WO2015180604A1 - 一种保密通信控制、保密通信方法及装置 - Google Patents

一种保密通信控制、保密通信方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2015180604A1
WO2015180604A1 PCT/CN2015/079715 CN2015079715W WO2015180604A1 WO 2015180604 A1 WO2015180604 A1 WO 2015180604A1 CN 2015079715 W CN2015079715 W CN 2015079715W WO 2015180604 A1 WO2015180604 A1 WO 2015180604A1
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Prior art keywords
key
encrypted
initial key
initial
random number
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PCT/CN2015/079715
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
梁兵杰
姚进华
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大唐移动通信设备有限公司
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Publication of WO2015180604A1 publication Critical patent/WO2015180604A1/zh

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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041Key generation or derivation
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular, to a secure communication control method and apparatus, and a secure communication method and apparatus.
  • the existing commercial secure communication systems can be classified into three types: the first one is an end-to-end commercial secure communication system using fixed keys between user equipments; The second is an end-to-end secure communication system that uses a dynamic key agreement mechanism between user equipments; the third is an end-to-end secure communication system in which a key management center dynamically allocates keys for user equipment.
  • the first type an end-to-end commercial secure communication system using fixed keys between user equipments.
  • FIG. 1 The schematic diagram of the end-to-end communication principle in the end-to-end commercial secure communication system using fixed keys between user equipments is shown in Figure 1.
  • the user equipment uses a fixed cryptographic algorithm and a fixed key (sessionKey) to implement the call process. Encryption and decryption of service data streams such as voice streams and short messages.
  • sessionKey a fixed key
  • FIG. 2 The schematic diagram of the end-to-end communication principle in the end-to-end secure communication system using the dynamic key agreement mechanism between user equipments is shown in Figure 2.
  • the call routing between the user equipments has been established.
  • the communication keys that are respectively enabled are notified to the opposite end, thereby establishing an encryption and decryption communication channel between the user equipments.
  • FIG. 3 The schematic diagram of the end-to-end communication principle in the end-to-end secure communication system for dynamically allocating keys for the user equipment by the key management center is shown in FIG. 3.
  • the key is The Key Manager System (KMC) allocates a temporary session key (sessionKey) to the calling and called user equipments participating in the secure communication, and the primary and the called user equipment perform secure communication according to the temporary session key assigned by the KMC.
  • KMC Key Manager System
  • the security of the key itself in the secure communication system is insufficient, resulting in a decrease in the security of the confidential service: in the user equipment
  • the key life cycle is long and is easily deliberately cracked. There is a risk that the confidential call will be eavesdropped and the confidential data will be stolen.
  • the security of the user equipment itself is low, resulting in a decrease in the security of the secure communication system: in the end-to-end secure communication system using a dynamic key agreement mechanism between user equipments, the key used by the user equipment is dynamically negotiated once the user equipment is lost. The key, key negotiation mechanism and cryptographic algorithm will be leaked. Due to the lack of protection mechanism of the cryptosystem, the keys used in the entire secure communication system will be leaked.
  • the existing commercial secure communication system has insufficient security of the key itself, resulting in a decrease in the security of the confidential service; the security of the user equipment itself is low, resulting in a decrease in the security of the secure communication system; and the security of the secure communication system.
  • the imperfection of the system has led to defects such as the promotion of commercial confidentiality business.
  • the present invention provides a secure communication control method and apparatus, and a secure communication method and apparatus for solving the security problem of a key application in a commercial secure communication system.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a secure communication control method, where the method includes:
  • the initial key is selected from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE, and a corresponding transmission key in the UE registration period is generated, and the initial key is used to correspond to the UE. Transmitting a key for encryption, and transmitting the encrypted transmission key to the UE;
  • the session key is encrypted by using the transmission key corresponding to the calling UE, and the encrypted session key is sent to the calling UE, and the called UE is used by the called UE.
  • the transport key encrypts the session key and sends the encrypted session key to the called UE.
  • the present invention ensures the security and flexibility of the key application in the commercial secure communication system through the design principle of the three-layer key, and improves the operation convenience of the confidential service of the commercial secure communication system, thereby The security problem of the key application in the commercial secure communication system is effectively solved.
  • the initial key group corresponding to the UE is determined according to the security module identifier of the UE, including:
  • Each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted first initial key group and the corresponding relationship are saved.
  • an initial key is selected from the initial key set based on the user password of the UE.
  • the method further includes: when the transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted by using the initial key, the method further includes:
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted transmission key and the corresponding relationship are saved.
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is subsequently searched according to the user identifier of the UE.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the second random array is encrypted by using the transmission key corresponding to the UE, and the encrypted second random array is sent to the UE to update the initial key group corresponding to the UE.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the transport key corresponding to the user identifier is searched according to the user identifier, and the transport key corresponding to the user identifier saved locally is destroyed.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the UE After receiving the successful registration response of the UE that carries the user identifier and the security module identifier of the UE, the UE searches for the encrypted transmission key corresponding to the locally saved user identifier according to the user identifier of the UE, and destroys the The encrypted transmission key is used to search for the encrypted initial key group corresponding to the security module identifier saved locally according to the security module identifier of the UE, and destroy the encrypted initial key group.
  • selecting the initial key from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE includes:
  • Determining an initial key in the initial key group by using a preset algorithm that is the same as the key sequence used by the UE to determine an initial key in the initial key group according to the user password of the UE according to the user password of the UE. corresponding Key sequence number;
  • An initial key in the initial key group is determined according to the key sequence number.
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted by using the initial key, and the encrypted transmission key is sent to the UE.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the calling UE obtains the first random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and the first encrypted instant message is obtained by the calling UE encrypting the instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the first random number;
  • the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message are sent to the called UE.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a secure communication method, where the method includes:
  • the session message transmitted between the local UE and the peer UE is encrypted and transmitted by using the session key obtained after decryption.
  • the present invention ensures the security and flexibility of the key application in the commercial secure communication system through the design principle of the three-layer key, and improves the operation convenience of the confidential service of the commercial secure communication system, thereby The security problem of the key application in the commercial secure communication system is effectively solved.
  • the initial key group corresponding to the UE is determined according to the security module identifier of the UE, including:
  • Each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted first initial key group is saved.
  • an initial key is selected from the initial key set based on the user password of the UE.
  • the method further includes:
  • the decrypted transport key is encrypted using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted transport key is saved.
  • the session key corresponding to the UE is subsequently decrypted by using the transmission key.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the first initial key group is replaced with a second initial key set.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the locally saved encrypted transport key is destroyed.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the initial key is selected from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE, including:
  • Determining an initial in the initial key group by using a preset algorithm that is used by the network side device to determine the same key sequence number corresponding to an initial key in the initial key group according to the user password of the UE. Key number corresponding to the key;
  • An initial key in the initial key group is determined according to the key sequence number.
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is decrypted using the initial key.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the calling UE When the UE initiates an instant messaging service as the calling UE, the calling UE randomly generates the first random number, and encrypts the first random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end to obtain the encrypted first random number, and uses the local end to correspond.
  • the transmission key and the first random number encrypt the instant message to obtain the first encrypted instant message;
  • the calling UE sends the encrypted first random number and the first encrypted instant message to the network side device;
  • the called UE receives the encrypted second random number and the encrypted instant message sent by the network side device, where the second random number Randomly generated by the network side device, the second random number is encrypted by the network side device by using the transmission key corresponding to the called UE, and the second encrypted instant message is transmitted by the network side device by using the called UE. Encrypting the instant message by the key and the second random number;
  • the called UE decrypts the encrypted second random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and decrypts the second encrypted instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the second random number to obtain an instant message.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a secure communication control apparatus, where the apparatus includes:
  • An initial key determining unit configured to determine, according to a security module identifier of the UE, an initial key group corresponding to the UE in an initialization process of the user equipment UE; after the security module authentication of the UE passes, the user according to the UE The password selects an initial key from the initial key group;
  • a transmission key determining unit configured to generate a corresponding transmission key in the UE registration period, use the initial key to encrypt the transmission key corresponding to the UE, and send the encrypted transmission key to the UE;
  • a session key determining unit configured to encrypt the session key by using a transport key corresponding to the calling UE and send the encrypted session key to the master when receiving the session establishment request sent by the UE as the calling UE
  • the UE is called to encrypt the session key by using the transmission key corresponding to the called UE and send the encrypted session key to the called UE.
  • the initial key determining unit determines the initial key group corresponding to the UE according to the security module identifier of the UE, the initial key determining unit is specifically configured to:
  • Each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted first initial key group and the corresponding relationship are saved.
  • an initial key is selected from the initial key set based on the user password of the UE.
  • the transmission key determining unit uses the initial key to encrypt the transmission key corresponding to the UE, and is also used to:
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted transmission key and the corresponding relationship are saved.
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is subsequently searched according to the user identifier of the UE.
  • the initial key determining unit is further configured to:
  • the second random array is encrypted by using the transmission key corresponding to the UE, and the encrypted second random array is sent to the UE to update the initial key group corresponding to the UE.
  • the device further comprises:
  • the first key destruction unit is configured to: when receiving the user logout request that carries the user identifier sent by the UE, search for the transport key corresponding to the user identifier according to the user identifier, and destroy the transport secret corresponding to the locally saved user identifier. key.
  • the device further comprises:
  • a second key destruction unit configured to send a UE logout request message to the UE when the UE needs to be logged off; when receiving a UE successfully sent by the UE and carrying the user identifier of the UE and the security module identifier, the UE successfully logs out And searching for the encrypted transmission key corresponding to the locally saved user identifier according to the user identifier of the UE, and destroying the encrypted transmission key, and searching for the encryption corresponding to the locally saved security module identifier according to the security module identifier of the UE.
