WO2011060739A1 - 一种安全系统及方法 - Google Patents

一种安全系统及方法 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2011060739A1
WO2011060739A1 PCT/CN2010/078932 CN2010078932W WO2011060739A1 WO 2011060739 A1 WO2011060739 A1 WO 2011060739A1 CN 2010078932 W CN2010078932 W CN 2010078932W WO 2011060739 A1 WO2011060739 A1 WO 2011060739A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
cpu card
data
computer
user
terminal
Prior art date
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PCT/CN2010/078932
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
邵通
Original Assignee
南京新神郁网络科技有限公司
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Publication of WO2011060739A1 publication Critical patent/WO2011060739A1/zh

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31User authentication
    • G06F21/34User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3823Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the field of information security.
  • the present invention relates to a system and method for secure payment.
  • it relates to a system and method that can securely pay on a networked computer client that may be unsafe. Background technique
  • the computer terminal displays the payment of three 300 yuan, and asks the user to confirm the signature; the user can use various confirmation means including digital signature or payment password; however, it is actually a computer Trojan request
  • the user confirms that he will pay 100,000 yuan to Li Si.
  • the root cause of this insecurity is that when the computer terminal is not secure, all the information you see on the computer terminal may not be true.
  • the main means of hacking is the man-in-the-middle attack.
  • the analog operation attack is that when a computer user inserts a USBKEY digital certificate into the computer for transaction, the Trojan takes an operation to simulate the user's keyboard and mouse: for example, modifying the transaction object, modifying the transaction price, and modifying the transaction amount.
  • Visual spoofing attacks are an advanced way of simulating operational attacks. You can modify the IE URL. Even when the user enters the correct URL, the Trojan allows IE to display the correct URL, but the internal URL is the address of the scammer, and the simulated bank website implements the scam. .
  • USBKEY is a trusted computer without a keyboard and display.
  • USBKEY should have a CPU, a display, and a keyboard to form a complete trusted computer that meets the requirements of a trusted computer in the "Method and System for Secure Transaction in Computer Systems" (Chinese Patent Application CN99806523.4).
  • a USBKEY is not easy to carry, so the display and keyboard must be simplified.
  • ICBC's second-generation U-Shield simplifies the display to display only one line, relying on moving lines to display complete information; the keyboard is simplified into five keys, and sensitive data (PIN) is entered in a complicated manner. This product greatly reduces the convenience and ease of use while bringing security.
  • USBKEY digital certificates are currently widely used and widely used in online banking applications.
  • online banking, U-Shield, U-Bao and EMV cards can be the carriers of USBKEY digital certificates.
  • USBKEY is a CPU card
  • the second generation USBKEY with display and keyboard is also a CPU card
  • the new CPU credit card with international EMV migration is also a CPU card
  • the security module with CPU (such as TPM) implanted in the computer terminal is also CPU card
  • the mobile phone and the computer terminal communicate with each other for security authentication, digital signature or bank payment, it is also a CPU card, but if the mobile phone directly passes the wireless network (such as mobile or Unicom) for security authentication, digital signature or bank payment, it is not a CPU card.
  • the CPU card can have a digital certificate or no digital certificate.
  • a CPU card is a portable device that obtains server services by interacting with a computer terminal and interacting with a server through a computer terminal.
  • a user terminal we are able to receive information from a CPU card and can communicate this information to a person's portable device, referred to as a user terminal (handheld device).
  • a user terminal There are many ways to convey information to people. For example, you can take the display ⁇ ⁇ , Wan sensible data, you can also take the meter reading device sound Wan type of people heard Wan data type, and so on.
  • the most common device that satisfies this condition is a mobile communication terminal, that is, a mobile phone; it can also be a handheld device specially designed for the present invention, and of course, it can also be a networked computer terminal.
  • the method of using the online banking for the CPU card is: when the user logs in to the online banking system, the CPU card is inserted into the computer terminal; then the PIN code is input on the computer, and if the verification is passed, further related operations can be performed; Entering or generating transaction key data (name, account number, amount) on the terminal and transmitting it to the CPU card; then the CPU card signs the key transaction data and transmits it back to the computer terminal, and then transmits it to the online banking server through the computer network to confirm the signature, and completes transaction.
  • the CPU card authentication method can be based on the PKI public key system, and the private key is securely stored in the CPU card, which is in line with the national security requirements for online financial transactions. Of course, the CPU card can use the other security protocols to implement the service without using the PKI public key system and the digital signature method.
  • Screen confirmation means that the user will verify the transaction data displayed on the CPU card display module during the transaction to achieve the purpose of confirmation.
  • Input confirmation means that when the user is trading, some key transaction data, such as the name of the other party, the account number, and the transaction amount, need to be confirmed by physical input on the input module of the CPU card to prevent the attacker from tampering with the signature content. In short, it is to find a way for the user to confirm the accuracy of the data to be signed or to be used in the CPU card.
  • a device of 5 data is confirmed, so it is not a beautiful case; or, the wrong signed data is transmitted from the bank server to the user's mobile phone, and is not confirmed by the user, but the bank is still After accepting it incorrectly, the legal loss will still be borne by the user. So the program is a flawed solution.
  • the user wants all the data sent to the bank server to be the data that the user wishes to send, and all the data seen on the display screen are the real data sent back by the bank or the real data input by the user himself. This is the so-called “what you see is what you sign” that the bank is currently paying for in the security field.
  • the inventor believes that the acceptable security is that after the user displays the normal operation according to the screen of the computer client, the user cannot cause actual loss even if the data is tampered with; nor can the user base the user's screen based on the false display of the computer client screen. Shows actual loss after normal operation. The fact that no actual loss is caused is that the result is that the terminal is broken and cannot be used.
  • Cipher application ZL200910008843 A device for performing trusted digital signature on a smart cipher key and its working method discloses a device for performing trusted digital signature on a smart cipher key and a working method thereof.
  • the key signature data in the smart cipher key can be confirmed by the customer by physical confirmation on the device.
  • the device processes the confirmed key signature data, it is combined with the key signature data and sent to the ordinary smart cryptographic key for digital signature, and transmitted back to the server, and the server determines the validity and correctness of the signature to implement the user. Trusted confirmation of ordinary smart cryptographic key signature data.
  • a CPU card with a display module or a keyboard module is fully compliant with the requirements of a complete trusted computer and clearly meets the requirements of "what you see is what you sign".
  • the display module and the input module can only be made small.
  • a small screen is not easy to read, and a small keyboard is not easy to operate; especially when the CPU card is in use, most of them need to physically access other computer terminals, so that the CPU card is far away from the user, which makes the small display module and The keypad module is not easy to use.
  • the CPU card is wirelessly connected to the computer terminal, of course, the distance problem can be avoided; however, the CPU card must have a battery system and charging problem.
  • the method of safely performing digital signature may be when the data to be signed is input through the computer terminal and transmitted to
  • a one-time confirmation password (dynamic password) is generated by the CPU card, and the confirmation password and the data to be signed are simultaneously transmitted to the computer terminal through a relatively safe method.
  • Bank customer after confirming the accuracy of the data to be signed, the bank customer inputs a corresponding confirmation password on the computer terminal; the CPU card compares the confirmation password received from the computer terminal with the generated confirmation password, and performs corresponding digital signature. Otherwise the corresponding digital signature is not performed. You can also cancel the wait by using the commonly used input three times to confirm that the password is incorrect. ⁇ ⁇ . ⁇ tl tl , , s N , ⁇ Sign the data to improve security.
  • the CPU card is connected to the party to be signed data item ij, and may also request to enter an identity authentication password (PIN) or an identity authentication dynamic password to prevent multiple attempts to input the data to be signed and confirm the password.
  • PIN identity authentication password
  • an identity authentication dynamic password to prevent multiple attempts to input the data to be signed and confirm the password.
  • the purpose of secure payment is to "see what you see is signed.” Since the work of the signature is performed on the CPU card, regardless of how unsafe the computer terminal is, it is necessary to deceive the bank server, and the fraudulent data still uses the signature function in the CPU card.
  • the CPU card can use the data only after obtaining the user confirmation (for example, digital signature, modify the data in the CPU card), and can further provide the bank.
  • the server gets the corresponding service.
