WO2020221218A1 - 信息获取方法及装置 - Google Patents

信息获取方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020221218A1
WO2020221218A1 PCT/CN2020/087333 CN2020087333W WO2020221218A1 WO 2020221218 A1 WO2020221218 A1 WO 2020221218A1 CN 2020087333 W CN2020087333 W CN 2020087333W WO 2020221218 A1 WO2020221218 A1 WO 2020221218A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
mobility management
management network
network element
root key
indication information
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PCT/CN2020/087333
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
胡力
李�赫
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华为技术有限公司
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Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to EP20798380.0A priority Critical patent/EP3955615A4/en
Publication of WO2020221218A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020221218A1/zh
Priority to US17/511,680 priority patent/US11877150B2/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/02—Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
    • H04W8/08—Mobility data transfer
    • H04W8/12—Mobility data transfer between location registers or mobility servers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/12—Reselecting a serving backbone network switching or routing node

Definitions

  • This application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to information acquisition methods and devices.
  • the mobile communication network defined by the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) introduces a security protection mechanism to ensure the security of mobile communication, including the confidentiality and integrity of communication.
  • 3GPP 3rd generation partnership project
  • 5G fifth generation
  • 5G a partial encryption protection mechanism for the initial non-access stratum (NAS) message is introduced, that is, some cells in the initial NAS message are Encryption processing to protect the cells in the initial NAS message as much as possible.
  • the source AMF may update the root key in the security context, resulting in the target AMF.
  • the security context obtained by the AMF from the source AMF is inconsistent with the security context used by the terminal, so the target AMF cannot decrypt the initial NAS message previously sent by the terminal.
  • the target AMF needs to initiate an authentication process in order to update the security context between the target AMF and the terminal.
  • the terminal resends the initial NAS message to the target AMF, so that the target AMF can decrypt the initial NAS message according to the updated security context to obtain the non-plain text information element in the initial NAS message.
  • the authentication process requires multiple signalings to be exchanged between the target AMF and the terminal, resulting in large signaling overhead.
  • This application provides an information acquisition method and device, which are used in a scenario where the source mobility management network element updates the root key in the security context, and the target mobility management network element can obtain the initial NAS message with lower signaling overhead Non-plain text cells in the.
  • an information acquisition method including: a target mobility management network element sends a first initial non-access stratum NAS message from a terminal to a source mobility management network element, and the first initial NAS message includes a first root The non-plain text cell with the key for security protection; the target mobility management network element receives the second root key and first indication information sent by the source mobility management network element, and the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is A root key after the key is updated; the target mobility management network element sends the second instruction information and the third instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information, and the second instruction information is used to instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself Key to obtain the second root key, the third indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the initial NAS message again; the target mobility management network element receives the second initial NAS message sent by the terminal, and the second initial NAS message includes the second root secret A non-plain text cell that is secured by a key.
  • the target mobility management network element determines that the first root key has been updated to the second root key through the first indication information from the source mobility management network element.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the second indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, so that the terminal can update the first root key to the second root key to ensure that the target mobility management network element and The root keys stored between the terminals are the same.
  • the target mobility management network element also sends third indication information to the terminal to obtain the second initial NAS message sent by the terminal.
  • the target mobility management network element Since the second initial NAS message includes the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key, and the target mobility management network element has obtained the second root key from the source mobility management network element, the target mobility management network element The non-plain text cell that is secured in the second initial NAS message can be decrypted to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the target mobility management network element does not need to initiate an authentication process, which is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead and saves the time spent in the authentication process.
  • the method further includes: the target mobility management network element performs a check on the second root key according to the second root key.
  • the non-plain text cell that is secured in an initial NAS message is decrypted; the target mobility management network element sends second indication information and third indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, including:
  • the target mobility management network element skips the authentication process according to the first indication information, and sends second indication information and third indication information to the terminal. It can be understood that skipping the authentication process is beneficial to saving signaling overhead.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, including: the target mobility management network element skips the authentication process according to the first indication information, Send the second instruction information and the third instruction information to the terminal. It can be understood that skipping the authentication process is beneficial to saving signaling overhead. In addition, there is no need to use the second key to decrypt the secured non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message, which is beneficial to save the time spent in the decryption process.
  • the second initial NAS message is included in a NAS security mode complete (SMP) message or a registration complete message.
  • SMP NAS security mode complete
  • the second indication information and the third indication information are included in a NAS security mode command (security mode command, SMC) message.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the first initial NAS message from the terminal to the source mobility management network element, including: the target mobility management network element sends a context request message to the source mobility management network element, the context request The message includes the first initial NAS message.
  • the target mobility management network element receives the second root key and the first indication information sent by the source mobility management network element, including: the target mobility management network element receives a context response message sent by the source mobility management network element, the context response message includes the second root Key and first instruction information.
  • an information acquisition method including: a target mobility management network element sends a first initial non-access stratum NAS message from a terminal to a source mobility management network element, and the first initial NAS message includes a first root The non-plain text cell with the key for security protection; the target mobility management network element receives the second root key and first indication information sent by the source mobility management network element, and the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is A root key after the key is updated; the target mobility management network element sends the second instruction information and the fourth instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information, and the second instruction information is used to instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself Key to obtain the second root key, and the fourth indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text cell again; the target mobility management network element receives the second initial NAS message sent by the terminal, and the second initial NAS message includes the second root A non-plain text cell that is secured by a key.
  • the target mobility management network element determines that the first root key has been updated to the second root key through the first indication information from the source mobility management network element.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the second indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, so that the terminal can update the first root key to the second root key to ensure that the target mobility management network element and The root keys stored between the terminals are the same.
  • the target mobility management network element also sends fourth indication information to the terminal to obtain the non-plain text cell that is sent by the terminal for security protection with the second root key.
  • the target mobility management network element Since the target mobility management network element has obtained the second root key from the source mobility management network element, the target mobility management network element can decrypt the non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key to obtain the Plain text element. Compared with the prior art, the target mobility management network element does not need to initiate an authentication process, which is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead and saves the time spent in the authentication process.
  • the method further includes: the target mobility management network element performs a check on the second root key according to the second root key.
  • the non-plain text cell that is secured in an initial NAS message is decrypted; the target mobility management network element sends second indication information and third indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, including:
  • the target mobility management network element skips the authentication process according to the first indication information, and sends second indication information and third indication information to the terminal. It can be understood that skipping the authentication process is beneficial to saving signaling overhead.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, including: the target mobility management network element skips the authentication process according to the first indication information, Send the second instruction information and the third instruction information to the terminal. It can be understood that skipping the authentication process is beneficial to saving signaling overhead. In addition, there is no need to use the second key to decrypt the secured non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message, which is beneficial to save the time spent in the decryption process.
  • the second initial NAS message is included in the NAS SMP message or the registration complete message.
  • the second indication information and the fourth indication information are included in the NAS SMC message.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the first initial NAS message from the terminal to the source mobility management network element, including: the target mobility management network element sends a context request message to the source mobility management network element, the context request The message includes the first initial NAS message; the target mobility management network element receives the second root key and the first indication information sent by the source mobility management network element, including: the target mobility management network element receives the context response message sent by the source mobility management network element , The context response message includes the second root key and the first indication information.
  • an information acquisition method including: the target mobility management network element sends a first initial non-access stratum NAS message from a terminal to the source mobility management network element, the first initial NAS message includes the first root The non-plain text cell with the key for security protection; the target mobility management network element receives the second root key, the first indication information, and the non-plain text cell sent by the source mobility management network element, the first indication information is used to indicate the second The root key is the root key after updating the first root key; the target mobility management network element sends the second instruction information and the fourth instruction information to the terminal according to the preset rule and the first instruction information, and the second instruction information is used for To instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second root key, the fourth instruction information is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text information element again; the target mobility management network element receives the second root key sent by the terminal Non-plain text cells for security protection.
  • the target mobility management network element determines that the first root key has been updated to the second root key through the first indication information from the source mobility management network element.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the second indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, so that the terminal can update the first root key to the second root key to ensure that the target mobility management network element and The root keys stored between the terminals are the same.
  • the target mobility management network element also sends fourth indication information to the terminal to obtain the non-plain text cell that is sent by the terminal for security protection with the second root key.
  • the target mobility management network element Since the target mobility management network element has obtained the second root key from the source mobility management network element, the target mobility management network element can decrypt the non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key to obtain the Plain text element. Compared with the prior art, the target mobility management network element does not need to initiate an authentication process, which is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead and saves the time spent in the authentication process.
  • the preset rule includes: when the source mobility management network element is not trusted, the target mobility management network element obtains non-plain text information elements from the terminal again. It is understandable that in the case that the source mobility management network element is not trusted, the non-plain text information element sent by the source mobility management network element may be tampered with. Therefore, it is necessary for the target mobility management network element to obtain the non-plain text information again. Yuan to ensure the security of the communication network.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the second indication information and the fourth indication information to the terminal according to preset rules and the first indication information, including: the target mobility management network element determines whether the source mobility management network element is available If the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy, the target mobility management network element sends second indication information and fourth indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information.
  • the target mobility management network element determines whether the source mobility management network element is trustworthy, including at least one of the following situations: (1) If the target mobility management network element determines that all mobility management network elements are trustworthy, then The target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is trustworthy; (2) If the target mobility management network element determines that all mobility management network elements are not trustworthy, the target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy; 3) If the source mobility management NE is in the whitelist, the target mobility management NE determines that the source mobility management NE is credible, and the whitelist includes at least one mobility management NE; (4) If the source mobility management NE is on the blacklist , The target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is not trusted, and the blacklist includes at least one mobility management network element.
  • the target mobility management network element sends second and fourth indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, including: if the source mobility management network element is not If the information is received, the target mobility management network element skips the authentication process according to the first indication information, and sends the second indication information and the fourth indication information to the terminal.
  • the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second key is included in the NAS SMP message or the registration completion message.
  • the second indication information and the fourth indication information are included in the NAS SMC message.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the first initial NAS message from the terminal to the source mobility management network element, including: the target mobility management network element sends a context request message to the source mobility management network element, the context request The message includes the first initial NAS message.
  • the target mobility management network element receives the second root key, the first indication information, and the non-plain text information element sent by the source mobility management network element, including: the target mobility management network element receives the context response message sent by the source mobility management network element, and the context
  • the response message includes the second root key, the first indication information, and non-plain text information elements.
  • an information acquisition method including: a target mobility management network element sends a first initial non-access stratum NAS message from a terminal to a source mobility management network element, and the first initial NAS message includes a first root The non-plain text cell with the key for security protection; the target mobility management network element receives the second root key, the first indication information, and the non-plain text cell sent by the source mobility management network element, the first indication information is used to indicate the second The root key is the root key after the first root key is updated; the target mobility management network element sends the second instruction information and the third instruction information to the terminal according to the preset rule and the first instruction information, and the second instruction information is used To instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second root key, the third indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the initial NAS message again; the target mobility management network element receives the terminal to send the second initial NAS message, and the second The initial NAS message includes non-plain text cells that are secured with the second root key.
  • the target mobility management network element determines that the first root key has been updated to the second root key through the first indication information from the source mobility management network element.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the second indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, so that the terminal can update the first root key to the second root key to ensure that the target mobility management network element and The root keys stored between the terminals are the same.
  • the target mobility management network element also sends third indication information to the terminal to obtain the second initial NAS message sent by the terminal.
  • the target mobility management network element Since the second initial NAS message includes the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key, and the target mobility management network element has obtained the second root key from the source mobility management network element, the target mobility management network element The non-plain text cell that is secured in the second initial NAS message can be decrypted to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the target mobility management network element does not need to initiate an authentication process, which is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead and saves the time spent in the authentication process.
  • the preset rule includes: when the source mobility management network element is not trusted, the target mobility management network element obtains non-plain text information elements from the terminal again. It is understandable that in the case that the source mobility management network element is not trusted, the non-plain text information element sent by the source mobility management network element may be tampered with. Therefore, it is necessary for the target mobility management network element to obtain the non-plain text information element again. To ensure the security of the communication network.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal according to preset rules and the first indication information, including: the target mobility management network element determines whether the source mobility management network element is available If the source mobility management network element is not credible, the target mobility management network element sends second and third indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information.
  • the target mobility management network element determines whether the source mobility management network element is trustworthy, including at least one of the following situations: (1) If the target mobility management network element determines that all mobility management network elements are trustworthy, then The target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is trustworthy; (2) If the target mobility management network element determines that all mobility management network elements are not trustworthy, the target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy; 3) If the source mobility management NE is in the whitelist, the target mobility management NE determines that the source mobility management NE is credible, and the whitelist includes at least one mobility management NE; (4) If the source mobility management NE is on the blacklist , The target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is not trusted, and the blacklist includes at least one mobility management network element.
  • the target mobility management network element sends second and third indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, including: if the source mobility management network element is not According to the first indication information, the target mobility management network element skips the authentication process and sends the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal. It can be understood that skipping the authentication process is beneficial to saving signaling overhead.
  • the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second key is included in the NAS SMP message or the registration completion message.
  • the second indication information and the fourth indication information are included in the NAS SMC message.
  • the target mobility management network element sends the first initial NAS message from the terminal to the source mobility management network element, including: the target mobility management network element sends a context request message to the source mobility management network element, the context request The message includes the first initial NAS message.
  • the target mobility management network element receives the second root key, the first indication information, and the non-plain text information element sent by the source mobility management network element, including: the target mobility management network element receives the context response message sent by the source mobility management network element, and the context
  • the response message includes the second root key, the first indication information, and non-plain text information elements.
  • a communication device including: a sending module, configured to send a first initial non-access stratum NAS message from a terminal to a source mobility management network element, the first initial NAS message including the first root secret A non-plain text cell that is secured by a key.
  • the receiving module is configured to receive the second root key and first indication information sent by the source mobility management network element, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is the root key after the first root key is updated.
  • the sending module is further configured to send second indication information and third indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, where the second indication information is used to instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second root key, The third indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the initial NAS message again.
  • the receiving module is further configured to receive a second initial NAS message sent by the terminal, where the second initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key.
  • the communication module further includes a processing module.
  • the processing module is configured to, after the receiving module receives the second root key and the first indication information, decrypt the security-protected non-plain text cells in the first initial NAS message according to the second root key.
  • the sending module is further configured to, in the case that the processing module fails to decrypt the non-plaintext cell that is secured in the first initial NAS message, skip the authentication process according to the first instruction information, and send the second instruction information to the terminal And the third instruction information.
  • the sending module is further configured to skip the authentication process according to the first indication information, and send the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal.
  • the second initial NAS message is included in the NAS SMP message or the registration complete message.
  • the second indication information and the third indication information are included in the NAS SMC message.
  • the sending module is specifically configured to send a context request message to the source mobility management network element, and the context request message includes the first initial NAS message.
  • the receiving module is specifically used for the context response message sent by the source mobility management network element, where the context response message includes the second root key and the first indication information.
  • a communication device including: a sending module, configured to send a first initial non-access stratum NAS message from a terminal to a source mobility management network element, the first initial NAS message including the first root secret A non-plain text cell that is secured by a key.
  • the receiving module is configured to receive the second root key and first indication information sent by the source mobility management network element, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is the root key after the first root key is updated.
  • the sending module is further configured to send second indication information and fourth indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, where the second indication information is used to instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second root key, The fourth indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text cell again.
  • the receiving module is further configured to receive a second initial NAS message sent by the terminal, where the second initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key.
  • the communication module also includes a processing module.
  • the processing module is configured to, after the receiving module receives the second root key and the first indication information sent by the source mobility management network element, perform, according to the second root key, to the non-plain text message that is securely protected in the first initial NAS message Yuan is decrypted.
  • the sending module is further configured to, in the case that the processing module fails to decrypt the non-plaintext cell that is secured in the first initial NAS message, skip the authentication process according to the first instruction information, and send the second instruction information to the terminal And the third instruction information.
  • the sending module is further configured to skip the authentication process according to the first indication information, and send the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal.
  • the second initial NAS message is included in the NAS SMP message or the registration complete message.
  • the second indication information and the fourth indication information are included in the NAS SMC message.
  • the sending module is specifically configured to send a context request message to the source mobility management network element, and the context request message includes the first initial NAS message.
  • the receiving module is specifically configured to receive a context response message sent by the source mobility management network element, where the context response message includes the second root key and the first indication information.
  • a communication device including: a sending module, configured to send a first initial non-access stratum NAS message from a terminal to a source mobility management network element, the first initial NAS message including the first root secret A non-plain text cell that is secured by a key.
  • the receiving module is configured to receive the second root key, the first indication information, and the non-plain text information element sent by the source mobility management network element, the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is an update to the first root key After the root key.
  • the sending module is further configured to send second instruction information and fourth instruction information to the terminal according to the preset rule and the first instruction information.
  • the second instruction information is used to instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second Root key
  • the fourth indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text cell again.
  • the receiving module is also used to receive the non-plain text cell that is sent by the terminal for security protection with the second root key.
  • the preset rule includes: when the source mobility management network element is not trusted, the target mobility management network element obtains non-plain text information elements from the terminal again.
