ciphertext of the authentication result information also includes the identity authentication result information.
  • the digital certificate of the requesting device then before the determining part 706 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, the determining part 706 is further configured to use the digital certificate of the requesting device included in the identity authentication result information to verify the identity of the requesting device.
  • the digital signature of the requesting device is verified, and if it is determined that the verification of the digital signature of the requesting device is passed, the identity authentication result of the requesting device is determined.
  • the key request message sent by the second sending part further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 701 also includes: including the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;
  • the determining part 706 is further configured to determine the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message. Describe the first authentication server.
  • the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 701 also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;
  • the determining part 706 is further configured to determine the first authentication server according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.
  • the identity ciphertext message further includes a second random number generated by the requesting device and a first random number obtained by the requesting device from the authentication access controller;
  • the first authentication request message sent by the first sending part 702 further includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and/or the first random number;
  • the first authentication response message received by the first receiving part 703 further includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and/or the first random number;
  • the authentication result recovery message received by the second receiving part further includes the first random number and/or the second random number
  • the authentication access controller further includes:
  • the fourth verification part is configured to, before the determination part 706 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, compare the identity identification of the authentication access controller and/or the first random number in the first authentication response message with the all the identity of the authentication access controller itself and/or the first random number generated by the authentication access controller for consistency verification;
  • the fourth verification part is further configured to compare the first random number and/or the second random number in the authentication result recovery message with the authentication result before the determination part 706 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device.
  • the first random number generated by the access controller and/or the second random number in the identity ciphertext message is subjected to consistency verification.
  • the message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest pre-order message sent by the requesting device; the authentication The message sent by the access controller to the first authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest pre-order message sent by the first authentication server.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a requesting device REQ, including:
  • the first encryption part 801 is configured to use the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the information including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protection random number to generate the identity information ciphertext;
  • the first sending part 802 is configured to send an identity ciphertext message to the authentication access controller, where the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device;
  • the second encryption part 803 is configured to encrypt the information including the protection random number by using the message encryption key to generate the ciphertext of the protection random number.
  • the requesting device further includes:
  • a first receiving part configured to receive a key request message sent by the authentication access controller, where the key request message includes key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller;
  • the first calculation part is configured to perform key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter of the requesting device and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller to generate the first calculation part.
  • a key which uses a key derivation algorithm to calculate a message encryption key according to information including the first key;
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the first sending part 802 further includes the key exchange parameter of the requesting device.
  • the key request message received by the first receiving part further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller
  • the first calculation part is further configured to calculate the message encryption key according to information including the first key, the first random number and the second random number generated by the requesting device;
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the first sending part 802 further includes the second random number.
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the first sending part 802 further includes the first random number.
  • the key request message received by the first receiving part further includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller, and the requesting device further includes:
  • a first determining part configured to determine a specific security policy used by the requesting device according to the security capability parameter information
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the first sending part 802 further includes the specific security policy.
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the first sending part 802 further includes the protected random number ciphertext.
  • the requesting device further includes:
  • the second sending part is configured to send an authentication result recovery message to the authentication access controller, where the authentication result recovery message includes the protected random number ciphertext.
  • the authentication result recovery message sent by the second sending part further includes a second message integrity check code
  • the requesting device further includes:
  • the second calculation part, the second message integrity check code is the second message integrity check code divided by the second message integrity check code in the recovery message by the second calculation part using the message integrity check key pair including the authentication result to restore the message Calculated from other fields.
  • the requesting device further includes:
  • the second receiving part is configured to receive an authentication result recovery request message including a first message integrity check code sent by the authentication access controller; the first message integrity check code is the authentication access code The controller uses the message integrity check key to calculate and generate other fields including the authentication result recovery request message except the first message integrity check code;
  • the verification part is configured to verify the first message integrity check code using the message integrity check key.
  • the key request message received by the first receiving part further includes an identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; the requesting device further includes:
  • a second determining part configured to determine the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the first sending part 802 further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the first sending part 802 further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
  • the message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device on the received latest pre-order message sent by the authentication access controller.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a first authentication server AS-AAC, where the first authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, including:
  • the first receiving part 901 is configured to receive the first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information ciphertext is encrypted using The public key of the certificate is generated by encrypting the information including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protection random number;
  • the first sending part 902 is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message includes the ciphertext of authentication result information and the digital signature of the first authentication server; the The authentication result information ciphertext is generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device using the protected random number obtained by decrypting the identity information ciphertext to encrypt and generate the information including the identity authentication result information of the requesting device; The identity authentication result information includes the verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information.
  • the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are the same authentication server
  • the first authentication server further includes:
  • the decryption part is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain the digital certificate and the protection random number of the requesting device;
  • a first verification part configured to perform legality verification on the digital certificate of the requesting device to obtain a verification result of the digital certificate
  • the first generating part is configured to generate identity authentication result information according to the information including the verification result of the digital certificate, and use the protected random number to encrypt the information including the identity authentication result information to generate authentication result information Ciphertext, the signature data including the authentication result information ciphertext is calculated to generate the digital signature of the first authentication server, according to the information including the authentication result information ciphertext and the digital signature of the first authentication server A first authentication response message is generated.
  • the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are two different authentication servers
  • the first authentication server further includes:
  • a second sending part configured to send a second authentication request message to the second authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • a second receiving part configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the ciphertext of authentication result information and the digital signature of the second authentication server;
  • the second verification part is configured to use the public key of the second authentication server to verify the digital signature of the second authentication server;
  • the second generation part is configured to calculate and generate the digital signature of the first authentication server from the signature data including the ciphertext of the authentication result information when the verification of the digital signature of the second authentication server passes, according to the The information including the authentication result information ciphertext and the digital signature of the first authentication server generates the first authentication response message.
  • the message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server on the received latest pre-order message sent by the authentication access controller.
  • the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest pre-order message sent by the second authentication server received.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a second authentication server AS-REQ
  • the second authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the requesting device, if the first authentication server trusted by the access controller and the If the second authentication servers trusted by the device are two different authentication servers, the second authentication servers include:
  • the receiving part 1001 is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the first authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device; the identity information ciphertext is encrypted using The public key of the certificate is generated by encrypting the information including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protection random number;
  • Decryption part 1002 configured to decrypt the encrypted identity information of the requesting device by using the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate to obtain the digital certificate of the requesting device and the protected random number;
  • the generating part 1003 is configured to perform legality verification on the digital certificate to obtain the verification result of the digital certificate, generate identity authentication result information according to the information including the verification result of the digital certificate, and use the protection random number Encrypting the information including the identity authentication result information to generate the authentication result information ciphertext, and calculating the signature data including the authentication result information ciphertext to generate the digital signature of the second authentication server, according to including the The information including the authentication result information ciphertext and the digital signature of the second authentication server generates a second authentication response message;
  • the sending part 1004 is configured to send the second authentication response message to the first authentication server.
  • the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server on the received latest pre-order message sent by the first authentication server.
  • a "part" may be a part of a circuit, a part of a processor, a part of a program or software, etc., of course, a unit, a module or a non-module transformed.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides an authentication access controller AAC, including: a first processor 1110 and a first memory 1120 .
  • the first processor 1110 may call and run a computer program from the first memory 1120 to implement the steps performed by the AAC in the foregoing embodiment.
  • the first memory 1120 may be a separate device independent of the first processor 1110 , or may be integrated in the first processor 1110 .
  • the authentication access controller may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AAC in the various methods in the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a requesting device REQ, including: a second processor 1210 and a second memory 1220 .
  • the second processor 1210 may call and run a computer program from the second memory 1220 to implement the steps performed by the REQ in the foregoing embodiment.
  • the second memory 1220 may be a separate device independent of the second processor 1210 , or may be integrated in the second processor 1210 .
  • the requesting device may implement the corresponding processes implemented by REQ in each method of the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a first authentication server AS-AAC, including: a third processor 1310 and a third memory 1320 .
  • the third processor 1310 may call and run a computer program from the third memory 1320 to implement the steps performed by the AS-AAC in the above embodiment.
  • the third memory 1320 may be a separate device independent of the third processor 1310 , or may be integrated in the third processor 1310 .
  • the first authentication server may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AS-AAC in each method in the embodiments of the present application, and for brevity, details are not described herein again.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a second authentication server AS-REQ, including: a fourth processor 1410 and a fourth memory 1420 .
  • the fourth processor 1410 may call and run a computer program from the fourth memory 1420 to implement the steps performed by the AS-REQ in the above-mentioned embodiment.
  • the fourth memory 1420 may be a separate device independent of the fourth processor 1410, or may be integrated in the fourth processor 1410.
  • the second authentication server may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AS-REQ in each method in the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • Embodiments of the present application further provide a computer-readable storage medium, where a computer program is stored on the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer program is run by a processor, the identification of the access controller AAC and the requesting device REQ in the above identification method is executed. , the steps performed by the first authentication server AS-AAC, or the second authentication server AS-REQ.
  • the storage medium may be a volatile or non-volatile computer-readable storage medium.
  • the storage medium may be at least one of the following media: read-only memory (English: Read-Only Memory, abbreviation: ROM), RAM, magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.
  • ROM Read-Only Memory
  • RAM Random Access Memory
  • magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.
  • Embodiments of the present application further provide a computer program, including computer-readable codes.
  • a processor in the electronic device executes and is configured to implement the authentication connection in the above-mentioned identity authentication method. steps performed by the incoming controller AAC, the requesting device REQ, the first authentication server AS-AAC, or the second authentication server AS-REQ.
  • An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, where the computer program product includes computer program instructions, and the computer program instructions can be used to perform the authentication of the access controller AAC, the requesting device REQ, and the first authentication server AS in the above-mentioned identity authentication method.
  • the computer program product includes computer program instructions
  • the computer program instructions can be used to perform the authentication of the access controller AAC, the requesting device REQ, and the first authentication server AS in the above-mentioned identity authentication method.
  • each embodiment in this specification is described in a progressive manner, and the same and similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. place.
  • the description is relatively simple, and reference may be made to some descriptions of the method embodiments for related parts.
  • the device and system embodiments described above are only illustrative, and the parts described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as parts may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in a local, or it can be distributed over multiple network elements. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution in this embodiment. Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand and implement it without creative effort.
  • the identity authentication method provided in this application can keep the identity information of the requesting device confidential when transmitting identity information, can prevent the identity information from being exposed in the process of accessing the network by the requesting device, ensure that the attacker cannot obtain private and sensitive information, and
  • the introduction of the authentication server not only ensures the confidentiality of the information related to the entity's identity, but also realizes the real-time authentication of the one-way identity of the requesting device by the authentication access controller, laying the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can access the network.

