WO2012033535A2 - Scrutin à distance ayant une intégrité et une résistance à une influence malvenue - Google Patents

Scrutin à distance ayant une intégrité et une résistance à une influence malvenue Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2012033535A2
WO2012033535A2 PCT/US2011/001563 US2011001563W WO2012033535A2 WO 2012033535 A2 WO2012033535 A2 WO 2012033535A2 US 2011001563 W US2011001563 W US 2011001563W WO 2012033535 A2 WO2012033535 A2 WO 2012033535A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
voter
card
vote
voters
mailed
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2011/001563
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2012033535A3 (fr
Inventor
Filip Zagorski
Original Assignee
Chaum, David
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Chaum, David filed Critical Chaum, David
Publication of WO2012033535A2 publication Critical patent/WO2012033535A2/fr
Publication of WO2012033535A3 publication Critical patent/WO2012033535A3/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q50/00—Information and communication technology [ICT] specially adapted for implementation of business processes of specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
    • G06Q50/01—Social networking
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q50/00—Information and communication technology [ICT] specially adapted for implementation of business processes of specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
    • G06Q50/10—Services
    • G06Q50/18—Legal services

Definitions

  • the invention is in the general field of voting systems, and more specifically where votes are cast remotely without the protections of a polling place or other controlled location.
  • remote voting includes so-called vote by mail, online voting, vote by phone and various combinations of channels for
  • Figure 1 shows a first flowchart in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • Figure 2 shows a second flowchart in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • Figure 3 shows a third flowchart in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • Figure 4 shows a plan view of series of interactions including a form view and a screen view in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • Figure 5 shows a first plan view of forms in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • Figure 6 shows a second plan view of forms in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • Figure 7 shows a first combination cryptographic protocol schematic and structure in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • Figure 8 shows a second combination cryptographic protocol schematic and structure in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • FIG. 9 shows a combination form and process in accordance with teachings of the
  • Figure 10 shows a third plan view of forms in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • Figure 1 1 shows a third combination cryptographic protocol schematic and structure in accordance with teachings of the present invention.
  • voters may appear at an official location in person. In such cases voters may attest to an agreement to have the material that will be sent them secretly rendered uncountable. Voters may during such a pre-election visit also be given information allowing them to vote and be provided with verification that the vote they will cast using the information they are provided will be counted. This verification provided voters, like that to be described later, is believed preferably such that it cannot readily be used to convince other persons.
  • voters may also visit an official location and attest that they are unable to vote because they did not receive the material that was to be sent them. Whatever vote may be cast with the material that was to be sent will be rendered uncountable. Also, new voting material may be supplied the voter allowing the voters to cast a vote.
  • voters may also visit an official location and attest that malware or the like has caused them to use up the scratch-off protected codes, and request more such codes.
  • voters show some ballot identi bomb and this may be verified as relating to that voter, such as by a form that has a voter identifier printed on it, and they receive extension scratch-off codes.
  • a voter may be allowed to participate in a protocol during the visit that provides the voter with verification that the vote the voter has been allowed to cast has the same "countability" (here meaning that it will be counted in the tally of the election or not counted in the tally of the election) as that of the voting material that is the subject of the visit.
  • countability here meaning that it will be counted in the tally of the election or not counted in the tally of the election
  • voters obtaining extra scratch-off s also provide some degree of verification that the material sent voters is related to countable ballots.
  • all the above-mentioned protocols conducted during voter visits may include the novel feature that the verification provided is not readily transferred by the voter to other persons, thereby preventing the protocols from being used to facilitate improper influence schemes.
  • the second issue (b). of improper influence is amplified in online elections because online vote buyers or coercers can be difficult to trace or penalize.
  • the argument that vote by mail, increasingly being allowed for general use, has "lowered the bar” by establishing the acceptability of improper influence attacks on elections flies in the face of over a hundred years of deliberate precedent in all the world's democracies.