  • a trusted terminal should have a keyboard, display, and CPU; it is now possible to confirm CPU security, but the display and keyboard may be insecure. Using your phone just wants to use the phone's display to display information. If the keyboard is guaranteed to be safe, the scheme for ensuring secure payment is the Chinese patent document of the inventor.
  • ZL20061 0041 361 .6 "A device and method for secure use of web server services independent of operating system security.”
  • the portable requirement wants to separate the display from the CPU, it is necessary to establish a secure channel between the CPU and the display, and because the security work should be the user's intervention as much as possible, especially the login, signature, secure payment and game security. Application; so you only need to tell the CPU whether the data displayed is correct or not.
  • a computer terminal that may be unsafe, it is possible to safely confirm the critical data in the CPU card and work according to the confirmed data.
  • the method can be used for network payment; combined with a good cryptographic protocol, a method for securely using services such as online banking, games, etc. on potentially unsafe computer terminals can be easily and securely solved. Realize the security purpose of "signing and seeing".
  • a security system comprising: a CPU card, a computer terminal, a server, and a user terminal; wherein, the CPU card is connected to the computer terminal, the computer terminal is connected to the server through the network, and the user terminal is securely connected to the CPU card;
  • the key data is input or generated on the computer terminal and transmitted to the CPU card; the key data is transmitted to the user terminal through the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal; the user confirms the input to the CPU card according to the key data on the user terminal; After the card is confirmed, the key data is transformed and transmitted to the server through the computer terminal.
  • enter the confirmation that the CPU card can be a button confirmation or (and) password confirmation.
  • the CPU card generates a confirmation password; transmits a confirmation password and key data to the user terminal through a secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal; the user confirms the key and enters the confirmation password on the computer terminal and transmits the confirmation password to the CPU card; After the CPU card comparison confirmation password matches the generated confirmation password, the key data is converted and transmitted to the server through the computer terminal.
  • the confirmation to the CPU card is to press the confirmation button and transfer to the CPU card.
  • a short message gateway a secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal, which is implemented by using a password device encryption in the CPU card, a short message gateway decryption, and a wireless mobile network.
  • the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal is realized by using a cryptographic device built into the CPU card, a wireless module built in the CPU card, a wireless module built in the user terminal, and a cryptographic device built in the user terminal.
  • the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal is realized by a connection between the CPU card built-in cryptographic device and the computer terminal, a wired or wireless connection between the computer terminal and the user terminal, and a built-in cryptographic device of the user terminal.
  • the method includes: a user inputs or generates key data on a computer terminal, and transmits the key data to the CPU card; transmits the key data to the user terminal through a secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal; the user is based on the user terminal The key data is confirmed and the input is confirmed to the CPU card. After the CPU card is confirmed, the key data is converted and transmitted to the server through the computer terminal. Enter the confirmation here that the CPU card can be a button confirmation or (and) password confirmation.
  • the CPU card generates a confirmation password, and transmits a confirmation password and key data to the user terminal through a secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal, that is, the confirmation password is input to the CPU terminal and transmitted to the CPU card.
  • the security connection between the CPU card and the user terminal is: encrypting the confirmation password and/or key data, transmitting to the short message gateway, decrypting the short message gateway, and transmitting to the user terminal;
  • the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal is: encryption confirmation password and/or key data, transmission to the user terminal through the wireless module built in the CPU card and the built-in wireless module of the user terminal, and decryption of the confirmation password and key by the user terminal data.
  • the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal is: encrypting the confirmation password and/or key data, transmitting to the computer terminal, transmitting to the user terminal through a wired or wireless connection of the computer terminal and the user terminal, and decrypting the confirmation password by the user terminal. And key data.
  • Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of a system associated with preferred embodiments 1, 3 and 4;
  • Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of the system associated with preferred embodiment 2. detailed description
  • Ben Ming is the security system and method of using the corpse terminal display device as the trusted display device and CPU ⁇ as the letter CPU.
  • the data to be signed or to be used in the CPU card is output to the trusted device display by the user in a trusted manner, and the data to be signed or to be used is confirmed by the user; after the user confirms, the corresponding signature or the corresponding data is used.
  • a system associated with a security system and method is shown in FIG.
  • the cryptographic device 42 corresponds to the cryptographic device 51 of the short message gateway 5; that is, the cryptographic device 42 completes the encryption and the cryptographic device 51 decrypts.
  • the cryptographic device 51 discloses a public key (EM), a secret private key (DM); then the cryptographic device 42 is encrypted with a public key (EM) and the cryptographic device 51 decrypts with a secret private key (DM).
  • EM public key
  • DM secret private key
  • encryption and decryption can be accomplished using other cryptographic protocols.
  • the CPU card 4 stores a handheld device address, such as a mobile phone number.
  • the user inputs or generates key data of the transaction according to the prompt of the computer terminal 3, such as key data such as the account name, account number, and amount of funds accepted; the computer terminal 3 transmits the key data to In the CPU card 4; the CPU card 4 generates a confirmation password (PIN) by the random number generator 41, and encrypts the key data, the confirmation password, and the handheld device address (mobile phone number) by the encryption device 42; the encrypted data is transmitted to the computer terminal.
  • PIN confirmation password
  • mobile phone number handheld device address
  • the cryptographic device 51 of the short message gateway 5 decrypts the encrypted data to obtain key data, confirm the password and the address of the handheld device (mobile phone number); the short message gateway 5 passes the key through the mobile wireless network 6
  • the data and the confirmation password are sent to the handheld device 7 (the user's mobile phone) according to the handheld device address (mobile phone number); after the user confirms that the key data on the handheld device 7 is correct, the confirmation password is input on the computer terminal 3; the computer terminal 3 receives the data.
  • the confirmation password is transferred to the CPU card 4; the CPU card 4 is compared After the received confirmation password is consistent with the generated confirmation password, the key data is signed by the signature device 43, and the CPU card 4 transmits the signed key data to the computer terminal 3, and transmits the signed key data to the bank server through the computer network 2. 1; The bank server 1 performs a corresponding payment operation based on the signed key data.
  • the signature of the key data is the legal basis for the bank to operate the funds, and it is clear that the key data of the signature is securely confirmed by the bank customer through the handheld device 7.
  • the solution obviously has a security defect.
  • the computer terminal 3 continuously delivers key data to the CPU card 4 and continuously guesses the corresponding confirmation password. Although the probability of success is small, it is also a security flaw.
  • the solution can be that the CPU card can only perform one key data signature work once, or send the input key data pre-password through SMS before entering the key data. Before entering the key data, it must be confirmed by the user's handheld device 7 (mobile phone), or combined with the CPU card 4 and the handheld device 7 (mobile phone) to form a dynamic password authentication to ensure that the key data is input into the CPU card 4 for pre-authentication. It is best to use the user to input the fingerprint, compare the fingerprint as a security certificate in the CPU card, and further use a fingerprint authentication to confirm the key data to improve security.
  • Another solution is to simply add a button to the CPU card. When the user confirms the critical data accuracy on the handheld device, simply press the button to confirm the data. This makes it possible to cancel the random number generator 41 in the CPU card, but this solution has the disadvantage that the manufacture of the CPU card is relatively difficult and the cost is slightly higher. But this is also recommended by the inventor ⁇ , ⁇ ⁇ ⁇
  • a security system is: a CPU card 4, a computer terminal 3, a server (bank network server 1), and a user terminal (handheld device 7); the CPU card 4 is connected to the computer terminal 3, and the computer terminal 3 passes The network and the server (bank network server 1) are connected, and the user terminal (handheld device 7) is securely connected to the CPU card through the cryptographic device 42 in the CPU 4, the CPU card is connected to the computer terminal 3 to the computer network 2 to the short message gateway, and the short message gateway 5 And a cryptographic device 51 and a mobile wireless network 6;
  • a security method is: the user inputs key data on the computer terminal 3 and transmits it to the CPU card 4; the CPU card 4 generates a confirmation password; through the CPU card 4 and the user terminal (handheld device 7) Secure connection, transfer confirmation password and key data to the user terminal (handheld device 7); according to the key data on the user terminal (handheld device 7), the user enters the confirmation password on the computer terminal after confirmation; the CPU card compares the input confirmation password with After the generated confirmation passwords are consistent, the key data is transformed (signed) and transmitted to the server through the computer terminal, and the payment can be further completed.
