WO2020216047A1 - 一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备 - Google Patents

一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020216047A1
WO2020216047A1 PCT/CN2020/083327 CN2020083327W WO2020216047A1 WO 2020216047 A1 WO2020216047 A1 WO 2020216047A1 CN 2020083327 W CN2020083327 W CN 2020083327W WO 2020216047 A1 WO2020216047 A1 WO 2020216047A1
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Prior art keywords
network device
key
type
error message
integrity
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PCT/CN2020/083327
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
刘福文
Original Assignee
中国移动通信有限公司研究院
中国移动通信集团有限公司
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Publication of WO2020216047A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020216047A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity

Definitions

  • This application relates to wireless communication technology, in particular to a method for processing authentication information, a terminal and a network device.
  • the user equipment (UE, User Equipment) and the network side are authenticated through the authentication and key agreement (AKA, Authentication and Key Agreement) protocol.
  • the authentication methods between the UE and the network side in the 5G system include the following two authentication methods: 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA'.
  • the former is based on the Long Term Evolution (LTE) authentication protocol evolved packet system authentication and key agreement (EPS-AKA, Evolved Packet System-Authentication and Key Agreement) development, while the latter is the International Internet Engineering Task Force
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • EPS-AKA Evolved Packet System-Authentication and Key Agreement
  • the authentication protocol defined by (IETF, The Internet Engineering Task Force) is used for the UE in the 4G network to use wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi, Wireless-Fidelity) to access the operator's network.
  • the two authentication methods, 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA' are subject to correlation attacks because the UE may send two different types of error messages when it fails
  • the embodiments of the present application expect to provide an authentication information processing method, terminal and network equipment.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a method for processing authentication information.
  • the method includes: in the case of a network authentication failure, a terminal separately based on the encryption key and the integrity key pair contains the first type of error message. Encryption and integrity protection of the indication information; the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on the shared key; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the terminal sends the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device; wherein the encrypted first instruction information is sent to the first network device through the second network device.
  • the method further includes: the terminal encrypts and protects the integrity of the user's permanent identity according to the encryption key and the integrity key, obtains the user's hidden identity, and reports The third network device sends the hidden user identification; wherein the hidden user identification is sent to the third network device through the second network device and the first network device.
  • the terminal sending the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device includes: the terminal sending the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device through an authentication response message And MAC information for integrity protection.
  • the encryption and integrity protection of the first indication information containing the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively includes:
  • the terminal encrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key, and generates MAC information based on the integrity key.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type;
  • the error message type includes a first type or a second type and response data;
  • the response data is related to the error message type ;
  • the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information;
  • the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN;
  • the response data is a numerical value that characterizes the failure of authentication synchronization; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the The response data is a first random number; the length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first A ciphertext indicating the information.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides an authentication information processing method, the method includes: a first network device receives first instruction information sent by a terminal through a second network device; the first instruction information is based on an encrypted secret Key and integrity key for encryption and integrity protection; the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on the shared key; the first indication information includes the error message type corresponding to the terminal network authentication failure; different The error message type corresponds to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • the method before the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, the method further includes: A network device receives the encryption key and the integrity key sent by a third network device.
  • the method before the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, the method further includes: A network device receives the shared key sent by a third network device, and determines the encryption key and the integrity key based on the shared key.
  • that the first network device receives the first indication information sent by the terminal through the second network device includes: the first network device receives the first indication information sent by the terminal through an authentication response message and MAC information used for integrity protection; the authentication response message is received through the forwarding of the second network device.
  • the first network device decrypting the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key includes: the first network device is based on the The integrity key verifies the MAC information, and if the verification is successful, decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type ;
  • the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information;
  • the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN;
  • the response data is a numerical value that characterizes the failure of authentication synchronization; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the The response data is a first random number; the length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first A ciphertext indicating the information.
  • the method further includes: in a case where the error message type included in the first indication information is the second type, the first network device sends the error message to the third The network device sends an authentication failure synchronization parameter, where the authentication failure synchronization parameter is at least used for the third network device to resume SQN synchronization with the terminal.
  • the method further includes: the first network device sends second indication information to the second network device, where the second indication information includes at least one of the following information: Error message type, permanent user identification.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a method for processing authentication information.
  • the method includes: a third network device receives a user hidden identifier sent by a terminal through a second network device and a first network device; the user hidden identifier Encryption and integrity protection are performed based on an encryption key and an integrity key; the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on a shared key;
  • the third network device decrypts the hidden user identification based on the encryption key and the integrity key to obtain a permanent user identification
  • the third network device determines an authentication protocol based on the permanent user identification, and the authentication protocol is used to authenticate with the terminal.
  • the method before the third network device decrypts the hidden user identity based on the encryption key and the integrity key, the method further includes: the third The network device determines the encryption key and the integrity key according to the shared key.
  • the method further includes: the third network device sending the encryption key and the integrity key to the first network device.
  • the method further includes: the third network device sends the shared key to the first network device.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a terminal, the terminal includes: a first encryption unit and a first communication unit; wherein,
  • the first encryption unit is configured to perform encryption and integrity protection on the first indication information containing the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively when the network authentication fails; the encryption key And the integrity key is obtained based on a shared key; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the first communication unit is configured to send encrypted first instruction information to a first network device; wherein the encrypted first instruction information is sent to the first network device through a second network device.
  • the first encryption unit is further configured to encrypt and integrity protect the permanent user identity according to the encryption key and the integrity key to obtain a hidden user identity;
  • the first communication unit is further configured to send the hidden user identifier to a third network device;
  • the user hidden identifier is sent to the third network device through the second network device and the first network device.
  • the first communication unit is configured to send the encrypted first indication information and the MAC information for integrity protection to the first network device through an authentication response message.
  • the first encryption unit is configured to encrypt the first indication information based on an encryption key, and generate MAC information based on the integrity key.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type
  • the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; where, in the error message
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is a first random number; The length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first A ciphertext indicating the information.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a network device, the network device is a first network device, and the network device includes: a second communication unit and a first decryption unit; wherein,
  • the second communication unit is configured to receive the first instruction information sent by the terminal through the second network device; the first instruction information is encrypted and integrity protected based on the encryption key and the integrity key; the encryption key And the integrity key is obtained based on the shared key; the first indication information includes the error message type corresponding to the terminal network authentication failure; the different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the first decryption unit is configured to decrypt the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • the second communication unit is further configured such that before the first decryption unit decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key , Receiving the encryption key and the integrity key sent by the third network device.
  • the second communication unit is further configured such that before the first decryption unit decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key , Receiving the shared key sent by the third network device;
  • the first decryption unit is further configured to determine the encryption key and the integrity key based on the shared key.
  • the second communication unit is configured to receive the first indication information sent by the terminal and the MAC information for integrity protection through an authentication response message; the authentication response message passes the The second network device forwards and receives.
  • the first decryption unit is configured to verify the MAC information based on the integrity key, and if the verification is successful, perform the verification based on the encryption key.
  • the first instruction information is decrypted.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type
  • the first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; where, in the error message
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is a first random number; The length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first A ciphertext indicating the information.
  • the second communication unit is further configured to send an error message to the third network device when the error message type included in the first indication information is the second type Send an authentication failure synchronization parameter, where the authentication failure synchronization parameter is used at least for the third network device to resume SQN synchronization with the terminal.
  • the second communication unit is further configured to send second indication information to the second network device, and the second indication information includes at least one of the following information: error message Type and permanent user identification.
  • the embodiments of the present application also provide a network device, the network device is a third network device, and the network device includes a third communication unit, a second decryption unit, and a second determination unit; wherein,
  • the third communication unit is configured to receive the hidden user identification sent by the terminal through the second network device and the first network device; the hidden user identification is encrypted and integrity protected based on the encryption key and the integrity key; The encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on the shared key;
  • the second decryption unit is configured to decrypt the hidden user identification based on the encryption key and the integrity key to obtain a permanent user identification
  • the second determining unit is configured to determine an authentication protocol based on the permanent user identification, and the authentication protocol is used to authenticate with the terminal.
  • the second determining unit is further configured to: before the second decryption unit decrypts the user hidden identifier based on the encryption key and the integrity key, The encryption key and the integrity key are determined according to the shared key.
  • the third communication unit is further configured to send the encryption key and the integrity key to the first network device.
  • the third communication unit is further configured to send the shared key to the first network device.
  • the embodiments of the present application also provide a computer-readable storage medium on which is stored a computer program, which when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method described in the first aspect of the embodiments of the present application; or When the program is executed by the processor, the steps of the method described in the second aspect of the embodiments of the present application are implemented; or, when the program is executed by the processor, the steps of the method described in the third aspect of the embodiments of the present application are implemented.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a terminal, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor.
  • the processor implements the embodiment of the present application when the program is executed. The steps of the method described in the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a network device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor, and the processor implements the implementation of the application when the program is executed. Examples are the steps of the method described in the second aspect; or, when the processor executes the program, the steps of the method described in the third aspect of the embodiments of this application are implemented.
  • the terminal encrypts and completes the first indication information containing the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively when the network authentication fails Security protection; the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on a shared key; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format; sending the encrypted first indication information to the first network device; wherein , The encrypted first instruction information is sent to the first network device through the second network device.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application indicates the type of error message through a message (i.e., the first indication information), that is, no matter what type of error message it obtains, the terminal will send the indication information in the same format to the network side, avoiding the network side according to different types.
  • the terminal determines the encryption key and the integrity key through the shared key known to the network side, and according to the encryption key
  • the first indication information is encrypted and integrity protected with the integrity key, so that even if an attacker captures the authentication response message, he cannot obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the flow of correlation attacks in related technologies
  • FIG. 2 is a first flowchart of a method for processing authentication information according to an embodiment of the application
  • FIG. 3 is a second schematic diagram of the flow of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 4 is a third flowchart of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a specific flow of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a composition structure of a terminal according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another composition structure of a terminal according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a composition structure of a network device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of another composition structure of a network device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of the hardware composition structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the process of correlation attacks in related technologies;
  • Figure 1 takes a 4G network (such as an LTE network) as an example for illustration. As shown in Figure 1, it includes:
  • Step 101 The mobility management entity (MME, Mobility Management Entity) sends an authentication request message to the UE, where the authentication request message includes a random password (RAND) and an authentication token (AUTN).
