WO2011020279A1

WO2011020279A1 - Public key certificate-based identity authentication method and system thereof

Info

Publication number: WO2011020279A1
Application number: PCT/CN2009/076223
Authority: WO
Inventors: 铁满霞; 曹军; 葛莉; 李琴
Original assignee: 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority date: 2009-08-19
Filing date: 2009-12-30
Publication date: 2011-02-24
Also published as: CN101631114A; CN101631114B

Abstract

Disclosed are a public key certificate-based identity authentication method and a system thereof. The authentication method includes the following steps: 1) an authentication access controller (AAC) sends an authentication activation packet to a requester (REQ); 2) after receiving the authentication activation packet, the REQ sends an access authentication request packet to the AAC; 5) the AAC generates the temporary public key y∙P used for the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange, and performs the ECDH calculation according to the temporary public key x∙P of the REQ and its own temporary private key y to obtain a base key (BK); then the AAC sets the access result to be a success, constructs an access authentication response packet and sends it to the REQ, and allows the user to access the network.

Description

Method for identifying identity based on ^I certificate and system thereof

This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 200910023629.7, entitled "A Public Key Certificate Based Identification Method and System", filed on August 19, 2009, the entire contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference. The citations are incorporated herein by reference.

Technical field

The invention relates to a method for authenticating an identity based on a public key certificate and a system thereof, in particular to a Tri-element Peer Authentication (TePA) based mechanism for a user in a wired local area network (LAN) to access a network. Identification method and system thereof.

Background technique

The ternary peer-to-peer identification TePA technology is the first technical idea and framework method for peer-to-peer authentication between users and networks. This technology defines a ternary entity authentication architecture. Based on the idea of peer-to-peer identification, users can complete users. Two-way peer-to-peer authentication with the network.

In wired LAN, IEEE currently implements security enhancement of IEEE802.3 to achieve link layer security. The typical secure access architecture protocol IEEE 802.1x is used. The basic method is to increase the number of terminals and access point devices. The authentication server uses the authentication server to authenticate the identity of the terminal, thereby implementing secure access control to the terminal. The access point device directly forwards the authentication information between the terminal and the authentication server, and does not participate in the identity authentication process as an independent entity. This mode can only realize the legality identification of the terminal identity of the network, but it can not meet the legality identification requirements of the terminal for the access network, and cannot realize the two-way authentication between the terminal and the network. The terminal cannot confirm the identity of the access point device. Even if security patches are added to the security architecture by adding security patches in the future, security problems such as man-in-the-middle attacks and terminal access to illegal networks cannot be completely solved. Such security access technology agreements have been extended to date and have caused serious obstacles to industrial development.

Summary of the invention

In order to solve the above technical problem in the prior art, the present invention provides an identity authentication method based on a ternary peer-to-peer authentication TePA mechanism when a user accesses a network in a wired local area network (LAN), which can implement two-way between the user and the network. To the functions of authentication, fast update authentication, support for multiple certificates, etc., wherein the authentication process is based on a public key certificate.

The technical solution of the present invention is: The present invention provides a public key certificate-based identity authentication method, and the public key certificate-based identity authentication method includes the following steps: 1) the authentication access controller AAC sends an authentication activation packet to the requester REQ;

The authentication activation packet includes: SNonce, ID _AS ^AC, CertAAc, and Para _ECDH ; wherein, the SNonce field: indicates an authentication identifier, and if it is the first identity authentication, the field is a random number generated by the authentication access controller AAC; For the updated identity authentication process, the value of the field is the authentication identifier value that is negotiated and generated during the last identity authentication process; ID _AS ^A _C field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication server AS trusted by the authentication access controller AAC. Is the identity authentication ID of the issuer authentication server AS that authenticates the access controller AAC certificate CertAAc; CertAAc field: indicates the certificate of the authentication access controller AAC; Para _ECDH field: the elliptic curve cryptographic parameter indicating the elliptic curve cryptosystem, is the request Elliptic curve cryptographic parameters used by the REQ and the authentication access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement calculation;

2) the requester REQ sends an access authentication request packet to the authentication access controller AAC after receiving the authentication activation packet;

The access authentication request packet includes: a SNonce field: indicating an authentication identifier, if the first identity authentication process, the field value directly depends on the SNonce field value in the authentication activation packet; if it is an updated identity authentication process, the field The value is the authentication identifier value calculated in the last identity authentication process; χ·Ρ field: the key data representing the requester REQ, which is the temporary public key EC·Ρ generated by the requester REQ for ECDH exchange; IDAAC field: indicates The identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC is obtained according to the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC in the authentication activation packet; the CertREQ field: the certificate representing the requester REQ; the Para _ECDH field: the elliptic curve representing the elliptic curve cryptosystem The password parameter is an elliptic curve cryptographic parameter used by the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key negotiation calculation, and the value is the same as the Para _ECDH field value in the authentication activation packet; Si _gRE Q field: indicates the signature of the requester REQ, which is the requester REQ uses its own private key to group access authentication requests. Signatures of all fields except this field;

5) The authentication access controller AAC generates a temporary public key P for ECDH exchange, and performs an ECDH calculation based on the temporary public key 请求·Ρ of the requester REQ and its own temporary private key y to obtain a base key ΒΚ, and then set up The result is successful, constructing an access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ, and allowing the user to access the network; the access authentication response packet includes: ACCRES field, χ·Ρ field, P field, IDAAC field, IDREQ field, SIGAAC Field or MIC1 field; where ACCRES field: indicates the access result, which is the access success or failure and failure of the authentication access controller AAC according to the authentication result. Reason; χ·Ρ : indicates the key data of the requester REQ, the value of which is the same as the value of the 鉴别·Ρ field in the access authentication request packet; P: indicates the key data of the authentication access controller AAC, which is the authentication access controller A temporary public key P for ECDH exchange generated by AAC; IDAAC field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, which is obtained according to the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC; IDREQ field: indicates the identity of the requester REQ ID, obtained according to the certificate CertREQ field of the requester REQ in the received access authentication request packet; SIGAAC field: indicates the signature of the authentication access controller AAC, and is the authentication access controller AAC uses its own private key to access the authentication response packet. The signature of all fields except this field; MIC 1 field: indicates the message authentication code, which is the authentication access controller AAC uses the base key BK negotiated in the authentication process to access all the authentication except the field in the access authentication response packet. The hash value obtained by the field calculation.