  • the communication module also includes a processing module.
  • the processing module is used to determine whether the source mobility management network element is credible.
  • the sending module is further configured to send second instruction information and fourth instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information when the processing module determines that the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy.
  • the processing module is used to determine whether the source mobility management network element is trustworthy, including at least one of the following situations: (1) If the target mobility management network element determines that all mobility management network elements are trustworthy, then The target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is trustworthy; (2) If the target mobility management network element determines that all mobility management network elements are not trustworthy, the target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy; 3) If the source mobility management NE is in the whitelist, the target mobility management NE determines that the source mobility management NE is credible, and the whitelist includes at least one mobility management NE; (4) If the source mobility management NE is on the blacklist , The target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is not trusted, and the blacklist includes at least one mobility management network element.
  • the sending module is specifically used for when the processing module determines that the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy, the target mobility management network element skips the authentication process according to the first instruction information, and sends the second Instruction information and fourth instruction information.
  • the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second key is included in the NAS SMP message or the registration completion message.
  • the second indication information and the fourth indication information are included in the NAS SMC message.
  • the sending module is specifically configured to send a context request message to the source mobility management network element, and the context request message includes the first initial NAS message.
  • the receiving module is specifically configured to receive a context response message sent by the source mobility management network element, where the context response message includes the second root key, first indication information, and non-plain text information elements.
  • a communication device including: a sending module, configured to send a first initial non-access stratum NAS message from a terminal to a source mobility management network element, the first initial NAS message including the first root secret A non-plain text cell that is secured by a key.
  • the receiving module is configured to receive the second root key, the first indication information, and the non-plain text information element sent by the source mobility management network element, the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is an update to the first root key After the root key.
  • the sending module is further configured to send second instruction information and third instruction information to the terminal according to preset rules and the first instruction information.
  • the second instruction information is used to instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second
  • the root key and the third indication information are used to instruct the terminal to send the initial NAS message again.
  • the receiving module is configured to receive a second initial NAS message sent by the terminal, where the second initial NAS message includes non-plain text cells that are secured by the second root key.
  • the preset rule includes: when the source mobility management network element is not trusted, the target mobility management network element obtains non-plain text information elements from the terminal again.
  • the communication device also includes a processing module.
  • the processing module is used to determine whether the source mobility management network element is credible.
  • the sending module is configured to send the second instruction information and the third instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information when the processing module determines that the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy.
  • the processing module is used to determine whether the source mobility management network element is trustworthy, including at least one of the following situations: (1) If the target mobility management network element determines that all mobility management network elements are trustworthy, then The target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is trustworthy; (2) If the target mobility management network element determines that all mobility management network elements are not trustworthy, the target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy; 3) If the source mobility management NE is in the whitelist, the target mobility management NE determines that the source mobility management NE is credible, and the whitelist includes at least one mobility management NE; (4) If the source mobility management NE is on the blacklist , The target mobility management network element determines that the source mobility management network element is not trusted, and the blacklist includes at least one mobility management network element.
  • the sending module is specifically used to skip the authentication process according to the first instruction information and send the second instruction information and the third instruction information to the terminal when the processing module determines that the source mobility management network element is not trustworthy. Instructions.
  • the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second key is included in the NAS SMP message or the registration completion message.
  • the second indication information and the fourth indication information are included in the NAS SMC message.
  • the sending module is specifically configured to send a context request message to the source mobility management network element, and the context request message includes the first initial NAS message.
  • the receiving module is specifically configured to receive a context response message sent by the source mobility management network element, where the context response message includes the second root key, first indication information, and non-plain text information elements.
  • a communication device including: a processor configured to couple with a memory, read instructions in the memory, and implement any one of the first to fourth aspects according to the instructions The described information acquisition method.
  • a computer-readable storage medium stores instructions that, when run on a communication device, enable the communication device to execute any one of the first to fourth aspects mentioned above.
  • a computer program product containing instructions which when running on a communication device, enables the communication device to execute the information acquisition method described in any one of the first to fourth aspects.
  • a chip in a twelfth aspect, includes a processing module and a communication interface.
  • the communication interface is used to transmit received code instructions to the processing module.
  • the processing module is used to run the code instructions to support the communication device to perform the first aspect.
  • the code instruction can come from the internal memory of the chip or the external memory of the chip.
  • the processing module may be a processor or microprocessor or integrated circuit integrated on the chip.
  • the communication interface can be an input/output circuit or transceiver pins on the chip.
  • a communication system including: a terminal, a source mobility management network element, and a target mobility management network element.
  • the terminal is configured to send a first non-access stratum NAS message to the target mobility management network element, where the first initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with a first root key.
  • the target mobility management network element is used to send the first initial NAS message to the source mobility management network element.
  • the source mobility management network element is configured to update the first root key stored in itself after performing integrity verification on the first initial NAS message, and generate a second root key; and
  • the target mobility management network element sends first indication information and the second root key, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is the root key after updating the first root key .
  • the target mobility management network element is further configured to send second instruction information and third instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information, and the second instruction information is used to instruct the terminal to update its own
  • the first root key is used to obtain the second root key
  • the third indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the initial NAS message again.
  • the terminal is further configured to update the first root key stored by itself according to the second instruction information to generate the second root key; and, according to the third instruction information, send the message to the target
  • the mobility management network element sends a second initial NAS message, where the second initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key.
  • a communication system including: a terminal, a target mobility management network element, and a source mobility management network element.
  • Terminal source mobility management network element, and target mobility management network element.
  • the terminal is configured to send a first non-access stratum NAS message to the target mobility management network element, where the first initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with a first root key.
  • the target mobility management network element is used to send the first initial NAS message to the source mobility management network element.
  • the source mobility management network element is configured to update the first root key stored in itself after performing integrity verification on the first initial NAS message, and generate a second root key; and The target mobility management network element sends first indication information and the second root key, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is the root key after updating the first root key .
  • the target mobility management network element is further configured to send second instruction information and fourth instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information, and the second instruction information is used to instruct the terminal to update its own
  • the first root key is used to obtain the second root key, and the fourth indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send a non-plain text cell again.
  • the terminal is further configured to update the first root key stored by itself according to the second instruction information, and generate the second root key; and, according to the fourth instruction information, report to the target
  • the mobility management network element sends a non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key.
  • a communication system including: a terminal, a target mobility management network element, and a source mobility management network element.
  • the terminal is configured to send a first non-access stratum NAS message to the target mobility management network element, where the first initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with a first root key.
  • the target mobility management network element is used to send the first initial NAS message to the source mobility management network element.
  • the source mobility management network element is configured to decrypt the first initial NAS message to obtain at least one non-plain text information element after performing integrity check on the first initial NAS message;
  • the first key is to generate a second key; the first indication information, the second key, and the at least one non-plain text element are sent to the target mobility management network element, the first indication The information is used to indicate that the second root key is the root key after updating the first root key.
  • the target mobility management network element is further configured to send second instruction information and fourth instruction information to the terminal according to a preset rule and the first instruction information, where the second instruction information is used to instruct the terminal Update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second root key, and the fourth indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text cell again.
  • the terminal is further configured to update the first root key stored by itself according to the second instruction information, and generate the second root key; and, according to the fourth instruction information, report to the target
  • the mobility management network element sends the at least one non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key.
  • a communication system including: a terminal, a target mobility management network element, and a source mobility management network element.
  • the terminal is configured to send a first non-access stratum NAS message to the target mobility management network element, where the first initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with a first root key.
  • the target mobility management network element is used to send the first initial NAS message to the source mobility management network element.
  • the source mobility management network element is configured to decrypt the first initial NAS message to obtain at least one non-plain text information element after performing integrity check on the first initial NAS message;
  • the first key is to generate a second key; the first indication information, the second key, and the at least one non-plain text element are sent to the target mobility management network element, the first indication The information is used to indicate that the second root key is the root key after updating the first root key.
  • the target mobility management network element is further configured to send second instruction information and third instruction information to the terminal according to a preset rule and the first instruction information, where the second instruction information is used to instruct the terminal Update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second root key, and the third indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the initial NAS message again.
  • the terminal is further configured to update the first root key stored by itself according to the second instruction information to generate the second root key; and, according to the third instruction information, send the message to the target
  • the mobility management network element sends a second initial NAS message, where the second initial NAS message includes the at least one non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key.
  • Fig. 1 is a flowchart of an information acquisition method provided by the prior art
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system provided by an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a 5G network architecture provided by an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of an information acquisition method provided by an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of another information acquisition method provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of another information acquisition method provided by an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 8 is a flowchart of another information acquisition method provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • A/B can mean A or B.
  • the "and/or” in this article is only an association relationship describing the associated objects, which means that there can be three relationships, for example, A and/or B, which can mean: A alone exists, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone These three situations.
  • “at least one” means one or more
  • “plurality” means two or more. The words “first” and “second” do not limit the quantity and order of execution, and the words “first” and “second” do not limit the difference.
  • instructions can include direct instructions and indirect instructions, as well as explicit instructions and implicit instructions.
  • the information indicated by a certain piece of information (the first indication information and the second indication information as described below) is referred to as information to be indicated.
  • the information to be indicated may be directly indicated, wherein the information to be indicated itself or the index of the information to be indicated, etc.
  • the information to be indicated can also be indicated indirectly by indicating other information, where there is an association relationship between the other information and the information to be indicated.
  • it is also possible to realize the indication of specific information by means of the pre-arranged order (for example, stipulated by the agreement) of each information, thereby reducing the indication overhead to a certain extent.
  • the initial NAS message is the first NAS message sent by the terminal from the idle (IDLE) state to the connected (CONNECTED) state. It should be noted that when the terminal is in the IDLE state, the terminal does not establish a radio resource control (Radio Resource Control, RRC) connection with the network side; when the terminal is in the CONNECTED state, the terminal establishes an RRC connection with the network side.
  • RRC Radio Resource Control
  • the initial NAS message may be a registration request message, a service request message, or a de-registration request message, etc., which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the initial NAS message when a partial encryption mechanism is introduced, the initial NAS message includes cleartext information and non-cleartext information.
  • plain text information is information that does not need to be encrypted
  • non-plain text information is information that needs to be encrypted. It should be noted that non-plain text information can also be referred to as encrypted information or cipher text information.
  • the plaintext information includes at least one of the following information elements: extended protocol discriminator, security header type, reserved half-word (spare half octet), registration request message identifier ( registration request message identity), 5G system registration type (5G system registration type), next generation key set identifier (ngKSI), 5G system mobile identity (5G system mobile identity, 5GS mobile identity), UE security Capability (UE security capability), additional globally unique temporary UE identity (additional GUTI), UE status (UE status), and evolved packet system (EPS) NAS message container (NAS message container) container).
  • extended protocol discriminator security header type, reserved half-word (spare half octet), registration request message identifier ( registration request message identity), 5G system registration type (5G system registration type), next generation key set identifier (ngKSI), 5G system mobile identity (5G system mobile identity, 5GS mobile identity), UE security Capability (UE security capability), additional globally unique temporary UE identity (additional GUTI), UE status (UE status), and evolved packet
  • the non-plain text information includes at least one of the following information elements: 5G mobility management capability (5GMM capability), payload container (payload container), user plane data, etc.
  • the non-plaintext information may include other information elements in the initial NAS message except for the plaintext information.
  • the cells included in the plaintext information may be called plaintext cells; the cells included in the non-plaintext information may be called ciphertext cells, or non-plaintext cells, or Encrypted cells.
  • the security context refers to information that can be used to implement data security protection (for example, encryption/decryption and/or integrity protection/verification).
  • the security context can include one or more of the following: root key, encryption key, integrity protection key, specific parameters (such as NAS Count), key set identifier (KSI for short), security algorithm, security Indications (for example, an indication of whether to enable encryption, an indication of whether to enable integrity protection, an indication of key usage period, key length), etc.
  • the encryption key is a parameter input when the sender encrypts the plaintext according to the encryption algorithm to generate the ciphertext. If symmetric encryption is used, the encryption key and decryption key are the same.
  • the receiving end can decrypt the cipher text according to the same encryption algorithm and encryption key. In other words, the sender and receiver can encrypt and decrypt based on the same key.
  • the integrity protection key is a parameter input when the sender performs integrity protection on the plaintext or ciphertext according to the integrity protection algorithm.
  • the receiving end can perform integrity verification on the integrity-protected data according to the same integrity protection algorithm and integrity protection key.
  • the security algorithm is the algorithm used when the data is secured. For example, encryption algorithm, decryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, etc.
  • the root key is used to generate encryption keys and integrity protection keys.
  • the root key may be referred to as a NAS root key, which is denoted as Kamf.
  • the encryption key can also be called the NAS encryption key, denoted as Knas-enc.
  • the integrity protection key can also be referred to as the NAS integrity protection key and is denoted as Knas-int. It should be noted that the specific process of generating the encryption key and the integrity protection key by using the root key can refer to the prior art, which is not repeated in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the source AMF and the terminal when the terminal is registered with the source AMF, the source AMF and the terminal will perform an authentication process to generate the security context of the terminal on the terminal and the source AMF respectively.
  • the root key stored in the security context may be referred to as the first root key.
  • the source AMF may change the first security context of the source AMF due to the local policy of the source AMF.
  • One key is updated.
  • the updated first root key may be referred to as the second root key. It is understandable that the second root key is the root key after updating the first root key.
  • the target AMF obtains the non-plain text information element carried in the initial NAS information with reference to FIG. 1.
  • the terminal generates an initial NAS message #1, which includes a non-plain text cell that is secured by the first root key. After that, the terminal sends the initial NAS message #1 to the target AMF.
  • the target AMF does not have the security context of the terminal locally, it sends a context request message to the source AMF, and the context request message includes the initial NAS message #1.
  • the source AMF performs an integrity check on the initial NAS message #1.
  • the source AMF can update the first root key in the security context to the second root key.
  • the source AMF sends a context response message to the target AMF, where the context response message includes a security context, and the security context includes the second root key.
  • the target AMF decrypts the initial NAS message #1 according to the second root key in the security context. Since the initial NAS message #1 is secured with the first root key, the target AMF cannot successfully decrypt the initial NAS message #1. After the decryption fails, the target AMF initiates an authentication process to facilitate synchronization of the security context between the target AMF and the terminal.
  • the target AMF sends a NAS SMC message to the terminal to request the terminal to resend the initial NAS message.
  • the terminal receives the NAS SMC message
  • the terminal generates the initial NAS message #2 according to the root key (for example, the third root key) in the updated security context.
  • the terminal sends a NAS SMP message to the target AMF, and the NAS SMP message includes the initial NAS message #2.
  • the target AMF can decrypt the initial NAS message #2, The non-plain text cell in the initial NAS message #2 is obtained.
  • the foregoing authentication process can refer to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • the target AMF sends an authentication request to the terminal, and the terminal returns an authentication response message to the target AMF.
  • the authentication process may also be called a re-authentication process, and the embodiment of the present application is not limited to this.
  • the target AMF needs to initiate an authentication process, which requires multiple signaling interactions between the target AMF and the terminal, resulting in the target AMF
  • the entire process of the AMF obtaining the non-plain text cell in the initial NAS message will generate a large signaling overhead, and also increase the delay for the target AMF to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • this application provides an information acquisition method, and the specific description of the method can be found below.
  • the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, for example, a communication system that adopts the fifth generation (5G) communication technology, a future evolution system, or multiple communication convergence systems, and so on.
  • the technical solution provided by this application can be applied to a variety of application scenarios, such as machine to machine (M2M), macro and micro communications, enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), ultra-high reliability and ultra-low latency Scenarios such as communication (ultra-reliable&low latency communication, uRLLC) and massive Internet of Things communication (massive machine type communication, mMTC).
  • M2M machine to machine
  • eMBB enhanced mobile broadband
  • uRLLC ultra-high reliability and ultra-low latency Scenarios
  • mMTC massive Internet of Things communication
  • These scenarios may include, but are not limited to: a communication scenario between a communication device and a communication device, a communication scenario between a network device and a network device, a communication scenario between a network device and a communication device, and so on.
  • a communication scenario between a communication device and a communication device a communication scenario between a network device and a network device
  • a communication scenario between a network device and a communication device and so on.
  • the application in the communication scenario between the network device and the terminal is taken as an example.
  • the communication system includes: a target mobility management network element 101, a source mobility management network element 102, and a terminal 103.
  • the target mobility management network element 101 is a mobility management network element that provides services such as mobility management for the terminal 103 after handover.
  • the source mobility management network element 102 is a mobility management network element that provides services such as mobility management for the terminal 103 before handover.
  • the communication system shown in FIG. 2 may be applied to the current 5G network and other future networks, and the embodiment of the present application is not limited to this.
  • a 5G network may include: terminals, radio access networks (RAN) or access networks (AN) (hereinafter RAN and AN are collectively referred to as (R)AN), core networks, and data networks ( data network, DN).
  • the core network includes multiple core network network elements (or referred to as network function network elements), such as: AMF network elements, session management function (session management function, SMF) network elements, policy control function (PCF) Network element, user plane function (UPF) network element, application layer function (application function) network element, authentication function (authentication server function, AUSF) network element, and unified data management (UDM) Network element.