  • the attacker may intercept the authentication request message, obtain and store the random password (RAND) and authentication token (AUTN) in the authentication request message.
  • Step 102 The UE performs network authentication. After the network authentication is completed, the UE sends an authentication response message to the MME. In this step, the attacker may intercept the authentication response message.
  • the UE may send two different types of error messages when the network authentication fails, including: a MAC failure (MAC_FAIL) message or a synchronization failure (SYNC_FAIL) message; among them, the MAC_FAIL message indicates that the UE fails to check the MAC information, usually It is caused by the mismatch between the root key of the UE and the root key of the network side; the SYNC_FAIL message indicates that the sequence number (SQN, Sequence Number) value of the network side is outside the range allowed by the UE.
  • MAC_FAIL MAC failure
  • SYNC_FAIL synchronization failure
  • Step 103 The attacker resends an authentication request message to the UE.
  • the authentication request message includes the random password (RAND) and the authentication token (AUTN) captured in step 101.
  • Step 104 The UE performs network authentication. After the network authentication is completed, the UE sends an authentication response message.
  • the UE sends an authentication response message carrying an error message, for example, the error message is a SYNC_FAIL message; the attacker intercepts the authentication response message, obtains the error message in the authentication response message, and determines the need to track based on the error message
  • the UE is in a specific area, so the attacker can track the UE by intercepting the error message in the authentication response message.
  • Fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart 1 of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in Fig. 2, the method includes:
  • Step 201 When the network authentication fails, the terminal encrypts and protects the first indication information including the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively; the encryption key and the integrity The key is obtained based on the shared key; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • Step 202 The terminal sends the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device; wherein the encrypted first instruction information is sent to the first network device through the second network device.
  • the first network device and the second network device may be core network devices used for network authentication.
  • the first network device may specifically be an authentication server function node (AUSF, Authentication Server Function); the second network device may be a security anchor node function ( SEAF, SEcurity Anchor Function).
  • AUSF authentication server function node
  • SEAF SEcurity Anchor Function
  • the method before the terminal performs network authentication, that is, before step 201, the method further includes: the terminal determines an encryption key and an integrity key according to the shared key .
  • the terminal performs network authentication based on the authentication request issued by the network device.
  • the first indication information including the error message type is encrypted and complete based on the encryption key and the integrity key. Protection; wherein the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on a shared key, and the shared key is commonly known by the terminal and the network side, that is, the terminal is based on a shared secret shared by the network side.
  • the key determines the encryption key and the integrity key, and encrypts and protects the integrity of the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key; on the other hand, the first network device can be based on a shared secret known to the terminal.
  • the key determines the encryption key and the integrity key, and decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, thereby obtaining the error message type contained in the first indication information.
  • the method before the terminal performs network authentication, that is, before step 201, the method further includes: the terminal checks the user with the encryption key and the integrity key The permanent identifier is encrypted and integrity protected, and the user hidden identifier is obtained, and the user hidden identifier is sent to a third network device; wherein, the user hidden identifier is transmitted to the third network device through the second network device and the first network device. The third network device sent.
  • the user permanent identifier may be a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI, Summary Permanent Identifier); the user hidden identifier may be a subscription hidden identifier (SUCI, Summary Concealed Identifier).
  • SUPI subscription permanent identifier
  • SUCI subscription hidden identifier
  • the user's permanent identity is encrypted and integrity protected by a key to generate a user hidden identity, and the user hidden identity is transmitted to the third network through the second network device and the first network device equipment. Since the shared key is commonly known by the terminal and the network side, that is, the third network device determines the encryption key and the integrity key based on the shared key, and decrypts the hidden user identification based on the encryption key and the integrity key Obtain permanent user identification.
  • the specific implementation of the SUPI encryption and integrity protection in this embodiment to obtain SUCI is similar to the related scheme, except that the terminal’s own private key and the network public key are removed, and the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M is obtained through the shared key K ECDH that the terminal and the network side know jointly.
  • the third network device may be a core network device used for network authentication.
  • the third network device may specifically be unified data management (UDM, Unified Data Management) and/or authentication credential storage and processing function (ARPF, Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function).
  • UDM Unified Data Management
  • ARPF authentication credential storage and processing function
  • the terminal sending the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device includes: the terminal sends the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device through an authentication response message The following first indication information and MAC information for integrity protection; wherein the authentication response message is sent to the first network device through the second network device. It can be understood that the terminal sends an authentication response message containing the encrypted first indication information and MAC information for integrity protection to the second network device, and the second network device forwards the authentication response message to The first network equipment.
  • the authentication response message includes an encrypted part of the first indication information and an integrity protection part of the first indication information; the integrity protection part of the first indication information is used for integrity protection The MAC information; the encryption and integrity protection of the first indication information containing the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively includes: the terminal encrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key, based on The integrity key generates MAC information.
  • the terminal sending the encrypted first instruction information to the first network device includes: the terminal sending the encrypted first instruction information and the MAC information to the first network device.
  • the MAC information may be understood as a sequence or a value, which is used to protect the integrity of the first indication information.
  • the terminal receives an authentication request message from a network device (specifically a third network device), and the authentication request message includes a random password (RAND) and an authentication token (AUTN); as an example, the authentication request message
  • the token (AUTN) can be a 128-bit value; the terminal performs MAC information verification based on the information in the authentication token (AUTN). For example, the terminal generates MAC information based on the information in the authentication token (AUTN), and verifies the generated MAC information with its own MAC information; if the verification is consistent, the verification is successful; if the verification is inconsistent, the verification is The test failed.
  • the function of encrypting and protecting the integrity of the first indication information is to prevent the first indication information from being “peeped” and tampering; wherein, the function of the first indication information based on the encryption key is to prevent the first indication information The information is "peeped”; and the function of generating MAC information based on the integrity key is to prevent the first indication information from being tampered with.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes the first type or the second type; the first type of error The message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; wherein, the type of the error message is the second
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes the failure of authentication synchronization; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is the first random number; the length of the numeric value is equal to The lengths of the first random numbers are the same.
  • the first type of error message may specifically be a MAC failure (MAC_FAIL) message, where the MAC_FAIL message indicates that the UE failed to verify the MAC information in the authentication token (AUTN), usually due to the UE's root key and the network side It is caused by the mismatch of the root keys of;
  • the second type of error message may specifically be a synchronization failure (SYNC_FAIL) message, which indicates that the SQN value on the network side is outside the range allowed by the UE.
  • MAC_FAIL MAC failure
  • SYNC_FAIL synchronization failure
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number (such as represented by Nonce), a permanent user identification (such as SUPI); the second The random number is used to distinguish the encrypted ciphertext of the first indication information.
  • a second random number such as represented by Nonce
  • a permanent user identification such as SUPI
  • the second random number is a one-time random number, which is used to make the ciphertext of the first indication information (or authentication response message) different every time, so as to prevent an attacker from guessing the The error message type in the first indication message.
  • the first indication information may carry a permanent user identification to prevent the second network device from initiating an identity request to the terminal when the user permanent identification of the terminal cannot be obtained.
  • the response data is related to the error message type.
  • the response data is a numerical value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; as an example, the response data is AUTS; when the type of the error message is all
  • the response data may be a first random number; the length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the terminal sends an authentication response message in the same format to the network side, and the authentication response message is encrypted and complete by the encryption key and the integrity key
  • the security protection makes it impossible for an attacker to obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext even if the authentication response message is captured.
  • the terminal since the terminal sends the authentication response message in the same format, it prevents SEAF from responding to different types of authentication Respond to the message, thereby generating a correlation attack, preventing the terminal from being tracked by the attacker.
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram 2 of the flow of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in Fig. 3, the method includes:
  • Step 301 The first network device receives the first instruction information sent by the terminal through the second network device; the first instruction information performs encryption and integrity protection based on the encryption key and the integrity key; the encryption key and the integrity key The integrity key is obtained based on the shared key; the first indication information includes the error message type corresponding to the terminal network authentication failure; different error message types correspond to the first indication information of the same format;
  • Step 302 The first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • the first network device and the second network device may be core network devices used for network authentication.
  • the first network device may specifically be AUSF; and the second network device may be SEAF.
  • the method before the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, that is, before step 302, The method further includes: the first network device receives the encryption key and the integrity key sent by a third network device.
  • the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on a shared key, and the shared key is commonly known by the terminal and the network side, that is, the terminal is based on the shared secret shared by the network side.
  • the key determines the encryption key and the integrity key, and encrypts and protects the integrity of the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key; on the other hand, the third network device can be based on a shared secret known to the terminal
  • the key determines the encryption key and the integrity key, and sends the encryption key and the integrity key to the first network device so that the first network device can pair the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key Decryption is performed to obtain the error message type contained in the first indication information.
  • the method before the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, that is, before step 302, The method further includes: the first network device receives the shared key sent by the third network device, and determines the encryption key and the integrity key based on the shared key.
  • the encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on a shared key, and the shared key is commonly known by the terminal and the network side, that is, the terminal is based on the shared secret shared by the network side.
  • the key determines the encryption key and the integrity key, and encrypts and protects the integrity of the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key; on the other hand, the first network device can be based on a shared secret known to the terminal
  • the key determines the encryption key and the integrity key, and decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, thereby obtaining the error message type contained in the first indication information.
  • the first network device receives the first instruction information sent by the terminal through the second network device includes: the first network device receives the first instruction information sent by the terminal through an authentication response message And MAC information used for integrity protection; the authentication response message is received through the forwarding of the second network device. It can be understood that the terminal sends an authentication response message containing the encrypted first indication information and MAC information for integrity protection to the second network device, and the second network device forwards the authentication response message to The first network equipment.
  • the authentication response message includes an encrypted part of the first indication information and an integrity protection part of the first indication information; the integrity protection part of the first indication information is used for integrity protection The MAC information; the first network device decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key, including: the first network device checks based on the integrity key If the MAC information is successfully verified, decrypt the first indication information based on the encryption key.
  • the MAC information may be understood as a sequence or a value, which is used to protect the integrity of the first indication information.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes the first type or the second type; the first type of error The message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; wherein, the type of the error message is the second
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case where the type of the error message is the first type, the response data is a first random number; the length of the numeric value is The lengths of the first random numbers are the same.