If the local policy of the authentication access controller AAC requires the authentication server AS to authenticate the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ, the method further includes between step 2) and step 5):

3) The authentication access controller AAC sends a certificate authentication request packet to the authentication server AS; the certificate authentication request packet includes: CertREQ field: a certificate representing the requester REQ, the value of which is the same as the value of the CertREQ field in the access authentication request packet; CertAAc field: Representing the certificate of the authentication access controller AAC, the value of which is the same as the value of the CertAAc field in the authentication activation packet;

4) The authentication server AS sends a certificate authentication response packet to the authentication access controller AAC after receiving the certificate authentication request packet; the certificate authentication response packet includes: RES _CERT field: indicates the verification result of the certificate, and the field includes the authentication access controller AAC query value. NAAC, requester REQ query value NRE _Q , CertAAc verification result and CertREQ verification result;

The signature of the RES _CERT field indicating the verification result of the certificate in the packet by the authentication server AS trusted by the requester REQ.

The specific implementation of the step 1) is: the authentication access controller AAC sends an authentication activation packet to the requester REQ to activate the requester REQ for the certificate authentication process.

The specific implementation manner of the step 2) is as follows: After the requester REQ receives the authentication activation packet, the following processing is performed:

2. 1) If the authentication process is an update process of the identity authentication, the requester REQ checks whether the authentication identifier field in the authentication activation packet is consistent with the authentication identifier calculated in the last identity authentication process, and if not, discards the Grouping, if they are consistent, perform 2.2); if the authentication process is not the update process of identity authentication, for the first identity authentication process, directly execute 2.2); 2.2) If the received authentication activation packet further includes the SIGAAC field, verify the correctness of the SIGAAC field, discard the packet if it is incorrect, if it is correct, execute 2.3); if the received authentication activation packet does not contain The SIGAAC field is directly executed by 2.3); the SIGAAC field: indicates the signature of the authentication access controller AAC, and is the signature of the authentication access controller AAC to use all of the fields except the field in the packet by using the private key of the access controller;

2.3) selecting the requester REQ certificate CertREQ issued by the authentication server AS according to the IDAS^AC field in the authentication activation packet or selecting the requester REQ certificate CertRE _Q according to the local policy, and generating the requester REQ temporary public key for ECDH exchange The 请求·Ρ and the requester REQ interrogate the NREQ, generate an access authentication request packet, and send it to the authentication access controller AAC.

The specific implementation manner of the step 3) is as follows: After the authentication access controller receives the access authentication request packet, the AAC performs the following processing:

3.1) If the authentication access controller AAC sends the authentication activation packet, it checks whether the SNonce, Para _ECDH field value and the corresponding field value in the authentication activation packet in the received access authentication request packet are consistent, if there is an inconsistency, Discard the packet, if it is consistent, perform 3.2); if the authentication access controller AAC does not send the authentication activation packet, check whether the SNonce field value is consistent with the authentication identifier calculated in the last certificate authentication process, and check the Para _ECDH field and Whether the Para _ECDH in the last authentication activation packet is consistent, if there is an inconsistency, discard the packet; if they are consistent, perform 3.2);

3.2) Check if the IDAAC is consistent with its own identity. If it is inconsistent, discard the packet; if it is consistent, execute 3.3);

3.3) Verify the requester REQ's signature SigREQ field is correct, if it is not correct, then execute the discarding of the packet; if it is correct, execute 3.4);

3.4) If the local policy of the authentication access controller AAC requires the authentication server AS to authenticate the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ, the authentication access controller AAC generates a certificate authentication request packet and sends it to the authentication server AS; otherwise, it executes 3.5);

3.5) Authenticate the certificate CertREQ of the access controller AAC local authentication requester REQ, that is, the verification result of the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ according to the verification result of the certificate CertREQ of the locally cached requester REQ and the time validity defined by the local policy, If it is legal, the temporary public key P for ECDH exchange is generated locally, and is based on the temporary public key χ·Ρ of the requester REQ and its own temporary private key y. The ECDH calculates the base key BK, and then sets the access result to be successful, constructs the access authentication response packet to the requester REQ, and allows the user to access the network; if the CertREQ verification result is invalid, the access controller AAC is authenticated. If the access result is set to be unsuccessful, the constructing access authentication response packet is sent to the requester REQ.

The specific implementation manner of the step 4) is: after the authentication server AS receives the certificate authentication request packet, the following processing is performed:

4.1) Simultaneously verify the certificate of the access controller AAC CertAAc and the requester REQ certificate CertREQ, and then execute 4.2);

4.2) According to the verification result of the certificate, a certificate authentication response packet is constructed, and the corresponding signature is attached to the authentication access controller AAC.

The specific implementation manner of the step 5) is as follows: After the authentication access controller receives the certificate authentication response packet, the AAC performs the following processing:

5.1) If the access authentication request packet further includes an NREQ field, and the certificate authentication request packet further includes a NAAC field and an NREQ field, the authentication access controller AAC checks the authentication result of the certificate RES _CERT field in the authentication access controller AAC. Whether the value of the NAAC field in the certificate authentication request packet is the same, if not, discarding the packet; if the same, performing 5.2); the NAAC field: indicating the authentication access controller AAC query, which is the randomization generated by the authentication access controller AAC NREQ field: indicates a requester REQ inquiry in a certificate authentication request packet, the value of which is the same as the value of the NREQ field in the access authentication request packet, and is a random number generated by the requester REQ in the access authentication request packet;

5.2) If the certificate authentication response packet further comprises SIG _AS _AAC field, check the AAC trusted authentication server AS signature SIG _AS _AAC fields are correct, if correct, the packet is discarded, if the correct execution 5.3); if the packet contains only one signature

Section, which indicates the results of the verification certificate to sign the authentication server AS is the AAC trusted authentication server AS, check SIG _AS _REQ field is correct, if not correct, the packet is discarded, if the correct execution 5.3); the SIGAS^AC field: indicates that the authentication server AS trusted by the access controller AAC trusts all the fields in the packet except this field;

5.3) Checking the verification result of the certificate The result of the verification of CertREQ in the RES _CERT field is legal. If it is legal, the temporary public key P for ECDH exchange is generated locally, and according to the temporary public key of the requester REQ and its own temporary The private key y performs ECDH calculation to obtain the base key ΒΚ, and then sets the access result. To successfully, the access authentication response packet is sent to the requester REQ, and the user is allowed to access the network. If the authentication result of the CertREQ is invalid, the authentication access controller AAC sets the access result to be unsuccessful, and constructs the access authentication response. The packet is sent to the requester REQ.

