WO2015131607A1

WO2015131607A1 - Method and device for creating trusted environment, and method and device for restoration after base station fault

Info

Publication number: WO2015131607A1
Application number: PCT/CN2014/093999
Authority: WO
Inventors: 成峰波; 姜军
Original assignee: 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date: 2014-09-25
Filing date: 2014-12-16
Publication date: 2015-09-11
Also published as: CN105516967A

Abstract

A method and a device for creating a trusted environment, and a method and a device for restoration after a base station fault. The method for restoration after a base station fault comprises: in a trusted environment, performing a trustability/risk-level check on the base station; upon discovering a base station fault during the trustability/risk-level check, resetting the base station and restoring same to trusted factory settings.

Description

Trusted environment creation method and device, and base station abnormality recovery method and device

Technical field

The present invention relates to the field of wireless communications, and in particular, to a trusted environment creation method and apparatus, and a base station abnormality recovery method and apparatus.

Background technique

At present, network security has become an urgent problem to be solved. In particular, mobile communication networks play an irreplaceable role in modern society's life and production, and their security is worthy of attention. The communication base station is a component of the mobile communication network, and has the characteristics of large number, wide distribution, and complicated working environment, especially the outdoor communication base station. Because the physical security protection is relatively weak and often lacks active security defense capability, it is easy in the entire communication network. A link to a security attack.

At the same time, communication base stations are the infrastructure for providing communication services, and the requirements for their operational availability are extremely severe. In the operation process, the communication base station faces complex risks such as hardware failure, software failure, human failure, and credible metric failure. The characteristics and countermeasures of various failure risks are also different. If the base station can identify various failure risks, conduct comprehensive analysis, and use the data recovery mechanism of the trusted computing environment to provide self-recovery from the abnormality, which will greatly improve the availability level of the base station, improve the communication user experience and improve communication operations. Business benefits are helpful.

Modern communication base stations are generally embedded computer systems, and use Trusted Computing (TC) technology to provide active security defense capabilities for communication base stations. Compared with the traditional passive security defense system consisting of firewall, intrusion detection, virus prevention, etc., the Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) is used as the security system of the underlying firmware to build a trust source point in the computing system. The cryptographic mechanism establishes a chain of trust and builds a trusted computing environment, making it possible to fundamentally solve security problems and has better system scalability.

The development of trusted computing technology is very rapid. Many foreign technology companies, such as Atmel and Broadcom, have launched TPM and security PCs that comply with trusted computing specifications. But such products typically focus on hardware-based computing platforms, including security coprocessors, personal tokens, cryptographic accelerators, and multifunction devices. The goal of these examples is to ensure data authenticity, data confidentiality, and number According to protection. However, these products are more focused on providing basic trusted computing services from the hardware platform level, and can not provide comprehensive trusted services for software systems and services.

Companies such as Verisign, Phoenix Technologies, and Microsoft have also introduced TPM application software and operating systems that can provide functions such as management files, information transfer, key delivery, and smart signature. However, pure software services affect their applications because of the possibility of tampering. Reliability. And because these software systems are generally integrated or based on desktop-level hardware platforms, or heavy-duty systems that rely on operating systems, applications in embedded systems such as base stations are limited.

The related technical solutions for applying trusted technology to communication base stations generally focus on the establishment of a trusted environment, lack of comprehensive analysis of various failure risks faced by the base station, and lack of a backup mechanism for system trusted data. After the exception, the system reset is simply implemented. There is no effective data recovery method, or it can not effectively recover from the abnormal state to the normal communication state, or other third-party system intervention is required to recover, but the recovery time is obviously prolonged.

In summary, the trusted computing technology solution applied to the communication base station is limited in the application of the limited resources of the embedded computing system, and cannot provide a reliable data backup mechanism adapted to the operation requirements of the base station and comprehensive analysis of various failure risks. Therefore, it is impossible to provide a reliable function for the base station to actively recover from an abnormality.

Summary of the invention

The embodiment of the invention provides a method and device for creating a trusted environment and a method and device for recovering an abnormality of a base station, which solves the problem that the trusted computing technology solution provides a reliable abnormal recovery function for the base station.

A base station abnormal recovery method includes:

After the base station is powered on for the first time, running the BIOS code of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware pre-written to the base station, and transferring the control of the trusted environment to the BIOS;

The BIOS controls loading of the secure operating system, and transferring the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system;

The secure operating system loads the software environment and creates a trusted environment.

Optionally, after the base station is powered on for the first time, before the step of running the BIOS code of the TPM hardware pre-written to the base station to transfer the control of the trusted environment to the BIOS, the method further includes:

The TPM hardware and the non-volatile storage of the base station are initialized before the base station is shipped from the factory. The non-volatile storage includes a data protection area and a file system data area, and specifically includes:

Writing a version switch identifier and a pre-installed version of the base station to the data protection area and the file system data area, where the pre-installed version of the base station includes a trusted Boot Loader code, a BOOT code, an image of a secure operating system, and a trusted Network software library, application software and weight data,

The key set and the BIOS code associated with the pre-installed version of the base station are written into the TPM hardware, and the key set includes a plurality of keys.

Optionally, the BIOS controls to perform loading of the secure operating system, and transferring the trusted environment control to the secure operating system includes:

After the hardware self-test ends, the BIOS checks the credibility of the data stored in the data protection area of the base station;

After the reliability check of the data stored in the data protection area is passed, the BIOS preloads the pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection area by using the Boot Loader code loading;

Starting to execute the BOOT code, performing hardware initialization on the embedded system of the base station, creating a file system, and performing trusted authentication on the file system;

After the trusted authentication of the file system is completed, the secure operating system image is extracted and loaded from the pre-installed version of the base station, and the trusted environment control is transferred to the secure operating system.

Optionally, after the step of checking the credibility of the data stored in the data protection area of the base station after the hardware self-test is completed, the BIOS further includes:

The BIOS triggers the base station to restart resetting when the reliability check of the data stored in the data protection zone fails.

Optionally, after the trusted authentication of the file system is completed, extracting an image of the secure operating system from the pre-installed version of the base station, and transferring the control of the trusted environment to the secure operating system includes:

Determining, according to the version switching identifier, a pre-installed version of the base station, and extracting an image of the secure operating system from the pre-installed version of the base station;

Trusted authentication of the image of the secure operating system;

After the image of the secure operating system passes the trusted authentication, the image of the secure operating system is loaded. For example, pass the trusted environment control to the secure operating system.

Optionally, determining, according to the version switching identifier, a pre-installed version of the base station, and extracting an image of the secure operating system from the pre-installed version of the base station includes:

When the version switch identifier indicates the pre-installed version of the base station in the file system data area, extract the corresponding secure operating system image directly from the pre-installed version of the base station indicated by the version switch identifier;

When the version switching identifier indicates a pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection area, the pre-installed version of the base station is restored to the file system data area, and then extracted from the pre-installed version of the base station in the file system data area. Secure operating system image.

Optionally, after the step of performing trusted authentication on the image of the secure operating system, the method further includes:

After the image of the security operating system fails to pass the trusted authentication, the base station is triggered to restart the reset, and the value of the version switch identifier is forcibly set to indicate that the other base station is pre-installed, and the other base station pre-installed version is stored in the File system data area or data protection area.