  • the core network may also include some other network elements not shown, which are not described in detail in the embodiment of the present application.
  • N11 interfaces there may be logical interfaces between various network elements (or devices).
  • N11 interfaces there are logical interfaces between AMF network elements and SMF network elements, which are referred to as N11 interfaces in this article; there are logical interfaces between AMF network elements and terminals. Interface, this article calls it N1 interface.
  • N1 interface This article will not be expanded one by one here.
  • the names of the above logical interfaces are only examples and do not constitute a limitation.
  • the above-mentioned core network elements may have other names, and the embodiment of the present application is not limited thereto.
  • the AMF network element may also be referred to as AMF for short
  • the UPF network element may also be referred to as UPF for short, and so on.
  • the terminal may be a device with a wireless transceiver function.
  • the terminal may have different names, such as user equipment (UE), access terminal, terminal unit, terminal station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, remote terminal, mobile equipment, wireless communication equipment, terminal agent Or terminal devices, etc.
  • UE user equipment
  • the terminal can be deployed on land, including indoor or outdoor, handheld or vehicle-mounted; it can also be deployed on the water (such as a ship, etc.); it can also be deployed in the air (such as aeroplane, balloon, satellite, etc.).
  • Terminals include handheld devices, vehicle-mounted devices, wearable devices, or computing devices with wireless communication functions.
  • the terminal may be a mobile phone, a tablet computer, or a computer with wireless transceiver function.
  • Terminal equipment can also be virtual reality (VR) terminal equipment, augmented reality (augmented reality, AR) terminal equipment, wireless terminals in industrial control, wireless terminals in unmanned driving, wireless terminals in telemedicine, and smart Wireless terminals in power grids, wireless terminals in smart cities, wireless terminals in smart homes, and so on.
  • the device for implementing the function of the terminal may be a terminal, or a device capable of supporting the terminal to implement the function, such as a chip system.
  • the chip system may be composed of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices.
  • the device used to implement the functions of the terminal is a terminal as an example to describe the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application.
  • AMF can be used for connection management, mobility management, registration management, access authentication and authorization, reachability management, security context management, and SMF network element selection.
  • SMF network elements can be used for session management such as session establishment, modification, and release, UPF network element selection and control, service and session continuity (service and session continuity) mode selection, and roaming services.
  • the PCF network element can be used to provide policy control services and obtain contract information related to policy decisions.
  • UPF network elements can be used to process events related to the user plane, such as transmitting or routing data packets, detecting data packets, reporting traffic, processing quality of service (QoS), lawful monitoring, and storing downlink data packets.
  • QoS quality of service
  • the target mobility management network element 101 and the source mobility management network element 102 may be the AMF in the 5G network
  • the terminal 103 may be a terminal in a 5G network.
  • the target mobility management network element 101, the source mobility management network element 102, or the terminal 103 shown in FIG. 2 may be implemented by one device, or multiple devices, or one device within one device.
  • Functional modules this embodiment of the application does not specifically limit this. It can be understood that the above-mentioned functions may be network elements in hardware devices, software functions running on dedicated hardware, or virtualization functions instantiated on a platform (for example, a cloud platform).
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • the communication device includes at least one processor 201, a communication line 202, a memory 203 and at least one communication interface 204.
  • the processor 201 can be a general-purpose central processing unit (central processing unit, CPU), a microprocessor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more programs for controlling the execution of the program of this application. integrated circuit.
  • CPU central processing unit
  • ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
  • the communication line 202 may include a path to transmit information between the aforementioned components.
  • the communication interface 204 uses any device such as a transceiver to communicate with other devices or communication networks, such as Ethernet, radio access network (RAN), wireless local area networks (WLAN), etc. .
  • RAN radio access network
  • WLAN wireless local area networks
  • the memory 203 can be a read-only memory (ROM) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, random access memory (RAM), or other types that can store information and instructions
  • the dynamic storage device can also be electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disk storage, optical disc storage (Including compact discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.), magnetic disk storage media or other magnetic storage devices, or can be used to carry or store desired program codes in the form of instructions or data structures and can be used by a computer Any other media accessed, but not limited to this.
  • the memory can exist independently and is connected to the processor through the communication line 202. The memory can also be integrated with the processor.
  • the memory 203 is used to store computer-executed instructions for executing the solution of the present application, and the processor 201 controls the execution.
  • the processor 201 is configured to execute computer-executable instructions stored in the memory 203, so as to implement the message transmission method provided in the following embodiments of the present application.
  • the computer-executable instructions in the embodiments of the present application may also be referred to as application program code, which is not specifically limited in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the processor 201 may include one or more CPUs, such as CPU0 and CPU1 in FIG. 4.
  • the communication device 300 may include multiple processors, such as the processor 201 and the processor 207 in FIG. 4. Each of these processors can be a single-CPU (single-CPU) processor or a multi-core (multi-CPU) processor.
  • the processor here may refer to one or more devices, circuits, and/or processing cores for processing data (for example, computer program instructions).
  • the communication apparatus may further include an output device 205 and an input device 206.
  • the output device 205 communicates with the processor 201 and can display information in a variety of ways.
  • the output device 205 may be a liquid crystal display (LCD), a light emitting diode (LED) display device, a cathode ray tube (CRT) display device, or a projector (projector) Wait.
  • the input device 206 communicates with the processor 201 and can receive user input in a variety of ways.
  • the input device 206 may be a mouse, a keyboard, a touch screen device, a sensor device, or the like.
  • an information acquisition method provided by an embodiment of this application includes the following steps:
  • the terminal sends a first initial NAS message to the target AMF, so that the target AMF receives the first initial NAS message from the terminal.
  • the first initial NAS message is an initial NAS message that is secured by the first root key.
  • the first initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell whose integrity is protected by the first root key.
  • the first root key is the root key stored in the current security context of the terminal.
  • the first key can be used to generate the first encryption key and the first integrity protection key.
  • the first encryption key and the first integrity protection key are derived from the first root key.
  • the terminal encrypts the plaintext information and the non-plaintext information with the first encryption key to construct the first NAS message container; after that, the terminal completes the first initial NAS message container with the first integrity protection key Sexual protection; Finally, the terminal uses the plaintext information and the first initial NAS message to construct the first initial NAS message.
  • the target AMF sends the first initial NAS message to the source AMF, so that the source AMF receives the first initial NAS message sent by the target AMF.
  • the target AMF may obtain the plaintext information in the first initial NAS message by parsing the first initial NAS message; then, the target AMF determines the source AMF according to the 5GS mobile identity in the plaintext information.
  • the target AMF sends a context request (context request) message to the source AMF, where the context request message is used to request the security context of the terminal, and the context request message includes the first initial NAS message.
  • context request context request
  • the source AMF updates the first root key and generates a second root key.
  • the second root key is the root key after the first root key is updated.
  • the second root key can generate a second encryption key and a second integrity protection key.
  • the second encryption key and the second integrity protection key can be derived from the second root key.
  • the source AMF parses the first initial NAS message and obtains the plaintext information in the first initial NAS message; then, the source AMF obtains the terminal’s mobile identity according to 5GS mobile identity in the plaintext information.
  • Security context The source AMF can perform integrity verification on the first initial NAS message according to the integrity protection key in the security context. When the integrity check of the first initial NAS message is successful (that is, the source AMF can determine that the first initial NAS message is complete), the source AMF can update the first root key and generate the second root key according to the local policy .
  • the local policy includes: when the source AMF determines that the target AMF is not trustworthy, the source AMF updates the root key.
  • the key isolation between the AMF can be realized, preventing the attacker from directly obtaining the root key (that is, the first root key) currently used by the terminal after hacking the target AMF, and decrypting the connection between the terminal and the source AMF Content of the communication. This helps to improve the security of the communication network.
  • the source AMF determines whether the target AMF is credible, including: the source AMF can determine that all AMFs are not credible; or, the source AMF can determine that the AMFs in the blacklist are not credible; or, the source AMF can determine AMF that is not in the whitelist is untrustworthy.
  • the source AMF generates the second root key according to the first root key, the direction value, and the upstream NAS count value (count). It is understandable that the key generation algorithm adopted by the source AMF can refer to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • the direction value is used to indicate the direction of data transmission (for example, the uplink direction or the downlink direction).
  • the direction value can be 0x00, indicating the upstream direction.
  • the uplink NAS count is used to count the NAS messages sent by the terminal to the network side.
  • the uplink NAS count may include the uplink non-access stratum sequence number (NAS sequence number, NAS SQN) and the uplink non-access stratum overflow value (NAS OVERFLOW).
  • the source AMF and the terminal jointly maintain the uplink NAS count.
  • the source AMF may determine the uplink NAS count according to the uplink NAS SQN carried in the first initial NAS message, combined with the uplink NAS OVERFLOW stored by itself.
  • the source AMF sends the second root key and the first indication information to the target AMF, so that the target AMF receives the second root key and the first indication message sent by the source AMF.
  • the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is an updated root key.
  • the first indication information is used to indicate that the second root key is the root key after updating the first root key.
  • the first indication information may be recorded as keyAmfHDerivationInd, and the embodiment of the present application is not limited to this.
  • the source AMF sends a context response message to the target AMF.
  • the context response message is used to feed back the security context of the terminal to the target AMF.
  • the context response message includes the first indication information and the second root key.
  • the context response message may be referred to as Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer response message.
  • the second root key is stored in the security context; the first indication information may be stored in the security context, or may be an independent cell in the context response message.
  • the target AMF can determine the second encryption key and the second integrity protection key according to the second root key, so that The target AMF uses the second encryption key to perform corresponding encryption/decryption, and uses the second integrity protection key to perform corresponding verification.
  • the target AMF sends the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal according to the first indication information, so that the terminal receives the second indication information and the third indication information sent by the target AMF.
  • the second indication information is used to instruct the terminal to update the first root key stored by itself to obtain the second root key.
  • the second indication information may be recorded as K_AMF_change_flag, and the embodiment of the present application is not limited thereto. It is understandable that after the terminal receives the second indication information, the terminal will update the first root key according to the second indication information to obtain the second root key. Further, the terminal also derives the second encryption key and the second integrity protection key according to the second root key.
  • the third indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the initial NAS message again. It can be understood that the content of the initial NAS message sent again is the same as the first initial NAS message sent before.
  • the second indication information and the third indication information may be carried in a NAS SMC message.
  • the NAS SMC message may be integrity protected with the second integrity protection key to avoid tampering by an attacker.
  • the third indication information may be an independent cell in the NAS SMC message. In this way, if the NAS SMC message includes the independent cell, it means that the NAS SMC message carries the third indication information. If the NAS SMC message does not include the independent cell, it means that the NAS SMC message does not carry the third indication information.
  • the NAS SMC message may use a bit field value to indicate whether the NAS SMC message carries the third indication information. For example, taking the bit field including only one bit as an example, "0" indicates that the NAS SMC message carries the third indication information, and "1" indicates that the NAS SMC message does not carry the third indication information.
  • the target AMF decrypts the security-protected non-plain text cells in the first initial NAS message according to the second root key. It is understandable that since the non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message is secured with the first key, the target AMF cannot successfully perform the security-protected non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message Decrypt. After the decryption fails, the target AMF skips the authentication process according to the first instruction information, and sends the second instruction information and the third instruction information to the source AMF.
  • the target AMF does not decrypt the securely protected non-plain text cells in the first initial NAS message, and directly according to the first indication information , Skip the authentication process, and send the second indication information and the third indication information to the source AMF. It is understandable that, because the target AMF can learn from the first indication information that it has received the second root key and cannot decrypt the first initial NAS message, the AMF is not used to decrypt the first initial NAS message with the second root key. Therefore, the time spent in the decryption process is saved, thereby reducing the delay for the target AMF to obtain non-plain text cells.
  • S106 The terminal sends a second initial NAS message to the target AMF, so that the target AMF receives the second initial NAS message.
  • the second initial NAS message is an initial NAS message that is secured by the second root key.
  • the second initial NAS message includes non-plain text cells that are secured with the second root key.
  • the terminal updates the first root key stored by itself according to the second instruction information to obtain the second root key. After that, the terminal generates a second initial NAS message according to the third indication information, and sends the second initial NAS message to the target AMF. In this way, because the target AMF obtains the second root key from the source AMF in advance, the target AMF can use the second root key to decrypt the secured non-plain text cells in the second initial NAS message to obtain Non-plain text element.
  • the terminal may generate the second initial NAS message in the following manner: the terminal encrypts the plaintext information and the non-plaintext information with the second encryption key to construct a second NAS message container; afterwards, the terminal protects the secret with the second integrity The key protects the integrity of the second initial NAS message container; finally, the terminal constructs the second initial NAS message with the second initial NAS message container and plaintext information.
  • non-plain text information elements included in the first initial NAS message and the non-plain text information elements included in the second initial NAS message are the same in content, and the root keys used in security protection are different. of.
  • the second initial NAS message may be included in the NAS SMP message.
  • the initial NAS message is a registration request message
  • the second initial NAS message may be included in the registration completion message.
  • the target AMF determines that the first root key has been updated to the second root key through the first indication information from the source AMF.
  • the target AMF sends the second instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information, so that the terminal can update the first root key to the second root key to ensure the root key stored between the target AMF and the terminal.
  • the keys are the same.
  • the target AMF also sends third indication information to the terminal to obtain the second initial NAS message sent by the terminal. Since the second initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key, and the target AMF has obtained the second root key from the source AMF, the target AMF can be used in the second initial NAS message.
  • the non-plain text cell of the security protection is decrypted to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the target AMF does not need to initiate an authentication process, which is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead and saves the time spent in the authentication process.
  • steps S105-S106 in FIG. 5 can be replaced with steps S107-S108.
  • the target AMF sends second instruction information and fourth instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information.
  • step S105 For the related description of the second indication information, please refer to the introduction in step S105, which will not be repeated here.
  • the fourth indication information is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text cell again.
  • the non-plain text information element that needs to be sent again may be a part or all of the non-plain text information element carried in the first initial NAS message.
  • the non-plain text cell that needs to be sent again is part of the non-plain text cell carried in the first initial NAS message
  • the non-plain text cell that needs to be sent again can be the target AMF and the terminal.
  • the agreement is determined in advance, or defined in the standard, or indicated by the fourth indication information.
  • the fourth indication information may include the identification of each non-plain text cell that needs to be sent again.
  • the first initial NAS message carries non-plain text cell #1, non-plain text cell #2, and non-plain text cell #3
  • the fourth indication information may include the identification of non-plain text cell #1 and the non-plain text.
  • the identification of cell #3 in this way, the terminal only needs to send the non-plain text cell #1 and the non-plain text cell #3 to the target AMF again without sending the non-plain text cell #2 again.
  • the fourth indication information includes a bitmap, and every n bits in the bitmap corresponds to a non-plain text cell, and the value of the n bits is used to indicate whether the terminal sends the non-plain text cell corresponding to the n bits again. Taking one bit corresponding to one non-plain text cell as an example, "0" is used to instruct the terminal not to send the non-plain text cell again, and "1" is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text cell again.
  • the initial NAS message carries non-plain text cell #1, non-plain text cell #2, and non-plain text cell #3.
  • One bit in the bitmap corresponds to a non-plain text cell in the initial NAS message.
  • the first bit in the figure corresponds to non-plaintext cell #1
  • the second bit in the bitmap corresponds to non-plaintext cell #2
  • the third bit in the bitmap corresponds to non-plaintext cell #3. If the bitmap included in the fourth indication information #2 is "010", the fourth indication information #2 is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text cell #2 again. If the bitmap included in the fourth indication information #2 is "110", the fourth indication information #2 is used to instruct the terminal to send the non-plain text cell #1 and the non-plain text cell #2 again.
  • the fourth indication information may also adopt other methods to indicate which non-plain text cells need to be sent to the target AMF again by the terminal.
  • the second indication information and the fourth indication information may be included in a NAS SMC message.
  • the target AMF decrypts the security-protected non-plain text cells in the first initial NAS message according to the second root key. It is understandable that since the non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message is secured with the first key, the target AMF cannot successfully perform the security-protected non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message Decrypt. After the decryption fails, the target AMF skips the authentication process according to the first instruction information, and sends the second instruction information and the fourth instruction information to the source AMF.
  • the target AMF does not decrypt the security-protected non-plain text cells in the first initial NAS message, and directly according to the first indication information , Skip the authentication process, and send the second indication information and the fourth indication information to the source AMF. It is understandable that, because the target AMF can learn from the first indication information that it has received the second root key and cannot decrypt the first initial NAS message, the AMF is not used to decrypt the first initial NAS message with the second root key. Therefore, the time spent in the decryption process is saved, thereby reducing the delay for the target AMF to obtain non-plain text cells.
  • S108 The terminal sends a non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key to the target AMF, so that the target AMF receives the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key sent by the terminal.
  • the non-plain text cell is secured with the second key, including: the non-plain text cell is encrypted with the second encryption key, and/or the non-plain text cell is integrity protected with the second integrity protection key .
  • the terminal updates the first root key stored by itself according to the second instruction information to obtain the second root key. After that, the terminal generates a non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key according to the fourth instruction information, and sends the non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key to the target AMF. In this way, since the target AMF obtains the second root key from the source AMF in advance, the target AMF can decrypt the non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key and obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key may be included in the NAS SMP message.
