WO2018088475A1

WO2018088475A1 - Electronic authentication method and program

Info

Publication number: WO2018088475A1
Application number: PCT/JP2017/040432
Authority: WO
Inventors: 誠武宮; 岡田　隆; 武至米津
Original assignee: ソラミツ株式会社
Priority date: 2016-11-09
Filing date: 2017-11-09
Publication date: 2018-05-17
Also published as: JP7114078B2; JPWO2018088475A1

Abstract

The purpose of the present invention is to provide a technology for simply and quickly executing electronic authentication. According to the present invention, a plurality of computers communicable with one another over a network serve as authentication stations, and the computers cooperate in certifying whether an individual or an organization has a valid record showing that the identity was authenticated. Therefore, the authentication stations have fault tolerance of being able to continuously operate as a whole even if some of the computers are down, so that timely electronic authentication can be executed at any time. Each of the computers stores and manages completely the same history data indicating whether an identity was confirmed, whether or not the contents of the data have been changed, and the like, and a state in which the data is matched among the computers is held. Only when agreement is built by the plurality of computers, registration of identity confirmation as valid data is allowed. Accordingly, the registered data can be used as reliable identity authentication information about a user.

Description

Electronic authentication method and program

The present invention relates to electronic authentication, particularly when an individual or an organization that has been verified in relation to one operator requires authentication for identification in relation to another operator. The present invention relates to a technique used for authentication of identity verification for another operator by using the fact that has been verified in relation to one operator.

Conventionally, when an individual opens an account at a financial institution such as a bank or a securities company, or when purchasing goods or services from an internet company via the Internet, the individual including at least name, address, date of birth, etc. Information and its certificate are required. If this personal information is abused, it not only leads to privacy infringement, but there is also a possibility of economic loss, so many companies treat it as confidential information. For example, when an individual X provides personal information and a certificate showing identification to Bank A to open an account at Bank A, and then opens an account at Bank B, the personal information and certificate are the same. Need to provide. Therefore, it has been troublesome for individuals to carry out identity verification procedures for each financial institution.

In recent years, electronic authentication is becoming popular for certificates. There are concerns about the exchange of information on the Internet, such as who the other party is, whether another person is impersonating, and whether the information exchanged can be trusted. An effective means for preventing spoofing and falsification of information using an electronic certificate issued by an electronic certificate authority is an electronic authentication technique. For example, in many prefectures, public personal authentication services are already available for various administrative procedures including tax payment, and electronic certificates are used. The public personal authentication service has been limited to administrative organizations, etc., but since 2016, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has been a public individual for various private services that require a higher security level than the ID / password method. We are promoting the spread of certification services. Recently, instead of providing personal information and a certificate at the time of opening an account at a financial institution or the like, use of an electronic certificate by a public personal authentication service has begun to be proposed.

In the case of the account opening of a financial institution described above, conventionally, an account opening application form in which personal information is entered or an identity verification document is sent or transmitted to the financial institution, etc., and the financial institution etc. confirms the sent document, It took a lot of time and money to return user cards, etc. to individuals by registered mail. Instead, if a procedure using an electronic certificate is used, the procedure can be started immediately after the application for opening an account, and the cost can be expected to be considerably reduced.

In addition to public personal authentication services, various types of private electronic authentication services will be provided by websites on the Internet by each electronic authentication service company, making it difficult for users to determine what is being authenticated. Or confirming whether the website providing the electronic authentication service is reliable appears as a new issue. Therefore, Patent Document 1 below discloses a system in which a user can confirm the reliability of a website that provides various electronic authentication services on a screen.

JP 2010-63069 A

Certainly, it can be said that the use of electronic certificates by the electronic authentication service is superior in terms of immediacy and cost compared to the past. However, in order to obtain an electronic certificate, each user must apply to a certificate authority and perform an operation according to a predetermined procedure. For example, since it is required to install a predetermined program for using the electronic authentication service in his / her terminal, there are some users who give up using the electronic authentication service due to troublesome setup work.

In addition, the certificate authority that is an institution that issues an electronic certificate is a single organization or organization, or has a multiple configuration in which a root certificate authority and an intermediate certificate authority exist on the certification path. The latter, in order from the issuing certificate authority, goes to the upper certificate authority that is authenticating the certificate authority, the higher certificate authority, etc., and finally takes the authentication procedure to reach the root certificate authority. . In the case of a certificate authority that is a single organization or group, it is natural that the certificate authority implements the overall function, but even if it is composed of a root certificate authority and an intermediate certificate authority, one One certificate authority still has central control and management. In other words, although each CA in the certification path has successively taken over the certification by other CAs, it operates in a collaborative system with multiple independent CAs simultaneously performing authentication processing in each local authentication. It has not been done.

For this reason, the conventional centrally managed certificate authority cannot issue an electronic certificate during a time period when the certificate authority server or the like is not operating, so that a user who wants to issue an electronic certificate has a limited use time. It will be. Even if the system can be operated 24 hours a day, it may be necessary to perform server maintenance regularly, or an unexpected system down may occur due to various factors. It will not be a service. In the case of a certificate authority composed of a central management type, it is not possible to provide a service that can obtain an electronic certificate at any time.