  • the input confirmation password may not be input to the computer terminal 3, but may be input to the computer terminal 3 on any networked computer in communication with the computer, and then confirmed to the CPU card.
  • Chinese patent application ZL9912388 On the Internet plus mobile phone sound protection money payment security method and corresponding system
  • Chinese patent application ZL02116722 mobile phone caller ID information for a variety of financial card payment confirmation telecommunications methods and systems” proposed by the mobile phone Confirm the data in the server.
  • the main difference from this embodiment is that one is to confirm the data in the CPU card, one is to confirm the data in the server; one must change (encrypt) the key data and confirm the password or say because the data in the CPU card must be securely confirmed.
  • a secure connection is established, and server data validation does not require this critical step; one is that the confirmed data also needs to be signed (encrypted) to be submitted to the banking service, and the data in the bank server is used directly for payment.
  • FIG. 1 a system associated with a security system and method is shown in FIG.
  • the handheld device 6 in the figure can be connected to the computer terminal 3 by a wired connection (such as a USB cable) or wirelessly (such as Bluetooth, can be a wireless computer network and a short message network), and the connection is represented by "wireless or wired connection 5".
  • the wireless or wired connection 5 can also directly connect the CPU card 4 to the handheld device 6.
  • the handheld device 6 is a mobile phone, it is better to add the password device 61 by adding an SD card or changing the SIM card, and of course, the password software can also be implemented by using the mobile phone software.
  • the corpse terminal (handset 6) is used to establish a secure connection with the CPU card 4.
  • the user inputs key data of the transaction according to the prompt of the computer terminal 3, such as key data such as account name, account number, and amount of money to be accepted; the computer terminal 3 transmits the key data to the CPU card.
  • the CPU card 4 generates a confirmation password (PIN) by the random number generator 41, and encrypts the key data and the confirmation password by the encryption device 42; the encrypted key data and the confirmation password are transmitted to the computer terminal 3, and wirelessly Or the wired connection 5 is transmitted to the handheld device 6 (handset); the cryptographic device 61 in the handheld device 6 decrypts the encrypted data to obtain key data and confirms the password; after the user confirms that the key data on the handheld device 6 is correct, the user inputs the data on the computer terminal 3.
  • PIN confirmation password
  • the computer terminal 3 transmits the received confirmation password to the CPU card 4; after comparing the received confirmation password with the generated confirmation password, the CPU card 4 signs the key data by the signature device 43, and the CPU card 4
  • the signed key data is transferred to the computer terminal 3 and transmitted through the computer terminal 2
  • the key data name to the bank server 1; bank server 1 corresponding payment operation according to the key data of the signature.
  • the signature of the key data is the legal basis for the bank to operate the funds, and it is clear that the key data of the signature is securely confirmed by the bank customer through the handheld device.
  • a security system is: a CPU card 4, a computer terminal 3, a server (bank network server 1), and a user terminal (handheld device 6); the CPU card 4 is connected to the computer terminal 3, and the computer terminal 3 passes The network and the server (bank network server 1) are connected, and the user terminal (handheld device 6) is securely connected to the CPU card through the password device 42 in the CPU 4, the path of the CPU card to the computer terminal 3 to the user terminal (handset device 6), and the password.
  • the device 61 consisting of a wired or wireless connection 5.
  • other information channels can be used, such as adding a wireless device to the CPU card via a wired or wireless connection 5, directly connecting to the user terminal (handset 6).
  • a security method is: the user inputs key data on the computer terminal 3 and transmits it to the CPU card 4; the CPU card 4 generates a confirmation password; through the CPU card 4 and the user terminal (handheld device 6) Secure connection, transfer confirmation password and key data to the user terminal (handheld device 6); according to the key data on the user terminal (handheld device 6), the user enters the confirmation password on the computer terminal after confirmation; the CPU card compares the input confirmation password with After the generated confirmation passwords are consistent, the key data is transformed (signed) and transmitted to the server through the computer terminal, and the payment can be further completed.
  • the input confirmation password may not be input to the computer terminal 3, but may be input to the computer terminal 3 on any networked computer in communication with the computer, and then confirmed to the CPU card.
  • the handheld device 6 used in the solution may be a "smart phone", and a decoding program for installing a password on the smart phone implements the cryptographic device 61; or a handheld device (mobile phone) of the solution is inserted into an SDIO card with a wireless communication module and decryption
  • the module is capable of receiving encrypted data transmitted from the computer terminal 3. And after decryption, it is displayed on the screen of the mobile phone. It is also possible for the user to hold a dedicated security device with a wireless communication module, display and keyboard.
  • smartphones also have a security risk, that is, when the smartphone is not secure, it may pass the confirmation password back to the unsafe calculation. Ln ⁇ , the machine is called 3, and then enter the CPU card to generate unsafe data confirmation.
  • the solution is to add a confirmation key to the CPU and use it with the confirmation password.
  • the best method is to make the connection of the CPU card to the user terminal a "one-way channel" from the CPU card to the user terminal, that is, the CPU card can transmit data to the user terminal, and the user device cannot transmit information to the CPU card.
  • a CPU card broadcasts information in a broadcast manner, and a user terminal can only receive information and cannot transmit information, which is a typical one-way channel.
  • a system associated with a security system and method is shown in FIG.
  • the CPU card 4 When the CPU card 4 is connected to the computer terminal 3, the user inputs key data of the transaction according to the prompt of the computer terminal 3, such as key data such as account name, account number, and amount of funds to be accepted; the computer terminal 3 transmits the key data to the CPU card. 4;
  • the CPU card 4 generates a confirmation password (PIN) by the random number generator 41, and generates a graphic (such as a JPEG format) with the confirmation password and the key data, and disturbs it so that the computer can hardly recognize it, and the person can recognize it.
  • PIN confirmation password
  • a graphic such as a JPEG format
  • the picture and the handheld device address are encrypted (or not encrypted) and sent to the short message gateway 5 and to the handheld device 7 (mobile phone); after the user confirms that the key data is correct, the confirmation password is entered on the computer terminal 3.
  • the computer terminal 3 transmits the received confirmation password to the CPU card 4; after comparing the received confirmation password with the generated confirmation password, the CPU card 4 signs the key data by the signature device 43, and the CPU card 4 signs the signature.
  • the data is transferred to the computer terminal 3, and the signed data is transmitted to the bank server 1 through the computer terminal 2; the bank server 1 performs a corresponding payment operation based on the signed payment data.
  • the signature of this key data is the legal basis for the bank to conduct capital operations, and it is clear that the key data of the signature is securely confirmed by the bank customer through the handheld device.
  • a security system is: a CPU card 4, a computer terminal 3, a server (bank network server 1), and a user terminal (handheld device 7); the CPU card 4 is connected to the computer terminal 3, and the computer terminal 3 passes The network and the server (bank network server 1) are connected, and the user terminal (handheld device 7) is securely connected to the CPU card through the cryptographic device 42 in the CPU 4, the CPU card is connected to the computer terminal 3 to the computer network 2 to the short message gateway, and the short message gateway 5 And a cryptographic device 51 and a mobile wireless network 6;
  • a security method is: the user inputs key data on the computer terminal 3 and transmits it to the CPU card 4; the CPU card 4 generates a confirmation password; through the CPU card 4 and the user terminal (handheld device 7) Secure connection, transfer the graphical confirmation password and key data to the user terminal (handheld device 7); the user enters the confirmation password on the computer terminal according to the key data on the user terminal (handheld device 7); the CPU card compares the input After confirming that the password matches the generated confirmation password, the key data is converted (signed) and transmitted to the server through the computer terminal, and the payment can be further completed.
  • the input confirmation password may not be input to the computer terminal 3, but may be input to the computer terminal 3 on any networked computer in communication with the computer, and then to the CPU card for corresponding confirmation.
  • the key data and the confirmation password are not necessarily transmitted to the corpse terminal (handheld device), and can also be transmitted to the user's e-mail address, which is convenient for users without a mobile phone. Security is definitely down, but it's easier to use. Therefore, some user trusted terminals are mobile phones, some users' trusted terminals are other computers (reading emails), and some users' trusted terminals are any other devices that can receive and display key data and confirm passwords. Essentially, it is necessary for the CPU card to tell the computer terminal which key data and confirmation password to send to which electronic address.