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种身份鉴别方法，对请求设备的身份信息进行保密处理，防止请求设备的身份信息在传输过程中暴露，保证攻击者无法获得请求设备的私密信息。并且，通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息机密性的同时，实现了鉴别接入控制器对请求设备的身份鉴别，确保只有合法用户才能访问网络。本申请实施例还公开了一种身份鉴别装置、存储介质、程序、及程序产品。

Description

身份鉴别方法、装置、存储介质、程序、及程序产品
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请基于申请号为202011569236.9、申请日为2020年12月26日、申请名称为“一种身份鉴别方法和装置”的中国专利申请提出，并要求该中国专利申请的优先权，该中国专利申请的全部内容在此引入本申请作为参考。
技术领域
本申请涉及网络通信安全技术领域，特别是涉及一种身份鉴别方法、装置、存储介质、程序、及程序产品。
背景技术
在通信网络中，请求设备可以通过鉴别接入控制器访问网络。在一些对安全性需求较高的情况下，鉴别接入控制器需要对请求设备的身份进行鉴别，以确保访问网络的请求设备属于合法用户。此外，在区块链技术中的点对点传输，也需要在不同节点之间建立信任关系，因此对于节点的身份鉴别也是十分重要的。
在对请求设备进行身份鉴别的过程中，请求设备需要提供自身的身份信息用于身份鉴别。然而，这类身份信息一般携带了诸如身份证号、家庭住址、银行卡信息等私密、敏感信息。并且在实际应用中，这类身份信息通常包含在实体的数字证书中，以数字证书作为实体的身份凭证。若在请求设备的身份鉴别过程中，请求设备的身份信息被恶意截获用于非法用途，则会对鉴别接入控制器、请求设备及网络造成极大的安全隐患。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供了一种身份鉴别方法、装置、存储介质、程序、及程序产品，通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息机密性的同时，实现鉴别接入控制器对请求设备的单向身份鉴别。
本发明实施例的技术方案可以如下实现：
第一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种身份鉴别方法，包括：
鉴别接入控制器获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
所述鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
所述鉴别接入控制器接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；所述鉴别结果信息密文为所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述保护随机数对包括所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的；所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果；
所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息加密密钥对从所述请求设备获取的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，利用所述保护随机数对所述鉴别结果信息密文解密获得所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息；所述保护随机数密文是所述请求设备利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
所述鉴别接入控制器验证所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；
在所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名验证通过后，所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述身份鉴别结果信 息中的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果，确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
第二方面，本申请实施例提供了一种鉴别接入控制器，包括：
获取部分，被配置为获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
第一发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
第一接收部分，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；所述鉴别结果信息密文为所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述保护随机数对包括所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的；所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果；
第一解密部分，被配置为利用消息加密密钥对从所述请求设备获取的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，利用所述保护随机数对所述鉴别结果信息密文解密获得所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息；所述保护随机数密文是所述请求设备利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
第一验证部分，被配置为验证所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；
确定部分，被配置为当所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名验证通过后，根据所述身份鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果，确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
第三方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种请求设备，包括：
第一加密部分，被配置为利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成身份信息密文；
第一发送部分，被配置为向鉴别接入控制器发送身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
第二加密部分，被配置为利用消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成保护随机数密文。
第四方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种第一鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
第一接收部分，被配置为接收鉴别接入控制器发送的第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
第一发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；所述鉴别结果信息密文为所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述保护随机数对包括所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的；所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果。
第五方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种第二鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，若鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：
接收部分，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
解密部分，被配置为利用所述加密证书对应的私钥对所述请求设备的加密身份信息解密得到所述请求设备的数字证书和所述保护随机数；
生成部分，被配置为对所述数字证书进行合法性验证得到所述数字证书的验证结果，根据包括所述数字证书的验证结果在内的信息生成身份鉴别结果信息，利用所述保护随机数对包括所述身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成鉴别结果信息密文，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成第二鉴别响应消息；
发送部分，被配置为向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二鉴别响应消息。
第六方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种鉴别接入控制器，包括：
第一处理器；
用于存储第一处理器可执行指令的第一存储器；
其中，所述第一处理器被配置为调用所述第一存储器存储的指令，以执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤。
第七方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种请求设备，包括：
第二处理器；
用于存储第二处理器可执行指令的第二存储器；
其中，所述第二处理器被配置为调用所述第二存储器存储的指令，以执行如第一方面所述身份鉴别方法中请求设备所执行的步骤。
第八方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种第一鉴别服务器，包括：
第三处理器；
用于存储第三处理器可执行指令的第三存储器；
其中，所述第三处理器被配置为调用所述第三存储器存储的指令，以执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
第九方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种第二鉴别服务器，包括：
第四处理器；
用于存储第四处理器可执行指令的第四存储器；
其中，所述第四处理器被配置为调用所述第四存储器存储的指令，以执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
第十方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序，该计算机程序被处理器运行时执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中鉴别接入控制器、请求设备、第一鉴别服务器、或第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
第十一方面，本申请实施例还提供一种计算机程序，包括计算机可读代码，当计算机可读代码在计算机设备中运行时，计算机设备中的处理器执行用于实现第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中鉴别接入控制器、请求设备、第一鉴别服务器、或第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
第十二方面，本申请实施例还提供一种计算机程序产品，包括计算机程序指令，该计算机程序指令使得计算机执行第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中鉴别接入控制器、请求设备、第一鉴别服务器、或第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
由上述技术方案可知，在传输身份信息时对请求设备的身份信息进行保密处理，可以防止身份信息在请求设备访问网络的过程中暴露，保证攻击者无法获得私密、敏感信息，并且通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息的机密性的同时，实现了鉴别接入控制器对请求设备的单向身份的实时鉴别，为确保只有合法用户才能访问网络奠定基础。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本申请实施例或现有技术中的技术方案，下面将对实施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅是本申请的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动性的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为本申请实施例提供的一种身份鉴别方法的示意图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种请求设备REQ和鉴别接入控制器AAC协商消息加密密钥的方法示意图；
图3为本申请实施例提供的非漫游情况下一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图4为本申请实施例提供的非漫游情况下另一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图5为本申请实施例提供的漫游情况下一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图6为本申请实施例提供的漫游情况下另一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图7为本申请实施例提供的一种鉴别接入控制器AAC的结构框图；
图8为本申请实施例提供的一种请求设备REQ的结构框图；
图9为本申请实施例提供的一种第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC的结构框图；
图10为本申请实施例提供的一种第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ的结构框图；
图11为本申请实施例提供的一种鉴别接入控制器AAC的硬件结构框图；
图12为本申请实施例提供的一种请求设备REQ的硬件结构框图；
图13为本申请实施例提供的一种第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC的硬件结构框图；
图14为本申请实施例提供的一种第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ的硬件结构框图。
具体实施方式
在通信网络中，请求设备可以通过鉴别接入控制器访问网络，为了确保访问网络的请求设备属于合法用户，鉴别接入控制器需要对请求设备的身份进行鉴别。
以目前的无线通信和移动通信场景为例，在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入无线网络的场景下，请求设备可以为手机、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，简称PDA)、平板电脑等终端设备，鉴别接入控制器可以是无线接入点、无线路由器等网络侧设备。在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入有线网络的场景下，请求设备可以为台式机、笔记本电脑等终端设备，鉴别接入控制器可以是交换机或路由器等网络侧设备。在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入第四/五代移动通信技术(the 4th/5th Generation mobile communication technology，简称4G/5G)网络的场景下，请求设备可以为手机、平板电脑等终端设备，鉴别接入控制器可以为基站等网络侧设备。当然，本申请同样适用于其他有线网络、近距离通信网络等各种数据通信场景。
然而，在请求设备的身份鉴别过程中，请求设备需要提供自身的身份信息用于身份鉴别。该身份信息通常包含在请求设备的数字证书中，且携带了私密、敏感信息，若攻击者截获了该身份信息并将其用于非法用途，则会对鉴别接入控制器、请求设备甚至网络造成极大的安全隐患。
为了解决上述技术问题，本申请实施例提供了一种身份鉴别方法，鉴别接入控制器获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，身份密文消息中包括请求设备的身份信息密文，该身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；然后，鉴别接入控制器向第一鉴别服务器发送包括身份信息密文的第一鉴别请求消息，接收第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和第一鉴别服务器的数字签名，鉴别结果信息密文为请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的保护随机数对包括请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的，身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的请求设备的数字证书的验证结果；通过该鉴别结果信息密文能够保证请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在鉴别接入控制器与第一鉴别服务器之间传输的安全性。其次，鉴别接入控制器利用消息加密密钥对从请求设备获取的保护随机数密文解密得到保护随机数，利用保护随机数对鉴别结果信息密文解密获得请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息，鉴别接入控制器验证第一鉴别服务器的数字签名，验证通过后，鉴别接入控制器根据身份鉴别结果信息中包括的请求设备的数字证书的验证结果确定请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
可以理解的是，本申请实施例中提到的鉴别结果信息可以是请求设备信任的鉴别服务器对请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到的。以上仅为请求设备、鉴别接入控制器及鉴别服务器的一些示例，不应当理解为对请求设备、鉴别接入控制器及鉴别服务器的限定，在本申请实施例其他可能的实现方式中，请求设备、鉴别接入控制器及鉴别服务器还可以是其他设备。
本申请实施例提供的身份鉴别方法是实现鉴别接入控制器对请求设备的单向身份鉴别(REQ Authentication with an Unauthenticated AAC，简称RAUA)。
为便于介绍，在本申请实施例中，将以请求设备(REQuester，简称REQ)、鉴别接入控制器(Authentication Access Controller，简称AAC)和鉴别服务器(Authentication Server，简称AS)为例对本申请的身份鉴别方法进行介绍。
其中，AS为可信第三方实体，持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、其他标准或其他技术体系规定的数字证书和数字证书对应的私钥。AAC信任的AS称为第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC。REQ信任的AS称为第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，具有验证REQ数字证书的合法性的能力。当AS-AAC和AS-REQ不相同时，AS-AAC和AS-REQ相互信任，并相互知晓对方的数字证书或数字证书中的公钥。证书解密服务器(Certificate Sever-Decrypt，简称CS-DEC)持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、 其他标准或其他技术体系规定的加密证书和加密证书对应的私钥，CS-DEC可以是独立的服务器，也可以驻留在AS-REQ中。
REQ可以是参与身份鉴别过程的一个端点，与AAC建立连接，访问AAC提供的服务，且通过AAC访问AS。REQ持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、其他标准或他技术体系规定的数字证书和数字证书对应的私钥，并知晓CS-DEC的加密证书或加密证书中的公钥。AAC可以是参与身份鉴别过程的另一个端点，与REQ建立连接，提供服务，并与REQ通信，且可直接访问AS-AAC。AAC知晓AS-AAC的数字证书或数字证书中的公钥。
下面结合图1，说明本申请实施例提供的一种身份鉴别方法，该方法包括：
S101：AAC获取REQ发送的身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括REQ的身份信息密文EncPub AS。其中，EncPub AS为REQ利用加密证书的公钥对包括REQ的数字证书Cert REQ和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的。由此在传输身份信息的过程中对REQ的身份信息进行保密处理，防止REQ的身份信息在传输过程中暴露。
S102：AAC向其信任的AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括EncPub AS。