Also, some digital certificates that are issued include personal information (for example, basic information on name, address, date of birth, and gender). With the rapid progress of computerization, the protection of personal information (Personal Information Protection Law) has been strengthened, such as prohibition of unintended use of personal information, proper acquisition methods, safety management measures, restrictions on provision of third parties, etc. Therefore, the information server owned and managed by the national government, local government itself, and private companies has taken measures to prevent unauthorized intrusion by the Service-to-Self. However, even with a server that is said to have a strict security system, the certificate authority is able to provide personal information as can be understood from the fact that there is no end to the news that information leakage could not be completely prevented as a result. In the current situation, it is not possible to guarantee that no leakage or tampering will occur.

By the way, recently, distributed ledger technology (DLT, “Distributed” Ledger Technology) has attracted attention mainly in the field of finance. At present, the exact definition of the distributed ledger technology has not been finalized, but one indicator is whether the person approving the ledger should be an arbitrary node terminal connected to the network or a limited node terminal (Permissionless / Permissioned) Can be classified as

A typical example of data disclosure in a public permissionless transaction is a block chain for cryptocurrency (bitcoin). On the other hand, “Ripple” is intended for Permissioned networks where network participation qualifications (especially data approvers), those who issue transactions, and those who read data from the API are limited to reliable node terminals. It is a mechanism called “Hyperledger”. For these, see below.
https://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_whitepaper.pdf, and
http://www.linuxfoundation.org/news-media/announcements/2016/02/linux-foundation
-s-hyperledger-project-announces-30-founding.

One of the features of distributed ledger technology is that it is based on a decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) network without relying on verification at specific servers to determine the legitimacy of transactions and actions. It is a point. When it is recognized that there is no inconsistency in any ledger for new transactions, etc., because each terminal manages the same ledger rather than a specific server managing the ledger for transactions, etc. Only in the management configuration, it is recognized as a regular transaction to be added to each ledger. For example, even if a certain terminal is attacked and the distributed ledger held by that terminal is tampered with by an unauthorized person, if it does not match the ledger of another terminal participating in the approver group on the network, It will be rejected. Without agreement from a certain number of terminals participating in the approver group on the network, the integrity of the distributed ledger will be lacking and will not be recorded as legitimate data. By making the network connection of each terminal P2P type, security management is distributed and reliability is improved.

In this way, the distributed ledger technology requires that the data held by each terminal be completely the same throughout the network, while maintaining the local circumstances at each terminal, that is, the existing system configuration, transaction processing procedure, and contents. It also has the flexibility of not requiring any changes. Accordingly, the distributed ledger technology has begun to attract attention as one of the excellent means as a means for distributing security and high reliability while maintaining the independence of each terminal.

Therefore, an object of the present invention is to provide a technique for performing electronic authentication based on a distributed ledger technique in order to solve the above-described various problems related to electronic authentication.

To achieve the above object, a program and method for information sharing according to the present invention is a program for performing authentication processing using a plurality of computers connected on a network, and is included in the plurality of computers. One computer, in response to a user registration request, outputs data including information identifying an individual or an organization on the network, and at least one other than the one computer included in the plurality of computers. The above computers capture the data output on the network and execute the same calculation to obtain consensus between the computers, and the plurality of computers store the data in their recording media. And an arbitrary computer included in the plurality of computers, When receiving a request for user authentication of a registered user from an entity or an individual, at least one of the plurality of computers determines whether the data is stored in its recording medium; When the data is stored, a process of transmitting a personal authentication report to an entity or an individual who requests the personal authentication is performed.

Further, the data is stored in the same recording medium in each of the plurality of computers. Whether or not the consensus is formed is determined by whether or not there is a predetermined number or more of coincidence of calculation results by the computers.

According to the electronic authentication processing according to the present invention, a plurality of independent computers that can communicate via a network serve as a certificate authority, and whether or not an individual or an organization has a valid personally authenticated record is linked between computers. And prove it. For this reason, even if some computers of multiple independent computers fail due to arbitrary factors, the entire certificate authority is fault-tolerant so that it can always operate, so timely electronic authentication is always possible It becomes. If a conventional centrally-managed certificate authority guarantees 24-hour operation, costs for fault tolerance and redundant configuration are incurred. However, in the present invention, a plurality of computers are independently authenticated by the same user. Since the standard specification of the P2P type distributed ledger technology that presupposes sharing is distributed, a zero downtime certificate authority system can be constructed at a low cost.

In the case of the present invention, the fact that a user (individual or organization) has already been authenticated is stored in a plurality of independent computers functioning as a certificate authority system because of the necessity of business of a certain business operator. , The fact that the person has already been authenticated is used for the person authentication required by another company. The fact that the user has already been authenticated is trusted to complete the user authentication. In other words, if another business operator receives a report in which a valid personal authentication is recorded from the certificate authority system of the present invention, the other business operator will renew the same if it is a personal authentication within a valid period. There is no need to perform identity verification. This not only reduces the time and labor of another business operator, but also has an effect that it is possible to omit complicated processing on the user side that has sent the identification document for each business operator.

