WO2018145127A1 - Procédés et systèmes de vérification d'une identification électronique avec stockage d'enregistrements de certification sur une chaîne latérale - Google Patents

Procédés et systèmes de vérification d'une identification électronique avec stockage d'enregistrements de certification sur une chaîne latérale Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018145127A1
WO2018145127A1 PCT/US2018/017136 US2018017136W WO2018145127A1 WO 2018145127 A1 WO2018145127 A1 WO 2018145127A1 US 2018017136 W US2018017136 W US 2018017136W WO 2018145127 A1 WO2018145127 A1 WO 2018145127A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
certification
signed
blockchain
registration
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2018/017136
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English (en)
Inventor
Armin EBRAHIM
Gaurav KHOT
Vladimir Reshetnikov
Robert GADBOIS
Original Assignee
ShoCard, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by ShoCard, Inc. filed Critical ShoCard, Inc.
Publication of WO2018145127A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018145127A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

Definitions

  • the present embodiments relate to methods, systems, and programs for managing the identify of users and of identifying those users to third parties, and more particularly, providing a certification of the identity of a user using a salt to obfuscate.
  • Identity theft causes tens of billions of dollars in losses every year.
  • systems and methods for identifying users to third parties have been developed.
  • user identity may be achieved through presentation of some form of identification card, such as a government issued ID.
  • a certification process may be performed to certify that form of identification.
  • this certification process may not be secure as certifications may be discoverable, such that a certification may be associated with a particular user. Users may wish to keep valuable certifications secret.
  • the present embodiments relate to solving one or more problems found in the related art, and specifically to provide for login without requiring a user to enter a username and password.
  • methods and systems are presented for certification of data previously registered to a blockchain, wherein the certification is obfuscated using a salt that is unique.
  • the present embodiments can be implemented in numerous ways, such as a method, an apparatus, a system, a device, or a computer program on a computer readable medium. Several embodiments are described below.
  • a method for certification includes receiving data of a user at a certification device of a certifying entity.
  • the method includes receiving a registration tx-ID of the data, wherein the registration tx-ID is generated from a blockchain in response to receiving and storing a signed hash value of the data for registration.
  • the signed hash value being signed using a private key of the user, and wherein the hash value of the data is generated using a registration hash algorithm.
  • the method includes generating a salt that is unique.
  • the method includes hashing the data combined with the salt using a certification hash algorithm to create a generated hashed data.
  • the method includes signing the generated hashed data using a private key of the certifying entity to create a signed certification of the data.
  • the method includes transmitting the signed certification of the data to a blockchain for storing.
  • the method includes receiving a certification tx-ID of the signed certification of the data.
  • another method for certification includes receiving data of a user at a certification device of a certifying entity.
  • the data includes a plurality of fields.
  • the method includes receiving a plurality of registration tx-IDs of the registration of the data, wherein each of the plurality of registration tx-IDs was generated from a blockchain in response to receiving and storing a signed hash value of a corresponding field of the data for registration signed using a private key of the user, wherein the hash value of the corresponding field was generated using a registration hash algorithm.
  • the method includes generating a plurality of salts, each salt being unique.
  • the salt is a unique random long string of bytes, in one embodiment.
  • the method includes hashing each of the plurality of fields of the data using a certification hash algorithm to create a plurality of generated hashed fields, wherein each field has a corresponding generated hashed field.
  • the method includes signing each of the plurality of generated hashed fields using a private key of the certifying entity to create a plurality of signed certifications of the plurality of fields.
  • the method includes transmitting the plurality of signed certifications to a blockchain.
  • the method includes receiving a plurality of certification tx-IDs of the plurality of signed certifications.
  • a computer system including a processor and memory coupled to the processor.
  • the memory having stored therein instructions that, if executed by the computer system, cause the computer system to execute a method for certification.
  • the method includes receiving data of a user at a certification device of a certifying entity.
  • the method includes receiving a registration tx-ID of the data, wherein the registration tx-ID is generated from a blockchain in response to receiving and storing a signed hash value of the data for registration.
  • the signed hash value being signed using a private key of the user, and wherein the hash value of the data is generated using a registration hash algorithm.
  • the method includes generating a salt that is unique.
  • the method includes hashing the data combined with the salt using a certification hash algorithm to create a generated hashed data.
  • the method includes signing the generated hashed data using a private key of the certifying entity to create a signed certification of the data.
  • the method includes transmitting the signed certification of the data to a blockchain for storing.
  • the method includes receiving a certification tx-ID of the signed certification of the data.
  • FIG. 1A illustrates a data flow for registering data in a blockchain, such as for registering user identification, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. IB illustrates a data flow for certifying the registered data using a blockchain, such as for certifying user identification that is registered with an identity manager, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 1C illustrates a data flow for verifying the registered data, and for verifying the certification of the registered data, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the implementation of a blockchain to ensure the integrity of the data embedded within, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3A illustrates one certification use case, wherein an organization certifies personally identifiable information (PII) data provided by a customer, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • PII personally identifiable information
  • FIG. 3B illustrates another certification use case, wherein a university (e.g., certifying entity) is able to certify grades of a corresponding student (e.g., a user), in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • a university e.g., certifying entity
  • a corresponding student e.g., a user
  • FIG. 3C illustrates a certification use case, wherein the certification is used to publish and/or deliver data between entities, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3D illustrates a certification use case, wherein a user may only wish to share portions of the data that has been previously registered with a blockchain, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 4A illustrates a data flow for certifying the registered data using a blockchain, such as for certifying user identification that is registered with an identity manager, wherein the certification is further obfuscated using a salt, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Figures 4B-1 and 4B-2 show a process for verifying hashed input data and a digital signature, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Figure 4C shows the secure delivery of the certification record from a certifying entity back to a user, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 5A is a diagram of the generation of a certification record from data taken as a whole, and the application of a salt value to the certification record, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 5B is a diagram of the generation of a plurality of certification records from data that is parsed into multiple fields, and the application of corresponding salt values to the certification records, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates the use of salt values to generate compensation for downstream certifications, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 7 illustrates the use of a one or more public ledgers to publish and verify seals (e.g., registrations) and certifications to one or more private and/or public ledgers (e.g., blockchains), in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 8 illustrates the use of a one or more public ledgers to publish and verify multiple seals (e.g., registrations) and/or multiple certifications to one or more private and/or public ledgers (e.g., blockchains), in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 9 illustrates the further obfuscation of a certification data block, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 10A is a diagram illustrating a system 1000A for performing registration, verification, validation, and certification of data of a user 5, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 10B is a flow diagram 1000B illustrating steps in a method for certification, wherein the certification is performed using a salt value to obfuscate the certification, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 11 illustrates components of an example device that can be used to perform aspects of the various embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • embodiments of the present disclosure describe systems and methods that provide for authenticated login, registration, and call center validation.
  • embodiments of the present invention allow users to login to websites, services and other portals without the use of usernames or passwords.
  • embodiments of the present invention allow users to remotely validate themselves such that a remote or local operator, such as those at a call center or a teller, can positively authenticate a user in order to gain access to their profiles and other information.
  • Other embodiments of the present disclosure describe systems and methods that provide for certification of user generated data (e.g., biometrics), which can be used for authenticating a user, and for providing access based on the certification.
  • the term “user” refers to an individual who has identifying credentials.
  • the term “man-in-the- middle” refers to a system or individual listening to communication between two parties in either electronic or analog form. For example, the man-in-the-middle may be a hacker.
  • the term “verifier” refers to a service which is configured to verify some or all of user information associated with a user.
  • the term “certifier” refers to a person or service which is configured to certify the user information (which previously could have been verified and validated).
  • the certifier is configured to produce a certification record, which uniquely further identifies data (e.g., user information), and can be used as proof that certain data belonged to a certain user at the time of the certification according to the certifier.
  • data e.g., user information
  • the term "session ID" refers to a unique identifier that may be used throughout an authentication and login process, thereby connecting the devices used in the process, and wherein the session ID may be associated with a
  • signature refers to a process by which a user is able to digitally sign data using a public/private key pair.
  • the process of signing data may be protected with access control to the App or device.
  • a Touch ID process previously introduced may be used as the user's permission to allow the App to digitally sign data on the user's behalf.
  • Embodiments of the present invention are based on an identity management platform implementing a technology layer that interacts with a blockchain.