需要说明的是，由于REQ和AAC信任的鉴别服务器可以相同也可以不同，当REQ信任的AS-REQ和AAC信任的AS-AAC为同一个鉴别服务器时，即为非漫游情况，此时REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器可以用AS-AAC(当然也可以用AS-REQ)来表示。此情形下处理所述EncPub AS的方法包括：AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)利用驻留在AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)内的证书解密服务器CS-DEC的加密证书对应的私钥对EncPub AS解密得到Cert REQ和保护随机数，或者，由AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)将EncPub AS发送给与之有交互、信任关系的CS-DEC解密，并获取解密得到的Cert REQ和保护随机数，然后验证Cert REQ的合法性得到验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Res REQ在内的信息生成身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ，利用所述保护随机数对包括Pub REQ在内的信息加密生成鉴别结果信息密文，对包括鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成数字签名Sig AS_AAC(也可以表示为Sig AS_REQ)，然后生成包括鉴别结果信息密文和Sig AS_AAC(也可以表示为Sig AS_REQ)的第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
当REQ信任的AS-REQ和AAC信任的AS-AAC为两个不同的鉴别服务器时，即为漫游情况，此情形下处理所述EncPub AS的方法包括：AS-AAC向AS-REQ发送包括所述EncPub AS的第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri，由AS-REQ利用驻留在AS-REQ内的证书解密服务器CS-DEC的加密证书对应的私钥对EncPub AS解密得到Cert REQ和保护随机数，或者，由AS-REQ将EncPub AS发送给与之有交互、信任关系的CS-DEC解密，并获取解密得到的Cert REQ和保护随机数，然后验证Cert REQ的合法性得到验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Res REQ在内的信息生成身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ，利用所述保护随机数对包括Pub REQ在内的信息加密生成鉴别结果信息密文，对包括鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成数字签名Sig AS_REQ，生成包括鉴别结果信息密文和Sig AS_REQ的第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri，并将AS-REQVeri发送给AS-AAC；AS-AAC接收AS-REQVeri后，利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ，验证通过后，AS-AAC对包括鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成数字签名Sig AS_AAC，根据包括鉴别结果信息密文和Sig AS_AAC在内的信息生成第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
S103：AAC接收AS-AAC发送的第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括鉴别结果信息密文和AS-AAC的数字签名Sig AS_AAC。其中，鉴别结果信息密文为REQ信任的AS-REQ利用解密EncPub AS得到的保护随机数对包括REQ的身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ在内的信息加密生成的。所述Pub REQ中包括对解密EncPub AS得到的Cert REQ的验证结果Res REQ。Sig AS_AAC的签名数据包括ASVeri中的所述鉴别结果信息密文。
S104：AAC利用AS-AAC的公钥对Sig AS_AAC进行验证。
S105：AAC利用消息加密密钥对从REQ获取的保护随机数密文解密得到保护随机数，利用保护随机数对鉴别结果信息密文解密得到REQ的身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ。
其中，所述保护随机数密文是REQ利用消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；消息加密密钥可以是由REQ和AAC协商得到的，也可以是REQ和AAC预先共享的。需要说明的是，AAC从REQ获取保护随机数密文可以包括以下方式：
(1)所述REQInit中还可以包括所述保护随机数密文，则在S101之后，AAC便可获取REQInit中的所述保护随机数密文。相应的，在S105中，AAC利用消息加密密钥对从REQ获取的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，包括：AAC利用消息加密密钥对REQInit中的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数。
(2)在REQ发送REQInit后，REQ还可以向AAC发送鉴别结果恢复消息REQAuth，所述REQAuth中包括所述保护随机数密文，则AAC接收所述REQAuth后，便可获取REQAuth中的所述保护随机数密文。相应的，在S105中，AAC利用消息加密密钥对从REQ获取的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，包括：AAC利用消息加密密钥对REQAuth中的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数。
S106：若对Sig AS_AAC验证通过后，AAC根据身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果。
需要说明的是，S104和S105的执行不限定顺序；当然，也可以先执行S104，当S104中对Sig AS_AAC验证通过后，再执行S105以及S106中AAC根据身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果的步骤。
由上述技术方案可以看出，在传输身份信息时，对请求设备的身份信息进行保密处理，可以防止身份信息在网络传输过程中暴露，保证攻击者无法获得私密、敏感信息，并且通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息机密性的同时，实现了鉴别接入控制器对请求设备的单向身份的实时鉴别，为确保只有合法用户才能访问网络奠定基础。
在一些实施例中，S101的REQInit中还可以包括REQ的数字签名Sig REQ，Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段，则在S106之前，AAC还需要确定Sig REQ是否验证通过，验证通过才能执行S106。需要说明的是，若AS-REQ和AS-AAC为同一个鉴别服务器，则所述Sig REQ可以由AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)进行验证，也可以由AAC进行验证；若AS-REQ和AS-AAC为两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述Sig REQ可以由AS-REQ进行验证，也可以由AAC进行验证。其中，AAC确定Sig REQ是否验证通过包括以下方式：
作为一种由鉴别服务器验证所述Sig REQ的实施例，在AS-REQ和AS-AAC为同一个鉴别服务器(即非漫游)的情形下，当AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)验证所述Sig REQ时，Sig REQ可以被携带在S102的AACVeri中传递至AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)，AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)利用解密所述EncPub AS得到的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ。若验证通过，则对Cert REQ的合法性进行验证得到验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Res REQ在内的信息生成REQ的身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ，并利用解密所述EncPub AS得到的保护随机数对包括Pub REQ在内的信息加密得到鉴别结果信息密文，随后执行生成并发送第一鉴别响应消息等步骤；若验证不通过，则不会执行生成并发送第一鉴别响应消息等步骤。因此，AAC可以根据是否能接收到第一鉴别响应消息来确定Sig REQ是否验证通过，若AAC能接收到第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri，则AAC可以确定Sig REQ验证通过。
作为一种由鉴别服务器验证所述Sig REQ的另一实施例，在AS-REQ和AS-AAC为两个不同的鉴别服务器(即漫游)的情形下，当AS-REQ验证所述Sig REQ时，Sig REQ可以被携带在S102的AACVeri及AS-AAC向AS-REQ发送的AS-AACVeri中传递至AS-REQ，AS-REQ利用解密所述EncPub AS得到的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ。若验证通过，则AS-REQ对Cert REQ的合法性进行验证得到验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Res REQ在内的信息生成REQ的身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ，利用解密所述EncPub AS得到的保护随机数对包括Pub REQ在内的信息加密得到鉴别结果信息密文，随后执行生成并发送第二鉴别响应消息及产生后续的第一鉴别响应消息等步骤；若验证不通过，则不会执行生成并发送第二鉴别响应消息及产生后续的第一鉴别响应消息等步骤。因此，AAC可以根据是否能接收到第一鉴别响应消息来确定Sig REQ是否验证通过，若AAC能接收到第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri，则AAC可以确定Sig REQ验证通过。
作为一种由AAC验证所述Sig REQ的实施例，鉴别服务器生成的REQ的身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中不仅包括Cert REQ的验证结果Res REQ，还包括Cert REQ。则在S105中，AAC对所述鉴别结果信息密文解密得到的REQ的身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中还包括Cert REQ，则AAC利用所述Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，从而确定Sig REQ是否验证通过。
在另一些实施例中，若S105中AAC从REQ获取的保护随机数密文是来自S101的REQInit，则所述REQInit中不仅包括所述保护随机数密文，还可以包括REQ的数字签名Sig REQ，Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段。此种情形下，S105中AAC利用保护随机数对鉴别结果信息密文解密得到的REQ的身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中还包括Cert REQ，则在S106之前，AAC还需要利用Pub REQ中的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，根据验证结果确定Sig REQ是否验证通过，验证通过才能执行S106。
在另一些实施例中，若S105中AAC从REQ获取的保护随机数密文是来自鉴别结果恢复消息REQAuth，则所述REQAuth中不仅包括所述保护随机数密文，还可以包括REQ的数字签名Sig REQ， Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQAuth中Sig REQ之前的其他字段。此种情形下，S105中AAC利用保护随机数对鉴别结果信息密文解密得到的REQ的身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中还包括Cert REQ，则在S106之前，AAC还需要利用Pub REQ中的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，根据验证结果确定Sig REQ是否验证通过，验证通过才能执行S106。
在其他一些实施例中，REQ、AAC和鉴别服务器之间传递的消息中还可以包括AAC和/或REQ生成的随机数、各自的身份标识等参数信息。正常情况下，在身份鉴别过程中，这些随机数和/或身份标识在通过各个消息进行传输的过程中应该是不变的，但是如果遇到网络抖动或攻击等情况时，可能造成消息中的随机数和/或身份标识等参数信息的丢失或篡改。因此，在进行身份鉴别时还可以对消息中的身份标识和/或随机数的一致性进行验证，以保障鉴别结果的可靠性和新鲜性。
例如，S101的REQInit中还可以包括AAC生成的第一随机数Nonce AAC和/或REQ生成的第二随机数Nonce REQ，其中的Nonce AAC是AAC向REQ发送的，则S102的AACVeri中还可以包括所述Nonce AAC和/或AAC的身份标识ID AAC，相应地，S103的ASVeri中还可以包括Nonce AAC和/或ID AAC，REQ向AAC发送的REQAuth中还可以包括Nonce AAC和/或Nonce REQ。
那么，AAC在确定REQ的身份鉴别结果之前，还可以先验证ASVeri中的Nonce AAC和/或ID AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC和/或AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC的一致性，AAC还可以将REQAuth中的Nonce AAC和/或Nonce REQ与AAC生成的Nonce AAC和/或REQInit中的Nonce REQ的一致性进行验证，验证通过后，AAC再执行S106中确定REQ的身份鉴别结果的步骤。
在一些实施例中，REQ向AAC发送的REQAuth中还可以包括第二消息完整性校验码MacTag REQ，MacTag REQ是REQ利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段计算生成的，那么在S105之前，AAC还可以利用消息完整性校验密钥验证MacTag REQ，若验证通过，则AAC再执行S105，若验证不通过，则丢弃REQAuth。AAC验证MacTag REQ时，应利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段计算生成MacTag REQ，并将计算出的MacTag REQ与接收到的REQAuth中的MacTag REQ进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，若不一致，则验证不通过。
在另一些实施例中，AAC接收到S103的ASVeri之后，可以向REQ发送鉴别结果恢复请求消息AACAuth，AACAuth中包括第一消息完整性校验码MacTag AAC。MacTag AAC是AAC利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACAuth中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段计算生成的。相应的，REQ在发送REQAuth之前，可以先利用消息完整性校验密钥验证MacTag AAC，若验证通过，则再向AAC发送REQAuth，若验证不通过，则丢弃AACAuth。REQ验证MacTag AAC时，应利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACAuth中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段计算生成MacTag AAC，将计算出的MacTag AAC与接收到的AACAuth中的MacTag AAC进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，若不一致，则验证不通过。其中，REQ和AAC生成消息完整性校验密钥的方式将在下一实施例中介绍。
以上实施例中，REQ和AAC使用的消息加密密钥可以是二者协商得到的，因此本实施例还提供一种REQ和AAC协商消息加密密钥的方法，参见图2，所述方法包括：
S201、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括AAC的密钥交换参数KeyInfo AAC，KeyInfo AAC包括AAC的临时公钥，其中，密钥交换是指如迪菲·赫尔曼(Diffie-Hellman，简称DH)等密钥交换算法。所述AACInit还可以包括AAC生成的第一随机数Nonce AAC。
所述AACInit中还可以包括Security capabilities AAC，Security capabilities AAC表示AAC支持的安全能力参数信息，包括AAC支持的身份鉴别套件(身份鉴别套件中通常包含一种或多种身份鉴别方法)、对称加密算法、完整性校验算法和/或密钥导出算法等，以供REQ选择使用的特定安全策略，则REQ可以根据Security capabilities AAC选择REQ使用的特定安全策略Security capabilities REQ。Security capabilities REQ表示REQ相应确定使用的身份鉴别方法、对称加密算法、完整性校验算法和/或密钥导出算法等。
S202、REQ根据包括REQ的密钥交换参数KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥。
若S201的AACInit中还包括AAC生成的Nonce AAC，则REQ可以根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合包括Nonce AAC和REQ生成的第二随机数Nonce REQ在内的信息，利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥。协商的密钥导出算法可以是REQ根据AAC发送的Security capabilities AAC而选择 使用的密钥导出算法。其中，KeyInfo REQ是REQ产生的密钥交换参数，包括REQ的临时公钥。KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥是REQ产生的对应于REQ的临时公钥的临时私钥，即所述临时公钥和临时私钥是一对临时公私钥对。
S203、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括KeyInfo REQ，以便AAC根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥在内的信息计算得到消息加密密钥。其中，KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥是AAC产生的对应于AAC的临时公钥的临时私钥，即所述临时公钥和临时私钥是一对临时公私钥对。
所述REQInit中还可以包括Security capabilities REQ。所述REQInit中还可以包括Nonce REQ，以便AAC根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥、所述KeyInfo REQ包括的临时公钥、所述Nonce AAC和所述Nonce REQ在内的信息计算得到该消息加密密钥。
所述REQInit中还可以包括Nonce AAC，进而AAC可以在计算消息加密密钥之前，对REQInit中的Nonce AAC和AAC生成的Nonce AAC的一致性进行验证，以确保AAC接收的REQInit是对AACInit的响应消息。
S204、AAC根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥。
若所述REQInit中还包括所述Nonce REQ，则AAC可以根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和所述KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥K1，将K1结合包括所述Nonce AAC和所述Nonce REQ在内的信息，利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算该消息加密密钥。其中，协商的密钥导出算法可以是AAC根据REQ发送的Security capabilities REQ而选择使用的密钥导出算法。
需要说明的是，在图2实施例中，REQ和AAC也可以生成消息完整性校验密钥。REQ和AAC各自生成消息完整性校验密钥的实施方式与图2实施例中示例的REQ和AAC各自生成消息加密密钥的实施方式相同。例如，AAC可以通过图2实施例的方式利用密钥导出算法导出一串密钥数据，该密钥数据既可以作为消息加密密钥又可以作为消息完整性校验密钥，或者，将该密钥数据中的一部分密钥数据作为消息加密密钥，将另一部分密钥数据作为消息完整性校验密钥；AAC也可以通过图2实施例的方式利用密钥导出算法分次导出两串相同或不同的密钥数据，一串作为消息加密密钥，一串作为消息完整性校验密钥。REQ可以通过图2实施例的方式利用密钥导出算法导出一串密钥数据，该密钥数据既可以作为消息加密密钥又可以作为消息完整性校验密钥，或者，将该密钥数据中的一部分密钥数据作为消息加密密钥，将另一部分密钥数据作为消息完整性校验密钥；REQ也可以通过图2实施例的方式利用密钥导出算法分次导出两串相同或不同的密钥数据，一串作为消息加密密钥，一串作为消息完整性校验密钥。
本申请实施例还提供了利用AAC和REQ之间信息交互来确定本次鉴别过程所使用的第一鉴别服务器和/或第二鉴别服务器的方法：