  • the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key may be included in the registration completion message.
  • steps S105-S106 in steps S107-S108, the terminal only needs to send non-plain text information elements to the target AMF without sending a complete initial NAS message. In this way, it is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead.
  • the target AMF determines that the first root key has been updated to the second root key through the first indication information from the source AMF.
  • the target AMF sends the second instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information, so that the terminal can update the first root key to the second root key to ensure the root key stored between the target AMF and the terminal.
  • the keys are the same.
  • the target AMF also sends fourth indication information to the terminal to obtain the non-plain text cell that is sent by the terminal for security protection with the second root key. Since the target AMF has obtained the second root key from the source AMF, the target AMF can decrypt the non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the target AMF does not need to initiate an authentication process, which is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead and saves the time spent in the authentication process.
  • another information acquisition method provided by this embodiment of the application includes the following steps:
  • S201 The terminal sends a first initial NAS message to the target AMF, so that the target AMF receives the first initial NAS message from the terminal.
  • the target AMF sends the first initial NAS message to the source AMF, so that the source AMF receives the first initial NAS message sent by the target AMF.
  • steps S201-S202 are similar to steps S101-S202, and the specific description can refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • the source AMF decrypts the non-plain text cell that is secured in the first initial NAS message to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the non-plaintext information element obtained by the source AMF may be all or part of the non-plaintext information element that is secured in the first initial NAS message.
  • the first initial NAS message carries non-plain text cell #1, non-plain text cell #2, and non-plain text cell #3
  • the non-plain text cell obtained by the source AMF may be non-plain text cell #1 and Non-plain text cell #2
  • the non-plain text cell obtained by the source AMF may be: non-plain text cell #2
  • the non-plain text cell obtained by the source AMF may be: non-plain text cell# 1.
  • Non-plain text element #2, and non-plain text element #3 may be all or part of the non-plaintext information element that is secured in the first initial NAS message.
  • the first initial NAS message carries non-plain text cell #1, non-plain text cell #2, and non-plain text cell #3
  • the non-plain text cell obtained by the source AMF may be non-plain text cell #1 and Non-plain text cell #2
  • the source AMF obtains the security context according to the 5GS mobile identity in the plaintext information carried in the first initial NAS message; then, the source AMF derives the first integrity according to the first root key in the security context Protection key and the first encryption key; the source AMF performs integrity check on the first initial NAS message according to the first integrity protection key; after the first initial NAS message passes the integrity check, the source AMF An encryption key is used to decrypt the NAS message container in the first initial NAS message to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the source AMF updates the first root key and generates a second root key.
  • step S204 is the same as step S103.
  • step S103 For detailed description, please refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, which will not be repeated here.
  • the source AMF sends the second root key, the first indication information, and the non-plain text information element to the target AMF, so that the target AMF receives the second root key, the first indication information, and the non-plain text information element sent by the source AMF .
  • step S104 For the related description of the second root key and the first indication information, please refer to the introduction of step S104, which will not be repeated here.
  • the source AMF sends a context response message to the target AMF.
  • the context response message is used to feed back the context to the target AMF.
  • the context response message includes: the second root key, the first indication information, and the Non-plain text element.
  • the context response message may be referred to as Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer response message.
  • the target AMF sends second instruction information and fourth instruction information to the terminal according to the preset rule and the first instruction information.
  • the related description of the second indication information can refer to the introduction of step S105
  • the related description of the fourth indication information can refer to the introduction of step S107, which will not be repeated here.
  • the preset rule includes: when the source AMF is not trusted, the target AMF reacquires the non-plain text cell. It is understandable that when the source AMF is not trusted, the non-plain text cell sent by the source AMF to the target AMF may be tampered with. Therefore, it is necessary for the target AMF to reacquire the plain text cell to ensure that the target AMF
  • the non-plain text cells acquired by the AMF are safe and reliable, which helps to ensure the security of the communication network.
  • step S206 can be specifically implemented as: the target AMF determines whether the source AMF is credible; if the source AMF is not credible, the target AMF sends the second instruction information and the fourth instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information.
  • step S206 can be changed accordingly, which will not be repeated here.
  • the target source AMF determines whether the source AMF is credible, including at least one of the following situations:
  • Case 1 If the target AMF determines that all AMFs are credible, the target AMF determines that the source AMF is credible.
  • Case 3 If the source AMF is in the whitelist, the target AMF determines that the source AMF is credible. Among them, the whitelist is used to record at least one trusted AMF. Optionally, if the source AMF is not in the whitelist, the target AMF may determine that the source AMF is not trusted. Or, if the source AMF is not in the whitelist, the target AMF further determines whether the source AMF is credible according to other information of the source AMF (for example, the deployment location).
  • Case 4 If the source AMF is in the blacklist, the target AMF determines that the source AMF is not credible. Among them, the blacklist is used to record at least one untrusted AMF. Optionally, if the source AMF is not in the blacklist, the target AMF can determine that the source AMF is credible. Or, if the source AMF is not in the blacklist, the target AMF further determines whether the source AMF is credible according to other information of the source AMF (for example, the deployment location).
  • the above whitelist and/or blacklist are pre-configured or specified in the agreement, which is not limited in the embodiment of the application.
  • the target AMF can also be implemented in other ways to determine whether the source AMF is credible, which will not be described here.
  • the target AMF determines that the source AMF is trustworthy, it means that the non-plain text cell from the source AMF is trustworthy (that is, the non-plain text cell has not been tampered with), and the target AMF The non-plain text cell can be used directly. If the target AMF determines that the source AMF is untrustworthy, it means that the non-plaintext cell from the source AMF is untrustworthy, and the target AMF needs to reacquire the non-plaintext cell. For example, when the non-plain text cell is user plane data, since the target AMF does not need to process the cell, but forwards it for the user, the target AMF cannot sense whether the cell has been tampered with. If the target AMF determines that the source AMF is not trusted , The target AMF needs to reacquire user plane data.
  • the target AMF decrypts the secured non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message according to the second root key. It is understandable that since the non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message is secured with the first key, the target AMF cannot successfully perform the security-protected non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message Decrypt. After the decryption fails, the target AMF skips the authentication process according to the first instruction information, and sends the second instruction information and the fourth instruction information to the source AMF.
  • the target AMF does not decrypt the secured non-plain text cells in the first initial NAS message, and directly according to the first instruction information, skips the authentication process, and sends the second instruction information and the first instruction information to the source AMF.
  • Four instructions it is understandable that, because the target AMF can learn from the first indication information that it has received the second root key and cannot decrypt the first initial NAS message, the AMF is not used to decrypt the first initial NAS message with the second root key. Therefore, the time spent in the decryption process is saved, thereby reducing the delay for the target AMF to obtain non-plain text cells.
  • S207 The terminal sends a non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key to the target AMF, so that the target AMF receives the non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key.
  • step S207 is the same as step S108, and the detailed description can refer to step S108, which will not be repeated here.
  • the target AMF determines that the first root key has been updated to the second root key through the first indication information from the source AMF.
  • the target AMF sends the second instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information, so that the terminal can update the first root key to the second root key to ensure the root key stored between the target AMF and the terminal.
  • the keys are the same.
  • the target AMF also sends fourth indication information to the terminal to obtain the non-plain text cell that is sent by the terminal for security protection with the second root key. Since the target AMF has obtained the second root key from the source AMF, the target AMF can decrypt the non-plain text cell that is secured by the second root key to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the target AMF does not need to initiate an authentication process, which is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead and saves the time spent in the authentication process.
  • the target AMF also does not trust the non-plain text cells sent by the source AMF, and obtains the non-plain text cells from the terminal again, which helps ensure network security.
  • steps S206-S207 can be replaced with steps S208-S209.
  • the target AMF sends the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal according to the preset rule and the first indication information, so that the terminal receives the second indication information and the third indication information sent by the target AMF.
  • the related description of the second indication information and the third indication information can refer to the introduction of step S105, and the related description of the preset rule can refer to the introduction of step S206, which will not be repeated here.
  • the target AMF decrypts the secured non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message according to the second root key. It is understandable that since the non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message is secured with the first key, the target AMF cannot successfully perform the security-protected non-plain text cell in the first initial NAS message Decrypt. After the decryption fails, the target AMF skips the authentication process according to the first instruction information, and sends the second instruction information and the third instruction information to the source AMF.
  • the target AMF does not decrypt the secured non-plain text cells in the first initial NAS message, and directly according to the first instruction information, skips the authentication process, and sends the second instruction information and the first instruction information to the source AMF.
  • Three instructions it is understandable that because the target AMF can learn from the first instruction information that it has received the second root key and cannot decrypt the non-plain text cells that are secured in the first initial NAS message, the AMF is not used to execute the second The root key decrypts the process of the first initial NAS message, thus saving the time spent in the decrypting process, thereby reducing the delay for the target AMF to obtain non-plain text cells.
  • S209 The terminal sends a second initial NAS message to the target AMF, so that the target AMF receives the second initial NAS message sent by the terminal.
  • step S209 is the same as step S106, and the detailed description can refer to step S106, which will not be repeated here.
  • the target AMF determines that the first root key has been updated to the second root key through the first indication information from the source AMF.
  • the target AMF sends the second instruction information to the terminal according to the first instruction information, so that the terminal can update the first root key to the second root key to ensure the root key stored between the target AMF and the terminal.
  • the keys are the same.
  • the target AMF also sends third indication information to the terminal to obtain the second initial NAS message sent by the terminal. Since the second initial NAS message includes a non-plain text cell that is secured with the second root key, and the target AMF has obtained the second root key from the source AMF, the target AMF can be used in the second initial NAS message.
  • the non-plain text cell of the security protection is decrypted to obtain the non-plain text cell.
  • the target AMF does not need to initiate an authentication process, which is beneficial to reduce signaling overhead and saves the time spent in the authentication process.
  • the target AMF also does not trust the non-plain text cells sent by the source AMF, and obtains the non-plain text cells from the terminal again, which helps ensure network security.
  • the target AMF in addition to the target AMF sending the second indication information and the third indication information to the terminal, or, in addition to the target AMF sending the second indication information and the fourth indication information to the terminal, the target AMF may also send The terminal sends an encryption algorithm and/or integrity protection algorithm to ensure that the same encryption algorithm and/or integrity protection algorithm is used between the target AMF and the terminal.
  • the encryption algorithm and/or integrity protection algorithm sent by the target AMF may be carried in the NAS SMC message or other signaling, which is not specifically limited.
  • the target AMF sending the encryption algorithm and/or the integrity protection algorithm to the terminal includes: the target AMF sends the identification of the encryption algorithm and/or the integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the encryption algorithm sent by the target AMF can be any one of the encryption algorithms supported by the terminal.
  • the target AMF determines the encryption with the highest priority supported by the terminal from a pre-configured encryption algorithm priority list Algorithm, and send the encryption algorithm with the highest priority supported by the terminal to the terminal.
  • the encryption algorithm priority list is used to indicate the priority of at least one encryption algorithm.
  • the integrity protection algorithm sent by the target AMF can be any of the integrity protection algorithms supported by the terminal.
  • the target AMF determines from a pre-configured priority list of integrity protection algorithms that the terminal supports The integrity protection algorithm with the highest priority is sent to the terminal with the integrity protection algorithm with the highest priority supported by the terminal.
  • the integrity protection algorithm priority list is used to indicate the priority of at least one integrity protection algorithm.
  • the target AMF does not send the encryption algorithm and/or integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, the encryption algorithm and/or integrity protection algorithm adopted by the terminal and the target AMF are pre-negotiated or specified in the agreement.
  • each network element such as a target mobility management network element
  • each network element includes hardware structures or software modules corresponding to each function, or a combination of the two, in order to realize the above functions.
  • the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a certain function is executed by hardware or computer software-driven hardware depends on the specific application and design constraint conditions of the technical solution. Professionals and technicians can use different methods for each specific application to implement the described functions, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
  • the embodiment of the application can divide the target mobility management network element into functional modules according to the above method examples.
  • each functional module can be divided corresponding to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module.
  • the above-mentioned integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiments of the present application is illustrative, and is only a logical function division, and there may be other division methods in actual implementation. The following is an example of dividing each function module corresponding to each function:
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • the communication device includes: a receiving module 301 and a sending module 302.
  • the receiving module 301 is used to support the communication device to perform steps S101, S104, and S106 in FIG. 5, step S108 in FIG. 6, steps S201, S205 and S207 in FIG. 7, step S209 in FIG. 8, or for Other processes that support the technical solutions described in this article.
  • the sending module 302 is used to support the communication device to perform steps S102 and S105 in FIG. 5, step S107 in FIG. 6, steps S202 and S206 in FIG. 7, step S208 in FIG. 8, or to support the technical solutions described herein Other processes.
  • the communication device further includes: a processing module 303.
  • the processing module 303 is used to implement the following steps: generating information (such as second indication information, third indication information, etc.), determining whether the source AMF is credible, decrypting the non-plain text cells in the initial NAS message that are protected by security, or Other processes used to support the technical solutions described in this article.
  • the receiving module 301 and the sending module 302 in FIG. 9 may be implemented by the communication interface 204 in FIG. 4; the processing module 303 in FIG. 9 may be implemented by the processing in FIG.
  • the embodiment of the present application does not impose any limitation on this.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which computer instructions are stored; when the computer-readable storage medium runs on the communication device shown in FIG. 4, the communication The device executes the methods shown in FIGS. 5 to 8.
  • the computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium.
  • the computer instructions may be transmitted from a website, computer, server, or data center. Transmission to another website, computer, server or data center via wired (such as coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (such as infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.).
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer, or may include one or more data storage devices such as servers and data centers that can be integrated with the medium.
  • the usable medium may be a magnetic medium (for example, a floppy disk, a hard disk, and a magnetic tape), an optical medium, or a semiconductor medium (for example, a solid state disk (SSD)).
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product containing computer instructions, when it runs on the communication device shown in FIG. 4, the communication device can execute the methods shown in FIGS. 5 to 8.
  • the communication device, computer storage medium, and computer program product provided in the above embodiments of the present application are all used to implement the methods provided above. Therefore, the beneficial effects that can be achieved can refer to the corresponding beneficial effects of the methods provided above. I will not repeat them here.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • the chip shown in FIG. 10 may be a general-purpose processor or a dedicated processor.
  • the chip includes a processor 401.
  • the processor 401 is configured to support the communication device to execute the technical solutions shown in FIG. 5 to FIG. 8.
  • the chip further includes a transceiving pin 402, which is used for receiving control of the processor 401 and used for supporting the communication device to execute the technical solutions shown in FIGS. 5 to 8.
  • the chip shown in FIG. 10 may further include: a storage medium 403.
  • the chip shown in Figure 10 can be implemented using the following circuits or devices: one or more field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), programmable logic devices (PLD) , Controllers, state machines, gate logic, discrete hardware components, any other suitable circuits, or any combination of circuits capable of performing the various functions described throughout this application.
  • FPGA field programmable gate arrays
  • PLD programmable logic devices
  • Controllers state machines
  • gate logic discrete hardware components
  • discrete hardware components any other suitable circuits, or any combination of circuits capable of performing the various functions described throughout this application.