  • the corresponding electronic address is the user's total.
  • the core of the invention displays the accuracy of the information in the CPU card on the user terminal through the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal. And use the confirmation password, buttons, etc. to confirm the data in the CPU card, and then safely use the data security system and method.
  • a security system that includes:
  • the CPU card is connected to the computer terminal, the computer terminal is connected to the server through the network, and the user terminal is securely connected to the CPU card; the user inputs or generates key data on the computer terminal and transmits the data to the CPU card; and the security of the CPU card and the user terminal Connect, transfer key data to the user terminal; the user confirms the input to the CPU card according to the key data on the user terminal; after the CPU card confirms, the key data is converted and transmitted to the server through the computer terminal.
  • the CPU card generates a confirmation password; and transmits a confirmation password and key data to the user terminal through a secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal; and the user according to the key data on the user terminal. After confirming, enter the confirmation password on the computer terminal and transfer it to the CPU card. After the CPU card comparison confirmation password matches the generated confirmation password, the key data is converted and transmitted to the server through the computer terminal.
  • the CPU card further has a confirmation button; when the user confirms the data through the user terminal, the input confirmation to the CPU card is to press the confirmation button and transmit to the CPU card.
  • the system according to claim 2 characterized in that there is also a short message gateway, and the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal is implemented by using a cryptographic device encryption, a short message gateway decryption and a wireless mobile network in the CPU card.
  • the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal is a built-in cryptographic device of the CPU card, a wireless module built in the CPU card, a wireless module built in the user terminal, and a built-in user terminal.
  • the cryptographic device is implemented.
  • the secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal is a connection between the CPU card built-in cryptographic device and the computer terminal, a wired or wireless connection between the computer terminal and the user terminal, and a user terminal.
  • Built-in cryptographic device Built-in cryptographic device.
  • a security method that includes:
  • the user confirms and enters the CPU card according to the key data on the user terminal;
  • step B further comprises: the CPU card generating a confirmation password, transmitting a confirmation password and key data to the user terminal through a secure connection between the CPU card and the user terminal; and confirming the input of step C, That is, the confirmation password is input on the computer terminal and transmitted to the CPU card.

Abstract

本发明的目的是提出一种安全系统及方法。在使用可能不安全的计算机终端时,可以安全地确认CPU卡中的关键数据,并把经过确认的数据提供给服务器,安全准确地获得服务器的服务。该系统及方法,结合好的密码协议,可简单且安全地解决在可能不安全计算机终端上安全使用网络支付、网络银行、游戏等服务的系统及方法。

Description

一种安全系统及方法
技术领域
本发明属于信息安全领域。 本发明涉及的是一种安全支付的系统及方法。 具体地说, 涉及一种可以在可能不安全的联网计算机客户端上安全支付的系统及方法。 背景技术
网络银行由于其巨大的方便性, 受到大家的普遍重视。 但是, 由于其安全性没有得到 很好地解决, 所以并没有得到很好地普及。 为此, 业界提出了大量的专利及非常多的解决 方案。 但是所有这些方案都没能达到安全与易用性的完美统一。 在 《计算机世界报》 一篇 文章 "SSL难保电子商务安全"(计算机世界报 2006年 05月 29日) 中, 描述了现在计算 机木马攻击银行系统的进展及各种对抗方法, 具体内容可以参见本发明人的专利申请文件 (ZL20061 0041 361 .6 一种不依赖操作系统安全的安全使用网络服务器服务的装置和方 法)。 事实上这些木马攻击, 加以改造甚至可以攻破现在银行认为最安全的 USBKEY数字 证书系统。 申请人认为, 造成这种情况的根本原因是, 用户无法准确判断计算机终端是否 处于安全状态。 而计算机终端不安全时, 任何需要计算机终端提供最基本安全保证的方案, 实际上都可能不安全。
