WO2010151102A1 - Remote destroy mechanism using trusted platform module - Google Patents

Remote destroy mechanism using trusted platform module Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010151102A1
WO2010151102A1 PCT/MY2010/000100 MY2010000100W WO2010151102A1 WO 2010151102 A1 WO2010151102 A1 WO 2010151102A1 MY 2010000100 W MY2010000100 W MY 2010000100W WO 2010151102 A1 WO2010151102 A1 WO 2010151102A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
tpm
key information
activated
mobile device
tampered
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/MY2010/000100
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Azuddin Bin Parman Mohd
Ab Manan Jamalul-Lail
Original Assignee
Mimos Berhad
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Mimos Berhad filed Critical Mimos Berhad
Publication of WO2010151102A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010151102A1/en

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/88Detecting or preventing theft or loss
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08Access security
    • H04W12/082Access security using revocation of authorisation
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2143Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method and an apparatus for protecting and ensuring data security of a mobile device through a remote destroy mechanism using trusted platform module (TPM)
  • TPM trusted platform module
  • Mobile devices such as mobile phones and mobile computers have become the most essential means as mobile devices makes our lives easier by making it possible for us to stay in touch with fast 3G networks and wi-fi capabilities which advance to wimax.
  • 3G networks and wi-fi capabilities which advance to wimax.
  • a variety of data will be potentially exposed when a mobile device is lost or stolen.
  • IMEI international mobile equipment identity
  • GSM Global Systems for Mobile Communication
  • TPM is capable of performing platform authentication to prevent unauthorized individual from accessing the lost or stolen mobile device.
  • TPM Platform Module
  • the method comprising the steps of initializing the TPM via a TPM command (202), detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM (204), extracting a key information of the TPM (206), processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM (208), receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM (210) and disabling functionality of the mobile device (212).
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • the at least one or more processors (102) in communication with the memory (104) and the TPM (106) comprises means for initializing the TPM via a TPM command, detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non- activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM, extracting a key information of the TPM, processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM, receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM and disabling functionality of the mobile device.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an apparatus arrangement that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart is illustrating a method that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen.
  • FIG.3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM.
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method for receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM.
  • Embodiments of the invention relate to a method and an apparatus for protecting and ensuring data security through remote destroy mechanism using trusted platform module.
  • this specification will describe the present invention according to the preferred embodiments of the present invention. However, it is to be understood that limiting the description to the preferred embodiments of the invention is merely facilitating discussion of the present invention and it is envisioned without departing from the scope of the appended claims.
  • the present invention describes a method and an apparatus that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device with the use of a trusted platform module (TPM), which makes the device inaccessible.
  • TPM trusted platform module
  • TPM is often known as the "TPM chip” or the "TPM Security Device”.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an apparatus arrangement that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen.
  • the apparatus arrangement that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen comprises at least one or more processors (102), a memory in communication with at least one of the processors (104) and a TPM in communication with at least one of the processors (106).
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a method that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen while FIG.3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM.
  • the method (200) for protecting and ensuring data security by destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device through a TPM comprising the steps of initializing the TPM via a TPM command (202), detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM (204), extracting a key information of the TPM (206), processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM (208), receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM (210) and disabling functionality of the mobile device (212).
  • the process of initializing the TPM via a TPM command specification commences by executing self-test to validate the integrity of device functionality.
  • PCRs Platform Configuration Registers
  • Hash values are recomputed upon boot up and compared to those in the PCR to ensure no unwanted changes occurred. Thereafter, TPM merges data stored within the
  • TPM together with the values contained in one or more PCR registers and encrypts the combination as a whole.
  • the self-test will determine the status of the TPM embedded in the mobile device as the TPM is detected to be non-activated, activated or tampered.
  • a non-activated TPM is a new TPM chip wherein the TPM is not used as such that it has not been activated.
  • An activated TPM is defined as a used TPM and it is not block by the system while a tampered TPM is a used TPM wherein the data captured in the TPM has been tampered and is inaccessible by all means.
  • Detection of the non-activated TPM comprises the steps of forwarding an ownership command with the extracted key information of the non-activated TPM to prevent from unauthorized use of the TPM (302).
  • the processor in communication with the TPM will confirmed the status of the TPM. Consequently, the processor in communication with the memory and the TPM will extract key information of the TPM wherein the key information comprises encryption keys, passwords or digital certificates. This key is used to allow the executions of secure transactions in order to start a secure transaction within a trusted entity.
  • the detection of the non-activated TPM further comprises forwarding an ownership command with the extracted key information of the non-activated TPM to prevent from unauthorized use of the TPM (302) such that there is an accountability of ownership.
  • the processor in communication with the TPM will endorse on the shield of the TPM as the activated TPM from the original state of the non-activated TPM (304).
  • the processor in communication with the TPM will endorse on the shield of the TPM as the tampered TPM from the original state of the activated TPM for a TPM that has been tampered and deemed inaccessible.
  • the processor in communication with the memory and the TPM will consequently process an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM.
  • the processor will process the application of the mobile device for an activated TPM.
  • the processor in communication with the memory and the TPM will receive a destroy command along with the key information of the TPM.
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method for receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM.
  • the processor in communication with the memory and the TPM receives a destroy command to destroy and disable the functionality of the mobile device via a server or a telecommunication service provider.
  • the processor compares the received key information with the key information stored in the TPM (402). Thereafter, the TPM determines that the received key information is for the TPM that has not been tampered when the received key information matches the key information stored in the captured data of the TPM (404).
  • the processor endorse the shield of the TPM by converting the mark to a tampered TPM from the original activated TPM when the received key information has not been tampered and matches the key information stored in the captured data of the TPM (406).
  • the processor signals the mobile device to automatically switch off its operation permanently, as the mobile device is deemed inaccessible.
  • the methodology and apparatus for protecting and ensuring data security through remote destroy mechanism using TPM is an aid to prevent from physical theft of mobile devices.
  • the approach of the present invention which incorporates the automatic destroy method to disable the operation of the mobile device upon receipt of a deactivation instruction is an absolute enhancement towards data security as it prevents from physical theft.