Optionally, the security operating system loads the software environment, and the creation of the trusted environment includes:

The security operating system is started, and the application software is extracted and loaded from the pre-installed version of the base station, and the trusted network software library is attached.

Optionally, the method further includes:

After the security operating system is started, the base station requests authentication from the remote control terminal;

Receiving, by the remote control end, the base station receives a new pre-installed version of the base station and a set of matching keys issued by the remote control end;

The base station writes the new base station pre-installed version into the data protection area and the file system data area, and writes the matching key set into the TPM hardware of the base station;

The value of the base station changing version switch identifier indicates that the new base station is pre-installed, and initiates a reset, and loads the new base station pre-installed version after reset.

The embodiment of the invention further provides a base station abnormality recovery method, including:

Performing a credential risk check on the base station in a trusted environment of the base station;

When the base station is abnormal in the reliability risk check, the base station is reset and restored to the trusted base station pre-installed version.

Optionally, the trusted environment of the base station is configured by a security operating system running on the base station, a trusted service software library, and a trusted network service system, where the method further includes:

Writing a version switch identifier and a pre-installed version of the base station to the non-volatile storage data protection area and the file system data area of the base station in advance, the base station pre-installed version including a trusted Boot Loader code, a BOOT code, and a security operation System image, trusted network software library and application software;

A key set and a BIOS code associated with the pre-installed version of the base station are written in advance to the TPM hardware of the base station.

Optionally, in the trusted environment of the base station, performing a trusted risk check on the base station, and performing a trusted risk check on the base station includes:

The security operating system cooperates with the application software and the trusted network software library to periodically perform self-test on system hardware, storage system, network communication, and software behavior;

A risk assessment decision is made on the data obtained by the self-test identification to determine whether a base station abnormality has occurred.

Optionally, the security operating system cooperates with the application software and the trusted network software library, and periodically performs self-checking on system hardware, storage system, network communication, and software behavior, including:

The security operating system cooperates with the application software to periodically perform self-test on the system hardware and the storage system of the base station, and collect static credibility evaluation data, where the static credibility evaluation data includes at least one of the following Or data of any number of base station anomalies:

Identify hardware failure and illegally replace the version;

Through the basic service function of the trusted network software library, the network communication is authenticated in real time, and the application system periodically authenticates to the operating system to collect system dynamic credibility evaluation data, and the system dynamic credibility evaluation data includes at least the following Data for any or any number of base station anomalies:

Network unauthorized access, network hijacking;

The external instruction concentration data check is performed by the service instruction category received by the application software, and the data of the unauthorized behavior feature is collected, and the unauthorized behavior feature data includes at least data of any one or any of the following base station abnormal events:

Unauthorized deletion of files, unauthorized copying of files, and unauthorized operations that seriously endanger the security of the device.

Optionally, an assessment decision is made on the risk obtained by the self-test identification, and determining whether the risk is a base station abnormality includes:

Using the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm, the static credibility assessment data obtained by the self-test identification, the system dynamic credibility assessment data, and the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics are evaluated and determined;

When the result of the decision is that a base station abnormality occurs, a base station resetting scheme is made and the version switching identifier saved by the data protection area is synchronously updated.

Optionally, using the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to evaluate the static credibility assessment data, the system dynamic credibility assessment data, and the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics of the self-test identification includes:

After using the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to calculate the static credibility evaluation data or the system dynamic credibility evaluation data or the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics, the weight obtained is higher than the corresponding threshold in the weight data. The decision occurs that the base station is abnormal.

Optionally, the method further includes:

Receiving, by the remote control end, the base station receives a new base station version and a matching key set delivered by the remote control end;

Transmitting, by the base station, the new base station version into the data protection zone, and writing the set of matching keys to the TPM hardware of the base station;

The embodiment of the invention further provides a trusted environment creation device, including:

a BIOS startup module, configured to: after the base station is powered on for the first time, run a BIOS code of the TPM hardware pre-written to the base station, and transfer the control of the trusted environment to the BIOS;

a BIOS, configured to: control loading of the operating system, and transfer the control of the trusted environment to the secure operating system;

A secure operating system that is set up to load a software environment and create a trusted environment.

Optionally, the device further includes:

And an initialization module, configured to: initialize the TPM hardware and non-volatile storage of the base station before the base station leaves the factory, the non-volatile storage includes a data protection area and a file system data area, including:

Optionally, the BIOS includes:

a credibility checking unit, configured to: after the end of the hardware self-test, check the credibility of the data stored in the data protection area of the base station;

a version loading unit, configured to: after the credibility check of the data stored in the data protection zone is passed, preloading the pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection zone by loading the Boot Loader code;

a file system creation unit, configured to: start executing the BOOT code, perform hardware initialization on the embedded system of the base station, create a file system, and perform trusted authentication on the file system;

An image loading unit is configured to: after completing the trusted authentication of the file system, extract a secure operating system image from the pre-installed version of the base station, and transfer the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system.

Optionally, the BIOS further includes:

And a restarting unit, configured to: when the credibility check of the data stored in the data protection zone fails, trigger the base station to restart the reset.

Optionally, the image loading unit includes:

a version selection subunit, configured to: determine a pre-installed version of the base station according to the version switching identifier, and extract an image of the security operating system from the pre-installed version of the base station;

An authentication subunit, configured to: perform trusted authentication on an image of the secure operating system;

The loading subunit is configured to: after the image of the security operating system passes the trusted authentication, load the image of the secure operating system, and transfer the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system.

Optionally, the version selection subunit is configured to: directly, when the version switching identifier indicates a pre-installed version of the base station in the file system data area, directly from the pre-installed version of the base station indicated by the version switching identifier Extract the corresponding secure operating system image,

Optionally, the version selection sub-unit is further configured to: after the image of the security operating system fails to pass the trusted authentication, trigger the base station to restart the reset, and forcibly set the value of the version switching identifier to indicate another base station. The pre-installed version is stored in the file system data area or the data protection area.

Optionally, the device further includes:

a remote authentication module, configured to: after the security operating system is started, the base station requests authentication from the remote control terminal;

a version downloading module, configured to receive a new pre-installed version of the base station and a set of supporting keys issued by the remote control terminal after being authenticated by the remote control terminal;

a storage module, configured to: write the new base station pre-installed version into the data protection area and the file system data area, and write the matching key set into the TPM hardware of the base station;

And a reset module, configured to: change the value of the version switch identifier to indicate the pre-installed version of the new base station, and initiate a reset, and load the new base station pre-installed version after the reset.

The embodiment of the invention further provides a base station abnormality recovery device, including:

An checking module, configured to perform a trusted risk check on the base station in a trusted environment of the base station;

The abnormality recovery module is configured to reset and restore the base station to a trusted pre-installed version of the base station when the base station is abnormal in the reliability risk check.