  • By solving improper influence for practical remote we in effect "raise the bar” back up, if it were ever lowered, since our techniques can be used to cast votes by mail as well as online.
  • the final issue (d), the once much discussed "digital divide,” may already be a red herring.
  • the trend is away from such a divide, as mobile phones become more capable computers and as retail and public Internet access becomes generally available.
  • the trend is toward requiring online transactions, such as already for some visas as well as a growing array of other governmental and private-sector services.
  • polling-place elections will be offered in parallel with online voting for some time to come, putting the second and third issues (c) and (d) in effect on hold.
  • An abrupt transition to online-only elections could result in sudden changes in voter demographics, which may be the dominant political issue facing Internet voting; but such concern is moderated by dual systems.
  • the techniques presented here integrate to dual systems well, such as by indistinguishably combining the number of votes cast in the two systems and by polling places providing in-person registration services for remote voters.
  • Voters cast ballots, in the same way for all versions of the system, simply by using a web browser or the like to post the votes online.
  • a first number known to the voter (called in the sequel a recordID ), is also entered by the voter and associated with the posted vote.
  • the voter After entering the vote and number, the voter should use a different computer to check that they have been posted correctly. If they are, the voter enters a second number (called lockln in the sequel) , which completes the voting transaction. Voters could also check that this second number is published properly (though there are other means to ensure this as will be described later) . All votes, and only those votes, with a published second number can be verified by voters as counted.
  • a second number called lockln in the sequel
  • the voter may already have an alternate first number and should simply try posting the vote again using that number. If the voter runs out of alternates, such as because of malware, a special step (shown in gray) allows the voter to authenticate themselves and obtain more alternates.
  • Numbers are provided to voters on "cards," pre-printed paper forms. The numbers are protected under scratch-off, which is to be removed as needed by voters.
  • An election can simply use only mailed cards or only virtual cards. It may even use both types, such as allowing each voter a choice of type of card. Voters may, for instance, be able to obtain a virtual card up until a deadline after which mailed cards are to be sent to the remaining eligible voters.
  • Voters can be protected against improper influence by what will here be called “fake” cards, that is cards containing numbers for votes that will not be counted. Such fake numbers may simply be sold by voters or, for instance, used to cast ballots in front of someone trying to coerce the voter to vote a certain way. What makes fake cards effective is that there is no way for a vote buyer or coercer to tell fake from valid.
  • the voter will of course know when they are using numbers from a ballot that should be fake, because they took steps to obtain the fake card. But protections are needed to ensure that voters are not unsuspectingly supplied fake cards. Voters are allowed to check whether cards are fake in the privacy of a booth at an official location. ⁇ 3 ⁇ 4ters obtain evidence of malfeasance, if what should be a valid card turns out to be fake as a part of such checking.
  • a voter has higher level of privacy - mailed cards printing process is designed in a way tha.t EA does not know which card a given voter gets (use of scratch off).
  • a voter may take a video of the ballot casting process - which can also be done in the case of postal-voting.
  • This solution is also more convenient for EA since it collects ballots in electronic way - there is no need of manual vote counting.
  • a voter gets a paper card by mail with recordID and lockin printed under scratch-off. A card is printed on both sides. Voting is performed in three steps:
  • a voter in order to cast a vote needs to appear in person at the polling place and get a digital card containing recordID and lockln by oblivious transfer (OT) procedure.
  • OT oblivious transfer
  • dummy cards There are also virtual dummy cards. These are the cards that contain numbers which will be accepted by a system but votes cast with those numbers will not be counted. Dummy cards can be obtained by voters - these cards are indistinguishable from the authentic [countable) ones by anyone but EA. Voters can get them both online and at the polling place (they can be preprinted or obtained from a kiosks).
  • Integrity OT process is designed in a way that EA does not know which of the two possible values a voter gets. Thanks to this fact, EA cannot cast a ballot for the voter - there is 50% chance that EA is going to be caught (if it does not follow the protocol).
  • Ballot secrecy A voter takes the OT forms from a hopper.
  • the forms are printed in a way that does not allow for distinguishing between them (i.e. there are no serial numbers printed on them). As a result of this, EA does not know which card a voter gets.