Using facts that have already been authenticated for identity verification by another company means that the fact of identity verification stored on multiple computers, which are certificate authorities, is completely authentic and ensures the authenticity of authentication. Always required to do. In this regard, each of the plurality of computers in the present invention stores the fact that the identity has been confirmed, whether the confirmation content has been changed, etc. in time series as completely identical electronic certificate history data, and there is a discrepancy between the computers. The recording state without a mark is retained. For this reason, even if the history data is changed for an unauthorized purpose or the like in one computer included in a plurality of computers, the history data is changed if it is not the same as the history data in other computers included in the plurality of computers. Historical data will never be accepted as legitimate data. History data that is not recorded and managed in a state where all the computers are in agreement is estimated to be not genuine (valid). Since it is virtually impossible for an unauthorized person to change history data on all computers at the same time, it is possible to eliminate the risk of falsification of the digital certificate, which is the fact that the individual has been authenticated. . Therefore, the electronic authentication processing according to the present invention can guarantee extremely high security.

[Correction 29.11.2017 under Rule 91]
It is the flowchart which showed the procedure at the time of opening an account in A bank and performing user registration to the authentication system which performs the authentication process of this invention. It is the flowchart which showed the procedure at the time of requesting a user's identity verification to an authentication system, when opening an account in B bank. It is the flowchart which showed the procedure at the time of requesting a user's identity verification to an authentication system, when opening an account in B bank. It is the figure which represented typically the data structure of the transaction data (electronic certificate) memorize | stored in each computer. It is the figure which showed the some computer which implement | achieves an electronic authentication method. It is the figure which showed the some computer of the structural example different from FIG. 4 (A).

Hereinafter, a certificate authority system that executes each process defined in the electronic authentication method or the program thereof according to the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. In the following embodiment, the fact of identity verification required when an individual opens an account at a financial institution is recorded and recorded, and when an account is opened at another financial institution, an identity verification document can be received from the individual. The procedure that can verify the identity at least is taken as an example. In addition, since the recorded data is evidence of the fact that the identity has been confirmed, it can also be used as a so-called electronic certificate. Note that the same applies to the case of electronic authentication not only for individuals but also for organizations such as corporations.

In the system configuration for executing the electronic authentication processing of the present invention, a certificate authority for authenticating an individual is constructed by a plurality of computers, and the plurality of computers forms a consortium of a plurality of financial institutions having no centralized terminal. This is a P2P type network connection. The plurality of computers are equal to each other, and will be described in detail later. However, the plurality of computers store data indicating the fact that the person has been confirmed, thereby distributing the same data.

In the following, first, a procedure for opening an account as usual, and then a user who has not registered the fact of identity confirmation registered in the authentication system 100 that is the certificate authority that executes the electronic authentication processing of the present invention registers the fact of identity confirmation. The electronic authentication process executed by the authentication system 100 when there is a request for authenticity of the fact that the identity of the user after registration has been received from the financial institution will be described.

Suppose user X has not yet registered his / her identity in authentication system 100. In order to open an account at bank A, user X makes an application for opening an account on the site of bank A via the Internet from his computer terminal, as in the past. Specifically, at least the name, address, date of birth, gender (hereinafter, these four pieces of information are referred to as “basic four information”) and the like necessary for opening an account are entered on the WEB screen. The account establishment is completed through procedures such as submission of identity verification documents and address confirmation. After the account establishment is completed, Bank A returns a predetermined ID and password to the user X. Although mail is sent here for the purpose of address confirmation, it may be sent to the email address of user X. Thereafter, the user X logs in to the A bank using this ID and password, confirms the balance, and executes a transaction. Note that the ID and password include both the case where it is the same as or different from the account number or the PIN code of ATM.

In order to open an account, it is necessary to send identity verification documents that prove the authenticity of the basic 4 information. Although a copy of the personal identification document may be mailed, electronic data of the personal identification document is also conventionally transmitted instead of mailing. Here, it is assumed that the personal identification document is sent as electronic data to Bank A. However, in order to open an account, there are applications not only via the Internet but also face-to-face.

銀行 Bank A checks the personal information including the basic 4 information and the contents of the transmitted identity verification document, and performs the identity verification operation of user X. Specifically, it is determined that the basic 4 information can be identified as a real person by confirming the contents of the identity verification document, confirming the address, collating with the blacklist, etc. and permit the account transaction. If it is possible, the account of the user X is opened because the identity has been confirmed. As a result, the user X can confirm that the opening of the bank A account has been completed. The user X can log in to the bank A site using the ID and password sent from the bank A, and can start a so-called online transaction in which deposits / withdraws, transfers, and the like are performed via the Internet.

The processing so far has already been performed, but the present invention registers the fact that the bank A has verified the identity of the user X in the authentication system 100, so that banks other than the bank A, etc. It is characterized by the fact that the fact that the identity has been confirmed can be used when opening an account. Whether or not to register in the authentication system 100 is premised on an application from the user X, and can be registered in the authentication system 100 by executing a user registration application at any time after opening an account.