Optionally, the trusted environment of the base station is composed of a security operating system running on the base station, a trusted service software library, and a trusted network service system, and the device further includes:

a first configuration module, configured to: write a version switch identifier and a pre-installed version of the base station to the data protection area and the file system data area of the non-volatile storage of the base station in advance, where the pre-installed version of the base station includes a trusted Boot Loader code, BOOT code, image of secure operating system, trusted network software library and application software;

And a second configuration module, configured to: write a key set and a BIOS code matched with the pre-installed version of the base station to the TPM hardware of the base station in advance.

Optionally, the checking module includes:

a self-checking unit, configured to: control the security operating system to cooperate with the application software and the trusted network software library, and periodically perform self-checking on system hardware, storage system, network communication, and software behavior;

The abnormality determining unit is configured to: perform risk assessment decision on the data obtained by the self-test identification, and determine whether a base station abnormality occurs.

Optionally, the self-test unit includes:

a hardware self-test sub-unit, configured to: control the security operating system to cooperate with the application software, periodically perform self-test on the system hardware and the storage system of the base station, and collect static credibility evaluation data, The static credibility assessment data contains at least data of any one or any of the following base station anomaly events:

Identify hardware failure and illegally replace the version;

a network self-checking sub-unit, configured to: authenticate the network communication in real time through the basic service function of the trusted network software library, periodically authenticate the operating system through the application software, and collect system dynamic credibility evaluation data, The system dynamic credibility assessment data includes at least data of any one or any of the following base station anomaly events:

Network unauthorized access, network hijacking;

a software self-test sub-unit, configured to: perform external command concentration data check by the service instruction category received by the application software, and collect data of an unauthorized behavior feature, where the non-authorized behavior feature data includes at least one of the following or Data for any number of base station exception events:

Optionally, the abnormality determining unit includes:

The decision subunit is configured to: use a weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to evaluate and determine the static credibility evaluation data, the system dynamic credibility evaluation data, and the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics obtained by the self-test identification;

The solution determining unit is configured to: when the decision result is that the base station abnormality occurs, make a base station resetting scheme and synchronously update the version switching identifier saved by the data protection zone.

Optionally, the device further includes:

a version downloading module, configured to: after the base station is authenticated by the remote control end, receive a new base station version and a matching key set delivered by the remote control end;

a storage module, configured to: write the new base station version into the data protection zone, and write the matching key set into the TPM hardware of the base station;

a reset module, configured to: change a value of the version switch identifier to indicate the pre-installed version of the new base station, and initiate a reset, and load the new base station pre-installed version after resetting

Embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer program comprising program instructions that, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform the method described above.

Embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer readable storage medium carrying the computer program.

An embodiment of the present invention provides a method and device for creating a trusted environment, and a method and device for recovering an abnormality of a base station, creating a trusted environment of the base station, and performing a trusted risk check on the base station in a trusted environment of the base station. When the base station is abnormal in the trusted risk check, the base station is reset and restored to the trusted base station pre-installed version. The abnormal self-test and automatic recovery of the base station based on the trusted environment are realized, and the problem that the trusted computing technology scheme provides a reliable abnormal recovery function for the base station is solved.

BRIEF abstract

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a base station abnormality recovery method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

2 is a flowchart of a method for creating a trusted environment according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

3 is a specific flowchart of step 203 in FIG. 2;

4 is a flowchart of a base station version update;

Figure 5 is a specific flow chart of step 102 in Figure 1;

FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a trusted environment creation apparatus according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

7 is a schematic structural diagram of a BIOS 602 of FIG. 6;

FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of the image loading unit 704 of FIG. 7;

FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a base station abnormality recovery apparatus according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of the self-checking module 901 of FIG. 9;

11 is a schematic structural view of the self-test unit 1001 of FIG. 10;

FIG. 12 is a schematic structural diagram of the abnormality determining unit 1102 of FIG. 11;

Figure 13 is a schematic diagram of the composition of a universal mobile communication system;

14 is a schematic diagram of an evolved UTRAN composition;

15 is a schematic diagram showing the structure of a base station using trusted computing technology;

Figure 16 is a schematic diagram of the main components of the TPM firmware;

17 is a schematic diagram of space allocation of non-volatile storage of a base station.

Preferred embodiment of the invention

The trusted computing related technical solution applied to the communication base station is limited in application of the limited resources of the embedded computing system, and cannot provide a reliable data backup mechanism adapted to the operation requirements of the base station and comprehensive analysis of various failure risks, thereby failing to The base station provides reliable ability to actively recover from anomalies.

In order to solve the above problem, an embodiment of the present invention provides a base station abnormal recovery law and apparatus. Embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that, in the case of no conflict, the features in the embodiments and the embodiments in the present application may be arbitrarily combined with each other.

First, the first embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

The embodiment of the present invention provides a base station abnormality recovery method based on a trusted environment. The process of performing self-test and recovery of the abnormality of the base station by using the method is as shown in FIG. 1 , and includes:

Step 101: Create a trusted environment of the base station.

An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for creating a trusted environment, and the process is as shown in FIG. 2, including:

Step 201: Initialize, by the base station, the TPM hardware and non-volatile storage of the base station, where the non-volatile storage includes a data protection zone and a file system data zone, and create a first one of the trusted environment. Complete source point;

include:

1. The version switch identifier and the pre-installed version of the base station are written into the data protection area and the file system data area, and the pre-installed version of the base station includes a trusted boot loader code, a boot (BOOT) code, and a security operation. System image, trusted network software library, application software, and weight data.

The file system data area is a storage area that can be changed when the security operating system is running. At the time of shipment, the file system data area is consistent with the storage content in the data protection area.

The version switch identifier points to a pre-installed version of the base station. It should be noted that one or more pre-installed versions of the base station may exist in the data protection area and the file system data area, and the value of the version switch identifier may point to a pre-installed version of any base station in the data protection zone, or may point to a file. A pre-installed version of any base station in the system data area.

The Trusted Network Software Library is a function library used by the secure operating system to access hardware storage information.

The weight data is used as a criterion for determining the subsequent decision, and at least includes a threshold for determining whether an event has occurred.

2. Write a key set and a basic input output system (BIOS) code associated with the pre-installed version of the base station to the TPM hardware to create a first complete source point of the trusted environment. The key set includes a plurality of keys, and each key has an index number. When the other device uses the key for authentication, the key may be selected according to the index sent by the other party for authentication, or the key may be selected. The index of the key is then sent to the other party for authentication.

The Boot loader code and BOOT code are placed side by side in the data protection area along with the pre-installed version.

Step 202: After the base station is powered on for the first time, run the BIOS code of the TPM hardware pre-written to the base station, and transfer the control of the trusted environment to the BIOS.

In this step, the base station powers up the TPM hardware BIOS. The trusted environment of the base station online operation process is created, starting from any power-on process of the base station. After the base station is powered on, the hardware circuit enables the TPM hardware BIOS to take over control of the system, first performing a hardware self-test.

Step 203: The BIOS controls to load the operating system, and transfers the control of the trusted environment to the security operating system.

This step is shown in Figure 3 and includes:

Step 301: After the hardware self-test ends, the BIOS checks the credibility of the data stored in the data protection area of the base station.

In this step, the BIOS authenticates the data protection zone. After the hardware self-test is completed, the BIOS checks the reliability of the data protection zone data of the base station by using the agreed key.