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Abstract

本申请提供一种信息获取方法及装置，该方法包括：目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第三指示信息用于指示终端再次发送初始NAS消息；目标移动管理网元接收终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，第二初始NAS消息包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。

Description

信息获取方法及装置
本申请要求于2019年04月28日提交国家知识产权局、申请号为201910351470.5、申请名称为“信息获取方法及装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及信息获取方法及装置。
背景技术
第三代合作伙伴计划项目(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)定义的移动通信网络引入了安全保护机制来保证移动通信的安全，包括：通信的保密性、完整性。例如，在第五代(5rd Generation，5G)网络中，引入了对于初始非接入层(Non-access stratum，NAS)消息的部分加密保护机制，也即对初始NAS消息中的部分信元进行加密处理，以尽可能的对初始NAS消息中的信元进行保护。
由于引入了部分加密保护机制，在终端从源接入和移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)切换到目标AMF之后，由于源AMF可能会更新安全上下文中的根密钥，导致目标AMF从源AMF获取到的安全上下文与终端使用的安全上下文不一致，从而目标AMF不能够对终端之前发送的初始NAS消息进行解密。在这种情况下，目标AMF需要发起鉴权流程，以便于目标AMF和终端之间更新安全上下文。在安全上下文更新之后，终端重新向目标AMF发送初始NAS消息，以便于目标AMF能够根据更新后的安全上下文，对初始NAS消息进行解密，以获取初始NAS消息中的非明文信元。但是，鉴权流程需要目标AMF和终端之间相互交互多条信令，导致信令开销较大。
发明内容
本申请提供一种信息获取方法及装置，用于在源移动管理网元更新安全上下文中的根密钥的场景下，目标移动管理网元可以以较低的信令开销可以获取到初始NAS消息中的非明文信元。
第一方面，提供一种信息获取方法，包括：目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第三指示信息用于指示终端再次发送初始NAS消息；目标移动管理网元接收终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，第二初始NAS消息包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
基于该技术方案，目标移动管理网元通过来自于源移动管理网元的第一指示信息，确定第一根密钥已更新为第二根密钥。在这种情况下，目标移动管理网元根据第一指 示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息，以使得终端能够将第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥，保证目标移动管理网元与终端之间存储的根密钥是相同的。另外，目标移动管理网元还向终端发送第三指示信息，以获取终端发送的第二初始NAS消息。由于第二初始NAS消息中包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元，而目标移动管理网元已从源移动管理网元获取到第二根密钥，因此目标移动管理网元能够对第二初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取到非明文信元。相比于现有技术，目标移动管理网元无需发起鉴权流程，有利于降低信令开销，并且节省了鉴权流程所耗费的时间。
一种可能的设计中，在目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息之后，还包括：目标移动管理网元根据第二根密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密；目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：在目标移动管理网元对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密失败的情况下，目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。可以理解的是，跳过鉴权流程，有利于节省信令开销。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。可以理解的是，跳过鉴权流程，有利于节省信令开销。另外，无需以第二根密钥对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，有利于节省解密流程所耗费的时间。
一种可能的设计中，第二初始NAS消息包括在NAS安全模式完成(security mode complete，SMP)消息或者注册完成消息中。
一种可能的设计中，第二指示信息和第三指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令(security mode command，SMC)消息中。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，包括：目标移动管理网元向源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息包括第一初始NAS消息。目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，包括：目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，上下文响应消息包括第二根密钥和第一指示信息。
第二方面，提供一种信息获取方法，包括：目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第四指示信息用于指示终端再次发送非明文信元；目标移动管理网元接收终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，第二初始NAS消息包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
基于该技术方案，目标移动管理网元通过来自于源移动管理网元的第一指示信息，确定第一根密钥已更新为第二根密钥。在这种情况下，目标移动管理网元根据第一指 示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息，以使得终端能够将第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥，保证目标移动管理网元与终端之间存储的根密钥是相同的。另外，目标移动管理网元还向终端发送第四指示信息，以获取终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。由于目标移动管理网元已从源移动管理网元获取到第二根密钥，因此目标移动管理网元能够对以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取到非明文信元。相比于现有技术，目标移动管理网元无需发起鉴权流程，有利于降低信令开销，并且节省了鉴权流程所耗费的时间。
一种可能的设计中，在目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息之后，还包括：目标移动管理网元根据第二根密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密；目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：在目标移动管理网元对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密失败的情况下，目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。可以理解的是，跳过鉴权流程，有利于节省信令开销。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。可以理解的是，跳过鉴权流程，有利于节省信令开销。另外，无需以第二根密钥对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，有利于节省解密流程所耗费的时间。
一种可能的设计中，第二初始NAS消息包括在NAS SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
一种可能的设计中，第二指示信息和第四指示信息包括在NAS SMC消息中。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，包括：目标移动管理网元向源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息包括第一初始NAS消息；目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，包括：目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，上下文响应消息包括第二根密钥和第一指示信息。
第三方面，提供一种信息获取方法，包括：目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；目标移动管理网元根据预设规则和第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第四指示信息用于指示终端再次发送非明文信元；目标移动管理网元接收终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
基于该技术方案，目标移动管理网元通过来自于源移动管理网元的第一指示信息，确定第一根密钥已更新为第二根密钥。在这种情况下，目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息，以使得终端能够将第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥，保证目标移动管理网元与终端之间存储的根密钥是相同的。另外，目标移动管理网元 还向终端发送第四指示信息，以获取终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。由于目标移动管理网元已从源移动管理网元获取到第二根密钥，因此目标移动管理网元能够对以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取到非明文信元。相比于现有技术，目标移动管理网元无需发起鉴权流程，有利于降低信令开销，并且节省了鉴权流程所耗费的时间。
一种可能的设计中，预设规则包括：在源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，目标移动管理网元重新从终端获取非明文信元。可以理解的是，在源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，源移动管理网元发送的非明文信元存在被篡改的风险，因此，目标移动管理网元有必要再次获取所述非明文信元，以保证通信网络的安全性。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元根据预设规则以及第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，包括：目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元是否可信；若源移动管理网元不可信，则目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：(1)若目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均可信，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元可信；(2)若目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均不可信，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元不可信；(3)若源移动管理网元位于白名单中，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元可信，白名单包括至少一个移动管理网元；(4)若源移动管理网元位于黑名单中，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元不可信，黑名单包括至少一个移动管理网元。
一种可能的设计中，若源移动管理网元不可信，则目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，包括：若源移动管理网元不可信，则目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元包括在NAS SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
一种可能的设计中，第二指示信息和第四指示信息包括在NAS SMC消息中。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，包括：目标移动管理网元向源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息包括第一初始NAS消息。目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，包括：目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，上下文响应消息包括第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元。
第四方面，提供一种信息获取方法，包括：目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；目标移动管理网元根据预设规则和第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一 根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第三指示信息用于指示终端再次发送初始NAS消息；目标移动管理网元接收终端发送第二初始NAS消息，第二初始NAS消息包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
基于该技术方案，目标移动管理网元通过来自于源移动管理网元的第一指示信息，确定第一根密钥已更新为第二根密钥。在这种情况下，目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息，以使得终端能够将第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥，保证目标移动管理网元与终端之间存储的根密钥是相同的。另外，目标移动管理网元还向终端发送第三指示信息，以获取终端发送的第二初始NAS消息。由于第二初始NAS消息中包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元，而目标移动管理网元已从源移动管理网元获取到第二根密钥，因此目标移动管理网元能够对第二初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取到非明文信元。相比于现有技术，目标移动管理网元无需发起鉴权流程，有利于降低信令开销，并且节省了鉴权流程所耗费的时间。
一种可能的设计中，预设规则包括：在源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，目标移动管理网元重新从终端获取非明文信元。可以理解的是，在源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，源移动管理网元发送的非明文信元存在被篡改的风险，因此，目标移动管理网元有必要再次获取非明文信元，以保证通信网络的安全性。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元根据预设规则以及第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元是否可信；若源移动管理网元不可信，则目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：(1)若目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均可信，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元可信；(2)若目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均不可信，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元不可信；(3)若源移动管理网元位于白名单中，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元可信，白名单包括至少一个移动管理网元；(4)若源移动管理网元位于黑名单中，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元不可信，黑名单包括至少一个移动管理网元。
一种可能的设计中，若源移动管理网元不可信，则目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：若源移动管理网元不可信，则目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。可以理解的是，跳过鉴权流程，有利于节省信令开销。
一种可能的设计中，以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元包括在NAS SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
一种可能的设计中，第二指示信息和第四指示信息包括在NAS SMC消息中。
一种可能的设计中，目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，包括：目标移动管理网元向源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息包括第一初始NAS消息。目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，包括：目标移动管理网元接收源移 动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，上下文响应消息包括第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元。
第五方面，提供一种通信装置，包括：发送模块，用于将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。接收模块，用于接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。发送模块，还用于根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第三指示信息用于指示终端再次发送初始NAS消息。接收模块，还用于接收终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，第二初始NAS消息包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
一种可能的设计中，所述通信模块还包括：处理模块。处理模块，用于在接收模块接收到第二根密钥和第一指示信息之后，根据第二根密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密。发送模块，还用于在处理模块对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密失败的情况下，根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，发送模块，还用于根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，第二初始NAS消息包括在NAS SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
一种可能的设计中，第二指示信息和第三指示信息包括在NAS SMC消息中。
一种可能的设计中，发送模块，具体用于向源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息包括第一初始NAS消息。接收模块，具体用于源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，上下文响应消息包括第二根密钥和第一指示信息。
第六方面，提供一种通信装置，包括：发送模块，用于将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。接收模块，用于接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。发送模块，还用于根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第四指示信息用于指示终端再次发送非明文信元。接收模块，还用于接收终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，第二初始NAS消息包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
一种可能的设计中，通信模块还包括处理模块。处理模块，用于在接收模块接收到源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息之后，根据第二根密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密。发送模块，还用于在处理模块对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密失败的情况下，根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，发送模块，还用于根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，第二初始NAS消息包括在NAS SMP消息或者注册完成消息 中。
一种可能的设计中，第二指示信息和第四指示信息包括在NAS SMC消息中。
一种可能的设计中，发送模块，具体用于向源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息包括第一初始NAS消息。接收模块，具体用于接收源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，上下文响应消息包括第二根密钥和第一指示信息。
第七方面，提供一种通信装置，包括：发送模块，用于将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。接收模块，用于接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。发送模块，还用于根据预设规则和第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第四指示信息用于指示终端再次发送非明文信元。接收模块，还用于接收终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
一种可能的设计中，预设规则包括：在源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，目标移动管理网元重新从终端获取非明文信元。
一种可能的设计中，通信模块还包括处理模块。处理模块，用于＝确定源移动管理网元是否可信。发送模块，还用于在处理模块确定源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，处理模块，用于确定源移动管理网元是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：(1)若目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均可信，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元可信；(2)若目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均不可信，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元不可信；(3)若源移动管理网元位于白名单中，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元可信，白名单包括至少一个移动管理网元；(4)若源移动管理网元位于黑名单中，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元不可信，黑名单包括至少一个移动管理网元。
一种可能的设计中，发送模块，具体用于在处理模块确定源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，目标移动管理网元根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元包括在NAS SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
一种可能的设计中，第二指示信息和第四指示信息包括在NAS SMC消息中。
一种可能的设计中，发送模块，具体用于向源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息包括第一初始NAS消息。接收模块，具体用于接收源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，上下文响应消息包括第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元。
第八方面，提供一种通信装置，包括：发送模块，用于将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。接收模块，用于接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥 更新后的根密钥。发送模块，还用于根据预设规则和第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，第三指示信息用于指示终端再次发送初始NAS消息。接收模块，用于接收终端发送第二初始NAS消息，第二初始NAS消息包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
一种可能的设计中，预设规则包括：在源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，目标移动管理网元重新从终端获取非明文信元。
一种可能的设计中，通信装置还包括处理模块。处理模块，用于确定源移动管理网元是否可信。发送模块，用于在处理模块确定源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，处理模块，用于确定源移动管理网元是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：(1)若目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均可信，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元可信；(2)若目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均不可信，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元不可信；(3)若源移动管理网元位于白名单中，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元可信，白名单包括至少一个移动管理网元；(4)若源移动管理网元位于黑名单中，则目标移动管理网元确定源移动管理网元不可信，黑名单包括至少一个移动管理网元。
一种可能的设计中，发送模块，具体用于在处理模块确定源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
一种可能的设计中，以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元包括在NAS SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
一种可能的设计中，第二指示信息和第四指示信息包括在NAS SMC消息中。
一种可能的设计中，发送模块，具体用于向源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息包括第一初始NAS消息。接收模块，具体用于接收源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，上下文响应消息包括第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元。
第九方面，提供一种通信装置，包括：处理器，所述处理器用于与存储器耦合，并读取存储器中的指令，并根据所述指令实现如上述第一方面至第四方面任一项所述的信息获取方法。
第十方面，提供一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当其在通信装置上运行时，使得通信装置可以执行上述第一方面至第四方面任一项所述的信息获取方法。
第十一方面，提供一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当其在通信装置上运行时，使得通信装置可以执行上述第一方面至第四方面任一项所述的信息获取方法。
第十二方面，提供一种芯片，该芯片包括处理模块和通信接口，通信接口用于将接收的代码指令传输至处理模块，处理模块用于运行所述代码指令支持通信装置执行上述第一方面至第四方面任一项所述的信息获取方法。该代码指令可以来自芯片内部的存储器，也可以来自芯片外部的存储器。可选的，处理模块可以为该芯片上集成的 处理器或者微处理器或者集成电路。通信接口可以为芯片上的输入输出电路或者收发管脚。