  • the first type of error message may specifically be a MAC failure (MAC_FAIL) message, where the MAC_FAIL message indicates that the UE failed to verify the MAC information in the authentication token (AUTN), usually due to the UE's root key and the network side It is caused by the mismatch of the root keys of;
  • the second type of error message may specifically be a synchronization failure (SYNC_FAIL) message, which indicates that the SQN value on the network side is outside the range allowed by the UE.
  • MAC_FAIL MAC failure
  • SYNC_FAIL synchronization failure
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number (such as represented by Nonce), a permanent user identification (such as SUPI); the second The random number is used to distinguish the encrypted ciphertext of the first indication information.
  • a second random number such as represented by Nonce
  • a permanent user identification such as SUPI
  • the second random number is a one-time random number, which is used to make the ciphertext of the first indication information (or authentication response message) different every time, so as to prevent an attacker from guessing the The error message type in the first indication message.
  • the first indication information may carry a permanent user identification to prevent the second network device from initiating an identity request to the terminal when the user permanent identification of the terminal cannot be obtained.
  • the response data is related to the error message type.
  • the response data is a numerical value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; as an example, the response data is AUTS; when the type of the error message is all
  • the response data may be a first random number; the length of the numerical value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the method further includes: when the error message type included in the first indication information is the second type, the first network device sends the error message to the first The third network device sends an authentication failure synchronization parameter, where the authentication failure synchronization parameter is at least used for the third network device to resume SQN synchronization with the terminal.
  • the method further includes: the first network device sends second instruction information to the second network device, and the second instruction information includes at least one of the following information : Error message type, permanent user identification.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application indicates the type of error message through a message (i.e., the first indication information), that is, no matter what type of error message it obtains, the terminal will send the indication information in the same format to the network side, avoiding the network side according to different types.
  • the terminal determines the encryption key and the integrity key through the shared key known to the network side, and according to the encryption key
  • the first indication information is encrypted and integrity protected with the integrity key, so that even if an attacker captures the authentication response message, he cannot obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext.
  • Fig. 4 is a third schematic flowchart of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in Fig. 4, the method includes:
  • Step 401 The third network device receives the hidden user identification sent by the terminal through the second network device and the first network device; the hidden user identification is encrypted and integrity protected based on the encryption key and the integrity key; The key and the integrity key are obtained based on the shared key;
  • Step 402 The third network device decrypts the hidden user identification based on the encryption key and the integrity key to obtain a permanent user identification
  • Step 403 The third network device determines an authentication protocol based on the permanent user identification, and the authentication protocol is used to authenticate with the terminal.
  • the first network device, the second network device, and the third network device may be core network devices used for network authentication.
  • the first network device may specifically be AUSF; the second network device may be SEAF; and the third network device may specifically be UDM and/or ARPF .
  • the terminal sends the hidden user identification to the second network device, the second network device sends the hidden user identification to the first network device, and the first network device sends the hidden user identification to the third network device.
  • Network equipment
  • the permanent user identification may be SUPI; the hidden user identification may be SUCI.
  • the terminal Before the terminal performs network authentication, when the terminal is connected to the network for the first time, the user's permanent identity is encrypted and integrity protected by a key to generate a user hidden identity, and the user hidden identity is transmitted to the third network through the second network device and the first network device equipment. Since the shared key is commonly known by the terminal and the network side, that is, the third network device determines the encryption key and the integrity key based on the shared key, and decrypts the hidden user identification based on the encryption key and the integrity key Obtain the user's permanent identification, and determine the authentication protocol corresponding to the terminal according to the user's permanent identification.
  • the method before the third network device decrypts the hidden user identifier based on the encryption key and the integrity key, that is, before step 402, the method It also includes: the third network device determines an encryption key and an integrity key according to the shared key.
  • the shared key is commonly known by the terminal and the network side, that is, the third network device determines the encryption key and the integrity key based on the shared key commonly known with the terminal.
  • the method further includes: the third network device sends the encryption key and the integrity key to the first network device.
  • the third network device sends the encryption key and the integrity key to the first network device, so that after the first network device receives the first indication information (or authentication response message) of the terminal Decrypting the first indication information (or authentication response message) based on the encryption key and the integrity key, thereby obtaining the error message type contained in the first indication information (or authentication response message).
  • the method further includes: the third network device sends the shared key to the first network device.
  • the third network device sends the shared key to the first network device, so that the first network device determines the encryption key and the integrity key based on the shared key, and after receiving the first instruction information of the terminal (Or authentication response message), decrypt the first indication information (or authentication response message) based on the encryption key and the integrity key, so as to obtain that the first indication information (or authentication response message) contains The type of error message.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application indicates the type of error message through a message (i.e., the first indication information), that is, no matter what type of error message it obtains, the terminal will send the indication information in the same format to the network side, avoiding the network side according to different types.
  • the terminal determines the encryption key and the integrity key through the shared key known to the network side, and according to the encryption key
  • the first indication information is encrypted and integrity protected with the integrity key, so that even if an attacker captures the authentication response message, he cannot obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext.
  • AUSF corresponds to the first network device in the foregoing embodiment
  • SEAF corresponds to the second network in the foregoing embodiment
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a specific flow of the authentication information processing method according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 5, the method includes:
  • Step 501 UE sends SUCI to UDM/ARPF through SEAF and AUSF.
  • the UE when it first connects to the network, it generates the shared key K ECDH through the ECIES method; the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M are determined according to the shared key K ECDH derivation.
  • the SUPI is encrypted with the encryption key K E , and the integrity protection tag Tag is generated by the integrity key K M to generate SUCI. Pass SUCI to UDM/ARPF through SEAF and AUSF.
  • the UE stores the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M in a non-tamperable storage area.
  • Step 502 UDM/ARPF decrypts SUCI, obtains SUPI, and determines the authentication protocol based on SUPI.
  • the UDM/ARPF has a shared key K ECDH that is commonly known to the UE, and the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M are determined based on the shared key K ECDH .
  • the SUCI is decrypted based on the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M to obtain SUPI.
  • UDM/ARPF determines the authentication information (Profile) of the UE according to SUPI, thereby determining which authentication protocol the UE uses for authentication (for example, 5G AKA or EAP-AKA').
  • Profile authentication information
  • Step 503 UDM/ARPF sends instruction information to AUSF.
  • UDM/ARPF sends a Nudm_Authentication_Get Response message to AUSF, and the message carries indication information.
  • the instruction information includes an encryption key K E and an integrity key K M ; so that AUSF can subsequently decrypt the authentication response message based on the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M .
  • the instruction information includes the shared key K ECDH , so that AUSF subsequently determines the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M , the encryption key K E and the integrity based on the shared key K ECDH The key K M decrypts the authentication response message.
  • Step 504 UDM/ARPF sends an authentication request message to the UE based on the determined authentication protocol; the authentication request message may include: a random password (RAND) and an authentication token (AUTN).
  • RAND random password
  • AUTN authentication token
  • Step 505 The UE performs network verification based on the network, and obtains a result of network verification failure.
  • Step 506 The UE sends an authentication response message (Authentication Response) to AUSF through SEAF.
  • Authentication Response an authentication response message
  • the authentication response message may include: error reason (FAIL_CAUSE), random number (Nonce), SUPI, response data (RES_DATA), and MAC information for integrity protection.
  • the different values of the error cause (FAIL_CAUSE) correspond to the first type of error message and the second type of error message respectively; the first type of error message may specifically be a MAC failure (MAC_FAIL) message, and the second The type of error message may specifically be a synchronization failure (SYNC_FAIL) message.
  • the random number is a one-time random number, which is used to make the ciphertext of the first indication information (or an authentication response message) different each time, so as to prevent an attacker from guessing an error in the first indication information Message type.
  • the authentication response message may carry SUPI to prevent the second network device from initiating an identity request to the terminal when the second network device cannot obtain the SUPI of the terminal.
  • the response data is related to the error message type. In the case that the type of the error message is the second type, the response data is a numerical value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; as an example, the response data is AUTS; when the type of the error message is all In the case of the first type, the response data may be a random number. Among them, the length of AUTS is the same as the length of the random number.
  • the UE encrypts the authentication response message based on the encryption key K E , and generates MAC information based on the integrity key K M for integrity protection.
  • Step 507 AUSF decrypts the authentication response message based on the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M , and determines the error message type.
  • AUSF can decrypt the authentication response message based on the encryption key K E and the integrity key K M obtained in step 503, or determine the encryption key K E and the shared key K ECDH obtained in step 503.
  • the integrity key K M is used to decrypt the authentication response message.
  • AUSF verifies the MAC information in the authentication response message based on the integrity key K M ; in the case of passing the verification, decrypts the authentication response message based on the encryption key K E. If the verification fails, the process ends.
  • Step 508 In the case that the error message type included in the authentication response message is the second type, AUSF sends an authentication failure synchronization parameter to UDM/ARPF, and the authentication failure synchronization parameter is used at least for UDM/ARPF recovery and the The SQN of the terminal is synchronized.
  • AUSF sends a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message to UDM/ARPF, and the message carries authentication failure synchronization parameters.
  • the authentication failure synchronization parameter may specifically be a random password (RAND) and AUTS, so that the UDM/ARPF can resume synchronization with the SQN of the terminal according to the random password (RAND) and AUTS.
  • Step 509 AUSF sends the error message type and SUPI to SEAF.
  • AUSF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to SEAF, and the message carries the error message type and SUPI, that is, the message carries the error cause (FAIL_CAUSE) and SUPI.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application indicates the type of error message through a message (i.e., the first indication information), that is, no matter what type of error message it obtains, the terminal will send the indication information in the same format to the network side, avoiding the network side according to different types.
  • the terminal determines the encryption key and the integrity key through the shared key known to the network side, and according to the encryption key
  • the first indication information is encrypted and integrity protected with the integrity key, so that even if an attacker captures the authentication response message, he cannot obtain the error message type in the authentication response message from the ciphertext.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a composition structure of a terminal according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 6, the terminal includes: a first encryption unit 61 and a first communication unit 62; wherein,
  • the first encryption unit 61 is configured to perform encryption and integrity protection on the first indication information containing the error message type based on the encryption key and the integrity key respectively when the network authentication fails; The key and the integrity key are obtained based on the shared key; different error message types correspond to the first indication information in the same format;
  • the first communication unit 62 is configured to send encrypted first instruction information to a first network device; wherein the encrypted first instruction information is sent to the first network device through a second network device.
  • the terminal further includes a first determining unit 63 configured to determine an encryption key and an integrity key according to the shared key before performing network authentication .
