WO2016161583A1

WO2016161583A1 - Gprs system key enhancement method, sgsn device, ue, hlr/hss and gprs system

Info

Publication number: WO2016161583A1
Application number: PCT/CN2015/076118
Authority: WO
Inventors: 张丽佳; 葛翠丽
Original assignee: 华为技术有限公司
Priority date: 2015-04-08
Filing date: 2015-04-08
Publication date: 2016-10-13
Also published as: EP3518569A1; JP6504630B2; CN107079293A; EP3258718B1; RU2683853C1; EP3258718A4; CA2979898A1; EP3518569B1; KR20170125381A; JP2018516483A; KR101929699B1; US20180034635A1; BR112017020874A2; EP3258718A1

Abstract

Provided in the present application are a GPRS system key enhancement method, SGSN device, UE, HLR/HSS and GPRS system. The method comprises: receiving, by an SGSN, a request message transmitted by a UE; acquiring, by the SGSN and from an HLR/HSS, an authentication vector comprising a first encryption key and a first integrity key; if the SGSN determines that the UE is a first-type UE, then selecting, for the UE, an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and transmitting, to the UE, the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm; and calculating, by the SGSN and according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, a second encryption key and a second integrity key. By adopting an embodiment of the present application, encryption protection and integrity protection can be performed, via the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN and the second encryption key and the second integrity key, on a communication message between the SGSN and the UE , thus improving communication security of the first-type UE in a GPRS network.

Description

Method for key enhancement of GPRS system, SGSN equipment, UE, HLR/HSS and GPRS system

Technical field

The present application relates to the field of communication security, and in particular, to a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system, an SGSN device, a UE, an HLR/HSS, and a GPRS system.

Background technique

In order to implement the data transmission function, the user equipment (User Equipment, UE) is generally connected to the operator's mobile communication network through a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) or a Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). A General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) network to communicate with other UEs, people, or mobile networks. In order to ensure the security of the UE communication, before the UE accesses the mobile communication network, authentication between the network side and the UE is usually required to ensure the legality of the network side and the UE, and generate a confidentiality key and an integrity key. To provide confidentiality protection and integrity protection for communication messages. However, in the prior art, when the UE using the SIM accesses the GPRS network, only one-way authentication of the UE by the network side and cryptographic protection of the communication message can be implemented, and the UE can not authenticate the network side and the pair. Integrity protection of communication messages. When the UE using the USIM accesses the GPRS network, the two-way authentication between the network side and the UE can be implemented, but the communication message can only be encrypted and cannot provide integrity protection for the communication message. The security threats are as follows: On the one hand, if the UE cannot authenticate the message from the network side, the UE may be attacked by the fake base station; on the other hand, if the communication message cannot be integrity protected, between the UE and the network side The communication may suffer from algorithm downgrade attacks, and even security risks such as eavesdropping or tampering of the communication content. For some UEs that require high-security communication, such as IoT UEs, machine communication UEs, etc., it is urgent to provide a method to enhance the security of such UEs in the GPRS network.

Summary of the invention

The embodiment of the present application discloses a GPRS system key enhancement method, an SGSN device, a UE, an HLR/HSS, and a GPRS system, which can enhance a key of a GPRS system and improve a first type of UE in GPRS. The security of communication in the network.

The first aspect of the embodiment of the present application discloses a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system, which may include:

Receiving, by the SGSN, a request message sent by the UE;

The SGSN obtains an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key;

If the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, select an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE, and send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE;

The SGSN obtains a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The second encryption key and the selected encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, the second integrity key and the selected integrity algorithm. And used for integrity protection of messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.

With reference to the first aspect, in a first possible implementation, the request message includes an identifier of the UE, and the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, including:

Sending, by the SGSN, the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, so that the HLR/HSS determines that the UE is a first type of UE according to the identifier of the UE, and sends the UE type indication information to the SGSN. The UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE;

The SGSN receives the UE type indication information sent by the HLR/HSS, and determines that the UE is a first type of UE.

With reference to the first aspect, in a second possible implementation manner, the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, including:

If the request message includes the UE type indication information, the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

With reference to the first aspect, and any one of the first to the second possible implementation manners of the first aspect, in a third possible implementation, the SGSN is configured according to the first encryption key and the first The integrity key, obtaining the second encryption key and the second integrity key, including:

The SGSN calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the SGSN calculates the second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string; The SGSN calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string Key; or,

The SGSN calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the SGSN is configured according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm, Computing the second encryption key; the SGSN calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key, a second algorithm type indication, and an identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, where the first algorithm The type indication and the value indicated by the second algorithm type are different.

With reference to the first aspect, and any one of the first to the second possible implementation manners of the first aspect, in a fourth possible implementation, the SGSN is configured according to a first encryption key in the authentication vector The first integrity key calculates the second encryption key and the second integrity key, including:

The SGSN calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the SGSN uses a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key And using the second preset bit of the intermediate key as the second integrity key; or

The SGSN calculates a second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm; the SGSN is instructed according to the first integrity key and the second algorithm type And calculating, by the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, a second integrity key, where the first algorithm type indication is different from the value indicated by the second algorithm type; or

The SGSN uses the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; the SGSN sets the first integrity key or the first The preset bit of the integrity key is used as the second integrity key.

With reference to the first aspect, and any one of the third to fourth possible implementation manners of the first aspect, in a fifth possible implementation manner,

The authentication vector is an authentication vector quintuple;

The first encryption key is an encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.

In conjunction with the fifth possible implementation of the first aspect, in a sixth possible implementation, the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.

The second aspect of the embodiment of the present application discloses a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system, which may include:

The UE sends a request message to the SGSN;

Receiving, by the UE, an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN;

Obtaining, by the UE, the second encryption key and the second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The second encryption key and the encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, where the second integrity key and the integrity algorithm are used. Performing integrity protection on messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.

With reference to the second aspect, in a first possible implementation, the request message sent by the UE to the SGSN includes UE type indication information, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE. .

With reference to the second aspect, in a first possible implementation manner, the UE acquires the second encryption key and the second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, including:

The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the UE calculates the second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string; The UE calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string; or

The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the UE calculates according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm. The second encryption key; the UE calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm, where the first algorithm type indication The value indicated by the second algorithm type is different.

With reference to the second aspect, and any one of the first possible implementation manners of the second aspect, in a second possible implementation manner, the UE obtains the first information according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. The second encryption key and the second integrity key, including:

The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the UE uses the first preset bit of the intermediate key as a second encryption key, and The second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key.

With reference to the second aspect, and the first possible implementation manner of the second aspect, in a third possible implementation, the UE calculates a second according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. The encryption key and the second integrity key, including:

The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the UE uses a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key, Will be in the middle a second preset bit of the key as the second integrity key; or

The UE calculates the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm; the UE according to the first integrity key, the algorithm type indication, and the The identifier of the integrity algorithm calculates the second integrity key, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values; or

The UE uses the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; the UE will use the first integrity key or the first The preset bit of the integrity key is used as the second integrity key.

With reference to any one of the second to third possible implementation manners of the second aspect, in a fourth possible implementation, the first encryption key is an encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple. The first integrity key is an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.

In conjunction with the fourth possible implementation of the second aspect, in a fifth possible implementation, the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.

The third aspect of the present application discloses a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system, which may include:

The HLR/HSS receives the identifier of the user equipment UE sent by the SGSN;

Determining, by the HLR/HSS, that the UE is a first type UE according to the identifier of the UE;

The HLR/HSS sends the UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

The fourth aspect of the present application discloses an SGSN device, which may include:

a receiving module, configured to receive a request message sent by the UE;

An obtaining module, configured to acquire an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key;

a selecting module, configured to: when the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, select an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE, and send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the Said UE;

Obtaining a module, configured to obtain a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The second encryption key and the selected encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, the second integrity key and the selected integrity. The algorithm is configured to perform integrity protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.

With reference to the fourth aspect, in a first possible implementation, the request message includes an identifier of the UE, and the SGSN device further includes:

a sending module, configured to send the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, so that the HLR/HSS determines, according to the identifier of the UE, whether the UE is a first type UE, and sends a UE type indication to the SGSN. Information, the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE;

The first determining module is configured to receive the UE type indication information that is sent by the HLR/HSS, and determine that the UE is a first type of UE.

With reference to the fourth aspect, in a second possible implementation manner, the SGSN device further includes:

And a second determining module, configured to: when the request message includes the UE type indication information, determine that the UE is a first type of UE, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

With reference to the fourth aspect, and any one of the first to the second possible implementation manners of the fourth aspect, in a third possible implementation, the obtaining module includes a first calculating unit, a second calculating unit, and a Three computing units, where:

The first calculating unit is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the second calculating unit is configured to use the intermediate key and the encryption feature The second encryption unit is configured to calculate the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string; or

The first calculating unit is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and the second calculating unit is configured to use, according to the intermediate key, the first An algorithm type indication and an identifier of the selected encryption algorithm, the second encryption key is calculated; the third calculation unit is configured to perform, according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the selected integrity algorithm And identifying, the second integrity key, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values.

With reference to the fourth aspect, and any one of the first to second possible implementation manners of the fourth aspect, in a fourth possible implementation manner,

The obtaining module is specifically configured to: calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; and use a first preset bit of the intermediate key as a second encryption key, Will be in the middle a second preset bit of the inter-key as the second integrity key; or

The obtaining module includes: a fourth calculating unit, configured to calculate the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm; the fifth calculating unit, Calculating the second integrity key according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and an identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type The values indicated are not the same; or,

The obtaining module is specifically configured to: use a first encryption key in the authentication vector or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; An integrity key or a preset bit of the first integrity key is used as the second integrity key.

With reference to any one of the third to fourth possible implementation manners of the fourth aspect, in a fifth possible implementation manner,

The authentication vector is an authentication vector quintuple;

In conjunction with the fifth possible implementation of the fourth aspect, in a sixth possible implementation, the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.

A fifth aspect of the present application discloses a computer storage medium storing a program, the first to sixth possible implementations including the first aspect and the first aspect are executed when the program is executed One of the steps described.

A sixth aspect of the present application provides an SGSN device, which may include a receiving device, a transmitting device, and a processor, where the receiving device, the transmitting device, and the processor are connected by a bus, where:

The receiving device is configured to receive a request message sent by the UE;

The processor is configured to:

Acquiring an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, the authentication vector including a first encryption key and a first integrity key;

And if the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, selecting an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE;

Obtaining a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The sending device is configured to send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE;

With reference to the sixth aspect, in a first possible implementation, the request message includes an identifier of the UE;

The sending device is further configured to send the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, so that the HLR/HSS determines, according to the identifier of the UE, whether the UE is a first type UE, and The SGSN sends the UE type indication information, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE;

Determining, by the processor, that the UE is a first type of UE, the method includes: the processor receiving the UE type indication information sent by the HLR/HSS, and determining that the UE is a first type of UE.

With reference to the sixth aspect, in a second possible implementation manner, the determining, by the processor, that the UE is a first type of UE includes:

If the request message includes the UE type indication information, the processor determines that the UE is a first type of UE, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

With reference to the sixth aspect, and any one of the first to the second possible implementation manners of the sixth aspect, in a third possible implementation, the processor, according to the first encryption key and the An integrity key, obtaining a second encryption key and a second integrity key, including:

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor calculates the second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string a key; the processor calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and an integrity feature string; or

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor is configured according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the selected encryption algorithm Identifying, calculating the second encryption key; the processor calculating the second integrity key according to the intermediate key, a second algorithm type indication, and an identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, wherein the The first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values.

Combining any of the first to second possible implementations of the sixth aspect and the sixth aspect, In a four possible implementation manner, the processor obtains the second encryption key and the second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, including:

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor uses a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption a key, the second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key; or

The processor calculates the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm in the authentication vector; the processor is according to the authentication vector Calculating the second integrity key by the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication are taken Values are not the same; or,

The processor uses the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; the processor sets the first integrity key or the The preset bit of the first integrity key is used as the second integrity key.

With reference to any one of the third to fourth possible implementation manners of the sixth aspect, in a fifth possible implementation manner,

The authentication vector is an authentication vector quintuple;

In conjunction with the fifth possible implementation of the sixth aspect, in a sixth possible implementation, the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.