第十三方面，提供一种通信系统，包括：终端、源移动管理网元、以及目标移动管理网元。终端，用于向目标移动管理网元发送第一非接入层NAS消息，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。所述目标移动管理网元，用于向源移动管理网元发送所述第一初始NAS消息。所述源移动管理网元，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验之后，更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥；以及，向所述目标移动管理网元发送第一指示信息和所述第二根密钥，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。所述目标移动管理网元，还用于根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第三指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送初始NAS消息。所述终端，还用于根据所述第二指示信息，更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成所述第二根密钥；以及，根据所述第三指示信息，向所述目标移动管理网元发送第二初始NAS消息，所述第二初始NAS消息包括以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
第十四方面，提供一种通信系统，包括：终端、目标移动管理网元、以及源移动管理网元。终端、源移动管理网元、以及目标移动管理网元。终端，用于向目标移动管理网元发送第一非接入层NAS消息，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。所述目标移动管理网元，用于向源移动管理网元发送所述第一初始NAS消息。所述源移动管理网元，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验之后，更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥；以及，向所述目标移动管理网元发送第一指示信息和所述第二根密钥，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。所述目标移动管理网元，还用于根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第四指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送非明文信元。所述终端，还用于根据所述第二指示信息，更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成所述第二根密钥；以及，根据所述第四指示信息，向所述目标移动管理网元发送以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
第十五方面，提供一种通信系统，包括：终端、目标移动管理网元、以及源移动管理网元。终端，用于向目标移动管理网元发送第一非接入层NAS消息，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。所述目标移动管理网元，用于向源移动管理网元发送所述第一初始NAS消息。所述源移动管理网元，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验之后，对所述第一初始NAS消息解密，获取至少一个非明文信元；更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥；向所述目标移动管理网元发送第一指示信息、所述第二根密钥、以及所述至少一个非明文信元，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。所述目标移动管理网元，还用于根据预设规则和所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第 二指示信息和第四指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第四指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送所述非明文信元。所述终端，还用于根据所述第二指示信息，更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成所述第二根密钥；以及，根据所述第四指示信息，向所述目标移动管理网元发送以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述至少一个非明文信元。
第十六方面，提供一种通信系统，包括：终端、目标移动管理网元、以及源移动管理网元。终端，用于向目标移动管理网元发送第一非接入层NAS消息，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。所述目标移动管理网元，用于向源移动管理网元发送所述第一初始NAS消息。所述源移动管理网元，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验之后，对所述第一初始NAS消息解密，获取至少一个非明文信元；更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥；向所述目标移动管理网元发送第一指示信息、所述第二根密钥、以及所述至少一个非明文信元，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。所述目标移动管理网元，还用于根据预设规则和所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第三指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送初始NAS消息。所述终端，还用于根据所述第二指示信息，更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成所述第二根密钥；以及，根据所述第三指示信息，向所述目标移动管理网元发送第二初始NAS消息，第二初始NAS消息包括以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述至少一个非明文信元。
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图6为本申请实施例提供的另一种信息获取方法的流程示意图；
图7为本申请实施例提供的另一种信息获取方法的流程示意图；
图8为本申请实施例提供的另一种信息获取方法的流程图；
图9为本申请实施例提供的一种通信装置的结构示意图；
图10为本申请实施例提供的一种芯片的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
在本申请的描述中，除非另有说明，“/”表示“或”的意思，例如，A/B可以表示A或B。本文中的“和/或”仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况。此外，“至少一个”是指一个或多个，“多个”是指两个或两个以上。“第一”、“第二”等字样并不对数量和执行次序进行限定，并且“第一”、“第二”等字样也并不限定一定不同。
需要说明的是，本申请中，“示例性的”或者“例如”等词用于表示作例子、例 证或说明。本申请中被描述为“示例性的”或者“例如”的任何实施例或设计方案不应被解释为比其他实施例或设计方案更优选或更具优势。确切而言，使用“示例性的”或者“例如”等词旨在以具体方式呈现相关概念。
在本申请的描述中，“指示”可以包括直接指示和间接指示，也可以包括显式指示和隐式指示。将某一信息(如下文所述的第一指示信息、第二指示信息)所指示的信息称为待指示信息，则具体实现过程中，对所述待指示信息进行指示的方式有很多种。例如，可以直接指示所述待指示信息，其中所述待指示信息本身或者所述待指示信息的索引等。又例如，也可以通过指示其他信息来间接指示所述待指示信息，其中该其他信息与所述待指示信息之间存在关联关系。又例如，还可以仅仅指示所述待指示信息的一部分，而所述待指示信息的其他部分则是已知的或者提前约定的。另外，还可以借助预先约定(例如协议规定)的各个信息的排列顺序来实现对特定信息的指示，从而在一定程度上降低指示开销。
为了便于理解本申请的技术方案，下面先对本申请所涉及的术语进行简单介绍。
1、初始NAS消息
初始NAS消息是终端从空闲(IDLE)态转变为连接(CONNECTED)态发送的第一条NAS消息。需要说明的是，当终端处于IDLE态时，终端未与网络侧建立无线资源控制(radio resource control，RRC)连接；当终端处于CONNECTED态时，终端与网络侧建立了RRC连接。
在实际应用场景中，初始NAS消息可以是注册请求消息，服务请求消息，或者去注册请求消息等，本申请实施例对此不作限定。
5G网络中，在引入了部分加密机制的情况下，初始NAS消息包括明文(cleartext)信息以及非明文(non-cleartext)信息。其中，明文信息为不需要加密的信息，非明文信息为需要加密的信息。需要说明的是，非明文信息也可以称之为加密信息或者密文信息。
可选的，明文信息包括以下信元中的至少一项：扩展协议识别(Extended protocol discriminator)，安全头类型(security header type)，预留的半字(spare half octet)、注册请求消息标识(registration request message identity)，5G系统注册类型(5G system registration type)，下一代密钥集标识(next generation key set identifier，ngKSI)，5G系统移动身份(5G system mobile identity，5GS mobile identity)，UE安全能力(UE security capability)，附加的全球唯一临时UE标识(additional globally unique temporary UE identity，additional GUTI)，UE状态(UE status)，以及演进分组系统(evolved packet system，EPS)NAS消息容器(NAS message container)。
可选的，非明文信息包括以下信元中的至少一项：5G移动管理能力(5GMM capability)，负载容器(payload container)，用户面数据等。非明文信息可以包括初始NAS消息中除了明文信息之外的其他信元。
在本申请实施例中，为了便于描述，明文信息所包括的信元可以成为称为明文信元；非明文信息所包括的信元可以称为密文信元，或者非明文信元，又或者加密信元。
2、安全上下文
安全上下文是指可以用于实现数据的安全保护(例如，加密/解密和/或完整性保 护/校验)的信息。
安全上下文可以包括以下一项或者多项：根密钥、加密密钥、完整性保护密钥、特定参数(比如NAS Count)、密钥集标识(key set identifier，简称KSI)、安全算法、安全指示(例如，是否开启加密的指示，是否开启完整性保护的指示、密钥使用期限的指示，密钥长度)等。
其中，加密密钥为发送端根据加密算法对明文进行加密以生成密文时输入的参数。若使用对称加密的方法，加密密钥和解密密钥是相同的。接收端可以根据相同的加密算法和加密密钥对密文进行解密。换句话说，发送端和接收端可以基于同一个密钥去加密和解密。
完整性保护密钥为发送端根据完整性保护算法对明文或密文进行完整性保护时输入的参数。接收端可以根据相同的完整性保护算法和完整性保护密钥对进行了完整性保护的数据进行完整性验证。
安全算法即对数据进行安全保护时使用的算法。例如，加密算法、解密算法、完整性保护算法等。
3、根密钥
根密钥用于生成加密密钥和完整性保护密钥。在本申请实施例中，根密钥可以称为NAS根密钥，记为Kamf。加密密钥也可以称为NAS加密密钥，记为Knas-enc。完整性保护密钥也可以称为NAS完整性保护密钥，记为Knas-int。需要说明的是，以根密钥生成加密密钥和完整性保护密钥的具体流程可以参考现有技术，本申请实施例在此不予赘述。
在本申请实施例中，终端注册到源AMF时，源AMF与终端之间会执行鉴权流程，以在终端和源AMF上分别生成终端的安全上下文。此时，安全上下文中存储的根密钥可以称为第一根密钥。
在本申请实施例中，在终端从源AMF切换到目标AMF之后，若目标AMF向源AMF请求终端的安全上下文，由于源AMF的本地策略，源AMF可能会将自身保存的安全上下文中的第一根密钥进行更新。更新后的第一根密钥可以称为第二根密钥。可以理解的是，第二根密钥即为对第一根密钥进行更新后的根密钥。
以上是对本申请实施例中所涉及的术语的简单介绍，以下不再赘述。
当前，在源AMF更新安全上下文中的根密钥的场景下，目标AMF获取初始NAS信息中携带的非明文信元的流程可以参照图1。如图1所示，终端生成初始NAS消息#1，初始NAS消息#1包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。之后，终端将初始NAS消息#1发送给目标AMF。目标AMF在本地没有所述终端的安全上下文的情况下，向源AMF发送上下文请求消息，该上下文请求消息包括初始NAS消息#1。源AMF对初始NAS消息#1进行完整性校验。在初始NAS消息#1通过完整性校验之后，源AMF可以将安全上下文中的第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥。源AMF向目标AMF发送上下文响应消息，该上下文响应消息包括安全上下文，该安全上下文包括第二根密钥。目标AMF根据安全上下文中的第二根密钥对初始NAS消息#1进行解密。由于初始NAS消息#1是以第一根密钥进行安全保护的，因此目标AMF不能够成功对初始NAS消息#1进行解密。在解密失败后，目标AMF发起鉴权流程，以便于目标 AMF与终端之间同步安全上下文。在鉴权成功之后，目标AMF向终端发送NAS SMC消息，以请求终端重新发送初始NAS消息。在终端接收到NAS SMC消息之后，终端根据更新后的安全上下文中的根密钥(例如第三根密钥)，生成初始NAS消息#2。终端向目标AMF发送NAS SMP消息，该NAS SMP消息包括初始NAS消息#2。这样一来，由于经过鉴权流程之后，终端存储的安全上下文中的根密钥与目标AMF存储的安全上下文中的根密钥是一致的，因此目标AMF能对初始NAS消息#2进行解密，获取到初始NAS消息#2中的非明文信元。
其中，上述鉴权流程可参考现有技术，在此不再赘述。例如，目标AMF向终端发送鉴权请求，终端向目标AMF返回鉴权响应消息。另外，鉴权流程也可以称为重认证流程，本申请实施例不限于此。
现有技术中，在源AMF更新自身保存的安全上下文中的根密钥的场景下，目标AMF需要发起鉴权流程，鉴权流程需要目标AMF与终端之间进行多条信令交互，导致目标AMF获取初始NAS消息中的非明文信元的整个流程会产生较大的信令开销，也增大了目标AMF获取到非明文信元的时延。
为了解决上述技术问题，本申请提供一种信息获取方法，该方法的具体描述可参见下文。
本申请实施例提供的技术方案可以应用于各种通信系统，例如，采用第五代(5th generation，5G)通信技术的通信系统，未来演进系统或者多种通信融合系统等等。本申请提供的技术方案可以应用于多种应用场景，例如，机器对机器(machine to machine，M2M)、宏微通信、增强型移动互联网(enhanced mobile broadband，eMBB)、超高可靠超低时延通信(ultra-reliable&low latency communication，uRLLC)以及海量物联网通信(massive machine type communication，mMTC)等场景。这些场景可以包括但不限于：通信设备与通信设备之间的通信场景，网络设备与网络设备之间的通信场景，网络设备与通信设备之间的通信场景等。下文中均是以应用于网络设备和终端之间的通信场景中为例进行说明的。
此外，本申请实施例描述的网络架构以及业务场景是为了更加清楚的说明本申请实施例的技术方案，并不构成对于本申请实施例提供的技术方案的限定，本领域普通技术人员可知，随着网络架构的演变和新业务场景的出现，本申请实施例提供的技术方案对于类似的技术问题，同样适用。
如图2所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种通信系统，该通信系统包括：目标移动管理网元101、源移动管理网元102、以及终端103。其中，目标移动管理网元101是切换后为终端103提供移动性管理等服务的移动管理网元。源移动管理网元102是切换前为终端103提供移动性管理等服务的移动管理网元。
可选的，图2所示的通信系统可以应用于目前的5G网络以及未来其他网络，本申请实施例不限于此。
示例性的，如图3所示，为本申请实施例提供的技术方案所适用的5G网络的架构。5G网络可以包括：终端、无线接入网络(radio access network，RAN)或者接入网络(access network，AN)(下文中将RAN和AN统称为(R)AN)、核心网、以及数据网(data network，DN)。其中，核心网包括多个核心网网元(或者称为网络 功能网元)，例如：AMF网元、会话管理功能(session management function，SMF)网元、策略控制功能(policy control function，PCF)网元、用户面功能(user plane function，UPF)网元、应用层功能(application function)网元、鉴权功能(authentication server function，AUSF)网元、以及统一数据管理(unified data management，UDM)网元。此外，核心网还可以包括一些其他未示出的网元，本申请实施例在此不予赘述。
如图3所示，各个网元(或者设备)之间可能存在逻辑接口，例如AMF网元和SMF网元之间存在逻辑接口，本文称之为N11接口；AMF网元与终端之间存在逻辑接口，本文称之为N1接口。本文在此不一一展开。另外，上述逻辑接口的名称仅是示例，不构成限定。
需要说明的是，上述核心网网元可以有其他的名称，本申请实施例不限于此。例如，AMF网元也可以简称为AMF，UPF网元也可以简称为UPF，等。
其中，终端可以是一种具有无线收发功能的设备。所述终端可以有不同的名称，例如用户设备(user equipment，UE)、接入终端、终端单元、终端站、移动站、移动台、远方站、远程终端、移动设备、无线通信设备、终端代理或终端装置等。终端可以被部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以被部署在水面上(如轮船等)；还可以被部署在空中(例如飞机、气球和卫星上等)。终端包括具有无线通信功能的手持式设备、车载设备、可穿戴设备或计算设备。示例性地，终端可以是手机(mobile phone)、平板电脑或带无线收发功能的电脑。终端设备还可以是虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR)终端设备、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)终端设备、工业控制中的无线终端、无人驾驶中的无线终端、远程医疗中的无线终端、智能电网中的无线终端、智慧城市(smart city)中的无线终端、智慧家庭(smart home)中的无线终端等等。本申请实施例中，用于实现终端的功能的装置可以是终端，也可以是能够支持终端实现该功能的装置，例如芯片系统。本申请实施例中，芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包括芯片和其他分立器件。本申请实施例中，以用于实现终端的功能的装置是终端为例，描述本申请实施例提供的技术方案。
AMF可以用于连接管理、移动性管理、注册管理、接入认证和授权、可达性管理、安全上下文管理以及SMF网元的选择等。SMF网元可以用于会话管理如会话的建立、修改和释放等、UPF网元的选择和控制、业务和会话连续性(service and session continuity)模式的选择以及漫游服务等。PCF网元可以用于提供策略控制服务以及获取策略决策相关的签约信息等。UPF网元，可以用于处理与用户面相关的事件，例如传输或路由数据包、检测数据包、上报业务量、处理服务质量(quality of service，QoS)、合法监听、存储下行数据包等。
在本申请实施例中，当图2所示的通信系统应用于图3所示的5G网络中，则上述目标移动管理网元101、源移动管理网元102可以是5G网络中的AMF，终端103可以是5G网络中的终端。
可选的，图2所示的目标移动管理网元101、源移动管理网元102、或者终端103可以由一个设备来实现，也可以由多个设备来实现，还可以是一个设备内的一个功能模块，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。可以理解的是，上述功能既可以是硬件设备中的网络元件，也可以是在专用硬件上运行的软件功能，或者是平台(例如，云平台) 上实例化的虚拟化功能。
例如，图2中的目标移动管理网元101、源移动管理网元102、或者终端103可以通过图4中的通信装置来实现。图4为本申请实施例提供的通信装置的结构示意图。如图4所示，该通信装置包括至少一个处理器201，通信线路202，存储器203以及至少一个通信接口204。
处理器201可以是一个通用中央处理器(central processing unit，CPU)，微处理器，特定应用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit，ASIC)，或一个或多个用于控制本申请方案程序执行的集成电路。
通信线路202可包括一通路，在上述组件之间传送信息。
通信接口204，使用任何收发器一类的装置，用于与其他设备或通信网络通信，如以太网，无线接入网(radio access network，RAN)，无线局域网(wireless local area networks，WLAN)等。
存储器203可以是只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)或可存储静态信息和指令的其他类型的静态存储设备，随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)或者可存储信息和指令的其他类型的动态存储设备，也可以是电可擦可编程只读存储器(electrically erasable programmable read-only memory，EEPROM)、只读光盘(compact disc read-only memory，CD-ROM)或其他光盘存储、光碟存储(包括压缩光碟、激光碟、光碟、数字通用光碟、蓝光光碟等)、磁盘存储介质或者其他磁存储设备、或者能够用于携带或存储具有指令或数据结构形式的期望的程序代码并能够由计算机存取的任何其他介质，但不限于此。存储器可以是独立存在，通过通信线路202与处理器相连接。存储器也可以和处理器集成在一起。
其中，存储器203用于存储执行本申请方案的计算机执行指令，并由处理器201来控制执行。处理器201用于执行存储器203中存储的计算机执行指令，从而实现本申请下述实施例提供的报文传输方法。
可选的，本申请实施例中的计算机执行指令也可以称之为应用程序代码，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
在具体实现中，作为一种实施例，处理器201可以包括一个或多个CPU，例如图4中的CPU0和CPU1。
在具体实现中，作为一种实施例，通信装置300可以包括多个处理器，例如图4中的处理器201和处理器207。这些处理器中的每一个可以是一个单核(single-CPU)处理器，也可以是一个多核(multi-CPU)处理器。这里的处理器可以指一个或多个设备、电路、和/或用于处理数据(例如计算机程序指令)的处理核。
在具体实现中，作为一种实施例，通信装置还可以包括输出设备205和输入设备206。输出设备205和处理器201通信，可以以多种方式来显示信息。例如，输出设备205可以是液晶显示器(liquid crystal display，LCD)，发光二级管(light emitting diode，LED)显示设备，阴极射线管(cathode ray tube，CRT)显示设备，或投影仪(projector)等。输入设备206和处理器201通信，可以以多种方式接收用户的输入。例如，输入设备206可以是鼠标、键盘、触摸屏设备或传感设备等。
下面将结合本申请实施例的附图，对本申请实施例所提供的技术方案进行介绍。
如图5所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种信息获取方法，该方法包括以下步骤：
S101、终端向目标AMF发送第一初始NAS消息，以使得目标AMF接收来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息。
其中，第一初始NAS消息是以第一根密钥进行安全保护的初始NAS消息。第一初始NAS消息中包括以第一根密钥进行完整性保护的非明文信元。
可以理解的是，第一根密钥是终端当前安全上下文中存储的根密钥。第一根密钥可以用于生成第一加密密钥以及第一完整性保护密钥。或者说，第一加密密钥和第一完整性保护密钥由第一根密钥推演得到。
作为一种实现方式，终端以第一加密密钥对明文信息和非明文信息进行加密，构造第一NAS消息容器；之后，终端以第一完整性保护密钥对第一初始NAS消息容器进行完整性保护；最后，终端以明文信息和第一初始NAS消息，构造第一初始NAS消息。
S102、目标AMF向源AMF发送所述第一初始NAS消息，以使得源AMF接收目标AMF发送的所述第一初始NAS消息。
在本申请实施例中，目标AMF可以通过解析第一初始NAS消息，获取第一初始NAS消息中的明文信息；之后，目标AMF根据明文信息中的5GS mobile identity，确定源AMF。
作为一种实现方式，目标AMF向源AMF发送上下文请求(context request)消息，该上下文请求消息用于请求终端的安全上下文，该上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息。
S103、源AMF更新第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥。
可以理解的是，第二根密钥即为第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。第二根密钥可以生成第二加密密钥以及第二完整性保护密钥。或者说，第二加密密钥和第二完整性保护密钥可以由第二根密钥推衍得到。
可选的，在接收到第一初始NAS消息之后，源AMF解析第一初始NAS消息，获取第一初始NAS消息中的明文信息；之后，源AMF根据明文信息中的5GS mobile identity，获取终端的安全上下文；源AMF可以根据安全上下文中的完整性保护密钥对第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验。当第一初始NAS消息的完整性校验成功时(也即源AMF能够确定第一初始NAS消息是完整的)，源AMF可以根据本地策略，更新第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥。
示例性的，本地策略包括：当源AMF确定目标AMF不可信时，源AMF更新根密钥。这样一来，可以实现AMF之间的密钥隔离，避免攻击者在攻破目标AMF后，直接获取到终端当前使用的根密钥(也即第一根密钥)，解密终端与源AMF之间的通信内容。这样有利于提高通信网络的安全性。
示例性的，源AMF确定目标AMF是否可信，包括：源AMF可以确定所有AMF均是不可信的；或者，源AMF可以确定黑名单中的AMF是不可信的；又或者，源AMF可以确定不在白名单中的AMF是不可信的。
作为一种实现方式，源AMF根据第一根密钥、方向值、以及上行NAS计数值(count)，生成第二根密钥。可以理解的是，源AMF所采用的密钥生成算法可以参 考现有技术，在此不予赘述。
其中，方向值用于指示数据传输的方向(例如上行方向或者下行方向)。例如，方向值可以是0x00，表示上行方向。
上行NAS count用于对终端向网络侧发送的NAS消息进行计数。上行NAS count可以包括上行非接入层序列号(NAS sequence number，NAS SQN)以及上行非接入层溢出值(NAS OVERFLOW)。源AMF和终端共同维护上行NAS count。源AMF可以根据第一初始NAS消息中携带的上行NAS SQN，结合自身存储的上行NAS OVERFLOW，确定上行NAS count。
S104、源AMF向目标AMF发送第二根密钥以及第一指示信息，以使得目标AMF接收源AMF发送的第二根密钥以及第一指示消息。
其中，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是更新后的根密钥。或者说，第一指示信息用于指示第二根密钥是对第一根密钥更新后的根密钥。可选的，第一指示信息可以记为keyAmfHDerivationInd，本申请实施例不限于此。
作为一种实现方式，源AMF向目标AMF发送上下文响应消息，该上下文响应消息用于向目标AMF反馈终端的安全上下文，该上下文响应消息包括第一指示信息以及第二根密钥。
可选的，上下文响应消息可以称为Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer response消息。
需要说明的是，第二根密钥存储于安全上下文中；第一指示信息可以存储于安全上下文中，也可以是该上下文响应消息中的一个独立信元。
在本申请实施例中，目标AMF在接收到第二根密钥以及第一指示信息之后，目标AMF可以根据第二根密钥，确定第二加密密钥以及第二完整性保护密钥，以便于目标AMF利用第二加密密钥进行相应的加/解密，以及利用第二完整性保护密钥进行相应的校验。
S105、目标AMF根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，以使得终端接收目标AMF发送的第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
其中，所述第二指示信息用于指示终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥。该第二指示信息可以记为K_AMF_change_flag，本申请实施例不限于此。可以理解的是，在终端接收到第二指示信息之后，终端会根据第二指示信息，更新第一根密钥，得到第二根密钥。进一步的，终端还会根据第二根密钥，推演出第二加密密钥和第二完整性保护密钥。
所述第三指示信息用于指示终端再次发送初始NAS消息。可以理解的是，再次发送的初始NAS消息与之前发送的第一初始NAS消息在内容上是相同的。
可选的，所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息可以承载于NAS SMC消息中。在本申请实施例中，该NAS SMC消息可以以第二完整性保护密钥进行完整性保护，避免被攻击者篡改。
需要说明的是，第三指示信息可以是NAS SMC消息中的一个独立信元。这样一来，若NAS SMC消息包括该独立信元，则说明NAS SMC消息携带第三指示信息。若NAS SMC消息不包括该独立信元，则说明NAS SMC消息未携带第三指示信息。
或者，NAS SMC消息可以以一个比特域的取值来指示该NAS SMC消息是否携带了第三指示信息。例如，以该比特域仅包括一个比特为例，“0”表示NAS SMC消息携带了第三指示信息，“1”表示NAS SMC消息未携带第三指示信息。
第二指示信息在NAS SMC消息中的实现方式可以参考上述第三指示信息的相关描述，在此不再赘述。
作为一种实现方式，在目标AMF接收到第二根密钥以及第一指示信息之后，目标AMF根据第二根密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密。可以理解的是，由于第一初始NAS消息中的非明文信元是以第一根密钥进行安全保护的，因此目标AMF不能对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行成功解密。在解密失败后，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向源AMF发送第二指示信息以及第三指示信息。