  • Scenario System uses two kinds of cards: mailed and digital. Mailed cards can be countable or dummy. All digital cards issued at the polling place are countable (and there are also digitcil dummy cards as well). Each voter gets only one countable card (either mailed or digital).
  • Integrity EA is required to publish numbers of issued countable mailed cards and number of dummy mailed cards (equal to the number of issued digital cards). Those two numbers should sum up to the number of registered voters. One needs to verify number of printed countable and dummy mailed cards and to supervise printing and mailing process.
  • the digital-cards subsystem remains unchanged while the mailed-cards part is modified by introducing dummy cards.
  • a countability check procedure is introduced. A voter may visit polling station and verify countability of her mailed card. If a card occurs to be a dummy, EA needs to provide a voter's signed request certifying that she has already ordered a dummy mailed card (in order to get digital one).
  • Ballot secrecy EA does not know which card a voter gets.
  • Vote casting process depends on the type of card that a voter wants to cast. Both cases were described above. 4.1.2 Visit - extra recordlDs
  • the procedure of issuance is exactly the same as in a pure digital scenario, but as a part of that procedure a voter needs to sign a request for dummy mail card.
  • a voter - owner of mailed card gets two slips of paper printed with numbers.
  • a voter checks: if those numbers sum up (digit by digit) to the lockin voter examines and checks if sum of extra digits is even (extra digits have the same parity).
  • a voter can take home only one of these slips, value from chosen slip is later published by EA, with key to the commitment to that value.
  • Election is divided in three periods: pre election 1. period starts with a system setup:
  • Visits A voter is allowed to visit a polling station: before, during or after given election.
  • a voter can visit a polling station: between election ⁇ check countability of any mailed ballot (any card with a name),
  • EA generates tables: Ballots. Locklns, ReMap. Switchboard, Results, ExtraB allots which are kept private, but EA publishes commitments to the values in those tables. EA also generates private tables that help them later to find connections between data stored in tables. Correspondence between data in tables is showed on the Figure 7. Each row of these tables corresponds to some ballot. Data for a given ballot can be located in different rows of the different tables.
  • Locklns table is divided into two subtables - one that corresponds to mailed ballots and the second corresponding to digital ballots. Ballots are paired - we call them /mfced-ballots.
  • Linked ballots are printed back-to-back on the same sheet of paper on mailed card and sent to a voter or they are printed two-up and used for the digital ballot issuance protocol.
  • Locklns-table In fact there are two sub-tables in the Locklntable: Digital-subtable for the digital ballots - those have locklnA and locklnB columns and Mailed-subtable for the mailed ballots.
  • Each row of the LocAJn' s-table corresponds to one of the rows of the Ballots- table.
  • locklnB values called summands are chosen independently at random: sAl, sA2.
  • This table binds recordlDs with the locklns.
  • a R.eMap can be treated as a random permutation
  • Results-table A row of a Results-table contains a count Me bit. It is set to 1 if a corresponding ballot will be counted (a ballot is countable), and is equal 0 if not (a ballot is dummy).
  • Results-pointer - a pointer to a row of Results-table
  • Each card is printed back-to-back (on both sides): on heads-side and on tails-side.
  • Each side of a card contains some data from a single row of the jBa Zois-table and from (possibly) different row of the Loc/e/n's-table.
  • Lockln equal to LockInX(ReMap ⁇ l (i)) (X e ⁇ A. B ⁇ ) from the corresponding row of the Lockln's table is printed under the scratch-off (LocklnX R.eMap ⁇ x (j)) is printed on the back-side).
  • Voter's name is printed in clear text Ballots mailing Every voter obtains a card (dummy or countable).
  • Each form is printed on both sides.
  • LocklnA (LockInA(B,eMap ⁇ 1 (i))) from the corresponding row of the Lockln's table is printed under the scratch-off.
  • LocklnB (LockInB(ReA / Iap ⁇ 1 (i))) from the corresponding row of the Lockln's table is printed under the scratch-off.
  • the procedure of obtaining digital card is performed at the polling stations (is presented on a Figure 6).
  • EA checks voter identity against the roster. If a voter is already registered
  • Voter picks one of the halves of a verification card (we call it "partial” )
  • a voter has a recordID and a lockin that she can use to cast a vote.
  • the EA does not know which of the two possible locklns voter has learnt - so EA cannot cast additional ⁇ Otes (a voter can catch EA with 50% chance by providing the value of a second lockin).
  • a voter can get extra recordlDs (see Section 5.6) - she just need to provide a prefix of her lockin. Prefixes of locklns for the same card are the same - so obtaining extra recordlDs does not reveal EA which lockin a voter has.
  • a voter gets a partial - with a suffix of a recordID and suffixes of locklns - she can use it to verify if forms were printed correctly since all data corresponding to unused digital cards are opened at the end of elections.