  • the blockchain securely holds data used for certifying identity transactions.
  • a blockchain is a technology that forms the heart of the cryptocurrency, Bitcoin.
  • the blockchain technology can be used by several integrated systems for purposes other than currency transactions, such as for identity management.
  • the blockchain can be a publicly viewable blockchain, such as Bitcoin, or it can be a private blockchain.
  • registration e.g., of a user
  • a certification process may be processed for certifying the registration and/or validation.
  • some form of user identification e.g., a driver's license or passport
  • One or more fields are extracted, such as your name, license number, passport number, date of birth (or other data), etc.
  • identifying information can be gathered individually. Further, the identifying information can be gathered manually. Each field is then processed to produce a hash of the data.
  • the hash can be produced of the original data along with a paired random data to prevent brute-force discovery of the hashed data; in this case, to validate the hash, the data and the random data (e.g., salt) must always be used together.
  • the private key that is present on the mobile device can be used to create a digital signature of that hash.
  • the name field can be appended with a Salt and then hashed.
  • the above process repeates for every field.
  • the signed hash value and optionally the public key of the user are stored to the blockchain; if the public key is not stored on the blockchain, it can be shared through other means when it is necessary to validate the digital signature.
  • the various fields are put together in one record to create an ID (e.g., in the form of a seal) for that user.
  • the user can then provide the raw data along with the corresponding Salts (if Salts are used) with a public key and a pointer to that record on the blockchain in order to allow verification of the data by a third party.
  • this provides a correlation between the data (e.g., the raw data) that the user has on the mobile device and what's on the blockchain. That is, the raw data that is newly presented may be verified using the data on the blockchain.
  • a user can be certified by some other trusted party, such as a bank or "know your customer” (KYC) checking company, which then can issue a certification for the user, based on the seal associated with the registration and validation of the user.
  • KYC knowledge your customer
  • these certifiers can use their own private key to write the records on the blockchain, pointing to record entry of the user that is also on the blockchain.
  • This certification may be referred to as the "User ID” (e.g., ShoCard ID issued by ShoCard, Inc.).
  • the first step is the registration process where hash signatures of the individual fields are sealed on the blockchain
  • the second step is a certification of the sealed registration.
  • the certifier does not necessarily sign all fields of a user's record. They will create a signature of the hash of the data-fields that are presented and they are able to verify or attest to. When hashing these fields, the 3 ld party certifier may optionally add a salt to each data-field before hashing it as well. More than one 3 ru party can certify a user, each certifying the user by signing their attestations using their own private key. This creates a multi-party certification of the user. The more certifiers that a user has, the greater web of trust that there will be in their identity and related attributes.
  • the platform providing registration and certification also provides for a secure work-around in cases when a bank suspects a credit card transaction could be fraudulent and wants to reject that transaction.
  • the bank for example, can send a
  • notification/challenge e.g., a secure notification
  • the challenge looks for a response confirming the user, and the challenge also confirms that the user authorizes the current transaction.
  • Additional features can include use of a biometrics for access-control (e.g., Touch ID).
  • Touch ID e.g., Touch ID
  • each time the user's private key can be accessed to answer those questions.
  • by using the private key of the user when responding to questions i.e., to see the data or questions), it is possible to avoid using clear text, which can ultimately be hacked.
  • embodiments of the present invention provide for being able to authenticate the user whenever the user does any kind of transaction, such as logging into a website, calling a call center, authenticating a transaction.
  • the systems, methods, and technical operations described herein, and based on the identity management platform providing for registration and/or certification of data can be implemented with the confidence of knowing who the user really is, and enabling this verification process in a timely manner.
  • the registration and/or validation process may be referred to as "sealing.”
  • Certification of the registration may be referred to as "certifying.”
  • sealing is the process of hashing and digitally signing the User ID data and storing it in the blockchain. Once it is sealed in the blockchain, the data becomes a permanent record. The data in the user ID may be changed, but the new data must be resealed in a new blockchain record.
  • no readable information is stored in the blockchain, only an indecipherable digital signature of a hash that can only be verified by producing the original data and the optional salt that was hashed and the user's public key. The user data is in control of the user and not available on the blockchain.
  • Certification of the registration and/or validation is the process of another party (e.g., third party, bank, airline, etc.) acknowledging the accuracy of the user ID that is registered, and marking that data (e.g., user ID) with a certification that can be recognized, such that the data can be recognized as being accurate when presented in the future, without having to see any other evidence of identity beyond the user ID.
  • the certifier provides a user with a unique SessionID (e.g., via a QR Code that the user can scan).
  • the user then signs the SessionID along with his/her raw data (e.g., user ID) and corresponding seal tx-ID on the blockchain and encrypts it with the public key of the certifier and delivers to the certifier.
  • the certifier performs decryption using its corresponding private key and generates a new hash based on the newly presented raw data and then verifies the digital signature of the hash on the blockchain against the newly generated hash and the public key of the user. It also verifies that it can use the same public key to verify the signature of the hash of combined SessionID along with the user's raw data. If the verification process is a match, this proves that the user has the private key(s) that is used to create both records.
  • the certifier can create a new record (e.g., certification record) with their own private key(s) that references the user ID that is registered and stored in the blockchain.
  • the third party can check the certification to make sure that the user is presenting the same user ID that was previously certified.
  • a Salt is added to the data before hashing to obfuscate the data further.
  • identity verification e.g., verification of a registration and/or certification of data
  • commercial applications may include those that require commercial entities to verify the identity of a user. Verifying the identity of a user can be required for achieving any number of functions, such as traveling, making transactions, banking, communication, loan verification, credit verification, purchase verification, and other uses.
  • private identity verification can also be facilitated using the methods, apparatus, computer readable media, and systems described herein.
  • private identity verification may be useful when a user wishes to prove their identity to another user in a fast and efficient manner.
  • the systems and methods described herein write data to the blockchain database, which is non-rewritable and permanently maintains the record without compromise. This enables writing of information to the blockchain in a manner that can be verified by one or more transactions executed by methods of the present inventions.
  • the systems and methods described herein may be executed with any number of computer systems.
  • the computer systems may include user devices, such as mobile phones, tablets, desktop computers, watch computers, head attached computers, eyeglasses computers, or combinations thereof.
  • Server operations may also be performed and communicated between client devices, to facilitate transactions with the blockchain database, server storage, and the like.
  • these computer devices can communicate over networks, such as the Internet, local area networks, Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), or even via exchange of codes such as QR codes.
  • the networks enable individual devices to transact with each other, such as by way of sending, receiving, and processing exchanged information.
  • the exchanged information can include different types of encrypted data, hashed data, data envelopes, codes, QR codes, PDF417 codes, messages, notifications, and other types of data.
  • the messaging and communication functions described herein are provided to enable users to exchange data over communication networks in order to verify identity, or enable or provide access to users to services, goods, or commercial transactions.
  • the verification process can be utilized by banks, as well as users of the bank, or third parties that require certified information from the banks regarding those users.
  • different travel entities can require identification of users, and the identification can also be verified by themselves or by other third parties that are trusted.
  • verification of a user identity can be useful in any type of industry, or private setting.
  • the use of verification is simply facilitated by using the verifying infrastructure, programs code, applications, and combinations thereof, to ensure that verification is secure.
  • the verification systems can be embodied in an application, such as those that can be installed on mobile devices (e.g., Apps).
  • apps e.g., Apps
  • users wishing to have their identity verified can use an application to seal information regarding their identity.
  • the data e.g., signed hashed data has been stored to the blockchain
  • this data e.g., raw data
  • the other party may also be utilizing a corresponding App or other applications on other devices, which enables efficient reading of the data, code, QR code, message, or notification, to validate the identity of the user.
  • code plug-ins can be integrated into commercial websites, which may use identity verification for different reasons or functions.
  • banks can install plug-in applications, code, or programs that can execute part or all of the verification processing to seal information and/or to certify information regarding identity.
  • FIGS. 1A-1C show data flows for the registration and/or validation process as well as the certification of the registered data, for example, as implemented by the identity management platform described herein, in embodiments of the present invention. These processes are performed to facilitate the implementation of authenticated login, registration, call center validation, and certification of user generated data (e.g., biometrics).
  • the UGD may be combined with a corresponding salt value for added security, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the salt value is added, the UGD should be understood to include the salt value (UGD+Salt).