The seventh aspect of the present application discloses a UE, which may include:

a sending module, configured to send a request message to the SGSN;

a receiving module, configured to receive an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN;

An acquiring module, configured to acquire a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

With reference to the seventh aspect, in a first possible implementation, the UE sends the SGSN The request message includes UE type indication information, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

With reference to the seventh aspect, and the first possible implementation manner of the seventh aspect, in a second possible implementation, the acquiring module includes a first calculating unit, a second calculating unit, and a third calculating unit ,among them:

The first calculating unit is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and the second calculating unit is configured to use, according to the intermediate key, the first The algorithm type indication and the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the second encryption key is calculated; the third calculating unit is configured to use, according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm, Calculating the second integrity key, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication value are different.

With reference to any one of the seventh aspect and the first possible implementation manner of the seventh aspect, in a third possible implementation manner,

The acquiring module is specifically configured to: calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; and use a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption a key, the second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key; or

The calculation module includes: a fourth calculation unit, configured to calculate the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm; and the fifth calculation unit is configured to: Calculating the second integrity key according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication Values are not the same; or,

The acquiring module is specifically configured to: use the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; and the first integrity key or the The preset bit of the first integrity key is used as the second integrity key.

In combination with any of the second to third possible implementations of the seventh aspect, in a fourth possible In an implementation manner, the first encryption key is an encryption key CK in an authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.

In conjunction with the fourth possible implementation of the seventh aspect, in a fifth possible implementation, the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.

The eighth aspect of the present application discloses a computer storage medium storing a program, and executing the program includes any of the first to fifth possible implementations of the second aspect and the second aspect. One of the steps described.

A ninth aspect of the present application discloses a UE, which may include a sending device, a receiving device, and a processor, where the sending device, the receiving device, and the processor are connected by a bus, where:

The sending device is configured to send a request message to the SGSN;

The receiving device is further configured to receive an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN;

The processor is configured to obtain a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

With reference to the ninth aspect, in a first possible implementation, the request message that is sent by the sending device to the SGSN includes UE type indication information, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is the first type. UE.

With reference to the ninth aspect, and the first possible implementation manner of the ninth aspect, in a second possible implementation, the processor is configured according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. The second encryption key and the second integrity key include:

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor is configured according to the intermediate key, a first algorithm type indication, and an identifier of the encryption algorithm Calculating the second encryption key; the processor according to the intermediate key, a second algorithm type indication, and The identifier of the integrity algorithm calculates the second integrity key, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values.

With reference to the ninth aspect, and the first possible implementation manner of the ninth aspect, in a third possible implementation, the processor is configured according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. The second encryption key and the second integrity key include:

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor uses a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key Key, the second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key; or

The processor calculates the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm; the processor is configured according to the first integrity key, the second The algorithm type indication and the identifier of the integrity algorithm calculate the second integrity key, where the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values; or

With reference to any one of the second to third possible implementation manners of the ninth aspect, in a fourth possible implementation, the first encryption key is an encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple. The first integrity key is an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.

In conjunction with the fourth possible implementation of the ninth aspect, in a fifth possible implementation, the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.

The tenth aspect of the present application discloses an HLR/HSS, which may include:

a receiving module, configured to receive an identifier of the user equipment UE sent by the serving GPRS support node SGSN;

a determining module, configured to determine, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type UE;

And a sending module, configured to send the UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

An eleventh aspect of the present application discloses a computer storage medium storing a program that, when executed, includes the steps as described in the third aspect of the present application.

A twelfth aspect of the present application discloses an HLR/HSS, which may include a transmitting device, a receiving device, and a processor, the transmitting device, the receiving device, and the processor are connected by a bus, wherein:

The receiving device is configured to receive an identifier of the user equipment UE that is sent by the serving GPRS support node SGSN;

The processor is configured to determine, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type UE;

The sending device is configured to send the UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE.

A thirteenth aspect of the present application discloses a GPRS system, which includes a serving GPRS support node SGSN device, a user equipment UE, and a home location register HLR/home subscription system HSS, wherein:

The SGSN device is configured to: receive a request message sent by the UE, and obtain an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key, if the SGSN determines that the UE is the first a type of UE, selecting an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE, sending the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, and according to the first encryption key and the first An integrity key, obtaining a second encryption key and a second integrity key;

The UE is configured to: send a request message to the SGSN, receive an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN, and acquire the second encryption according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. a key and the second integrity key;

In conjunction with the thirteenth aspect, in a first possible implementation, the HLR/HSS is used to:

Receiving an identifier of the UE sent by the SGSN;

Determining, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type UE;

Sending UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

In the embodiment of the present application, the SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE, and after determining that the UE is the first type of UE, selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and obtains an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, according to the authentication vector. a first encryption key and a first integrity key, obtaining an enhanced second encryption key and a second integrity key, and transmitting the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, so that After calculating the second encryption key and the second integrity key, the SGSN and the UE may use the second encryption key, the second integrity key, the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN, and the integrity algorithm to the SGSN and the UE. The communication message between the two performs encryption protection and integrity protection, and enhances the security of communication of the first type UE in the GPRS network.

DRAWINGS

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present application, the drawings to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application, For ordinary technicians, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying for creative labor.

1 is a schematic flow chart of an embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

2 is a schematic flowchart diagram of another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

3 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

4 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application; FIG.

6 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

7 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application; FIG.

9 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

10 is a flow chart showing still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. intention;

11 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

12 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application;

FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of an SGSN device provided by the present application; FIG.

14 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of an obtaining module in an SGSN device provided by the present application;

15 is a schematic structural diagram of another embodiment of an obtaining module in an SGSN device provided by the present application;

16 is a schematic structural diagram of another embodiment of an SGSN device provided by the present application;

17 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a UE provided by the present application;

FIG. 18 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of an acquiring module in a UE provided by the present application;

19 is a schematic structural diagram of another embodiment of an acquiring module in a UE provided by the present application;

20 is a schematic structural diagram of another embodiment of a UE provided by the present application;

21 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of an HLR/HSS provided by the present application;

22 is a schematic structural diagram of another embodiment of an HLR/HSS provided by the present application;

FIG. 23 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a GPRS system provided by the present application.

detailed description

The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application are clearly and completely described in the following with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. It is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by a person of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present application without departing from the inventive scope are the scope of the present application.

The present application provides a GPRS system key enhancement method, an SGSN device, a UE, an HLR/HSS, and a GPRS system, which can enhance a key between an SGSN and an UE, and provide encryption protection and integrity for communication between the SGSN and the UE. Sexual protection will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

Please refer to FIG. 1. FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart diagram of an embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 1, the method may include the following steps:

S101. The SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE.

In a specific implementation, the UE sends the SGSN (Serving GPRS Support Node, serving GPRS) The request message of the node may be an attach request message, a route update message, or other message, such as a service request message. After receiving the request message sent by the UE, the SGSN may obtain the identifier of the UE that sends the request message. If the UE is the first type of UE, the request message may carry the UE type indication information.

In the embodiment of the present application, the UE communicates with the network through the USIM card, and the identifier of the UE may be an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number) of the USIM card. The first type of UE may be an Internet of Things UE, a Machine To Machine (M2M) UE, or other high security UE. Among them, the Internet of Things (UE) refers to user equipments with information sensing functions and data transmission functions, such as navigation machines, personal digital assistants, barcode collectors, data collection terminals, and POS machines mainly used for consumption or transfer. Machine communication UE refers to a user equipment that has networking and communication capabilities, and realizes "smart" attributes through sensors, controllers, etc., so that information can be exchanged with people, mobile networks or other machines.

S102. The SGSN acquires an authentication vector from an HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key.

The Home Location Register (HLR) is a permanent database of the GPRS system, which stores information needed to manage the communication of many mobile users, including static information such as registered mobile users' identity information, service information, service authorization, and users. Dynamic information such as location information. The Home Subscription System (HSS) is an evolution and upgrade of the HLR. It is mainly responsible for managing the subscription data of users and the location information of mobile users. Since the HSS and the HLR function similarly in the network, the stored data has more repetitions, and is usually presented as an HSS and HLR fusion device. In the embodiment of the present application, the HLR/HSS may be an HLR device, an HSS device, or a fusion device of an HLR and an HSS.

In the embodiment of the present application, the authentication vector acquired by the SGSN to the HLR/HSS is an authentication vector quintuple, including a random number RAND, an expected response XRES, an authentication token AUTN, an encryption key CK, and an integrity key IK.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first encryption key is an encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.

S103. If the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, select an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE, and send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE.

In some possible implementations, the SGSN may send the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, and the HLR/HSS determines whether the UE is the first type of UE according to the identifier of the UE, and if the SGSN receives the UE type indication sent by the HLR/HSS. For information, the UE may be determined to be the first type of UE according to the UE type indication information.

In other possible implementation manners, if the request message sent by the UE to the SGSN carries the UE type indication information, the SGSN may determine that the UE is the first type of UE.

Optionally, the UE type indication information may indicate that the UE is the first type of UE by using the presence of a specific information element (IE), for example, when the SGSN receives the HLR/HSS or the UE type indication information sent by the UE, If a certain IE exists in the UE type indication information, the SGSN may determine that the UE is the first type of UE, and may determine that the UE is not the first type of UE. Alternatively, the UE type indication information may also indicate that the UE is the first type of UE by using the value of the specific IE. For example, when the SGSN receives the HLR/HSS or the UE type indication information sent by the UE, if the UE type indication information is in the UE type indication information, If the value of the specific IE is 1, the SGSN may determine that the UE is the first type of UE. If the value of the specific IE is 0, the SGSN may determine that the UE is not the first type of UE.

In the specific implementation, the SGSN may first obtain the authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, and then determine that the UE is the first type of UE; or determine that the UE is the first type of UE, and then obtain the authentication vector from the HLR/HSS.

In a specific implementation, the UE and the SGSN are respectively configured with some encryption algorithms and integrity algorithms. When the UE sends a request message to the SGSN, the UE sends the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm supported by the UE to the SGSN, and the SGSN receives the request message of the UE. An encryption algorithm supported by the SGSN and an integrity algorithm supported by the SGSN are selected from the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm supported by the UE.

In some possible implementations, the SGSN selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm can be used to calculate the second encryption key and the second integrity key together with the first encryption key and the first integrity key in the authentication vector. . In addition, according to the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN and the second encryption key, the communication message may be encrypted to generate a message ciphertext; and the message authentication code MAC may be calculated according to the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN and the second integrity key. The message authentication code MAC can be used to verify the integrity of the communication message.

Optionally, when the GPRS network needs a 128-bit second encryption key, the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN may be any one of the 128-EEA1 algorithm, the 128-EEA2 algorithm, and the 128-EEA3 algorithm; the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN. Can be 128-EIA1 algorithm, 128-EIA2 algorithm, 128-EIA3 algorithm Meaning one. The 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm use the SNOW 3G algorithm as the core algorithm; the 128-EEA2 algorithm and the 128-EIA2 algorithm use the AES algorithm as the core algorithm; the 128-EEA3 algorithm and the 128-EIA3 algorithm use the ZUC algorithm (the Zuchong algorithm set) ) as the core algorithm.

In a specific implementation, the SGSN may send the selected encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm to the UE, and may also send the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN in the authentication vector to the UE, and the UE may use the authentication token AUTN to the SGSN side. The authentication is performed to implement the authentication of the network side by the UE side, and the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK are calculated by using the f1-f5 algorithm according to the received random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN. .

In order to protect the communication message between the SGSN and the UE, both the SGSN and the UE need to use the agreed key (ie, the second encryption key and the second integrity key) and the algorithm (ie, the encryption algorithm and integrity selected by the SGSN). The algorithm encrypts the communication message. Therefore, after the SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, the selected encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm need to be sent to the UE, so that the UE according to the first encryption key CK and After the first integrity key IK calculates the second encryption key and the second integrity key, the same encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm are used with the SGSN, and the second encryption key and the second integrity key pair communication message are used. Encrypt.

S104. The SGSN obtains a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

In the embodiment of the present application, after the SGSN selects the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm, the second encryption key and the second integrity key may be obtained according to the first encryption key and the second encryption key in the authentication vector. The second encryption key and the second integrity key are keys enhanced based on the first encryption key and the first integrity key, wherein the second encryption key and the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN are available for the SGSN The message transmitted between the UE and the UE is confidentially protected; the second integrity key and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN can be used to perform integrity protection on messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.

Optionally, the SGSN may obtain the second encryption key and the second integrity key only according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; or may be based on the first encryption key, the first integrity key The key, the selected encryption algorithm, and the selected integrity algorithm are used to obtain the second encryption key and the second integrity key.