这时, 一般计算机终端用户所相信的自己敲击的键盘码及计算机终端屏幕的显示都可 能有安全问题。 例如, 当用户希望给张三支付 300元, 计算机终端显示支付张三 300元, 并要求用户确认签名; 用户可以使用包括数字签名或支付密码等各种确认手段; 但是, 实 际上是计算机木马要求用户确认给李四支付十万元。 造成这种不安全的根本原因是, 当计 算机终端不安全时, 所有你在计算机终端上看到的信息可能都不真实。
目前黑客攻击的主要手段是中间人攻击, 将来还有模拟操作攻击及视觉诈骗攻击。 模 拟操作攻击就是, 当计算机用户把 USBKEY数字证书插入计算机准备进行交易时, 木马采 取模拟用户键盘及鼠标的操作实施攻击: 如, 修改交易对象、 修改交易价格、 修改交易数 量。视觉诈骗攻击是模拟操作攻击的高级方式, 可以修改 I E的 URL, 甚至当用户输入正确 的 URL时, 木马程序让 I E显示正确的 URL, 但是内部的 URL是诈骗者的地址, 模拟银行 网站实施诈骗。 现在有很多安全人员, 把以上提到的攻击网络银行计算机客户端的方法用 其他两个词来定义: "机器劫持"和 "数据篡改"。 或者, 用 "所见非所签"表示该种不安 全状态; 用 "所见即所签"表示希望达到的安全目的。
关于计算机终端安全的最原始的专利申请是 "计算机系统中用于安全交易的方法和系 , ,^ ^ , ^ 统' '(中国专利甲请 CN99806523.4 )。该万案就是米用另一台可 计算机釆孵犬联网计算 机终端的不可信问题, 即使用不可信联网计算机终端和一个可信计算机组成系统来解决安 全问题。
随着技术的进步, 可信计算机的主机 (CPU ) 越来越便宜。 由于便携的要求及尽量不 改变人们使用计算机终端习惯的要求, 人们提出了很多改进的技术方案。 例如, 目前普遍 使用的 USBKEY证书, 实质就是 "计算机系统中用于安全交易的方法和系统 "方案中, 取 消可信键盘及可信显示器的可信计算机方案。 也可以说 USBKEY就是没有键盘及显示器的 可信计算机。 这个方案虽然满足了便携及尽量不改变人们使用计算机终端习惯的要求, 但 是降低了安全性。 也就是说该方案不能保证计算机键盘输入的不被篡改, 也不能保证显示 屏幕上显示数据的准确性。
当然 USBKEY还是应该具有 CPU、显示器及键盘, 这样才能构成一个完整的可信计算 机, 符合 "计算机系统中用于安全交易的方法和系统"(中国专利申请 CN99806523.4 ) 中可信计算机的要求。 但是, 这样的 USBKEY不易携带, 所以必须对显示器及键盘进行简 化。 工行的第二代 U盾, 把显示器简化成只显示一行, 依靠移动行来显示完整的信息; 键 盘简化成五个键, 并通过复杂的方式输入敏感数据 (PIN)。 该产品在带来安全性的同时, 极大地损失了方便性及易用性。
目前, 国际信用卡组织的新信用卡标准的 EMV 卡也是只有 CPU 的卡, 本质上与 USBKEY完全一致。 USBKEY数字证书目前是网上银行应用十分广泛且比较安全方式, 比 如网银盾、 U盾、 U宝及 EMV卡等都可以是 USBKEY数字证书的载体。
在本专利申请中, 我们把具有 CPU 的便携设备 (或与计算机终端连接使用的带 CPU 的设备)均称为 CPU卡。 显然, USBKEY是 CPU卡; 带显示及键盘的第二代 USBKEY也 是 CPU卡; 符合国际 EMV迁移的新的带 CPU的信用卡也是 CPU卡; 植入计算机终端的 带 CPU的安全模块 (如 TPM) 也是 CPU卡; 如果手机与计算机终端相互通讯进行安全认 证、 数字签名或银行支付也是 CPU卡, 但是如果手机直接通过无线网 (如移动或联通) 进 行安全认证、 数字签名或银行支付则不是 CPU卡, 而是计算机终端; 但是如果手机中有相 当于 TPM的安全模块, 则该模块是 CPU卡, 而手机是计算机终端。 CPU卡中可以有数字 证书, 也可以没有数字证书。
总之, CPU卡是通过与计算机终端进行信息交互, 并通过计算机终端与服务器交互信 息, 从而获得服务器服务的便携设备。
在本专利申请中, 我们把能够接收到 CPU卡的信息, 并能把该信息传达到人的便携设 备, 称为用户终端 (手持设备)。 传达信息到人, 可以有多种方式。 例如, 可以采取显示屏 α ^ , 显 数据的万式、 也可以米取设备发声阅读的万式使人听到数据的万式, 等等。 显然满足 该条件的最普通的设备是移动通讯终端, 即手机; 也可以是为本发明专门设计的手持设备, 当然也可以就是联网的计算机终端。
一般 CPU卡使用网银的方法是:当用户登陆网银系统的时候,在计算机终端上插入 CPU 卡; 然后在计算机上输入 PIN码, 没能如果验证通过, 则可以进行进一步的相关操作; 然 后在计算机终端上输入或产生交易关键数据 (名称、 账号、 金额), 并传送到 CPU卡; 然 后 CPU卡对关键交易数据进行签名, 并传送回计算机终端, 再通过计算机网络传送到网银 服务器确认签名, 完成交易。 这种 CPU卡认证方式可以是基于 PKI公钥体系, 私钥安全地 保存在 CPU卡中, 符合国家对网上金融交易的安全要求。 当然 CPU卡可以不使用 PKI公 钥体系及数字签名方式, 而采用其他安全协议来实现服务。
然而, 当前使用 CPU卡的方法并不是绝对安全。 广泛应用的普通 CPU卡 (不带液晶 和按键) 实际存在 "所见非所签" 的安全漏洞。 计算机终端与 CPU卡交互操作存在被中间 人攻击的漏洞, 无法防止待签名数据被篡改后传送到 CPU卡。 另外, 黑客还可以远程控制 计算机终端, 在后台篡改需要 CPU卡签名的交易数据, 而客户却无法知晓。 有效防范 "所 见非所签"的关键就是在于要让用户知道 CPU卡内的真实待签名数据, 并可以对篡改过的 CPU卡内的交易数据拒绝签名。
目前网银交易中, 防范 "所见非所签" 的方式主要是通过在普通 CPU卡上增加显示模 块和按键模块, 实现 "屏幕确认"或者 "输入确认"的功能。 即通常所说的 "所见即所签"。
用户在交易时, 需要用户对网银交易数据进行确认, 使得攻击者无法暗中篡改网银交 易数据, 从而保证合法用户账户的安全。 屏幕确认即指用户在交易时, 会对显示在 CPU卡 显示模块上的交易数据进行核实, 以达到确认的目的。 输入确认是指用户在交易的时候, 需要将部分交易关键数据, 比如对方姓名、 账号、 交易金额等在 CPU卡的输入模块上以物 理输入的方式进行确认, 杜绝攻击者篡改签名内容的机会。 总之, 就是想办法让用户确认 处于 CPU卡中的待签名或待使用的数据的准确性。
中国专利申请 ZL9912388 "互联网上加手机声响保障钱款支付安全方法及相应系统" 及中国专利申请 ZL02116722 "手机来电显示信息的多种金融卡支付确认电讯方法及系统" 中, 提出的一种方式是银行服务器将关键交易数据及一个由银行服务器产生动态的确认口 令, 通过手机短信方式告诉客户, 如果客户认为关键交易数据无误, 在计算机终端上输入 确认口令, 传送到银行确认并完成交易。 该方案的本质就是把关键数据传送到银行, 然后 想办法让用户确认已经处于银行服务器中的待使用的数据。 这种方式也可以解决 "所见非 所签" 问题, 但是该方案不能由 CPU卡对交易数据进行数字签名, 只能对传送到银行服务 ππ ^ Λ , ^ ,一 器的 5ζ易数据迸仃确认, 所以不是芫美的万案; 或者说, 错误的经过签名的数据, 从银行 服务器传送到用户手机, 并且没有得到用户确认, 但银行仍然错误地接受后, 从法律上看 损失还是将由用户承担。 所以该方案是一个有一定缺陷的方案。
所以, 用户希望所有送到银行服务器的数据都是用户希望送出的数据、 所有在显示屏 幕上看到的数据都是银行送回的真实数据或用户自己输入的真实数据。 这就是目前银行支 付安全领域所希望的所谓的 "所见即所签"。
目前在所有其他计算机客户端的安全方案中, 或多或少或不自觉地认为计算机客户端 有一定的安全性, 实际上造成所有的方案都有这样那样的安全漏洞。 而我们的出发点就是, 认为客户端就是木马, 而不仅仅是可能有木马。 我们假设操作系统就是黑客编的木马, 黑 客完全掌握了该客户端, 而用户完全不应该相信该计算机客户端的安全性。 从用户的角度 来看, 他只是希望计算机客户端能正确地帮他处理问题, 而并不在乎计算机客户端是不是 安全。
当计算机客户端不安全时, 显然上述希望不可能都成立。 但是本发明人认为可以接受 的安全是, 当用户按照计算机客户端屏幕显示正常操作后, 即使数据被篡改也不能使用户 产生实际损失; 也不能因为计算机客户端屏幕的虚假显示, 使用户根据这些显示正常操作 后产生实际损失。 不产生实际损失的意思是, 产生的结果就是该终端坏了不能用而已。
最重要的一点就是, 在网络服务器端得到的数据必须肯定是操作者认可的, 至少必须 保证银行服务器得到的有法律意义的交易数据必须肯定是操作者认可的。
中国专利申请 ZL200410103401.6 种增强计算机上使用电子签名工具安全性的方 法", 联网获得授权才能使用签名工具。 利用对方计算机对待签名数据的签名, 反解后与待 签名数据比较, 正确后才进行签名。 安全性只有对方计算机及本地计算机均被攻破后才行, 当然也可以篡改两个原始数据达到攻击的目的。 并没有解决计算机客户端不安全后, 如何 安全使用银行支付的问题。