  • the salt value such that hash(UGD) hash(UGD+Salt).
  • FIG. 1A illustrates a data flow 100A for registering data in a
  • a user 5 may generate and/or capture any type of raw data (UGD) and have that data certified by a third party (e.g., certifier).
  • UMD raw data
  • certifier e.g., certifier
  • the data can be any of the following types, but not limited only to these types of data: a simple text string; a date; an enumerated data type; a number; an arbitrary series of data bytes (e.g., a data block), a digital key, biometrics, etc.
  • This data can be saved locally on a device associated with the user 5 (e.g., mobile phone operating an identity management application).
  • the user 5 would then seal her record by writing this data to a blockchain 50 in operation 115. This can be done by either inserting a new seal record with the added user generated data, that may overwrite any previous seal (if any), or a new seal that complements any prior seals.
  • the value field written to the blockchain is for registration and/or validation of the original, raw data only.
  • the user 5 is expected to securely (e.g., through encryption) hold onto that data on their own private devices such as a mobile-phone and only share it when the user chooses to.
  • the data is first hashed in operation 110 so the UGD becomes ⁇ hash.UGD>.
  • any number of hashing algorithms can be used, such as SHA256.
  • the user 5 then signs the ⁇ hash.UGD> with a private key of the user, producing
  • a seal 120 is generated that includes a transaction identifier for the blockchain that can be used to access the signed hash value ( ⁇ signed.hash.UGD>) at the appropriate location in the blockchain.
  • the UGD field can be a combination of actual data plus a Salt value that is appended to the data and then hashed.
  • FIG. IB illustrates a data flow 100B for certifying the registered data using a blockchain, such as for verifying raw data that is registered with an identity manager using a blockchain 50, and for certifying the raw data (e.g., user identification) that is registered, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the user 5 may then present the UGD (securely maintained by the user or another device storage of her choosing), along with her public -key and a pointer to the seal record 120 on the blockchain to another party.
  • the other party is a verifier 30 that performs operations to verify the UGD.
  • the other party is a certifier 20 that performs operations to certify the registered UGD.
  • Operations 130 and 135 may be performed by the certifier 20 or verifier 30 for purposes of verifying the UGD that was previously registered, though these operations are shown as being performed by the certifier 20.
  • a request to access the registered seal record 120 is made to the public blockchain 50, and at operation 135, the seal record 120 is returned to the certifier.
  • blocks 140 operations are performed for verifying the UGD.
  • the data stored in the blockchain 50 is extracted, namely the signed hash value ( ⁇ signed.hash.UGD>).
  • the newly presented UGD is hashed using the same hash algorithm that was performed when registering the data.
  • Verification of the raw data is performed by performing a verification process on input data including the newly generated hash value, the public key of the user, and the ⁇ signed.hash.UGD> stored on the blockchain 50.
  • hash values of the UGD newly generated and based on the ⁇ signed.hash.UGD> may be compared, and is verified when the hash values match.
  • the certifier 20 begins the certification process.
  • validation of the raw data is performed.
  • the raw data is inspected to see if it conforms to public form (e.g., follows the form of a driver's license), and is validated if the raw data as presented conforms with the public form.
  • the seal 120 e.g., transaction identifier or txn- ID
  • the seal 120 and public key optionally may also be hashed.
  • Data may be combined in a certification record that is signed (using the private key of the certifier 20) and sealed in a blockchain, wherein the data may include one or more of the seal 120 of the UGD (e.g., seal txn-ID, pointer to the blockchain), the raw UGD, the certification signature (as the raw data of the certification record), public key of certifier, etc.
  • the certification record is sealed in the same or different blockchain 50, and in operation 155 the certification record seal including the pointer to the blockchain where the certification record is stored is returned to the certifier 20 for distribution.
  • the certification record seal is provided to the user 5 to offer as certifying proof of the UGD, as is described in FIG. 1C.
  • the raw fields (UGD) plus any corresponding Salts are also given to the user if the certifier wishes the user to freely share that certification with others.
  • FIG. 1C illustrates a data flow lOOC for verifying the registered data, and for verifying the certification of the registered data, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the user 5 may present the raw UGD (and other information) to a third party, along with registration and certification record information, so that the third party may verify the UGD using multiple factors (e.g., registration and/or certification).
  • data may be combined for presentation, and includes one or more of the raw UGD, public key of the user 5, seal 120 of the UGD (e.g., seal txn-ID, pointer to the blockchain), the certification signature (as the raw data of the certification record), the certification record seal (e.g., certification seal txn-ID, pointer to blockchain), public key of certifier, etc.
  • the third party is verifier 30.
  • verifier 30 obtains the seal record 120 (e.g., using txn-ID for the blockchain) to obtain the data stored in the blockchain 50 (e.g., , ⁇ signed.hash.UGD> and public key of user 5) to verify the raw data (UGD).
  • the data stored in the blockchain 50 is extracted, namely the signed hash value ( ⁇ signed.hash.UGD>).
  • the newly presented UGD is hashed using the same hash algorithm that was performed when registering the data.
  • Verification of the raw data is performed by performing a verification process on input data including the newly generated hash value, the public key of the user, and the ⁇ signed.hash.UGD> stored on the blockchain 50.
  • hash values of the UGD newly generated and that based on the ⁇ signed.hash.UGD> may be compared, and is verified when the hash values match.
  • verifier 30 obtains the certification seal record (e.g., using certification seal txn-ID for the blockchain) to obtain the data stored in the blockchain 50 (same or different blockchain). That is, at operation 190 the certification record is returned to the verifier 30.
  • operations are performed to verify the certification record.
  • the data stored in the blockchain 50 is extracted, namely the certification record which may be signed using the private key of the certifier 20 (e.g., signed hash value ( ⁇ signed.certification record>).
  • the newly presented certification record can be hashed using the same hash algorithm that was performed when sealing the certification record - however, the method of hashing needs to be known so it can be reproduced.
  • Verification of the certification record is performed by performing a verification process on input data including the newly generated hash value, the public key of the certifier 20, and the ⁇ signed. certification record> stored on the blockchain 50.
  • hash values of the UGD newly generated and hash values based on the ⁇ signed.hash.UGD> e.g., using the public key
  • verification of the raw data, UGD may be performed if not already performed.
  • the verification has been performed on the UGD itself and a certification of the UGD.
  • the presented UGD is trustworthy after going through a verification of the UGD and the certification record of the UGD.
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a system 300 for performing authentication and login onto a web portal of a web server, wherein two devices of the user 5 interact with the web server 320 for authentication purposes, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • system 300 may be implemented to perform authenticated login, registration, and call center validation.
  • system 300 may be configured to allow users to login to websites, services and other portals without the use of usernames or passwords. Further configurations of system 300 allow users to remotely validate themselves such that a remote or local operator, such as those at a call center or a teller, can definitively authenticate a user in order to gain access to their profiles and other information.
  • the certification process allows one entity (e.g., a certifying entity) to certify another entity, such as through corresponding data associated with the entity.
  • the certification can contain one or both of the following, as previously described: data that is shared with the certifying entity, and/or unsolicited data that is typically generated by the certifying entity.
  • the certification of data e.g., personal data
  • the certification of data allows a user to present the personal data along with the certification to a third party. In that manner, the personal data is more trustworthy having been examined and given a certification.
  • the third party relies solely on the certification record to validate the personal data, especially when the third party fully trusts the certifying entity.
  • the third party is able to verify the certification record, as previously described.
  • Various use cases are provided below as examples of the use of a certification record when certifying data.
  • FIG. 3 A illustrates one certification use case, wherein an organization (e.g., bank 325) certifies personally identifiable information (PII) data provided by a customer 305, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • PII personally identifiable information
  • the customer 305 provides the bank 325 with a Seal.
  • the PII may have been previously registered at 310 with a blockchain, thereby generating the Seal.
  • the bank 325 is configured to certify those fields of the PII (e.g., as presented in a identification card - driver's license, etc.).
  • the Seal is based on and associated with identifying information, such as first and last names, address, photo id, etc.
  • Certification is performed after a verification and/or validation process is performed at 314, such as verifying/validating address information, verifying/validation that the photo id matches the face of the customer 305 through automatic or manual methods, etc.
  • This verification and/or validation step is typically performed by the bank employee at the physical branch of the bank 325 or it can be done digitally using facial recognition and facial comparison engines (these services are readily available as SaaS or on-premise services that can be integrated into server, such as a bank server).