If the access authentication response packet includes a SIGAAC field, the method further includes after step 5):

6) The requester REQ sends an access authentication acknowledgement packet to the authentication access controller AAC after receiving the access authentication response packet; the access authentication acknowledgement packet includes: MIC2 field: indicates a message authentication code.

The specific implementation manner of the step 6) is as follows: After the requester REQ receives the access authentication response packet, the following processing is performed:

6.1) determining, according to the IDAAC and IDREQ fields in the packet, whether the packet is an access authentication response packet corresponding to the current access authentication request packet, and if not, discarding the packet; if yes, executing 6.2);

6.2) Comparing the requester in the packet The REQ temporary public key χ·Ρ field value is consistent with the value of the χ·Ρ field in the access authentication request packet sent by itself. If not, the packet is discarded; otherwise, 6.3);

6.3)) Check the ACCRES field in the packet. If the access result is unsuccessful, it is known that the network cannot be accessed. If the access result is successful, execute 6.4);

6.4) If the received access authentication response packet contains the SIGAAC field, verify the correctness of the SIGAAC, if not, discard the packet; if it is correct, execute 6.5); if the received packet contains the MIC 1 field , then verify the correctness of the MIC 1 field, if not, discard the packet; if it is correct, execute 6.5);

6.5) Verifying the composite certificate verification result The NREQ field value included in the MRES _CERT field is consistent with the value of the NREQ field in the access authentication request packet sent by itself. If not, the packet is discarded; if yes, the signature SIG _AS is verified. Whether _REQ is correct, discard the packet if it is incorrect, and 6.6 if it is correct;

6.6) Verifying the composite certificate verification result The authentication result of the access controller AAC certificate in the MRES _CERT field is legal. If it is not legal, it is known that the network is illegal and cannot access the network; if it is legal, the network is legal. , can be accessed, and executed 6.7);

6.7) The requester REQ performs the ECDH calculation based on the temporary public key P of the authentication access controller AAC and its own temporary private key X to obtain the base key BK;

6.8) If the received packet contains the SIGAAC field, then an access authentication acknowledgement packet needs to be constructed. Send to the authentication access controller AAC.

In the step 6), after the authentication access controller AAC sends the access authentication response packet to the requester REQ, if the sent access authentication response packet includes the signature SIGAAC field of the authentication access controller AAC, the method The method further includes: the authentication access controller AAC waiting to receive the access authentication confirmation packet.

After the access authentication controller AAC receives the access authentication acknowledgement packet sent by the requester REQ, the method further includes: verifying the correctness of the MIC2 field in the packet, and if correct, means that the requester REQ has the sum The own base key BK; if not correct, discard the packet.

The MIC 1 field in the access authentication response packet is preferably all the fields except the current field and the next certificate authentication in the access authentication response packet by the authentication access controller AAC using the base key BK negotiated in the authentication process. The process's authentication identifies the calculated hash value.

The present invention also provides an identity authentication system based on a public key certificate, the public key certificate based identity authentication system comprising a requester REQ, an authentication access controller AAC;

The authentication access controller AAC is configured to send an authentication activation packet to the requester REQ; generate a temporary public key P for ECDH exchange, and perform according to the temporary public key χ·Ρ of the requester REQ and its own temporary private key y The ECDH calculates the base key ΒΚ, and then sets the access result to be successful, constructs the access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ, and allows the user to access the network;

The requester REQ, configured to send an access authentication request packet to the authentication access controller AAC after receiving the authentication activation packet;

The authentication activation packet includes: SNonce, ID _AS-A AC, CertAAc, and Para _ECDH ; wherein

SNonce field: indicates the authentication identifier. If it is the first identity authentication, the field is the random number generated by the authentication access controller AAC. If it is the updated identity authentication process, the value of the field is negotiated during the last identity authentication process. Identification ID value; ID _AS ^ A _C field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication server AS trusted by the authentication access controller AAC, which is the identity ID of the issuer authentication server AS that authenticates the access controller AAC certificate CertAAc; CertAAc field : Indicates the certificate that authenticates the access controller AAC; Para _ECDH field: Elliptic curve cryptographic parameter indicating the elliptic curve cryptosystem, is the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC performs elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key negotiation The elliptic curve cryptographic parameters used in the calculation;

The access authentication request packet includes: a SNonce field: indicating an authentication identifier, if it is the first body For the authentication process, the value of the field directly depends on the value of the SNonce field in the authentication activation packet; if it is an updated identity authentication process, the field value is the value of the authentication identifier calculated in the last identity authentication process; χ·Ρ field: The key data representing the requester REQ is a temporary public key generated by the requester REQ for ECDH exchange; IDAAC field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, and the authentication access controller is activated according to the authentication activation packet AAC's certificate CertAAc field is obtained; CertREQ field: indicates the requester's REQ certificate; Para _ECDH field: indicates the ECDH parameter, which is the elliptic curve cryptographic parameter used by the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC for ECDH calculation. Same as the Para _ECDH field value in the authentication activation packet; Si _gRE Q field: indicates the signature of the requester REQ, which is the signature of the requester REQ using all of the fields except the field in the access authentication request packet by using the private key of the requester;

The access authentication response packet includes: an ACCRES field, a χ·Ρ field, a P field, an IDAAC field, an IDREQ field, a SIGAAC field, or an MIC1 field; wherein, the ACCRES field: indicates an access result, and is an authentication access controller AAC according to the authentication. The result indicates the success or failure of the access and the reason for the failure; x P: the key data representing the requester REQ, the value of which is the same as the value of the χ·Ρ field in the access authentication request packet; y P: indicates the authentication access controller The key data of the AAC is a temporary public key generated by the access controller AAC for ECDH exchange; IDAAC field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, which is obtained according to the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC; IDREQ field: indicates the identity ID of the requester REQ, which is obtained according to the certificate CertREQ field of the requester REQ in the received access authentication request packet; SIGAAC field: indicates the signature of the authentication access controller AAC, which is used by the authentication access controller AAC. The signature of all the fields except this field in the own private key; MIC1 field: indicates the message Code, the AAC is negotiated during authentication generated using the base key BK for access authentication hash value calculated for all fields in addition to this packet field response.