Abstract

A method (100) and an apparatus (200) for protecting and ensuring data security by destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device through a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), the apparatus comprising at least one or more processors (102), a memory in communication with at least one of the processors (104) and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in communication with at least one of the processors (106). The at least one or more processors in communication with the memory and the TPM having means for initializing the TPM via a TPM command (202), detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM (204), extracting a key information of the TPM (206), processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM (208), receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM (210) and disabling functionality of the mobile device (212).

Description

REMOTE DESTROY MECHANISM USING TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE
FIELD OF INVENTION
The present invention relates to a method and an apparatus for protecting and ensuring data security of a mobile device through a remote destroy mechanism using trusted platform module (TPM)
BACKGROUND ART
Mobile devices such as mobile phones and mobile computers have become the most essential means as mobile devices makes our lives easier by making it possible for us to stay in touch with fast 3G networks and wi-fi capabilities which advance to wimax. However, a variety of data will be potentially exposed when a mobile device is lost or stolen.
Existing security mechanisms such as an international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) number is used to protect accessibility of stolen mobile devices such as mobile phones. The IMEI number is used by the Global Systems for Mobile Communication (GSM) network to identify valid location of the stolen devices. Thereafter the telecommunication service provider will use the identified IMEI to stop the stolen phone from accessing the network. A significant drawback of IMEI is that it is possible to change the IMEI using special equipment and the used of IMEI limits phone disability from accessing the network only in its country of origin. In addition, identification of IMEI does not disable data accesibility of a stolen phone.
Other typical existing mechanisms such as a remote delete mechanism which is currently used in selected smartphones such as a Blackberry ® will erase data of a lost or stolen Blackberry ® only if the Blackberry ® is configured to be used with a Blackberry ® enterprise server. There is no integrity check to validate the user who sends the command to delete data stored in the device. In addition, the stolen smart device can be use by reloading a new firmware. Consequently, data cannot be erased on a personal or standalone Blackberry ® with encrytion methodology. Further to the exisiting mechanism is the mechanism to disable the mobile device during boot-up procedure whereby the address of the Media Access Control (MAC) of the device is use to transfer the blocking request. The disadvantage is such that the said mobile device can only be disable through connectivity over the Internet.
The test methodology and apparatus of the present invention, applies the concept of a remote destroy mechanism through the implementation of TPM in the mobile device. TPM is capable of performing platform authentication to prevent unauthorized individual from accessing the lost or stolen mobile device.
The subject matter claimed herein is not limited to embodiments that solve any disadvantages or that operate only in environments such as those described above. Rather, this background is only provided to illustrate one exemplary technology area where some embodiments described herein may be practice.
SUMMARY OF INVENTION
In one embodiment of the present invention is a method for protecting and ensuring data security by destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device through a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM). The method comprising the steps of initializing the TPM via a TPM command (202), detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM (204), extracting a key information of the TPM (206), processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM (208), receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM (210) and disabling functionality of the mobile device (212).
In another embodiment of the present invention is an apparatus for protecting and ensuring data security by destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device through a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), the apparatus comprising at least one or more processors (102), a memory in communication with at least one of the processors (104) and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in communication with at least one of the processors (106). The at least one or more processors (102) in communication with the memory (104) and the TPM (106) comprises means for initializing the TPM via a TPM command, detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non- activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM, extracting a key information of the TPM, processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM, receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM and disabling functionality of the mobile device.
The present invention consists of several novel features and a combination of parts hereinafter fully described and illustrated in the accompanying drawings, it being understood that various changes in the details may be made without departing from the scope of the invention or sacrificing any of the advantages of the present invention. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACCOMPANYING DRAWINGS
To further clarify various aspects of some embodiments of the present invention, a more particular description of the invention will be rendered by references to specific embodiments thereof, which are illustrated in the appended drawings. It is appreciated that these drawings depict only typical embodiments of the invention and are therefore not to be considered limiting of its scope. The invention will be described and explained with additional specificity and detail through the accompanying drawings in which:
FIG. 1 illustrates an apparatus arrangement that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen.
FIG. 2 is a flowchart is illustrating a method that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen.
FIG.3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM.
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method for receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