In a specific implementation, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN are sent to the UE in step S104, and the SGSN in step S105 is based on the first encryption key and the first in the authentication vector. The order in which the integer key calculates the second encryption key and the second integrity key is in no particular order.

In the embodiment of the present application, the SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE, and after determining that the UE is the first type of UE, selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and obtains an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, according to the authentication vector. Obtaining the second encryption key and the second integrity key, obtaining the enhanced second encryption key and the second integrity key, and transmitting the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, so that the UE is calculating the second After the encryption key and the second integrity key, the SGSN and the UE can communicate the communication message between the SGSN and the UE by using the second encryption key, the second integrity key, the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN, and the integrity algorithm. Encryption protection and integrity protection are performed to enhance the security of communication of the first type of UE in the GPRS network.

Please refer to FIG. 2. FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart diagram of another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 2, the method may include the following steps:

S201. The SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE.

S202. The SGSN acquires an authentication vector from an HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key.

S203. If the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, select an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE.

S204. The SGSN sends the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE.

For the specific implementation of the steps S201-S204 in the embodiment of the present application, reference may be made to the steps S101-S103 of the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 , and details are not described herein.

S205. The SGSN calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

As a feasible implementation manner, the first encryption key and the first integrity key may be operated, and then the operation result is used as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the intermediate key. For example, the intermediate key may be Km=KDF(CK||IK), where CK||IK represents a join operation on the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK.

As another feasible implementation manner, the intermediate key may directly adopt an existing 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or an existing 128-bit encryption key Kc128, that is, the existing GPRS encryption key Kc may be directly used. (64-bit) as the intermediate key, or directly use the existing Kc128 (128-bit) as the intermediate key. Kc and Kc128 are generated based on CK and IK calculations.

S206. The SGSN calculates a second encryption key according to the intermediate key or according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string.

As a possible implementation manner, the SGSN may use the first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key. For example, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second encryption key, the highest 64 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second encryption key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second encryption key, then The highest 128 bits of the intermediate key are directly used as the second encryption key. In other optional implementations, the bit of the required number of bits may be arbitrarily selected from the intermediate key as the second encryption key, which is not limited in this application.

As another possible implementation manner, the SGSN may calculate a second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string ciphering. In a specific implementation, the intermediate key and the encrypted feature string ciphering may be used as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second encryption key. For example, the second encryption key can be calculated by K _cipher =KDF(Km, "ciphering"). "ciphering" is an encrypted feature string that can be generated by encoding.

In some feasible implementation manners, the GPRS system needs a 128-bit second encryption key, and a preset 128-bit (for example, the highest 128 bits) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function KDF. One of the input parameters, the output of the KDF is used as the second encryption key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the preset is intercepted in the output of the KDF 128 bits (for example, the highest 128 bits) as the second encryption key; or, the intermediate key Kc128 is used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the output of the key derivation function KDF is used as the second encryption Key.

In some feasible implementation manners, the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second encryption key, and a preset 64-bit (for example, the highest 64-bit) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function KDF. One of the input parameters, the output of the KDF is used as the second encryption key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the preset is intercepted in the output of the KDF 64 bits (for example, the highest 64 bits) as the second encryption key; alternatively, the intermediate key Kc (64 bits) can be used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the key derivation function KDF The output is used as the second encryption key.

S207. The SGSN calculates a second integrity key according to the intermediate key or according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string.

As a possible implementation manner, the SGSN may use the second preset bit of the intermediate key as the second integrity key. For example, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, the lowest 64 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second integrity key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second integrity key Then, the lowest 128 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second integrity key. In other optional implementations, the bit of the required number of bits may be arbitrarily selected from the intermediate key as the second integrity key, which is not limited in this application.

As another possible implementation manner, the SGSN may calculate a second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string integrity. In a specific implementation, the intermediate key and the integrity feature string integrity may be used as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second integrity key. For example, the second integrity key can be calculated by K _integrity = KDF(Km, "integrity"). "integrity" is an integrity feature string that can be generated by encoding.

In some feasible implementation manners, the GPRS system needs a 128-bit second integrity key, and a preset 128-bit (for example, the highest 128 bits) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function. One of the input parameters of the KDF, the output of the KDF is used as the second integrity key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and intercepted in the output of the KDF The preset 128 bits (for example, the highest 128 bits) is used as the second integrity key; or, the intermediate key Kc128 may be used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the output of the key derivation function KDF is output. As the second integrity key.

In some possible implementations, the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, and a preset 64-bit (eg, the highest 64-bit) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function. One of the input parameters of the KDF, the output of the KDF is used as the second integrity key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and intercepted in the output of the KDF The preset 64 bits (for example, the highest 64 bits) is used as the second integrity key; or, the intermediate key Kc (64 bits) can be used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the key is deduced The output of the function KDF acts as the second integrity key.

In the embodiment of the present application, the encryption feature string ciphering and the integrity feature string integrity are used to make the calculated second encryption key and the second integrity key different to facilitate differentiation, so the integrity feature string integrity may be Any string that is inconsistent with the ciphering of the encrypted feature string.

In a specific implementation, the step S204 sends the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN to the UE, and the steps of calculating the intermediate key, the second encryption key, and the second integrity key in steps S205, S206, and S207 are in no particular order. .

In the embodiment of the present application, the SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE, and after determining that the UE is the first type of UE, selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and obtains an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, according to the authentication vector. Obtaining the second encryption key and the second integrity key, obtaining the enhanced second encryption key and the second integrity key, and transmitting the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, so that the UE is calculating the second After the encryption key and the second integrity key, both the SGSN and the UE can communicate the communication message between the SGSN and the UE by using the second encryption key and the second integrity key, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN. Encryption protection and integrity protection are performed to enhance the security of communication of the first type of UE in the GPRS network.

Please refer to FIG. 3. FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 3, the method may include the following steps:

S301. The SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE.

S302. The SGSN acquires an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key.

S303. If the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, select an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE.

S304. The SGSN sends the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE.

S305. The SGSN calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

For the specific implementation of the steps S301-S305 in the embodiment of the present application, reference may be made to the steps S201-S205 of the embodiment shown in FIG. 2, and details are not described herein.

S306. The SGSN calculates a second encryption key according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm.

In a specific implementation, the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm may be used as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second encryption key. For example, the second encryption key K _cipher can be calculated by K _cipher = KDF (Km, algorithm type distinguished er1, ciphering algorithm id), where Km is an intermediate key, the algorithm type distinguish er1 is the first algorithm type indication, and the ciphering algorithm id is The identifier of the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN.

S307. The SGSN calculates a second integrity key according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm.

In a specific implementation, the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm may be used as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second integrity key. For example, the second integrity key K _cipher can be calculated by K _integrity = KDF (Km, algorithm type distinguished er2, integrity algorithm id), where Km is the intermediate key, the algorithm type distinguish er2 is the second algorithm type indication, and the integrity algorithm id The identity of the integrity algorithm selected for the SGSN.

In some feasible implementation manners, the GPRS system needs a 128-bit second integrity key, and a preset 128-bit (for example, the highest 128 bits) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function. One of the input parameters of the KDF, the output of the KDF is used as the second integrity key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and intercepted in the output of the KDF a preset 128 bits (for example, the highest 128 bits) is used as the second integrity key; or, the intermediate key Kc128 may be used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, The output of the key derivation function KDF is taken as the second integrity key.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first algorithm type indication is used to indicate that the algorithm currently participating in the operation is an encryption type algorithm, and the second algorithm type indication is used to indicate that the algorithm currently participating in the operation is an integrity type algorithm, and the first algorithm type indication The value indicated by the second algorithm type is different. In some feasible embodiments, the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication may include the same IE, and the two are distinguished by different values of the IE. For example, the first algorithm type indication and the IE indicated by the second algorithm type are both an algorithm type distinguisher er. When the algorithm type distinguishes er=00, an algorithm indicating an encryption type, when the algorithm type distinguishes er=01, an algorithm indicating the integrity type.

In some possible cases, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm may adopt the same identifier, and in this case, the algorithm type indication is needed to uniquely distinguish each algorithm. For example, suppose that both the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 are identified by an algorithm. When the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN are the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm, respectively, the first algorithm type indicates and the second Different values of the IE in the algorithm type indication may distinguish the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm, and may cause the calculated values of the second encryption key and the second integrity key to be different to distinguish the second encryption key. Key and second integrity key.

In a specific implementation, the step S304 sends the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN to the UE, and the steps of calculating the intermediate key, the second encryption key, and the second integrity key in steps S305, S306, and S307 are in no particular order. .

In the embodiment of the present application, the SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE, and after determining that the UE is the first type of UE, selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and obtains an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, according to the authentication vector. a first encryption key and a first integrity key, obtaining an enhanced second encryption key and a second integrity key, and transmitting the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, so that The UE calculates a second encryption key and a second integrity key, and performs encryption protection and integrity protection on the communication message between the SGSN and the UE by using the second encryption key and the second integrity key to enhance the first type of UE. Security of communication in a GPRS network.

Please refer to FIG. 4. FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 4, the method may include the following steps:

S401. The SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE.

S402. The SGSN acquires an authentication vector from an HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key.

For the specific implementation of the steps S401-S402 in the embodiment of the present application, reference may be made to the steps S101-S102 of the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 , and details are not described herein.

S403. The SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE.

Optionally, the SGSN may determine whether the UE is a first type of UE by using a specific information element (IE) in the UE type indication information, for example, when the UE type indication information includes the specific IE, the SGSN The UE may be determined to be the first type of UE. When the UE type indication information does not include the specific IE, the SGSN may determine that the UE is not the first type of UE. Alternatively, the SGSN may determine whether the UE is the first type of UE by using the data content of an IE in the UE type indication information. For example, when the data content of the foregoing IE is 1, the SGSN may determine that the UE is the first type of UE. When the data content of one of the above IEs is 0, the SGSN may determine that the UE is not the first type of UE.

S404. The SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE.

In a specific implementation, the UE and the SGSN are respectively configured with some encryption algorithms and integrity algorithms, and the UE When sending the request message to the SGSN, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm supported by the SGSN are sent to the SGSN. When the SGSN receives the request message of the UE, the SGSN selects an encryption supported by the SGSN from the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm supported by the UE. Algorithm and an integrity algorithm supported by the SGSN.

In the embodiment of the present application, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN may be used to calculate the second encryption key and the second integrity key together with the first encryption key and the first integrity key in the authentication vector. In addition, according to the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN and the generated second encryption key, the communication message may be encrypted to generate a message ciphertext; and the message may be calculated according to the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN and the generated second integrity key. The authentication code MAC, the message authentication code MAC, can be used to verify the integrity of the communication message.

Optionally, when the GPRS network needs a 128-bit second encryption key, the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN may be any one of the 128-EEA1 algorithm, the 128-EEA2 algorithm, and the 128-EEA3 algorithm; the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN. It may be any one of 128-EIA1 algorithm, 128-EIA2 algorithm, and 128-EIA3 algorithm. The 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm use the SNOW 3G algorithm as the core algorithm; the 128-EEA2 algorithm and the 128-EIA2 algorithm use the AES algorithm as the core algorithm; the 128-EEA3 algorithm and the 128-EIA3 algorithm use the ZUC algorithm (the Zuchong algorithm set) ) as the core algorithm.

S405. The SGSN calculates a second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm.

Specifically, the SGSN may calculate the second encryption key by using the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, for example: K _cipher =KDF( CK, algorithm type distinguisher er1, ciphering algorithm id), where CK is the first encryption key, the algorithm type distinguisher er1 is the first algorithm type indication, and the ciphering algorithm id is the identifier of the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN.

Optionally, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second encryption key, the highest 64 bits may be taken from the calculated K _cipher as the second encryption key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second encryption key, The highest 128 bits are taken from the calculated K _cipher as the second encryption key. In other possible implementations, the required number of bits can be arbitrarily selected as the second encryption key from the calculated K _cipher , which is not limited in this application.

S406. The SGSN calculates a second integrity key according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm.

Specifically, the SGSN may calculate the second integrity by using the first integrity key IK, the second algorithm type indicating algorithm type distinguisher2, and the identifier integrity algorithm id of the selected integrity algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF. The key, for example, K _integrity = KDF (IK, algorithm type distinguished er2, integrity algorithm id), where IK is the first integrity key, the algorithm type distinguisher er2 is the second algorithm type indication, and the integrity algorithm id is selected by the SGSN. The identity of the integrity algorithm.