  • a voter may check whether a mailed card or a partial is countable or dummy. A voter can do it during at any time: before (recordID is posted), during (recordID is posted but lockin is not) or after (both recordID and lockin are posted) vote casting. For the purpose of this procedure. EA prints forms on demand, forms are presented on the Figure 10.
  • Voter presents a mailed card in person revealing the lockin (i. e. corresponding to the 2th row of the Lockln-table).
  • Voter 1 checks the two parts of the form in a booth:
  • the part of unscratched lockin is a proof of malfeasance (for mailed card) and (with probability ⁇ with digital card)
  • Voter is allowed to perform further extensions of recordlDs.
  • To authenticate this step she is obliged to provide "getMore" number that is printed under scratch-off on extension form and is connected with a serial number of a given form (not shown in the figures) .
  • Write-ins The system allows for write-ins.
  • the values entered by a voter are published next to the submitted recordID in the Ballots table.
  • To avoid attacks on privacy write- in votes cannot be directly copied into Switchboard and Results tables because they can be unique so when copied into a Results table they would reveal countability of a given recordID.
  • write-in values are transformed into a form which disallows for distinguishing them e.g., Marion Johns 3213 ⁇ Marion Johns.
  • Print audit 1 Opens commitments corresponding to every unused lockln: values from ReMap, Ballots, Switchboard and Results tables. 5.8 Multiple-contests
  • Ballots can be prepared in such a way that a recordID is printed on the scratch-off layer which covers lockln. This makes recordID being destroyed while a voter wants to learn a value of a lockln (see Figure 12).
  • Cards can be prepared slightly different. Instead of one recordID per one lockln, one can generate and print many recordl Ds for a given lockln - this approach is similar to the one described in Section 5.6 but saves voter efforts. In this case voters do not need to visit a polling place when their vote occurs not to be posted correctly.
  • Mailed cards can be printed in a way that simulates digital cards issuance process. After printing (recordID and both locklns) and tumbling, a random part containing one of two locklns is cut and shredded.
  • the system divides vote casting in distinct steps. Moreover, for casting digital cards no further voter authentication is required. This allows to use various methods of collecting votes, including those which use P2P network. Such an approach may lead to improved DOS-attacks immunity.
  • a voter can be provided with a card for given election which would hide her choice - one can use i.e. Sure Vote.
  • the other way to increase voter's privacy is to use encryption of votes.
  • a voter uses voting application which encrypts her choice with the public key of a system (threshold encryption scheme can be used). At the end of election private key is published and so the ballots become public.
  • a voter can check if the encryption of a vote made by voting application is correct by using a different computer.
  • First party prints recordlDs and locklns and covers them with scratch-off. It also prints a barcode (also under scratch-off) on each of the cards, this binds printed numbers with that barcode (this link is kept secret). After the printing by the first party, cards are tumbled.
  • Second party picks each card and prints a name and address of a voter on it. It also prints a barcode that links value of that code with a voter's name and address. Then the part containing both barcodes is cut-off from the card and stored by the Second Party. 0
  • Remotegrity a family of highly customizable internet voting systems that are designed for national elections. Any member of R.emotegrity family offers unconditional integrity. R,emotegrity in "mixed" -configuration (both mailed and digital cards) assures also immunity against improper influence.
  • Voters can easily avoid that threat by using different computers for each of the stage of voting. They can also use software assuring anonymous communication like TOR.
  • Partial is a half of an unchosen form that voter gets as a result of digital-ballot issuance procedure 3This allows poll worker to learn neither which card voter chosen nor which side of a card a voter has learnt.
  • Vote casting is as follows:
  • Table 2 Election tables after Alice's vote 8.3 Bob - digital card and dummy mailed card
  • Digital card Bob gets a digital card during in-person visit (and orders a dummy card to be mailed-him). He learns: recordID, locklnB for that card and a suffix of another recordID and lockln:
  • Dummy card Bob obtains a dummy card by mail with the following values under the scratch-off:
  • Table 3 Election tables after Alice's and Bob's vote 8.4 Oskar— countable mailed card and extra recordlDs
  • Oskar asks for comitability check for his card(s).
  • Oskar performs comitability check for his mailed card.
  • EA checks name and address printed on a card against the photo ID given by a voter.
  • Bob reveals prefix of a lockin to a poll worker: 77.
  • Poll worker prints a proof.
  • Bob goes into a booth and checks: if digit-by-digit sum of the sumrnands equals to lockin, and
  • Oskar casts from a different computer: (3139, Julia) (correctly posted).
  • Table 4 Election tables after Alice's. Bob's and Oskar Vote's vote 8.5 Tally
  • Table 5 EA opens commitments to the linked ballots and to the verified summands.
  • EA publishes results. Votes that are being counted (those which were locked are copied to the corresponding rows of Switchboard table and then to Results table.