The public key certificate based identity authentication system further includes: an authentication server AS, an authentication server AS and a requester REQ, an authentication access controller AAC link; a requester REQ and an authentication access controller AAC for authentication by the authentication server AS.

The invention provides a wired local area network in which a user accesses a network based on ternary peer-to-peer identification of TePA The mechanism identification method can realize two-way (one-way) authentication, fast update authentication, and support for multiple certificates between the user and the network, so as to ensure confidentiality, integrity, source identification and anti-replay of data. The authentication process is based on a public key certificate.

DRAWINGS

Figure 1 is a schematic illustration of the authentication process of the method of the present invention.

detailed description

Referring to Figure 1, the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC obtain the public key certificate issued by the authentication server AS in advance, representing their own identity, and the public key certificate is in the X.509 certificate format. When the requester REQ needs to access the network, an identity authentication method provided by the present invention is implemented to implement secure access control. The method includes:

1) Authentication Activation: The authentication access controller AAC sends an authentication activation packet to the requester REQ to activate the requester REQ for the certificate authentication process. The main contents of the authentication activation packet include:

among them:

SNonce field: indicates the authentication identifier. If it is the first identity authentication, the field is the random number generated by the authentication access controller AAC. If it is the updated identity authentication process, the value of the field is negotiated during the last identity authentication process. The identification value of the identification.

ID _AS _AAC field: represents the AAC trusted authentication server AS identity ID (identity), is the AAC CertAAc certificate issued by the authentication server AS identity ID.

CertAAc field: Indicates the certificate that authenticates the access controller AAC.

Para _ECDH field: Elliptic curve cryptographic parameter representing the elliptic curve cryptosystem, which is the elliptic curve cryptographic parameter used by the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key negotiation calculation. ;

TIEAAC field: Indicates the authentication and key management suite and password suite supported by the Authentication Access Controller AAC. This field is optional.

SIGAAC field: indicates the signature of the authentication access controller AAC, which is the authentication access controller AAC. Field.

2) Access authentication request: After the requester REQ receives the authentication activation packet, the following processing is performed: 2.1) If the authentication process is the identity authentication update process, the requester REQ checks the authentication identification field in the authentication activation packet and Whether the authentication identifiers calculated in one identity authentication process are consistent, if not, discard the packets, otherwise perform 2.2); if the authentication process is the first identity authentication process, directly execute 2.2);

2.2) If the received authentication activation packet contains a SIGAAC field, verify the correctness of the SIGAAC field, discard the packet if it is incorrect, otherwise perform 2.3); if the received authentication activation packet does not contain the SIGAAC field, then Direct execution 2.3);

2.3) selecting the requester REQ certificate CertREQ issued by the authentication server AS according to the IDAS^AC field in the authentication activation packet or selecting the requester REQ certificate CertRE _Q according to the local policy, and generating requester REQ key data for ECDH exchange The 请求·Ρ and the requester REQ interrogate the NREQ, generate an access authentication request packet, and send it to the authentication access controller AAC.

The main contents of the access authentication request packet include:

SNonce field: Indicates the authentication identifier whose value is the same as the value of the SNonce field in the authentication activation packet. If it is the first identity authentication process, the value of the field directly depends on the SNonce field value in the authentication activation packet; if it is an updated identity authentication process, the field value is the value of the authentication identifier calculated in the last identity authentication process.

NREQ field: Indicates the requester REQ query, which is the random number generated by the requester REQ. χ·Ρ field: Indicates the key data of the requester REQ, which is the temporary public key generated by the requester REQ for ECDH exchange.

IDAAC field: Indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, which is obtained according to the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC in the authentication activation packet.

CertREQ field: A certificate representing the requester REQ.

Para _ECDH field: Elliptic curve cryptographic parameter representing the elliptic curve cryptosystem, which is the elliptic curve cryptographic parameter used by the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key negotiation calculation. The value is the same as the value of the Para _ECDH field in the authentication activation packet. TIEREQ field: An authentication and key management suite and cipher suite that represents the requester's REQ selection. This field is optional.

List _AS _REQ field: Indicates the list of authentication server ASs trusted by the requester REQ, but does not include the issuer of the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ. If the requester REQ trusts other certificate entities in addition to other certificate entities, the authentication server AAC can be notified through this field. This field is optional.

SigREQ field: Represents the signature of the requester REQ, which is the signature of the requester REQ with its own private key for all fields in this group except this field.

3) Certificate authentication request: Authentication access controller After receiving the access authentication request packet, AAC performs the following processing:

3.1) If the authentication access controller AAC sends the authentication activation packet, it checks whether the SNonce, Para _ECDH field value and the corresponding field value in the authentication activation packet in the received access authentication request packet are consistent, if there is an inconsistency, Discard the packet, otherwise perform 3.2); if the authentication access controller AAC does not send the authentication activation packet, check whether the SNonce field value is consistent with the authentication identifier calculated in the last certificate authentication process, and check the Para _ECDH field and the last authentication. Whether the Para _ECDH in the activation group is consistent. If there is an inconsistency, discard the packet, otherwise perform 3.2);

3.2) Check if the IDAAC is consistent with its own identity. If it is inconsistent, discard the packet, otherwise execute 3.3);

3. 4) If the local policy of the authentication access controller AAC requires the authentication server AS to authenticate the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ, the authentication access controller AAC generates a certificate authentication request packet, which is sent to the authentication server AS; otherwise, 3.5);

3.5) The certificate CertREQ of the access controller AAC local authentication requester REQ is authenticated, that is, the verification result of the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ is confirmed according to the verification result of the certificate CertREQ of the locally cached requester REQ and the time validity defined by the local policy. If it is legal, the temporary public key P for the ECDH exchange is generated locally, and the AAC queries the NAAC, and the base key is calculated according to the temporary public key χ·Ρ of the requester REQ and the temporary private key y of the requester, and the next time The authentication identifier of the identity authentication process, and then setting the access result to be successful, constructing the access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ, and Allowing the user to access the network; if the authentication result of CertREQ is invalid, the authentication access controller AAC sets the access result to be unsuccessful, and the authentication access controller AAC query NAAC and temporary public key P can be set to any value, The incoming authentication response packet is sent to the requester REQ.