Optionally, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, a maximum of 64 bits may be taken from the calculated K _integrity as a second integrity key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second integrity key The key can take up to 128 bits from the calculated K _integriy as the second integrity key. In other possible implementations, the required number of bits can be arbitrarily selected as the second integrity key from the calculated K _integrity , which is not limited in this application.

In some possible cases, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm may adopt the same identifier, and in this case, the algorithm type indication is needed to uniquely distinguish each algorithm. For example, suppose that both the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 are identified by an algorithm. When the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN are the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm, respectively, the first algorithm type indicates and the second The different values indicated by the algorithm type can distinguish the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm, and can make the calculated values of the second encryption key and the second integrity key different to distinguish the second encryption key and Second integrity key.

S407. The SGSN sends the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE.

In a specific implementation, the SGSN may send the selected encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm to the UE, and may also send the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN in the authentication vector to the UE, and the UE may use the authentication token AUTN to the SGSN side. Perform authentication, that is, implement the UE side to the network side The weight may also calculate the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK by using the f1-f5 algorithm according to the received random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN.

In a specific implementation, step S407 sends the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN to the UE, and the steps of calculating the second encryption key and the second integrity key in steps S405 and S406 are in no particular order.

In order to protect the communication message between the SGSN and the UE, both the SGSN and the UE need to use the agreed key (ie, the second encryption key and the second integrity key) and the algorithm (ie, the encryption algorithm and integrity selected by the SGSN). The algorithm encrypts the communication message. Therefore, after the SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, the selected encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm need to be sent to the UE, so that the UE according to the first encryption key CK and After the first integrity key IK calculates the second encryption key and the second integrity key, the same encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm used by the SGSN, and the second encryption key and the second integrity key pair are communicated. The message is encrypted.

In the embodiment of the present application, the SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE, and after determining that the UE is the first type of UE, selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and obtains an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, according to the authentication vector. Obtaining the second encryption key and the first integrity key, obtaining the enhanced second encryption key and the second integrity key, and transmitting the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, so that the UE calculates the second encryption The key and the second integrity key perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the communication message between the SGSN and the UE through the second encryption key and the second integrity key, and enhance communication of the first type UE in the GPRS network Security.

Please refer to FIG. 5. FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 5, the method may include the following steps:

S501. The SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE.

S502. The SGSN acquires an authentication vector from an HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key.

For the specific implementation of the steps S501-S502 in the embodiment of the present application, reference may be made to the steps S101-S102 of the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 , and details are not described herein.

S503. The SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE.

S504. The SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE.

In the embodiment of the present application, the specific implementation manners of steps S503-S504 can refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 3. Steps S303-S304 are not described herein.

S505. The SGSN uses the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as a second encryption key.

In some possible implementations, the first encryption key is a 128-bit key, and the second encryption key required by the GPRS system is also a 128-bit key, and the first encryption key can be directly used as the second encryption key. Key; if the second encryption key required by the GPRS system is a 64-bit key, 64 preset bits may be selected from the first encryption key as the second encryption key, for example, selecting the highest 64 bits as the second key Encryption key.

S506. The SGSN uses the first integrity key or a preset bit of the first integrity key as a second integrity key.

In some possible implementations, the first integrity key is a 128-bit key, and the second integrity key required by the GPRS system is also a 128-bit key, and the first integrity key can be directly used as the first a second integrity key; if the second integrity key required by the GPRS system is a 64-bit key, 64 preset bits may be selected from the first integrity key as the second integrity key, for example The highest 64 bits are selected as the second integrity key.

In the embodiment of the present application, according to the second encryption key and the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN, the communication message may be encrypted to generate a message ciphertext; and the message may be calculated according to the second integrity key and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN. The authentication code MAC, the message authentication code MAC, can be used to verify the integrity of the communication message.

S507. The SGSN sends the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE.

In a specific implementation, the SGSN may send the selected encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm to the UE, and may also send the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN in the authentication vector to the UE, and the UE may use the authentication token AUTN to the SGSN side. The authentication is performed, that is, the UE side authenticates the network side, and the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK are calculated by using the f1-f5 algorithm according to the received random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN. .

In a specific implementation, step S507 sends the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN to the UE, and the sequence of steps S505 and S506 is in no particular order.

In order to protect the communication message between the SGSN and the UE, both the SGSN and the UE need to use the agreed key (ie, the second encryption key and the second integrity key) and the algorithm (ie, the SGSN selects The encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm) encrypt the communication message. Therefore, after the SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, the selected encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm need to be sent to the UE, so that the UE is based on the first After the encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK calculate the second encryption key and the second integrity key, the same encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm as used by the SGSN, and the second encryption key and the second The integrity key encrypts the communication message.

Please refer to FIG. 6. FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 6, the method may include the following steps:

S601. The UE sends a request message to the SGSN.

In a specific implementation, the request message sent by the UE to the SGSN may be an attach request message, a route update message, or other message, such as a service request message. After receiving the request message sent by the UE, the SGSN may obtain the identifier of the UE that sends the request message. If the UE is the first type of UE, the request message may carry the UE type indication information.

In the embodiment of the present application, the UE communicates with the network through the USIM card, and the identifier of the UE may be an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number) of the USIM card. The first type of UE may include an Internet of Things UE, a Machine To Machine (M2M) UE, or other high security UE. Among them, the Internet of Things (UE) refers to user equipments with information sensing functions and data transmission functions, such as navigation machines, personal digital assistants, bar code collectors, data collection terminals, and POS machines mainly used for consumption or transfer. Machine communication UE refers to a user equipment that has networking and communication capabilities, and realizes "smart" attributes through sensors, controllers, etc., so that information can be exchanged with people, mobile networks or other machines.

The embodiment of the present application takes the UE as the first type of UE as an example, and is in some feasible implementations. The request message sent by the UE to the SGSN may include UE type indication information, so that the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type UE according to the UE type indication information.

In a specific implementation, the UE and the SGSN are respectively configured with some encryption algorithms and integrity algorithms. When the UE sends a request message to the SGSN, the UE sends the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm supported by the UE to the SGSN.

S602. The UE receives an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN.

After the SGSN receives the request message of the UE, if it is determined that the UE is the first type of UE, the SGSN selects an encryption algorithm supported by the SGSN and an integrity algorithm supported by the SGSN from the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm supported by the UE. The SGSN sends the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, and obtains a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key in the authentication vector.

In a specific implementation, the SGSN may send the selected encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm to the UE, and may also send the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN in the authentication vector to the UE. The UE can authenticate the SGSN side according to the authentication token AUTN to implement authentication on the network side by the UE side. The UE may further calculate the first encryption key and the first integrity key by using the f1-f5 algorithm according to the received random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN, and the first encryption key and the first integrity calculated by the UE. The key is the same as the first encryption key and the first integrity key in the authentication vector obtained by the SGSN from the HLR/HSS. The authentication vector acquired by the SGSN to the HLR/HSS is an authentication vector quintuple including a random number RAND, an expected response XRES, an authentication token AUTN, an encryption key CK, and an integrity key IK.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first encryption key is an encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple, An integrity key is the integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.

In some possible implementations, the SGSN selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm can be used to calculate the second encryption key and the second integrity key together with the first encryption key CK, the first integrity key IK. In addition, according to the encryption algorithm and the generated second encryption key, the communication message may be encrypted to generate a message ciphertext; according to the integrity algorithm and the generated second integrity key, the message authentication code MAC, the message may be calculated. The authentication code MAC can be used to verify the integrity of the communication message.

S603. The UE acquires a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

In the embodiment of the present application, the second encryption key and the second integrity key are keys enhanced based on the first encryption key and the first integrity key. The second encryption key and the encryption algorithm sent by the SGSN are used to perform confidentiality protection on the message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, and the integrity algorithm sent by the second integrity key and the SGSN is used for the SGSN and the UE. The messages transmitted between are integrity protected.

Optionally, the UE may obtain the second encryption key and the second integrity key only according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; or may be based on the first encryption key, the first integrity key The key, the encryption algorithm sent by the SGSN, and the integrity algorithm acquire the second encryption key and the second integrity key.

After obtaining the second encryption key and the second integrity key, in order to protect the communication message between the SGSN and the UE, the SGSN and the UE are required to use the agreed key (ie, the second encryption key and the second integrity). The key) and the algorithm (ie, the encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN) encrypt the communication message.

In this embodiment, the UE sends a request message to the SGSN, receives an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN, and calculates a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. . Both the SGSN and the UE can add the communication message between the UE and the SGSN by using the second encryption key, the second integrity key, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN to the UE. Density protection and integrity protection enhance the security of communication of the first type of UE in the GPRS network.

Please refer to FIG. 7. FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 7, the method may include the following steps:

S701. The UE sends a request message to the SGSN.

S702. The UE receives an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN.

For the specific implementation of the steps S701-S702 in the embodiment of the present application, reference may be made to the steps S601-S602 of the embodiment shown in FIG. 6, which are not described herein.

S703. The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

The UE receives the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN, and also receives the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN sent by the SGSN. Before calculating the intermediate key, the expected authentication code XMAC may be first calculated according to the authentication token AUTN and the random number RAND, and the SGSN side is compared by comparing whether the expected authentication code XMAC and the message authentication code MAC in the authentication token AUTN are the same. Certify. After the authentication of the SGSN side is passed, the UE calculates the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK according to the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN sent by the SGSN, and calculates a random number response RES, and responds with a random number. The RES is sent to the SGSN for the SGSN side to authenticate the UE.

As a feasible implementation manner, the UE may perform operations on the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and use the operation result as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the intermediate key. For example, the intermediate key may be Km=KDF(CK||IK), where CK||IK represents a join operation on the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK.

S704. The UE calculates a second encryption key according to the intermediate key or according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string.

As a possible implementation manner, the UE may use the first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key. For example, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second encryption key, the highest 64 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second encryption key; if the GPRS system requires 128 The second encryption key of the bit can directly use the highest 128 bits of the intermediate key as the second encryption key. In other optional implementations, the bit of the required number of bits may be arbitrarily selected from the intermediate key as the second encryption key, which is not limited in this application.

As another feasible implementation manner, the UE may calculate a second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string ciphering. In a specific implementation, the intermediate key and the encrypted feature string ciphering may be used as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second encryption key. For example, the second encryption key can be calculated by K _cipher =KDF(Km, "ciphering"). "ciphering" is an encrypted feature string that can be generated by encoding.

In some feasible implementation manners, the GPRS system needs a 128-bit second encryption key, and a preset 128-bit (for example, the highest 128 bits) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function KDF. One of the input parameters, the output of the KDF is used as the second encryption key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the preset is intercepted in the output of the KDF 128 bits (for example, the highest 128 bits) are used as the second encryption key; alternatively, the intermediate key Kc128 can be used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the output of the key derivation function KDF is used as the second Encryption key.

S705. The UE calculates a second integrity key according to the intermediate key or according to the intermediate key and an integrity feature string.

As a possible implementation manner, the UE may use the second preset bit of the intermediate key as the second integrity key. For example, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, the lowest 64 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second integrity key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second integrity key Then, the lowest 128 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second integrity key. Optionally, the required number of bits can also be arbitrarily selected from the intermediate key. The bit is used as the second integrity key, which is not limited in this application.

As another optional implementation manner, the UE may calculate a second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string integrity. In a specific implementation, the intermediate key and the integrity feature string integrity may be used as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second integrity key. For example, the second integrity key can be calculated by K _integrity = KDF(Km, "integrity"). "integrity" is an integrity feature string that can be generated by encoding.

In this embodiment, the UE sends a request message to the SGSN, receives an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN, and calculates a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. . Both the SGSN and the UE can perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the communication message between the UE and the SGSN by using the second encryption key, the second integrity key, and the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN to the UE. The security of communication of a type of UE in a GPRS network.

Please refer to FIG. 8. FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 8, the method may include the following steps:

S801. The UE sends a request message to the SGSN.

S802. The UE receives an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN.

S803. The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

For the specific implementation of the steps S801-S803 in the embodiment of the present application, refer to steps S701-S703 of the embodiment shown in FIG. 7, and details are not described herein.

S804. The UE calculates a second encryption key according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm.

In a specific implementation, the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm may be used as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second encryption key. For example, the second encryption key K _cipher can be calculated by K _cipher = KDF (Km, algorithm type distinguished er1, ciphering algorithm id), where Km is an intermediate key, the algorithm type distinguish er1 is the first algorithm type indication, and the ciphering algorithm id is The identifier of the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN.