请参考图2，AAC在S201的AACInit中添加AAC信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_AAC，则REQ根据所述ID AS_AAC确定自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_REQ。具体实现时，REQ从ID AS_AAC中选取至少一个鉴别服务器且是自身信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识作为ID AS_REQ，若选取失败，则REQ将自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识作为ID AS_REQ(其中，选取成功对应非漫游情况，选取失败对应漫游情况)，将该ID AS_REQ添加至S203的REQInit中发送给AAC。进而，AAC可以根据ID AS_AAC和ID AS_REQ确定第一鉴别服务器，例如AAC可以判断ID AS_REQ和ID AS_AAC中是否存在至少一个相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识，若存在，即为非漫游情况，AAC从上述至少一个REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识中，确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器；若不存在，则为漫游情况，AAC需要根据ID AS_AAC确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，并将ID AS_REQ发送给AS-AAC，以便AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ。
作为另一种实施方式，AAC可以不必向REQ发送ID AS_AAC，而由REQ在S203的REQInit中添加自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_REQ。根据ID AS_REQ和AAC自身信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_AAC确定参与身份鉴别过程的第一鉴别服务器和/或第二鉴别服务器的具体实现方式如前一种实施方式。
由于REQ和AAC信任的鉴别服务器可以相同也可以不同，当REQ和AAC信任的鉴别服务器相同时，即为非漫游情况；当REQ和AAC信任的鉴别服务器不同时，即为漫游的情况。为表述简便，在以下图3-图6实施例中，验证Cert REQ的合法性得到的验证结果表示为Res REQ，REQ的身份 鉴别结果信息可以用Pub REQ表示。
参见图3，是非漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的一个实施例，其中可以用AS-AAC(也可以用AS-REQ)来表示REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器。在该实施例中，REQ和AAC之间的消息加密密钥协商过程被并行地融合到了身份鉴别过程中，更便于工程实施。其中，由AAC验证REQ的数字签名Sig REQ，该方法包括：
S301、AAC生成Nonce AAC和KeyInfo AAC，根据需要生成Security capabilities AAC。
S302、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo AAC和Security capabilities AAC。其中，Security capabilities AAC为可选字段，表示AAC支持的安全能力参数信息，包括AAC支持的身份鉴别套件、对称加密算法、完整性校验算法和/或密钥导出算法等(下文同)。
S303、REQ生成Nonce REQ、KeyInfo REQ和Nonce REQPub，根据需要生成Security capabilities REQ，根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥，并利用加密证书的公钥计算REQ的身份信息密文EncPub AS；计算Sig REQ。
其中，Security capabilities REQ为可选字段，表示REQ根据Security capabilities AAC作出的特定安全策略的选择，即REQ确定使用的身份鉴别方法、对称加密算法、完整性校验算法和/或密钥导出算法等(下文同)；REQ是否生成Security capabilities REQ取决于AAC向REQ发送的AACInit中是否携带Security capabilities AAC。
S304、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、KeyInfo REQ、EncPub AS及Sig REQ。其中，Nonce AAC和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段，且Nonce AAC应等于AACInit中的相应字段；EncPub AS的加密数据包括Cert REQ及保护随机数Nonce REQPub。Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段，例如，当REQInit中依次包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、KeyInfo REQ、EncPub AS及Sig REQ时，Sig REQ的签名数据包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、KeyInfo REQ及EncPub AS。此外，当REQInit中不包括Nonce AAC字段时，Sig REQ的签名数据还包括AACInit中的Nonce AAC字段。本申请实施例中，将被加密的对象称为加密数据，将被签名的对象称为签名数据。
S305、AAC接收所述REQInit后，执行下述操作(若无特别说明或逻辑上的关系，本文中以(1)、(2)……编号的动作并不因为有编号而存在必然的先后顺序，全文同)，包括：
(1)、若REQInit中存在Nonce AAC，则检查该Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同，若不同，则丢弃REQInit；
(2)、根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；当然这一步也可以在AAC后续需要使用消息加密密钥和/或消息完整性校验密钥时再执行。
S306、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括EncPub AS、ID AAC和Nonce AAC。其中，EncPub AS应等于REQInit中的相应字段。
S307、AS-AAC接收所述AACVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用加密证书对应的私钥解密EncPub AS获得Cert REQ和Nonce REQPub；
(2)、验证Cert REQ的合法性得到Res REQ，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成身份鉴别结果信息Pub REQ；
(3)、将Pub REQ和Nonce REQPub进行异或运算得到鉴别结果信息密文Pub REQ Nonce REQPub；
(4)、计算数字签名Sig AS_AAC。
S308、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ Nonce REQPub、Sig AS_AAC。其中，ID AAC、Nonce AAC应等于AACVeri中的相应字段。Sig AS_AAC的签名数据包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC和Pub REQ Nonce REQPub。
S309、AAC接收所述ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查ID AAC、Nonce AAC是否分别与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC、AAC生成的Nonce AAC相 同；
(2)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC；
(3)、上述检查和验证均通过，则计算第一消息完整性校验码MacTag AAC；若上述检查和验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASVeri。
S310、AAC向REQ发送鉴别结果恢复请求消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC及MacTag AAC。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQInit中的Nonce REQ、AAC生成的Nonce AAC。MacTag AAC的计算过程为：利用消息完整性校验密钥采用完整性校验算法对包括AACAuth中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段在内的信息计算生成MacTag AAC。
S311、REQ接收所述AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACAuth中存在Nonce REQ和/或Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否相同，和/或，检查所述Nonce AAC与接收到的AACInit中的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、验证MacTag AAC；
验证过程为：利用消息完整性校验密钥采用完整性校验算法对包括AACAuth中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算生成MacTag AAC(该计算方式与AAC计算MacTag AAC的方式相同)，并将计算出的MacTag AAC与接收到的AACAuth中的MacTag AAC进行比较。
(3)、上述检查和验证均通过，则利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算保护随机数密文EncData REQ，若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AACAuth；
(4)、计算第二消息完整性校验码MacTag REQ。
S312、REQ向AAC发送鉴别结果恢复消息REQAuth。
所述REQAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData REQ及MacTag REQ。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQ生成的Nonce REQ、AACInit中的Nonce AAC。EncData REQ的加密数据包括Nonce REQPub。MacTag REQ的计算过程为：利用消息完整性校验密钥采用完整性校验算法对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段在内的信息计算生成MacTag REQ。
S313、AAC接收所述REQAuth后，执行以下操作，包括：
(1)、若REQAuth中存在Nonce REQ和/或Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce REQ与接收到的REQInit中的Nonce REQ是否相同，和/或，检查所述Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、验证MacTag REQ；
验证过程为：利用消息完整性校验密钥采用完整性校验算法对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算生成MacTag REQ(该计算方式与REQ计算MacTag REQ的方式相同)，将计算出的MacTag REQ和接收到的REQAuth中的MacTag REQ进行比较。
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法解密所述EncData REQ得到Nonce REQPub；
(4)、将Nonce REQPub与Pub REQ Nonce REQPub进行异或运算恢复Pub REQ；
(5)、利用Pub REQ中的Cert REQ验证REQInit中的Sig REQ；
(6)、上述检查和验证均通过后，根据Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果，若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃REQAuth。
需要说明的是，S304的REQInit中也可以不包括Sig REQ，而在S312的REQAuth中添加Sig REQ，即在S312中，REQ先对REQAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData REQ在内的签名数据计算生成Sig REQ；此种情形下，在S313中AAC验证的Sig REQ为S312的REQAuth中的Sig REQ。
参见图4，是非漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的另一实施例，其中可以用AS-AAC(也可以用AS-REQ)来表示REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器。在该实施例中，REQ和AAC之间的消息加密密钥协商过程被并行地融合到了身份鉴别过程中，更便于工程实施。其中，由AS-AAC(也可以用AS-REQ来表示)验证Sig REQ，该方法包括：
S401、AAC生成Nonce AAC和KeyInfo AAC，根据需要生成Security capabilities AAC。
S402、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo AAC和Security capabilities AAC。其中，Security capabilities AAC为可选字段。
S403、REQ生成Nonce REQ、KeyInfo REQ和Nonce REQPub，根据需要生成Security capabilities REQ，根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验 密钥，并利用加密证书的公钥计算REQ的身份信息密文EncPub AS；计算生成Sig REQ。
S404、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、KeyInfo REQ、EncPub AS及Sig REQ。其中，Security capabilities REQ为可选字段，Nonce AAC应等于AACInit中的相应字段；EncPub AS的加密数据包括Cert REQ及保护随机数Nonce REQPub。Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段。
S405、AAC接收所述REQInit后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查REQInit中的Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否相同，若不同，则丢弃REQInit；
(2)、根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和所述KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥。
S406、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括REQInit和ID AAC。
S407、AS-AAC接收所述AACVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用加密证书对应的私钥解密REQInit中的EncPub AS获得Cert REQ和Nonce REQPub；
(2)、利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，若验证不通过，则丢弃AACVeri；
(3)、验证Cert REQ的合法性得到Res REQ，根据包括Res REQ在内的信息生成Pub REQ，将Pub REQ和Nonce REQPub进行异或运算得到鉴别结果信息密文Pub REQ Nonce REQPub；
(4)、计算数字签名Sig AS_AAC。
S408、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ Nonce REQPub和Sig AS_AAC。其中，ID AAC、Nonce AAC应分别等于AACVeri中的相应字段。Sig AS_AAC的签名数据包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC和Pub REQ Nonce REQPub。
S409、AAC接收所述ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查ID AAC、Nonce AAC是否分别与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC、AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同；
(2)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC；
(3)、上述检查和验证均通过，则计算第一消息完整性校验码MacTag AAC；若上述检查和验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASVeri。
S410、AAC向REQ发送鉴别结果恢复请求消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC及MacTag AAC。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQInit中的Nonce REQ、AAC生成的Nonce AAC。MacTag AAC的计算过程如图3实施例所述。
S411、REQ接收所述AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACAuth中存在Nonce REQ和/或Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否相同，和/或，检查所述Nonce AAC与接收到的AACInit中的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、验证MacTag AAC，验证过程如图3实施例所述；
(3)、上述检查和验证均通过，则利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算保护随机数密文EncData REQ，上述检查和验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AACAuth；
(4)、计算第二消息完整性校验码MacTag REQ。
S412、REQ向AAC发送鉴别结果恢复消息REQAuth。
所述REQAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData REQ及MacTag REQ。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQ生成的Nonce REQ、AACInit中的Nonce AAC。EncData REQ的加密数据包括Nonce REQPub；MacTag REQ的计算过程如图3实施例所述。
S413、AAC接收所述REQAuth后，执行以下操作，包括：
(1)、若REQAuth中存在Nonce REQ和/或Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce REQ与接收到的REQInit中的Nonce REQ是否相同，和/或，检查所述Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、验证MacTag REQ，验证过程如图3实施例所述；
(3)、上述检查和验证均通过后，利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法解密所述EncData REQ得到Nonce REQPub，上述检查和验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃REQAuth；
(4)、将Nonce REQPub与Pub REQ Nonce REQPub进行异或运算恢复Pub REQ；
(5)、根据Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果。
参见图5，是漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的一个实施例。在该实施例中，REQ和AAC之间的消息加密密钥协商过程被并行地融合到了身份鉴别过程中，更便于工程实施。其中，由AAC验证Sig REQ，该方法包括：
S501、AAC生成Nonce AAC和KeyInfo AAC，根据需要生成Security capabilities AAC。
S502、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo AAC、ID AS_AAC和Security capabilities AAC。其中，ID AS_AAC和Security capabilities AAC为可选字段；ID AS_AAC表示AAC信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，用于使得REQ根据ID AS_AAC确定是否存在共同信任的鉴别服务器(下文同)。
S503、REQ生成Nonce REQ、KeyInfo REQ和Nonce REQPub，根据需要生成ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ，根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥，利用加密证书的公钥计算REQ的身份信息密文EncPub AS；计算Sig REQ。
其中，ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段；ID AS_REQ表示REQ信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，当AACInit中存在ID AS_AAC时，REQ尽量从其信任的鉴别服务器中选择至少一个与ID AS_AAC中相同的鉴别服务器作为ID AS_REQ，若选择失败，则将自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器作为ID AS_REQ；当AACInit中不存在ID AS_AAC时，REQ将自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器作为ID AS_REQ(下文同)。