中国专利申请 ZL200910008843 "对智能密码钥匙进行可信数字签名的装置及其工作方 法" 中, 公开了一种针对智能密码钥匙进行可信数字签名的装置及其工作方法。 通过所述 工作方法可将智能密码钥匙内的关键签名数据, 在装置上由客户以物理确认方式加以确认。 所述装置将经过确认的关键签名数据处理后, 和关键签名数据组合在一起交给普通智能密 码钥匙进行数字签名, 并传回至服务器, 由服务器判断签名的有效性和正确性, 以实现用 户对普通智能密码钥匙签名数据的可信确认。
中国专利文献 ZL200910008843 "对智能密码钥匙进行可信数字签名的装置及其工作方 法"、 中国专利文献 ZL02116722 "手机来电显示信息的多种金融卡支付确认电讯方法及系 , , ,, „ , 统"、中国专利文献 9912388 "互联网上加手机声响保障钱款支付安全万法及相 ^糸统"、《计 算机世界报》文章 "SSL难保电子商务安全"(计算机世界报 2006年 05月 29日)、 中国专 利文献 ZL20061 0041 361 .6 种不依赖操作系统安全的安全使用网络服务器服务的装 置和方法"、 中国专利文献 CN99806523.4 "计算机系统中用于安全交易的方法和系统"、 中国专利文献 ZL200410103401.6 种增强计算机上使用电子签名工具安全性的方法"等 以上所提到的所有专利文献都是本专利实现的背景文件, 为了节省本专利说明书的篇幅, 申请人把上述所有专利文献的说明书都作为本专利申请的一部分, 表示已经把这些申请文 件写入了本说明书。
发明内容
有显示模块或键盘模块的 CPU卡, 完全符合一个完整的可信计算机的要求, 显然能够 满足 "所见即所签" 的要求。 为了便于携带, 只能把显示模块及输入模块做的很小。 但是, 很小的屏幕不便于阅读, 小的键盘不便于操作; 特别是 CPU卡在使用时, 大多需要物理接 入其他计算机终端, 这样使得 CPU卡远离使用者, 这就更使得小显示模块及小键盘模块显 得不易用。 如果 CPU卡采用无线与计算机终端连接, 当然可以避免距离问题; 但是, CPU 卡必然有电池系统及充电问题。 从历史上看, 曾经就有具有 CPU、 显示屏及薄膜键盘的 SMART卡, 并没有得到广大用户的认可。 另外, 具有显示屏及键盘的 CPU卡可靠性差、 成本更高体积更大; 由于大的体积, 所以用户不能像现在使用信用卡那样, 在一个钱包中 放置多个带显示模块及键盘模块的 CPU卡。
从现在人们的出行习惯来说, 银行卡及手机都是必带物品; 手机有显示器及键盘, 充 分利用手机是一个易用的方案。但是,手机可能也不是安全终端。所以可以利用手机及 CPU 卡两个物品来提高安全性。 只要保证在其中一个物品是安全的, 就可以保证支付安全; 比 较差的情况就是两个物品都不安全时, 只要两个物品中的 "木马"不是同一黑客所为还是 可以保证安全; 更进一步就是两个物品中的 "木马"就是同一黑客所为, 但是只要黑客很 难对应该两个物品, 也还是安全。
所以安全进行数字签名的方法, 可以是当通过计算机终端输入待签名数据, 并传送到
CPU卡; 在 CPU卡中, 对待签名数据签名前, 先由 CPU卡产生一个一次性的确认口令(动 态密码), 并将该确认口令与待签名数据同时以相对安全的方法通过计算机终端传送给银行 客户; 银行客户确认该待签名数据的准确性后, 在计算机终端上输入对应的确认口令; CPU 卡比较从计算机终端接收到的确认口令与产生的确认口令, 一致则进行相应的数字签名, 否则不进行相应的数字签名。 也可以使用普遍采用的输入三次确认口令不正确就取消该待 ^ ^ . ^ Λ t l , , s N , ^ 签数据的万法釆提高安全性。 当然 CPU卡接党待签名数据目 ij, 也可以先要求湔入身份认证 密码 (PIN) 或身份认证动态密码, 防止多次输入待签名数据及确认口令的攻击。
安全支付的目的就是 "所见即所签"。 由于签名的工作是在 CPU卡中进行, 所以不管 计算机终端如何不安全, 要进行欺骗银行服务器的工作, 其欺骗的数据还是要使用 CPU卡 内的签名功能。
能不能实现"所见即所签", 也可以换一种角度来说, 即实现 "所签即所见"。 即在 CPU 卡使用关键数据之前, 把该数据安全地提供给用户, 只有获得用户确认后, CPU卡才能使 用该数据 (例如数字签名, 修改 CPU卡中的数据), 并可以进一步可以提供给银行服务器 获得相应的服务。
从安全的角度来看,一个可信终端应该有键盘、显示器及 CPU;现在可以确认的是 CPU 安全, 但是显示及键盘可能不安全。 利用手机只不过希望使用手机的显示屏来显示信息。 如果保证键盘是安全的, 保证安全支付的方案就是本发明人的中国专利文献
ZL20061 0041 361 .6 "一种不依赖操作系统安全的安全使用网络服务器服务的装置和方 法"。但是, 由于便携要求希望使显示器与 CPU分离, 所以必须在 CPU与显示器之间建立 安全通道, 又由于安全工作应该是用户尽量干预较少的工作, 特别是登陆、 签名、 安全支 付及游戏等安全应用; 所以只需要告诉 CPU显示的数据正确与否即可。
本发明的目的是提出一种安全系统及方法。 在使用可能不安全的计算机终端时, 可以 安全地确认 CPU卡中的关键数据,并根据确认的数据进行工作。该方法可以用于网络支付; 结合好的密码协议, 可简单且安全地解决在可能不安全计算机终端上安全使用网络银行、 游戏等服务的方法。 实现 "所签即所见" 的安全目的。
根据本发明的一种安全系统, 它包括: CPU卡、 计算机终端、 服务器及用户终端; 其 中, CPU卡与计算机终端连接、 计算机终端通过网络与服务器连接、 用户终端与 CPU卡安 全连接; 用户在计算机终端上输入或产生关键数据, 并传送到 CPU卡; 通过 CPU卡与用 户终端的安全连接, 传送关键数据到用户终端; 用户根据用户终端上的关键数据, 确认后 输入确认到 CPU卡; CPU卡确认后, 变换关键数据并通过计算机终端传送到服务器。 这里 输入确认到 CPU卡可以是按键确认或 (和) 口令确认。
进一步, 如果是口令认证, 那么应该还有下面的数据流程。 CPU卡生成确认口令; 通 过 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接, 传送确认口令及关键数据到用户终端; 用户根据用户终 端上的关键数据, 确认后在计算机终端上输入确认口令并传送到 CPU卡; CPU卡比较确认 口令与生成的确认口令一致后, 变换关键数据并通过计算机终端传送到服务器。
进一步, 如果是按键确认, 那么 CPU卡上还有一个确认按键; 当用户通过用户终端确 、, ' 、, ^ ' , β丄,
认数据 , 湔入确认到 CPU卡就是按确认按键并传送到 CPU卡。
更进一步, 还有短信网关, CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接, 是采用 CPU卡内的密码装 置加密、 短信网关解密及无线移动网实现的。
更方便地, CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接, 是采用 CPU卡内置的密码装置、 CPU卡内 置的无线模块、 用户终端内置的无线模块及用户终端内置的密码装置实现的。
简单地, CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接, 是采用 CPU卡内置密码装置与计算机终端的 连接、 计算机终端与用户终端的有线或无线连接、 用户终端的内置密码装置实现的。
根据本发明的一种安全方法, 它包括: 用户在计算机终端上输入或产生关键数据, 并 传送到 CPU卡; 通过 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接传送关键数据到用户终端; 用户根据 用户终端上的关键数据, 确认后输入确认到 CPU卡; CPU卡确认后, 变换关键数据并通过 计算机终端传送到服务器。 这里输入确认到 CPU卡可以是按键确认或 (和) 口令确认。
进一步, 如果是口令认证, 那么应该还有下面的数据流程。 CPU卡生成确认口令、 通 过 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接传送确认口令及关键数据到用户终端, 就是计算机终端上 输入确认口令并传送到 CPU卡。
更进一步, 其特征在于 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接为: 加密确认口令和 (或) 关 键数据、 传送到短信网关、 短信网关解密后传送到用户终端;
更方便地, CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接为: 加密确认口令和 (或)关键数据、 通过 CPU卡内置的无线模块及用户终端内置无线模块传送到用户终端、 用户终端解密得到确认 口令及关键数据。