  • the initial key determining unit selects the initial key from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE, the initial key determining unit is specifically configured to:
  • Determining an initial key in the initial key group by using a preset algorithm that is the same as the key sequence used by the UE to determine an initial key in the initial key group according to the user password of the UE according to the user password of the UE. Corresponding key sequence number;
  • An initial key in the initial key group is determined according to the key sequence number.
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted by using the initial key, and the encrypted transmission key is sent to the UE.
  • the device further comprises:
  • the instant service key determining unit is configured to: when the UE initiates an instant message service as the calling UE, receive the encrypted first random number and the first encrypted instant message sent by the calling UE, where the first random number is determined by the calling UE Randomly generated, the first random number is encrypted by the calling UE by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and the first encrypted instant message is used by the calling UE to use the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the first random number. Encrypting the number of instant messages;
  • the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message are sent to the called UE.
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a secure communication device, the device comprising:
  • An initial key determining unit configured to determine an initial key group corresponding to the UE according to the security module identifier of the user equipment UE; and select an initial key from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE;
  • a transmission key determining unit configured to receive the encrypted transmission key sent by the network side device, and decrypt the encrypted transmission key by using the initial key
  • the session key determining unit is configured to receive the encrypted session key sent by the network side device, decrypt the encrypted session key by using the decrypted transmission key, and use the session key obtained after decryption to the local UE.
  • the session message transmitted between the peer UE is encrypted and transmitted.
  • the initial key determining unit determines the initial key group corresponding to the UE according to the security module identifier of the UE, the initial key determining unit is specifically configured to:
  • Each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted first initial key group is saved.
  • an initial key is selected from the initial key set based on the user password of the UE.
  • the transmission key determining unit is further configured to:
  • the decrypted transport key is encrypted using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted transport key is saved.
  • the session key corresponding to the UE is subsequently decrypted by using the transmission key.
  • the initial key determining unit is further configured to:
  • the first initial key group is replaced with a second initial key set.
  • the device further comprises:
  • the first key destruction unit is configured to: when the network side device sends the user logout request carrying the user identifier of the UE, destroy the locally saved encrypted transport key.
  • the device further comprises:
  • a second key destruction unit configured to receive a UE logout request message of the UE sent by the network side device; destroy the locally saved encrypted transport key and the initial key group; and send the user carrying the UE to the network side device The UE that is identified by the identity and security module is successfully logged out.
  • the initial key determining unit selects the initial key from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE, the initial key determining unit is specifically configured to:
  • Determining an initial in the initial key group by using a preset algorithm that is used by the network side device to determine the same key sequence number corresponding to an initial key in the initial key group according to the user password of the UE. Key number corresponding to the key;
  • An initial key in the initial key group is determined according to the key sequence number.
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is decrypted using the initial key.
  • the device method further comprises:
  • the instant service key determining unit is configured to: when the UE initiates an instant message service as the calling UE, the calling UE randomly generates a first random number, and encrypts the first random number by using a transmission key corresponding to the local end to obtain an encryption.
  • the first random number is obtained by encrypting the instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the first random number to obtain the first encrypted instant message;
  • the calling UE sends the encrypted first random number and the first encrypted instant message to the network side device;
  • the called UE receives the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message sent by the network side device, where the second random number is randomly generated by the network side device, and the encrypted second random number is transmitted by the network side device by using the called UE.
  • the key is obtained by encrypting the second random number
  • the second encrypted instant message is obtained by the network side device encrypting the instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the called UE and the second random number;
  • the called UE decrypts the encrypted second random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and decrypts the second encrypted instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the second random number to obtain an instant message.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication principle of an end-to-end commercial secure communication system using a fixed key
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a communication principle of an end-to-end secure communication system using a dynamic key agreement mechanism
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a communication principle of an end-to-end secure communication system for dynamically allocating keys for a user equipment by a key management center;
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a method for controlling a secret communication according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a secure communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of a method for updating an initial key group according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of a method for destroying an initial key group according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart of a transmission key transmission mechanism according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart of a method for destroying a transmission key according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic flowchart of an encrypted VoIP service according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of a method for encrypting an instant message service according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic structural diagram of a secure communication control apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of a secure communication apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a secure communication control method and apparatus, and a secure communication method and apparatus for solving the security problem of a key application in a commercial secure communication system.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a secure communication control method, where the method includes:
  • step S41 determining an initial key group corresponding to the UE according to the security module identifier of the UE, including:
  • Each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted first initial key group and the corresponding relationship are saved.
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted by using the initial key
  • the method further includes:
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted transmission key and the corresponding relationship are saved.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the second random array is encrypted by using the transmission key corresponding to the UE, and the encrypted second random array is sent to the UE to update the initial key group corresponding to the UE.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the transport key corresponding to the user identifier is searched according to the user identifier, and the transport key corresponding to the user identifier saved locally is destroyed.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the UE After receiving the successful registration response of the UE that carries the user identifier and the security module identifier of the UE, the UE searches for the encrypted transmission key corresponding to the locally saved user identifier according to the user identifier of the UE, and destroys the The encrypted transmission key is used to search for the encrypted initial key group corresponding to the security module identifier saved locally according to the security module identifier of the UE, and destroy the encrypted initial key group.
  • the initial key is selected from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE, including:
  • An initial key in the initial key group is determined according to the key sequence number.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the calling UE obtains the first random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and the first encrypted instant message is obtained by the calling UE encrypting the instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the first random number;
  • the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message are sent to the called UE.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a secure communication method, where the method includes:
  • S53 Receive an encrypted transmission key sent by the network side device, and decrypt the encrypted transmission key by using the initial key.
  • S54 Receive an encrypted session key sent by the network side device, and decrypt the encrypted session key by using the decrypted transmission key.
  • the initial key group corresponding to the UE is determined according to the security module identifier of the UE in step S51, including:
  • Each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted first initial key group is saved.
  • the method further includes:
  • the decrypted transport key is encrypted using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted transport key is saved.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the first initial key group is replaced with a second initial key set.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the locally saved encrypted transport key is destroyed.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the initial key is selected from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE in step S52, including:
  • Determining an initial in the initial key group by using a preset algorithm that is used by the network side device to determine the same key sequence number corresponding to an initial key in the initial key group according to the user password of the UE. Key number corresponding to the key;
  • An initial key in the initial key group is determined according to the key sequence number.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the calling UE When the UE initiates an instant messaging service as the calling UE, the calling UE randomly generates the first random number, and encrypts the first random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end to obtain the encrypted first random number, and uses the local end to correspond.
  • the transmission key and the first random number encrypt the instant message to obtain the first encrypted instant message;
  • the calling UE sends the encrypted first random number and the first encrypted instant message to the network side device;
  • the called UE receives the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message sent by the network side device, where the second random number is randomly generated by the network side device, and the encrypted second random number is transmitted by the network side device by using the called UE.
  • the key is obtained by encrypting the second random number
  • the second encrypted instant message is obtained by the network side device encrypting the instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the called UE and the second random number;
  • the called UE decrypts the encrypted second random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and decrypts the second encrypted instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the second random number to obtain an instant message.
  • the secure communication system in the embodiment of the present invention is designed with three types of keys, namely, an initial key, a transmission key, and a session key.
  • the following describes the secure communication proposed by the embodiment of the present invention in combination with the specific embodiments of the three types of keys.
  • the network side device in the embodiment of the present invention includes a Key Management System (KMC) and a Secret Multimedia Communication System (SMCS).
  • KMC Key Management System
  • SMCS Secret Multimedia Communication System
  • Embodiment 1 The role, generation, update and destruction of an initial key in a secure communication system.
  • the role of the initial key used to add and decrypt the transmission key corresponding to the UE to improve the security of the transmission key during transmission.
  • Network side device When the UE registers, its security module needs to be initialized on the KMC side. At this time, the KMC generates a random array (ie, the first random array) according to the security module identifier of the UE, and uses the random array to generate an initial key group (ie, the first initial key group) corresponding to the UE;
  • a random array ie, the first random array
  • an initial key group ie, the first initial key group
  • the KMC establishes the initial key group corresponding to the security module of the UE, and the KMC can establish the first initial key group according to the security module identifier of the UE. Corresponding relationship between the security module identifiers of the UEs corresponding to the first initial key group; to improve the security of the key storage, using the user password of the UE, respectively, each initial secret in the first initial key group
  • the key is encrypted, and the KMC stores the correspondence between the encrypted first initial key group and the security module identifier of the UE corresponding to the first initial key group and the first initial key group, where the first initial key group is
  • the ciphertext form is stored in the KMC;
  • the KMC uses the UE and the UE according to the user password of the UE. Determining, according to the user password of the UE, a preset algorithm with the same key sequence number corresponding to an initial key in the initial key group, determining a key sequence number corresponding to an initial key in the initial key group, and determining an initial according to the key sequence number.
  • An initial key in the key group. The initial key is the initial key corresponding to the UE.
  • the authentication process performed by the KMC on the security module of the UE is that after the KMC receives the security module authentication request message that is sent by the UE and carries the user identifier of the UE and the security module identifier, the KMC searches for the locally saved user by using the user identifier. Identifying the corresponding security module identifier, and comparing whether the security module identifier of the query is consistent with the security module identifier carried in the security module authentication request message sent by the UE; if they are consistent, the KMC authenticates the security module of the UE; otherwise, the KMC is for the UE. The security module authentication failed.
  • the method for the UE to determine the initial key is similar to the method for the network side device to determine the initial key corresponding to the UE, that is, the UE generates a random array according to the security module identifier (ie, the first random array, generated by the network side device)
  • the first random array is the same, and uses the same algorithm as the KMC for generating the initial key group according to the random array, and uses the random array to generate an initial key group corresponding to the UE (ie, the first initial key group);
  • the UE encrypts each initial key in the first initial key group by using its user password, and saves the encrypted first initial key group.