<Registration to authentication system 100>
FIG. 1 is a flowchart showing a procedure for performing registration for using the authentication system 100. The left part of FIG. 1 shows the process when registering the user X in the authentication system 100 for the first time in a time-series flow, and shows what data or signal is exchanged in each process on the right side of the flow. . As shown in the figure, data or signals are transmitted and received between the computer terminal (C1) of the user X, the mobile terminal (C2) of the user X such as a smartphone, the authentication terminal (A1), and the certificate authority terminal (Aall). Here, the authentication terminal (A1) corresponds to the terminal of bank A where the user X opened an account. The reason why the bank A terminal is referred to as the “authentication” terminal is because the bank A verifies the identity of the user X (authentication) as described above. The certificate authority terminal (Aall) is a predetermined plurality of terminals that construct a distributed ledger technology (DLT) or a block chain in the authentication system 100. The plurality of terminals function as a certificate authority, and, as will be described later, the bank A, that is, the authentication terminal (A1) receives a user registration request and requests the authentication system 100, which is a certificate authority, to register. become.

When the opening of the bank A account is completed, a document with a predetermined ID and password is returned to the user X as described above. When the user X desires to register with the authentication system 100, the user X first logs in by entering the ID and password assigned to the A bank site from the user PC (C1). (Refer to “1. User login” in FIG. 1). Next, since a user registration application button necessary for using the authentication service by the authentication system 100 is displayed on the login screen, the user X presses this button. As a result, the authentication terminal (A1), which is a bank A terminal, issues a disposable random value called a nonce, attaches an electronic signature to the nonce, and transmits it to the user PC (C1) (FIG. (Refer to “2. Then, the user PC (C1) generates a QR code (registered trademark) using the received nonce and displays it on the screen. Since the electronic signature itself is a known technical matter, description thereof is omitted in this specification.

“A1 signature (nonce)” in the figure means a nonce with an electronic signature by the authentication terminal (A1). Similarly, the meaning of the description of the ## signature (**) transmitted and received in FIGS. 1 and 2A to 2B represents ** with an electronic signature by ##.
The purpose of issuing the nonce to the user X by the authentication terminal (A1) is to confirm that the user X requesting user registration truly performs the registration procedure in the subsequent procedure processing. If it is not sent back to the authentication terminal (A1), it is determined that the registration procedure is by a person other than the user X.

Next, the user X performs a procedure for making the mobile terminal (smartphone or the like) usable in the authentication system 100. In recent years, the number of users who have at least one mobile terminal (C2) has increased, and the use of the mobile terminal (C2) enhances security by using two-step authentication, and it is also possible to enter and exit even when away from home. This is in order to meet the demand for personal authentication for money or money transfer.

It is assumed that a user registration application downloaded from a predetermined application site is activated on the mobile terminal (C2). The user X who has received the nonce with the electronic signature of the authentication terminal (A1) by the user PC (C1) reads the QR code displayed on the screen of the user PC (C1) using the portable terminal (C2). The QR code includes bank information related to bank A, and includes, for example, a connection address for connecting to bank A from the mobile terminal (C2). The portable terminal (C2) receives the bank information from the read QR code and the nonce received by the user PC (C1) (see “3. QR code reading” in FIG. 1).
In other embodiments, the QR code (registered trademark) may be displayed on a document in which a predetermined ID and password are described.

Next, in the portable terminal (C2), a key pair of a secret key and a public key is created by a user registration application (see “4. Key pair creation” in FIG. 1). The secret key (C2 secret key) of the key pair is stored in the mobile terminal (C2). On the other hand, the public key (C2 public key) of the key pair is transmitted to the authentication terminal (A1) which is the A bank. At this time, the portable terminal (C2) gives an electronic signature using the C2 private key to the nonce and C2 public key received at the time of “3. QR code reading”. The nonce with the electronic signature of the portable terminal (C2) and the C2 public key are transmitted to the authentication terminal (A1) (see “5. User public key transmission” in FIG. 1).

The authentication terminal (A1) verifies the electronic signature of the portable terminal (C2) using the received C2 public key. Only the C2 private key forming the key pair corresponds to the C2 public key. Therefore, if the electronic signature provided using the C2 private key can be confirmed by the C2 public key, it can be confirmed that the C2 public key is signed by the portable terminal (C2) that stores the C2 private key forming the key pair. Further, the authentication terminal (A1) receives a nonce in addition to the C2 public key, and whether this nonce is the same as the nonce issued by the authentication terminal (A1) at the time of “2. nonce transmission”. It is confirmed that the user X is a true user who desires user registration. If the identity of the nonce cannot be confirmed, it is rejected as a procedure by a person other than the user X.

When the authentication terminal (A1) can confirm the authenticity of the user X requesting user registration, the authentication terminal (A1) then requests the certificate authority terminal (Aall) composed of a plurality of computers to perform user registration. 4 A hash value of information, an electronic signature is attached to the public key (A1 public key) of the authentication terminal (A1) and transmitted to the certification authority terminal (Aall) ("6. Registration with the certification authority" in FIG. 1) "reference). Furthermore, as an option, an expiration date that makes the validity of the user registration time-limited may be added and transmitted to the certificate authority terminal (Aall). Since the authentication terminal (A1) is provided with basic 4 information from the user X at the time of opening an account, a hash operation is performed on the basic 4 information using a predetermined hash function, and a hash value is generated and transmitted. To do. Since the hash is a technical matter known to those skilled in the art, the description thereof is omitted in this specification.