Step 302: After the reliability check of the data stored in the data protection zone is passed, the BIOS loads the security pre-installed in the pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection zone by using the Boot Loader code loading. Operating system image;

In this step, after the BIOS checks the credibility of the data protection zone, the operating system can be loaded by the trusted Boot Loader code. If the credibility check of the data protection zone fails, the alarm indicator of the base station is prompted. The base station restarts reset.

Step 303: Start executing the BOOT code, perform hardware initialization on the embedded system of the base station, create a file system, and perform trusted authentication on the file system.

In this step, BOOT starts execution. BOOT first performs hardware initialization on the embedded system.

BOOT creates a file system and performs trusted authentication on the file system.

Step 304: After completing the trusted authentication of the file system, extract a secure operating system image from the pre-installed version of the base station, and pass the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system.

In this step, according to the version switching identifier in the data protection zone, the corresponding security operating system image is selected for loading. If the value of the version switch identifier indicates that the secure operating system image is loaded from the file system area of the base station, the load flow proceeds directly to step 204. If it is instructed to load from the data protection zone, after the data protection zone version is restored to the file system with TPM support, the operating system image is ready to be loaded.

When the trusted operating system image of the secure operating system passes, the security operating system is directly loaded. Image, when the trusted authentication of the secure operating system image fails, the value of the version switch identifier is forcibly set to load the pre-installed version of the base station from the data protection zone (optionally, at least one base station is pre-installed in the file system data area) In the version, the value of the version switch identifier may be set to indicate that another base station pre-installed version in the data area of the file system is loaded. The data change rule of the version switch identifier may be set according to requirements, and the present invention does not limit this. It is ensured that the manner in which the pre-installed version of the other base station is replaced without being trusted is considered to be within the protection scope of the present invention), and the base station is reset.

Step 204: The security operating system loads a software environment and creates a trusted environment.

The secure operating system extracts and executes the application software from the pre-installed version of the base station, completes the hooking of the trusted network software library, loads the trusted network software library, and transfers the control of the trusted environment to the The application software and the trusted network software library.

Optionally, the base station performs loading of the security operating system image, and the secure operating system takes over the control of the trusted environment, and completes the hook invoked by the TPM driver and the trusted network software library (both included in the pre-installed version of the base station).

Load and execute the trusted network software library that comes with the operating system.

Trusted authentication of the application software by the secure operating system. If the authentication is passed, the application software is just loaded and loaded; if the authentication fails, the base station is reset after the version switching identifier is set.

The trusted environment creation of the base station online operation process also includes the trusted delivery of the trusted environment after the version upgrade of the base station. The version upgrade during the operation of the base station is coordinated with the dynamic upgrade of the data protection area of the base station. The dynamic upgrade update of the base station version is based on the trusted network service provided by the trusted environment, and is performed by the base station control terminal through remote interaction.

After the security operating system is started, it can detect whether the current pre-installed version of the base station needs to be updated, and perform the update when it needs to be updated, as shown in Figure 4, including:

Step 401: First, the base station and the remote control end perform key authentication of the session, where the key used is the key in the foregoing key set.

Step 402: After the base station is authenticated by the remote control end, the base station receives a new pre-installed version of the base station and a set of matching keys issued by the remote control terminal.

Step 403: The base station writes the received pre-installed version of the trusted base station to the data protection zone, and the new The key set of the pre-installed version of the base station is written into the TPM hardware storage area.

Step 404: The base station changes the version switching identifier and initiates a reset, and loads the new base station pre-installed version after the reset.

In this step, the base station changes the version switching identifier and initiates a reset, and loads the upgraded base station version after the reset.

Through the sequence of the above steps, the trusted environment control is passed to the secure operating system and finally passed to the trusted network software library to provide trusted services for the application software. After the trusted application software is successfully launched, the trusted environment is created. success.

After the creation of the trusted environment is completed, the detection of the abnormality of the base station can be continued.

Step 102: Perform a trusted risk check on the base station in a trusted environment of the base station.

Identification of abnormal risks during operation of the base station. During the operation of the base station, the security operating system cooperates with the application software and the trusted network software library, periodically performs self-test on the system hardware, the storage system, the network communication, and the software behavior, and obtains the static credibility evaluation data. The system authenticates the network communication in real time through the basic service function of the trusted service library, periodically authenticates to the operating system through the application software, collects the system dynamic credibility evaluation data, and performs external command concentration through the service instruction category received by the application software. Data check to identify software behavior characteristics and external execution characteristics.

Then, a risk assessment decision is made on the data obtained by the self-test identification to determine whether a base station abnormality has occurred. Specifically, the comprehensive decision of the base station operation risk. The identified hardware failure risk, software failure risk, human failure risk, and credibility measurement risk are uniformly sent to the decision maker, and the decision maker uses the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to make the evaluation decision, wherein the weight data is stored in the software version. You can follow the version to upgrade. If the decision maker gives a base station reset in the base station reset scheme, the base station resets after the version switch identifier saved by the base station data protection area is synchronously updated; if the base station does not need to reset, the base station continues to work normally.

This step is shown in Figure 5 and includes:

Step 501: During the operation of the base station, the security operating system and the trusted application software cooperate to periodically perform self-test on the system hardware and the storage system, identify risks such as hardware failure and illegal version replacement, and obtain static credibility evaluation data. The static credibility evaluation data includes at least data of any one or any of the following base station abnormal events:

Identify hardware failure and illegally replace the version;

Step 502: The system authenticates the network communication in real time through the basic service function of the trusted network software library, periodically authenticates to the operating system through the application software, identifies the network unauthorized access, network hijacking, and the like, and collects the system dynamic credibility evaluation data. The system dynamic credibility evaluation data includes at least data of any one or any of the following base station abnormal events:

Network unauthorized access, network hijacking;

Step 503: Perform external command concentration data check, data of the non-authorized behavior feature by using the service instruction category received by the application software, where the unlicensed behavior feature data includes at least data of any one or any of the following base station abnormal events:

Risks such as unauthorized file deletion/copy, unauthorized operation that seriously jeopardizes device security.

It should be noted that there is no strict timing constraint between the above steps 501 to 503.

Step 504: Using a weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to evaluate the static credibility evaluation data, the system dynamic credibility evaluation data, the software behavior characteristics, and the external execution characteristics of the self-test identification;

After using the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to calculate the static credibility evaluation data or the system dynamic credibility evaluation data or the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics, the weight obtained is higher than the corresponding threshold in the weight data. The decision occurs that the base station is abnormal. The weight data is stored in the pre-installed version of the base station and can be upgraded following the version.

Step 505: When the result of the decision is that the base station is abnormal, perform a base station resetting scheme and synchronously update the version switching identifier saved by the data protection zone.

In this step, when it is confirmed that a base station abnormality occurs, the decision maker gives a base station reset scheme and synchronously updates the version switching identifier saved in the non-volatile storage data protection area to ensure abnormal active recovery after the base station is reset.

Step 103: When the base station is abnormal in the reliability risk check, the base station is reset and restored to a pre-installed version of the trusted base station.

This step is to restore the base station to the pre-installed version of the base station indicated by the value of the current version switch identifier.