S805. The UE is configured according to the intermediate key, a second algorithm type, and the integrity algorithm. The identity of the second integrity key is calculated.

In a specific implementation, the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm may be used as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second integrity key. For example, the second integrity key K _cipher can be calculated by K _integrity = KDF (Km, algorithm type distinguished er2, integrity algorithm id), where Km is the intermediate key, the algorithm type distinguish er2 is the second algorithm type indication, and the integrity algorithm id The identity of the integrity algorithm selected for the SGSN.

In some possible cases, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm may use the same identity. The algorithm type indication needs to be combined to uniquely distinguish each algorithm. For example, suppose that both the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 are identified by an algorithm. When the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN are the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm, respectively, the first algorithm type indicates and the second Different values of the IE in the algorithm type indication may distinguish the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm, and may cause the calculated values of the second encryption key and the second integrity key to be different to distinguish the second encryption key. Key and second integrity key.

In this embodiment, the UE sends a request message to the SGSN, receives an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN, and acquires a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. . Both the SGSN and the UE can perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the communication message between the UE and the SGSN by using the second encryption key, the second integrity key, and the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN to the UE. The security of communication of a type of UE in a GPRS network.

Please refer to FIG. 9. FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 9, the method may include the following steps:

S901. The UE sends a request message to the SGSN.

S902. The UE receives an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN.

For the specific implementation of the steps S901-S902 in the embodiment of the present application, reference may be made to the steps S601-S602 of the embodiment shown in FIG. 6, which are not described herein.

S903. The UE calculates a second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm.

The UE receives the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN, and also receives the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN sent by the SGSN. Before calculating the second encryption key or the second integrity key, the UE may first calculate the expected authentication code XMAC according to the authentication token AUTN and the random number RAND by comparing the expected authentication code XMAC with the message in the authentication token AUTN. Whether the authentication code MAC is the same to authenticate the SGSN side. After the authentication of the SGSN side is passed, the UE calculates the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK according to the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN sent by the SGSN, and calculates a random number response RES, and responds with a random number. The RES is sent to the SGSN for the SGSN side to authenticate the UE.

Specifically, the UE may calculate the second encryption key by using the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, for example: K _cipher =KDF( CK, algorithm type distinguisher er1, ciphering algorithm id), where CK is the first encryption key, the algorithm type distinguisher er1 is the first algorithm type indication, and the ciphering algorithm id is the identifier of the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN.

S904. The UE calculates a second integrity key according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm.

Specifically, the UE may calculate the second integrity by using the first integrity key IK, the second algorithm type indicating algorithm type distinguisher2, and the identifier integrity algorithm id of the selected integrity algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF. The key, for example, K _integrity = KDF (IK, algorithm type distinguished er2, integrity algorithm id), where IK is the first integrity key, the algorithm type distinguisher er2 is the second algorithm type indication, and the integrity algorithm id is selected by the SGSN. The identity of the integrity algorithm.

Optionally, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, a maximum of 64 bits may be taken from the calculated K _integrity as a second integrity key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second integrity key The key can take the highest 128 bits from the calculated K _integrity as the second integrity key. In other possible implementations, the required number of bits can be arbitrarily selected as the second encryption key from the calculated K _integrity , which is not limited in this application.

In some possible cases, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm may use the same identity. The algorithm type indication needs to be combined to uniquely distinguish each algorithm. For example, suppose that both the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 are identified by an algorithm. When the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN are the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm, respectively, the first algorithm type indicates and the second The different values indicated by the algorithm type can distinguish the 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm, and can make the calculated values of the second encryption key and the second integrity key different to distinguish the second encryption key and Second integrity key.

Please refer to FIG. 10. FIG. 10 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 10, the method may include the following steps:

S1001: The UE sends a request message to the SGSN.

S1002. The UE receives an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN.

For the specific implementation of the steps S1001-S1002 in the embodiment of the present application, reference may be made to the steps S601-S602 of the embodiment shown in FIG. 6, which are not described herein.

S1003. The UE uses a first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as a second encryption key.

S1004. The UE uses a first integrity key or a preset bit of the first integrity key as a second integrity key.

Please refer to FIG. 11. FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 11, the method may include the following steps:

S1101: The HLR/HSS receives the identifier of the UE sent by the SGSN.

In the embodiment of the present application, the UE communicates with the network through the USIM card, and the identifier of the UE may be an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number) of the USIM card.

S1102. The HLR/HSS determines, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type of UE.

In a specific implementation, the HLR/HSS stores various information of a plurality of UEs. After receiving the identifier of the UE sent by the SGSN, the HLR/HSS may query related information of the UE to determine whether the UE is a UE of the first type. The embodiment of the present application is described by taking the UE as the first type of UE as an example.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first type of UE may include an Internet of Things UE, a Machine To Machine (M2M) UE, or other high security UE. Among them, the Internet of Things (UE) refers to user equipments with information sensing functions and data transmission functions, such as navigation machines, personal digital assistants, bar code collectors, data collection terminals, and POS machines mainly used for consumption or transfer. Machine communication UE refers to a user equipment that has networking and communication capabilities, and realizes "smart" attributes through sensors, controllers, etc., so that information can be exchanged with people, mobile networks or other machines.

S1103: The HLR/HSS sends UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE.

In the embodiment of the present application, the HLR/HSS may also send an authentication vector to the SGSN, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key.

In some possible implementations, the above authentication vector may be an authentication vector quintuple including a random number RAND, a desired response XRES, an authentication token AUTN, an encryption key CK, and an integrity key IK. The first encryption key is the encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is the integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.

In this embodiment, the HLR/HSS may receive the identifier of the UE that is sent by the SGSN, determine that the UE is the first type of UE according to the identifier of the UE, and send the UE type indication information to the SGSN to indicate that the UE is the first type of UE. The SGSN can perform the first type with the first type of UE The key enhancement processing of the UE improves the security of communication of the first type UE in the GPRS network.

Please refer to FIG. 12. FIG. 12 is a schematic flowchart diagram of still another embodiment of a method for key enhancement of a GPRS system provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 12, the method may include the following steps:

S1201. The UE sends a request message to the SGSN.

S1202. The SGSN sends the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS.

S1203. The HLR/HSS determines that the UE is the first type of UE according to the identifier of the UE.

S1204: The HLR/HSS sends the UE type indication information and the authentication vector to the SGSN.

S1205. The SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm according to the UE type indication information and an algorithm supported by the UE, and obtains a second encryption key and a second integrity key.

S1206: The SGSN sends an authentication and encryption request to the UE, where the SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, a random number RAND, and an authentication token AUTN.

S1207: The UE performs authentication on the SGSN side, and obtains a second encryption key and a second integrity key after the authentication is passed.

S1208: The UE sends an authentication and encryption corresponding RES to the SGSN.

S1209: The SGSN verifies the RES value and performs authentication on the UE side.

In the embodiment of the present application, the UE sends a request message to the SGSN, and after determining that the UE is the first type of UE, the SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and the UE and the SGSN according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, Calculating the enhanced second encryption key and the second integrity key, encrypting the communication message between the UE and the SGSN by using the second encryption key, the second integrity key, and an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN Protection and integrity protection enhances the security of communication of the first type of UE in the GPRS network.

Please refer to FIG. 13. FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of an SGSN device provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 13, the SGSN device may include a receiving module 1301, an obtaining module 1302, a selecting module 1303, and an obtaining module 1304, where:

The receiving module 1301 is configured to receive a request message sent by the UE.

The obtaining module 1302 is configured to obtain an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key.

The selecting module 1303 is configured to: when the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, select an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE, and send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to The UE.

In some possible implementations, the SGSN device may further include a sending module and a first determining module (not shown), wherein:

a sending module, configured to send the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, so that the HLR/HSS Determining, according to the identifier of the UE, whether the UE is a first type of UE, and sending, to the SGSN, UE type indication information, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE;

In some possible implementations, the SGSN device may further include a second determining module (not shown), where the second determining module is configured to determine that the UE is a first type of UE when the request message includes UE type indication information. The UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

In some feasible implementation manners, the SGSN device may also include a sending module, a first determining module, and a second determining module.

In the specific implementation, the SGSN may first obtain the authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, and then determine that the UE is the first type of UE; the SGSN may also first determine that the UE is the first type of UE, and then obtain the authentication vector from the HLR/HSS.

In some possible implementations, the SGSN selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm can be used to calculate the second encryption key and the second integrity key together with the first encryption key and the first integrity key in the authentication vector. . In addition, according to the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN and the second encryption key, the communication message may be encrypted to generate a message ciphertext; according to the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN and the second integrity key, The message authentication code MAC can be calculated, and the message authentication code MAC can be used to verify the integrity of the communication message.

The obtaining module 1304 is configured to obtain a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

In the embodiment of the present application, after the SGSN selects the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm, the second encryption key and the second integrity key are calculated according to the first encryption key and the second encryption key in the authentication vector, where the first The encryption key is the encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is the integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple. The second encryption key and the second integrity key are keys enhanced based on the first encryption key and the first integrity key, wherein the second encryption key and the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN are available for the SGSN The message transmitted between the UE and the UE is confidentially protected; the second integrity key and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN are used to transmit between the SGSN and the UE The message is integrity protected.

Optionally, the SGSN may calculate the second encryption key and the second integrity key according to only the first encryption key and the first integrity key; or may be based on the first encryption key, the first integrity key The second encryption key and the second integrity key are calculated by the key, the selected encryption algorithm, and the selected integrity algorithm.

In a specific implementation, the selecting module 1303 sends the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN to the UE, and the obtaining module 1304 obtains the second encryption key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key in the authentication vector. The order of the key and the second integrity key may be in no particular order.

The structure and function of the obtaining module 1304 shown in FIG. 13 will be described in detail below with reference to FIGS. 14 to 15.

In some possible implementations, as shown in FIG. 14, the obtaining module 1304 can include a first calculating unit 13041, a second calculating unit 13042, and a third calculating unit 13043, wherein:

The first calculating unit 13041 is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

As a feasible implementation manner, the first calculating unit 13041 may perform operations on the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and then use the operation result as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the intermediate key. For example, the intermediate key may be Km=KDF(CK||IK), where CK||IK represents a join operation on the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK.

As another feasible implementation manner, the intermediate key may directly adopt an existing 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or an existing 128-bit encryption key Kc128, that is, the first calculation unit 13041 may directly use the existing GPRS encryption key Kc (64 bit) as the intermediate key, or directly the existing Kc128 (128 bits) as an intermediate key. Kc and Kc128 are generated based on CK and IK calculations.

The second calculating unit 13042 is configured to calculate a second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encrypted feature string.

In a specific implementation, the intermediate key and the encrypted feature string ciphering may be used as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second encryption key. For example, the second encryption key can be calculated by K _cipher =KDF(Km, "ciphering"). "ciphering" is an encrypted feature string that can be generated by encoding.

The third calculating unit 13043 is configured to calculate a second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string.

In a specific implementation, the intermediate key and the integrity feature string integrity may be used as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the second integrity key. For example, the second integrity key can be calculated by K _integrity = KDF(Km, "integrity"). "integrity" is an integrity feature string that can be generated by encoding.

In some feasible implementation manners, the GPRS system needs a 128-bit second integrity key, and a preset 128-bit (for example, the highest 128 bits) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function. One of the input parameters of the KDF is to use K _integrity calculated according to the preset 128 bits of Km as the second integrity key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as the input parameter of the key derivation function KDF. For example, the preset 128 bits (for example, the highest 128 bits) are intercepted as the second integrity key in the calculated K _integrity ; or the intermediate key Kc128 may be used as the input parameter of the key derivation function KDF. First, the output of the key derivation function KDF is taken as the second integrity key.

As a feasible implementation manner, the first calculating unit 1041 may perform operations on the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and then use the operation result as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the intermediate key. For example, the intermediate key may be Km=KDF(CK||IK), where CK||IK represents a join operation on the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK.

As another feasible implementation manner, the first calculating unit 1041 may directly use the existing GPRS encryption key Kc (64 bits) as an intermediate key, or directly use the existing Kc128 (128 bits) as an intermediate key. Kc and Kc128 are generated based on CK and IK calculations.

a second calculating unit 13042, configured to select and select according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type The identifier of the selected encryption algorithm calculates the second encryption key.