作为另一种实现方式，在目标AMF接收到第二根密钥以及第一指示信息之后，目标AMF不对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，直接根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向源AMF发送第二指示信息以及第三指示信息。可以理解的是，由于目标AMF根据第一指示信息可以获知接收到的是第二根密钥，无法解密第一初始NAS消息，故AMF不用于执行以第二根密钥解密第一初始NAS消息的流程，因此节省了该解密流程所耗费的时间，从而减少目标AMF获取到非明文信元的时延。
S106、终端向目标AMF发送第二初始NAS消息，以使得目标AMF接收到第二初始NAS消息。
其中，第二初始NAS消息是以第二根密钥进行安全保护的初始NAS消息。第二初始NAS消息包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
作为一种实现方式，终端根据第二指示信息，更新自身保存的第一根密钥，得到第二根密钥。之后，终端根据第三指示信息，生成第二初始NAS消息，并将该第二初始NAS消息发送给目标AMF。这样一来，由于目标AMF预先从源AMF获取到第二根密钥，因此目标AMF能够利用第二根密钥，对第二初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取非明文信元。
可选的，终端可按照如下方式生成第二初始NAS消息：终端以第二加密密钥对明文信息和非明文信息进行加密，构造第二NAS消息容器；之后，终端以第二完整性保护密钥对第二初始NAS消息容器进行完整性保护；最终，终端以第二初始NAS消息容器以及明文信息，构造第二初始NAS消息。
可以理解的是，第一初始NAS消息所包括的非明文信元和第二初始NAS消息所包括的非明文信元在内容上是相同的，在安全保护上所采用的根密钥是不相同的。
在本申请实施例中，第二初始NAS消息可以包括在NAS SMP消息中。或者，当初始NAS消息为注册请求消息时，第二初始NAS消息可以包括在注册完成消息中。
基于图5所示的技术方案，目标AMF通过来自于源AMF的第一指示信息，确定第一根密钥已更新为第二根密钥。在这种情况下，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息，以使得终端能够将第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥，保证目标AMF与终端之间存储的根密钥是相同的。另外，目标AMF还向终端发送第三指示信 息，以获取终端发送的第二初始NAS消息。由于第二初始NAS消息中包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元，而目标AMF已从源AMF获取到第二根密钥，因此目标AMF能够对第二初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取到非明文信元。相比于现有技术，目标AMF无需发起鉴权流程，有利于降低信令开销，并且节省了鉴权流程所耗费的时间。
可选的，如图6所示，图5中的步骤S105-S106可以替换为步骤S107-S108。
S107、目标AMF根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息以及第四指示信息。
其中，第二指示信息的相关描述可参考步骤S105中的介绍，在此不再赘述。
第四指示信息用于指示终端再次发送非明文信元。在本申请实施例中，需要再次发送的非明文信元可以是第一初始NAS消息中携带的非明文信元的一部分或者全部。
需要说明的是，若需要再次发送的非明文信元是第一初始NAS消息所携带的非明文信元的一部分，则需要再次发送的非明文信元具体是哪些信元可以是目标AMF与终端之间预先协议确定的，或者是标准中定义的，又或者是第四指示信息所指示的。
例如，第四指示信息可以包括每一个需要再次发送的非明文信元的标识。示例性的，第一初始NAS消息携带非明文信元#1、非明文信元#2、以及非明文信元#3，则第四指示信息可以包括非明文信元#1的标识和非明文信元#3的标识，这样一来，终端仅需要再次向目标AMF发送非明文信元#1和非明文信元#3，而无需再次发送非明文信元#2。
又例如，第四指示信息包括位图，位图中每n个比特对应一个非明文信元，该n个比特的取值用于指示终端是否再次发送该n个比特对应的非明文信元。以一个比特对应一个非明文信元为例，“0”用于指示终端不再次发送该非明文信元，“1”用于指示终端再次发送该非明文信元。示例性的，假设初始NAS消息携带非明文信元#1、非明文信元#2、以及非明文信元#3，位图中以一个比特对应初始NAS消息中的一个非明文信元，位图中的第一个比特对应非明文信元#1，位图中的第二个比特对应非明文信元#2，位图中的第三个比特对应非明文信元#3。若第四指示信息#2包括的位图为“010”，则第四指示信息#2用于指示终端再次发送非明文信元#2。若第四指示信息#2包括的位图为“110”，则第四指示信息#2用于指示终端再次发送非明文信元#1和非明文信元#2。
可以理解的是，第四指示信息还可以采用其他方式，来指示哪些非明文信元需要终端再次发送给目标AMF。
可选的，所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息可以包括在NAS SMC消息中。
作为一种实现方式，在目标AMF接收到第二根密钥以及第一指示信息之后，目标AMF根据第二根密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密。可以理解的是，由于第一初始NAS消息中的非明文信元是以第一根密钥进行安全保护的，因此目标AMF不能对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行成功解密。在解密失败后，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向源AMF发送第二指示信息以及第四指示信息。
作为另一种实现方式，在目标AMF接收到第二根密钥以及第一指示信息之后， 目标AMF不对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，直接根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向源AMF发送第二指示信息以及第四指示信息。可以理解的是，由于目标AMF根据第一指示信息可以获知接收到的是第二根密钥，无法解密第一初始NAS消息，故AMF不用于执行以第二根密钥解密第一初始NAS消息的流程，因此节省了该解密流程所耗费的时间，从而减少目标AMF获取到非明文信元的时延。
S108、终端向目标AMF发送以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元，以使得目标AMF接收到终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
其中，非明文信元以第二根密钥进行安全保护，包括：非明文信元以第二加密密钥进行加密，和/或非明文信元以第二完整性保护密钥进行完整性保护。
作为一种实现方式，终端根据第二指示信息，更新自身保存的第一根密钥，得到第二根密钥。之后，终端根据第四指示信息，生成以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元，并且将该以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元发送给目标AMF。这样一来，由于目标AMF预先从源AMF获取到第二根密钥，因此目标AMF能够对第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，获取到非明文信元。
在本申请实施例中，以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元可以包括在NAS SMP消息中。或者，当第一初始NAS消息为注册请求消息时，以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元可以包括在注册完成消息中。
可以理解的是，相比于步骤S105-S106来说，在步骤S107-S108中，终端仅需向目标AMF发送非明文信元，而无需发送完整的初始NAS消息。这样一来，有利于降低信令开销。
基于图6所示的技术方案，目标AMF通过来自于源AMF的第一指示信息，确定第一根密钥已更新为第二根密钥。在这种情况下，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息，以使得终端能够将第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥，保证目标AMF与终端之间存储的根密钥是相同的。另外，目标AMF还向终端发送第四指示信息，以获取终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。由于目标AMF已从源AMF获取到第二根密钥，因此目标AMF能够对以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取到非明文信元。相比于现有技术，目标AMF无需发起鉴权流程，有利于降低信令开销，并且节省了鉴权流程所耗费的时间。
如图7所示，为本申请实施例提供的另一种信息获取方法，该方法包括以下步骤：
S201、终端向目标AMF发送第一初始NAS消息，以使得目标AMF接收来自终端的第一初始NAS消息。
S202、目标AMF向源AMF发送所述第一初始NAS消息，以使得源AMF接收目标AMF发送的所述第一初始NAS消息。
其中，步骤S201-S202与步骤S101-S202相似，具体描述可参考图5所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。
S203、源AMF对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，获取非明文信元。
其中，源AMF获取到的非明文信元可以是第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非 明文信元的全部或者一部分。例如，第一初始NAS消息携带非明文信元#1、非明文信元#2、以及非明文信元#3，所述源AMF获取到的非明文信元可以为非明文信元#1和非明文信元#2，或者所述源AMF获取到的非明文信元可以为：非明文信元#2，又或者所述源AMF获取到的非明文信元可以为：非明文信元#1、非明文信元#2、以及非明文信元#3。
作为一种实现方式，源AMF根据第一初始NAS消息所携带的明文信息中的5GS mobile identity，获取安全上下文；之后，源AMF根据安全上下文中的第一根密钥，推演出第一完整性保护密钥和第一加密密钥；源AMF根据第一完整性保护密钥，对第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验；在第一初始NAS消息通过完整性校验之后，源AMF根据第一加密密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中的NAS消息容器进行解密，以获取所述非明文信元。
S204、源AMF更新第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥。
其中，步骤S204与步骤S103相同，详细描述可参考图5所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。
S205、源AMF向目标AMF发送第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，以使得目标AMF接收源AMF发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元。
其中，第二根密钥以及第一指示信息的相关描述可参考步骤S104的介绍，在此不再赘述。
作为一种实现方式，源AMF向目标AMF发送上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息用于向目标AMF反馈上下文，所述上下文响应消息包括：第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元。
可选的，上下文响应消息可以称为Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer response消息。
S206、目标AMF根据预设规则以及第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息以及第四指示信息。
其中，第二指示信息的相关描述可参考步骤S105的介绍，第四指示信息的相关描述可参考步骤S107的介绍，在此不再赘述。
可选的，预设规则包括：在源AMF不可信的情况下，目标AMF重新获取所述非明文信元。可以理解的是，在源AMF不可信的情况下，源AMF发送给目标AMF的所述非明文信元存在被篡改的可能，因此，目标AMF有必要重新获取所述明文信元，以保证目标AMF获取到的所述非明文信元是安全可信的，这有利于保证通信网络的安全性。
基于该预设规则，步骤S206可具体实现为：目标AMF确定源AMF是否可信；若源AMF不可信，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息以及第四指示信息。
可以理解的是，若预设规则为其他规则，步骤S206的具体实现可以进行相应的改变，在此不予赘述。
可选的，目标源AMF确定源AMF是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：
情形一、若目标AMF确定所有AMF均可信，则目标AMF确定源AMF可信。
情形二、若目标AMF确定所有AMF均不可信，则目标AMF确定源AMF不可信。
情形三、若源AMF在白名单中，则目标AMF确定源AMF可信。其中，白名单用于记录至少一个可信的AMF。可选的，若源AMF不在白名单中，则目标AMF可以确定源AMF不可信。或者，若源AMF不在白名单中，则目标AMF根据源AMF的其他信息(例如部署位置)，进一步判断源AMF是否可信。
情形四、若源AMF在黑名单中，则目标AMF确定源AMF不可信。其中，黑名单用于记录至少一个不可信的AMF。可选的，若源AMF不在黑名单中，则目标AMF可以确定源AMF可信。或者，若源AMF不在黑名单中，则目标AMF根据源AMF的其他信息(例如部署位置)，进一步判断源AMF是否可信。
上述白名单和/或黑名单是预先配置的，或者是协议中规定的，本申请实施例对此不作限定。
另外，上述情形一至情形四仅是示例。目标AMF还可以其他实现方式来确定源AMF是否可信，在此不一一展开叙述。
可以理解的是，若目标AMF确定源AMF是可信的，则说明来自于源AMF的所述非明文信元是可信任的(也即所述非明文信元未被篡改)，从而目标AMF可以直接使用所述非明文信元。若目标AMF确定源AMF是不可信的，则说明来自于源AMF的所述非明文信元是不可信任的，从而目标AMF需要重新获取所述非明文信元。例如，当非明文信元是用户面数据时，由于目标AMF不需要处理该信元，而是为用户转发，因此目标AMF无法感知该信元是否被篡改，若目标AMF确定源AMF不可信时，目标AMF需要重新获取用户面数据。
作为一种实现方式，目标AMF根据第二根密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密。可以理解的是，由于第一初始NAS消息中的非明文信元是以第一根密钥进行安全保护的，因此目标AMF不能对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行成功解密。在解密失败后，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向源AMF发送第二指示信息以及第四指示信息。
作为另一种实现方式，目标AMF不对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，直接根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向源AMF发送第二指示信息以及第四指示信息。可以理解的是，由于目标AMF根据第一指示信息可以获知接收到的是第二根密钥，无法解密第一初始NAS消息，故AMF不用于执行以第二根密钥解密第一初始NAS消息的流程，因此节省了该解密流程所耗费的时间，从而减少目标AMF获取到非明文信元的时延。
S207、终端向目标AMF发送以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元，以使得目标AMF接收到以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
其中，步骤S207与步骤S108相同，具体描述可参考步骤S108，在此不再赘述。
基于图7所示的技术方案，目标AMF通过来自于源AMF的第一指示信息，确定第一根密钥已更新为第二根密钥。在这种情况下，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息，以使得终端能够将第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥，保证目标AMF与终端之间存储的根密钥是相同的。另外，目标AMF还向终端发送第四指示信息，以获取终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。由于目标AMF已 从源AMF获取到第二根密钥，因此目标AMF能够对以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取到非明文信元。相比于现有技术，目标AMF无需发起鉴权流程，有利于降低信令开销，并且节省了鉴权流程所耗费的时间。
另外，在源AMF不可信的情况下，目标AMF同样不信任源AMF发送的非明文信元，并从终端再次获取非明文信元，有利于保证网络安全性。
可选的，如图8所示，步骤S206-S207可以替换为步骤S208-S209。
S208、目标AMF根据预设规则和第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，以使得终端接收目标AMF发送的第二指示信息和第三指示信息。
其中，第二指示信息和第三指示信息的相关描述可参考步骤S105的介绍，预设规则的相关描述可参考步骤S206中的介绍，在此不再赘述。
作为一种实现方式，目标AMF根据第二根密钥，对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密。可以理解的是，由于第一初始NAS消息中的非明文信元是以第一根密钥进行安全保护的，因此目标AMF不能对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行成功解密。在解密失败后，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向源AMF发送第二指示信息以及第三指示信息。
作为另一种实现方式，目标AMF不对第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，直接根据第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向源AMF发送第二指示信息以及第三指示信息。可以理解的是，由于目标AMF根据第一指示信息可以获知接收到的是第二根密钥，无法解密第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元，故AMF不用于执行以第二根密钥解密第一初始NAS消息的流程，因此节省了该解密流程所耗费的时间，从而减少目标AMF获取到非明文信元的时延。
S209、终端向目标AMF发送第二初始NAS消息，以使得目标AMF接收终端发送的第二初始NAS消息。
其中，步骤S209与步骤S106相同，具体描述可参考步骤S106，在此不再赘述。
基于图8所示的技术方案，目标AMF通过来自于源AMF的第一指示信息，确定第一根密钥已更新为第二根密钥。在这种情况下，目标AMF根据第一指示信息，向终端发送第二指示信息，以使得终端能够将第一根密钥更新为第二根密钥，保证目标AMF与终端之间存储的根密钥是相同的。另外，目标AMF还向终端发送第三指示信息，以获取终端发送的第二初始NAS消息。由于第二初始NAS消息中包括以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元，而目标AMF已从源AMF获取到第二根密钥，因此目标AMF能够对第二初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，以获取到非明文信元。相比于现有技术，目标AMF无需发起鉴权流程，有利于降低信令开销，并且节省了鉴权流程所耗费的时间。
另外，在源AMF不可信的情况下，目标AMF同样不信任源AMF发送的非明文信元，并从终端再次获取非明文信元，有利于保证网络安全性。
在本申请实施例中，在目标AMF向终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息之外，或者，在目标AMF向终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息之外，目标AMF还可以向终端发送加密算法和/或完整性保护算法，以保证目标AMF和终端之间采用相同的加密算法和/或完整性保护算法。
其中，目标AMF所发送的加密算法和/或完整性保护算法可以承载于NAS SMC消息中或者其他信令中，对此不做具体限定。
在具体实现中，目标AMF向终端发送加密算法和/或完整性保护算法，包括：目标AMF向终端发送加密算法的标识和/或完整性保护算法的标识。
可选的，目标AMF所发送的加密算法可以是终端所支持的加密算法中的任意一种，例如，目标AMF从预先配置的加密算法优先级列表中，确定终端所支持的优先级最高的加密算法，并将该终端所支持的优先级最高的加密算法发送给终端。其中，加密算法优先级列表用于指示至少一个加密算法的优先级。
可选的，目标AMF所发送的完整性保护算法可以是终端所支持的完整性保护算法中的任意一种，例如，目标AMF从预先配置的完整性保护算法优先级列表中，确定终端所支持的优先级最高的完整性保护算法，并将该终端所支持的优先级最高的完整性保护算法发送给终端。其中，完整性保护算法优先级列表用于指示至少一个完整性保护算法的优先级。
可以理解的是，若目标AMF不向终端发送加密算法和/或完整性保护算法，则终端以及目标AMF所采用的加密算法和/或完整性保护算法是预先协商的或者是协议中规定的。
上述主要从每一个网元之间交互的角度对本申请实施例提供的方案进行了介绍。可以理解的是，每一个网元，例如目标移动管理网元，为了实现上述功能，其包含了执行每一个功能相应的硬件结构或软件模块，或两者结合。本领域技术人员应该很容易意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
本申请实施例可以根据上述方法示例对目标移动管理网元进行功能模块的划分，例如，可以对应每一个功能划分每一个功能模块，也可以将两个或两个以上的功能集成在一个处理模块中。上述集成的模块既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能模块的形式实现。需要说明的是，本申请实施例中对模块的划分是示意性的，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。下面以采用对应每一个功能划分每一个功能模块为例进行说明：
图9为本申请实施例提供的一种通信装置的结构示意图。如图9所示，该通信装置包括：接收模块301和发送模块302。其中，接收模块301用于支持通信装置执行图5中的步骤S101、S104和S106，图6中的步骤S108，图7中的步骤S201、S205和S207，图8中的步骤S209，或者用于支持本文描述的技术方案的其他过程。发送模块302用于支持通信装置执行图5中的步骤S102和S105，图6中的步骤S107，图7中的步骤S202和S206，图8中的步骤S208，或者用于支持本文描述的技术方案的其他过程。
可选的，如图9所示，该通信装置还包括：处理模块303。该处理模块303用于实现以下步骤：生成信息(例如第二指示信息、第三指示信息等)、确定源AMF是 否可信、对初始NAS消息中被安全保护的非明文信元进行解密，或者用于支持本文描述的技术方案的其他过程。
作为一个示例，结合图4所示的通信装置，图9中的接收模块301和发送模块302可以由图4中的通信接口204来实现；图9中的处理模块303可以由图4中的处理器201来实现，本申请实施例对此不作任何限制。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质中存储有计算机指令；当所述计算机可读存储介质在图4所示的通信装置上运行时，使得该通信装置执行如图5至图8所示的方法。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或者数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(digital subscriber line，DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可以用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)，光介质、或者半导体介质(例如固态硬盘(solid state disk，SSD))等。
本申请实施例还提供了一种包含计算机指令的计算机程序产品，当其在图4所示的通信装置上运行时，使得通信装置可以执行图5至图8所示的方法。
上述本申请实施例提供的通信装置、计算机存储介质以及计算机程序产品均用于执行上文所提供的方法，因此，其所能达到的有益效果可参考上文所提供的方法对应的有益效果，在此不再赘述。
图10为本申请实施例提供的一种芯片的结构示意图。图10所示的芯片可以为通用处理器，也可以为专用处理器。该芯片包括处理器401。其中，处理器401用于支持通信装置执行图5至图8所示的技术方案。
可选的，该芯片还包括收发管脚402，收发管脚402用于接受处理器401的控制，用于支持通信装置执行图5至图8所示的技术方案。
可选的，图10所示的芯片还可以包括：存储介质403。
需要说明的是，图10所示的芯片可以使用下述电路或者器件来实现：一个或多个现场可编程门阵列(field programmable gate array，FPGA)、可编程逻辑器件(programmable logic device，PLD)、控制器、状态机、门逻辑、分立硬件部件、任何其他适合的电路、或者能够执行本申请通篇所描述的各种功能的电路的任意组合。
尽管在此结合各实施例对本申请进行了描述，然而，本领域技术人员通过查看所述附图、公开内容、以及所附权利要求书，可理解并实现所述公开实施例的其他变化。在权利要求中，“包括”(comprising)一词不排除其他组成部分或步骤，“一”或“一个”不排除多个的情况。单个处理器或其他单元可以实现权利要求中列举的若干项功能。相互不同的从属权利要求中记载了某些措施，但这并不表示这些措施不能组合起来产生良好的效果。
尽管结合具体特征及其实施例对本申请进行了描述，显而易见的，在不脱离本申请的精神和范围的情况下，可对其进行各种修改和组合。相应地，本说明书和附图仅 仅是所附权利要求所界定的本申请的示例性说明，且视为已覆盖本申请范围内的任意和所有修改、变化、组合或等同物。显然，本领域的技术人员可以对本申请进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本申请的精神和范围。这样，倘若本申请的这些修改和变型属于本申请权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内，则本申请也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。

Claims (71)

  1. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，包括：
    目标移动管理网元，用于接收来自终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；向源移动管理网元发送所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述源移动管理网元，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验之后，更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥；以及，向所述目标移动管理网元发送第一指示信息和所述第二根密钥，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述目标移动管理网元，还用于根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第三指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送初始NAS消息。
  2. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，包括：
    目标移动管理网元，用于接收来自终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；向源移动管理网元发送所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述源移动管理网元，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验之后，对所述第一初始NAS消息解密，获取所述非明文信元；更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥；向所述目标移动管理网元发送第一指示信息、所述第二根密钥、以及所述非明文信元，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述目标移动管理网元，还用于根据预设规则和所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第四指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送所述非明文信元。
  3. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，包括：
    目标移动管理网元，用于接收来自终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；向源移动管理网元发送所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述源移动管理网元，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验之后，更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥；以及，向所述目标移动管理网元发送第一指示信息和所述第二根密钥，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述目标移动管理网元，还用于根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第四指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送所述非明文信元。