The main contents of the certificate authentication request packet include:

among them:

NAAC field: Indicates the authentication access controller AAC query, which is the random number generated by the authentication access controller AAC.

NREQ field: Indicates the requester REQ inquiry whose value is the same as the value of the NREQ field in the access authentication request packet.

CertREQ field: A certificate representing the requester REQ whose value is the same as the value of the CertREQ field in the access authentication request packet.

CertAAc field: A certificate representing the authentication access controller AAC, the value of which is the same as the value of the CertAAc field in the authentication activation packet.

List _AS _REQ fields: a list of AS indicates the REQ trusted authentication server, which is the same value in the access authentication request packet List _AS _REQ field. This field is optional.

4) Certificate authentication response: After the authentication server receives the certificate authentication request packet, the AS performs the following processing:

4.1) If the authentication process is one-way authentication, only the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ is verified. If it is a two-way authentication, it is necessary to simultaneously verify the certificate CertAAc of the access controller AAC and the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ, and then execute 4.2. );

The main contents of the certificate authentication response packet include:

RES Cert SIG AS-REQ SIG AS-AAC

among them:

RES _Cert field: indicates the verification result of the certificate. This field includes the authentication access controller AAC query value NAAC, the requester REQ query value NREQ, the verification result of CertAAc, and the verification result of CertREQ. If only one-way verification is performed, the verification result of CertAAc is not included. SIG _AS _REQ field: A signature indicating the authentication result RES _CERT field of the certificate in the packet by the authentication server AS trusted by the requester REQ.

SIG _AS _AAC field: Indicates that the authentication server AS that authenticates the access controller AAC trusts all the fields in this packet except this field. This field is optional. This field is not required if the authentication server AS that signed the certificate verification result is the same as the authentication server AS that the authentication access controller AAC trusts.

5) Access authentication response: Authentication access controller After receiving the certificate authentication response packet, AAC performs the following processing:

5. 1) Checking the verification result of the certificate The authentication access controller AAC in the RES _CERT field queries whether the NAAC and the NAAC field value in the certificate authentication request packet are the same. If not, the packet is discarded, otherwise 5.2);

5.2) If the packet contains two signature field, check the AAC trusted authentication server AS signature SIG _AS _AAC field is correct, if not correct, the packet is discarded, otherwise 5.3); if a packet containing only a signature field, i.e., the certificate verification result indicates that the authentication server aS signed is the AAC trusted authentication server aS, SIG _aS _REQ check field is correct, if correct, the packet is discarded Otherwise, 5.3);

5.3) Checking the verification result of the certificate The validity of the CertREQ verification result in the RES _CERT field is legal. If it is legal, the temporary public key P for ECDH exchange is generated locally, and the temporary public key xP of the requester REQ and its own temporary private key are generated. y performing ECDH calculation to obtain the base key BK and the identification identifier of the next identity authentication process, and then setting the access result to be successful, constructing the access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ, and allowing the user to access the network; if the CertREQ is verified If the result is illegal, the authentication access controller AAC sets the access result to be unsuccessful, and the authentication NAAC and the temporary public key P of the authentication access controller AAC can be set to an arbitrary value, and the configuration access authentication response packet is sent to the requester REQ. .

The main contents of the access authentication response packet include:

among them:

NREQ field: Indicates the requester REQ inquiry, which is the random number generated by the requester REQ. When only the one-way authentication process is used, the access authentication response packet needs to include this field. If present, its value is the same as the value of the NRE _Q field in the Access Authentication Request packet sent by the requester REQ. NAAC field: A query indicating the authentication access controller AAC, which is a random number generated by the authentication access controller AAC. When only the one-way authentication process is used, the access authentication response packet needs to include this field. If present, its value is the same as the value of the NAAC field in the certificate authentication request packet sent by the authentication access controller AAC.

ACCRES field: Indicates the access result, which is the reason why the access controller AAC sets the success or failure of the access according to the authentication result and the failure.

x P: Key data representing the requester REQ, the value of which is the same as the value of the χ·Ρ field in the access authentication request packet.

y P: indicates the key data of the authentication access controller AAC, which is the temporary public key generated by the access controller AAC for ECDH exchange.

IDAAC field: Indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, which is obtained according to the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC.

IDREQ field: Indicates the identity ID of the requester REQ, which is obtained according to the certificate CertREQ field of the requester REQ in the received access authentication request packet.

MRES _CERT field: Indicates the result of the certificate verification of the composite. This field is required in the access authentication response packet only for the two-way authentication process. If present, this field consists of the fields in the certificate authentication response packet and has the same value.

SIGAAC field: indicates the signature of the authentication access controller AAC, which is the authentication access controller AAC

MIC 1 field: indicates the message authentication code, which is the authentication key calculation by the access controller AAC using the base key BK negotiated in the authentication process to identify all the fields except the field and the next certificate authentication process in the access authentication response packet. The hash value obtained.

Note: The access authentication response packet only needs to contain either the SIGAAC field and the MIC 1 field. If there is an authentication activation packet in the identity authentication process, and the authentication activation packet includes a SIGAAC field, then only the MIC 1 field is included in the packet; if the authentication authentication packet does not exist in the identity authentication process or the SIGAAC is not included in the authentication activation packet Field, then only the SIGAAC field is included in this group.