Embodiments of the invention relate to a method and an apparatus for protecting and ensuring data security through remote destroy mechanism using trusted platform module. Hereinafter, this specification will describe the present invention according to the preferred embodiments of the present invention. However, it is to be understood that limiting the description to the preferred embodiments of the invention is merely facilitating discussion of the present invention and it is envisioned without departing from the scope of the appended claims.
The present invention describes a method and an apparatus that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device with the use of a trusted platform module (TPM), which makes the device inaccessible. In practice, a variety of security techniques are available for securing and protecting data in mobile devices. In general, TPM is often known as the "TPM chip" or the "TPM Security Device".
Reference is first being made to FIG. 1. FIG. 1 illustrates an apparatus arrangement that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen. The apparatus arrangement that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen comprises at least one or more processors (102), a memory in communication with at least one of the processors (104) and a TPM in communication with at least one of the processors (106).
Reference is now being made to FIG. 2 and FIG. 3 collectively. FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a method that is capable of destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device when it is lost or stolen while FIG.3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM. The method (200) for protecting and ensuring data security by destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device through a TPM comprising the steps of initializing the TPM via a TPM command (202), detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM (204), extracting a key information of the TPM (206), processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM (208), receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM (210) and disabling functionality of the mobile device (212).
The process of initializing the TPM via a TPM command specification commences by executing self-test to validate the integrity of device functionality. The expected Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs) stored in a secure nonvolatile memory of the TPM will be configured. The expected configuration state of each component in the chain of trust is represented by a hash value stored in the TPM's Platform Configuration Register
(PCR). Hash values are recomputed upon boot up and compared to those in the PCR to ensure no unwanted changes occurred. Thereafter, TPM merges data stored within the
TPM together with the values contained in one or more PCR registers and encrypts the combination as a whole.
The self-test will determine the status of the TPM embedded in the mobile device as the TPM is detected to be non-activated, activated or tampered. A non-activated TPM is a new TPM chip wherein the TPM is not used as such that it has not been activated. An activated TPM is defined as a used TPM and it is not block by the system while a tampered TPM is a used TPM wherein the data captured in the TPM has been tampered and is inaccessible by all means.
Detection of the non-activated TPM comprises the steps of forwarding an ownership command with the extracted key information of the non-activated TPM to prevent from unauthorized use of the TPM (302). The processor in communication with the TPM will confirmed the status of the TPM. Consequently, the processor in communication with the memory and the TPM will extract key information of the TPM wherein the key information comprises encryption keys, passwords or digital certificates. This key is used to allow the executions of secure transactions in order to start a secure transaction within a trusted entity.
The detection of the non-activated TPM further comprises forwarding an ownership command with the extracted key information of the non-activated TPM to prevent from unauthorized use of the TPM (302) such that there is an accountability of ownership. Subsequently, the processor in communication with the TPM will endorse on the shield of the TPM as the activated TPM from the original state of the non-activated TPM (304). Alternatively, the processor in communication with the TPM will endorse on the shield of the TPM as the tampered TPM from the original state of the activated TPM for a TPM that has been tampered and deemed inaccessible.
The processor in communication with the memory and the TPM will consequently process an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM. The processor will process the application of the mobile device for an activated TPM. Alternatively, the processor in communication with the memory and the TPM will receive a destroy command along with the key information of the TPM.
Reference is now being made to FIG. 4. FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method for receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM. The processor in communication with the memory and the TPM receives a destroy command to destroy and disable the functionality of the mobile device via a server or a telecommunication service provider. The processor compares the received key information with the key information stored in the TPM (402). Thereafter, the TPM determines that the received key information is for the TPM that has not been tampered when the received key information matches the key information stored in the captured data of the TPM (404). Subsequently, the processor endorse the shield of the TPM by converting the mark to a tampered TPM from the original activated TPM when the received key information has not been tampered and matches the key information stored in the captured data of the TPM (406). The processor signals the mobile device to automatically switch off its operation permanently, as the mobile device is deemed inaccessible.
The methodology and apparatus for protecting and ensuring data security through remote destroy mechanism using TPM is an aid to prevent from physical theft of mobile devices. The approach of the present invention which incorporates the automatic destroy method to disable the operation of the mobile device upon receipt of a deactivation instruction is an absolute enhancement towards data security as it prevents from physical theft.
The present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from its essential characteristics. The described embodiments are to be considered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The scope of the invention is, therefore indicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description. All changes, which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are to be embraced within their scope.