Landscapes

  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Tourism & Hospitality (AREA)
  • Primary Health Care (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Human Resources & Organizations (AREA)
  • Marketing (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Economics (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Technology Law (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)

Abstract

Un système de vote à distance comprend des formulaires physiques envoyés par courrier électronique ou fournis par d'autres moyens à des électeurs. Ces formulaires contiennent des codes cachés sous une zone à gratter que les électeurs utilisent lorsqu'ils votent en ligne. Tout d'abord, un électeur soumet son vote en ligne, sous la forme d'un texte en clair ou codé, au moyen de codes servant de mots de passe à usage unique. Ensuite, un électeur vérifie, à l'aide d'un dispositif en ligne séparé, que le vote a été correctement envoyé, et il donne un second code qu'il peut choisir de façon imprévisible parmi plusieurs possibilités. Les protocoles devant être suivis par les visites des électeurs à des emplacements protégés comprennent des aspects tels que la possibilité pour les électeurs de demander que de faux bulletins de vote leur soient envoyés tandis que des bulletins de vote valides leur sont fournis pendant la visite, la récupération des formulaires qui ont au moins été signalés comme n'ayant pas été remis, et un programme malveillant qui peut épuiser les codes fournis à un électeur.
PCT/US2011/001563 2010-09-11 2011-09-09 Scrutin à distance ayant une intégrité et une résistance à une influence malvenue WO2012033535A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US38197210P 2010-09-11 2010-09-11
US61/381,972 2010-09-11

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2012033535A2 true WO2012033535A2 (fr) 2012-03-15
WO2012033535A3 WO2012033535A3 (fr) 2012-08-09

Family

ID=45811113

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2011/001563 WO2012033535A2 (fr) 2010-09-11 2011-09-09 Scrutin à distance ayant une intégrité et une résistance à une influence malvenue

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2012033535A2 (fr)

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR20040005791A (ko) * 2003-12-26 2004-01-16 에스케이 텔레콤주식회사 사이버계좌를 기반으로 한 전자 상거래 방법
KR20050102051A (ko) * 2005-09-22 2005-10-25 대한민국(관리부서 : 중앙선거관리위원회 위원장) 인터넷을 이용한 전자투표시스템
KR100653361B1 (ko) * 2004-06-04 2006-12-06 고려대학교 산학협력단 투표결과의 반영 여부를 검증 가능한 전자투표 방법 및시스템
US7431209B2 (en) * 2000-11-20 2008-10-07 Avante International Technology, Inc. Electronic voting apparatus, system and method

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7431209B2 (en) * 2000-11-20 2008-10-07 Avante International Technology, Inc. Electronic voting apparatus, system and method
KR20040005791A (ko) * 2003-12-26 2004-01-16 에스케이 텔레콤주식회사 사이버계좌를 기반으로 한 전자 상거래 방법
KR100653361B1 (ko) * 2004-06-04 2006-12-06 고려대학교 산학협력단 투표결과의 반영 여부를 검증 가능한 전자투표 방법 및시스템
KR20050102051A (ko) * 2005-09-22 2005-10-25 대한민국(관리부서 : 중앙선거관리위원회 위원장) 인터넷을 이용한 전자투표시스템

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2012033535A3 (fr) 2012-08-09

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Benaloh Ballot Casting Assurance via Voter-Initiated Poll Station Auditing.
Ryan et al. Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system
Rivest et al. Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin
Chaum et al. Scantegrity: End-to-end voter-verifiable optical-scan voting
Ali et al. An overview of end-to-end verifiable voting systems
US6973581B2 (en) Packet-based internet voting transactions with biometric authentication
EP1756767A2 (fr) Systemes et procedes cryptographiques, notamment verification d'intentions pratiques de grande certitude, par exemple pour des votes cryptes dans le cadre d'une election electronique
US20220366751A1 (en) Random sample elections
Helbach et al. Secure internet voting with code sheets
US11790719B2 (en) Tamper resistant public ledger voting system
US11361606B1 (en) Tamper resistant public ledger voting system
US20220406114A1 (en) Cryptographically secured paper ballot voting system
US10050786B2 (en) Random sample elections
Geetha et al. A secure digital e-voting using blockchain technology
WO2012033535A2 (fr) Scrutin à distance ayant une intégrité et une résistance à une influence malvenue
Kintu et al. A secure e-voting system using biometric fingerprint and crypt-watermark methodology
Moran et al. Automated anonymity verification of the ThreeBallot and VAV voting systems
Yadav et al. Online Voting System
EP2053565A2 (fr) Sistème d'election transparent ä double rotation des votes
Pasquinucci Web voting, security and cryptography
Yasinsac et al. Of paper trails and voter receipts
Friede The State of Cryptographic Voting Systems
Krishnamoorthy et al. A Robust Blockchain Assisted Electronic Voting Mechanism with Enhanced Cyber Norms and Precautions
Popoveniuc et al. On the privacy threats of electronic poll books
WO2024043937A1 (fr) Système de vote par bulletin de vote en papier sécurisé de manière cryptographique

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 11823887

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A2

NENP Non-entry into the national phase in:

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 11823887

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A2