  • the first encryption unit 61 is further configured to encrypt and integrity protect the permanent user identity according to the encryption key and the integrity key to obtain a hidden user identity;
  • the first communication unit 62 is further configured to send the hidden user identification to a third network device; wherein, the hidden user identification transmits to the third network device through the second network device and the first network device. Device sent.
  • the first communication unit 62 is configured to send the encrypted first indication information and the MAC information for integrity protection to the first network device through an authentication response message.
  • the authentication response message includes an encrypted part of the first indication information and an integrity protection part of the first indication information;
  • the integrity protection part of the first indication information is MAC information for integrity protection;
  • the first encryption unit 61 is configured to encrypt the first indication information based on an encryption key, and generate MAC information based on the integrity key.
  • the first communication unit 62 is configured to send encrypted first indication information and MAC information to the first network device.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type; The first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; wherein, the type of the error message
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case of the error message type is the first type, the response data is a first random number; The length of the value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first Indicates the cipher text of the information.
  • the first encryption unit 61 and the first determination unit 63 in the terminal can be used by the central processing unit (CPU, Central Processing Unit) and digital signal processor ( DSP, Digital Signal Processor), Microcontroller Unit (MCU, Microcontroller Unit) or Programmable Gate Array (FPGA, Field-Programmable Gate Array) implementation;
  • the first communication unit 62 in the terminal can be implemented through communication in practical applications Module (including: basic communication kit, operating system, communication module, standardized interface and protocol, etc.) and transceiver antenna implementation.
  • the terminal provided in the above embodiment performs authentication information processing
  • only the division of the above-mentioned program modules is used as an example for illustration.
  • the above-mentioned processing can be allocated by different program modules as needed, namely The internal structure of the terminal is divided into different program modules to complete all or part of the processing described above.
  • the terminal provided in the foregoing embodiment and the embodiment of the authentication information processing method belong to the same concept, and the specific implementation process is detailed in the method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a composition structure of a network device according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 8, the network device includes: a second communication unit 71 and a first decryption unit 72; wherein,
  • the second communication unit 71 is configured to receive the first instruction information sent by the terminal through the second network device; the first instruction information is encrypted and integrity protected based on the encryption key and the integrity key; the encryption key The key and the integrity key are obtained based on the shared key; the first indication information includes the error message type corresponding to the terminal network authentication failure; the different error message types correspond to the first indication information of the same format;
  • the first decryption unit 72 is configured to decrypt the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key.
  • the second communication unit 71 is further configured such that the first decryption unit 72 decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key Before, receiving the encryption key and the integrity key sent by the third network device.
  • the second communication unit 71 is further configured such that the first decryption unit 72 decrypts the first indication information based on the encryption key and the integrity key Before, receiving the shared key sent by the third network device;
  • the first decryption unit 72 is further configured to determine the encryption key and the integrity key based on the shared key.
  • the second communication unit 71 is configured to receive the first indication information sent by the terminal and the MAC information for integrity protection through an authentication response message; the authentication response message passes the The second network device forwards and receives.
  • the authentication response message includes an encrypted part of the first indication information and an integrity protection part of the first indication information;
  • the integrity protection part of the first indication information is MAC information for integrity protection;
  • the first decryption unit 72 is configured to verify the MAC information based on the integrity key, and if the verification is successful, perform decryption processing on the first indication information based on the encryption key.
  • the first indication information includes an error message type and response data; the response data is related to the error message type; the error message type includes a first type or a second type; The first type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the MAC information in the authentication information; the second type of error message is used to indicate that the terminal fails to verify the SQN; wherein, the type of the error message
  • the response data is a numeric value that characterizes authentication synchronization failure; in the case of the error message type is the first type, the response data is a first random number; The length of the value is the same as the length of the first random number.
  • the first indication information further includes at least one of the following information: a second random number, a permanent user identification; the second random number is used to distinguish the encrypted first Indicates the cipher text of the information.
  • the second communication unit 71 is further configured to send to the third network device when the error message type included in the first indication information is the second type Send an authentication failure synchronization parameter, where the authentication failure synchronization parameter is used at least for the third network device to resume SQN synchronization with the terminal.
  • the second communication unit 71 is further configured to send second indication information to the second network device, and the second indication information includes at least one of the following information: error message Type and permanent user identification.
  • the first decryption unit 72 in the network device can be implemented by the CPU, DSP, MCU or FPGA in the network device in practical applications; the second communication unit 71 in the network device, In practical applications, it can be implemented through communication modules (including basic communication kits, operating systems, communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc.) and transceiver antennas.
  • communication modules including basic communication kits, operating systems, communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc.
  • the network device provided in the above embodiment performs authentication information processing
  • only the division of the above-mentioned program modules is used as an example.
  • the above-mentioned processing can be distributed by different program modules as needed. That is, the internal structure of the network device is divided into different program modules to complete all or part of the processing described above.
  • the network device provided in the foregoing embodiment and the embodiment of the authentication information processing method belong to the same concept, and the specific implementation process is detailed in the method embodiment, and will not be repeated here.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of another composition structure of a network device according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 9, the network device includes a third communication unit 81, a second decryption unit 82, and a second determination unit 83;
  • the third communication unit 81 is configured to receive the hidden user identification sent by the terminal through the second network device and the first network device; the hidden user identification is encrypted and integrity protected based on the encryption key and the integrity key; The encryption key and the integrity key are obtained based on the shared key;
  • the second decryption unit 82 is configured to decrypt the hidden user identification based on the encryption key and the integrity key to obtain a permanent user identification;
  • the second determining unit 83 is configured to determine an authentication protocol based on the permanent user identification, and the authentication protocol is used to authenticate with the terminal.
  • the second determining unit 83 is further configured such that the second decryption unit 82 decrypts the hidden user identifier based on the encryption key and the integrity key. To determine the encryption key and the integrity key according to the shared key.
  • the third communication unit 81 is further configured to send the encryption key and the integrity key to the first network device.
  • the third communication unit 81 is further configured to send the shared key to the first network device.
  • the second decryption unit 82 and the second determination unit 83 in the network device can be implemented by the CPU, DSP, MCU or FPGA in the network device in actual applications;
  • the third communication unit 81 can be implemented by a communication module (including a basic communication kit, an operating system, a communication module, a standardized interface and a protocol, etc.) and a transceiver antenna in practical applications.
  • the network device provided in the above embodiment performs authentication information processing
  • only the division of the above-mentioned program modules is used as an example.
  • the above-mentioned processing can be distributed by different program modules as needed. That is, the internal structure of the network device is divided into different program modules to complete all or part of the processing described above.
  • the network device provided in the foregoing embodiment and the embodiment of the authentication information processing method belong to the same concept, and the specific implementation process is detailed in the method embodiment, and will not be repeated here.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of the hardware composition structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • the communication device includes a memory 92, a processor 91, and a computer program stored on the memory 92 and running on the processor 91.
  • the processor 91 executes the program, the steps of the authentication information processing method applied to the terminal in the embodiment of this application are implemented; as another implementation manner, when the processor 91 executes the program Implement the steps of the authentication information processing method applied to the first network device in the embodiment of this application; as yet another implementation manner, when the processor 91 executes the program, the process applied to the third network device in the embodiment of this application is implemented The steps of the authentication information processing method.
  • the communication device further includes a communication interface 93.
  • the various components in the communication device are coupled together through the bus system 94.
  • the bus system 94 is used to implement connection and communication between these components.
  • the bus system 94 also includes a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus.
  • various buses are marked as the bus system 94 in FIG. 10.
  • the memory 92 may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, and may also include both volatile and non-volatile memory.
  • the non-volatile memory can be read only memory (ROM, Read Only Memory), programmable read only memory (PROM, Programmable Read-Only Memory), erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM, Erasable Programmable Read- Only Memory, Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), Ferromagnetic Random Access Memory (FRAM), Flash Memory, Magnetic Surface Memory , CD-ROM, or CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory); magnetic surface memory can be magnetic disk storage or tape storage.
  • the volatile memory may be random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), which is used as an external cache.
  • RAM random access memory
  • SRAM static random access memory
  • SSRAM synchronous static random access memory
  • DRAM dynamic random access Memory
  • SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • DDRSDRAM Double Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • ESDRAM enhanced -Type synchronous dynamic random access memory
  • SLDRAM SyncLink Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • direct memory bus random access memory DRRAM, Direct Rambus Random Access Memory
  • DRRAM Direct Rambus Random Access Memory
  • the memory 92 described in the embodiment of the present application is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
  • the method disclosed in the foregoing embodiment of the present application may be applied to the processor 91 or implemented by the processor 91.
  • the processor 91 may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. In the implementation process, the steps of the foregoing method can be completed by hardware integrated logic circuits in the processor 91 or instructions in the form of software.
  • the aforementioned processor 91 may be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP, Digital Signal Processor), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, and the like.
  • the processor 91 may implement or execute various methods, steps, and logical block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.
  • the steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be directly embodied as being executed and completed by a hardware decoding processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor.
  • the software module may be located in a storage medium, and the storage medium is located in the memory 92.
  • the processor 91 reads the information in the memory 92 and completes the steps of the foregoing method in combination with its hardware.
  • the communication device may be used by one or more application specific integrated circuits (ASIC, Application Specific Integrated Circuit), DSP, programmable logic device (PLD, Programmable Logic Device), complex programmable logic device (CPLD, Complex Programmable Logic Device, Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA, Field-Programmable Gate Array), general-purpose processor, controller, microcontroller (MCU, Micro Controller Unit), microprocessor (Microprocessor), or other electronic components Implementation, used to perform the aforementioned method.
  • ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
  • DSP programmable logic device
  • PLD Programmable Logic Device
  • CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device
  • FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
  • general-purpose processor controller, microcontroller (MCU, Micro Controller Unit), microprocessor (Microprocessor), or other electronic components Implementation, used to perform the aforementioned method.
  • the authentication information processing solution of the embodiment of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as a global system of mobile communication (GSM, Global System of Mobile communication) system, LTE system, 5G system, or New Radio (NR, New Radio) system, etc.
  • GSM Global System of Mobile communication
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • 5G Fifth Generation
  • NR New Radio
  • the communication system of this embodiment at least includes a terminal, a first network device, a second network device, and a third network device; wherein, the first network device, the second network device, and the third network device are core networks
  • the device used for authentication in the device may be an AUSF device; the second network device may be a SEAF device; and the third network device may be a UDM device.