The certificate authority terminal (Aall) has a data structure sometimes called so-called distributed ledger technology (DLT) or block chain, and the data sent from the authentication terminal (A1) is sent to each of the plurality of computers in the same manner. Remember (distributed ledger). A specific processing method for data registration will be described later. The authentication terminal (A1) confirms whether it has been registered (refer to “7. Confirmation of Registration Result” in FIG. 1), and the certificate authority terminal (Aall) returns the confirmation result to the authentication terminal (A1) (FIG. 1). (See “8. Results of registration confirmation”).

If the registration is completed normally, the authentication terminal (A1) creates the encrypted data by encrypting the basic 4 information using the C2 public key received at the time of "5. User public key transmission". Then, the authentication terminal (A1) gives its own electronic signature to the encrypted data and the public key (A1 public key) of the authentication terminal (A1) and transmits it to the portable terminal (C2) (“9” in FIG. 1). Refer to “Registering Basic 4 Information”). The reason why the encrypted data of the basic 4 information is created is to avoid the risk of unauthorized use or the like if the raw (plaintext) basic 4 information is wiretapped on the communication line.

The portable terminal (C2) verifies the electronic signature of the authentication terminal (A1) using the received A1 public key. Only the A1 private key forming the key pair corresponds to the A1 public key. Therefore, the portable terminal (C2) can confirm the correct communication from the authentication terminal (A1) by checking the electronic signature of the authentication terminal (A1) using the A1 private key with the A1 public key. . Further, the basic 4 information is decrypted with the C2 secret key stored by itself and registered in a safe area (for example, a key chain) other than the application data. Further, an expiration date may be registered as an option.

In addition, the authentication terminal (A1) transmits the registration result (may include basic 4 information and expiration date) to the user PC (C1) so that the fact of user registration does not contradict the mobile terminal (C2). (See “10. Registration result notification” in FIG. 1). Through the series of procedures described above, the user X is registered in the authentication system 100, and the user authentication service by the authentication system 100 can be used.

<Use of authentication system 100>
Next, it is assumed that the user X opens an account with another financial institution other than Bank A (for example, Bank B). When the user X applies for an account opening for the bank B, conventionally, the bank B also requests the user X to send an identification document, and performs the user X identification process in the same manner as the bank A. However, in the case of the present embodiment, this authentication process is requested to the authentication system 100.

2 (A) and 2 (B) are flowcharts showing the procedure of identity verification using the authentication system 100 when opening an account of B bank. The request for the identity verification service by the authentication system 100 is premised on the application from the user X. The application for the identity verification service can be performed from a PC terminal or a mobile terminal such as a smartphone. If the user X does not apply, a copy of the personal identification document is mailed or transmitted to the bank B as before, and the bank B verifies the personal information including the basic four information based on the personal identification document.

User X requests the opening of the bank B account from the user PC (C1) (see “1. V1 account opening request” in FIG. 2A).

On the WEB screen, a selection button for displaying whether or not to use the personal identification service using the authentication system 100 instead of the data transmission of the personal identification document is displayed. When the button used by the user X is selected, the authentication system 100 It is confirmed whether or not the user is registered. Since the identity verification service cannot be used unless the user is registered, an existing identity verification flow (that is, opening an account by submitting an identity verification document) is performed. If user registration is desired, user registration processing may be performed according to the procedure shown in FIG.

As described above, since the user X has already registered as a user, the verification terminal (V1) which is a terminal of the B bank issues a disposable random value called a nonce to the user X and verifies this. The electronic signature of the terminal (V1) is given and transmitted to the user PC (C1) which is the terminal of the user X (see “2. nonce transmission” in FIG. 2A).

As with the opening of the bank A account, the user X who has received the nonce with the electronic signature of the verification terminal (V1) by the user PC (C1) receives the QR code displayed on the screen of the user PC (C1) as a portable terminal. Read using (C2). The QR code includes bank information related to the B bank, and includes, for example, a connection destination address for connecting to the B bank from the mobile terminal (C2). The portable terminal (C2) receives the bank information and the nonce received by the user PC (C1) from the read QR code (see “3. QR code reading” in FIG. 2A).

As described in “4. 保管 Key pair creation” in FIG. 1A, the mobile terminal (C2) stores the C2 key pair (secret key, public key). Therefore, next, the portable terminal (C2) gives an electronic signature to the received nonce and C2 public key using the C2 private key. The nonce with the electronic signature of the portable terminal (C2) and the C2 public key are transmitted to the verification terminal (V1) (refer to “4. User public key transmission” in FIG. 2A).

The verification terminal (V1) verifies the electronic signature of the portable terminal (C2) using the received C2 public key, and confirms the validity of the data transmitted from the portable terminal (C2). Furthermore, it is confirmed whether or not the user X is a true user who wishes to open a bank B account by confirming whether or not it is the same as the nonce issued at the time of “2.「 nonce transmission ”. If the identity of the nonce cannot be confirmed, it is rejected as a registration procedure by a person other than the user X.