The trusted authentication method involved in the embodiment of the present invention is described below, and is a trusted authentication based on key matching and ciphertext comparison. The specific authentication algorithm is:

In the first step, the authenticator provides 36 bytes of authentication data (RND). The first 4 bytes are the random number (RND1) determined when the data to be authenticated is generated, and the 16 bytes of data are the key-encrypted check data (RND2), and the last 16 bytes are the data to be checked (RND3). ).

In the second step, the authenticator selects an encryption key based on the authentication data RND.

This step is divided into the following steps:

1) Take the fourth byte of RND1 (from left to right) and perform an AND operation with "0X26"

2) Then take the value of modulo 3 for the result, and the result of modulo 3 (between 0 and 2) is the index number of the authentication key to be selected.

3) Select "Authentication Key" from the "Key Set" according to the authentication key index number, and use the TPM serial number and RND1 as the dispersion factor to perform the two-level dispersion to obtain the "Authentication Session Key" (16 bytes).

In the third step, the authenticator encrypts the last 16 bytes of the RND (called RND3) with 3DES_ECB_ENC using the "authentication session key" to obtain ciphertext data (16 bytes).

__

In the fourth step, the ciphertext data is compared with RND2. If the comparison is passed, the authentication is passed; if the comparison fails, the authentication fails.

For step 301, the BIOS is the authenticator, and the data protection zone is the authenticated party; for step 303, the BOOT code is the authenticator, and the file system is the authenticated party; for step 304, the BOOT code is the authenticator. The image of the secure operating system is the authenticated party; for step 204, the secure operating system is the authenticator and the application software is the authenticated party; for the base station preinstalled version update process shown in FIG. 4, the remote control end is the authenticator. The base station is the authenticated party.

Embodiment 2 of the present invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

The embodiment of the invention provides a trusted environment creation device, which can create a trusted environment inside the base station. The structure of the device is as shown in FIG. 6 and includes:

The BIOS startup module 601 is configured to run a pre-write to the base station after the base station is powered on for the first time. The BIOS code of the TPM hardware transfers the control of the trusted environment to the BIOS;

The BIOS 602 is configured to control loading of the operating system, and transfer the control of the trusted environment to the secure operating system;

The secure operating system 603 is configured to load a software environment and create a trusted environment.

Optionally, the device further includes:

The initialization module 604 is configured to initialize the TPM hardware and the non-volatile storage of the base station before the base station is shipped from the factory. The non-volatile storage includes a data protection area and a file system data area, and specifically includes:

Optionally, the structure of the BIOS 602 is as shown in FIG. 7, and includes:

The credibility checking unit 701 is configured to check the credibility of the data stored in the data protection area of the base station after the hardware self-test ends;

The version loading unit 702 is configured to pre-write the pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection area by using the Boot Loader code after the credibility check of the data stored in the data protection area is passed;

The file system creating unit 703 is configured to start executing the BOOT code, perform hardware initialization on the embedded system of the base station, create a file system, and perform trusted authentication on the file system;

The image loading unit 704 is configured to, after completing the trusted authentication of the file system, extract a secure operating system image from the pre-installed version of the base station, and transfer the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system.

Optionally, the BIOS 602 further includes:

The restarting unit 705 is configured to trigger the base station to restart the reset when the credibility check of the data stored in the data protection zone fails.

Optionally, the image loading unit 704 is configured as shown in FIG. 8 and includes:

The version selection subunit 801 is configured to determine a pre-installed version of the base station according to the version switching identifier, and extract an image of the security operating system from the pre-installed version of the base station;

The authentication subunit 802 is configured to perform trusted authentication on the image of the secure operating system;

The loading sub-unit 803 is configured to load the image of the secure operating system after the image of the secure operating system passes the trusted authentication, and transfer the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system.

Optionally, the version selection sub-unit 801 is configured to directly use the pre-installed version of the base station indicated by the version switching identifier when the version switching identifier indicates a pre-installed version of the base station in the file system data area. Extract the corresponding secure operating system image,

Optionally, the version selection sub-unit 801 is further configured to: after the image of the security operating system fails to pass the trusted authentication, trigger the base station to restart the reset, and forcibly set the value of the version switching identifier to indicate another base station. The pre-installed version is stored in the file system data area or the data protection area.

Optionally, the device further includes:

The remote authentication module 605 is configured to: after the security operating system is started, the base station requests authentication from the remote control terminal;

The version downloading module 606 is configured to receive a new base station pre-installed version and a matching key set delivered by the remote control end after being authenticated by the remote control end;

The storage module 607 is configured to write the new base station pre-installed version into the data protection area and the file system data area, and write the matching key set into the TPM hardware of the base station;

The reset module 608 is configured to change the value of the version switch identifier to indicate the pre-installed version of the new base station, and initiate a reset, and load the new base station pre-installed version after the reset.

The embodiment of the invention further provides a base station abnormality recovery device, and the structure of the device is as shown in FIG. Show, including:

The checking module 901 is configured to perform a trusted risk check on the base station in a trusted environment of the base station;

The abnormality recovery module 902 is configured to reset and restore the base station to a trusted base station pre-installed version when a base station abnormality is found in the trusted risk check.

The first configuration module 903 is configured to write a version switching identifier and a pre-installed version of the base station to the data protection area and the file system data area of the non-volatile storage of the base station in advance, where the pre-installed version of the base station includes a trusted boot. Loader code, BOOT code, image of secure operating system, trusted network software library and application software;

The second configuration module 904 is configured to write a key set and a BIOS code associated with the pre-installed version of the base station to the TPM hardware of the base station in advance.

Optionally, the structure of the check module 901 is as shown in FIG. 10, and includes:

The self-checking unit 1001 is configured to control the security operating system to cooperate with the application software and the trusted network software library, and periodically perform self-checking on system hardware, storage system, network communication, and software behavior;

The abnormality determining unit 1002 is configured to perform a risk assessment decision on the data obtained by the self-test identification, and determine whether a base station abnormality has occurred.

Optionally, the structure of the self-test unit 1001 is as shown in FIG. 11 and includes:

The hardware self-test sub-unit 1101 is configured to control the security operating system to cooperate with the application software, periodically perform self-test on the system hardware and the storage system of the base station, and collect static credibility evaluation data, where the static The credibility assessment data contains at least data of any one or any of the following base station anomaly events:

Identify hardware failure and illegally replace the version;

The network self-test sub-unit 1102 is configured to authenticate the network communication in real time through the basic service function of the trusted network software library, periodically authenticate the operating system through the application software, and collect system dynamic credibility evaluation data, the system Dynamic credibility assessment data includes at least one of the following Data for multiple base station anomalies:

Network unauthorized access, network hijacking;

The software self-test sub-unit 1103 is configured to perform external command concentration data check by the service instruction category received by the application software, and collect data of an unauthorized behavior feature, where the non-authorized behavior feature data includes at least one of the following or any Data for multiple base station anomalies:

Optionally, the structure of the abnormality determining unit 1102 is as shown in FIG. 12, and includes:

The decision subunit 1201 is configured to use the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to evaluate the static credibility evaluation data, the system dynamic credibility evaluation data, and the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics obtained by the self-test identification;

The solution determining unit 1202 is configured to: when the decision result is that the base station abnormality occurs, make a base station resetting scheme and synchronously update the version switching identifier saved by the data protection zone.