  • the first initial key group is stored in the UE in cipher text. ;
  • the UE determines the initial according to the user password by using a preset algorithm that is used by the KMC to determine the key sequence corresponding to an initial key in the initial key group according to the user password of the UE.
  • a key sequence number corresponding to an initial key in the key group, and an initial key in the initial key group is determined according to the key sequence number, where the initial key is an initial key corresponding to the UE.
  • Initial key update process In order to ensure the security of the secure communication system, it is necessary to save the security module of the UE when the security of the UE is low (management personnel make security decisions on the security module of the UE), or periodically save the UE and the KMC.
  • the initial key group is dynamically updated. As shown in FIG. 6, the update process of the initial key group saved in the UE and the KMC is as follows:
  • the number of random numbers in the second random array is the same as the number of random numbers in the first random array
  • the KMC encrypts the second random array by using a transmission key corresponding to the UE.
  • the initial key update request carrying the encrypted second random array is forwarded to the UE by using the SMCS.
  • the UE After receiving the initial key update request that carries the encrypted second random array, the UE decrypts the second random array by using the transmission key corresponding to the UE.
  • the UE generates a second initial key group corresponding to the UE according to the decrypted second random array, and the UE encrypts each initial key in the second initial key group by using the user password, and encrypts the initial key.
  • the second initial key group replaces the encrypted first initial key group;
  • the UE forwards the initial key update response message to the KMC through the SMCS.
  • the KMC After receiving the initial key update response message, the KMC generates, according to the second random array, the corresponding number of the UE.
  • the initial key group saves the correspondence between the second initial key group and the security module identifier of the UE corresponding to the second initial key group, and uses the user password of the UE to respectively identify the second initial key group.
  • Each initial key is encrypted, and the KMC replaces the encrypted first initial key group with the encrypted second initial key set.
  • the KMC uses the same algorithm as the second initial key group used by the UE to generate the UE according to the second random array, and generates a second initial key group corresponding to the UE according to the second random array.
  • step S607 the UE will initiate a security module authentication process to the network side device to obtain a new transmission key corresponding to the UE.
  • the process of destroying the initial key group If the security module of the UE is in a non-secure environment, the system can remotely destroy the encrypted initial password group corresponding to the UE in the KMC and the encrypted initial password group on the UE side.
  • the KMC sends a key destruction request message to the UE by using the SMCS, where the key destruction request message carries the user identifier and the security module identifier of the UE.
  • the SMCS instructs the UE to perform key destruction; if the UE has logged off, the SMCS feeds back the registration failure command to the KMC, and the KMC saves the key destruction request message of the UE; when the UE initiates authentication to the KMC When registering, the KMC sends a key destruction request message to the UE through the SMCS;
  • the UE After receiving the key destruction request message, the UE destroys the locally saved encrypted initial key group and the encrypted transmission key.
  • the UE sends a key destruction response message to the KMC through the SMCS.
  • the KMC After receiving the key destruction response message, the KMC destroys the locally stored encrypted initial key group and the encrypted transmission key corresponding to the UE.
  • Embodiment 2 The role, transmission mechanism and destruction of the transmission key in the secure communication system.
  • the role of the transport key used to encrypt the session key corresponding to the UE to ensure the security of the session key during transmission.
  • Transmission mechanism of the transmission key As shown in FIG. 8, the transmission mechanism of the transmission key in the secure communication system provided by the embodiment of the present invention is as follows:
  • the corresponding transmission key in the UE registration period is generated.
  • the KMC saves a correspondence between the transport key and the user identifier of the UE corresponding to the transport key, and encrypts the transport key corresponding to the UE by using the user password of the UE, and saves the encrypted transport key.
  • the KMC encrypts the transmission key corresponding to the UE by using an initial key corresponding to the UE.
  • the KMC sends the encrypted transmission key to the UE by using the SMCS.
  • the UE After receiving the encrypted transmission key corresponding to the UE, the UE decrypts the transmission key by using the initial key corresponding to the UE, and encrypts the decrypted transmission key by using the user password of the UE, and saves The encrypted transport key.
  • the process of destroying the transmission key is divided into two types. One is the key destruction process initiated by the KMC to the UE when the security module of the UE is in a non-secure environment. 7 is not repeated here; the other is the key destruction process initiated by the UE when the UE initiates the user logout process. As shown in FIG. 9, the transmission key destruction process is as follows:
  • the UE sends a user logout request message to the SMCS.
  • the SMCS sends a user logout response message to the UE, to instruct the UE to perform a transport key destruction process.
  • the UE After receiving the user logout response message, the UE destroys the locally saved encrypted transport key.
  • the SMCS sends a user logout request message to the KMC, where the user logout request message carries the user identifier of the UE.
  • the SMC After receiving the user logout request message, the SMC searches for the encrypted transmission key corresponding to the locally saved UE according to the user identifier of the UE, and destroys it;
  • the KMC returns a user logout response message to the SMCS.
  • S907 After receiving the user logout response message, the SMCS performs user logout for the UE, and releases related resources of the UE.
  • Embodiment 3 The role, transmission mechanism, use and destruction of a session key in a secure communication system.
  • the role of the session key used to add and decrypt the service data (voice media stream) during the session between the UEs, which is the actual working key of the service flow.
  • VoIP voice over IP
  • the calling UE sends an encrypted session request message to the KMC through the SMCS, where the encrypted session request message carries the user identifier of the calling UE and the user identifier of the called UE.
  • the KMC After receiving the encrypted session request message, the KMC generates a session key for the encrypted session.
  • the KMC searches for the transport key corresponding to the calling UE according to the user identifier of the calling UE, searches for the transport key corresponding to the called UE according to the user identifier of the called UE, and uses the transport key and the corresponding call UE respectively.
  • the transmission key corresponding to the called UE encrypts the session key;
  • the KMC sends an encrypted session response message to the calling UE and the called UE by using the SMCS, where the encrypted session response message sent to the calling UE carries the session key encrypted by using the transmission key corresponding to the calling UE.
  • the encrypted session response message sent to the called UE carries the session key encrypted by using the transmission key corresponding to the called UE;
  • the calling UE After receiving the encrypted session response message, the calling UE decrypts the encrypted session key according to the local transmission key, obtains the session key of the current encrypted session, and saves the session key.
  • the called UE After receiving the encrypted session response message, the called UE decrypts the encrypted session key according to the local transmission key, obtains the session key of the current encrypted session, and saves the session key.
  • the calling UE and the called UE feed back an encrypted session response message to the SMCS to indicate whether the UE successfully obtains the session key of the current encrypted session; if the SMCS does not receive within the specified time
  • the SMCS resends the encrypted session response message carrying the encrypted session key to the calling UE or the called UE, and the number of repeated transmissions is set by the system.
  • the calling UE encrypts the service data by using the session key, and sends the encrypted service data to the called UE;
  • the called UE receives the encrypted service data sent by the calling UE, and decrypts the encrypted service data by using the session key to obtain the current service data.
  • the calling UE sends an encrypted session end message to the KMC through the SMCS.
  • Steps S1010 and S1011 are optional steps. When the KMC does not save the session key of the current encryption session, steps S1010 and S1011 are not required.
  • Embodiment 4 As shown in FIG. 11, the process of encrypting an instant message service in a secure communication system is as follows:
  • the calling UE sends the encrypted first random number and the first encrypted instant message to the KMC through the SMCS;
  • the KMC receives the encrypted first random number and the first encrypted instant message sent by the calling UE, and uses the transmission key corresponding to the calling UE to decrypt the encrypted first random number, and uses the transmission key corresponding to the calling UE and the first Decrypting the first encrypted instant message by a random number to obtain an instant message;
  • S1104 The KMC randomly generates a second random number, and encrypts the second random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the called UE to obtain an encrypted second random number, and uses the transmission key corresponding to the called UE and the second random number pair to immediately
  • the message is encrypted to obtain a second encrypted instant message
  • the KMC sends the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message to the called UE through the SMCS;
  • S1106 The called UE receives the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message, and decrypts the encrypted second random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and uses the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the second random number pair.
  • the second encrypted instant message is decrypted to obtain an instant message.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a secure communication control apparatus, where the apparatus includes:
  • the initial key determining unit 121 is configured to determine, according to the security module identifier of the UE, an initial key group corresponding to the UE in the process of initializing the user equipment UE, and after the authentication of the security module of the UE is passed, according to the UE The user password selects the initial key from the initial key group;
  • the transmission key determining unit 122 is configured to generate a corresponding transmission key in the UE registration period, use the initial key to encrypt the transmission key corresponding to the UE, and send the encrypted transmission key to the UE;
  • the session key determining unit 123 is configured to: when receiving the session establishment request sent by the UE as the calling UE, encrypt the session key by using the transmission key corresponding to the calling UE, and send the encrypted session key to the session key
  • the calling UE encrypts the session key by using the transmission key corresponding to the called UE and transmits the encrypted session key to the called UE.
  • the initial key determining unit 121 determines the initial key group corresponding to the UE according to the security module identifier of the UE, the initial key determining unit 121 is specifically configured to:
  • Each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted first initial key group and the corresponding relationship are saved.
  • the transmission key determining unit 122 encrypts the transmission key corresponding to the UE by using the initial key, and is also used to:
  • the transmission key corresponding to the UE is encrypted by using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted transmission key and the corresponding relationship are saved.
  • the initial key determining unit 121 is further configured to:
  • the second random array is encrypted by using the transmission key corresponding to the UE, and the encrypted second random array is sent to the UE to update the initial key group corresponding to the UE.
  • the device further comprises:
  • the first key destruction unit 124 is configured to: when receiving the user logout request carrying the user identifier sent by the UE, searching for the transport key corresponding to the user identifier according to the user identifier, and destroying the locally corresponding transmission of the user identifier Key.