Next, the verification terminal (V1) creates a temporary key pair (T secret key, T public key) (see “5. Temporary communication key creation” in FIG. 2A). This is because it is used for encryption when receiving basic four information from the user X. The verification terminal (V1) attaches an electronic signature to the T public key of the temporary key pair and the issued nonce, and transmits it to the mobile terminal (C2) (see “6. Temporary Communication Key Transmission” in FIG. 2A). "reference). The T secret key is stored in the verification terminal (V1).

The mobile terminal (C2) that has received the T public key encrypts the basic four information using the T public key and creates encrypted data. Then, the mobile terminal (C2) attaches an electronic signature to the encrypted data and the nonce, and transmits it to the verification terminal (V1) (see “7. Basic 4 information transmission” in FIG. 2A).

The verification terminal (V1) restores the basic 4 information to plaintext by decrypting the encrypted data using the stored T secret key, and then hashes the basic 4 information with a predetermined hash function (hash ( 4 information)). Next, the verification terminal (V1) transmits the hash (4 information) and the C2 public key to the certification authority terminal (Aall), and whether there is a fact that the user X is truly registered in the certification authority terminal (Aall). (See “8. Confirmation Request for Existing Registration” in FIG. 2B).

As described above, each of the plurality of computers in the certificate authority terminal (Aall) stores and manages the fact of user registration in the same recording medium. In the present embodiment, for example, the presence or absence of user registration is detected by searching the recording medium using the C2 public key as a search key.
If a plurality of registrations are made for the same user, the latest registration is detected. This will apply to cases where the address or name has changed. Moreover, what is not expired should just be detected when it is registered including the expiration date. As described above, the certificate authority terminal (Aall) has (i) that at least one computer (preferably a certain number of computers) constituting the certificate authority terminal (Aall) records the fact of the user registration. And (ii) if the recorded hash (4 information) is the same as the hash (4 information) sent from the verification terminal (V1), it could not be confirmed as a result of user registration. In this case, the result of no user registration is returned to the verification terminal (V1) (see “9. Confirmation process of already registered” in FIG. 2B).

The verification terminal (V1) considers that the identity has been obtained in the case of the result of the user registration, and opens the B bank account of the user X. In the case of the result without user registration, the bank B account is not opened (see “10. Open account with V1” in FIG. 2B).

Further, the verification terminal (V1) issues a request for registering the fact that the user X has established the B bank account in the certificate authority terminal (Aall). For this registration, the verification terminal (V1) gives an electronic signature to the C2 public key, hash (4 information) that is hashed basic 4 information, and the public key (V1 public key) of the verification terminal (V1). To the certificate authority terminal (Aall). As an option, an expiration date for setting an expiration date of user registration, a date and time of registration, and the like may be included. Still another embodiment includes setting the expiration date to the expiration date of a driver's license or insurance card, or determining the registration date and time as, for example, one year.
In response, the certification authority terminal (Aall) registers the received data (see “11. Registration with Certification Authority” in FIG. 2B).

Further, the verification terminal (V1) confirms whether or not the registration is normally performed in the certification authority terminal (Aall), and the certification authority terminal (Aall) returns the confirmation result to the verification terminal (V1) (FIG. 2B). Refer to “12. Confirmation of registration result”. The verification terminal (V1) transmits the report registered by the certificate authority terminal (Aall) to the mobile terminal (C2) (see “13. Registration completion report” in FIG. 2B).

In another embodiment, when transmitting a user-registered report to the mobile terminal (C2), the basic four information encrypted with the C2 public key received at the time of “4. user public key transmission”; An electronic signature of the verification terminal (V1) (and optionally an expiration date may also be included) may be attached to the public key of the verification terminal (V1) and transmitted to the mobile terminal (C2). Upon receiving the transmission from the verification terminal (V1), the mobile terminal (C2) verifies the electronic signature of the verification terminal (V1) using the public key of the verification terminal (V1) and encrypts it with its own C2 private key. Decrypt the data. Thereby, you may make it know that the account opening of B bank was registered into the certification authority terminal (Aall).

After that, the verification terminal (V1) executes the key destruction that disables the temporary key pair (T secret key, T public key) (see “14. Temporary communication key destruction” in FIG. 2B). "reference). Then, the verification terminal (V1) transmits the registration result (basic 4 information and expiration date may also be included) to the user PC (C1), and the registration of the bank B account opening is performed with the portable terminal (C2). (Refer to "15. Registration result notification" in Fig. 2 (B))

As described above, the bank B does not request the user X to send a personal identification document as in the past, but the user X is already registered in the authentication system 100 for transactions with other businesses. Therefore, it is possible to process the identity verification work for each business operator instead of the identity verification work.