Optionally, the device further includes:

The version downloading module 905 is configured to receive a new base station version and a matching key set delivered by the remote control end after the base station is authenticated by the remote control end;

The storage module 906 is configured to write the new base station version into the data protection zone, and write the set of matching keys to the TPM hardware of the base station;

The reset module 907 is configured to change the value of the version switch identifier to indicate that the new base station is pre-installed, and initiate a reset, and load the new base station pre-installed version after the reset.

The trusted environment creation device and the base station abnormality recovery device may be integrated into the base station device, and the base station device performs the corresponding function.

In the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present invention, after the initialization and hardware testing of the firmware is completed in the power-on phase of the base station, the trust is transmitted to the operating system, and then the operating system takes over the system and provides the application through the trusted software service library. Letter calculation function. Lightweight level including hardware system, software system and network service based on embedded hardware platform through TPM firmware basic support Integrated trusted service.

The data protection service based on the trusted environment realizes the non-volatile storage data protection area and the protection area update mechanism in the embedded system, and is used for ensuring the base station configuration data and the backup version credibility stored in the protection area.

By partitioning the non-volatile storage of the base station, the data protection zone and the file system data zone are divided, and under the protection of the TPM firmware and the trusted service, the integrity of the base station's factory trusted environment and the version update after the operation are ensured. The integrity of the letter environment. The data protection area of the non-volatile storage of the base station always keeps the trusted base station version and data backup.

A version switch identifier is stored in the data protection area of the non-volatile storage for selecting a trusted version during base station startup. The version switch identifier is updated by the exception decision algorithm and is also protected by the trusted environment. The method can ensure that the base station recovers the trusted version by changing the version switching identifier and then resetting the base station after identifying the abnormal risk, so as to ensure the trusted operation of the base station.

During the operation of the base station, collect hardware self-test detection results, static trusted evaluation results, software operation behavior characteristics, external command feature identification, dynamic trusted evaluation results, etc., identification of hardware failure risks, software failure risks, and human failure risks. The credibility metric risk is sent to the decision maker, and the decision maker uses the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to make the evaluation decision. The base station reset scheme is given and the non-volatile storage-storing version switching identifier is updated synchronously to ensure that the base station can be abnormal after reset. Active recovery.

The embodiment of the present invention provides a base station abnormality recovery method and device, which can be applied to a Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), and is generally composed of a baseband processing unit (BBU) and a radio remote unit (RRU). As shown in Figure 13. It can also be applied to an evolved UTRAN architecture (E-UTRAN), which is mainly composed of a layer of an evolved NodeB (eNodeB), as shown in FIG.

The use of data protection, key and decentralized technology in trusted computing technology, with the support of TPM firmware, enables the establishment of a lightweight trusted environment. The device consists of three parts: hardware motherboard (including TPM firmware and embedded hardware circuit), secure operating system, and trusted network software library. The relationship between the components is shown in Figure 15.

The TPM firmware is used as a trusted source point in the system to provide hardware level cryptography calculation and key protection and small capacity data storage, and its components are shown in FIG. 16. The BIOS for the embedded system startup is stored in the TPM memory, mainly to complete the hardware self-test and the credibility check of the non-volatile storage in the embedded system. The BIOS in the TPM storage cannot be updated to ensure that the BIOS is trusted, but the key stored in the TPM module can be updated online after the trusted environment is established.

The non-volatile storage space of the embedded hardware platform is divided into a data protection area and a file system data area. The space allocation diagram is shown in FIG. The data protection area is used to store the execution version of the base station and the backup of important configuration data, the Boot Loader code, the BOOT code, and can only be operated by block device access, and the access operation is protected by the TPM to ensure only authorized operations. Update the data of the protected area. The file system data area is controlled and accessed by the operating system file system and is also protected by a trusted environment. Because the running version of the base station generally accesses data through the file system during the running process, the data protection area can greatly prevent the risk of rewriting caused by software failure and improve the reliability of the system backup data.

The secure operating system is based on embedded linux, which performs random and trusted authentication changes to the kernel's network communication services, adding TPM driver and authentication services. The trusted network software library encapsulates the basic trusted authentication service provided by the secure operating system, provides a friendly calling interface, and provides trusted service functions such as transaction-level trusted authentication services.

Embodiments of the present invention provide a trusted environment creation method and apparatus, and a base station abnormality recovery method and apparatus, which create a trusted environment of a base station, and perform a trusted risk check on the base station in a trusted environment of the base station. When the base station is abnormal in the risk check, the base station is reset and restored to the trusted base station pre-installed version. The abnormal self-test and automatic recovery of the base station based on the trusted environment are realized, which solves the problem that the existing trusted computing technology scheme provides a reliable abnormal recovery function for the base station.

By adopting the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present invention, the creation of the trusted operating environment, the identification of the abnormal risk and the comprehensive decision, and the active abnormal recovery of the base station can be realized by completely relying on the capability of the communication base station, and no intervention by other systems or network elements is required. Cooperation.

The embodiment of the invention can effectively establish a lightweight integrated trusted environment of hardware, software and service on the embedded hardware, so that the base station has certain active security defense capabilities; and the trusted data is created through a creative data protection zone mechanism. On the basis of protection, it supports the unification of normal version upgrade and abnormal scene version switching; and through the identification and comprehensive judgment of various abnormal risks of base stations, The abnormal recovery is more active and effective, and the effect of improving the availability of the base station is achieved, which can reduce the maintenance cost of the operator and improve the user experience.

One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that all or a portion of the steps of the above-described embodiments can be implemented using a computer program flow, which can be stored in a computer readable storage medium, such as on a corresponding hardware platform (eg, The system, device, device, device, etc. are executed, and when executed, include one or a combination of the steps of the method embodiments.

Alternatively, all or part of the steps of the above embodiments may also be implemented by using an integrated circuit. These steps may be separately fabricated into individual integrated circuit modules, or multiple modules or steps may be fabricated into a single integrated circuit module. achieve. Thus, the invention is not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.

The devices/function modules/functional units in the above embodiments may be implemented by a general-purpose computing device, which may be centralized on a single computing device or distributed over a network of multiple computing devices.

When each device/function module/functional unit in the above embodiment is implemented in the form of a software function module and sold or used as a stand-alone product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. The above mentioned computer readable storage medium may be a read only memory, a magnetic disk or an optical disk or the like.

Industrial applicability

The embodiment of the invention implements the abnormal self-test and automatic recovery of the base station based on the trusted environment, and solves the problem that the trusted computing technology solution provides a reliable abnormal recovery function for the base station.