  • the bank 325 can certify the PII, and in association the customer at 316.
  • the bank can share the certification at 318, such as with the customer 305.
  • the customer 305 at 320 can store the certification (e.g., certification record), and present the certification along with the PII to a third party to prove to the third party that the PII is reliable, since it has been previously certified.
  • FIG. 3B illustrates another certification use case, wherein a university 335 (e.g., certifying entity) is able to certify grades of a corresponding student 330 (e.g., a user), in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the university would generate grades for the user at 340.
  • the university 335 can issue a certification containing the grades.
  • the university 335 can share the certification along with the grades with the student 330.
  • the student 330 can store the certification (e.g., certification record), which the student 330 can later use it to prove his grades from that university 335.
  • the student 330 can present the certification along with a copy of the grades to a third party to prove to the third party that the grades are reliable, since it has been previously certified by the university 335.
  • FIG. 3C illustrates a certification use case, wherein the certification is used to publish and/or deliver data between entities, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • a certification can be presented as a proof, and is further verifiable by a third party.
  • the student 330 might present his grades (previously certified in FIG. 3B) and various other certifications that certify other data to a potential employer 350.
  • Other data may include a PII (e.g., as presented through a university ID, driver's license, etc.).
  • the PII may include one or more fields, such as name, date-of-birth (DOB), address, image, etc.
  • DOB date-of-birth
  • the employer 350 can verify each of the following is true, as previously described (e.g., verification/validation of the data, and verification of the corresponding certification). For example, at 352, the employer 352 can verify the identity of the student 330 using corresponding identifying information (e.g., driver's license DMV or other government certification) and a corresponding certification. In addition, at 354, the employer 354 can verify the identity of the university using a corresponding university ID and a corresponding certification. Further, at 356, the employer 350 can verify the grades, as previously described in FIG. 3B using a copy of the grades and the corresponding certification. In that manner, the employer can verify the integrity of the data containing the grades as presented by the student, such as to rule out man-in-the- middle spoofs.
  • corresponding identifying information e.g., driver's license DMV or other government certification
  • the employer 354 can verify the identity of the university using a corresponding university ID and a corresponding certification.
  • the employer 350 can verify the grades, as previously described
  • Additional verification information may be used, including verifying timestamps and signatures, wherein the grades provided by the student 330 can be issued by a university 335 (as verified through signatures of data) and at a particular time (as verified through timestamps).
  • verifying timestamps and signatures wherein the grades provided by the student 330 can be issued by a university 335 (as verified through signatures of data) and at a particular time (as verified through timestamps).
  • the data presented by the student 330 may be accepted.
  • FIG. 3D illustrates a certification use case, wherein a user (e.g., individual 360) may only wish to share portions of the data that has been previously registered with a blockchain, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure. That is, the individual 360 may decide to share only portions of their identity. For example an individual 360 visiting a bar 370 may decide to share only his or her photo identification and DOB. The individual may wish to keep other personal information private. For example, the individual 360 may wish to not expose his or her name, home address, etc.).
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure provide for a certification/verification that supports partial data verification. Specifically, each key/value pair of the PII is individually registered and certified.
  • partial Seal data registration of personal data is performed. That is, each key/value pair of the PII is individually signed by the user when registering the corresponding key/value pair with the blockchain, as previously described. For example, each field (e.g., DOB, address, name, height, weight, etc.) of the PII contained in a driver's license of a DMV 365 is registered with a blockchain. Further, certification of the partial Seal data registration is also possible at 382.
  • each of the fields of the PII (e.g., as presented through a university ID, driver's license, etc.) is separately certifiable, such that each field (e.g., name, DOB, address, image, etc.) has a corresponding certification.
  • each registration and corresponding field is signed by the certifying entity to generate a corresponding certification record of the field, as previously described.
  • the certifications may be partially submitted at 386.
  • the individual 360 may wish to only present raw data of a photo ID and a DOB, along with the corresponding
  • the bar 370 can verify each of the following is true, as previously described (e.g., verification/validation of the data, and verification of the certification). For example, at 391 the bar 370 can verify the person through a visual inspection. In addition, at 392, the bar 370 is able to verify the DMV identity using a corresponding DMV ID and a corresponding certification. Further, at 393 the bar 370 can verify the particular fields of information, such as DOB and photo ID using the corresponding fields of information and corresponding certifications. At 395, once the data has been verified through corresponding certifications, the data presented by the individual 360 may be accepted by the bar 370.
  • the certification process can be further strengthened through the application of a salt value when generating the certification record, in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • a user may wish to keep corresponding certifications issued by one or more certifying entities on behalf of the user (e.g., wherein the certification may be used to log into a web site of a corresponding certifying entity) private.
  • the user may have been issued a certification from a luxury service provider.
  • the user may wish to keep that association private so that an inference that the user is wealth is made.
  • the user may been issued a certification with a particular political organization.
  • the user may wish to keep that association also private so that his or her political views are not discoverable.
  • certifications may be discoverable through brute force processes. For example, if a hacker obtains the user PII (e.g., driver's license) that potentially may be used for creating a
  • the hacker may use various combinations of the PII data, hashes of those combinations using appropriate hash algorithms, and public keys of all the certifying entities of interest to discover matches. Once a match is discovered, that validates the certification, and an association may be made between the user and the corresponding certifying entity.
  • Application of a salt value to a corresponding certification would ensure that the certification is obfuscated from discovery, such as through a brute force discovery process. This is because the salt value is virtually impossible to discover without disclosure from a holder of the salt value.
  • FIG. 4A shows a simplified block diagram for a certification method for managing the identity of a user in a public storage facility 428, wherein the certification is further obfuscated using a salt, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • an identification card 402 may be used. In other embodiments, other forms of identification, which may be digital or non-digital may be used.
  • personal data 404 is contained thereon, which identifies the user.
  • the input data can include a photo 406 of the user; the user's name, address and driver license number 408, and/or a bar code 410 or similar computer code for storing, scanning and/or retrieving additional data.
  • Such coding can include PDF417 codes, QR codes, and other such codes.
  • the identification card 402 may also take a physical or a digital form and the information can be retrieved either through scanning a code as described, performing Optical Character Recognition (OCR) on text strings, digitally transferring a digital identification card from one system to another, manually inputting the information using a keyboard, manually inputting the information using voice recognition, etc., in example embodiments.
  • OCR Optical Character Recognition
  • the identification card 402 can be a government issued form of identification such as a driver license, passport, employee badge, military identification, political documentation, or the like.
  • the identification card 402 can also be a privately issued form of identification such as a student ID, library card, social club card, or any other form of identification issued by a third party.
  • an input device 412 may be used to input such personal data from the identification card 402 to provide input data.
  • Input device 412 can take many forms.
  • input device 412 can be a digital scanner, digital camera, or smartphone (e.g., with the camera commonly found in smartphones) for reading data from the identification card 402, including any codes appearing on the card 402.
  • the input device 412 can also be a device for manually inputting personal data such as a keyboard, touchscreen, voice recognition device, handwriting recognition device, or other manual input device.
  • the input data can be optionally encrypted by encryption logic 418 and securely stored.
  • the input data is transferred directly to hashing logic 420, without passing through encryption logic 418.
  • hashing logic 420 For ease of understanding, the operations of the optional encryption logic 418 will be discussed first, and then the operations processed by the hashing logic 420. As such, the process may proceed directly from receiving the user information via 412 to the hashing logic 420.
  • encryption logic 418 might include software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof, and consist of one or more encryption algorithms, e.g., an RSA encryption algorithm.
  • Encryption logic 418 encrypts the input data with a public key to provide encrypted data.
  • the public key is paired with an associated private key as is conventional when generating such keys using an RSA encryption algorithm, an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), or other encryption algorithm known to those skilled in the art.
  • EDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
  • the private key of the user on the input device 412 can then only be accessed with the private key of the user on the input device 412, which might be stored in a more secure part of input device 412, e.g., "the Keychain", if input device 412 is an iOS (e.g., operating system used by devices made by Apple, Inc.) smartphone. If the device is of a different type, e.g., one using an Android OS (e.g., operating system by Google, Inc.), similar secure device storage methods may be used. In this manner, for added security, the private key is not compromised and is kept safely on the input device 412. It should be understood that the private key may be stored on another device, but similar or additional security should be processed to ensure that the private key is not compromised.