  4. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，包括：
    目标移动管理网元，用于接收来自终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；向源移动管理网元发送所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述源移动管理网元，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息进行完整性校验之后，对所述第一初始NAS消息解密，获取所述非明文信元；更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥，生成第二根密钥；向所述目标移动管理网元发送第一指示信息、所述第二根密钥、以及所述非明文信元，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述目标移动管理网元，还用于根据预设规则和所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第三指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送初始NAS消息。
  5. 一种信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第三指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送初始NAS消息。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，所述第二初始NAS消息包括以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元。
  7. 根据权利要求5或6所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，在所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息之后，还包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第二根密钥，对所述第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的所述非明文信元进行解密；
    所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：
    在所述目标移动管理网元对所述第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的所述非明文信元进行解密失败的情况下，所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息。
  8. 根据权利要求5或6所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息。
  9. 根据权利要求6至8任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，第二初始NAS消息包括在NAS安全模式完成SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
  10. 根据权利要求5至9任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述第二指 示信息和所述第三指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令SMC消息中。
  11. 根据权利要求5至10任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元向所述源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，所述上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息包括所述第二根密钥和所述第一指示信息。
  12. 一种信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述目标移动管理网元根据预设规则和所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第四指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送所述非明文信元。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述终端发送的以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元。
  14. 根据权利要求12或13所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述预设规则包括：在所述源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，所述目标移动管理网元重新从所述终端获取所述非明文信元。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元根据预设规则以及所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元是否可信；
    若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：
    若所述目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均可信，则所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元可信；
    若所述目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均不可信，则所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元不可信；
    若所述源移动管理网元位于白名单中，则所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元可信，所述白名单包括至少一个移动管理网元；
    若所述源移动管理网元位于黑名单中，则所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元不可信，所述黑名单包括至少一个移动管理网元。
  17. 根据权利要求15或16所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息，包括：
    若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息。
  18. 根据权利要求12至17任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述以第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元包括在NAS安全模式完成SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
  19. 根据权利要求12至18任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令SMC消息中。
  20. 根据权利要求12至19任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元向所述源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，所述上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息包括所述第二根密钥、所述第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元。
  21. 一种信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；
    所述目标移动管理网元接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，所述第四指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送非明文信元。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
  23. 根据权利要求21或22所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，在所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息之后，还包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第二根密钥，对所述第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的所述非明文信元进行解密；
    所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，包括：
    在所述目标移动管理网元对所述第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的所述非明文信元进行解密失败的情况下，所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴 权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息。
  24. 根据权利要求21或22所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息。
  25. 根据权利要求22至24任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，第二初始NAS消息包括在NAS安全模式完成SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
  26. 根据权利要求21至25任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令SMC消息中。
  27. 根据权利要求21至26任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元向所述源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，所述上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息包括所述第二根密钥和所述第一指示信息。
  28. 一种信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述目标移动管理网元根据预设规则和所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第三指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送初始NAS消息。
  29. 根据权利要求28所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，所述第二初始NAS消息包括以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元。
  30. 根据权利要求28或29所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述预设规则包括：在所述源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，所述目标移动管理网元重新从所述终端获取所述非明文信元。
  31. 根据权利要求30所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元根据预设规则以及所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元是否可信；
    若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息。
  32. 根据权利要求31所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：
    若所述目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均可信，则所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元可信；
    若所述目标移动管理网元确定所有的移动管理网元均不可信，则所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元不可信；
    若所述源移动管理网元位于白名单中，则所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元可信，所述白名单包括至少一个移动管理网元；
    若所述源移动管理网元位于黑名单中，则所述目标移动管理网元确定所述源移动管理网元不可信，所述黑名单包括至少一个移动管理网元。
  33. 根据权利要求31或32所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息，包括：
    若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则所述目标移动管理网元根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息。
  34. 根据权利要求28至33任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述以第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元包括在NAS安全模式完成SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
  35. 根据权利要求28至34任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令SMC消息中。
  36. 根据权利要求28至35任一项所述的信息获取方法，其特征在于，所述目标移动管理网元将来自于终端的第一初始NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元向所述源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，所述上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及非明文信元，包括：
    所述目标移动管理网元接收所述源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息包括所述第二根密钥、所述第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元。
  37. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    发送模块，用于将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；
    接收模块，用于接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述发送模块，还用于根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第三指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送初始NAS消息。
  38. 根据权利要求37所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收模块，还用于接收所述终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，所述第二初始NAS消息包括以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元。
  39. 根据权利要求37或38所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置还包括处理模块；
    所述处理模块，用于根据所述第二根密钥，对所述第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的所述非明文信元进行解密；
    所述发送模块，具体用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的所述非明文信元进行解密失败的情况下，根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息。
  40. 根据权利要求37或38所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，具体用于根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息。
  41. 根据权利要求38至40任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，第二初始NAS消息包括在NAS安全模式完成SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
  42. 根据权利要求37至41任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令SMC消息中。
  43. 根据权利要求37至42任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，具体用于向所述源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，所述上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述接收模块，具体用于接收所述源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息包括所述第二根密钥和所述第一指示信息。
  44. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    发送模块，用于将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；
    接收模块，用于接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述发送模块，还用于根据预设规则和所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第四指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送所述非明文信元。
  45. 根据权利要求44所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收模块，还用于接收所述终端发送的以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元。
  46. 根据权利要求44或45所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述预设规则包括：在所述源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，重新从所述终端获取所述非明文信元。
  47. 根据权利要求46所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置还包括处理模块；
    所述处理模块，用于确定所述源移动管理网元是否可信；
    所述发送模块，还用于若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息。
  48. 根据权利要求47所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述处理模块，用于确定所述源移动管理网元是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：
    若确定所有的移动管理网元均可信，则确定所述源移动管理网元可信；
    若确定所有的移动管理网元均不可信，则确定所述源移动管理网元不可信；
    若所述源移动管理网元位于白名单中，则确定所述源移动管理网元可信，所述白名单包括至少一个移动管理网元；
    若所述源移动管理网元位于黑名单中，则确定所述源移动管理网元不可信，所述黑名单包括至少一个移动管理网元。
  49. 根据权利要求47或48所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，用于若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息。
  50. 根据权利要求44至49任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述以第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元包括在NAS安全模式完成SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
  51. 根据权利要求44至50任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令SMC消息中。
  52. 根据权利要求44至51任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，还用于向所述源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，所述上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述接收模块，还用于接收所述源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息包括所述第二根密钥、所述第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元。
  53. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    发送模块，用于将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；
    接收模块，用于接收源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥和第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述发送模块，还用于根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第四指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的第一根密钥以获取第二根密钥，所述第四指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送非明文信元。
  54. 根据权利要求53所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收模块，还用于接收所述终端发送的以第二根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元。
  55. 根据权利要求53或54所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置还包括处理模块；
    所述处理模块，用于根据所述第二根密钥，对所述第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的所述非明文信元进行解密；
    所述发送模块，用于在对所述第一初始NAS消息中被安全保护的所述非明文信元进行解密失败的情况下，根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息。
  56. 根据权利要求53或54所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，还用于根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息。
  57. 根据权利要求54至56任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，第二初始NAS消息包括在NAS安全模式完成SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
  58. 根据权利要求53至57任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述第二指示信息和所述第四指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令SMC消息中。
  59. 根据权利要求53至58任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，具体用于向所述源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，所述上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述接收模块，具体用于接收所述源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息包括所述第二根密钥和所述第一指示信息。
  60. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    发送模块，用于将来自于终端的第一初始非接入层NAS消息发送给源移动管理网元，所述第一初始NAS消息包括以第一根密钥进行安全保护的非明文信元；
    接收模块，用于接收所述源移动管理网元发送的第二根密钥、第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二根密钥是对所述第一根密钥更新后的根密钥；
    所述发送模块，还用于根据预设规则和所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送第二指示信息和第三指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新自身保存的所述第一根密钥以获取所述第二根密钥，所述第三指示信息用于指示所述终端再次发送初始NAS消息。
  61. 根据权利要求60所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收模块，还用于接收所述终端发送的第二初始NAS消息，所述第二初始NAS消息包括以所述第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元。
  62. 根据权利要求60或61所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述预设规则包括：在所述源移动管理网元不可信的情况下，重新从所述终端获取所述非明文信元。
  63. 根据权利要求62所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置还包括处理模块；
    所述处理模块，用于确定所述源移动管理网元是否可信；
    所述发送模块，具体用于若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则根据所述第一指示信息，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息。
  64. 根据权利要求63所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述处理模块，用于确定所述源移动管理网元是否可信，至少包括以下情形之一：
    若确定所有的移动管理网元均可信，则确定所述源移动管理网元可信；
    若确定所有的移动管理网元均不可信，则确定所述源移动管理网元不可信；
    若所述源移动管理网元位于白名单中，则确定所述源移动管理网元可信，所述白名单包括至少一个移动管理网元；
    若所述源移动管理网元位于黑名单中，则确定所述源移动管理网元不可信，所述 黑名单包括至少一个移动管理网元。
  65. 根据权利要求63或64所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，具体用于若所述源移动管理网元不可信，则根据所述第一指示信息，跳过鉴权流程，向所述终端发送所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息。
  66. 根据权利要求60至65任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述以第二根密钥进行安全保护的所述非明文信元包括在NAS安全模式完成SMP消息或者注册完成消息中。
  67. 根据权利要求60至66任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述第二指示信息和所述第三指示信息包括在NAS安全模式命令SMC消息中。
  68. 根据权利要求60至67任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，具体用于向所述源移动管理网元发送上下文请求消息，所述上下文请求消息包括所述第一初始NAS消息；
    所述接收模块，具体用于接收所述源移动管理网元发送的上下文响应消息，所述上下文响应消息包括所述第二根密钥、所述第一指示信息、以及所述非明文信元。
  69. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，所述计算机可读存储介质存储有计算机程序，所述计算机程序包括程序指令，所述程序指令被处理器执行时使得处理器实现如权利要求5至36任一项所述的信息获取方法。
  70. 一种计算机程序产品，其特征在于，所述计算机程序产品包括程序指令，所述程序指令被处理器执行时使得处理器实现如权利要求5至36任一项所述的信息获取方法。
  71. 一种芯片，其特征在于，所述芯片包括处理器，当所述处理器执行指令时，所述处理器用于实现权利要求5至36任一项所述的信息获取方法。
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