<Configuration of registration data and registration processing>
Hereinafter, the configuration of data stored in a plurality of computers constituting the authentication system 100 and the arithmetic processing performed when the plurality of computers register the user X in their recording media will be described.
The authentication system 100 according to the present embodiment executes processing based on the distributed ledger technology. One of the features of the distributed ledger technology is that a plurality of terminals participating in the network have the same book (that is, history data), and the information is always shared. Nodes (terminals) connected to the network in the P2P type store history data in a distributed manner. It is configured in a centralized type with a server as a core like many conventional systems, and is greatly different from a mechanism in which a centralized server controls instances and data on a network. Therefore, the authentication system 100 according to the present embodiment is characterized in that it is premised that user data registered (stored) in each recording medium by a plurality of computers is the same data. .

1. Registered Data Configuration FIG. 3 shows an example of the configuration of data registered by each computer in the certificate authority (Aall). According to the registration flow of FIG. 1, the data registered in the procedure of “6. Registration with certificate authority” includes the public key of the portable terminal (C2) and the basic four information of user X as shown in the left part of FIG. It includes a hash value, a public key of the authentication terminal (A1) that is A bank, and an expiration date as an option, and an electronic signature data group 31 of the authentication terminal (A1). The data group 31 is not necessarily limited, and other data may be included as appropriate. For example, time stamp information at the time of storage may be included. This time stamp information may be both the date and time common to each computer of the certificate authority (Aall) or the date and time stored in each computer.

Also, the right part of FIG. 3 shows an example of the data structure in which the fact that the user has been registered at the time of opening the bank A account and then requested the identity authority (Aall) to confirm the identity at the time of opening the bank B account is recorded. This data structure conceptually represents a case where the data group 32 recorded at the time of the B bank is connected and recorded immediately after the data group 31 recorded at the time of the A bank. Since it is considered as a chain of such data groups, it is also called a so-called distributed ledger technology (DLT) or a block chain structure.

Actually, after the data group 31 is recorded, other user registrations performed by an arbitrary entity such as Bank A or Bank B are registered. Therefore, if data registration is represented in time series, Similar data related to the user Y will be recorded between the data group 31 and the data group 32. In this case, the data group 31 and the data group 32 may have link information (for example, a pointer) indicating the storage address of each other, so that the stored data of the same person named the user X can be searched quickly. Each computer in the certificate authority (Aall) stores the plurality of data groups in the same data configuration.

2. Registration Processing Next, after each computer in the certificate authority (Aall) has formed a consensus, the public key of the portable terminal (C2), the hash value of the basic four information of the user X, the authentication terminal (A1) that is A bank Registration of a public key will be described.

First, it is assumed that one computer is selected as a leader from among a plurality of computers, and other computers follow the conclusions made by the leader. Since each computer has its own reliability score and a plurality of computers share a predetermined reliability rate, the computer having the highest reliability score, for example, is selected from among computers that exceed this reliability rate as a threshold. Select as In other embodiments, a leader may be selected at random, or may become a leader in order after a predetermined time has elapsed.

The computer that has become the leader instructs other computers to execute predetermined operations using the distributed ledger technology (DLT) or block chain data of the configuration shown in FIG. To do. The predetermined operation is a mathematical calculation using the hash function H. For example, in this embodiment, a public encryption technique based on an elliptic curve is used, and the hash function H to be used is 512-bit SHA3.
When the secret key K is a random 256-bit integer, the public key A corresponding to the secret key K is
H (k) = (h ₀ , h ₁ ,..., H ₅₁₁ ) (1)
^{^{a = 2 256 + Σ2 i h}} i ( where, 3 ≦ i ≦ 253) ( 2)
A = aB (3)
It can generate | occur | produce by performing each step of.
Here, B is a set of basic points for forming a predetermined elliptic curve, and has an enormous number of elements. A is also each element of set B that can be encoded into a 256-bit integer. Thus, since A is an element of set B, it is encoded into a 256-bit integer public key A that functions as a public key.

When the message M, the secret key K and the related public key A are stored as target data,
H (k) = (h ₀ , h ₁ ,..., H ₅₁₁ ) (4)
r = H (h ₂₅₆ ,..., h ₅₁₁ , M) (5)
R = rB (6)
S = (r + H (R, A, M) a) mod q (7)
A signature can be generated by executing each of the steps.
Further, (R, S) is a signature of the message M under the secret key K.

Each computer computes R ′ = SB−H (R, A, M) A to verify the signature (R, S) for a given message M and public key A, and R ′ = R To verify. When the number of computers with matching values exceeds a predetermined number, it is considered that a registration agreement has been formed among a plurality of computers, and it is determined that the data is to be registered. If no consensus is formed, the data is excluded without being registered as part of a block distributed ledger technology (DLT) or chain.

The mathematical operations related to collective consensus (consensus) executed by each computer described above are merely examples, and are not limited to the above-described procedure. For example, Proof of Work (POW) performed in bitcoin ) Does not exclude the calculation method.
Collective agreement on the legitimacy of data to be recorded in cooperation with a plurality of computers is extremely effective in finding illegal data duplication and stored data alteration.

FIG. 4A and FIG. 4B show a configuration example of the authentication system 100 using a plurality of computers described so far. In FIG. 4A, a plurality of certificate authority terminals Y (1) to Y (N) are connected to the network 3, and each of the terminals Y (1) to Y (N) records the same transaction data, and P2P This is an example of embodying a distributed type ledger technology. Terminals Y (1) to Y (N) surrounded by a dashed line indicate “a plurality of computers” recited in the claims.