S504、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、ID AS_REQ、KeyInfo REQ、Security capabilities REQ、EncPub AS及Sig REQ。其中，Nonce AAC、ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段，且Nonce AAC应等于AACInit中的相应字段。EncPub AS的加密数据包括Cert REQ及保护随机数Nonce REQPub。Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段，当REQInit中不包括Nonce AAC时，Sig REQ的签名数据还包括AACInit中的Nonce AAC字段。
S505、AAC接收所述REQInit后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若REQInit中存在Nonce AAC，则检查该Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同，若不同，则丢弃REQInit；
(2)、根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；
(3)、若REQInit中携带ID AS_REQ且AACInit中携带ID AS_AAC，则AAC判断ID AS_REQ和ID AS_AAC是否存在至少一个相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识，若存在，即为非漫游情况，AAC从上述至少一个REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识中，确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器；若不存在，则为漫游情况，AAC需要根据ID AS_AAC确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，并将ID AS_REQ发送给AS-AAC，以便AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ；或者，
若REQInit中携带ID AS_REQ但AACInit中不携带ID AS_AAC，则AAC判断ID AS_REQ和AAC所信任的鉴别服务器是否存在至少一个相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识，若存在，即为非漫游情况，AAC从上述至少一个REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识中，确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器；若不存在，则为漫游情况，AAC需要根据自身信任的鉴别服务器确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，并将ID AS_REQ发送给AS-AAC，以便AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ；
需要说明的是，此实施例判断出的结果为漫游情况。
S506、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括ID AS_REQ、EncPub AS、ID AAC和Nonce AAC。其中，ID AS_REQ为可选字段，可以使AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定此次鉴别过程中使用的第二鉴别服务器，且ID AS_REQ、EncPub AS应等于REQInit中的相应字段。若AACVeri中存在ID AS_REQ，则AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，若不存在，则说明AS-AAC已确知AS-REQ。
S507、AS-AAC接收所述AACVeri后，向AS-REQ发送第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri。
所述AS-AACVeri中包括EncPub AS、ID AAC和Nonce AAC。所述AS-AACVeri中的字段均来源于AACVeri。
S508、AS-REQ接收所述AS-AACVeri后，向证书解密服务器CS-DEC发送解密请求消息AS-REQReq。
所述AS-REQReq中包括EncPub AS，该EncPub AS应等于AS-AACVeri中的相应字段。
S509、CS-DEC接收所述AS-REQReq后，利用加密证书对应的私钥解密所述EncPub AS得到Cert REQ和Nonce REQPub。
S510、CS-DEC向AS-REQ发送解密响应消息CS-DECRep。
所述CS-DECRep中包括解密得到的Cert REQ和Nonce REQPub。其中，CS-DEC可以为与AS-REQ具有交互、信任关系的独立设备，也可以集成于AS-REQ中。当CS-DEC集成于AS-REQ中时，由AS-REQ直接解密EncPub AS得到Cert REQ和Nonce REQPub。
S511、AS-REQ接收所述CS-DECRep后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、验证Cert REQ的合法性得到Res REQ，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成Pub REQ；
(2)、将Pub REQ和Nonce REQPub进行异或运算得到鉴别结果信息密文Pub REQ Nonce REQPub；
(3)、计算数字签名Sig AS_REQ。
S512、AS-REQ向AS-AAC发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri。
所述AS-REQVeri中包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ Nonce REQPub及Sig AS_REQ。其中，ID AAC、Nonce AAC应分别等于AS-AACVeri中的相应字段，Nonce REQPub应等于CS-DECRep中的相应字段。Sig AS_REQ的签名数据包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC和Pub REQ Nonce REQPub。
S513、AS-AAC接收所述AS-REQVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ，若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-REQVeri；
(2)、计算数字签名Sig AS_AAC。
S514、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ Nonce REQPub、Sig AS_AAC。其中，ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ Nonce REQPub应分别等于AS-REQVeri中的相应字段。Sig AS_AAC的签名数据包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ Nonce REQPub。
S515、AAC接收所述ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查ID AAC和Nonce AAC是否分别与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC、AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同；
(2)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC；
(3)、上述检查与验证均通过，则计算第一消息完整性校验码MacTag AAC，若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASVeri。
S516、AAC向REQ发送鉴别结果恢复请求消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC及MacTag AAC。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQInit中的Nonce REQ、AAC生成的Nonce AAC。MacTag AAC的计算过程如图3实施例所述。
S517、REQ接收所述AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACAuth中存在Nonce REQ和/或Nonce AAC，则检查Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否相同，和/或，检查Nonce AAC与接收到的AACInit中的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、验证MacTag AAC，验证过程如图3实施例所述；
(3)、上述检查与验证均通过，则利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算保护随机数密文EncData REQ，若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AACAuth；
(4)、计算第二消息完整性校验码MacTag REQ。
S518、REQ向AAC发送鉴别结果恢复消息REQAuth。
所述REQAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData REQ及MacTag REQ。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQ生成的Nonce REQ、AACInit中的Nonce AAC。EncData REQ的加密数据包括Nonce REQPub。MacTag REQ的计算过程如图3实施例所述。
S519、AAC接收所述REQAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若REQAuth中存在Nonce REQ和/或Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce REQ与接收到的REQInit中的Nonce REQ是否相同，和/或，检查所述Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、验证MacTag REQ；验证过程如图3实施例所述；
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法解密EncData REQ获得Nonce REQPub；
(4)、将Nonce REQPub与Pub REQ Nonce REQPub进行异或运算恢复Pub REQ；
(5)、利用Pub REQ中的Cert REQ验证REQInit中的Sig REQ；
(6)、上述检查和验证均通过后，根据Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果，若上述检查和验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃REQAuth。
需要说明的是，S504的REQInit中也可以不包括Sig REQ，而在S518的REQAuth中添加Sig REQ，即在S518中，REQ先对REQAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData REQ在内的签名数据计算生成Sig REQ；此种情形下，在S519中AAC验证的Sig REQ为S518的REQAuth中的Sig REQ。
参见图6，是漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的另一实施例。在该实施例中，REQ和AAC之间的消息加密密钥协商过程被并行地融合到了身份鉴别过程中，更便于工程实施。其中，由AS-REQ验证Sig REQ，该方法包括：
S601、AAC生成Nonce AAC和KeyInfo AAC，根据需要生成Security capabilities AAC。
S602、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo AAC、Security capabilities AAC和ID AS_AAC。其中，ID AS_AAC和Security capabilities AAC为可选字段。
S603、REQ生成Nonce REQ、KeyInfo REQ和Nonce REQPub，根据需要生成ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ，根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥，并利用加密证书的公钥计算REQ的身份信息密文EncPub AS；计算Sig REQ。
S604、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、ID AS_REQ、KeyInfo REQ、Security capabilities REQ、EncPub AS及Sig REQ。其中，ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段；Nonce AAC应等于AACInit中的相应字段；EncPub AS的加密数据包括Cert REQ及保护随机数Nonce REQPub；Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段。
S605、AAC接收所述REQInit后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查REQInit中的Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同，若不同，则丢弃REQInit；
(2)、根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；
(3)、AAC确定AS-AAC的方法同实施例5中相关描述。
S606、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括REQInit、ID AAC。
S607、AS-AAC接收所述AACVeri后，向AS-REQ发送第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri。
所述AS-AACVeri中包括REQInit和ID AAC。所述AS-AACVeri中的字段均来源于AACVeri。AS-AAC确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ的方法同实施例5中相关描述。
S608、AS-REQ接收所述AS-AACVeri后，向证书解密服务器CS-DEC发送解密请求消息AS-REQReq。
所述AS-REQReq中包括EncPub AS。其中，EncPub AS应等于AS-AACVeri中的相应字段。
S609、CS-DEC接收所述AS-REQReq后，利用加密证书对应的私钥解密所述EncPub AS得到Cert REQ和Nonce REQPub。
S610、CS-DEC向AS-REQ发送解密响应消息CS-DECRep。
所述CS-DECRep包括解密得到的Cert REQ和Nonce REQPub。
S611、AS-REQ接收所述CS-DECRep后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，若验证不通过，则丢弃CS-DECRep；
(2)、验证Cert REQ的合法性得到Res REQ，根据包括Res REQ在内的信息生成Pub REQ；
(3)、将Pub REQ和Nonce REQPub进行异或运算得到鉴别结果信息密文Pub REQ⊕Nonce REQPub；
(4)、计算数字签名Sig AS_REQ。
S612、AS-REQ向AS-AAC发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri。
所述AS-REQVeri中包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ⊕Nonce REQPub及Sig AS_REQ。其中，ID AAC、 Nonce AAC应分别等于AS-AACVeri中的相应字段；Nonce REQPub应等于CS-DECRep中的相应字段。Sig AS_REQ的签名数据包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC和Pub REQ⊕Nonce REQPub。
S613、AS-AAC接收所述AS-REQVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ，若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-REQVeri；
(2)、计算数字签名Sig AS_AAC。
S614、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ⊕Nonce REQPub和Sig AS_AAC。其中，ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ⊕Nonce REQPub应分别等于AS-REQVeri中的相应字段。Sig AS_AAC的签名数据包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ⊕Nonce REQPub。
S615、AAC接收所述ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查ID AAC和Nonce AAC是否分别与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC和AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同；
(2)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC；
(3)、上述检查与验证均通过，则计算第一消息完整性校验码MacTag AAC，上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASVeri。
S616、AAC向REQ发送鉴别结果恢复请求消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC和MacTag AAC。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQInit中的Nonce REQ、AAC生成的Nonce AAC。MacTag AAC的计算过程如图3实施例所述。
S617、REQ接收所述AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACAuth中存在Nonce REQ和/或Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否相同，和/或，检查所述Nonce AAC与接收到的AACInit中的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、验证MacTag AAC；验证过程如图3实施例所述；
(3)、上述检查与验证均通过后，利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算保护随机数密文EncData REQ，上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AACAuth；
(4)、计算第二消息完整性校验码MacTag REQ。
S618、REQ向AAC发送鉴别结果恢复消息REQAuth。
所述REQAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData REQ及MacTag REQ。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQ生成的Nonce REQ、AACInit中的Nonce AAC。EncData REQ的加密数据包括Nonce REQPub；MacTag REQ的计算过程如图3实施例所述。
S619、AAC接收所述REQAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若REQAuth中存在Nonce REQ和/或Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce REQ与接收到的REQInit中的Nonce REQ是否相同，和/或，检查所述Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、验证MacTag REQ；验证过程如图3实施例所述；
(3)、上述检查和验证均通过后，利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法解密EncData REQ获得Nonce REQPub，上述检查和验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃REQAuth；
(4)、将Nonce REQPub与Pub REQ⊕Nonce REQPub进行异或运算恢复Pub REQ；
(5)、根据Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果。