6) Access authentication confirmation: After receiving the access authentication response packet, the requester REQ performs the following processing: 6.1) determining, according to the IDAAC and IDREQ fields in the packet, whether it is an access authentication response packet corresponding to the current access authentication request packet, If not, discard the packet, otherwise 6.2); 6.2) In the comparison packet, the requester REQ key data χ·Ρ field value is consistent with the value of the χ·Ρ field in the access authentication request packet sent by itself, and if not, the packet is discarded, otherwise 6.3);

6.3) If it is a one-way authentication process, compare whether the value of the NREQ field is consistent with the value of the NREQ field in the previously sent access authentication request packet, and if not, discard the packet, otherwise perform 6.4); if it is a two-way authentication process , directly execute 6.4);

6.4) View the ACCRES field in the packet. If the access result is unsuccessful, it is known that the network cannot be accessed; otherwise, 6.5);

6.5) If the received access authentication response packet contains the SIGAAC field, verify the correctness of the SIGAAC, if not, discard the packet, otherwise perform 6.6); if the received packet contains the MIC1 field, then verify The correctness of the MIC1 field, if not correct, discard the packet, otherwise perform 6.6);

6.6) If it is a one-way authentication process, execute 6.8); otherwise verify the composite certificate verification result

The value of the NREQ field included in the 1^80^ field is the same as the value of the NREQ field in the access authentication request packet sent by itself. If not, the packet is discarded, otherwise the signature is verified.

, if not correct, discard the packet, otherwise perform 6.7);

6.7) Verifying the composite certificate verification result In the MRES _CERT field, the authentication access controller AAC certificate verification result is legal. If it is not legal, it is known that the network is illegal and cannot access the network; otherwise, the network is legal. Can be accessed and executed 6.8);

6.8) Requester REQ performs ECDH calculation based on the temporary public key P of the authentication access controller AAC and its own temporary private key X to obtain the base key BK and the identification identifier of the next identity authentication process;

6.9) If the received access authentication response packet contains the MIC1 field, whether to send the access authentication acknowledgement packet is optional; if the received packet contains the SIGAAC field, the access authentication acknowledgement packet needs to be constructed and sent to The access controller AAC is authenticated.

The main contents of the access authentication confirmation packet include:

MIC2

among them:

MIC2 field: indicates the message authentication code, which is calculated by the requester REQ using the base key BK negotiated in the authentication process to identify the access controller AAC query value NAAC, the requester REQ query value NREQ, and the next certificate authentication process. The hash value. After the authentication access controller AAC sends the access authentication response packet to the requester REQ, if the sent access authentication response packet contains the signature SIGAAC field of the authentication access controller AAC, the authentication access controller AAC needs to wait for receiving. Enter the authentication confirmation packet.

The authentication access controller AAC verifies the correctness of the MIC2 field in the packet after receiving the access authentication acknowledgement packet sent by the requester REQ. If it is correct, it means that the requester REQ has the base key BK consistent with itself; otherwise , discard the packet.

Note: The function of the present invention is highly concentrated, and two-way authentication can be realized, and one-way authentication can be realized, and authentication update and fast authentication update are also supported. The so-called fast authentication update means that the authentication server AS does not need to participate in the identity authentication process, and the authentication between the access controller AAC and the requester REQ is directly verified according to the certificate verification result in the previous identity authentication process; In the content, the identity authentication process does not include the certificate authentication request packet and the certificate authentication response packet, and the access authentication response packet does not include a composite certificate verification result field; the fast authentication process can only be used as the authentication update process, and cannot Used as the first authentication when the client is connected to the network.

The present invention also provides an identity authentication system based on a public key certificate, including a requester REQ, an authentication access controller AAC, and an authentication server AS, the authentication server AS and the requester REQ, the authentication access controller AAC link, respectively; the requester REQ and The authentication access controller AAC authenticates through the authentication server AS.

Claims

Rights request

A public key certificate based authentication method, characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:

1) The authentication access controller AAC sends an authentication activation packet to the requester REQ; the authentication activation packet includes: SNonce, ID _AS-A AC, CertAAc, and Para _ECDH ; wherein, SNonce field: indicates an authentication identifier, if it is the first identity authentication , the field discrimination by the random number generated by the AAC; if the authentication process is updated, the value of this field is the identification value of the primary differential process identity authentication negotiation generated; ID _aS _AAC field: represents identification The identity ID of the authentication server AS trusted by the access controller AAC is the identity identifier ID of the issuer authentication server AS of the authentication access controller AAC certificate CertAAc; CertAAc field: the certificate representing the authentication access controller AAC; Para _ECDH field: The elliptic curve cryptographic parameter representing the elliptic curve cryptosystem is an elliptic curve cryptographic parameter used by the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key negotiation calculation;

2) The requester REQ sends an access authentication request packet to the authentication access controller AAC after receiving the authentication activation packet; the access authentication request packet includes: SNonce field: indicates an authentication identifier, and if it is the first identity authentication process, the field The value directly depends on the SNonce field value in the authentication activation packet; if it is an updated identity authentication process, the field value is the authentication identity value calculated in the last identity authentication process; χ·Ρ field: the key representing the requester REQ Data, is a temporary public key generated by the requester REQ for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman exchange; IDAAC field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, and the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC according to the authentication activation packet Get; CertREQ field: certificate representing requester REQ; Para _ECDH field: Elliptic curve cryptographic parameter indicating elliptic curve cryptosystem, requester REQ and authentication access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key negotiation calculation The elliptic curve cryptographic parameter used at the same time, the value of which is the same as the value of the Para _ECDH field in the authentication activation group; _gRE Q field: indicates the signature of the requester REQ, which is the signature of the requester REQ using all of the fields except the field in the access authentication request packet by using the private key of the requester;

5) The authentication access controller AAC generates a temporary public key P for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman exchange, and performs elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman calculation according to the temporary public key χ·Ρ of the requester REQ and its own temporary private key y. Obtaining the base key BK, and then setting the access result to be successful, constructing the access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ, and allowing the user to access the network; the access authentication response packet The ACCRES field, the χ·Ρ field, the P field, the IDAAC field, the IDREQ field, the SIGAAC field or the MIC1 field; wherein, the ACCRES field: indicates the access result, and the authentication access controller AAC sets the access success according to the authentication result. Or failure and the reason for the failure; xP: indicates the key data of the requester REQ, and its value is the same as the value of the χ·Ρ field in the access authentication request packet; P: indicates the key data of the authentication access controller AAC, which is the authentication access. The temporary public key generated by the controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman exchange; IDAAC field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, which is obtained according to the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC; IDREQ field: indicates The identity ID of the requester REQ is obtained according to the certificate CertREQ field of the requester REQ in the received access authentication request packet; SIGAAC field: indicates the signature of the authentication access controller AAC, which is the authentication access controller AAC message authentication code, The authentication access controller AAC uses the base key BK negotiated in the authentication process to access the authentication response packet except the field. The hash value calculated for all fields.