  • the terminal can be used to implement the corresponding function implemented by the terminal device in the above method
  • the network device can be used to implement the corresponding function implemented by the network device in the above method.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored.
  • a computer program As an implementation manner, when the program is executed by a processor, the authentication information processing method applied to the terminal in the embodiment of the present application is implemented. Step; As another implementation manner, when the program is executed by the processor, the steps of the authentication information processing method applied to the first network device in the embodiment of this application are implemented; as another implementation manner, when the program is executed by the processor Implement the steps of the authentication information processing method applied to the third network device in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the disclosed device and method may be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division, and there may be other divisions in actual implementation, such as: multiple units or components can be combined, or It can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not implemented.
  • the coupling, or direct coupling, or communication connection between the components shown or discussed may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be electrical, mechanical or other forms of.
  • the units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units; Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
  • the functional units in the embodiments of the present application can all be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can be individually used as a unit, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit;
  • the unit can be implemented in the form of hardware, or in the form of hardware plus software functional units.
  • the foregoing program can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it is executed. Including the steps of the foregoing method embodiment; and the foregoing storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a mobile storage device, ROM, RAM, magnetic disk, or optical disk.
  • the above-mentioned integrated unit of this application is implemented in the form of a software function module and sold or used as an independent product, it can also be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for A computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) executes all or part of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: removable storage devices, ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks and other media that can store program codes.

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备。所述方法包括：终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的第一指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。

Description

一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请基于申请号为201910325119.9、申请日为2019年4月22日的中国专利申请提出，并要求该中国专利申请的优先权，该中国专利申请的全部内容在此以引入方式并入本申请。
技术领域
本申请涉及无线通信技术，具体涉及一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备。
背景技术
移动通信系统中用户设备(UE，User Equipment)与网络侧之间通过认证与密钥协商(AKA，Authentication and Key Agreement)协议进行认证。而5G系统中UE与网络侧之间的认证方式包括以下两种认证方式：5G-AKA和EAP-AKA′。前者是基于长期演进(LTE，Long Term Evolution)的认证协议演进型分组系统认证与密钥协商(EPS-AKA，Evolved Packet System-Authentication and Key Agreement)发展而来，而后者是国际互联网工程任务组(IETF，The Internet Engineering Task Force)定义的认证协议用于4G网络中UE使用无线保真(Wi-Fi，Wireless-Fidelity)接入运营商网络。5G-AKA和EAP-AKA′这两种认证方式会因为UE认证网络失败时可能会发送两个不同类型的错误消息而受到关联性攻击。
为解决关联性攻击的相关技术中，在UE认证网络失败时，通过试用网络的公钥加密的信息以指示错误消息类型，由于此消息是加密的，攻击者得不到此消息的内容，从而攻击者无法发起关联性攻击。然而这种方式虽 然能够解决关联性攻击的问题，但需要运营商部署公钥基础设施(PKI，Public Key Infrastructure)；并且这种方式使用非对称算法进行加密，需要消耗大量的计算资源，这对于电池工作时长有需求的物联网终端不适用。
发明内容
本申请实施例期望提供一种认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备。
为达到上述目的，本申请实施例的技术方案是这样实现的：
第一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的第一指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端根据所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对用户永久标识进行加密和完整性保护，获得用户隐藏标识，向第三网络设备发送所述用户隐藏标识；其中，所述用户隐藏标识通过所述第二网络设备和所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括：所述终端通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，包括：
所述终端基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
第二方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备接收第三网络设备发送的所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥 和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备接收第三网络设备发送的所述共享密钥，基于所述共享密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息，包括：所述第一网络设备通过认证响应消息接收终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密，包括：所述第一网络设备基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述第一网络设备向所 述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备向所述第二网络设备发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
第三方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：第三网络设备通过第二网络设备和第一网络设备接收终端发送的用户隐藏标识；所述用户隐藏标识基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；
所述第三网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密，获得用户永久标识；
所述第三网络设备基于所述用户永久标识确定认证协议，所述认证协议用于与所述终端进行认证。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第三网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密之前，所述方法还包括：所述第三网络设备根据所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第三网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第三网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送所述共享密钥。
第四方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端，所述终端包括：第一加密单元和第一通讯单元；其中，
所述第一加密单元，配置为在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；不同的错误 消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述第一通讯单元，配置为向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的第一指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一加密单元，还配置为根据所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对用户永久标识进行加密和完整性保护，获得用户隐藏标识；
所述第一通讯单元，还配置为向第三网络设备发送所述用户隐藏标识；
其中，所述用户隐藏标识通过所述第二网络设备和所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一通讯单元，配置为通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一加密单元，配置为基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后 的所述第一指示信息的密文。
第五方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种网络设备，所述网络设备为第一网络设备，所述网络设备包括：第二通讯单元和第一解密单元；其中，
所述第二通讯单元，配置为通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述第一解密单元，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为所述第一解密单元基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，接收第三网络设备发送的所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为所述第一解密单元基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，接收第三网络设备发送的所述共享密钥；
所述第一解密单元，还配置为基于所述共享密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元，配置为通过认证响应消息接收终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一解密单元，配置为基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型 和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为向所述第二网络设备发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
第六方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种网络设备，所述网络设备为第三网络设备，所述网络设备包括第三通讯单元、第二解密单元和第二确定单元；其中，
所述第三通讯单元，配置为通过第二网络设备和第一网络设备接收终端发送的用户隐藏标识；所述用户隐藏标识基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；
所述第二解密单元，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密，获得用户永久标识；
所述第二确定单元，配置为基于所述用户永久标识确定认证协议，所述认证协议用于与所述终端进行认证。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二确定单元，还配置为所述第二解密单元基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密之前，根据所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第三通讯单元，还配置为向所述第一网络设备发送所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第三通讯单元，还配置为向所述第一网络设备发送所述共享密钥。
第七方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例第一方面所述方法的步骤；或者，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例第二方面所述方法的步骤；或者，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例第三方面所述方法的步骤。
第八方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例第一方面所述方法的步骤。
第九方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种网络设备，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例第二方面所述方法的步骤；或者，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例第三方面所述方法的步骤。
本申请实施例提供的认证信息处理方法、终端和网络设备，终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信 息；向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的第一指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。本申请实施例的技术方案通过一个消息(即第一指示信息)指示错误消息类型，即终端无论获得何种类型的错误消息，均向网络侧发送相同格式的指示信息，避免网络侧根据不同类型的指示信息进行响应，从而避免攻击者通过截获不同类型的响应以确定错误消息类型；并且，终端通过与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并根据加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型。
附图说明
图1为相关技术中关联性攻击的流程示意图；
图2为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图一；
图3为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图二；
图4为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图三；
图5为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的具体流程示意图；
图6为本申请实施例的终端的一种组成结构示意图；
图7为本申请实施例的终端的另一种组成结构示意图；
图8为本申请实施例的网络设备的一种组成结构示意图；
图9为本申请实施例的网络设备的另一种组成结构示意图；
图10为本申请实施例的通信设备的硬件组成结构示意图。
具体实施方式
在对本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法进行详细阐述之前，首先对关联性攻击进行简单介绍。
图1为相关技术中关联性攻击的流程示意图；图1以4G网络(如LTE 网络)为例进行说明。如图1所示，包括：
步骤101：移动性管理实体(MME，Mobility Management Entity)向UE发送认证请求消息，所述认证请求消息中包括随机口令(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)。在本步骤中，攻击者可能会截获认证请求消息，获得认证请求消息中的随机口令(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)并存储。
步骤102：UE进行网络认证，在网络认证完成后，UE向MME发送认证响应消息。在本步骤中，攻击者可能会截获认证响应消息。
本步骤中，UE在网络认证失败的情况下可能发送两个不同类型的错误消息，包括：MAC失败(MAC_FAIL)消息或同步失败(SYNC_FAIL)消息；其中，MAC_FAIL消息表示UE检验MAC信息失败，通常是由于UE的根密钥与网络侧的根密钥不匹配造成的；SYNC_FAIL消息表示网络侧的序列号(SQN，Sequence Number)值在UE允许的范围之外。