  • iOS e.g., operating system used by devices made by Apple, Inc.
  • Android OS e.g., operating system by Google, Inc.
  • similar secure device storage methods may be used. In this manner, for added security, the private key is not compromised and is kept
  • the operations to be performed by the hashing logic 420 can proceed directly after receiving the input data from the input device 412.
  • the hashing logic 420 is used for hashing the input data (or selected fields of the input data or personal data) to provide or generate a hash value.
  • the hash value is sometimes referred to as "hash data," that is generated by an algorithm.
  • hashing logic 420 might be software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof, and consist of one or more hashing algorithms, e.g., a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) algorithm.
  • SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
  • Hashing logic 420 passes the hash value to digital- signature logic 421, which performs a digital signature on the hash value, using the private key on the input device 412.
  • digital-signature logic 421 might be a component (or module) of encryption logic 418.
  • the digital- signature logic 421 may be defined by separate code, firmware, and/or hardware.
  • the digital-signature logic 421 then passes the signed hash value and the public key to a user accessible interface 426 (e.g., a graphical user interface or GUI), which might be other software running on the input device 412.
  • a user accessible interface 426 e.g., a graphical user interface or GUI
  • the user accessible interface 426 might be part of an application or app that includes encryption logic 418, hashing logic 420, and digital- signature logic 421, and/or other modules or code.
  • the user accessible interface 426 might be used by the user to transmit the digitally signed hash value and, optionally, the public key to a public storage facility 428 via a line 430, and receive back from the public storage facility 428 a transaction number 432 corresponding to the transmitted hash value and public key.
  • the public storage facility 428 can take the form of a block chain (e.g., in a bitcoin online payment system) or any other public or private distributed database.
  • the public storage facility 428 is connected to a communication link via a line and can be adapted to communicate over a public computer network, the internet, an intranet, an extranet, or any private communication network.
  • the public storage facility 428 is accessible by any device that has an Internet connection over a network.
  • the input data (or selected fields of the input data) might be hashed and the resulting hash value might be signed with a digital signature, created using a private key paired with a public key, before transmission, along with, optionally, the public key, from the input device (e.g., a user's smartphone) 412 to the public storage facility 428 for storage.
  • the user accessible interface 426 is thus adapted to "seal" the signed hash value and the public key in the public storage facility 428.
  • a later verification may be made if another party is able to hash the same input data.
  • the user accessible interface 426 (e.g., a GUI) can be controllable by the user of the input device 412 to encrypt and provide the transaction number 432, the input data (or selected fields of the input data), and, optionally, the public key to an input device 442 (e.g., a
  • the encryption might be performed by the encryption logic 418 using a public key of a certifier paired with a private key of the certifier.
  • coding logic on the input device 412 might code the encrypted transaction number 432, the input data (or selected fields of the input data), and, optionally, the public key into a barcode or QR code and the certifier might use input device 442 to scan the barcode or QR code and decode it to gain access to the encrypted items.
  • the certifier might decrypt the encrypted items using the private key of the certifier and verify them, e.g., using a "verify" function call to an RSA algorithm as explained in further detail below.
  • decoding logic on the certifier's input device 412 might decode the barcode or QR code and decryption logic 470 on the certifier's input device 442 might use the certifier's private key to decrypt the encrypted items.
  • decryption logic 470 might be a component (or module) of more general encryption logic.
  • the decrypted input data (or selected fields of the input data) and the salt might be hashed into a hash value by hashing logic 472 on the certifier's input device 442, using the same hashing algorithm that was used to create the hash value that was digitally signed by the user.
  • the decrypted transaction number 432 might be used by a user accessible interface 480 (e.g., a GUI) to access the public storage facility 428 (e.g., the block chain) and retrieve the signed hash value and public key of the user.
  • verifying logic 473 might be a component (or module) of decryption logic 470. In another embodiment, the verifying logic 473 may be a separate module, software, firmware and/or hardware.
  • the public key of the user might be obtained from some other source than the public storage facility 428 (e.g., from the user), in an example embodiment.
  • Figure 4B-l shows how a digitally signed hash value is created from input data.
  • the input data (or selected fields of the input data) is hashed into a hash value "ABC" by hashing logic 420 on the user's input device 112, in operation 1.
  • the hash value "ABC” is digitally signed with the user's private key using digital-signature logic 121 to create digitally signed hash value "XYZ", in operation 2.
  • Figure 4B-2 shows how a digitally signed hash value is verified after being retrieved along with the public key of the user from the public storage facility 428.
  • the input data (or selected fields of the input data) is received from the user's input device 412 at the certifier's input device 442 and is hashed into a generated hash value "ABC” using hashing logic 472, in operation 3.
  • the signed hash value "XYZ”, the generated hash value "ABC” and the user's public key are input to verification logic 473 in operation 4.
  • the verification logic 473 might include a RSA verification algorithm, in an example embodiment.
  • the verification logic 473 If the hash value in the digitally signed hash value "XYZ" is the same as the generated hash value "ABC" and the digital signature was signed with a private key that is associated with the user's public key, the verification logic 473 returns a value of "true”. Otherwise the verification logic 473 returns a value of "false”. It should be understood that the verification logic 473 may be executed on any device (e.g., a user's device, a certifier's device, a verifier's device, a third party's device, a commercial entity's device, a private entity's device, etc.), that needs to perform a verification operation.
  • a user's device e.g., a user's device, a certifier's device, a verifier's device, a third party's device, a commercial entity's device, a private entity's device, etc.
  • the certifier Upon receipt of a "true" value from encryption logic 470, the certifier might create a certification record that refers to the verification.
  • the certification record might include the transaction number 432, the input data (or selected fields of the input data) received from the user, and, optionally, a timestamp.
  • a salt value may also be included.
  • a salt generator 471 generates a salt value, and combines the above information (e.g., transaction number 432, the input data - or selected fields of the input data - received from the user, and, optionally, a timestamp) with the salt value when generating the certification record.
  • the salt value may be appended to the data, or added to the data, or concatenated with the data, etc.
  • the salt value or salt may be unique value, such as a random number generated by a random number generator.
  • the certification record (including the salt value) might be hashed and digitally signed by the certifier using a private key of the certifier associated with a public key. Then the certifier might use user accessible interface 480 (e.g., a GUI) to transmit the signed certification record to the public storage facility 428 for storage and receive in return transaction number 482 from the public storage facility 428. In an example embodiment, the certifier might encrypt the certification record with the certifier's public key before transmission to the public storage facility 428, in order to keep the certification record private.
  • user accessible interface 480 e.g., a GUI
  • the verification process shown in Figures 4B-1 and 4B-2 might be used to verify the digital signature on items of data other than the input data (or selected fields of the input data) received by input device 412.
  • the item of data that is digitally signed might not be hashed before being digitally signed.
  • the verification process shown in Figures 4B-1 and 4B-2 might be used to verify a digitally- signed hash of a document other than an identification card, e.g., a digitally- signed certification as described above or a digitally- signed acknowledgement as described below.
  • the same verification process might be used to verify a digitally- signed token (e.g., random number) that is sent by a sender using a secure-envelope process.
  • a secure-envelope process as described below, might be used instead of, or in addition to, public-key encryption when transmitting data from a user to a certifier, verifier, third party, etc., and vice versa.
  • a sender when using a secure envelope process, might hash a real-time token (e.g., a random number generated by the user's remote device) and digitally sign the hashed token using the sender's private key.
  • a timestamp might be optionally included with the token.
  • the sender might transmit the signed hashed token and, optionally, the public key associated with the sender's private key to a distributed public database for storage, receiving a transaction number in return from the distributed public database.
  • the sender might transmit the transaction number and the token to a receiver, e.g., a certifier, a verifier, a third party, etc., optionally, after encrypting the transaction number and the token with the receiver's public key.
  • a receiver e.g., a certifier, a verifier, a third party, etc.
  • the receiver might receive the transaction number and token (optionally including the timestamp), decrypt them using the receiver's private key, if necessary, and then use the transaction number to retrieve the digitally signed hashed and, optionally, the sender's public key from the distributed public database.
  • the receiver might generate a hash of the token using the same hashing algorithm the sender used.