在上述各实施例中，每条消息还可以携带一个杂凑值HASH X_Y，该杂凑值HASH X_Y是该消息的发送方实体X利用杂凑算法对接收到的对端实体Y发送的最新前序消息计算得到的，用于对端实体Y来验证实体X是否接收到完整的最新前序消息。其中，HASH REQ_AAC表示REQ对接收到的AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AAC_REQ表示AAC对接收到的REQ发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AAC_AS-AAC表示AAC对接收到的AS-AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-AAC_AAC表示AS-AAC对接收到的AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-AAC_AS-REQ表示AS-AAC对接收到的AS-REQ发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-REQ_AS-AAC表示AS-REQ对接收到的AS-AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。若发送方实体X当前发送的消息为实体X和实体Y之间交互的首条消息，意味着实体X未曾收到对端实体Y发送的前序消息，则该条消息中HASH X_Y可以不存在或者无意义。
对应的，对端实体Y接收到实体X发送的消息后，若该条消息中包含HASH X_Y，则当实体Y未曾向实体X发送过前序消息时，实体Y忽略HASH X_Y；当实体Y曾向实体X发送过前序消息时，实体Y利用杂凑算法对之前向实体X发送的最新前序消息在本地计算杂凑值，并与接收到的消息中 携带的杂凑值HASH X_Y比较，若一致，则执行后续步骤，否则丢弃或者结束本次鉴别过程。
本发明中，对实体X而言，对端实体Y向实体X发送的前序消息指的是：实体X向对端实体Y发送消息M之前，接收过的对端实体Y向实体X发送的消息；对端实体Y向实体X发送的最新前序消息指的是：实体X向对端实体Y发送消息M之前，接收的对端实体Y向实体X发送的最新一条消息。若实体X向其对端实体Y发送的消息M是实体X和实体Y之间交互的第一条消息，则实体X向其对端实体Y发送消息M之前，不存在对端实体Y向实体X发送的前序消息。
需要说明的是，上述图3、图4、图5和图6实施例中的可选字段和可选操作，在说明书附图的图3、图4、图5和图6中用“*”表示。以上实施例涉及的消息中所包括的各个内容不限定顺序，且在没有特别说明的情况下，不限定消息接收方收到该消息后对相关消息的操作顺序以及对消息中包括的内容进行处理的顺序。
基于图1-6对应的方法实施例，参见图7，本申请实施例提供了一种鉴别接入控制器AAC，包括：
获取部分701，被配置为获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
第一发送部分702，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
第一接收部分703，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；所述鉴别结果信息密文为所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述保护随机数对包括所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的；所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果；
第一解密部分704，被配置为利用消息加密密钥对从所述请求设备获取的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，利用所述保护随机数对所述鉴别结果信息密文解密获得所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息；所述保护随机数密文是所述请求设备利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
第一验证部分705，被配置为验证所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；
确定部分706，被配置为当所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名验证通过后，根据所述身份鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果，确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
可选的，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第二发送部分，被配置为向所述请求设备发送密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；获取部分701获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数；
第一计算部分，被配置为根据包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述请求设备的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥。
可选的，所述第二发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；获取部分701获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第二随机数；
所述第一计算部分，还被配置为根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥。
可选的，获取部分701获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数；所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第二验证部分，被配置为对所述身份密文消息中的第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数的一致性进行验证。
可选的，所述第二发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息；则获取部分701获取的身份密文消息中还包括特定安全策略，所述特定安全策略是所述请求设备根据所述安全能力参数信息确定的。
可选的，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述保护随机数密文，则第一解密部分704，还被配置为利用消息加密密钥对所述请求设备发送的身份密文消息中的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数。
可选的，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述请求设备发送的鉴别结果恢复消息，所述鉴别结果恢复消息中包括所述保护随机数密文；
对应的，第一解密部分704，还配置为利用消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果恢复消息中的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数。
可选的，所述第二接收部分接收的鉴别结果恢复消息还包括第二消息完整性校验码，所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；则所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第三验证部分，被配置为利用消息完整性校验密钥验证所述第二消息完整性校验码。
可选的，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第三发送部分，被配置为向所述请求设备发送鉴别结果恢复请求消息，所述鉴别结果恢复请求消息中包括第一消息完整性校验码；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器的第二计算部分利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复请求消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
可选的，获取部分701获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，则在所述确定部分确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，所述确定部分还被配置为确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则再确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
可选的，确定部分706，还被配置为：
若第一解密部分704解密所述鉴别结果信息密文得到的身份鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，则确定部分706利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证时，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
所述第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若所述鉴别接入控制器接收到所述第一鉴别响应消息，则确定部分706确定所述请求设备的数字签名已验证通过。
可选的，所述第二接收部分接收的鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，第一解密部分704解密所述鉴别结果信息密文得到的身份鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书；则在确定部分706确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，确定部分706，还被配置为利用所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括的所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则再确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
可选的，所述第二发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；对应的，获取部分701获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
则确定部分706，还被配置为根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述密钥请求消息中所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
可选的，获取部分701获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
则确定部分706，还被配置为根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
可选的，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第二随机数和所述请求设备从所述鉴别接入控制器获取的第一随机数；
第一发送部分702发送的第一鉴别请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或所述第一随机数；
第一接收部分703接收的第一鉴别响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或所述第一随机数；
所述第二接收部分接收的鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括所述第一随机数和/或所述第二随机数；
相应的，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第四验证部分，被配置为在确定部分706确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，将所述第一鉴别响应消息中的鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或第一随机数与所述鉴别接入控制器自身的身份标识和/或所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数进行一致性验证；
所述第四验证部分，还被配置为在确定部分706确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，将所 述鉴别结果恢复消息中的第一随机数和/或第二随机数与所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数和/或所述身份密文消息中的第二随机数进行一致性验证。
可选的，所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
参见图8，本申请实施例还提供了一种请求设备REQ，包括：
第一加密部分801，被配置为利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成身份信息密文；
第一发送部分802，被配置为向鉴别接入控制器发送身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
第二加密部分803，被配置为利用消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成保护随机数密文。
可选的，所述请求设备还包括：
第一接收部分，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；
第一计算部分，被配置为根据包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥；
第一发送部分802发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数。
可选的，所述第一接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；
所述第一计算部分，还被配置为根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥；
第一发送部分802发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述第二随机数。
可选的，第一发送部分802发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数。
可选的，所述第一接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息，所述请求设备还包括：
第一确定部分，被配置为根据所述安全能力参数信息确定所述请求设备使用的特定安全策略；
第一发送部分802发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述特定安全策略。
可选的，第一发送部分802发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述保护随机数密文。
可选的，所述请求设备还包括：
第二发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别结果恢复消息，所述鉴别结果恢复消息包括所述保护随机数密文。
可选的，所述第二发送部分发送的鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括第二消息完整性校验码，则所述请求设备还包括：
第二计算部分，所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述第二计算部分利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
可选的，所述请求设备还包括：
第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的包括第一消息完整性校验码的鉴别结果恢复请求消息；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复请求消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；
验证部分，被配置为利用所述消息完整性校验密钥验证所述第一消息完整性校验码。
可选的，所述第一接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述请求设备还包括：
第二确定部分，被配置为根据所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
第一发送部分802发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识。
可选的，第一发送部分802发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识。
可选的，所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
参见图9，本申请实施例还提供了一种第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，所述第一鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
第一接收部分901，被配置为接收鉴别接入控制器发送的第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
第一发送部分902，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；所述鉴别结果信息密文为所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述保护随机数对包括所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的；所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果。
可选的，当所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是同一个鉴别服务器时，所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
解密部分，被配置为利用加密证书对应的私钥对所述身份信息密文解密得到请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数；
第一验证部分，被配置为对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到所述数字证书的验证结果；
第一生成部分，被配置为根据包括所述数字证书的验证结果在内的信息生成身份鉴别结果信息，利用所述保护随机数对包括所述身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成鉴别结果信息密文，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成第一鉴别响应消息。
可选的，当所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器时，所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
第二发送部分，被配置为向所述第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名；
第二验证部分，被配置为利用所述第二鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名进行验证；
第二生成部分，被配置为当所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名验证通过时，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
可选的，所述第一鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
参见图10，本申请实施例还提供了一种第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，所述第二鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，若鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：
接收部分1001，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
解密部分1002，被配置为利用所述加密证书对应的私钥对所述请求设备的加密身份信息解密得到所述请求设备的数字证书和所述保护随机数；
生成部分1003，被配置为对所述数字证书进行合法性验证得到所述数字证书的验证结果，根据包括所述数字证书的验证结果在内的信息生成身份鉴别结果信息，利用所述保护随机数对包括所述身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成鉴别结果信息密文，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成第二鉴别响应消息；
发送部分1004，被配置为向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二鉴别响应消息。
可选的，所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
需要说明的是，在本申请实施例以及其他的实施例中，“部分”可以是部分电路、部分处理器、部分程序或软件等等，当然也可以是单元，还可以是模块也可以是非模块化的。
参见图11，本申请实施例还提供了一种鉴别接入控制器AAC，包括：第一处理器1110和第一存储器1120。其中，第一处理器1110可以从第一存储器1120中调用并运行计算机程序，以实现上述实施例中的AAC执行的步骤。
其中，第一存储器1120可以是独立于第一处理器1110的一个单独的器件，也可以集成在第一处理器1110中。
应理解，该鉴别接入控制器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AAC实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