步骤103：攻击者重新向UE发送认证请求消息，所述认证请求消息中包括步骤101中捕获的随机口令(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)。
步骤104：UE进行网络认证，在网络认证完成后，UE发送认证响应消息。在UE网络认证失败的情况下，UE发送携带有错误消息的认证响应消息，例如错误消息为SYNC_FAIL消息；攻击者截获认证响应消息，获得认证响应消息中的错误消息，根据该错误消息确定需要跟踪的UE在特定区域内，这样攻击者通过截获认证响应消息中的错误消息跟踪到UE。
下面结合附图及具体实施例对本申请作进一步详细的说明。
本申请实施例提供了一种认证信息处理方法。图2为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图一；如图2所示，所述方法包括：
步骤201：终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；不同的错误消息类型对应 相同格式的第一指示信息；
步骤202：所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的第一指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
本实施例中，所述第一网络设备和所述第二网络设备可以是用于网络认证的核心网设备。作为一种示例，在5G系统或NR系统的场景下，所述第一网络设备具体可以是鉴权服务器功能节点(AUSF，Authentication Server Function)；所述第二网络设备可以是安全锚节点功能(SEAF，SEcurity Anchor Function)。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，在终端进行网络认证之前，也即在步骤201之前，所述方法还包括：所述终端根据所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
本实施例中，终端基于网络设备下发的认证请求进行网络认证，在网络认证失败的情况下，基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；其中，所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得，所述共享密钥为所述终端和网络侧共同知道的，即终端基于与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；另一方面，第一网络设备可基于与终端共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行解密，从而获得第一指示信息中包含的错误消息类型。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，在终端进行网络认证之前，也即在步骤201之前，所述方法还包括：所述终端根据所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对用户永久标识进行加密和完整性保护，获得用户隐藏标识，向第三网络设备发送所述用户隐藏标识；其中，所述用户隐藏标识通过所述第二网络设备和所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送。
本实施例中，作为一种示例，所述用户永久标识可以是订阅永久标识(SUPI，SUscription Permanent Identifier)；所述用户隐藏标识可以是订阅隐藏标识(SUCI，SUscription Concealed Identifier)。在终端进行网络认证之前，终端首次连接网络时，通过密钥对用户永久标识进行加密和完整性保护生成用户隐藏标识，将用户隐藏标识通过第二网络设备和第一网络设备传递至第三网络设备。由于共享密钥为所述终端和网络侧共同知道的，即第三网络设备基于共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对用户隐藏标识进行解密获得用户永久标识。
相关方案中，SUCI的内容可满足以下表达式：SUCI＝SUPI的类型+归属网络标识+路由标识+保护方案标识+B PUB+A PUB+K E{SUPI}+Tag；其中，A PUB表示终端自身随机生成的私钥；B PUB表示网络的公钥；终端根据A PUB和B PUB生成共享密钥K ECDH，根据共享密钥K ECDH确定加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M；Tag表示完整性保护标签，通过完整性密钥K M对SUCI进行完整性保护，产生Tag。
而本实施例中对SUPI的加密和完整性保护得到SUCI的具体实现方式与相关方案类似，只是去除了终端自身的私钥和网络的公钥，并且加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M是通过终端与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥K ECDH得到的。
本实施例中，所述第三网络设备可以是用于网络认证的核心网设备。作为一种示例，在5G系统或NR系统的场景下，所述第三网络设备具体可以是统一数据管理(UDM，Unified Data Management)和/或认证凭据存储和处理功能(ARPF，Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function)。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，在步骤202中，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括：所述终端通过认证响应消息向第 一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；其中，所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。可以理解，所述终端将包含有加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息的认证响应消息发送至第二网络设备，再由第二网络设备的转发将认证响应消息发送至第一网络设备。
本实施例中，所述认证响应消息包括所述第一指示信息的加密部分和所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分；所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分为用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，包括：所述终端基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。相应的，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括：所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和MAC信息。
本实施例中，所述MAC信息可以理解为一个序列或者一个数值，用于对第一指示信息进行完整性保护。实际应用中，终端接收到网络设备(具体是第三网络设备)的认证请求消息，所述认证请求消息中包括随机口令(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)；作为一种示例，所述认证令牌(AUTN)可以为128位数值；则终端基于认证令牌(AUTN)中的信息进行MAC信息校验。例如，终端基于认证令牌(AUTN)中的信息生成MAC信息，将生成的MAC信息与自身的MAC信息进行校验；若校验一致，则表示校验成功；若校验不一致，则表示校验失败。
本实施例中，对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护的作用在于防止第一指示信息被“偷看”以及篡改；其中，基于加密密钥对第一指示信息的作用在于防止第一指示信息被“偷看”；而基于完整性密钥生成MAC信息的作用在于防止第一指示信息被篡改。
本实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述 响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
这里，所述第一类型的错误消息具体可以是MAC失败(MAC_FAIL)消息，其中，MAC_FAIL消息表示UE检验认证令牌(AUTN)中的MAC信息失败，通常是由于UE的根密钥与网络侧的根密钥不匹配造成的；所述第二类型的错误消息具体可以是同步失败(SYNC_FAIL)消息，表示网络侧的SQN值在UE允许的范围之外。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数(如通过Nonce表示)、用户永久标识(例如SUPI)；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
本实施例中，所述第二随机数为一次性随机数，用于使所述第一指示信息(也可为认证响应消息)的密文每次都不相同，以防止攻击者猜测所述第一指示信息中的错误消息类型。所述第一指示信息中可携带有用户永久标识，以防止第二网络设备无法获得终端的用户永久标识的情况下向终端发起身份请求。
本实施例中，所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关。在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；作为一种示例，所述响应数据为AUTS；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据可以为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
本申请实施例的技术方案，无论错误消息类型是第一类型或第二类型， 终端向网络侧发送相同格式的认证响应消息，且认证响应消息通过加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型，另一方面由于终端发送相同格式的认证响应消息，也避免SEAF回应不同类型的认证响应消息，从而产生关联性攻击，避免终端被攻击者跟踪到。
本申请实施例还提供了一种认证信息处理方法。图3为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图二；如图3所示，所述方法包括：
步骤301：第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
步骤302：所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
本实施例中，所述第一网络设备和所述第二网络设备可以是用于网络认证的核心网设备。作为一种示例，在5G系统或NR系统的场景下，所述第一网络设备具体可以是AUSF；所述第二网络设备可以是SEAF。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，也即在步骤302之前，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备接收第三网络设备发送的所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
本实施例中，所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得，所述共享密钥为所述终端和网络侧共同知道的，即终端基于与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；另一方面，第三网络设备可基于 与终端共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，将加密密钥和完整性密钥发送至第一网络设备，以使所述第一网络设备可基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行解密，从而获得第一指示信息中包含的错误消息类型。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，也即在步骤302之前，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备接收第三网络设备发送的所述共享密钥，基于所述共享密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
本实施例中，所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得，所述共享密钥为所述终端和网络侧共同知道的，即终端基于与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；另一方面，第一网络设备可基于与终端共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行解密，从而获得第一指示信息中包含的错误消息类型。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息，包括：所述第一网络设备通过认证响应消息接收终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。可以理解，所述终端将包含有加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息的认证响应消息发送至第二网络设备，再由第二网络设备的转发将认证响应消息发送至第一网络设备。
本实施例中，所述认证响应消息包括所述第一指示信息的加密部分和所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分；所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分为用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和 所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密，包括：所述第一网络设备基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
本实施例中，所述MAC信息可以理解为一个序列或者一个数值，用于对第一指示信息进行完整性保护。
本实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
这里，所述第一类型的错误消息具体可以是MAC失败(MAC_FAIL)消息，其中，MAC_FAIL消息表示UE检验认证令牌(AUTN)中的MAC信息失败，通常是由于UE的根密钥与网络侧的根密钥不匹配造成的；所述第二类型的错误消息具体可以是同步失败(SYNC_FAIL)消息，表示网络侧的SQN值在UE允许的范围之外。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数(如通过Nonce表示)、用户永久标识(例如SUPI)；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
本实施例中，所述第二随机数为一次性随机数，用于使所述第一指示信息(也可为认证响应消息)的密文每次都不相同，以防止攻击者猜测所述第一指示信息中的错误消息类型。所述第一指示信息中可携带有用户永久标识，以防止第二网络设备无法获得终端的用户永久标识的情况下向终端发起身份请求。
本实施例中，所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关。在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；作为一种示例，所述响应数据为AUTS；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据可以为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第一网络设备向所述第二网络设备发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
本申请实施例的技术方案通过一个消息(即第一指示信息)指示错误消息类型，即终端无论获得何种类型的错误消息，均向网络侧发送相同格式的指示信息，避免网络侧根据不同类型的指示信息进行响应，从而避免攻击者通过截获不同类型的响应以确定错误消息类型；并且，终端通过与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并根据加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型。
本申请实施例还提供了一种认证信息处理方法。图4为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的流程示意图三；如图4所示，所述方法包括：
步骤401：第三网络设备通过第二网络设备和第一网络设备接收终端发送的用户隐藏标识；所述用户隐藏标识基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；
步骤402：所述第三网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所 述用户隐藏标识进行解密，获得用户永久标识；
步骤403：所述第三网络设备基于所述用户永久标识确定认证协议，所述认证协议用于与所述终端进行认证。
本实施例中，所述第一网络设备、所述第二网络设备和所述第三网络设备可以是用于网络认证的核心网设备。作为一种示例，在5G系统或NR系统的场景下，所述第一网络设备具体可以是AUSF；所述第二网络设备可以是SEAF；所述第三网络设备具体可以是UDM和/或ARPF。本实施例中，终端发送用户隐藏标识至第二网络设备，由第二网络设备将所述用户隐藏标识发送至第一网络设备，再由第一网络设备将所述用户隐藏标识发送至第三网络设备。
其中，所述用户永久标识可以是SUPI；所述用户隐藏标识可以是SUCI。在终端进行网络认证之前，终端首次连接网络时，通过密钥对用户永久标识进行加密和完整性保护生成用户隐藏标识，将用户隐藏标识通过第二网络设备和第一网络设备传递至第三网络设备。由于共享密钥为所述终端和网络侧共同知道的，即第三网络设备基于共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对用户隐藏标识进行解密获得用户永久标识，根据用户永久标识确定终端对应的认证协议。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述第三网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密之前，即在步骤402之前，所述方法还包括：所述第三网络设备根据所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
本实施例中，所述共享密钥为所述终端和网络侧共同知道的，即第三网络设备基于与终端共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第三网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
本实施例中，第三网络设备向第一网络设备发送所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥，以使第一网络设备在接收到终端的第一指示信息(或认证响应消息)后，基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对第一指示信息(或认证响应消息)进行解密处理，从而获得第一指示信息(或认证响应消息)中包含的错误消息类型。
在本申请的一种可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述第三网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送所述共享密钥。
本实施例中，第三网络设备向第一网络设备发送共享密钥，以使第一网络设备基于所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，在接收到终端的第一指示信息(或认证响应消息)后，基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对第一指示信息(或认证响应消息)进行解密处理，从而获得第一指示信息(或认证响应消息)中包含的错误消息类型。
本申请实施例的技术方案通过一个消息(即第一指示信息)指示错误消息类型，即终端无论获得何种类型的错误消息，均向网络侧发送相同格式的指示信息，避免网络侧根据不同类型的指示信息进行响应，从而避免攻击者通过截获不同类型的响应以确定错误消息类型；并且，终端通过与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并根据加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型。