  • the device further comprises:
  • the second key destruction unit 125 is configured to send a UE logout request message to the UE when the UE needs to be logged off; and when the UE successfully sends a logout success response that is sent by the UE and carries the user identifier of the UE and the security module identifier And searching for the encrypted transmission key corresponding to the locally saved user identifier according to the user identifier of the UE, and destroying the added
  • the encrypted transmission key is used to search for the encrypted initial key group corresponding to the security module identifier saved locally according to the security module identifier of the UE, and destroy the encrypted initial key group.
  • the initial key determining unit 121 is specifically configured to: when selecting an initial key from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE:
  • Determining an initial key in the initial key group by using a preset algorithm that is the same as the key sequence used by the UE to determine an initial key in the initial key group according to the user password of the UE according to the user password of the UE. Corresponding key sequence number;
  • the root key sequence number determines an initial key in the initial key group.
  • the device further comprises:
  • the instant service key determining unit 126 is configured to: when the UE initiates an instant message service as the calling UE, receive the encrypted first random number and the first encrypted instant message sent by the calling UE, where the first random number is determined by the calling party The UE randomly generates, and the first random number is encrypted by the calling UE by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and the first encrypted instant message is used by the calling UE to use the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the first Random numbers are used to encrypt instant messages;
  • the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message are sent to the called UE.
  • the initial key determining unit 121, the transmission key determining unit 122, the session key determining unit 123, the first key destroying unit 124, the second key destroying unit 125, and the instant service key determining unit 126 may be processed by
  • the transmitter and the transmission module having the transceiving function are implemented, and the transmission module having the transceiving function, for example, the transmission module, may be a dedicated chip and an antenna, etc., and the present invention is not limited to the entity that implements these units.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a secure communication device, where the device includes:
  • the initial key determining unit 131 is configured to determine an initial key group corresponding to the UE according to the security module identifier of the user equipment UE, and select an initial key from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE;
  • the transmission key determining unit 132 is configured to receive the encrypted transmission key sent by the network side device, and decrypt the encrypted transmission key by using the initial key;
  • the session key determining unit 133 is configured to receive the encrypted session key sent by the network side device, decrypt the encrypted session key by using the decrypted transmission key, and use the session key obtained by the decryption to the local end.
  • the session message transmitted between the UE and the peer UE is encrypted and transmitted.
  • the initial key determining unit 131 determines an initial corresponding to the UE according to the security module identifier of the UE.
  • a key group it is specifically used to:
  • Each initial key in the first initial key group is encrypted by the user password of the UE, and the encrypted first initial key group is saved.
  • the transmission key determining unit 132 is further configured to:
  • the decrypted transport key is encrypted using the user password of the UE, and the encrypted transport key is saved.
  • the initial key determining unit 131 is further configured to:
  • the first initial key group is replaced with a second initial key set.
  • the device further comprises:
  • the first key destruction unit 134 is configured to: when the user side request for carrying the user identifier of the UE is sent to the network side device, destroy the locally saved encrypted transmission key.
  • the device further comprises:
  • the second key destruction unit 135 is configured to receive the UE logout request message of the UE sent by the network side device, destroy the locally saved encrypted transport key and the initial key group, and send the network side device to carry the UE The user ID and the security module identified by the UE are successfully logged out.
  • the initial key determining unit 131 is specifically configured to: when selecting an initial key from the initial key group according to the user password of the UE:
  • Determining an initial in the initial key group by using a preset algorithm that is used by the network side device to determine the same key sequence number corresponding to an initial key in the initial key group according to the user password of the UE. Key number corresponding to the key;
  • the root key sequence number determines an initial key in the initial key group.
  • the device method further comprises:
  • the instant service key determining unit 136 is configured to: when the UE initiates an instant message service as the calling UE, the calling UE randomly generates a first random number, and encrypts the first random number by using a transmission key corresponding to the local end. Encrypting the first random number, and encrypting the instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the first random number to obtain the first encrypted instant message;
  • the calling UE sends the encrypted first random number and the first encrypted instant message to the network side device;
  • the called UE receives the encrypted second random number and the second encrypted instant message sent by the network side device, where the second random number is randomly generated by the network side device, and the encrypted second random number is transmitted by the network side device by using the called UE.
  • the key is obtained by encrypting the second random number
  • the second encrypted instant message is obtained by the network side device encrypting the instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the called UE and the second random number;
  • the called UE decrypts the encrypted second random number by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end, and decrypts the second encrypted instant message by using the transmission key corresponding to the local end and the second random number to obtain an instant message.
  • the initial key determining unit 131, the transmission key determining unit 132, the session key determining unit 133, the first key destroying unit 134, the second key destroying unit 135, and the instant service key determining unit 136 may be processed by And a transmission module having a transceiving function, the transmission module having a transceiving function may be, for example, a dedicated chip and an antenna, and the present invention is not limited to an entity that implements these units.
  • embodiments of the invention may be provided as a method, apparatus, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or a combination of software and hardware. Moreover, the invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage and optical storage, etc.) including computer usable program code.
  • the computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising the instruction device.
  • the apparatus implements the functions specified in one or more blocks of a flow or a flow and/or block diagram of the flowchart.
  • These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device such that a series of operational steps are performed on a computer or other programmable device to produce computer-implemented processing for execution on a computer or other programmable device.
  • the instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flow or in a block or blocks of a flow diagram.

Abstract

本发明提供一种保密通信控制、保密通信方法及装置,用以解决商用保密通信系统中密钥应用存在的安全性问题。本发明方法包括:在对UE进行初始化过程中,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,并生成该UE注册周期内对应的传输密钥,利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE;当接收到该UE作为主叫UE发送的会话建立请求时,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给主叫UE,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给被叫UE。

Description

一种保密通信控制、保密通信方法及装置
本申请要求在2014年5月28日提交中国专利局、申请号为201410232264.X、发明名称为“一种保密通信控制、保密通信方法及装置”的中国专利申请的优先权,其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本发明涉及通信领域,尤其涉及一种保密通信控制方法及装置,一种保密通信方法及装置。
背景技术
随着4G网络的大规模应用以及虚拟运营商的政策落实,为高端商业客户提供保密通信是一种潜在的市场需求。
根据用户设备(User Equipment,UE)之间的密码协商原理,现有的商用保密通信系统可以分为三种:第一种是用户设备之间采用固定密钥的端到端商用保密通信系统;第二种是用户设备之间采用动态密钥协商机制的端到端保密通信系统;第三种是由密钥管理中心为用户设备动态分配密钥的端到端保密通信系统。这三种体系分述如下:
第一种:用户设备之间采用固定密钥的端到端商用保密通信系统。
用户设备之间采用固定密钥的端到端商用保密通信系统中端到端通信原理示意图如图1所示,在此系统中,用户设备采用固定密码算法和固定密钥(sessionKey)实现通话过程中的语音流、短消息等业务数据流的加解密。
第二种:用户设备之间采用动态密钥协商机制的端到端保密通信系统。
用户设备之间采用动态密钥协商机制的端到端保密通信系统中端到端通信原理示意图如图2所示,用户设备之间需要进行保密通信时,在用户设备之间呼叫路由已经建立的基础上,通过用户设备之间的端到端密钥协商机制,将各自启用的本次通信密钥告知对端,从而建立用户设备之间的加解密通信通道。
第三种:由密钥管理中心为用户设备动态分配密钥的端到端保密通信系统。