In a specific implementation, the second calculating unit 1042 may calculate the second encryption key by using the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF. For example, the second encryption key K _cipher can be calculated by K _cipher = KDF (Km, algorithm type distinguished er1, ciphering algorithm id), where Km is an intermediate key, the algorithm type distinguish er1 is the first algorithm type indication, and the ciphering algorithm id is The identifier of the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN.

a third calculating unit 13043, configured to calculate, according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, the second integrity key, where the first algorithm type indication and The values indicated by the second algorithm type are different.

In a specific implementation, the third calculating unit 13043 may calculate the second integrity key by using the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF. For example, the second integrity key K _cipher can be calculated by K _integrity = KDF (Km, algorithm type distinguished er2, integrity algorithm id), where Km is the intermediate key, the algorithm type distinguish er2 is the second algorithm type indication, and the integrity algorithm id The identity of the integrity algorithm selected for the SGSN.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first algorithm type indicates an algorithm for indicating that the algorithm currently participating in the operation is an encryption type, and the second algorithm type indicates an algorithm for indicating that the algorithm currently participating in the operation is an integrity type. In some feasible embodiments, the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication may include the same IE, and the two are distinguished by different values of the IE. For example, the first algorithm type indication and the IE indicated by the second algorithm type are both an algorithm type distinguisher er. When the algorithm type distinguishes er=00, an algorithm indicating an encryption type, when the algorithm type distinguishes er=01, an algorithm indicating the integrity type.

In some possible implementations, as shown in FIG. 15, the obtaining module 1304 can include a fourth calculating unit 13044 and a fifth calculating unit 13045, where:

The fourth calculating unit 13044 is configured to calculate a second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm.

Specifically, the fourth calculating unit 13044 may calculate the second encryption key by using the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, for example: K _{The cipher} is the first encryption type, and the ciphering algorithm id is the identifier of the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN. The cipher is the first encryption type.

The fifth calculating unit 13045 calculates a second integrity key according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm in the authentication vector.

Specifically, the fifth calculating unit 13045 may calculate the second integrity key by using the identifier of the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the selected integrity algorithm as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF, For example: K _integrity = KDF (IK, algorithm type distinguisher er2, integrity algorithm id), where IK is the first integrity key, algorithm type distinguish er2 is the second algorithm type indication, and integrity algorithm id is the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN. Logo.

Optionally, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, a maximum of 64 bits may be taken from the calculated K _integrity as a second integrity key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second integrity key The key can take the highest 128 bits from the calculated K _integrity as the second integrity key. In other possible implementations, the required number of bits can be arbitrarily selected as the second integrity key from the calculated K _integrity , which is not limited in this application.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first algorithm type indication is used to indicate that the algorithm currently participating in the operation is an encryption type algorithm, and the second algorithm type indication is used to indicate that the algorithm currently participating in the operation is an integrity type algorithm, and the first algorithm type indication The value indicated by the second algorithm type is different. In some feasible realities In an embodiment, the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication may include the same IE, and the two are distinguished by different values of the IE. For example, the first algorithm type indication and the IE indicated by the second algorithm type are both an algorithm type distinguisher er. When the algorithm type distinguishes er=00, an algorithm indicating an encryption type, when the algorithm type distinguishes er=01, an algorithm indicating the integrity type.

In some possible implementations,

In some possible implementations, the obtaining module 1304 can be specifically configured to:

Calculating an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The first preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second encryption key, and the second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key.

As a feasible implementation manner, the obtaining module 1304 may perform operations on the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and then use the operation result as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the intermediate key. For example, the intermediate key may be Km=KDF(CK||IK), where CK||IK represents a join operation on the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK.

As another possible implementation manner, the obtaining module 1304 may directly use the existing GPRS encryption key Kc (64 bits) as an intermediate key, or directly use the existing Kc128 (128 bits) as an intermediate key. Kc and Kc128 are generated based on CK and IK calculations.

As a possible implementation manner, the obtaining module 1304 may use the first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key. For example, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second encryption key, the highest 64 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second encryption key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second encryption key, then The highest 128 bits of the intermediate key are directly used as the second encryption key. In other optional implementations, the bit of the required number of bits may be arbitrarily selected from the intermediate key as the second encryption key, which is not limited in this application.

As a possible implementation manner, the obtaining module 1304 may use the second preset bit of the intermediate key as the second integrity key. For example, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, the lowest 64 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second integrity key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second integrity key Then, the lowest 128 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second integrity key. In other optional implementations, the bit of the required number of bits may be arbitrarily selected from the intermediate key as the second integrity key, which is not limited in this application.

Using the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; pre-predetermining the first integrity key or the first integrity key A bit is set as the second integrity key.

Please refer to FIG. 16. FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of another embodiment of an SGSN device provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 16, the SGSN device may include a receiving device 1601, a transmitting device 1602, and a The processor 1603, the receiving device 1601, the transmitting device 1602 and the processor 1603 are connected by a bus, wherein:

The receiving device 1601 is configured to receive a request message sent by the UE.

The processor 1603 is configured to:

The sending device 1602 is configured to send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE;

In some possible implementations, the request message includes an identifier of the UE;

The sending device 1602 is further configured to send the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, so that the HLR/HSS determines that the UE is a first type UE according to the identifier of the UE, and the The SGSN sends the UE type indication information, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE;

The processor 1603 determines whether the UE is a first type of UE, and the method includes: the processor receiving the UE type indication information sent by the HLR/HSS, and determining that the UE is a first type of UE.

In some possible implementations, the processor 1603 determines that the UE is a first type of UE, including:

If the request message includes UE type indication information, the processor 1603 determines that the UE is a first type of UE.

In some possible implementations, the processor 1603 obtains the second encryption key and the second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, including:

The processor 1603 calculates, according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, Inter-key

The processor 1603 calculates a second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string;

The processor 1603 calculates a second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string.

In some possible implementations, the authentication vector is an authentication vector quintuple;

In some possible implementations, the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.

In the embodiment of the present application, the SGSN receives the request message sent by the UE, and after determining that the UE is the first type of UE, selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and obtains an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, according to the authentication vector. Obtaining the second encryption key and the second integrity key, obtaining the enhanced second encryption key and the second integrity key, and transmitting the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, so that the UE is calculating the second After the encryption key and the second integrity key, both the SGSN and the UE can use the second encryption key and the second integrity key, the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN, and the integrity algorithm. The communication message between the SGSN and the UE performs encryption protection and integrity protection, and enhances the security of communication of the first type UE in the GPRS network.

Referring to FIG. 17, FIG. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a UE provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 17, the UE may include a sending module 1701, a receiving module 1702, and an obtaining module 1703, where:

The sending module 1701 is configured to send a request message to the SGSN.

In a specific implementation, the request message sent by the sending module 1701 to the SGSN may be an attach request message, a route update message, or other message, such as a service request message. After receiving the request message sent by the UE, the SGSN may obtain the identifier of the UE that sends the request message. If the UE is the first type of UE, the request message may carry the UE type indication information.

In the embodiment of the present application, the UE communicates with the network through the USIM card, and the identifier of the UE may be an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number) of the USIM card. The first type of UE refers to user equipments having information sensing functions and message transmission functions, such as a navigation machine, a personal digital assistant, a barcode collector, a data collection terminal, and a POS machine mainly used for consumption or transfer. Machine communication UE refers to a user equipment that has networking and communication capabilities, and realizes "smart" attributes through sensors, controllers, etc., so that information can be exchanged with people, mobile networks or other machines.

The UE in the embodiment of the present application is a first type of UE. In some possible implementations, the request message sent by the sending module 1701 to the SGSN may include UE type indication information, so that the SGSN indicates according to the UE type. The information determines that the UE is a first type of UE.

In a specific implementation, the UE and the SGSN are respectively configured with some encryption algorithms and integrity algorithms. When the sending module 1701 sends a request message to the SGSN, the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm supported by the UE are supported. And sent to the SGSN.

The receiving module 1702 is configured to receive an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN.

In some possible implementations, the SGSN selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm can be used to calculate the second encryption key and the second integrity together with the first encryption key CK, the first integrity key IK in the authentication vector. Key. In addition, according to the encryption algorithm and the generated second encryption key, the communication message may be encrypted to generate a message ciphertext; according to the integrity algorithm and the generated second integrity key, the message authentication code MAC, the message may be calculated. The authentication code MAC can be used to verify the integrity of the communication message.

Optionally, when the GPRS network needs a 128-bit second encryption key, the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN may be any one of the 128-EEA1 algorithm, the 128-EEA2 algorithm, and the 128-EEA3 algorithm; the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN. It may be any one of 128-EIA1 algorithm, 128-EIA2 algorithm, and 128-EIA3 algorithm. The 128-EEA1 algorithm and the 128-EIA1 algorithm use the SNOW 3G algorithm as the core algorithm; the 128-EEA2 algorithm and the 128-EIA2 algorithm use the AES algorithm as the core algorithm; 128-EEA3 The algorithm and the 128-EIA3 algorithm use the ZUC algorithm (the ancestral algorithm set) as the core algorithm.

The obtaining module 1703 is configured to obtain the second encryption key and the second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

Optionally, the obtaining module 1703 may obtain the second encryption key and the second integrity key only according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; or the obtaining module 1703 may be configured according to the first encryption key, The first integrity key, the encryption algorithm sent by the SGSN, and the integrity algorithm acquire the second encryption key and the second integrity key.

The structure and function of the acquisition module 1703 shown in FIG. 17 will be described in detail below with reference to FIGS. 18 to 19.

In some possible implementations, as shown in FIG. 18, the obtaining module 1703 may include a first calculating unit 17031, a second calculating unit 17032, and a third calculating unit 17033, where:

The first calculating unit 17031 is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key.

In some feasible implementation manners, before the first calculating unit 17031 calculates the intermediate key, the UE first calculates the expected authentication code XMAC according to the authentication token AUTN and the random number RAND sent by the SGSN, by comparing the expected authentication code XMAC and the authentication. Message authentication code MAC in token AUTN Whether it is the same to authenticate the SGSN side. After the authentication of the SGSN side is passed, the UE calculates the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK according to the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN sent by the SGSN, and calculates a random number response RES, and responds with a random number. The RES is sent to the SGSN for the SGSN side to authenticate the UE.

As a feasible implementation manner, the first calculating unit 17031 may perform operations on the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and then use the operation result as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the intermediate key. For example, the intermediate key may be Km=KDF(CK||IK), where CK||IK represents a join operation on the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK.

As another feasible implementation manner, the intermediate key may directly adopt an existing 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or an existing 128-bit encryption key Kc128, that is, the first computing unit 17031 may directly use the existing The GPRS encryption key Kc (64 bits) is used as an intermediate key, or the existing Kc128 (128 bits) is directly used as an intermediate key. Kc and Kc128 are generated based on CK and IK calculations.

The second calculating unit 17032 is configured to calculate a second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encrypted feature string.

In some feasible implementations, the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second encryption key, and a preset 64-bit (for example, the highest 64-bit) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function KDF. One of the input parameters, the output of the KDF is used as the second encryption key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, The preset 64-bit (for example, the highest 64 bits) is intercepted in the output of the KDF as the second encryption key; or, the intermediate key Kc (64 bits) may be used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, The output of the key derivation function KDF is used as the second encryption key.

The third calculating unit 17033 is configured to calculate a second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string.

The second calculating unit 17032 is configured to calculate the second encryption key according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm.

In a specific implementation, the second calculating unit 1042 may calculate the second encryption key by using the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF. For example, the second encryption key K _cipher can be calculated by K _cipher = KDF (Km, algorithm type distinguished er1, ciphering algorithm id), where Km is an intermediate key, the algorithm type distinguish er1 is the first algorithm type indication, and the ciphering algorithm id is The identifier of the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN.

In some feasible implementation manners, the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second encryption key, and a preset 64-bit (for example, the highest 64-bit) can be intercepted from the calculated intermediate key Km as a key derivation function KDF. One of the input parameters, the output of the KDF is used as the second encryption key; or, the calculated intermediate key Km can be directly used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the preset is intercepted in the output of the KDF 64 bits (eg, the highest 64 bits) as the second encryption key; or The intermediate key Kc (64 bits) may be used as one of the input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, and the output of the key derivation function KDF may be used as the second encryption key.

The third calculating unit 17033 is configured to calculate the second integrity key according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm, where the first algorithm type indication and the The value indicated by the second algorithm type is different.