Further, as shown in FIG. 4B, a terminal Z (1) other than the terminals Y (1) to Y (N) may be included in the authentication system 100. In the case of such a system configuration, the terminals Y (1) to Y (N) and the terminal Z (1) indicate “a plurality of computers” described in the claims. The terminal Z is not necessarily required to be single. Therefore, there may be a plurality of terminals Z corresponding to two or more third-party organizations.

The terminal Z (1) is in a third party position (for example, an organization that supervises a financial institution or a certification authority for the purpose of preventing the transfer of criminal proceeds, a company that provides an authentication service according to the present invention, etc.). It is a terminal that is positioned. A series of data or transactions recorded in a plurality of computers as a distributed ledger makes it easy to trace whether the records have been falsified later, since past history records serve as evidence for showing personal authentication facts. It is unavoidable to reexamine past historical records because it is necessary to confirm the flow of information when legal matters require incidents related to information leakage or when auditing financial institutions. If a third-party organization such as terminal Z is included, even if the bank refuses, the transmission record can be checked by tracing the history of the recording medium of terminal Z, and a highly transparent system is constructed. can do.

In the above description, bank A or bank B requests authentication of any of the terminals Y (1) to Y (N) of the certificate authority and requests the user to issue an electronic certificate. Bank A and bank B may function as the terminal Y of the certificate authority. In order for Bank A and Bank B to use the authentication service described above, it is natural that the service provider is registered in advance in the authentication system 100 as a service provider, but the service provider functions as a computer constituting the certificate authority. There is no restriction in the present embodiment that it should not be done. In another embodiment, an authentication service provider (for example, a financial institution) of the present invention may be distinguished from a certificate authority.

Also, a predetermined execution program is installed in the terminals Y (1) to Y (N) and the terminal Z, and each process according to the present invention is executed in each terminal by starting the execution program. The execution program is such that the terminals Y (1) to Y (N) and the terminal Z can be downloaded from a predetermined site via a network, or installed from a CD or USB memory in which the execution program is stored. To do. Therefore, the present invention relates to a program installed or loaded in a computer by downloading it through various recording media such as an optical disk such as a CD-ROM, a magnetic disk, and a semiconductor memory, or via a communication network, and the storage thereof. The medium is included in the scope of the invention.

The certificate authority system 100 according to the present invention is a P2P network that does not require a central management entity, and distributes data records among a plurality of computers. As a result, even if some computers are down, the entire system has fault tolerance so that a 24-hour operation system without downtime is realized. And since it is a distributed ledger technology (DLT) or block chain type data structure that is extremely difficult to be tampered with by unauthorized persons, it is possible to construct a highly secure system at low cost.
In addition, since the basic 4 information that each computer records in its own recording medium is hashed instead of raw data, even if the basic 4 information is read from each computer, it may not be decoded. It has high security.

In the above-described embodiment, user authentication when opening an account in a financial institution has been described, but the present invention is not necessarily limited to authentication at a financial institution. For example, various fields such as medical care, communication, real estate, education, administration, logistics, insurance, voluntary contracts, Internet services, and sharing economy services are also included in the scope of the present invention. In addition, the technical significance of the present invention is also exhibited when authentication is performed not only for personal information but also for information that can be defined as digital assets (for example, rights and value records) at any organization or organization. Would.

2 User PC terminal 3 Network 100 Authentication system X User mobile terminal Y Certification authority terminal Z Terminal of supervisory organization or authentication system provider

Claims

A program for performing authentication processing using a plurality of computers connected to a network,
One computer included in the plurality of computers, in response to a user registration request, outputs data including information identifying an individual or an organization on the network;
When at least one computer other than the one computer included in the plurality of computers fetches the data output on the network and executes the same operation, thereby obtaining consensus between the computers And the plurality of computers store the data in their recording media;
When an arbitrary computer included in the plurality of computers receives a request for user authentication of the registered user from a business entity or an individual, at least one of the plurality of computers stores the data in its recording medium. A process of determining whether or not it is stored;
When the data is stored, a process of sending a report of authenticated personal identity to an entity or individual requesting the personal authentication;
A program that causes a program to be executed.
The program according to claim 1, wherein the data is stored in the same recording medium in each of the plurality of computers.
The program according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the presence or absence of the consensus is determined by whether or not the number of coincidence of calculation results by the computers is equal to or greater than a predetermined number.
An electronic authentication method using a plurality of computers connected on a network,
In response to a user registration request, one computer included in the plurality of computers transmits data including information identifying an individual or an organization to another computer included in the plurality of computers.
Each computer of the plurality of computers stores the data in its own recording medium when consensus formation is obtained between the computers by executing the same operation,
When an arbitrary computer included in the plurality of computers receives a request for user authentication of the registered user from a business entity or an individual, at least one of the plurality of computers stores the data in its recording medium. Determine whether it is remembered,
If the data is stored, send a personally authenticated report to the entity or individual requesting the personal authentication,
The electronic authentication method that is performed.