由密钥管理中心为用户设备动态分配密钥的端到端保密通信系统中端到端通信原理示意图如图3所示,在此系统中,每次用户设备之间建立保密通信时,密钥管理系统(Key Manager System,KMC)为参与保密通信的主、被叫用户设备分配临时的会话密钥(sessionKey),主、被叫用户设备根据KMC分配的临时会话密钥进行保密通信。
上述三种商用保密通信系统,虽然在一定程度上保证了用户设备之间的保密通信要求,但仍然存在以下技术缺陷:
保密通信系统中密钥本身的安全性不够,导致保密业务的安全性降低:在用户设备之 间采用固定密钥的端到端商用保密通信系统中,由于每次保密通信过程中用户设备之间使用相同的密钥对语音流进行加解密,导致密钥生存周期长,容易遭到蓄意破解,存在保密通话被窃听、保密数据被窃取的风险。
用户设备本身的安全性低,导致保密通信系统安全性降低:在用户设备之间采用动态密钥协商机制的端到端保密通信系统中,用户设备使用的密钥虽然动态协商,一旦用户设备丢失密钥,密钥协商机制和密码算法就会泄露,由于缺乏密码体系的保护机制,从而会导致整个保密通信系统中所用密钥均被泄露。
保密通信系统的保密体系的不完善,导致商用保密业务推广阻力大:在上述现有的三种商用保密通信系统中,对于用户设备的保密要求非常高,用户设备本身的安全性能是整个业务体系安全维系的关键环节;但由于商用用户设备的灵活性和个性化,难免导致用户设备的保密要求达不到系统保密要求,因而对用户设备使用者的高要求就成为了保密通信业务推广的很大阻力。
综上所述,现有的商用保密通信系统存在密钥本身的安全性不够,导致保密业务的安全性降低;用户设备本身的安全性低,导致保密通信系统安全性降低;保密通信系统的保密体系的不完善,导致商用保密业务推广阻力大等缺陷。
发明内容
本发明提供一种保密通信控制方法及装置,以及一种保密通信方法及装置,用以解决商用保密通信系统中密钥应用存在的安全性问题。
本发明实施例提供一种保密通信控制方法,该方法包括:
在对用户设备UE进行初始化过程中,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;
在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,并生成该UE注册周期内对应的传输密钥,利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE;
当接收到该UE作为主叫UE发送的会话建立请求时,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给主叫UE,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给被叫UE。
从上述方法可以看出,本发明通过三层密钥的设计原理,保证了商用保密通信系统中密钥应用的安全性和灵活性,提高了商用保密通信系统的保密业务的操作便捷性,从而有效解决了商用保密通信系统中密钥应用存在的安全性问题。
较佳地,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组,包括:
根据UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的 第一初始密钥组;
建立第一初始密钥组与第一初始密钥组对应的该UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系;
利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组、以及对应关系。
这样,以便根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥。
较佳地,在利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密的同时,该方法还包括:
建立传输密钥与该传输密钥对应的UE的用户标识之间的对应关系;
利用该UE的用户口令,对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥、以及对应关系。
这样,以便后续根据UE的用户标识查找该UE对应的传输密钥。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
随机生成第二随机数组,并根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组;
利用该UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数组进行加密,并将加密后的第二随机数组发送给该UE,以更新UE对应的初始密钥组。
这样,通过更新UE对应的初始密钥组,提高UE对应的初始密钥组的安全性。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当接收到UE发送的携带有用户标识的用户注销请求时,根据用户标识查找该用户标识对应的传输密钥,并销毁本地保存的该用户标识对应的传输密钥。
这样,通过销毁UE对应的传输密钥,提高UE对应的传输密钥的安全性。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当需要注销该UE时,向该UE发送UE注销请求消息;
当接收到该UE发送的携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应时,根据该UE的用户标识查找本地保存的该用户标识对应的加密后的传输密钥,并销毁该加密后的传输密钥,根据该UE的保密模块标识查找本地保存的该保密模块标识对应的加密初始密钥组,并销毁该加密后的初始密钥组。
这样,通过销毁UE对应的传输密钥和初始密钥组,提高UE对应的传输密钥和初始密钥组的安全性。
较佳地,根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,包括:
根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与该UE用于根据UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的 密钥序号;
根据密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
这样,以便利用初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当该UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,接收主叫UE发送的加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息,其中,第一随机数由主叫UE随机生成,加密第一随机数由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到,第一加密即时消息由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对加密第一随机数进行解密得到第一随机数,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对第一加密即时消息进行解密得到及时消息;
生成第二随机数,并利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到加密第二随机数,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第二加密即时消息;
将加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息发送给被叫UE。
这样,以便对即时消息业务进行保密。
本发明实施例提供一种保密通信方法,该方法包括:
根据用户设备UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;
根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的传输密钥,并利用初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密;
接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的会话密钥,利用解密后得到的传输密钥对加密后的会话密钥进行解密;
利用解密后得到的会话密钥对本端UE与对端UE之间传输的会话消息进行加密并传输。
从上述方法可以看出,本发明通过三层密钥的设计原理,保证了商用保密通信系统中密钥应用的安全性和灵活性,提高了商用保密通信系统的保密业务的操作便捷性,从而有效解决了商用保密通信系统中密钥应用存在的安全性问题。
较佳地,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组,包括:
根据该UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组。
这样,以便根据UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥。
较佳地,在利用初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密之后,该方法还包括:
利用该UE的用户口令,对解密后的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥。
这样,以便后续利用传输密钥对该UE对应的会话密钥进行解密。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的第二随机数组,利用该UE对应的传输密钥对加密后的第二随机数组进行解密,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
根据解密得到第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组;
用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组。
这样,通过更新UE对应的初始密钥组,提高UE对应的初始密钥组的安全性。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当向网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识的用户注销请求时,销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥。
这样,通过销毁UE对应的传输密钥,提高UE对应的传输密钥的安全性。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
接收网络侧设备发送的该UE的UE注销请求消息;
销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥和初始密钥组;
向网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应。
这样,通过销毁UE对应的传输密钥和初始密钥组,提高UE对应的传输密钥和初始密钥组的安全性,并指示网络侧设备进行密钥销毁。
较佳地,根据UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,包括:
根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与网络侧设备用于根据该UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
根据密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
这样,以便利用初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行解密。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当该UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,主叫UE随机生成第一随机数,并利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到加密第一随机数,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第一加密即时消息;
主叫UE将加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息发送给网络侧设备;
被叫UE接收网络侧设备发送的加密第二随机数和加密即时消息,其中,第二随机数 由网络侧设备随机生成,加密第二随机数由网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到,第二加密即时消息由网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
被叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对加密第二随机数进行解密,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对第二加密即时消息进行解密,得到即时消息。
这样,以便对即时消息业务进行保密。
本发明实施例提供一种保密通信控制装置,该装置包括:
初始密钥确定单元,用于在对用户设备UE进行初始化过程中,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
传输密钥确定单元,用于生成该UE注册周期内对应的传输密钥,利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE;
会话密钥确定单元,用于当接收到该UE作为主叫UE发送的会话建立请求时,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给主叫UE,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给被叫UE。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元在根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组时,具体用于:
根据该UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
建立第一初始密钥组与第一初始密钥组对应的UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系;
利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组、以及对应关系。
这样,以便根据UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥。
较佳地,传输密钥确定单元在利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密的同时,还用于:
建立传输密钥与该传输密钥对应的UE的用户标识之间的对应关系;
利用该UE的用户口令,对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥、以及对应关系。
这样,以便后续根据UE的用户标识查找该UE对应的传输密钥。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元还用于:
随机生成第二随机数组,并根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组;
利用该UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数组进行加密,并将加密后的第二随机数组发送给该UE,以更新UE对应的初始密钥组。
这样,通过更新UE对应的初始密钥组,提高UE对应的初始密钥组的安全性。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
第一密钥销毁单元,用于当接收到UE发送的携带有用户标识的用户注销请求时,根据用户标识查找该用户标识对应的传输密钥,并销毁本地保存的该用户标识对应的传输密钥。
这样,通过销毁UE对应的传输密钥,提高UE对应的传输密钥的安全性。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
第二密钥销毁单元,用于当需要注销该UE时,向该UE发送UE注销请求消息;当接收到该UE发送的携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应时,根据该UE的用户标识查找本地保存的该用户标识对应的加密后的传输密钥,并销毁该加密后的传输密钥,根据该UE的保密模块标识查找本地保存的该保密模块标识对应的加密初始密钥组,并销毁该加密后的初始密钥组。
这样,通过销毁UE对应的传输密钥和初始密钥组,提高UE对应的传输密钥和初始密钥组的安全性。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元在根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥时,具体用于:
根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与该UE用于根据UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
根据密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
这样,以便利用初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
即时业务密钥确定单元,用于当该UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,接收主叫UE发送的加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息,其中,第一随机数由主叫UE随机生成,加密第一随机数由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到,第一加密即时消息由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对加密第一随机数进行解密得到第一随机数,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对第一加密即时消息进行解密得到及时消息;
生成第二随机数,并利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到加密第二随机数,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第二加密 即时消息;
将加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息发送给被叫UE。
这样,以便对即时消息业务进行保密。
本发明实施例提供一种保密通信装置,该装置包括:
初始密钥确定单元,用于根据用户设备UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
传输密钥确定单元,用于接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的传输密钥,并利用初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密;
会话密钥确定单元,用于接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的会话密钥,利用解密后得到的传输密钥对加密后的会话密钥进行解密;利用解密后得到的会话密钥对本端UE与对端UE之间传输的会话消息进行加密并传输。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元在根据UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组时,具体用于:
根据该UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组。
这样,以便根据UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥。
较佳地,传输密钥确定单元在利用初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密之后,还用于:
利用该UE的用户口令,对解密后的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥。
这样,以便后续利用传输密钥对该UE对应的会话密钥进行解密。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元还用于:
接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的第二随机数组,利用该UE对应的传输密钥对加密后的第二随机数组进行解密,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
根据解密得到的第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组;