参考图12，本申请实施例还供了一种请求设备REQ，包括：第二处理器1210和第二存储器1220。其中，第二处理器1210可以从第二存储器1220中调用并运行计算机程序，以实现上述实施例中的REQ执行的步骤。
其中，第二存储器1220可以是独立于第二处理器1210的一个单独的器件，也可以集成在第二处理器1210中。
应理解，该请求设备可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由REQ实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
参考图13，本申请实施例还供了一种第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，包括：第三处理器1310和第三存储器1320。其中，第三处理器1310可以从第三存储器1320中调用并运行计算机程序，以实现上述实施例中的AS-AAC执行的步骤。
其中，第三存储器1320可以是独立于第三处理器1310的一个单独的器件，也可以集成在第三处理器1310中。
应理解，该第一鉴别服务器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AS-AAC实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
参考图14，本申请实施例还供了一种第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，包括：第四处理器1410和第四存储器1420。其中，第四处理器1410可以从第四存储器1420中调用并运行计算机程序，以实现上述实施例中的AS-REQ执行的步骤。
其中，第四存储器1420可以是独立于第四处理器1410的一个单独的器件，也可以集成在第四处理器1410中。
应理解，该第二鉴别服务器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AS-REQ实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序，该计算机程序被处理器运行时执行上述身份鉴别方法中鉴别接入控制器AAC、请求设备REQ、第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC、或第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ所执行的步骤。其中，该存储介质可以是易失性或非易失的计算机可读取存储介质。
需要说明的是，存储介质可以是下述介质中的至少一种：只读存储器(英文：Read-Only Memory，缩写：ROM)、RAM、磁碟或光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机程序，包括计算机可读代码，当所述计算机可读代码在电子设备中运行时，所述电子设备中的处理器执行配置为实现上述身份鉴别方法中鉴别接入控制器AAC、请求设备REQ、第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC、或第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ所执行的步骤。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机程序产品，该计算机程序产品包括计算机程序指令，所述计算机程序指令可用于执行上述身份鉴别方法中鉴别接入控制器AAC、请求设备REQ、第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC、或第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ所执行的步骤，详细可参见上述方法实施例，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本说明书中的各个实施例均采用递进的方式描述，各个实施例之间相同相似的部分互相参见即可，每个实施例重点说明的都是与其他实施例的不同之处。尤其，对于设备及系统实施例而言，由于其与方法实施例相一致和对应，所以描述得比较简单，相关之处参见方法实施例的部分说明即可。以上描述的设备及系统实施例仅是示意性的，其中作为分离部件说明的部分可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为部分显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或全部模块来实现本实施例方案的目的。本领域普通技术人员在不付出创造性劳动的情况下，即可以理解并实 施。
以上所述，仅为本申请的一种具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应该以权利要求的保护范围为准。
工业实用性
本申请提供的身份鉴别方法，能够在传输身份信息时对请求设备的身份信息进行保密处理，可以防止身份信息在请求设备访问网络的过程中暴露，保证攻击者无法获得私密、敏感信息，并且通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息的机密性的同时，实现了鉴别接入控制器对请求设备的单向身份的实时鉴别，为确保只有合法用户才能访问网络奠定基础。

Claims (59)

  1. 一种身份鉴别方法，所述方法包括：
    鉴别接入控制器获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
    所述鉴别接入控制器接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；所述鉴别结果信息密文为所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述保护随机数对包括所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的；所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果；
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息加密密钥对从所述请求设备获取的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，利用所述保护随机数对所述鉴别结果信息密文解密获得所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息；所述保护随机数密文是所述请求设备利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
    所述鉴别接入控制器验证所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；
    在所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名验证通过后，所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述身份鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果，确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，在所述鉴别接入控制器获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；
    所述请求设备根据包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算所述消息加密密钥；
    对应的，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数；
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述请求设备的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算所述消息加密密钥。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其中，所述密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；
    则所述请求设备计算所述消息加密密钥还包括：
    所述请求设备根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥；
    对应的，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述第二随机数；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器计算所述消息加密密钥还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数；
    则在所述鉴别接入控制器计算所述消息加密密钥之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器对所述身份密文消息中的第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数的一致性进行验证；
    若验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器再计算所述消息加密密钥。
  5. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其中，所述密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备根据所述安全能力参数信息确定所述请求设备使用的特定安全策略；
    则所述身份密文消息中还包括所述特定安全策略。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述保护随机数密文，则所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息加密密钥对保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息加密密钥对所述请求设备发送的身份密文消息中的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数。
  7. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，在所述请求设备发送身份密文消息之后，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别结果恢复消息，所述鉴别结果恢复消息中包括所述保护随机数密文；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息加密密钥对保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息加密密钥对所述请求设备发送的鉴别结果恢复消息中的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括第二消息完整性校验码，所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；所述请求设备利用的消息完整性校验密钥的生成方式与所述请求设备生成消息加密密钥的方式相同；
    相应的，在所述鉴别接入控制器对所述保护随机数密文解密之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息完整性校验密钥验证所述第二消息完整性校验码；若验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器再执行相关步骤；所述鉴别接入控制器利用的消息完整性校验密钥的生成方式与所述鉴别接入控制器生成消息加密密钥的方式相同。
  9. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，在所述请求设备发送所述鉴别结果恢复消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送鉴别结果恢复请求消息，所述鉴别结果恢复请求消息中包括第一消息完整性校验码；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复请求消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；所述鉴别接入控制器利用的消息完整性校验密钥的生成方式与所述鉴别接入控制器生成消息加密密钥的方式相同；
    相应的，所述请求设备利用消息完整性校验密钥验证所述第一消息完整性校验码；若验证通过，则所述请求设备再执行相关步骤；所述请求设备利用的消息完整性校验密钥的生成方式与所述请求设备生成消息加密密钥的方式相同。
  10. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，则在所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则再根据所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过，包括：
    若所述鉴别接入控制器解密所述鉴别结果信息密文得到的所述身份鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，则所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
    所述第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书，对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若所述鉴别接入控制器接收到所述第一鉴别响应消息，则确定所述请求设备的数字签名已验证通过。
  12. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，所述鉴别接入控制器解密所述鉴别结果信息密文得到的所述身份鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书；则在所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用解密得到的所述身份鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则再根据所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
  13. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其中，所述密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备根据所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述请求 设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    则所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述密钥请求消息中所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
  14. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
  15. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第二随机数和所述请求设备从所述鉴别接入控制器获取的第一随机数；
    则所述第一鉴别请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或所述第一随机数；
    所述第一鉴别响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或所述第一随机数；
    所述鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括所述第一随机数和/或所述第二随机数；
    相应的，在所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器将所述第一鉴别响应消息中的鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或第一随机数与所述鉴别接入控制器自身的身份标识和/或所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数进行一致性验证；
    所述鉴别接入控制器将所述鉴别结果恢复消息中的第一随机数和/或第二随机数与所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数和/或所述身份密文消息中的第二随机数进行一致性验证。
  16. 根据权利要求1至15任一项所述的方法，其中，当所述第一鉴别服务器和所述第二鉴别服务器相同时，在所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第一鉴别响应消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一鉴别服务器获取利用所述加密证书对应的私钥对所述身份信息密文解密得到的所述请求设备的数字证书和所述保护随机数，对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到所述数字证书的验证结果，根据包括所述数字证书的验证结果在内的信息生成所述身份鉴别结果信息，利用所述保护随机数对包括所述身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成所述鉴别结果信息密文，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
  17. 根据权利要求1至15任一项所述的方法，其中，当所述第一鉴别服务器和所述第二鉴别服务器不同时，在所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第一鉴别响应消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述第二鉴别服务器获取利用所述加密证书对应的私钥对所述请求设备的身份信息密文解密得到的所述请求设备的数字证书和所述保护随机数，对所述数字证书进行合法性验证得到所述数字证书的验证结果，根据包括所述数字证书的验证结果在内的信息生成所述身份鉴别结果信息，利用所述保护随机数对包括所述身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成所述鉴别结果信息密文，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成第二鉴别响应消息；
    所述第一鉴别服务器接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的所述第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名；
    所述第一鉴别服务器利用所述第二鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名进行验证；
    若验证通过，则所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
  18. 根据权利要求1至15任一项所述的方法，其中，所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器收到所述请求设备发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述请求设备收到所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述第一鉴别服务器收到所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述第一鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器收到所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述第二鉴别服务器收到所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述第一鉴别服务器收到所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
  19. 一种鉴别接入控制器，所述鉴别接入控制器包括：
    获取部分，被配置为获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
    第一发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
    第一接收部分，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；所述鉴别结果信息密文为所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述保护随机数对包括所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的；所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果；
    第一解密部分，被配置为利用消息加密密钥对从所述请求设备获取的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数，利用所述保护随机数对所述鉴别结果信息密文解密获得所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息；所述保护随机数密文是所述请求设备利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
    第一验证部分，被配置为验证所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；