下面结合一个具体施例对本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法进行详细说明，在本示例中，以AUSF对应于前述实施例中的第一网络设备、以SEAF对应于前述实施例中的第二网络设备、以UDM/ARPF对应于前述实施例中的第三网络设备为例进行说明。
图5为本申请实施例的认证信息处理方法的具体流程示意图；如图5所示，所述方法包括：
步骤501：UE通过SEAF和AUSF向UDM/ARPF发送SUCI。
其中，UE在首次连接网络时，通过ECIES方式产生共享密钥K ECDH；根据共享密钥K ECDH推演确定加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M。将SUPI使用加密密钥K E加密，并通过完整性密钥K M生成完整性保护标签Tag，生成SUCI。通过SEAF和AUSF将SUCI传递给UDM/ARPF。
其中，UE将加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M存储在不可篡改的存储区域内。
步骤502：UDM/ARPF对SUCI进行解密，获得SUPI，基于SUPI确定认证协议。
这里，UDM/ARPF中具有与UE共同知道的共享密钥K ECDH，根据共享密钥K ECDH推演确定加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M。基于加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M对SUCI进行解密，获得SUPI。进一步，UDM/ARPF根据SUPI确定UE的认证信息(Profile),从而确定UE使用何种认证协议进行认证(例如5G AKA或EAP-AKA’)。
步骤503：UDM/ARPF向AUSF发送指示信息。
作为一种示例，UDM/ARPF向AUSF发送Nudm_Authentication_Get Response消息，所述消息中携带有指示信息。其中，作为一种示例，所述指示信息中包括加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M；以使AUSF后续基于加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M对认证响应消息进行解密处理。作为另一种示例，所述指示信息中包括共享密钥K ECDH，以使AUSF后续基于共享密钥K ECDH确定加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M，加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M对认证响应消息进行解密处理。
步骤504：UDM/ARPF基于确定的认证协议向UE发送认证请求消息；所述认证请求消息中可包括：随机口令(RAND)和认证令牌(AUTN)。
步骤505：UE基于进行网络验证，并获得网络验证失败的结果。
步骤506：UE通过SEAF向AUSF发送认证响应消息(Authentication Response)。
本实施例中，所述认证响应消息可包括：错误原因(FAIL_CAUSE)、随机数(Nonce)、SUPI、响应数据(RES_DATA)以及用于完整性保护的MAC信息。其中，错误原因(FAIL_CAUSE)的不同取值和分别对应第一类型的错误消息和第二类型的错误消息；所述第一类型的错误消息具体可以是MAC失败(MAC_FAIL)消息，所述第二类型的错误消息具体可以是同步失败(SYNC_FAIL)消息。所述随机数为一次性随机数，用于使所述第一指示信息(也可为认证响应消息)的密文每次都不相同，以防止攻击者猜测所述第一指示信息中的错误消息类型。所述认证响应消息中可携带有SUPI，以防止第二网络设备无法获得终端的SUPI的情况下向终端发起身份请求。所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关。在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；作为一种示例，所述响应数据为AUTS；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据可以为一随机数。其中，AUTS的长度与随机数的长度相同。
本实施例中，UE基于加密密钥K E对认证响应消息进行加密，基于完整性密钥K M生成MAC信息以进行完整性保护。
步骤507：AUSF基于加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M对认证响应消息进行解密处理，确定错误消息类型。
本实施例中，AUSF可基于步骤503获得的加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M对认证响应消息进行解密处理，或者基于步骤503获得的共享密钥K ECDH确定加密密钥K E和完整性密钥K M，从而对认证响应消息进行解密处理。
作为一种示例，AUSF基于完整性密钥K M校验认证响应消息中的MAC信息；在验证通过的情况下，基于加密密钥K E对认证响应消息进行解密处 理。在验证不通过的情况下，结束流程。
步骤508：在认证响应消息中包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，AUSF向UDM/ARPF发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于UDM/ARPF恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
这里，在认证响应消息中的错误原因(FAIL_CAUSE)的取值为SYNC_FAIL的情况下，执行本步骤。
作为一种示例，AUSF向UDM/ARPF发送Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request消息，所述消息中携带认证失败同步参数。作为一种示例，所述认证失败同步参数具体可以是随机口令(RAND)和AUTS，以使UDM/ARPF根据随机口令(RAND)和AUTS恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
步骤509：AUSF向SEAF发送错误消息类型和SUPI。
这里，AUSF向SEAF发送Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response消息，所述消息中携带错误消息类型和SUPI，也即所述消息中携带错误原因(FAIL_CAUSE)和SUPI。
本申请实施例的技术方案通过一个消息(即第一指示信息)指示错误消息类型，即终端无论获得何种类型的错误消息，均向网络侧发送相同格式的指示信息，避免网络侧根据不同类型的指示信息进行响应，从而避免攻击者通过截获不同类型的响应以确定错误消息类型；并且，终端通过与网络侧共同知道的共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥，并根据加密密钥和完整性密钥对第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，使得攻击者即使捕获到认证响应消息，也无法从密文上获取认证响应消息中的错误消息类型。
本申请实施例还提供了一种终端。图6为本申请实施例的终端的一种组成结构示意图；如图6所示，所述终端包括：第一加密单元61和第一通讯单元62；其中，
所述第一加密单元61，配置为在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加 密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述第一通讯单元62，配置为向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的第一指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
在本申请的可选实施例中，如图7所示，所述终端还包括第一确定单元63，配置为在进行网络认证之前，根据所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第一加密单元61，还配置为根据所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对用户永久标识进行加密和完整性保护，获得用户隐藏标识；
所述第一通讯单元62，还配置为向第三网络设备发送所述用户隐藏标识；其中，所述用户隐藏标识通过所述第二网络设备和所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第一通讯单元62，配置为通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述认证响应消息包括所述第一指示信息的加密部分和所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分；所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分为用于完整性保护的MAC信息；
所述第一加密单元61，配置为基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第一通讯单元62，配置为向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和MAC信息。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
本申请实施例中，所述终端中的第一加密单元61和第一确定单元63，在实际应用中均可由所述终端中的中央处理器(CPU，Central Processing Unit)、数字信号处理器(DSP，Digital Signal Processor)、微控制单元(MCU，Microcontroller Unit)或可编程门阵列(FPGA，Field－Programmable Gate Array)实现；所述终端中的第一通讯单元62，在实际应用中可通过通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现。
需要说明的是：上述实施例提供的终端在进行认证信息处理时，仅以上述各程序模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而将上述处理分配由不同的程序模块完成，即将终端的内部结构划分成不同的程序模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分处理。另外，上述实施例提供的终端与认证信息处理方法实施例属于同一构思，其具体实现过程详见方法实施例，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种网络设备，所述网络设备为第一网络设备。 图8为本申请实施例的网络设备的一种组成结构示意图；如图8所示，所述网络设备包括：第二通讯单元71和第一解密单元72；其中，
所述第二通讯单元71，配置为通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
所述第一解密单元72，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元71，还配置为所述第一解密单元72基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，接收第三网络设备发送的所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元71，还配置为所述第一解密单元72基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，接收第三网络设备发送的所述共享密钥；
所述第一解密单元72，还配置为基于所述共享密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元71，配置为通过认证响应消息接收终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述认证响应消息包括所述第一指示信息的加密部分和所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分；所述第一指示信息的完整性保护部分为用于完整性保护的MAC信息；
所述第一解密单元72，配置为基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解 密处理。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元71，还配置为在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第二通讯单元71，还配置为向所述第二网络设备发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
本申请实施例中，所述网络设备中的第一解密单元72，在实际应用中可由所述网络设备中的CPU、DSP、MCU或FPGA实现；所述网络设备中的第二通讯单元71，在实际应用中可通过通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现。
需要说明的是：上述实施例提供的网络设备在进行认证信息处理时，仅以上述各程序模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而 将上述处理分配由不同的程序模块完成，即将网络设备的内部结构划分成不同的程序模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分处理。另外，上述实施例提供的网络设备与认证信息处理方法实施例属于同一构思，其具体实现过程详见方法实施例，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种网络设备，所述网络设备为第三网络设备。图9为本申请实施例的网络设备的另一种组成结构示意图；如图9所示，所述网络设备包括第三通讯单元81、第二解密单元82和第二确定单元83；其中，所述第三通讯单元81，配置为通过第二网络设备和第一网络设备接收终端发送的用户隐藏标识；所述用户隐藏标识基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；
所述第二解密单元82，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密，获得用户永久标识；
所述第二确定单元83，配置为基于所述用户永久标识确定认证协议，所述认证协议用于与所述终端进行认证。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第二确定单元83，还配置为所述第二解密单元82基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密之前，根据所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第三通讯单元81，还配置为向所述第一网络设备发送所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
在本申请的可选实施例中，所述第三通讯单元81，还配置为向所述第一网络设备发送所述共享密钥。
本申请实施例中，所述网络设备中的第二解密单元82和第二确定单元83，在实际应用中可由所述网络设备中的CPU、DSP、MCU或FPGA实现；所述网络设备中的第三通讯单元81，在实际应用中可通过通信模组(包含： 基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现。
需要说明的是：上述实施例提供的网络设备在进行认证信息处理时，仅以上述各程序模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而将上述处理分配由不同的程序模块完成，即将网络设备的内部结构划分成不同的程序模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分处理。另外，上述实施例提供的网络设备与认证信息处理方法实施例属于同一构思，其具体实现过程详见方法实施例，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种通信设备。图10为本申请实施例的通信设备的硬件组成结构示意图，如图10所示，通信设备包括存储器92、处理器91及存储在存储器92上并可在处理器91上运行的计算机程序。作为一种实施方式，所述处理器91执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例中应用于终端的认证信息处理方法的步骤；作为另一种实施方式，所述处理器91执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例中应用于第一网络设备的认证信息处理方法的步骤；作为又一种实施方式，所述处理器91执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例中应用于第三网络设备的认证信息处理方法的步骤。
可选地，通信设备还包括通信接口93。可以理解，通信设备中的各个组件通过总线系统94耦合在一起。可理解，总线系统94用于实现这些组件之间的连接通信。总线系统94除包括数据总线之外，还包括电源总线、控制总线和状态信号总线。但是为了清楚说明起见，在图10中将各种总线都标为总线系统94。
可以理解，存储器92可以是易失性存储器或非易失性存储器，也可包括易失性和非易失性存储器两者。其中，非易失性存储器可以是只读存储器(ROM，Read Only Memory)、可编程只读存储器(PROM，Programmable Read-Only Memory)、可擦除可编程只读存储器(EPROM，Erasable  Programmable Read-Only Memory)、电可擦除可编程只读存储器(EEPROM，Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory)、磁性随机存取存储器(FRAM，ferromagnetic random access memory)、快闪存储器(Flash Memory)、磁表面存储器、光盘、或只读光盘(CD-ROM，Compact Disc Read-Only Memory)；磁表面存储器可以是磁盘存储器或磁带存储器。易失性存储器可以是随机存取存储器(RAM，Random Access Memory)，其用作外部高速缓存。通过示例性但不是限制性说明，许多形式的RAM可用，例如静态随机存取存储器(SRAM，Static Random Access Memory)、同步静态随机存取存储器(SSRAM，Synchronous Static Random Access Memory)、动态随机存取存储器(DRAM，Dynamic Random Access Memory)、同步动态随机存取存储器(SDRAM，Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、双倍数据速率同步动态随机存取存储器(DDRSDRAM，Double Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、增强型同步动态随机存取存储器(ESDRAM，Enhanced Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、同步连接动态随机存取存储器(SLDRAM，SyncLink Dynamic Random Access Memory)、直接内存总线随机存取存储器(DRRAM，Direct Rambus Random Access Memory)。本申请实施例描述的存储器92旨在包括但不限于这些和任意其它适合类型的存储器。
上述本申请实施例揭示的方法可以应用于处理器91中，或者由处理器91实现。处理器91可能是一种集成电路芯片，具有信号的处理能力。在实现过程中，上述方法的各步骤可以通过处理器91中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。上述的处理器91可以是通用处理器、数字信号处理器(DSP，Digital Signal Processor)，或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件等。处理器91可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤及逻辑框图。通用处理器可以是微处 理器或者任何常规的处理器等。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤，可以直接体现为硬件译码处理器执行完成，或者用译码处理器中的硬件及软件模块组合执行完成。软件模块可以位于存储介质中，该存储介质位于存储器92，处理器91读取存储器92中的信息，结合其硬件完成前述方法的步骤。