用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组。
这样,通过更新UE对应的初始密钥组,提高UE对应的初始密钥组的安全性。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
第一密钥销毁单元,用于当向网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识的用户注销请求时,销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥。
这样,通过销毁UE对应的传输密钥,提高UE对应的传输密钥的安全性。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
第二密钥销毁单元,用于接收网络侧设备发送的该UE的UE注销请求消息;销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥和初始密钥组;向网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应。
这样,通过销毁UE对应的传输密钥和初始密钥组,提高UE对应的传输密钥和初始密钥组的安全性,并指示网络侧设备进行密钥销毁。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元在根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥时,具体用于:
根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与网络侧设备用于根据该UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
根据密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
这样,以便利用初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行解密。
较佳地,该装置法还包括:
即时业务密钥确定单元,用于当该UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,主叫UE随机生成第一随机数,并利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到加密第一随机数,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第一加密即时消息;
主叫UE将加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息发送给网络侧设备;
被叫UE接收网络侧设备发送的加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息,其中,第二随机数由网络侧设备随机生成,加密第二随机数由网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到,第二加密即时消息由网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
被叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对加密第二随机数进行解密,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对第二加密即时消息进行解密,得到即时消息。
这样,以便对即时消息业务进行保密。
附图说明
图1为采用固定密钥的端到端商用保密通信系统的通信原理示意图;
图2为采用动态密钥协商机制的端到端保密通信系统的通信原理示意图;
图3为由密钥管理中心为用户设备动态分配密钥的端到端保密通信系统的通信原理示意图;
图4为本发明实施例提供的一种保密通信控制方法流程示意图;
图5为本发明实施例提供的一种保密通信方法流程示意图;
图6为本发明实施例提供的初始密钥组的更新方法流程示意图;
图7为本发明实施例提供的初始密钥组的销毁方法流程示意图;
图8为本发明实施例提供的传输密钥的传输机制流程示意图;
图9为本发明实施例提供的传输密钥的销毁方法流程示意图;
图10为本发明实施例提供的加密VoIP业务流程示意图;
图11为本发明实施例提供的一种加密即时消息业务流程示意图;
图12为本发明实施例提供的一种保密通信控制装置结构示意图;
图13为本发明实施例提供的一种保密通信装置结构示意图。
具体实施方式
本发明实施例提供一种保密通信控制方法及装置,以及一种保密通信方法及装置,用以解决商用保密通信系统中密钥应用存在的安全性问题。
如图4所示,在网络侧,本发明实施例提供了一种保密通信控制方法,该方法包括:
S41、在对用户设备UE进行初始化过程中,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;
S42、在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,并生成该UE注册周期内对应的传输密钥,利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE;
S43、当接收到该UE作为主叫UE发送的会话建立请求时,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给主叫UE,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给被叫UE。
较佳地,在步骤S41中,根据UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组,包括:
根据UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
建立第一初始密钥组与第一初始密钥组对应的该UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系;
利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组、以及对应关系。
较佳地,在步骤S42中,利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密的同时,该方法还包括:
建立传输密钥与该传输密钥对应的该UE的用户标识之间的对应关系;
利用该UE的用户口令,对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥、以及对应关系。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
更新初始密钥组,具体方法如下:
随机生成第二随机数组,并根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组;
利用该UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数组进行加密,并将加密后的第二随机数组发送给该UE,以更新UE对应的初始密钥组。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当接收到该UE发送的携带有用户标识的用户注销请求时,根据用户标识查找该用户标识对应的传输密钥,并销毁本地保存的该用户标识对应的传输密钥。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当需要注销该UE时,向该UE发送UE注销请求消息;
当接收到该UE发送的携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应时,根据该UE的用户标识查找本地保存的该用户标识对应的加密后的传输密钥,并销毁该加密后的传输密钥,根据该UE的保密模块标识查找本地保存的该保密模块标识对应的加密初始密钥组,并销毁该加密后的初始密钥组。
较佳地,在步骤S41中,根据UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,包括:
根据UE的用户口令,通过采用与UE用于根据UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
根据密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当该UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,接收主叫UE发送的加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息,其中,第一随机数由主叫UE随机生成,加密第一随机数由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到,第一加密即时消息由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对加密第一随机数进行解密得到第一随机数,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对第一加密即时消息进行解密得到及时消息;
生成第二随机数,并利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到加密第二随机数,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第二加密即时消息;
将加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息发送给被叫UE。
如图5所示,在UE侧,本发明实施例提供了一种保密通信方法,该方法包括:
S51、根据用户设备UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;
S52、根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
S53、接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的传输密钥,并利用初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密;
S54、接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的会话密钥,利用解密后得到的传输密钥对加密后的会话密钥进行解密;
S55、利用解密后得到的会话密钥对本端UE与对端UE之间传输的会话消息进行加密并传输。
较佳地,步骤S51中根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组,包括:
根据该UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组。
较佳地,步骤S52中在利用初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密之后,该方法还包括:
利用该UE的用户口令,对解密后的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
更新初始密钥组,具体方法如下:
接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的第二随机数组,利用该UE对应的传输密钥对加密后的第二随机数组进行解密,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
根据解密得到的第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组;
用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当向网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识的用户注销请求时,销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
接收网络侧设备发送的该UE的UE注销请求消息;
销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥和初始密钥组;
向网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应。
较佳地,步骤S52中根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,包括:
根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与网络侧设备用于根据该UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
根据密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
较佳地,该方法还包括:
当该UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,主叫UE随机生成第一随机数,并利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到加密第一随机数,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第一加密即时消息;
主叫UE将加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息发送给网络侧设备;
被叫UE接收网络侧设备发送的加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息,其中,第二随机数由网络侧设备随机生成,加密第二随机数由网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到,第二加密即时消息由网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
被叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对加密第二随机数进行解密,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对第二加密即时消息进行解密,得到即时消息。
本发明实施例中的保密通信系统设计三种密钥,分别为初始密钥、传输密钥以及会话密钥,下面结合这三种密钥的具体实施例详细说明本发明实施例提出的保密通信系统,本发明实施例中的网络侧设备包括密钥管理系统(Key Manager System,KMC)和保密多媒体通信系统(Secret Multimedia Communication System,SMCS)。
实施例一:初始密钥在保密通信系统中的作用、生成、更新及销毁。
初始密钥的作用:用于对UE对应的传输密钥进行加、解密,以提高传输密钥在传输过程中的安全性。
初始密钥的生成过程:
网络侧设备:UE在注册时,其保密模块需要在KMC侧进行初始化。此时,KMC根据UE的保密模块标识生成一个随机数组(即第一随机数组),并利用该随机数组生成该UE对应的一个初始密钥组(即第一初始密钥组);
由于KMC中保存有多个UE的保密模块对应的初始密钥组,为保证后续使用时KMC可以根据UE的保密模块标识查找到该UE对应的初始密钥组,KMC建立第一初始密钥组与第一初始密钥组对应的UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系;为提高密钥存储的安全性,利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,KMC保存加密后的第一初始密钥组、以及第一初始密钥组与第一初始密钥组对应的UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系,第一初始密钥组以密文形式存储在KMC中;
在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,KMC根据UE的用户口令,通过采用与UE用于根 据UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号,并根据该密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥,该初始密钥即为UE对应的初始密钥。
其中,KMC对UE的保密模块进行的认证过程即为,KMC接收到UE发送的携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的保密模块鉴权请求消息后,通过用户标识查找本地保存的该用户标识对应的保密模块标识,并比较查询的保密模块标识与UE发送的保密模块鉴权请求消息中携带的保密模块标识是否一致;如果一致,则KMC对UE的保密模块认证通过;否则KMC对UE的保密模块认证失败。
UE侧:UE确定初始密钥的方法与网络侧设备确定该UE对应的初始密钥的方法类似,即UE根据其保密模块标识生成一个随机数组(即第一随机数组,与网络侧设备生成的第一随机数组相同),并采用与KMC用于根据随机数组生成初始密钥组相同的算法,利用该随机数组生成该UE对应的一个初始密钥组(即第一初始密钥组);
UE利用其用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组,第一初始密钥组以密文形式存储在UE中;
在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,UE根据其用户口令,通过采用与KMC用于根据UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号,并根据该密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥,该初始密钥即为UE对应的初始密钥。
初始密钥的更新过程:为了保证保密通信系统的安全性,需要当UE的保密模块安全性低时(管理人员对UE的保密模块进行安全性判定)、或者周期性地对UE和KMC中保存的初始密钥组进行动态更新。如图6所示,UE和KMC中保存的初始密钥组的更新过程如下:
S601、KMC随机生成第二随机数组;
其中,第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
S602、KMC利用该UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数组进行加密;
S603、将携带有加密后的第二随机数组的初始密钥更新请求通过SMCS转发给UE;
S604、UE接收到携带有加密后的第二随机数组的初始密钥更新请求后,利用该UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数组进行解密;
S605、UE根据解密后的第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组,UE利用其用户口令,分别对第二初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并用加密后的第二初始密钥组替换加密后的第一初始密钥组;
S606、UE将初始密钥更新响应消息通过SMCS转发给KMC;
S607、KMC接收到初始密钥更新响应消息后,根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第 二初始密钥组,保存第二初始密钥组与第二初始密钥组对应的UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系,利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第二初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,KMC用加密后的第二初始密钥组替换加密后的第一初始密钥组。
其中,KMC采用与UE用于根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组相同的算法,根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组。
在步骤S607之后,UE将向网络侧设备发起保密模块认证流程,以获取新的该UE对应的传输密钥。
初始密钥组的销毁过程:如果UE的保密模块在非安全环境下,系统可以对KMC中UE对应的加密初始密码组、以及UE侧的加密初始密码组进行远程销毁。
如图7所示,初始密钥组的销毁过程如下:
S701、KMC通过SMCS将密钥销毁请求消息发送给UE,该密钥销毁请求消息中携带该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识;
具体的,若UE已注册,则SMCS指示UE进行密钥销毁;若UE已注销,则SMCS向KMC反馈注册失败命令,KMC保存该UE的密钥销毁请求消息;当该UE向KMC发起鉴权注册时,KMC再通过SMCS将密钥销毁请求消息发送给UE;
S702、UE接收到密钥销毁请求消息后,销毁本地保存的加密初始密钥组和加密传输密钥;
S703、UE通过SMCS向KMC发送密钥销毁响应消息;
S704、KMC接收到密钥销毁响应消息后,销毁本地保存的该UE对应的加密初始密钥组和加密传输密钥。
实施例二:传输密钥在保密通信系统中的作用、传输机制及销毁。
传输密钥的作用:用于对UE对应的会话密钥进行加密,以确保会话密钥在传输过程中的安全。