2. The public key certificate based identity authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: if the local policy of the authentication access controller AAC requires the authentication server AS to authenticate the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ, the method is Between step 2) and step 5) further includes:

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein: the specific implementation manner of the step 1) is: the authentication access controller AAC sends an authentication activation packet to the requester REQ to activate The requester REQ performs a certificate authentication process.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 3, wherein: the specific implementation manner of the step 2) is: after the requester REQ receives the authentication activation packet, the following is performed: Reason:

2.1) If the authentication process is an update process of identity authentication, the requester REQ checks whether the authentication identifier field in the authentication activation packet is consistent with the authentication identifier calculated in the last identity authentication process, and if not, discards the packet. If they are consistent, execute 2.2); if the authentication process is the first identity authentication process, directly execute 2.2);

2.2) If the received authentication activation packet further includes the SIGAAC field, verify the correctness of the SIGAAC field, discard the packet if it is incorrect, if it is correct, execute 2.3); if the received authentication activation packet does not contain The SIGAAC field is directly executed by 2.3); the SIGAAC field: indicates the signature of the authentication access controller AAC, and is the signature of the authentication access controller AAC to use all of the fields except the field in the packet by using the private key of the access controller;

2.3) Selecting the requester REQ certificate CertREQ issued by the authentication server AS according to the IDAS^AC field in the authentication activation packet or selecting the requester REQ certificate CertRE _Q according to the local policy, and generating Diffie-Hellman key agreement for elliptic curve The exchanged requester REQ key data Ρ·Ρ and the requester REQ interrogate the NREQ, generate an access authentication request packet, and send it to the authentication access controller AAC.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 4, wherein: the specific implementation manner of the step 3) is: after the authentication access controller AAC receives the access authentication request packet, performing the following processing: :

3.1) If the authentication access controller AAC sends the authentication activation packet, it checks whether the SNonce, Para _ECDH field value and the corresponding field value in the authentication activation packet in the received access authentication request packet are consistent, if there is an inconsistency, Discard the packet, if it is consistent, perform 3.2); if the authentication access controller AAC does not send the authentication activation packet, check whether the SNonce field value is consistent with the authentication identifier calculated in the last certificate authentication process, and check the Para _ECDH field and Whether the Para _ECDH in the last authentication activation packet is consistent. If there is an inconsistency, discard the packet. If they are consistent, perform 3.2);

3.3) Verify the requester REQ's signature The correctness of the SigREQ field, if correct, execute 3.4); if not, perform discarding the packet;

3.4) If the local policy of the authentication access controller AAC requires the authentication server AS to be used for authentication Requester REQ's certificate CertREQ, then the authentication access controller AAC generates a certificate authentication request packet, and sends it to the authentication server AS; otherwise, it executes 3.5);

3.5) Authenticate the certificate CertREQ of the access controller AAC local authentication requester REQ, that is, the verification result of the certificate CertREQ of the requester REQ according to the verification result of the certificate CertREQ of the locally cached requester REQ and the time validity defined by the local policy, If it is legal, the temporary public key P for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement exchange is generated locally, and the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman is performed according to the temporary public key χ·Ρ of the requester REQ and its own temporary private key y. Key negotiation calculates the base key BK, then sets the access result to be successful, constructs the access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ, and allows the user to access the network; if the CertREQ verification result is invalid, the authentication access controller The AAC sets the access result to be unsuccessful, and constructs an access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 5, wherein: the specific implementation manner of the step 4) is: after the authentication server AS receives the certificate authentication request packet, the following processing is performed:

4. 1) Verify the authentication access controller AAC's certificate CertAAc and the requester REQ certificate CertREQ, and then execute 4.2);

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 6, wherein: the specific implementation manner of the step 5) is: after the authentication access controller AAC receives the certificate authentication response packet, the following processing is performed:

5. 1) If the access authentication request packet includes an NREQ field, and the certificate authentication request packet further includes a NAAC field and an NREQ field, the inquiry of the authentication access controller AAC in the verification result RES _CER segment of the access controller AAC check certificate is authenticated. Whether the value of the NAAC field in the NAAC is the same as the value of the NAAC field in the certificate authentication request packet. If it is different, the packet is discarded. If the same, the 5.2) is performed; the NAAC field: indicates that the authentication access controller AAC query is generated by the authentication access controller AAC. a random number; NREQ field: indicates a requester REQ inquiry in a certificate authentication request packet, the value of which is the same as the value of the NREQ field in the access authentication request packet, and is a random number generated by the requester REQ in the access authentication request packet;

5.2) If the certificate authentication response packet also includes SIG _AS _AAC field, check the AAC trusted authentication server AS signature SIG _AS _AAC field is correct, if not correct, Discard the packet, if it is correct, execute 5.3); if the packet contains only one signature

5.3) Checking the verification result of the certificate The validity of the CertREQ verification result in the RES _CERT field is legal. If it is legal, the temporary public key yP for the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement exchange is generated locally, and according to the temporary public of the requester REQ The key χ·Ρ and its own temporary private key y are subjected to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key negotiation to obtain the base key BK, and then the access result is set to be successful, and the constructing access authentication response packet is sent to the requester REQ, and The user is allowed to access the network; if the verification result of the CertREQ is invalid, the authentication access controller AAC sets the access result to be unsuccessful, and constructs the access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein: if the access authentication response packet includes a SIGAAC field, the method further includes: after step 5):