In a specific implementation, the third calculating unit 17033 may calculate the second integrity key by using the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF. For example, the second integrity key K _cipher can be calculated by K _integrity = KDF (Km, algorithm type distinguished er2, integrity algorithm id), where Km is the intermediate key, the algorithm type distinguish er2 is the second algorithm type indication, and the integrity algorithm id The identity of the integrity algorithm selected for the SGSN.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first algorithm type indicates an algorithm for indicating that the algorithm currently participating in the operation is an encryption type, and the second algorithm type indicates an algorithm for indicating that the algorithm currently participating in the operation is an integrity type. In some feasible embodiments, the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication may include the same IE, and the two are distinguished by different values of the IE. For example, the first algorithm type indication and the second The IE indicated by the algorithm type is an algorithm type distinguisher er. When the algorithm type distinguishes er=00, the algorithm indicating the encryption type is an algorithm indicating the integrity type when the algorithm type distinguishes er=01.

In some possible implementations, as shown in FIG. 19, the obtaining module 1703 may include a fourth calculating unit 17034 and a fifth calculating unit 17035, where:

The fourth calculating unit 17034 is configured to calculate a second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm.

In some feasible implementation manners, before the fourth calculating unit 17034 calculates the second encryption key and the fifth calculating unit 17035 calculates the second integrity key, the UE first calculates according to the authentication token AUTN and the random number RAND sent by the SGSN. The authentication code XMAC is expected to authenticate the SGSN side by comparing whether the expected authentication code XMAC is the same as the message authentication code MAC in the authentication token AUTN. After the authentication of the SGSN side is passed, the UE calculates the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK according to the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN sent by the SGSN, and calculates a random number response RES, and responds with a random number. The RES is sent to the SGSN for the SGSN side to authenticate the UE.

Specifically, the fourth calculating unit 17034 may calculate the second encryption key by using the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, for example: K _{The cipher} is the first encryption type, and the ciphering algorithm id is the identifier of the encryption algorithm selected by the SGSN. The cipher is the first encryption type.

The fifth calculating unit 17035 is configured to calculate a second integrity key according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm.

Specifically, the fifth calculating unit 17035 may calculate the second integrity key by using the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm as input parameters of the key derivation function KDF, For example: K _integrity = KDF (IK, algorithm type distinguisher er2, integrity algorithm id), where IK is the first integrity key, algorithm type distinguish er2 is the second algorithm type indication, and integrity algorithm id is the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN. Logo.

Optionally, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, a maximum of 64 bits may be taken from the calculated K _integrity as a second integrity key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second integrity key The key can take the highest 128 bits from the calculated K _integrity as the second integrity key.

In some possible implementations, the obtaining module 1703 may be specifically configured to:

In some feasible implementation manners, before the obtaining module 1703 calculates the intermediate key, the UE first calculates the expected authentication code XMAC according to the authentication token AUTN and the random number RAND sent by the SGSN, by comparing the expected authentication code XMAC with the authentication token. Whether the message authentication code MAC in the AUTN is the same to authenticate the SGSN side. After the authentication of the SGSN side is passed, the UE calculates the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK according to the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN sent by the SGSN, and calculates a random number response RES, and responds with a random number. The RES is sent to the SGSN for the SGSN side to authenticate the UE.

As a feasible implementation manner, the obtaining module 1703 may perform operations on the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and then use the operation result as an input parameter of the key derivation function KDF to calculate the intermediate key. For example, the intermediate key may be Km=KDF(CK||IK), where CK||IK represents a join operation on the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK.

As another feasible implementation manner, the intermediate key may directly adopt an existing 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or an existing 128-bit encryption key Kc128, that is, the acquisition module 1703 may directly encrypt the existing GPRS. The key Kc (64 bits) is used as the intermediate key, or the existing Kc128 (128 bits) is directly used as the intermediate key. Kc and Kc128 are generated based on CK and IK calculations.

As a possible implementation manner, the obtaining module 1703 may use the first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key. For example, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second encryption key, the highest 64 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second encryption key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second encryption key, then The highest 128 bits of the intermediate key are directly used as the second encryption key. Optionally, the bit of the required number of bits can be arbitrarily selected from the intermediate key as the second encryption key, which is not limited in this application.

As a possible implementation manner, the obtaining module 1703 may use the second preset bit of the intermediate key as the second integrity key. For example, if the GPRS system requires a 64-bit second integrity key, the lowest 64 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second integrity key; if the GPRS system requires a 128-bit second integrity key Then, the lowest 128 bits of the intermediate key can be directly used as the second integrity key. Optionally, the bit of the required number of bits can be arbitrarily selected from the intermediate key as the second integrity key, which is not limited in this application.

Using a first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key;

The first integrity key or the preset bit of the first integrity key is used as the second integrity key.

In some feasible implementation manners, before the obtaining module 1703 calculates the second encryption key or the second integrity key, the UE may first calculate the expected authentication code XMAC according to the authentication token AUTN and the random number RAND, by comparing the expected identification. The weight code XMAC is the same as the message authentication code MAC in the authentication token AUTN to authenticate the SGSN side. After the authentication of the SGSN side is passed, the UE calculates the first encryption key CK and the first integrity key IK according to the random number RAND and the authentication token AUTN sent by the SGSN, and calculates a random number response RES, and responds with a random number. The RES is sent to the SGSN for the SGSN side to authenticate the UE.

Referring to FIG. 20, FIG. 20 is a schematic structural diagram of another embodiment of a UE provided by the present application. As shown in FIG. 20, the UE may include a transmitting device 2001, a receiving device 2002, and a processor 2003. The transmitting device 2001, the receiving device 2002 and the processor 2003 can be connected by a bus, wherein:

The sending device 2001 is configured to send a request message to the SGSN;

The receiving device 2002 is configured to receive an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN;

The processor 2003 is configured to obtain a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

In some feasible implementation manners, the request message sent by the sending apparatus 2001 to the SGSN includes UE type indication information, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

In some possible implementations, the processor 2003 acquires the second encryption key and the second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, including:

The processor 2003 calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The processor 2003 calculates a second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string;

The processor 2003 calculates a second integrity key based on the intermediate key and the integrity feature string.

The processor 2003 calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor 2003 uses the first preset bit of the intermediate key as a second encryption key, The second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key; or

The processor 2003 calculates a second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm; the processor 2003 according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the integrity The identifier of the algorithm calculates a second integrity key; or,

The processor 2003 uses the first encryption key or the preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; the processor 2003 uses the first integrity key or the preset bit of the first integrity key as the Second integrity key.

In some possible implementations, the first encryption key is an encryption in an authentication vector quintuple a key CK, the first integrity key being an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.

In this embodiment, the UE sends a request message to the SGSN, and calculates a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN, the first encryption key, and the first integrity key. Encryption protection and integrity protection of the communication message between the UE and the SGSN by the second encryption key and the second integrity key enhance the security of communication of the first type UE in the GPRS network.

Referring to FIG. 21, FIG. 21 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of an HLR/HSS according to an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG. 21, the HLR/HSS may include a receiving module 2101, a determining module 2102, and a sending module 2103, where:

The receiving module 2101 is configured to receive an identifier of the user equipment UE that is sent by the serving GPRS support node SGSN.

The determining module 2102 is configured to determine, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type of UE.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first type of UE may include an Internet of Things UE and a machine communication (Machine To Machine, M2M) UE or other high security UE. Among them, the Internet of Things (UE) refers to user equipments with information sensing functions and data transmission functions, such as navigation machines, personal digital assistants, bar code collectors, data collection terminals, and POS machines mainly used for consumption or transfer. Machine communication UE refers to a user equipment that has networking and communication capabilities, and realizes "smart" attributes through sensors, controllers, etc., so that information can be exchanged with people, mobile networks or other machines.

The sending module 2103 is configured to send the UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

In this embodiment, the HLR/HSS may receive the identifier of the UE that is sent by the SGSN, determine that the UE is the first type of UE according to the identifier of the UE, and send the UE type indication information to the SGSN to indicate that the UE is the first type of UE. The SGSN may perform key enhancement processing for the first type of UE with the first type of UE to improve the security of communication of the first type of UE in the GPRS network.

Referring to FIG. 22, FIG. 22 is a schematic structural diagram of another embodiment of an HLR/HSS according to an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG. 22, the HLR/HSS may include a receiving device 2201, a transmitting device 2202, and a processor 2203. The receiving device 2201, the transmitting device 2202, and the processor 2203 are connected by a bus, where:

The receiving device 2201 is configured to receive an identifier of the user equipment UE that is sent by the SGSN.

The processor 2203 is configured to determine, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type UE;

The sending device 2202 is configured to send the UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.

Referring to FIG. 23, FIG. 23 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a GPRS system according to an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG. 23, the GPRS system may include an SGSN device 2301, a UE 2302, and an HLR/HSS 2303, where:

In some possible implementations, the HLR/HSS 2303 can be used to:

Receiving an identifier of the UE sent by the SGSN;

In the embodiment of the present application, the UE sends a request message to the SGSN, and after determining that the UE is the first type of UE, the SGSN selects an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm, and the UE and the SGSN perform the first encryption according to the first encryption. Key and first integrity key, calculating an enhanced second encryption key and a second integrity key, using a second encryption key, a second integrity key, and an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm selected by the SGSN The communication message between the UE and the SGSN performs encryption protection and integrity protection, and enhances the security of communication of the first type UE in the GPRS network.

The embodiment of the present application also correspondingly discloses a computer storage medium having a program stored therein, and the embodiment described in any of FIGS. 1-5 of the present application may be executed when the program is run.

Another embodiment of the present application also discloses a computer storage medium having a program stored therein that can execute an embodiment as described in any of FIGS. 6-10 of the present application.

The embodiment of the present application further discloses another computer storage medium, wherein the computer storage medium stores a program, and when the program is executed, the embodiment as described in FIG. 11 of the present application can be executed.

It should be noted that, for the foregoing various method embodiments, for the sake of brevity, they are all described as a series of action combinations, but those skilled in the art should understand that the present application is not limited by the described action sequence. Because some steps may be performed in other orders or concurrently in accordance with the present application. In the following, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are all preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily required by the present application.

In the above embodiments, the descriptions of the various embodiments are different, and the parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment can be referred to the related descriptions of other embodiments.

A person skilled in the art may understand that all or part of the various steps of the foregoing embodiments may be performed by a program to instruct related hardware. The program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and the storage medium may include: Flash disk, Read-Only Memory (ROM), Random Access Memory (RAM), disk or optical disk.

The GPRS system key enhancement method, the SGSN device, the UE, the HLR/HSS, and the GPRS system provided by the embodiments of the present application are described in detail. The specific examples are used to explain the principles and implementation manners of the present application. The description of the above embodiments is only for helping to understand the method of the present application and its core ideas; at the same time, for those of ordinary skill in the art, according to the idea of the present application, there will be changes in specific embodiments and application scopes. In summary, the content of this specification should not be construed as limiting the application.