简单地, CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接为: 加密确认口令和 (或)关键数据、 传送到 计算机终端、 通过计算机终端与用户终端的有线或无线连接传送到用户终端、 用户终端解 密得到确认口令及关键数据。
完整地、 综合上述所有手段, 加入在 CPU卡上按确认按键的确认方法。 附图说明
下面参照附图描绘本发明, 其中
图 1表示优选实施例 1、 3及 4相关联的系统的示意图;
图 2表示优选实施例 2相关联的系统的示意图。 具体实施方式
[实施例 1 ] 短' , , 一 一 ππ ^ ^ 本犮明的核心就是米用用尸终端显 器作为可信显 器及 CPU卞作为 信 CPU的安 全系统及方法。 处于 CPU卡中的待签名或待使用数据, 用可信的方法输出到用户可信设备 显示, 由用户确认待签名或待使用数据; 用户确认后进行相应的签名或使用相应的数据。 根据本发明第一种实施方式, 一种安全系统及方法所关联的系统如图 1 所示。 在该图中, 密码装置 42与短信网关 5的密码装置 51对应; 即密码装置 42完成加密, 密码装置 51解 密。 例如, 密码装置 51公开公钥 (E M), 保密私钥 (D M); 则密码装置 42用公钥(E M) 加密, 而密码装置 51 用保密私钥 (D M) 解密。 当然, 可以采用其他密码协议完成 加密及解密。 CPU卡 4内存储有手持设备地址, 如手机号码。
当把 CPU卡 4与计算机终端 3连接后, 用户根据计算机终端 3的提示输入或产生交易 的关键数据, 如接受资金的账户名、 账号、 金额等关键数据; 计算机终端 3将这些关键数 据传送到 CPU卡 4中; CPU卡 4用随机数生成器 41生成确认口令 (PIN), 并通过密码装 置 42加密关键数据、 确认口令及手持设备地址 (手机号码); 该被加密的数据传送到计算 机终端 3, 并通过计算机网络 2传送到短信网关 5; 短信网关 5的密码装置 51解密该加密 数据得到关键数据、 确认口令及手持设备地址 (手机号码); 短信网关 5通过移动无线网 6 把该关键数据及确认口令根据手持设备地址(手机号码)发送到手持设备 7 (用户手机)上; 用户确认手持设备 7上的关键数据正确后,在计算机终端 3上输入确认口令; 计算机终端 3 把接收到的确认口令传送到 CPU卡 4中; CPU卡 4比较收到的确认口令与生成的确认口令 一致后, 通过签名装置 43签名该关键数据, CPU卡 4将该已签名关键数据传送到计算机终 端 3, 并通过计算机网络 2传送已签名关键数据到银行服务器 1 ; 银行服务器 1根据该已签 名关键数据进行相应的支付操作。 该关键数据的签名就是银行进行资金操作的法律依据, 并且显然该签名的关键数据是经过银行客户通过手持设备 7安全确认过的。
该方案显然有一个安全缺陷, 当 CPU卡 4与计算机终端 3连接后, 计算机终端 3不断 地向 CPU卡 4输送关键数据, 并不断猜测相应的确认口令。 虽然成功的概率很小, 但是也 是安全缺陷, 解决的方法可以是一次 CPU卡加电只能进行一次关键数据签名的工作、 或者 在输入关键数据之前通过短信方式发送输入关键数据前置口令, 保证输入关键数据前必须 通过用户的手持设备 7 (手机) 确认、 或者用 CPU卡 4与手持设备 7 (手机) 联合构成动 态口令认证, 保证关键数据输入 CPU卡 4的前置认证。 最好采用用户输入指纹, 在 CPU 卡中比较指纹作为安全认证, 并进一步采用一次指纹认证一次关键数据确认来提高安全性。
还有一个解决方案就是简单地在 CPU卡上增加一个按键, 当用户在手持设备上确认关 键数据准确性后, 简单地按键表示数据的确认。 这样就可以取消 CPU卡中的随机数生成器 41, 但是该方案有 CPU卡的制造相对困难成本稍高的缺点。 但是这也是本发明人推荐使用 ^ , Λ ^ Α
的一柙万茱顼买施例。 也可以结合 CPU卡上的按键与确认口令两个万茱, 必须湔入确认口 令后还要按键才能确认数据, 这样可以防止重复猜测确认口令的攻击, 这是一个更安全的 实施方案。
在实施例 1中, 一种安全系统的是: CPU卡 4、 计算机终端 3、 服务器(银行网络服务 器 1 ) 及用户终端 (手持设备 7); CPU卡 4与计算机终端连接 3、 计算机终端 3通过网络 与服务器 (银行网络服务器 1 ) 连接、 用户终端 (手持设备 7) 与 CPU卡安全连接是通过 CPU4中的密码装置 42 CPU卡到计算机终端 3到计算机网络 2到短信网关的通路、 短信 网关 5及密码装置 51、 移动无线网 6组成;
在实施例 1中, 一种安全方法的是: 用户在计算机终端 3上输入关键数据, 并传送到 CPU卡 4; CPU卡 4生成确认口令; 通过 CPU卡 4与用户终端(手持设备 7) 的安全连接, 传送确认口令及关键数据到用户终端 (手持设备 7); 用户根据用户终端 (手持设备 7) 上 的关键数据, 确认后在计算机终端上输入确认口令; CPU卡比较输入的确认口令与生成的 确认口令一致后, 变换 (签名) 关键数据并通过计算机终端传送到服务器, 进一步可以完 成支付。 另外输入确认口令可以不在计算机终端 3输入, 而是在与计算机通信的任何联网 计算机上输入传送到计算机终端 3, 然后到 CPU卡中进行相应的确认。
中国专利申请 ZL9912388 "互联网上加手机声响保障钱款支付安全方法及相应系统" 及中国专利申请 ZL02116722 "手机来电显示信息的多种金融卡支付确认电讯方法及系统" 所提出的方案, 是通过手机确认服务器中的数据。 与本实施例的主要区别是, 一个是确认 CPU卡中的数据, 一个是确认服务器中的数据; 一个由于必须保证安全确认 CPU卡中的数 据, 必须变换 (加密) 关键数据及确认口令或者说是建立安全连接, 而服务器数据确认不 需要这关键的步骤; 一个是被确认的数据还需要 (签名或加密) 提交到银行服务才有效, 而银行服务器中的数据直接用于支付。
通过短信实现关键数据及确认口令的传送, 必须依赖无线网络的可靠性, 所以有实施 例 2
[实施例 2] 无线确认(专用、 手机加 SD卡、 手机加 SIM卡)
根据本发明第二种实施方式, 一种安全系统及方法所关联的系统如图 2所示。 在该实 施方式中。 该图中的手持设备 6可以与计算机终端 3用有线连接 (如 USB线) 或无线连接 (如蓝牙、 可以是无线计算机网络及短信网络), 该种连接用 "无线或有线连接 5"表示, 当然无线或有线连接 5还可以直接连接 CPU卡 4与手持设备 6。 另外手持设备 6如果是手 机, 最好通过加 SD卡或更改 SIM卡加入密码装置 61, 当然也可以用手机软件实现密码装 m , m 、 山 、 ^ ^ Λ
置 61的功酡。 总之用尸终端 (手持设备 6) 与 CPU卡 4建立安全 接。
当把 CPU卡 4与计算机终端 3连接后, 用户根据计算机终端 3的提示输入交易的关键 数据, 如接受资金的账户名、 账号、 金额等关键数据; 计算机终端 3将这些关键数据传送 到 CPU卡 4中; CPU卡 4用随机数生成器 41生成确认口令 (PIN), 并把通过密码装置 42 加密关键数据及确认口令; 该被加密的关键数据及确认口令传送到计算机终端 3, 并通过无 线或有线连接 5传送到手持设备 6 (手机); 手持设备 6中的密码装置 61解密该加密数据得 到关键数据及确认口令; 用户确认手持设备 6上的关键数据正确后, 在计算机终端 3上输 入确认口令; 计算机终端 3把接收到的确认口令传送到 CPU卡 4中; CPU卡 4比较收到的 确认口令与生成的确认口令一致后, 通过签名装置 43签名该关键数据, CPU卡 4将该已签 名关键数据传送到计算机终端 3,并通过计算机终端 2传送签名后的关键数据到银行服务器 1 ; 银行服务器 1根据该签名的关键数据进行相应的支付操作。 该关键数据的签名就是银行 进行资金操作的法律依据, 并且显然该签名的关键数据是经过银行客户通过手持设备安全 确认过的。
在实施例 2中, 一种安全系统的是: CPU卡 4、 计算机终端 3、 服务器(银行网络服务 器 1 ) 及用户终端 (手持设备 6); CPU卡 4与计算机终端连接 3、 计算机终端 3通过网络 与服务器 (银行网络服务器 1 ) 连接、 用户终端 (手持设备 6) 与 CPU卡安全连接是通过 CPU4中的密码装置 42、 CPU卡到计算机终端 3到用户终端 (手持设备 6) 的通路、 密码 装置 61、 有线或无线连接 5组成。 显然还可以采用其他信息通路, 如在 CPU卡中增加无线 装置通过有线或无线连接 5, 直接与用户终端 (手持设备 6) 连接。
在实施例 2中, 一种安全方法的是: 用户在计算机终端 3上输入关键数据, 并传送到 CPU卡 4; CPU卡 4生成确认口令; 通过 CPU卡 4与用户终端(手持设备 6) 的安全连接, 传送确认口令及关键数据到用户终端 (手持设备 6); 用户根据用户终端 (手持设备 6) 上 的关键数据, 确认后在计算机终端上输入确认口令; CPU卡比较输入的确认口令与生成的 确认口令一致后, 变换 (签名) 关键数据并通过计算机终端传送到服务器, 进一步可以完 成支付。 另外输入确认口令可以不在计算机终端 3输入, 而是在与计算机通信的任何联网 计算机上输入传送到计算机终端 3, 然后到 CPU卡中进行相应的确认。