在示例性实施例中，通信设备可以被一个或多个应用专用集成电路(ASIC，Application Specific Integrated Circuit)、DSP、可编程逻辑器件(PLD，Programmable Logic Device)、复杂可编程逻辑器件(CPLD，Complex Programmable Logic Device)、现场可编程门阵列(FPGA，Field-Programmable Gate Array)、通用处理器、控制器、微控制器(MCU，Micro Controller Unit)、微处理器(Microprocessor)、或其他电子元件实现，用于执行前述方法。
本申请实施例的认证信息处理方案可应用于各种通信系统，例如全球移动通讯(GSM、Global System of Mobile communication)系统、LTE系统、5G系统或新无线(NR，New Radio)系统等等。
本实施例的通信系统至少包括终端、第一网络设备、第二网络设备和第三网络设备；其中，所述第一网络设备、所述第二网络设备和所述第三网络设备为核心网设备中用于认证的设备。作为一种示例，以5G系统或NR系统为例，所述第一网络设备可以是AUSF设备；所述第二网络设备可以是SEAF设备；所述第三网络设备可以是UDM设备。
其中，该终端可以用于实现上述方法中由终端设备实现的相应的功能，以及该网络设备可以用于实现上述方法中由网络设备实现的相应的功能为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，作为一种实施方式，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例中应用于终端的认证信息处理方法的步骤；作为另一种实施方式，该程序被处 理器执行时实现本申请实施例中应用于第一网络设备的认证信息处理方法的步骤；作为又一种实施方式，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例中应用于第三网络设备的认证信息处理方法的步骤。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的设备和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。以上所描述的设备实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，如：多个单元或组件可以结合，或可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另外，所显示或讨论的各组成部分相互之间的耦合、或直接耦合、或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，设备或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性的、机械的或其它形式的。
上述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是、或也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是、或也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，也可以分布到多个网络单元上；可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各实施例中的各功能单元可以全部集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各单元分别单独作为一个单元，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中；上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用硬件加软件功能单元的形式实现。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解：实现上述方法实施例的全部或部分步骤可以通过程序指令相关的硬件来完成，前述的程序可以存储于一计算机可读取存储介质中，该程序在执行时，执行包括上述方法实施例的步骤；而前述的存储介质包括：移动存储设备、ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
或者，本申请上述集成的单元如果以软件功能模块的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，也可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。 基于这样的理解，本申请实施例的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机、服务器、或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分。而前述的存储介质包括：移动存储设备、ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
本申请所提供的几个方法实施例中所揭露的方法，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的方法实施例。
本申请所提供的几个产品实施例中所揭露的特征，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的产品实施例。
本申请所提供的几个方法或设备实施例中所揭露的特征，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的方法实施例或设备实施例。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (41)

  1. 一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：
    终端在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
    所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的第一指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端根据所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对用户永久标识进行加密和完整性保护，获得用户隐藏标识，向第三网络设备发送所述用户隐藏标识；
    其中，所述用户隐藏标识通过所述第二网络设备和所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送。
  3. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法，其中，所述终端向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息，包括：
    所述终端通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其中，所述分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护，包括：
    所述终端基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
  5. 根据权利要求1至4任一项所述的方法，其中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
    所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
    第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
    其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的方法，其中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
  7. 一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：
    第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
    所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网络设备接收第三网络设备发送的所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  9. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，所述方法还 包括：
    所述第一网络设备接收第三网络设备发送的所述共享密钥，基于所述共享密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  10. 根据权利要求7至9任一项所述的方法，其中，第一网络设备通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息，包括：
    所述第一网络设备通过认证响应消息接收终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其中，所述第一网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密，包括：
    所述第一网络设备基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
  12. 根据权利要求7至11任一项所述的方法，其中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
    所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
    第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
    其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
  14. 根据权利要求12或13所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
  15. 根据权利要求12至14任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网络设备向所述第二网络设备发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
  16. 一种认证信息处理方法，所述方法包括：
    第三网络设备通过第二网络设备和第一网络设备接收终端发送的用户隐藏标识；所述用户隐藏标识基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；
    所述第三网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密，获得用户永久标识；
    所述第三网络设备基于所述用户永久标识确定认证协议，所述认证协议用于与所述终端进行认证。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其中，所述第三网络设备基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第三网络设备根据所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
  18. 根据权利要求16或17所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述第三网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  19. 根据权利要求16或17所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述第三网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送所述共享密钥。
  20. 一种终端，所述终端包括：第一加密单元和第一通讯单元；其中，
    所述第一加密单元，配置为在网络认证失败的情况下，分别基于加密密钥和完整性密钥对包含有错误消息类型的第一指示信息进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
    所述第一通讯单元，配置为向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息；其中，所述加密后的第一指示信息通过第二网络设备向所述第一网络设备发送。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的终端，其中，所述第一加密单元，还配置为根据所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对用户永久标识进行加密和完整性保护，获得用户隐藏标识；
    所述第一通讯单元，还配置为向第三网络设备发送所述用户隐藏标识；
    其中，所述用户隐藏标识通过所述第二网络设备和所述第一网络设备向所述第三网络设备发送。
  22. 根据权利要求20或21所述的终端，其中，所述第一通讯单元，配置为通过认证响应消息向第一网络设备发送加密后的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息。
  23. 根据权利要求22所述的终端，其中，所述第一加密单元，配置为基于加密密钥加密第一指示信息，基于所述完整性密钥生成MAC信息。
  24. 根据权利要求20至23任一项所述的终端，其中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
    所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
    第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
    其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数 据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
  25. 根据权利要求24所述的终端，其中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
  26. 一种网络设备，所述网络设备为第一网络设备，所述网络设备包括：第二通讯单元和第一解密单元；其中，
    所述第二通讯单元，配置为通过第二网络设备接收终端发送的第一指示信息；所述第一指示信息基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；所述第一指示信息包括终端网络认证失败对应的错误消息类型；不同的错误消息类型对应相同格式的第一指示信息；
    所述第一解密单元，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密。
  27. 根据权利要求26所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为所述第一解密单元基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，接收第三网络设备发送的所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  28. 根据权利要求26所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为所述第一解密单元基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密之前，接收第三网络设备发送的所述共享密钥；
    所述第一解密单元，还配置为基于所述共享密钥确定所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  29. 根据权利要求26至28任一项所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二 通讯单元，配置为通过认证响应消息接收终端发送的第一指示信息和用于完整性保护的MAC信息；所述认证响应消息通过所述第二网络设备的转发而接收。
  30. 根据权利要求29所述的网络设备，其中，所述第一解密单元，配置为基于所述完整性密钥校验所述MAC信息，在校验成功的情况下，基于所述加密密钥对所述第一指示信息进行解密处理。
  31. 根据权利要求26至30任一项所述的网络设备，其中，所述第一指示信息包括错误消息类型和响应数据；所述响应数据与所述错误消息类型相关；
    所述错误消息类型包括第一类型或第二类型；
    第一类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验认证信息中的MAC信息失败；所述第二类型的错误消息用于表示所述终端校验SQN失败；
    其中，在所述错误消息的类型为所述第二类型的情况下，所述响应数据为表征认证同步失败的数值；在所述错误消息的类型为所述第一类型的情况下，所述响应数据为第一随机数；所述数值的长度与所述第一随机数的长度相同。
  32. 根据权利要求31所述的网络设备，其中，所述第一指示信息还包括以下信息的至少之一：第二随机数、用户永久标识；所述第二随机数用于区分加密后的所述第一指示信息的密文。
  33. 根据权利要求31或32所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为在所述第一指示信息包括的错误消息类型为所述第二类型的情况下，向所述第三网络设备发送认证失败同步参数，所述认证失败同步参数至少用于所述第三网络设备恢复与所述终端的SQN同步。
  34. 根据权利要求31至33任一项所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二通讯单元，还配置为向所述第二网络设备发送第二指示信息，所述第二指 示信息包括以下信息的至少之一：错误消息类型、用户永久标识。
  35. 一种网络设备，所述网络设备为第三网络设备，所述网络设备包括第三通讯单元、第二解密单元和第二确定单元；其中，
    所述第三通讯单元，配置为通过第二网络设备和第一网络设备接收终端发送的用户隐藏标识；所述用户隐藏标识基于加密密钥和完整性密钥进行加密和完整性保护；所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥基于共享密钥获得；
    所述第二解密单元，配置为基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密，获得用户永久标识；
    所述第二确定单元，配置为基于所述用户永久标识确定认证协议，所述认证协议用于与所述终端进行认证。
  36. 根据权利要求35所述的网络设备，其中，所述第二确定单元，还配置为所述第二解密单元基于所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥对所述用户隐藏标识进行解密之前，根据所述共享密钥确定加密密钥和完整性密钥。
  37. 根据权利要求35或36所述的网络设备，其中，所述第三通讯单元，还配置为向所述第一网络设备发送所述加密密钥和所述完整性密钥。
  38. 根据权利要求35或36所述的网络设备，其中，所述第三通讯单元，还配置为向所述第一网络设备发送所述共享密钥。
  39. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求1至6任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求7至15任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求16至19任一项所述方法的步骤。
  40. 一种终端，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求1至6任一项所述方法的步骤。
  41. 一种网络设备，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求7至15任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求16至19任一项所述方法的步骤。
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