Claims

A method for key enhancement of a GPRS system, comprising:

The serving GPRS support node SGSN receives the request message sent by the user equipment UE;

The SGSN acquires an authentication vector from a home location register HLR/home subscription system HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key;

If the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, select an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE, and send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE;

The SGSN obtains a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The second encryption key and the selected encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, the second integrity key and the selected integrity algorithm. And used for integrity protection of messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.
The method according to claim 1, wherein the request message includes an identifier of the UE, and the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, including:

Sending, by the SGSN, the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, so that the HLR/HSS determines that the UE is a first type of UE according to the identifier of the UE, and sends the UE type indication information to the SGSN. The UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE;

The SGSN receives the UE type indication information sent by the HLR/HSS, and determines that the UE is a first type of UE.
The method according to claim 1, wherein the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, including:

If the request message includes the UE type indication information, the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.
The method according to any one of claims 1-3, wherein the SGSN obtains a second encryption key and a second integrity according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key Secret Key, including:

The SGSN calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the SGSN calculates the second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string; The SGSN calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string; or

The SGSN calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the SGSN is configured according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm, Computing the second encryption key; the SGSN calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key, a second algorithm type indication, and an identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, where the first algorithm The type indication and the value indicated by the second algorithm type are different.
The method according to any one of claims 1-3, wherein the SGSN obtains a second encryption key and a second integrity according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key Key, including:

The SGSN calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the SGSN uses a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key, Using the second preset bit of the intermediate key as the second integrity key; or

The SGSN calculates the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm; the SGSN is configured according to the first integrity key and the second algorithm. The type indication and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm calculate the second integrity key, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values; or

The SGSN uses the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; the SGSN sets the first integrity key or the first The preset bit of the integrity key is used as the second integrity key.
A method according to any one of claims 4 or 5, wherein:

The authentication vector is an authentication vector quintuple;

The first encryption key is an encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.
The method according to claim 6, wherein the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.
A method for key enhancement of a GPRS system, comprising:

The user equipment UE sends a request message to the serving GPRS support node SGSN;

Receiving, by the UE, an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN;

Obtaining, by the UE, the second encryption key and the second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The second encryption key and the encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, where the second integrity key and the integrity algorithm are used. Performing integrity protection on messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.
The method according to claim 8, wherein the request message sent by the UE to the SGSN includes UE type indication information, and the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE.
The method according to any one of claims 8 or 9, wherein the UE acquires a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, including :

The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the UE calculates the second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string; The UE calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string; or

The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the UE calculates according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm. The second encryption key; the UE calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm, where the first algorithm type indication The value indicated by the second algorithm type is different.
The method according to any one of claims 8 or 9, wherein the UE is based on The encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm, the first encryption key, and the first integrity key calculate the second encryption key and the second integrity key, including:

The UE calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the UE uses a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key, Using the second preset bit of the intermediate key as the second integrity key; or

The UE calculates the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm; the UE according to the first integrity key, the algorithm type indication, and the The identifier of the integrity algorithm calculates the second integrity key, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values; or

The UE uses the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; the UE will use the first integrity key or the first The preset bit of the integrity key is used as the second integrity key.
The method according to any one of claims 10 or 11, wherein the first encryption key is an encryption key CK in an authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is the authentication The integrity key IK in the vector quintuple.
The method according to claim 12, wherein the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.
A method for key enhancement of a GPRS system, comprising:

The home location register HLR/home subscription system HSS receives the identifier of the user equipment UE sent by the serving GPRS support node SGSN;

Determining, by the HLR/HSS, that the UE is a first type UE according to the identifier of the UE;

The HLR/HSS sends the UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.
A service GPRS support node SGSN device, comprising:

a receiving module, configured to receive a request message sent by the user equipment UE;

An obtaining module, configured to acquire an authentication vector from a home location register HLR/home subscription system HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key;

a selecting module, configured to: when the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, select an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE, and send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the Said UE;

Obtaining a module, configured to obtain a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The second encryption key and the selected encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, the second integrity key and the selected integrity algorithm. And used for integrity protection of messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.
The SGSN device according to claim 15, wherein the request message includes an identifier of the UE, and the SGSN device further includes:

a sending module, configured to send the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, so that the HLR/HSS determines, according to the identifier of the UE, whether the UE is a first type UE, and sends a UE type indication to the SGSN. Information, the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE;

The first determining module is configured to receive the UE type indication information that is sent by the HLR/HSS, and determine that the UE is a first type of UE.
The SGSN device according to claim 15, wherein the SGSN device further comprises:

And a second determining module, configured to: when the request message includes the UE type indication information, determine that the UE is a first type of UE, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.
The SGSN device according to any one of claims 15-17, wherein the obtaining module comprises a first calculating unit, a second calculating unit and a third calculating unit, wherein:

The first calculating unit is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the second calculating unit is configured to use the intermediate key and the encryption feature String, Calculating the second encryption key; the third calculating unit, configured to calculate the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string; or

The first calculating unit is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and the second calculating unit is configured to use, according to the intermediate key, the first An algorithm type indication and an identifier of the selected encryption algorithm, the second encryption key is calculated; the third calculation unit is configured to perform, according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the selected integrity algorithm And identifying, the second integrity key, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values.
The SGSN device according to any one of claims 15-17, characterized in that:

The obtaining module is specifically configured to: calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; and use a first preset bit of the intermediate key as a second encryption key, Using the second preset bit of the intermediate key as the second integrity key; or

The obtaining module includes: a fourth calculating unit, configured to calculate the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm; the fifth calculating unit, Calculating the second integrity key according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and an identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type The values indicated are not the same; or,

The obtaining module is specifically configured to: use a first encryption key in the authentication vector or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; An integrity key or a preset bit of the first integrity key is used as the second integrity key.
The SGSN device according to any one of claims 18 or 19, characterized in that:

The authentication vector is an authentication vector quintuple;

The first encryption key is an encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.
The SGSN device according to claim 20, characterized in that the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.
A computer storage medium, characterized in that the computer storage medium stores a program, and when the program is executed, the steps of any one of claims 1 to 7 are performed.
A service GPRS support node SGSN device, comprising: a receiving device, a transmitting device and a processor, wherein the receiving device, the transmitting device and the processor are connected by a bus, wherein:

The receiving device is configured to receive a request message sent by the user equipment UE;

The processor is configured to:

Obtaining an authentication vector from a home location register HLR/home subscription system HSS, the authentication vector including a first encryption key and a first integrity key;

And if the SGSN determines that the UE is a first type of UE, selecting an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE;

Obtaining a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The sending device is configured to send the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE;

The second encryption key and the selected encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, the second integrity key and the selected integrity algorithm. And used for integrity protection of messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.
The SGSN device according to claim 23, wherein the request message includes an identifier of the UE;

The sending device is further configured to send the identifier of the UE to the HLR/HSS, so that the HLR/HSS determines, according to the identifier of the UE, whether the UE is a first type UE, and The SGSN sends the UE type indication information, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE;

Determining, by the processor, that the UE is a first type of UE, the method includes: the processor receiving the UE type indication information sent by the HLR/HSS, and determining that the UE is a first type of UE.
The SGSN device according to claim 23, wherein the processor determines that the UE is a first type of UE, including:

If the request message includes the UE type indication information, the processor determines that the UE is a first type of UE, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.
The SGSN device according to any one of claims 23-25, wherein the processor obtains a second encryption key and a second according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key Integrity key, including:

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor calculates the second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string a key; the processor calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and an integrity feature string; or

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor is configured according to the intermediate key, the first algorithm type indication, and the selected encryption algorithm Identifying, calculating the second encryption key; the processor calculating the second integrity key according to the intermediate key, a second algorithm type indication, and an identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, wherein the The first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values.
The SGSN device according to any one of claims 23-25, wherein the processor obtains a second encryption key and a second according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key Integrity key, including:

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor uses a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption a key, the second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key; or

The processor calculates the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected encryption algorithm in the authentication vector; the processor is according to the authentication vector Calculating the second integrity key by the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the selected integrity algorithm, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication are taken Values are not the same; or,

The processor uses the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; the processor sets the first integrity key or the The preset bit of the first integrity key is used as the second integrity key.
The SGSN device according to any one of claims 26 or 27, characterized in that:

The authentication vector is an authentication vector quintuple;

The first encryption key is an encryption key CK in the authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is an integrity key IK in the authentication vector quintuple.
The SGSN device according to claim 28, characterized in that the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.
A user equipment (UE), comprising:

a sending module, configured to send a request message to the serving GPRS support node SGSN;

a receiving module, configured to receive an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN;

An acquiring module, configured to acquire a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The second encryption key and the encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, where the second integrity key and the integrity algorithm are used. Performing integrity protection on messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.
The UE according to claim 30, wherein the request message sent by the UE to the SGSN includes UE type indication information, and the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE.
The UE according to any one of claims 30 or 31, wherein the acquisition module comprises a first calculation unit, a second calculation unit and a third calculation unit, wherein:

The first calculating unit is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the second calculating unit is configured to use the intermediate key and the encryption feature String, Calculating the second encryption key; the third calculating unit, configured to calculate the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and the integrity feature string; or

The first calculating unit is configured to calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key, and the second calculating unit is configured to use, according to the intermediate key, the first The algorithm type indication and the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the second encryption key is calculated; the third calculating unit is configured to use, according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm, Calculating the second integrity key, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication value are different.
The UE according to any one of claims 30 or 31, wherein

The acquiring module is specifically configured to: calculate an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; and use a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption a key, the second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key; or

The calculation module includes: a fourth calculation unit, configured to calculate the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm; and the fifth calculation unit is configured to: Calculating the second integrity key according to the first integrity key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm, wherein the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indication Values are not the same; or,

The acquiring module is specifically configured to: use the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; and the first integrity key or the The preset bit of the first integrity key is used as the second integrity key.
The UE according to any one of claims 32 or 33, wherein the first encryption key is an encryption key CK in an authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is the authentication The integrity key IK in the vector quintuple.
The UE according to claim 34, characterized in that the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.
A computer storage medium, characterized in that the computer storage medium stores a program, and when the program is executed, the steps of any one of claims 8 to 13 are performed.
A user equipment UE, comprising: a transmitting device, a receiving device and a processor, wherein the transmitting device, the receiving device and the processor are connected by a bus, wherein:

The sending device is configured to send a request message to the serving GPRS support node SGSN;

The receiving device is configured to receive an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN;

The processor is configured to obtain a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key;

The second encryption key and the encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, where the second integrity key and the integrity algorithm are used. Performing integrity protection on messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.
The UE according to claim 37, wherein the request message sent by the sending apparatus to the SGSN includes UE type indication information, and the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE.
The UE according to any one of claims 37 or 38, wherein the processor acquires a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. include:

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor calculates the second encryption key according to the intermediate key and the encryption feature string a key; the processor calculates the second integrity key according to the intermediate key and an integrity feature string; or

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor is configured according to the intermediate key, a first algorithm type indication, and an identifier of the encryption algorithm Calculating the second encryption key; the processor calculating the second integrity key according to the intermediate key, the second algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the integrity algorithm, where the first The algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values.
The UE according to any one of claims 37 or 38, wherein the processor acquires a second encryption key and a second integrity key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. include:

The processor calculates an intermediate key according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key; the processor uses a first preset bit of the intermediate key as the second encryption key Key, the second preset bit of the intermediate key is used as the second integrity key; or

The processor calculates the second encryption key according to the first encryption key, the first algorithm type indication, and the identifier of the encryption algorithm; the processor is configured according to the first integrity key, the second The algorithm type indication and the identifier of the integrity algorithm calculate the second integrity key, where the first algorithm type indication and the second algorithm type indicate different values; or

The processor uses the first encryption key or a preset bit of the first encryption key as the second encryption key; the processor sets the first integrity key or the The preset bit of the first integrity key is used as the second integrity key.
The UE according to any one of claims 39 or 40, wherein the first encryption key is an encryption key CK in an authentication vector quintuple, and the first integrity key is the authentication The integrity key IK in the vector quintuple.
The UE according to claim 41, characterized in that the intermediate key is a 64-bit GPRS encryption key Kc or a 128-bit encryption key Kc128.
A home location register HLR/home subscription system HSS, comprising:

a receiving module, configured to receive an identifier of the user equipment UE sent by the serving GPRS support node SGSN;

a determining module, configured to determine, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type UE;

And a sending module, configured to send the UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.
A computer storage medium, characterized in that the computer storage medium stores a program, and the step of executing the program comprises the steps of claim 14.
A home location register HLR/home signing system HSS, comprising: a transmitting device, a receiving device and a processor, wherein the transmitting device, the receiving device and the processor are connected by a bus, wherein:

The receiving device is configured to receive an identifier of the user equipment UE that is sent by the serving GPRS support node SGSN;

The processor is configured to determine, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type UE;

The sending device is configured to send the UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type UE.
A GPRS system, characterized in that the GPRS system comprises a serving GPRS support node SGSN device, a user equipment UE and a home location register HLR/home subscription system HSS, wherein:

The SGSN device is configured to: receive a request message sent by the UE, and obtain an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS, where the authentication vector includes a first encryption key and a first integrity key, if the SGSN determines that the UE is the first a type of UE, selecting an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm for the UE, sending the selected encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm to the UE, and according to the first encryption key and the first An integrity key, obtaining a second encryption key and a second integrity key;

The UE is configured to: send a request message to the SGSN, receive an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm sent by the SGSN, and acquire the second encryption according to the first encryption key and the first integrity key. a key and the second integrity key;

The second encryption key and the encryption algorithm are used to perform confidentiality protection on a message transmitted between the SGSN and the UE, where the second integrity key and the integrity algorithm are used. Performing integrity protection on messages transmitted between the SGSN and the UE.
The GPRS system of claim 46 wherein said HLR/HSS is for:

Receiving an identifier of the UE sent by the SGSN;

Determining, according to the identifier of the UE, that the UE is a first type UE;

Sending UE type indication information to the SGSN, where the UE type indication information is used to indicate that the UE is a first type of UE.