  • the receiver might verify, e.g., using an RSA verify call as described above, that the token in the generated hash is the same as the token in the digitally signed hash token and verify that the digital signature was created with the sender's private key.
  • An RSA verify call may be, for example, processed by verifying logic 473, e.g., to execute a verify operation.
  • the token (optionally including the timestamp) might not be hashed before being signed.
  • the certifier might encrypt the certification record and transaction number 482 (e.g., the transaction number the certifier received from the public storage facility 428) with the user's public key and transmit in 481 the encrypted certification record to the user, using user accessible interface 480 (e.g., a GUI).
  • user accessible interface 480 e.g., a GUI
  • the user Upon receiving the encrypted certification record, the user might decrypt it using the user's private key.
  • the salt value may be included in the certification record, and as such upon decryption, the user is aware of the salt value.
  • the user may create an acknowledgement record that refers to or includes the certification record, and optionally includes a timestamp, in order to link the two records in the public storage facility 428 to facilitate convenient lookup by a third party, if the certification record is verified.
  • the user might hash the certification record (including the salt value) using the same hashing algorithm that the certifier used prior to digital signature by the certifier.
  • the user might use transaction number 482 to retrieve the signed certification record and the certifier's public key from the public storage facility 428.
  • the user might verify that the certification record in the generated hash is the same as the certification record in the digitally signed certification record and verify that the digital signature was created with the certifier's private key, e.g., using an RSA verify call as described above.
  • the acknowledgement record might include the certification record, the transaction number 482, and optionally, a timestamp, and the user might digitally sign the acknowledgement record with the user's private key. Then the user might use user accessible interface 428 (e.g., a GUI) to transmit the signed acknowledgement record and the user's public key to the public storage facility 428 for storage and receive a transaction number 429 in response from the public storage facility 428. In an example embodiment, the user might encrypt the signed acknowledgement record with the user's public key before transmission to the public storage facility 428 in order to keep the acknowledgement record private.
  • user accessible interface 428 e.g., a GUI
  • FIG. 5A is a diagram of the generation of a certification record from data taken as a whole, and the application of a salt value to the certification record, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the certification record may be further obfuscated from discovery, such as through brute force, dictionary, and other discovery tactics on the signed data.
  • a certifying entity generates a certification record of data, wherein the data was previously registered to a blockchain.
  • the data may be PII, such as that obtained from a government agency ID card (e.g., driver's license).
  • the combined data 505 may include the PII and other optional data (e.g., the registration tx-ID of the PII on the blockchain).
  • Block 510 creates a JSON string 515 from the combined data 505, in one embodiment, though other types of data strings may be used in other embodiments.
  • JSON string 515 may include a universal unique identifier (e.g., registration tx-ID that is generated by the client), a timestamp representing the time the record was created, and other data, in one embodiment.
  • the JSON string 515 and a unique salt value 521 are combined (e.g., appended to, concatenated, added, etc.) and hashed using a hash algorithm 520 (e.g., SHA256) to generate a hashed value 525 (that includes the salt value). Thereafter the hashed value 525 is signed with the private key 531 of the certifying entity to generate a signed value 535.
  • the signed value may comprise or form part of a certification record 537 that may be stored to a blockchain.
  • a holder of the certification record along with the corresponding salt value may present and/or share both pieces of information to a third party.
  • the third party may perform a verification process to verify the original data (also presented) that was certified by performing a signature verification process, as previously described.
  • the data obtained from the input data (e.g., the PII from the driver's license) is treated as a whole unit of data. That is, in one embodiment, in order to ensure the consistency and ownership of the data, certifying entities may be configured to sign the entire certification string when generating a corresponding certification record. That is, the certification record is signed and can be used to verify the original data that has been certified. In this manner, the certifying entity is able to prove the ownership of the entire string, and to ensure that the certification record has not been tampered with.
  • FIG. 5B is a diagram of the generation of a plurality of certification records from data that is parsed into multiple fields, and the application of corresponding salt values to the certification records, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • each of the certification records corresponding to fields may be further obfuscated from discovery, such as through brute force discovery tactics.
  • each certification record corresponds to a data field (e.g., obtained from a map of key/value pairs) representing unsolicited data being certified.
  • Each key/value pair may be signed by a certifying entity to generate a corresponding certificate record, which can be used to verify the original data.
  • a certifying entity generates a plurality of certification records of data based on the fields.
  • Each of the fields of the data was previously registered to a blockchain, and as such a plurality of registrations (e.g., corresponding registration tx-IDs) were generated.
  • the fields of data may be independent pieces of PII, such as that obtained from a government agency ID card (e.g., driver's license). Examples of fields are provided, to include: name, address, phone number, height, weight, photo ID, etc.
  • combined data may include the field of the PII and other optional data (e.g., the registration tx-ID of the corresponding PII field on the blockchain).
  • the combined data 505a may include field- 1 and other optional data (e.g., the registration tx-ID of the PII field- 1 on the blockchain).
  • Block 510 creates a JSON string 515a from the combined data 505a.
  • the JSON string 515a and a unique salt value 521a are combined (e.g., appended to, concatenated, added, etc.) and hashed using a hash algorithm 520 (e.g., SHA256) to generate a hashed value 525a (that includes the salt value 521a).
  • a hash algorithm 520 e.g., SHA256
  • the hashed value 525a is signed with the private key 531 of the certifying entity to generate a signed value 535a.
  • the signed value 535a may comprise or form part of a certification record 537a for PII field- 1 that may be stored to a blockchain.
  • Block 510 creates a JSON string 515n from the combined data 505n.
  • the JSON string 515n and a unique salt value 521n are combined (e.g., appended to, concatenated, added, etc.) and hashed using a hash algorithm 520 (e.g., SHA256) to generate a hashed value 525n (that includes the salt value 52 In).
  • a hash algorithm 520 e.g., SHA256
  • the hashed value 525n is signed with the private key 531 of the certifying entity to generate a signed value 535n.
  • the signed value 535n may comprise or form part of a certification record 537n for PII field-N that may be stored to a blockchain.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates the use of salt values to generate compensation for downstream certifications, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • a first certifying entity 650 may wish to leverage the use of generated salt values to control the dissemination of corresponding certification records.
  • the first certifying entity 650 generates a certification record 601, wherein a salt value 615 was used to obfuscate the certification record 601.
  • the certification record 601 was generated at the request of the user 655.
  • the user 655 may present the original data (e.g., PII, field of PII, etc.) that was registered (e.g., registration tx-ID) to the first certifying entity 650 for certification.
  • the certification record 605 may be stored to a blockchain, and a certification tx-ID 605 is returned.
  • the certification tx-ID 605 may be the certification or form part of the certification of the original data, in one embodiment.
  • the first certifying entity may present the certification to the user, such as in the form of the certification tx-ID 605.
  • the user 655 may present the certification along with the original data to a third party for verification of the original data based on the
  • the user 655 may present the original data and the certification tx-ID 605 to a second certifying entity 660, for purposes of obtaining a second certification.
  • the original data was previously certified (e.g., certification tx-ID) by the first certifying entity 650.
  • the certification record 601 stored to the blockchain was generated using a salt value for added security.
  • the second certifying entity 660 may fully verify the certification record 601 only if given the salt value 615.
  • the second verifying entity is able to then verify the certification record 601 using the methods previously described.
  • the second certifying entity 660 may take full advantage of the work and cost of the first certifying entity 650 when originally certifying the original data (e.g., verification/validation and certification).
  • the second certifying entity 660 may generate a second certification based on the first certification, with minimal cost to the second certifying entity 660.
  • the cost for certification is fully borne by the first certifying entity 650.
  • the cost may be significant depending on the type of data being certified. For example, the certification process may take anywhere from 5 minutes to 2 days, with an associated ramp in cost.
  • the salt value 615 is not freely disseminated.
  • the certifying entity may leverage the salt value 615 in order to obtain compensation for its release. Without the salt value 615, the second certifying entity 660 cannot verify the certification record 601. Because the first certifying entity 650 controls the salt value 615, the second certifying entity 660 sends a request 610 to the first certifying entity 650 for the salt value 615.
  • the request 610 includes compensation in return for the salt value 615.
  • the compensation may be in the form of a cryptocurrency, such as one associated with an initial coin offering (ICO).
  • ICO initial coin offering
  • the first certifying entity 650 sends the salt value 615 back to the second certifying entity 660.