Claims

A method for creating a trusted environment, including:

After the base station is powered on for the first time, running a basic input/output system (BIOS) code pre-written to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware of the base station, and transferring the control of the trusted environment to the BIOS;

The BIOS controls loading of the secure operating system, and transferring the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system;

The secure operating system loads the software environment and creates a trusted environment.
The trusted environment creation method according to claim 1, after the base station is powered on for the first time, before the step of pre-writing the BIOS code of the TPM hardware of the base station to transfer the control of the trusted environment to the BIOS, the method further include:

Initializing the TPM hardware and non-volatile storage of the base station before the base station leaves the factory, the non-volatile storage includes a data protection area and a file system data area,

Initializing the non-volatile storage of the base station includes: writing a version switch identifier and a pre-installed version of the base station to the data protection area and the file system data area, where the pre-installed version of the base station includes a trusted Boot Loader code , BOOT code, image of secure operating system, trusted network software library, application software and weight data,

Initializing the TPM hardware of the base station includes: writing a key set and a BIOS code associated with the pre-installed version of the base station to the TPM hardware, where the key set includes a plurality of keys.
The trusted environment creation method according to claim 2, wherein the BIOS controls to perform loading of the secure operating system, and transferring the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system comprises:

After the hardware self-test ends, the BIOS checks the credibility of the data stored in the data protection area of the base station;

After the reliability check of the data stored in the data protection area is passed, the BIOS preloads the pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection area by using the Boot Loader code loading;

Starting execution of the BOOT code, performing hardware initialization on the embedded system of the base station, Create a file system and perform trusted authentication on the file system;

After the trusted authentication of the file system is completed, the secure operating system image is extracted and loaded from the pre-installed version of the base station, and the trusted environment control is transferred to the secure operating system.
The method for creating a trusted environment according to claim 3, after the step of checking the credibility of the data stored in the data protection area of the base station after the hardware self-test is completed, the method further includes:

The BIOS triggers the base station to restart resetting when the reliability check of the data stored in the data protection zone fails.
The trusted environment creation method according to claim 3, wherein after the trusted authentication of the file system is completed, an image of the secure operating system is extracted from the pre-installed version of the base station, and the control of the trusted environment is transmitted. To the secure operating system includes:

Determining, according to the version switching identifier, a pre-installed version of the base station, and extracting an image of the secure operating system from the pre-installed version of the base station;

Trusted authentication of the image of the secure operating system;

After the image of the secure operating system passes the trusted authentication, the image of the secure operating system is loaded, and the trusted environment control is transferred to the secure operating system.
The trusted environment creation method according to claim 5, wherein determining a pre-installed version of the base station according to the version switching identifier, and extracting an image of the secure operating system from the pre-installed version of the base station comprises:

When the version switch identifier indicates the pre-installed version of the base station in the file system data area, extract the corresponding secure operating system image directly from the pre-installed version of the base station indicated by the version switch identifier;

When the version switching identifier indicates a pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection area, the pre-installed version of the base station is restored to the file system data area, and then extracted from the pre-installed version of the base station in the file system data area. Secure operating system image.
The trusted environment creation method according to claim 5, after the step of performing trusted authentication on the image of the secure operating system, the method further includes:

When the image of the security operating system fails to pass the trusted authentication, the base station is triggered to restart the reset, and the value of the version switch identifier is forcibly set to indicate that the other base station is pre-installed, and the other base station pre-installed version is stored in the File system data area or data protection area.
The trusted environment creation method according to claim 3, wherein the secure operating system loads the software environment, and the creation of the trusted environment comprises:

The security operating system is started, and the application software is extracted and loaded from the pre-installed version of the base station, and the trusted network software library is attached.
The trusted environment creation method according to claim 1, further comprising:

After the security operating system is started, the base station requests authentication from the remote control terminal;

Receiving, by the remote control end, the base station receives a new pre-installed version of the base station and a set of matching keys issued by the remote control end;

The base station writes the new base station pre-installed version into the data protection area and the file system data area, and writes the matching key set into the TPM hardware of the base station;

The value of the base station changing version switch identifier indicates that the new base station is pre-installed, and initiates a reset, and loads the new base station pre-installed version after reset.
A base station abnormal recovery method includes:

Performing a credential risk check on the base station in a trusted environment of the base station;

When the base station is abnormal in the reliability risk check, the base station is reset and restored to the trusted base station pre-installed version.
The base station abnormality recovery method according to claim 10, wherein the trusted environment of the base station is composed of a secure operating system running on the base station, a trusted service software library, and a trusted network service system, and the method further includes :

Writing a version switch identifier and a pre-installed version of the base station to the non-volatile storage data protection area and the file system data area of the base station in advance, the base station pre-installed version including a trusted Boot Loader code, a BOOT code, and a security operation System image, trusted network software library and application software;

A key set and a basic input/output system (BIOS) code associated with the pre-installed version of the base station are written in advance to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware of the base station.
The base station abnormality recovery method according to claim 11, wherein in the trusted environment of the base station, performing a trusted risk check on the base station, and performing a trusted risk check on the base station includes:

The security operating system cooperates with the application software and the trusted network software library to periodically perform self-test on system hardware, storage system, network communication, and software behavior;

A risk assessment decision is made on the data obtained by the self-test identification to determine whether a base station abnormality has occurred.
The base station abnormality recovery method according to claim 12, wherein the security operating system cooperates with the application software and the trusted network software library, and periodically performs system hardware, storage system, network communication, and software behavior. The inspection includes:

The security operating system cooperates with the application software to periodically perform self-test on the system hardware and the storage system of the base station, and collect static credibility evaluation data, where the static credibility evaluation data includes at least one of the following Or data of any number of base station anomalies:

Identify hardware failure and illegally replace the version;

Through the basic service function of the trusted network software library, the network communication is authenticated in real time, and the application system periodically authenticates to the operating system to collect system dynamic credibility evaluation data, and the system dynamic credibility evaluation data includes at least the following Data for any or any number of base station anomalies:

Network unauthorized access, network hijacking;

The external instruction concentration data check is performed by the service instruction category received by the application software, and the data of the unauthorized behavior feature is collected, and the unauthorized behavior feature data includes at least data of any one or any of the following base station abnormal events:

Unauthorized deletion of files, unauthorized copying of files, and unauthorized operations that seriously endanger the security of the device.
The base station abnormality recovery method according to claim 12, wherein the risk assessment of the self-test identification is performed, and determining whether the risk is a base station abnormality comprises:

Using the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm, the static credibility assessment data obtained by the self-test identification, the system dynamic credibility assessment data, and the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics are evaluated and determined;

When the result of the decision is that a base station abnormality occurs, a base station resetting scheme is made and the version switching identifier saved by the data protection area is synchronously updated.
The base station abnormality recovery method according to claim 14, wherein the static credibility evaluation data, the system dynamic credibility evaluation data, and the unauthorized behavior characteristics of the self-test identification are used by using a weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm. Data evaluation decisions include:

After using the weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to calculate the static credibility evaluation data or the system dynamic credibility evaluation data or the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics, the weight obtained is higher than the corresponding threshold in the weight data. The decision occurs that the base station is abnormal.
The base station abnormality recovery method according to claim 11, further comprising:

Receiving, by the remote control end, the base station receives a new base station version and a matching key set delivered by the remote control end;

Transmitting, by the base station, the new base station version into the data protection zone, and writing the set of matching keys to the TPM hardware of the base station;