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 8, wherein the specific implementation manner of the step 6) is: after the requester REQ receives the access authentication response packet, the following processing is performed:

6.3) View the ACCRES field in the packet. If the access result is unsuccessful, it is known that the network cannot be accessed. If the access result is successful, execute 6.4);

6.4) If the received access authentication response packet contains the SIGAAC field, verify the correctness of the SIGAAC, if not, discard the packet; if it is correct, execute 6.5); if the received packet contains the MIC 1 field , then verify the correctness of the MIC 1 field, if not correct, discard the packet, such as If it is correct, execute 6.5);

6.5) Verifying the composite certificate verification result The NREQ field value included in the MRES _CER ^ segment is consistent with the value of the NREQ field in the access authentication request packet sent by itself. If not, the packet is discarded; if it is consistent, the signature SIG is verified. Whether _AS _REQ is correct, if not correct, discard the packet, if it is correct, execute 6.6);

6.6) Verifying the composite certificate verification result In the MRES _Cert field, the authentication access controller AAC certificate verification result is legal. If it is not legal, the network is invalid and cannot access the network; if it is legal, the network is legal. , can be accessed, and executed 6.7);

6.7) The requester REQ performs an elliptic curve based on the temporary public key P of the authentication access controller AAC and its own temporary private key X. The base key BK is obtained by Diffie-Hellman calculation;

6.8) If the received packet contains the SIGAAC field, then an access authentication acknowledgement packet needs to be constructed and sent to the authentication access controller AAC.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 8, wherein: in the step 6), after the authentication access controller AAC sends the access authentication response packet to the requester REQ, if the transmission is received Included in the incoming authentication response packet is the signature SIGAAC field of the authentication access controller AAC, the method further comprising: the authentication access controller AAC waiting to receive the access authentication acknowledgement packet.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 8, wherein: in the step 6), after the authentication access controller AAC receives the access authentication acknowledgement packet sent by the requester REQ, Including: Verifying the correctness of the MIC2 field in the packet, if correct, means that the requester REQ has a base key BK that is consistent with itself; if not, discarding the packet.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein: the MIC 1 field in the access authentication response packet is generated by negotiation by the authentication access controller AAC during the authentication process. The base key BK calculates the hash value of all the fields except the present field in the access authentication response packet and the identification identifier of the next certificate authentication process.

13. A public key certificate based identity authentication system, characterized in that: the public key certificate based identity authentication system comprises a requester REQ, an authentication access controller AAC;

The authentication access controller AAC is configured to send an authentication activation packet to the requester REQ; generate a temporary public key y P for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman exchange, and according to the temporary public of the requester REQ Key χ·Ρ and its own temporary private key y perform elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman calculation to obtain the base key BK, and then set the access result to be successful, construct the access authentication response packet to be sent to the requester REQ, and allow the user to access The internet;

The authentication activation packet includes: SNonce, ID _AS ^AC, CertAAc, and Para _ECDH ; wherein, the SNonce field: indicates an authentication identifier, and if it is the first identity authentication, the field is a random number generated by the authentication access controller AAC; For the updated identity authentication process, the value of the field is the authentication identifier value that is negotiated and generated during the last identity authentication process; ID _AS ^A _C field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication server AS trusted by the authentication access controller AAC. Is the identity authentication ID of the issuer authentication server AS that authenticates the access controller AAC certificate CertAAc; CertAAc field: indicates the certificate of the authentication access controller AAC; Para _ECDH field: the elliptic curve cryptographic parameter indicating the elliptic curve cryptosystem, is the request Elliptic curve cryptographic parameters used by the REQ and the authentication access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement calculation;

The access authentication request packet includes: a SNonce field: indicating an authentication identifier, if the first identity authentication process, the field value directly depends on the SNonce field value in the authentication activation packet; if it is an updated identity authentication process, the field The value is the authentication identifier value calculated in the last identity authentication process; χ·Ρ field: the key data representing the requester REQ, which is the temporary public key generated by the requester REQ for the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman exchange; ID _AAC Field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, obtained according to the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC in the authentication activation packet; CertREQ field: certificate representing the requester REQ; Para _ECDH field: representing the elliptic curve cryptosystem The elliptic curve cryptographic parameter is an elliptic curve cryptographic parameter used by the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key negotiation calculation, and the value is the same as the Para _ECDH field value in the authentication activation packet; Si _gRE Q field: indicates the signature of the requester REQ, which is the requester REQ uses its own private key pair access authentication request a signature of all the fields in the packet except the field; the access authentication response packet includes: an ACCRES field, a χ·Ρ field, a P field, an IDAAC field, an IDREQ field, a SIGAAC field, or an MIC1 field; wherein, the ACCRES field: Indicates the access result, which is the reason why the access controller AAC sets the access success or failure according to the authentication result and the failure; x P: represents the key data of the requester REQ, and its value is the same as the access authentication request packet. The value of the field; y P: indicates the key data of the authentication access controller AAC, is a temporary public key generated by the access controller AAC for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman exchange; IDAAC field: indicates the identity ID of the authentication access controller AAC, It is obtained according to the certificate CertAAc field of the authentication access controller AAC; IDREQ field: indicates the identity ID of the requester REQ, which is obtained according to the certificate CertREQ field of the requester REQ in the received access authentication request packet; SIGAAC field: indicates the authentication access The signature of the controller AAC is that the authentication access controller AAC uses its own private key to sign all the fields except this field in the packet; MIC1 field: indicates the message authentication code, which is generated by the authentication access controller AAC during the authentication process. The base key BK calculates the hash value of all the fields except the present field in the access authentication response packet.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication system according to claim 13, wherein: the public key certificate-based identity authentication system further comprises: an authentication server AS, the authentication server AS and the requester REQ, respectively The access controller AAC link is authenticated; the requester REQ and the authentication access controller AAC authenticate by the authentication server AS.

The public key certificate-based identity authentication system according to claim 13 or 14, wherein the MIC 1 field in the access authentication response packet is generated by the authentication access controller AAC during negotiation using the authentication process. The base key BK calculates the hash value of all the fields except the present field in the access authentication response packet and the identification identifier of the next certificate authentication process.