    确定部分，被配置为当所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名验证通过后，根据所述身份鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果，确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第二发送部分，被配置为向所述请求设备发送密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数；
    第一计算部分，被配置为根据包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述请求设备的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第二发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第二随机数；
    所述第一计算部分，还被配置为根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数；所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第二验证部分，被配置为对所述身份密文消息中的第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第 一随机数的一致性进行验证。
  23. 根据权利要求20所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第二发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息；则所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括特定安全策略，所述特定安全策略是所述请求设备根据所述安全能力参数信息确定的。
  24. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述保护随机数密文，则所述第一解密部分，还被配置为利用消息加密密钥对所述请求设备发送的身份密文消息中的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数。
  25. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述请求设备发送的鉴别结果恢复消息，所述鉴别结果恢复消息中包括所述保护随机数密文；
    对应的，所述第一解密部分，还被配置为利用消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果恢复消息中的保护随机数密文解密得到所述保护随机数。
  26. 根据权利要求25所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括第二消息完整性校验码，所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；则所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第三验证部分，被配置为利用消息完整性校验密钥验证所述第二消息完整性校验码。
  27. 根据权利要求25所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第三发送部分，被配置为向所述请求设备发送鉴别结果恢复请求消息，所述鉴别结果恢复请求消息中包括第一消息完整性校验码；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器的第二计算部分利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复请求消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
  28. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，则在所述确定部分确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，所述确定部分，还被配置为确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则再确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
  29. 根据权利要求28所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述确定部分，还被配置为：
    若所述第一解密部分解密所述鉴别结果信息密文得到的身份鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，则所述确定部分利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证时，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
    所述第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若所述鉴别接入控制器接收到所述第一鉴别响应消息，则所述确定部分确定所述请求设备的数字签名已验证通过。
  30. 根据权利要求25所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第二接收部分接收的鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，所述第一解密部分解密所述鉴别结果信息密文得到的身份鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书；则在所述确定部分确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，所述确定部分还被配置为利用解密得到的所述身份鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则再确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
  31. 根据权利要求20所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第二发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；对应的，所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    则所述确定部分，还被配置为根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述密钥请求消息中所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
  32. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    则所述确定部分，还被配置为根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
  33. 根据权利要求25所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第二随机数和所述请求设备从所述鉴别接入控制器获取的第一随机数；
    所述第一发送部分发送的第一鉴别请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或所述第一随机数；
    所述第一接收部分接收的第一鉴别响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或所述第一随机数；
    所述第二接收部分接收的鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括所述第一随机数和/或所述第二随机数；
    相应的，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第四验证部分，被配置为在所述确定部分确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，将所述第一鉴别响应消息中的鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和/或第一随机数与所述鉴别接入控制器自身的身份标识和/或所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数进行一致性验证；
    所述第四验证部分，还被配置为在所述确定部分确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，将所述鉴别结果恢复消息中的第一随机数和/或第二随机数与所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数和/或所述身份密文消息中的第二随机数进行一致性验证。
  34. 根据权利要求19至33任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  35. 一种请求设备，所述请求设备包括：
    第一加密部分，被配置为利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成身份信息密文；
    第一发送部分，被配置为向鉴别接入控制器发送身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
    第二加密部分，被配置为利用消息加密密钥对包括所述保护随机数在内的信息加密生成保护随机数密文。
  36. 根据权利要求35所述的请求设备，其中，所述请求设备还包括：
    第一接收部分，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；
    第一计算部分，被配置为根据包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥；
    所述第一发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数。
  37. 根据权利要求36所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；
    所述第一计算部分还被配置为根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥；
    所述第一发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述第二随机数。
  38. 根据权利要求37所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数。
  39. 根据权利要求36所述的请求设备，所述第一接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息，所述请求设备还包括：
    第一确定部分，被配置为根据所述安全能力参数信息确定所述请求设备使用的特定安全策略；
    所述第一发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述特定安全策略。
  40. 根据权利要求35所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一发送部分发送的身份密文消息还包括所述保护随机数密文。
  41. 根据权利要求35所述的请求设备，其中，所述请求设备还包括：
    第二发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别结果恢复消息，所述鉴别结果恢复消息包括所述保护随机数密文。
  42. 根据权利要求41所述的请求设备，其中，所述第二发送部分发送的鉴别结果恢复消息中还包括第二消息完整性校验码，则所述请求设备还包括：
    第二计算部分，所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述第二计算部分利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
  43. 根据权利要求41所述的请求设备，其中，所述请求设备还包括：
    第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的包括第一消息完整性校验码的鉴别结果恢复请求消息；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别结果恢复请求消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；
    验证部分，被配置为利用所述消息完整性校验密钥验证所述第一消息完整性校验码。
  44. 根据权利要求36所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述请求设备还包括：
    第二确定部分，被配置为根据所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    所述第一发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识。
  45. 根据权利要求36所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识。
  46. 根据权利要求35至45任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  47. 一种第一鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
    第一接收部分，被配置为接收鉴别接入控制器发送的第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息包括请求设备的身份信息密文，所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
    第一发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名；所述鉴别结果信息密文为所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器利用解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述保护随机数对包括所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成的；所述身份鉴别结果信息中包括对解密所述身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的验证结果。
  48. 根据权利要求47所述的第一鉴别服务器，其中，当所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是同一个鉴别服务器时，所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
    解密部分，被配置为利用加密证书对应的私钥对所述身份信息密文解密得到请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数；
    第一验证部分，被配置为对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到所述数字证书的验证结果；
    第一生成部分，被配置为根据包括所述数字证书的验证结果在内的信息生成身份鉴别结果信息，利用所述保护随机数对包括所述身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成鉴别结果信息密文，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成第一鉴别响应消息。
  49. 根据权利要求47所述的第一鉴别服务器，其中，当所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器时，所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
    第二发送部分，被配置为向所述第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
    第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文和所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名；
    第二验证部分，被配置为利用所述第二鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名进行验证；
    第二生成部分，被配置为当所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名验证通过时，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
  50. 根据权利要求47至49任一项所述的第一鉴别服务器，其中，所述第一鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  51. 一种第二鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，若鉴别接入控 制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：
    接收部分，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书和保护随机数在内的信息加密生成的；
    解密部分，被配置为利用所述加密证书对应的私钥对所述请求设备的加密身份信息解密得到所述请求设备的数字证书和所述保护随机数；
    生成部分，被配置为对所述数字证书进行合法性验证得到所述数字证书的验证结果，根据包括所述数字证书的验证结果在内的信息生成身份鉴别结果信息，利用所述保护随机数对包括所述身份鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成鉴别结果信息密文，对包括所述鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名，根据包括所述鉴别结果信息密文和所述第二鉴别服务器的数字签名在内的信息生成第二鉴别响应消息；
    发送部分，被配置为向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二鉴别响应消息。
  52. 根据权利要求51所述的第二鉴别服务器，其中，所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  53. 一种鉴别接入控制器，包括：
    第一处理器；
    用于存储第一处理器可执行指令的第一存储器；
    其中，所述第一处理器被配置为调用所述第一存储器存储的指令，以执行如权利要求1至15、以及18任意一项所述的鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤。
  54. 一种请求设备，包括：
    第二处理器；
    用于存储第二处理器可执行指令的第二存储器；
    其中，所述第二处理器被配置为调用所述第二存储器存储的指令，以执行如权利要求1至9、13、及18任一项所述的请求设备所执行的步骤。
  55. 一种第一鉴别服务器，包括：
    第三处理器；
    用于存储第三处理器可执行指令的第三存储器；
    其中，所述第三处理器被配置为调用所述第三存储器存储的指令，以执行如权利要求16至18任意一项所述的第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
  56. 一种第二鉴别服务器，包括：
    第四处理器；
    用于存储第四处理器可执行指令的第四存储器；
    其中，所述第四处理器被配置为调用所述第四存储器存储的指令，以执行如权利要求17或18所述的第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
  57. 一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序，该计算机程序被处理器运行时执行如权利要求1至15、以及18任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求1至9、13、及18任一项所述的请求设备所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求16至18任一项所述的第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求17或18所述的第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
  58. 一种计算机程序，包括计算机可读代码，当所述计算机可读代码在电子设备中运行时，计算机设备中的处理器执行用于实现如权利要求1至15、以及18任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求1至9、13、及18任一项所述的请求设备所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求16至18任一项所述的第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求17或18所述的第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
  59. 一种计算机程序产品，包括计算机程序指令，该计算机程序指令使得计算机执行如权利要求1至15、以及18任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求1至9、13、及18任一项所述的请求设备所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求16至18任一项所述的第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤、或者如权利要求17或18所述的第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
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