  • the second certifying entity can verify the certification record 601 along with the original data.
  • the overall cost to certify the original data is borne across one or more certifying entities'. Further, revenue may be further generated from the certification of the original data through downstream certification entities.
  • One or more ledgers may be used to publish and verify seals (e.g., registrations of data) and certifications.
  • the ledgers e.g., blockchains
  • the ledgers may be public or private.
  • publication may be made to a ledger with unlimited data storage.
  • the compete seal and certification records may be published in the ledger, and may include for example, data, signature, public keys, timestamps, user ID (e.g., ShoCard ID) of the originator (e.g., registration of the user with the identity manager), and a hash of the data.
  • publication is made to ledgers with limited data storage.
  • data signature
  • public key public key
  • timestamp timestamp
  • ShoCardID hash
  • publication is made to ledgers with very limited data storage. In that case, size limitation only allow extremely low amount of data to be preserved. As such, embodiments of the invention publish a hash that consists of a limited set of parameters, such as a signature and a timestamp.
  • publication is made to multiple ledgers, including a first ledger (e.g., private or public blockchain) and a sidechain (e.g., public or private blockchain). For example, FIG.
  • FIG. 7 illustrates the use of a one or more public ledgers to publish and verify seals (e.g., registrations) and certifications to one or more private and/or public ledgers (e.g., blockchains), in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • a public blockchain 720 is used in combination with a side chain 710.
  • the blockchain 720 may be public or private. For instance, many banks use a permission based blockchain, which is a form of a private blockchain. Public blockchains are open sourced, and include Bitcoin blockchain, Ethereum, etc.
  • the side chain 710 may be a private chain or a public chain (e.g., private turned into a public blockchain). The side chain 710 may not be as popular or as widely distributed as major blockchains, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.
  • the certification data block includes collectively one associated group of data, such as the different fields of a PII of a single user.
  • the certification record may include one or more of hashes of the combination of fields and salts that are signed. For instance, one entry may include a signature of a first hash of a combination of a first field and first salt value, and a second entry may include a signature of a second hash of a combination of second field and a second value, and so on.
  • the certification record may include one or more entries of signatures of combinations of hashed fields combined with corresponding salts.
  • the hash of the certification record is written to a public blockchain, in one embodiment.
  • the public blockchain may be a Bitcoin blockchain, or any other suitable blockchain.
  • the hash of the certification record may be written to a private blockchain in some embodiments.
  • the transaction ID of the hash of the certiciation record stored on the public blochain is received from the public blockchain.
  • the transaction ID may be named— Txn_ID_Pub.
  • the transaction ID (e.g., Txn_ID_Pub) is appended to the end of the certification record.
  • this combination of the data, including the certification record, the hash of the certification record, and the appended transaction ID (e.g., Txn_ID_Pub) is collectively called the "Certification Data Block.”
  • the Certification Data Block is written to the side chain 710, and includes the transaction ID (e.g., Txn_ID_Pub).
  • the side chain 710 generates a new transaction ID (e.g., Txn_ID_Side) that has a reference to the hash of its data on the public blockchain (e.g., transaction ID— Txn_ID_Pub).
  • FIG. 8 illustrates the use of a one or more public ledgers to publish and verify multiple seals (e.g., registrations) and/or multiple certifications to one or more private and/or public ledgers (e.g., blockchains), in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • a public blockchain 820 is used in combination with a side chain 810.
  • the blockchain 820 may be public or private. For instance, many banks use a permission based blockchain, which is a form of a private blockchain. Public blockchains are open sourced, and include Bitcoin blockchain, Ethereum, etc.
  • the side chain 810 may be a private chain or a public chain (e.g., private turned into a public blockchain). The side chain 810 may not be as popular or as widely distributed as major blockchains, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.
  • each certification data block 1-N may be associated with different fields of a corresponding PII of a corresponding user, for example.
  • the Certification Record Data Block 1 includes a certification record of one or more of hashes of the combination of fields and salts that are signed.
  • the certification record may be associated with user 1. For instance, one entry may include a signature of a first hash of a combination of a first field and first salt value, and a second entry may include a signature of a second hash of a combination of second field and a second value, and so on.
  • the Certification Record Data Block 2 includes a certification record of one or more of hashes of the combination of fields and salts that are signed.
  • the certification record may be associated with user 2.
  • the threshold may be a maximum number, in one embodiment.
  • the threshold may be a period of time, such as 5 minutes, or 10 minutes, after which the collected Certification Data Blocks are gathered and collected. For example, when N records are written to the Box Car Hash List, or when a timer expires (e.g., every 10 minutes), then the box-car is considered to be full.
  • corresponding Certification Data Blocks are generated.
  • a hash is created for the corresponding certification record.
  • For Certification Data Block 1 a "Hash 1 (Certification Record)" is generated; for Certification Data Block 2, a “Hash2(Certification Record)” ... and for Certification Data Block N, a "HashN(Certification Record)”.
  • the hash of the corresponding certification record is added to the Box Car Record. Further, the BoxCar ID (e.g., BoxCar_ID_X) is appended to each of the Certification Data Blocks 1-N. [00118] Each of the competed Certification Data Blocks 1-N are then written to the side chain 710. In some embodiments, more than one side chain is used. For example, one side chain may be used for Certification Data Blocks, and another side chain used for Box Car Records.
  • HashBoxCar (HashList) is written to the public blockchain 720.
  • a transaction ID of that operation is returned (e.g., Txn_ID_Pub). This value is written to the end of the Box Car Record. That is, the HashList is also hashed (e.g., HashBoxCar), and stored to the blockchain 720 and the Box Car Record.
  • FIG. 9 illustrates the further obfuscation of a certification data block, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the certification data block 910a has keys in clear text. For example, if a certifying entity uses a particular unique key that is in clear text, hackers can look, using brute- force, through all certification records looking for those key matches and using that, they may be able to identify who the certifier is. However, to provide further security these keys cannot be in clear text.
  • the certification data block 910b has keys that are obfuscated. By obfuscating these records, only the certification records and keys that are desired can be discovered and only when a user explicitly shares the key plus the salt value for the keys.
  • FIG. 10A is a diagram illustrating a system 1000A for performing registration, verification, validation, and certification of data of a user 5, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • user 5 is associated with one or more electronic devices, such as client device 1010 and device 1011.
  • Client device 1010 may include a web browser configurable for communication over a network 1050, such as the internet.
  • client device 1010 and/or device 1011 may allow a user 5 to register data of a user.
  • Client device 1010 and device 1011 can be any type of computing device having at least a memory 1104 and a processor module 1130 that is capable of connecting to the network 1050.
  • Some examples of client device 100 include a personal computer (PC), a game console, a home theater device, a general purpose computer, mobile computing device, a tablet, a phone, or any other types of computing devices.
  • Identity manager 1030 includes any type of computing device having at least a memory 1104 and a processor module 1130 that is capable of connecting to the network 1050.
  • Data store 1035 may be controlled and/or accessible by identity manager 330.
  • Data store 1035 may be a public or private blockchain.
  • identity manager 330 may be used, in part, to implement technology to perform registration, validation, and/or certification of raw data, as previously introduced.
  • Certifying entity 1020 may be configured for certifying the raw data that was previously registered to the blockchain. Certifying entity may include any type of computing device having at least a memory 1104 and a processor module 1130 that is capable of connecting to the network 1050. Data store 1025 may be controlled and/or accessible by certifying entity 1020. For example, data store 1025 may be a public or private blockchain.
  • Certifying entity 1020 may be configured to provide information and/or services over network 1050.
  • certifying entity 1020 may be used, in part, to implement technology to perform registration, validation, and/or certification of raw data, as previously introduced.
  • One or more certifying entities may be similarly configured as certifying entity 1020, each of which may be implemented to perform registration, validation, and/or certification of raw data.
  • a data store 1060 may be configured for storing registration and/or certification data. Data store 1060 may be controlled and/or accessible by one or more certifying entities, such as certifying entity 1020.
  • data store 1025 may be a public or private blockchain.
  • FIG. 10B is a flow diagram 1000B illustrating steps in a method for certification, wherein the certification is performed using a salt value to obfuscate the certification, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the method outlined in FIG. 10B may be performed by one or more of the entities described in this specification.
  • the method in flow diagram 1000B is performed by a certifying entity, as previously introduced throughout the specification.