Claims

1. A method (200) for protecting and ensuring data security by destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device through a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), the method comprising the steps of: initializing the TPM via a TPM command (202); detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non- activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM (204); extracting a key information of the TPM (206); processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM (208); receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM (210); and disabling functionality of the mobile device (212).
2. The method (200) according to claim 1 , wherein detecting a non-activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM (204) further comprises: forwarding an ownership command with the extracted key information of the non-activated TPM to prevent from unauthorized use of the TPM (302); and endorsing on a shield of the TPM as the activated TPM (304).
3. The method (200) according to claim 1 , wherein extracting a key information of the TPM (206) further comprises endorsing on a shield of the TPM as the activated TPM or the tampered TPM.
4. The method (200) according to claim 1, wherein the key information comprises encryption keys, passwords or digital certificates.
5. The method (200) according to claim 1, wherein receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM (210) further comprises: comparing the received key information with the key information stored in the TPM (402); determining that the received key information is for the TPM that has not been tampered (404); and endorsing the shield of the TPM as the tampered TPM if the received key information matches the key information stored in the TPM (406).
6. An apparatus (100) for protecting and ensuring data security by destroying and disabling functionality of a mobile device through a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), the apparatus comprising: at least one or more processors (102); a memory in communication with at least one of the processors (104); and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in communication with at least one of the processors (106). characterized in that the at least one or more processors (102) in communication with the memory (104) and the TPM (106) comprises means for: initializing the TPM via a TPM command; detecting a status of the TPM wherein the status of the TPM is a non-activated TPM, an activated TPM or a tampered TPM; extracting a key information of the TPM; processing an application for the mobile device using the extracted key information of the activated TPM; receiving a destroy command and the key information of the TPM; and disabling functionality of the mobile device.
7. The apparatus (100) according to claim 6, wherein the at least one or more processors (102) in communication with the memory (104) and the TPM (106) further comprises means for: forwarding an ownership command with the extracted key information of the non-activated TPM to prevent from unauthorized use of the TPM; and endorsing on a shield of the TPM as the activated TPM.
8. The apparatus (100) according to claim 6, wherein the at least one or more processors (102) in communication with the memory (104) and the TPM (106) further comprises means for endorsing on a shield of the TPM as the activated TPM or the tampered TPM.
9. The apparatus (100) according to claim 6, wherein the at least one or more processors (102) in communication with the memory (104) and the TPM (106) further comprises means for: comparing the received key information with the key information stored in the TPM; determining that the received key information is for the TPM that has not been tampered; and endorsing the shield of the TPM as the tampered TPM if the received key information matches the key information stored in the TPM.
PCT/MY2010/000100 2009-06-23 2010-06-15 Remote destroy mechanism using trusted platform module WO2010151102A1 (en)

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US11240667B2 (en) * 2016-12-06 2022-02-01 Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft Telephony control device, means of locomotion and method for operating a mobile radio module for a means of locomotion

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