The value of the base station changing version switch identifier indicates that the new base station is pre-installed, and initiates a reset, and loads the new base station pre-installed version after reset.
A trusted environment creation device, comprising:

A basic input/output system (BIOS) startup module is configured to: after the base station is powered on for the first time, run a BIOS code of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware pre-written to the base station, and transfer the control of the trusted environment to the BIOS. ;

a BIOS, configured to: control loading of an operating system, and transfer control of the trusted environment to a secure operating system;

A secure operating system that is set up to load a software environment and create a trusted environment.
The trusted environment creation device of claim 1, further comprising:

An initialization module, configured to: initialize the TPM hardware and non-volatile storage of the base station before the base station leaves the factory, the non-volatile storage includes a data protection area and a file system data area,

Initializing the non-volatile storage of the base station includes: writing a version switch identifier and a pre-installed version of the base station to the data protection area and the file system data area, where the pre-installed version of the base station includes a trusted Boot Loader code , BOOT code, image of secure operating system, trusted network software library, application software and weight data,

Initializing the TPM hardware of the base station includes: writing a key set and a BIOS code associated with the pre-installed version of the base station to the TPM hardware, where the key set includes a plurality of keys.
The trusted environment creation device of claim 18, wherein the BIOS comprises:

a credibility checking unit, configured to: after the end of the hardware self-test, check the credibility of the data stored in the data protection area of the base station;

a version loading unit, configured to: after the credibility check of the data stored in the data protection zone is passed, preloading the pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection zone by loading the Boot Loader code;

a file system creation unit, configured to: start executing the BOOT code, perform hardware initialization on the embedded system of the base station, create a file system, and perform trusted authentication on the file system;

An image loading unit is configured to: after completing the trusted authentication of the file system, extract a secure operating system image from the pre-installed version of the base station, and transfer the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system.
The trusted environment creation device according to claim 19, wherein the BIOS further comprises:

And a restarting unit, configured to: when the credibility check of the data stored in the data protection zone fails, trigger the base station to restart the reset.
The trusted environment creation device according to claim 19, wherein the image loading unit comprises:

a version selection subunit, configured to: determine a pre-installed version of the base station according to the version switching identifier, and extract an image of the security operating system from the pre-installed version of the base station;

An authentication subunit, configured to: perform trusted authentication on an image of the secure operating system;

The loading subunit is configured to: after the image of the security operating system passes the trusted authentication, load the image of the secure operating system, and transfer the trusted environment control right to the secure operating system.
The trusted environment creation device according to claim 21, wherein

The version selection subunit is configured to: in the version switching identifier, indicate the file system When the version of the base station in the data area is pre-installed, the corresponding security operating system image is directly extracted from the pre-installed version of the base station indicated by the version switching identifier.

When the version switching identifier indicates a pre-installed version of the base station in the data protection area, the pre-installed version of the base station is restored to the file system data area, and then extracted from the pre-installed version of the base station in the file system data area. Secure operating system image.
The trusted environment creation device according to claim 21, wherein

The version selection sub-unit is further configured to: after the image of the security operating system fails to pass the trusted authentication, trigger the base station to restart the reset, and forcibly set the value of the version switching identifier to indicate that the other base station is pre-installed. The other base station pre-installed version is stored in the file system data area or the data protection area.
The trusted environment creation device of claim 1, further comprising:

a remote authentication module, configured to: after the security operating system is started, the base station requests authentication from the remote control terminal;

a version downloading module, configured to receive a new pre-installed version of the base station and a set of supporting keys issued by the remote control terminal after being authenticated by the remote control terminal;

a storage module, configured to: write the new base station pre-installed version into the data protection zone and the file system data zone, and write the set of matching keys to the TPM hardware of the base station;

And a reset module, configured to: change the value of the version switch identifier to indicate the pre-installed version of the new base station, and initiate a reset, and load the new base station pre-installed version after the reset.
A base station abnormality recovery device, comprising:

An inspection module configured to: perform a trusted risk check on the base station in a trusted environment of the base station;

The abnormality recovery module is configured to reset and restore the base station to a trusted pre-installed version of the base station when the base station is abnormal in the reliability risk check.
The base station abnormality recovery device according to claim 25, wherein the trusted environment of the base station is composed of a secure operating system running on the base station, a trusted service software library, and a trusted network service system, and the device further includes :

a first configuration module, configured to: write a version switch identifier and a pre-installed version of the base station to the data protection area and the file system data area of the non-volatile storage of the base station in advance, where the pre-installed version of the base station includes a trusted Boot Loader code, BOOT code, image of a secure operating system, trusted network software library, and application software;

And a second configuration module, configured to: write a key set and a basic input/output system (BIOS) code associated with the pre-installed version of the base station to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware of the base station in advance.
The base station abnormality recovery apparatus according to claim 26, wherein the inspection module comprises:

a self-checking unit, configured to: control the security operating system to cooperate with the application software and the trusted network software library, and periodically perform self-checking on system hardware, storage system, network communication, and software behavior;

The abnormality determining unit is configured to: perform risk assessment decision on the data obtained by the self-test identification, and determine whether a base station abnormality occurs.
The base station abnormality recovery device according to claim 27, wherein the self-test unit comprises:

a hardware self-test sub-unit, configured to: control the security operating system to cooperate with the application software, periodically perform self-test on the system hardware and the storage system of the base station, and collect static credibility evaluation data, The static credibility assessment data contains at least data of any one or any of the following base station anomaly events:

Identify hardware failure and illegally replace the version;

a network self-checking sub-unit, configured to: authenticate the network communication in real time through the basic service function of the trusted network software library, periodically authenticate the operating system through the application software, and collect system dynamic credibility evaluation data, The system dynamic credibility assessment data includes at least data of any one or any of the following base station anomaly events:

Network unauthorized access, network hijacking;

a software self-test sub-unit, configured to: perform external command concentration data check by the service instruction category received by the application software, and collect data of an unauthorized behavior feature, the non-authorized behavior The feature data contains at least data of any one or any of the following base station anomaly events:

Unauthorized deletion of files, unauthorized copying of files, and unauthorized operations that seriously endanger the security of the device.
The base station abnormality recovery apparatus according to claim 27, wherein said abnormality determining unit comprises:

The decision subunit is configured to: use a weighted linear Bayesian decision algorithm to evaluate and determine the static credibility evaluation data, the system dynamic credibility evaluation data, and the data of the unauthorized behavior characteristics obtained by the self-test identification;

The solution determining unit is configured to: when the decision result is that the base station abnormality occurs, make a base station resetting scheme and synchronously update the version switching identifier saved by the data protection zone.
The base station abnormality recovery device according to claim 26, further comprising:

a version downloading module, configured to: after the base station is authenticated by the remote control end, receive a new base station version and a matching key set delivered by the remote control end;

a storage module, configured to: write the new base station version into the data protection zone, and write the set of matching keys to the TPM hardware of the base station;

And a reset module, configured to: change the value of the version switch identifier to indicate the pre-installed version of the new base station, and initiate a reset, and load the new base station pre-installed version after the reset.
A computer program comprising program instructions which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of any of claims 1-16.
A computer readable storage medium carrying the computer program of claim 31.