该方案所用的手持设备 6可能是 "智能手机", 在智能手机上安装密码的解码程序实现 密码装置 61 ; 或者该方案的手持设备 (手机) 上插入一个 SDIO卡, 上面有无线通讯模块 及解密模块, 能够接收计算机终端 3传送来的加密数据。 并解密后显示在手机屏幕上。 也 可以为了安全, 用户手持一个有无线通讯模块、 显示屏及键盘的专用安全设备。 但是, 智 能手机也有一个安全隐患, 就是智能手机不安全时, 可能把确认口令传回到不安全的计算 l n Λ , 机终稱 3, 然 湔入 CPU卡广生不安全数据确认。解决的万法是在 CPU卞上堦加一个确认 键与确认口令配合使用。 最好的方法, 就是使 CPU卡到用户终端的连接是 CPU卡到用户 终端的 "单向通道", 即 CPU卡可以把数据发送到用户终端, 而用户设备不能把信息传送 到 CPU卡。 例如 CPU卡采用广播的方式传播信息, 而用户终端只能接收信息不能发送信 息, 就是典型的单向通道。 实施例 3 图形确认
根据本发明第三种实施方式,一种安全系统及方法所关联的系统如图 1所示。当把 CPU 卡 4与计算机终端 3连接后, 用户根据计算机终端 3的提示输入交易的关键数据, 如接受 资金的账户名、账号、金额等关键数据; 计算机终端 3将这些关键数据传送到 CPU卡 4中; CPU卡 4用随机数生成器 41生成确认口令 (PIN),并把该确认口令与关键数据生成图形(如 JPEG格式), 并加以扰乱使之计算机很难识别, 而人可以识别。该图片与手持设备地址(手 机号码) 被加密 (也可以不加密)的传送到短信网关 5, 并到手持设备 7 (手机) 上; 用户确 认关键数据正确后, 在计算机终端 3上输入确认口令; 计算机终端 3把接收到的确认口令 传送到 CPU卡 4中; CPU卡 4比较收到的确认口令与生成的确认口令一致后, 通过签名装 置 43签名该关键数据, CPU卡 4将该已签名数据传送到计算机终端 3, 并通过计算机终端 2传送签名后的数据到银行服务器 1 ; 银行服务器 1根据该签名的支付数据进行相应的支付 操作。 该关键数据的签名就是银行进行资金操作的法律依据, 并且显然该签名的关键数据 是经过银行客户通过手持设备安全确认过的。
在实施例 1中, 一种安全系统的是: CPU卡 4、 计算机终端 3、 服务器(银行网络服务 器 1 ) 及用户终端 (手持设备 7); CPU卡 4与计算机终端连接 3、 计算机终端 3通过网络 与服务器 (银行网络服务器 1 ) 连接、 用户终端 (手持设备 7) 与 CPU卡安全连接是通过 CPU4中的密码装置 42 CPU卡到计算机终端 3到计算机网络 2到短信网关的通路、 短信 网关 5及密码装置 51、 移动无线网 6组成;
在实施例 1中, 一种安全方法的是: 用户在计算机终端 3上输入关键数据, 并传送到 CPU卡 4; CPU卡 4生成确认口令; 通过 CPU卡 4与用户终端(手持设备 7) 的安全连接, 传送图形化的确认口令及关键数据到用户终端 (手持设备 7); 用户根据用户终端 (手持设 备 7) 上的关键数据, 确认后在计算机终端上输入确认口令; CPU卡比较输入的确认口令 与生成的确认口令一致后, 变换 (签名) 关键数据并通过计算机终端传送到服务器, 进一 步可以完成支付。 另外输入确认口令可以不在计算机终端 3输入, 而是在与计算机通信的 任何联网计算机上输入传送到计算机终端 3, 然后到 CPU卡中进行相应的确认。 ^ , 显然天键数据与确认口令, 没有必要必须传送到用尸终端 (手持设备), 买际上也可以 传送到用户的电子邮箱, 方便没有手机的用户。 安全性肯定有所下降, 但是更易用了。 所 以有的用户可信终端是手机, 有的用户的可信终端是其他计算机 (读电子邮件), 有的用户 的可信终端是其他任何可以收到并显示关键数据与确认口令的设备。 本质上就是需要 CPU 卡告诉计算机终端把关键数据及确认口令送到哪个电子地址。 对应该电子地址就是用户终 总之, 发明的核心通过 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接, 在用户终端上显示 CPU卡内 信息的准确性。 并采用确认口令、 按键等方式确认 CPU卡内数据, 然后安全使用该数据的 安全系统及方法。
以上用银行服务器与 CPU卡的签名支付来说明本发明的方法。 但是本发明并不完全限 定用于银行应用, 显然也可以应用于网络游戏, 还有其他需要确认 CPU卡的数据, 然后让 CPU卡能够准确地提供该数据到服务器的应用。 尽管在以上的实施例中对本发明进行了描 述, 但可以理解, 以上实施例的描述是说明性的而非限制性的, 本领域的熟练技术人员可 以理解, 在不脱离由权利要求书定义的本发明的精神和范围的前提下, 可做出各种变形、 改进、 修改和替换。
权 利 要 求
1、 一种安全系统, 它包括:
CPU卡、 计算机终端、 服务器及用户终端;
其中, CPU卡与计算机终端连接、计算机终端通过网络与服务器连接、用户终端与 CPU 卡安全连接; 用户在计算机终端上输入或产生关键数据, 并传送到 CPU卡; 通过 CPU卡 与用户终端的安全连接, 传送关键数据到用户终端; 用户根据用户终端上的关键数据, 确 认后输入确认到 CPU卡; CPU卡确认后, 变换关键数据并通过计算机终端传送到服务器。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的系统, 其特征在于还有 CPU卡生成确认口令; 通过 CPU卡与用 户终端的安全连接, 传送确认口令及关键数据到用户终端; 用户根据用户终端上的关键数 据, 确认后在计算机终端上输入确认口令并传送到 CPU卡; CPU卡比较确认口令与生成的 确认口令一致后, 变换关键数据并通过计算机终端传送到服务器。
3、 根据权利要求 1所述的系统, 其特征在于 CPU卡上还有一个确认按键; 当用户通过用 户终端确认数据后, 输入确认到 CPU卡就是按确认按键并传送到 CPU卡。
4、根据权利要求 2所述的系统,其特征在于还有短信网关, CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接, 是采用 CPU卡内的密码装置加密、 短信网关解密及无线移动网实现的。
5、 根据权利要求 1所述的系统, 其特征在于 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接, 是采用 CPU 卡内置的密码装置、 CPU卡内置的无线模块、 用户终端内置的无线模块及用户终端内置的 密码装置实现的。
6、 根据权利要求 1所述的系统, 其特征在于 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接, 是采用 CPU 卡内置密码装置与计算机终端的连接、 计算机终端与用户终端的有线或无线连接、 用户终 端的内置密码装置实现的。
7、 一种安全方法, 它包括:
A、 用户在计算机终端上输入或产生关键数据, 并传送到 CPU卡;
B、 通过 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接传送关键数据到用户终端;
C、 用户根据用户终端上的关键数据, 确认后输入确认到 CPU卡;
D、 CPU卡确认后, 变换关键数据并通过计算机终端传送到服务器。
8、根据权利要求 7所述的方法, 其特征在于步骤 B还有: CPU卡生成确认口令、通过 CPU 卡与用户终端的安全连接传送确认口令及关键数据到用户终端; 步骤 C的输入确认, 就是 计算机终端上输入确认口令并传送到 CPU卡。
9、 根据权利要求 8所述的方法, 其特征在于 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接为: 加密确认 口令和 (或) 关键数据、 传送到短信网关、 短信网关解密后传送到用户终端;

Claims

10、 报据仪利要求 8所述的万法, 其特征在于 CPU卡与用尸终端的安全连揆为: 加密确认 口令和 (或) 关键数据、 通过 CPU卡内置的无线模块及用户终端内置无线模块传送到用户 终端、 用户终端解密得到确认口令及关键数据。
11、 根据权利要求 8所述的方法, 其特征在于 CPU卡与用户终端的安全连接为: 加密确认 口令和 (或) 关键数据、 传送到计算机终端、 通过计算机终端与用户终端的有线或无线连 接传送到用户终端、 用户终端解密得到确认口令及关键数据。
12、 根据权利要求 7 8 9 10或 11所述的方法, 其特征在于步骤 C中的输入确认是按 CPU卡上确认按键。
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