传输密钥的传输机制:如图8所示,本发明实施例提供的保密通信系统中传输密钥的传输机制如下:
S801、KMC在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,生成该UE注册周期内对应的传输密钥;
S802、KMC保存传输密钥与该传输密钥对应的UE的用户标识之间的对应关系,利用UE的用户口令,对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥;
S803、KMC利用该UE对应的初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密;
S804、KMC通过SMCS将加密传输密钥发送给UE;
S805、UE接收到该UE对应的加密传输密钥后,利用该UE对应的初始密钥对传输密钥进行解密,并利用该UE的用户口令,对解密后的传输密钥进行加密,并保存此次加密后的传输密钥。
传输密钥的销毁过程:传输密钥的销毁过程分为两种,一种是当UE的保密模块在非安全环境下,由KMC向UE发起的密钥销毁过程,具体密钥销毁过程如图7所示,此处不再赘述;另一种是当UE发起用户注销流程时,由UE主动发起的密钥销毁过程,如图9所示,传输密钥销毁过程如下:
S901、UE向SMCS发送用户注销请求消息;
S902、SMCS向UE发送用户注销响应消息,以指示UE进行传输密钥销毁过程;
S903、UE接收到用户注销响应消息后,销毁本地保存的加密传输密钥;
S904、SMCS向KMC发送用户注销请求消息,该用户注销请求消息携带UE的用户标识;
S905、KMC接收到用户注销请求消息后,根据UE的用户标识查找本地保存的该UE对应的加密传输密钥,并销毁;
S906、KMC向SMCS返回用户注销响应消息;
S907、SMCS接收到用户注销响应消息后,SMCS对UE进行用户注销,并释放该UE的相关资源。
实施例三:会话密钥在保密通信系统中的作用、传输机制、使用及销毁。
会话密钥的作用:用于在UE之间进行会话过程中对业务数据(语音媒体流)进行加、解密,是业务流的实际工作密钥。
如图10所示,通过加密基于IP的语音传输(Voice over IP,VoIP)业务流程具体说明会话密钥的传输机制、使用及销毁过程,加密VoIP业务流程如下:
S1001、主叫UE通过SMCS向KMC发送加密会话请求消息,该加密会话请求消息携带有主叫UE的用户标识和被叫UE的用户标识;
S1002、KMC接收到加密会话请求消息后,为本次加密会话生成会话密钥;
S1003、KMC根据主叫UE的用户标识查找主叫UE对应的传输密钥,根据被叫UE的用户标识查找被叫UE对应的传输密钥,并分别利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥和和被叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密;
S1004、KMC通过SMCS分别向主叫UE和被叫UE发送加密会话响应消息;其中,向主叫UE发送的加密会话响应消息携带有利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥加密后的会话密钥,向被叫UE发送的加密会话响应消息携带有利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥加密后的会话密钥;
S1005、主叫UE接收到加密会话响应消息后,根据本端的传输密钥对加密会话密钥进行解密,获得本次加密会话的会话密钥,并保存;
S1006、被叫UE接收到加密会话响应消息后,根据本端的传输密钥对加密会话密钥进行解密,获得本次加密会话的会话密钥,并保存;
较佳地,在步骤S1005和S1006之后,主叫UE和被叫UE会向SMCS反馈加密会话响应消息,以指示UE是否成功获得本次加密会话的会话密钥;如果在规定时间内SMCS没有收到主叫UE或被叫UE反馈的加密会话响应消息,则SMCS向主叫UE或被叫UE重新发送携带有加密会话密钥的加密会话响应消息,重复发送次数由系统设定。
S1007、主叫UE利用会话密钥对业务数据进行加密,并将加密后的业务数据发送给被叫UE;
S1008、被叫UE接收主叫UE发送的加密业务数据,并利用会话密钥对加密业务数据进行解密,获得本次业务数据;
被叫UE向主叫UE发送业务数据的过程与步骤S907和S908相同,此处不再赘述。
S1009、当本次加密会话结束时,主叫UE和被叫UE销毁本地保存的会话密钥;
S1010、主叫UE通过SMCS向KMC发送加密会话结束消息;
S1011、KMC接收到加密会话结束消息后,销毁本次加密会话的会话密钥。
步骤S1010和S1011为可选步骤,当KMC没有保存本次加密会话的会话密钥时,不需要进行步骤S1010和S1011。
实施例四:如图11所示,在保密通信系统中加密即时消息业务流程如下:
S1101、当主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,主叫UE随机生成第一随机数,并利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到加密第一随机数,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第一加密即时消息;
S1102、主叫UE将加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息通过SMCS发送给KMC;
S1103、KMC接收主叫UE发送的加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对加密第一随机数进行解密,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对第一加密即时消息进行解密,得到即时消息;
S1104、KMC随机生成第二随机数,并利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到加密第二随机数,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第二加密即时消息;
S1105、KMC通过SMCS将加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息发送给被叫UE;
S1106、被叫UE接收加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息,利用本端对应的传输密钥对加密第二随机数进行解密,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对第二加密即时消息进行解密,得到即时消息。
与上述方法相对应的,如图12所示,本发明实施例提供一种保密通信控制装置,该装置包括:
初始密钥确定单元121,用于在对用户设备UE进行初始化过程中,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,根据UE的用 户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
传输密钥确定单元122,用于生成该UE注册周期内对应的传输密钥,利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE;
会话密钥确定单元123,用于当接收到该UE作为主叫UE发送的会话建立请求时,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给主叫UE,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给被叫UE。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元121在根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组时,具体用于:
根据UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
建立第一初始密钥组与第一初始密钥组对应的该UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系;
利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组、以及对应关系。
较佳地,传输密钥确定单元122在利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密的同时,还用于:
建立传输密钥与该传输密钥对应的该UE的用户标识之间的对应关系;
利用该UE的用户口令,对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥、以及对应关系。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元121还用于:
随机生成第二随机数组,并根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组;
利用该UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数组进行加密,并将加密后的第二随机数组发送给该UE,以更新UE对应的初始密钥组。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
第一密钥销毁单元124,用于当接收到UE发送的携带有用户标识的用户注销请求时,根据用户标识查找该用户标识对应的传输密钥,并销毁本地保存的该用户标识对应的传输密钥。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
第二密钥销毁单元125,用于当需要注销该UE时,向该UE发送UE注销请求消息;当接收到该UE发送的携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应时,根据该UE的用户标识查找本地保存的该用户标识对应的加密后的传输密钥,并销毁该加 密后的传输密钥,根据该UE的保密模块标识查找本地保存的该保密模块标识对应的加密初始密钥组,并销毁该加密后的初始密钥组。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元121在根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥时,具体用于:
根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与该UE用于根据UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
根密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
即时业务密钥确定单元126,用于当该UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,接收主叫UE发送的加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息,其中,第一随机数由主叫UE随机生成,加密第一随机数由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到,第一加密即时消息由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对加密第一随机数进行解密得到第一随机数,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对第一加密即时消息进行解密得到及时消息;
生成第二随机数,并利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到加密第二随机数,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第二加密即时消息;
将加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息发送给被叫UE。
具体的,初始密钥确定单元121、传输密钥确定单元122、会话密钥确定单元123、第一密钥销毁单元124、第二密钥销毁单元125以及即时业务密钥确定单元126可以由处理器和具有收发功能的传输模块实现,具有收发功能的传输模块例如传输模块可以是专用芯片及天线等设备,本发明不局限于实现这些单元的实体。
如图13所示,本发明实施例提供一种保密通信装置,该装置包括:
初始密钥确定单元131,用于根据用户设备UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;根据该UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
传输密钥确定单元132,用于接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的传输密钥,并利用初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密;
会话密钥确定单元133,用于接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的会话密钥,利用解密后得到的传输密钥对加密后的会话密钥进行解密;利用解密后得到的会话密钥对本端UE与对端UE之间传输的会话消息进行加密并传输。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元131在根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始 密钥组时,具体用于:
根据该UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
利用UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组。
较佳地,传输密钥确定单元132在利用初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密之后,还用于:
利用该UE的用户口令,对解密后的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元131还用于:
接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的第二随机数组,利用该UE对应的传输密钥对加密后的第二随机数组进行解密,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
根据解密得到的第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组;
用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
第一密钥销毁单元134,用于当向网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识的用户注销请求时,销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥。
较佳地,该装置还包括:
第二密钥销毁单元135,用于接收网络侧设备发送的该UE的UE注销请求消息;销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥和初始密钥组;向网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应。
较佳地,初始密钥确定单元131在根据UE的用户口令从初始密钥组中选择初始密钥时,具体用于:
根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与网络侧设备用于根据该UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
根密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
较佳地,该装置法还包括:
即时业务密钥确定单元136,用于当该UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,主叫UE随机生成第一随机数,并利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到加密第一随机数,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第一加密即时消息;
主叫UE将加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息发送给网络侧设备;
被叫UE接收网络侧设备发送的加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息,其中,第二随机数由网络侧设备随机生成,加密第二随机数由网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到,第二加密即时消息由网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
被叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对加密第二随机数进行解密,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对第二加密即时消息进行解密,得到即时消息。
具体的,初始密钥确定单元131、传输密钥确定单元132、会话密钥确定单元133、第一密钥销毁单元134、第二密钥销毁单元135以及即时业务密钥确定单元136可以由处理器和具有收发功能的传输模块实现,具有收发功能的传输模块例如可以是专用芯片及天线等设备,本发明不局限于实现这些单元的实体。
本领域内的技术人员应明白,本发明的实施例可提供为方法、装置、或计算机程序产品。因此,本发明可采用完全硬件实施例、完全软件实施例、或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式。而且,本发明可采用在一个或多个其中包含有计算机可用程序代码的计算机可用存储介质(包括但不限于磁盘存储器和光学存储器等)上实施的计算机程序产品的形式。
本发明是参照根据本发明实施例的方法、设备(装置)、和计算机程序产品的流程图和/或方框图来描述的。应理解可由计算机程序指令实现流程图和/或方框图中的每一流程和/或方框、以及流程图和/或方框图中的流程和/或方框的结合。可提供这些计算机程序指令到通用计算机、专用计算机、嵌入式处理机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器以产生一个机器,使得通过计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器执行的指令产生用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的装置。
这些计算机程序指令也可存储在能引导计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备以特定方式工作的计算机可读存储器中,使得存储在该计算机可读存储器中的指令产生包括指令装置的制造品,该指令装置实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能。
这些计算机程序指令也可装载到计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备上,使得在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行一系列操作步骤以产生计算机实现的处理,从而在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行的指令提供用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的步骤。
显然,本领域的技术人员可以对本发明进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本发明的精神和范围。这样,倘若本发明的这些修改和变型属于本发明权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内,则本发明也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。

Claims (32)

  1. 一种保密通信控制方法,其特征在于,该方法包括:
    在对用户设备UE进行初始化过程中,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;
    在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,根据该UE的用户口令从所述初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,并生成该UE注册周期内对应的传输密钥,利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE;
    当接收到该UE作为主叫UE发送的会话建立请求时,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给主叫UE,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给被叫UE。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组,包括:
    根据UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
    建立第一初始密钥组与第一初始密钥组对应的该UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系;
    利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组、以及所述对应关系。
  3. 如权利要求2所述的方法,其特征在于,在利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密的同时,该方法还包括:
    建立传输密钥与该传输密钥对应的该UE的用户标识之间的对应关系;
    利用该UE的用户口令,对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥、以及所述对应关系。
  4. 如权利要求3所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    随机生成第二随机数组,并根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
    用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组;
    利用该UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数组进行加密,并将加密后的第二随机数组发送给该UE,以更新UE对应的初始密钥组。
  5. 如权利要求3所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    当接收到该UE发送的携带有用户标识的用户注销请求时,根据用户标识查找该用户标识对应的传输密钥,并销毁本地保存的该用户标识对应的传输密钥。
  6. 如权利要求2或3所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    当需要注销该UE时,向该UE发送UE注销请求消息;
    当接收到该UE发送的携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应时,根据该UE的用户标识查找本地保存的该用户标识对应的加密后的传输密钥,并销毁该加密后的传输密钥,根据该UE的保密模块标识查找本地保存的该保密模块标识对应的加密初始密钥组,并销毁该加密后的初始密钥组。
  7. 如权利要求1、2或4中的任意一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述根据该UE的用户口令从所述初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,包括:
    根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与该UE用于根据UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
    根据所述密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
  8. 如权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    当所述UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,接收主叫UE发送的加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息,其中,所述第一随机数由主叫UE随机生成,所述加密第一随机数由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到,所述第一加密即时消息由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
    利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对加密第一随机数进行解密得到第一随机数,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对第一加密即时消息进行解密得到及时消息;
    生成第二随机数,并利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到加密第二随机数,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第二加密即时消息;
    将加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息发送给被叫UE。
  9. 一种保密通信方法,其特征在于,该方法包括:
    根据用户设备UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;
    根据该UE的用户口令从所述初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
    接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的传输密钥,并利用所述初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密;
    接收所述网络侧设备发送的加密后的会话密钥,利用解密后得到的传输密钥对加密后的会话密钥进行解密;
    利用解密后得到的会话密钥对本端UE与对端UE之间传输的会话消息进行加密并传输。
  10. 如权利要求9所述的方法,其特征在于,所述根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该 UE对应的初始密钥组,包括:
    根据该UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
    利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组。
  11. 如权利要求10所述的方法,其特征在于,在利用所述初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密之后,该方法还包括:
    利用该UE的用户口令,对解密后的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥。
  12. 如权利要求11所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    接收所述网络侧设备发送的加密后的第二随机数组,利用该UE对应的传输密钥对加密后的第二随机数组进行解密,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
    根据解密得到的第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组;
    用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组。
  13. 如权利要求11所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    当向所述网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识的用户注销请求时,销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥。
  14. 如权利要求10或11所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    接收所述网络侧设备发送的该UE的UE注销请求消息;
    销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥和初始密钥组;
    向所述网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应。
  15. 如权利要求9、10或12中的任意一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述根据该UE的用户口令从所述初始密钥组中选择初始密钥,包括:
    根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与所述网络侧设备用于根据该UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
    根据所述密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
  16. 如权利要求9所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    当所述UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,主叫UE随机生成第一随机数,并利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到加密第一随机数,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第一加密即时消息;
    主叫UE将加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息发送给所述网络侧设备;
    被叫UE接收所述网络侧设备发送的加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息,其中,所 述第二随机数由所述网络侧设备随机生成,所述加密第二随机数由所述网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到,第二加密即时消息由所述网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
    被叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对加密第二随机数进行解密,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对第二加密即时消息进行解密,得到即时消息。
  17. 一种保密通信控制装置,其特征在于,该装置包括:
    初始密钥确定单元,用于在对用户设备UE进行初始化过程中,根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;在对UE的保密模块认证通过后,根据该UE的用户口令从所述初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
    传输密钥确定单元,用于生成该UE注册周期内对应的传输密钥,利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并将加密后的传输密钥发送给该UE;
    会话密钥确定单元,用于当接收到该UE作为主叫UE发送的会话建立请求时,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给主叫UE,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对会话密钥进行加密并将加密后的会话密钥发送给被叫UE。
  18. 如权利要求17所述的装置,其特征在于,所述初始密钥确定单元在根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组时,具体用于:
    根据UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
    建立第一初始密钥组与第一初始密钥组对应的该UE的保密模块标识之间的对应关系;
    利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组、以及所述对应关系。
  19. 如权利要求17所述的装置,其特征在于,所述传输密钥确定单元在利用该初始密钥对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密的同时,还用于:
    建立传输密钥与该传输密钥对应的该UE的用户标识之间的对应关系;
    利用该UE的用户口令,对该UE对应的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥、以及所述对应关系。
  20. 如权利要求19所述的装置,其特征在于,所述初始密钥确定单元还用于:
    随机生成第二随机数组,并根据第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
    用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组;
    利用该UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数组进行加密,并将加密后的第二随机数组发送给该UE,以更新UE对应的初始密钥组。
  21. 如权利要求19所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:
    第一密钥销毁单元,用于当接收到UE发送的携带有用户标识的用户注销请求时,根据用户标识查找该用户标识对应的传输密钥,并销毁本地保存的该用户标识对应的传输密钥。
  22. 如权利要求18或19所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:
    第二密钥销毁单元,用于当需要注销该UE时,向该UE发送UE注销请求消息;当接收到该UE发送的携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应时,根据该UE的用户标识查找本地保存的该用户标识对应的加密后的传输密钥,并销毁该加密后的传输密钥,根据该UE的保密模块标识查找本地保存的该保密模块标识对应的加密初始密钥组,并销毁该加密后的初始密钥组。
  23. 如权利要求17、19或20中的任意一项所述的装置,其特征在于,所述初始密钥确定单元在根据该UE的用户口令从所述初始密钥组中选择初始密钥时,具体用于:
    根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与该UE用于根据UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
    根据所述密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
  24. 如权利要求17所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:
    即时业务密钥确定单元,用于当所述UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,接收主叫UE发送的加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息,其中,所述第一随机数由主叫UE随机生成,所述加密第一随机数由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到,所述第一加密即时消息由主叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
    利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥对加密第一随机数进行解密得到第一随机数,利用主叫UE对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对第一加密即时消息进行解密得到及时消息;
    生成第二随机数,并利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到加密第二随机数,利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第二加密即时消息;
    将加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息发送给被叫UE。
  25. 一种保密通信装置,其特征在于,该装置包括:
    初始密钥确定单元,用于根据用户设备UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组;根据该UE的用户口令从所述初始密钥组中选择初始密钥;
    传输密钥确定单元,用于接收网络侧设备发送的加密后的传输密钥,并利用所述初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密;
    会话密钥确定单元,用于接收所述网络侧设备发送的加密后的会话密钥,利用解密后得到的传输密钥对加密后的会话密钥进行解密;利用解密后得到的会话密钥对本端UE与对端UE之间传输的会话消息进行加密并传输。
  26. 如权利要求25所述的装置,其特征在于,所述初始密钥确定单元在根据该UE的保密模块标识确定该UE对应的初始密钥组时,具体用于:
    根据该UE的保密模块标识生成第一随机数组,并根据第一随机数组生成该UE对应的第一初始密钥组;
    利用该UE的用户口令,分别对第一初始密钥组中的每个初始密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的第一初始密钥组。
  27. 如权利要求26所述的装置,其特征在于,所述传输密钥确定单元在利用所述初始密钥对加密后的传输密钥进行解密之后,还用于:
    利用该UE的用户口令,对解密后的传输密钥进行加密,并保存加密后的传输密钥。
  28. 如权利要求27所述的装置,其特征在于,所述初始密钥确定单元还用于:
    接收所述网络侧设备发送的加密后的第二随机数组,利用该UE对应的传输密钥对加密后的第二随机数组进行解密,其中第二随机数组中随机数的数量与第一随机数组中随机数的数量相同;
    根据解密得到的第二随机数组生成该UE对应的第二初始密钥组;
    用第二初始密钥组替换第一初始密钥组。
  29. 如权利要求27所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:
    第一密钥销毁单元,用于当向所述网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识的用户注销请求时,销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥。
  30. 如权利要求26或27所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:
    第二密钥销毁单元,用于接收所述网络侧设备发送的该UE的UE注销请求消息;销毁本地保存的加密后的传输密钥和初始密钥组;向所述网络侧设备发送携带有该UE的用户标识和保密模块标识的UE注销成功响应。
  31. 如权利要求25、27或28中的任意一项所述的装置,其特征在于,所述初始密钥确定单元在根据该UE的用户口令从所述初始密钥组中选择初始密钥时,具体用于:
    根据该UE的用户口令,通过采用与所述网络侧设备用于根据该UE的用户口令确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号相同的预设算法,确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥对应的密钥序号;
    根据所述密钥序号确定初始密钥组中一个初始密钥。
  32. 如权利要求25所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置法还包括:
    即时业务密钥确定单元,用于当所述UE作为主叫UE发起即时消息业务时,主叫UE 随机生成第一随机数,并利用本端对应的传输密钥对第一随机数进行加密得到加密第一随机数,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第一随机数对即时消息进行加密得到第一加密即时消息;
    主叫UE将加密第一随机数和第一加密即时消息发送给所述网络侧设备;
    被叫UE接收所述网络侧设备发送的加密第二随机数和第二加密即时消息,其中,所述第二随机数由所述网络侧设备随机生成,所述加密第二随机数由所述网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥对第二随机数进行加密得到,第二加密即时消息由所述网络侧设备利用被叫UE对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对即时消息进行加密得到;
    被叫UE利用本端对应的传输密钥对加密第二随机数进行解密,利用本端对应的传输密钥和第二随机数对第二加密即时消息进行解密,得到即时消息。
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