  • the method includes receiving data of a user at a certification device of a certifying entity.
  • the data may be PII, such as that collected from a government issued ID card (e.g., driver's license, passport, etc.).
  • the data was previously registered through a blockchain, and as such a registration tx-ID was generated.
  • the method includes receiving the registration tx-ID of the data.
  • the registration tx-ID is generated from a blockchain in response to receiving and storing a signed hash value of the data for registration.
  • the signed hash value is signed using a private key of the user.
  • the hash value of the data was generated using a registration hash algorithm.
  • the method includes generating a salt that is unique.
  • the salt value may be a randomly generated number, such as that generated through a random number generator.
  • the salt value provides additional security for the resulting certification record.
  • the method includes hashing the data that is combined with the salt value using a certification hash algorithm to create a generated hashed data. This may be performed after the verification of the data is performed using original data newly submitted, a public key of the user, and the record on the blockchain (e.g., the original data signed with the user's private key). In that manner, once the data is verified through its corresponding registration, the certifying entity may choose to certify the data.
  • the method includes signing the generated hashed data (as generated using the salt) using a private key of the certifying entity to create a signed certification of the data. This value may form all or part of the certification record, wherein at 1051, the method includes transmitting the signed certification of the data to a blockchain for storing. In return, at 1053 the method includes receiving a certification tx-ID of the signed certification of the data. As such, a holder of the certification (e.g., certification tx-ID), along with the original data, and salt value, may present such for verification of the original data, based on the certification.
  • a holder of the certification e.g., certification tx-ID
  • salt value may present such for verification of the original data, based on the certification.
  • FIG. 11 illustrates components of an example device that can be used to perform aspects of the various embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 11 illustrates an exemplary hardware system suitable for implementing a device in accordance with one embodiment.
  • This block diagram illustrates a computer system 1100, such as a personal computer, video game console, personal digital assistant, or other digital device, suitable for practicing an embodiment of the invention.
  • Computer system 1100 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 1102 for running software applications and optionally an operating system.
  • CPU 1102 may be comprised of one or more homogeneous or heterogeneous processing cores.
  • CPU 1102 is one or more general-purpose microprocessors having one or more processing cores. Further embodiments can be
  • CPU 1130 may be configured to include a certification engine 1141 configured for performing certification of data previously registered to a block chain, a verification engine 1142 for performing verification logic (e.g., verifying data that is signed, registered, and/or certified), a scanning engine 1143 configured for scanning codes (e.g., QR code, scan code, PDF417 code, etc.), an
  • encryption/decryption engine 1144 configured for encrypting and decrypting data using a public/private key pair
  • a hashing engine 1145 configured for hashing data using any one of a number of well known hashing algorithms
  • a signing engine 1146 configured for creating a digital signature using a private key
  • a handle generator 1147 configured for generating a session ID or envelope ID
  • a scan code generator 1148 for generating a scannable code (e.g., QR code, scan code, PDF417 code, etc.)
  • an a comparator or matching engine 1149 configured for comparing newly captured biometric data and original biometric data.
  • Memory 1104 stores applications and data for use by the CPU 1102.
  • Storage 1106 provides non- volatile storage and other computer readable media for applications and data and may include fixed disk drives, removable disk drives, flash memory devices, and CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, Blu-ray, HD-DVD, or other optical storage devices, as well as signal transmission and storage media.
  • User input devices 1108 communicate user inputs from one or more users to the computer system 1100, examples of which may include keyboards, mice, joysticks, touch pads, touch screens, still or video cameras, and/or microphones.
  • Network interface 1110 allows computer system 1100 to communicate with other computer systems via an electronic communications network, and may include wired or wireless communication over local area networks and wide area networks such as the Internet.
  • An audio processor 1112 is adapted to generate analog or digital audio output from instructions and/or data provided by the CPU 1102, memory 1104, and/or storage 1106.
  • the components of computer system 1100, including CPU 1102, memory 1104, data storage 1106, user input devices 1108, network interface 1110, and audio processor 1112 are connected via one or more data buses 1122
  • a graphics subsystem 1114 is further connected with data bus 1122 and the components of the computer system 1100.
  • the graphics subsystem 1114 includes a graphics processing unit (GPU) 1116 and graphics memory 1118.
  • Graphics memory 1118 includes a display memory (e.g., a frame buffer) used for storing pixel data for each pixel of an output image.
  • Graphics memory 1118 can be integrated in the same device as GPU 1116, connected as a separate device with GPU 1116, and/or implemented within memory 1104. Pixel data can be provided to graphics memory 1118 directly from the CPU 1102.
  • CPU 1102 provides the GPU 1116 with data and/or instructions defining the desired output images, from which the GPU 1116 generates the pixel data of one or more output images.
  • the data and/or instructions defining the desired output images can be stored in memory 1104 and/or graphics memory 1118.
  • the GPU 1116 includes 3D rendering capabilities for generating pixel data for output images from instructions and data defining the geometry, lighting, shading, texturing, motion, and/or camera parameters for a scene.
  • the GPU 1116 can further include one or more programmable execution units capable of executing shader programs.
  • the graphics subsystem 1114 periodically outputs pixel data for an image from graphics memory 1118 to be displayed on display device 1122.
  • Display device 1122 can be any device capable of displaying visual information in response to a signal from the computer system 1100, including CRT, LCD, plasma, and OLED displays.
  • Computer system 1100 can provide the display device 1122 with an analog or digital signal.
  • embodiments of the present invention may be practiced with various computer system configurations including hand-held devices, microprocessor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, minicomputers, mainframe computers and the like.
  • the invention can also be practiced in distributed computing
  • any of the operations described herein that form part of the invention are useful machine operations.
  • the invention also relates to a device or an apparatus for performing these operations.
  • the apparatus can be specially constructed for the required purpose, or the apparatus can be a general-purpose computer selectively activated or configured by a computer program stored in the computer.
  • various general-purpose machines can be used with computer programs written in accordance with the teachings herein, or it may be more convenient to construct a more specialized apparatus to perform the required operations
  • the disclosure can employ various computer-implemented operations involving data stored in computer systems. These operations are those requiring physical manipulation of physical quantities. Any of the operations described herein that form part of the disclosure are useful machine operations.
  • the disclosure also relates to a device or an apparatus for performing these operations.
  • the apparatus can be specially constructed for the required purpose, or the apparatus can be a general-purpose computer selectively activated or configured by a computer program stored in the computer.
  • various general-purpose machines can be used with computer programs written in accordance with the teachings herein, or it may be more convenient to construct a more specialized apparatus to perform the required operations.
  • One or more embodiments can also be fabricated as computer readable code on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium.
  • the non-transitory computer readable storage medium is any non-transitory data storage device that can store data, which can be thereafter be read by a computer system. Examples of the non-transitory computer readable storage medium include hard drives, network attached storage (NAS), read-only memory, random-access memory, CD-ROMs, CD-Rs, CD-RWs, magnetic tapes and other optical and non-optical data storage devices.
  • the non-transitory computer readable storage medium can include computer readable storage medium distributed over a network-coupled computer system so that the computer readable code is stored and executed in a distributed fashion.

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Abstract

Le procédé de certification comprend la réception de données d'utilisateur au niveau d'un dispositif de certification d'une entité de certification, et la réception d'un identifiant tx-ID d'enregistrement des données, l'identifiant tx-ID d'enregistrement étant généré à partir d'une chaîne de blocs lors de la réception et du stockage d'une valeur de hachage signée des données pour un enregistrement signé à l'aide d'une clé privée de l'utilisateur, la valeur de hachage des données étant générée à l'aide d'un algorithme de hachage d'enregistrement. Le procédé comprend la génération d'un sel qui est unique. Le procédé comprend le hachage des données en combinaison avec le sel pour créer des données hachées générées. Le procédé comprend la signature des données hachées générées à l'aide d'une clé privée de l'entité de certification pour créer une certification signée des données. Le procédé comprend la transmission de la certification signée des données à une chaîne de blocs en vue de son stockage. Le procédé comprend la réception d'un identifiant tx-ID de certification de la certification signée des données.
PCT/US2018/017136 2017-02-06 2018-02-06 Procédés et systèmes de vérification d'une identification électronique avec stockage d'enregistrements de certification sur une chaîne latérale WO2018145127A1 (fr)

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