WO2010040259A1

WO2010040259A1 - Method and apparatus for providing user of communication terminal with identity confidentiality protection

Info

Publication number: WO2010040259A1
Application number: PCT/CN2008/072641
Authority: WO
Inventors: 胡志远; 骆志刚; 万志坤; 王楠
Original assignee: 上海贝尔阿尔卡特股份有限公司; 阿尔卡特朗讯公司
Priority date: 2008-10-10
Filing date: 2008-10-10
Publication date: 2010-04-15
Also published as: CN102124767B; WO2010040259A8; CN102124767A

Abstract

A method, apparatus and computer program are provided in the present invention for providing the user of the communication terminal with identity confidentiality protection. In the present invention, at least two pseudonyms are allocated, by the network entity that manages user identities, to the user of the communication terminal; when the relative entity in the network sends a message, which requests to obtain the user permanent identity, to the communication terminal to identify the user of it, the communication terminal replaces the permanent identity with the non-current pseudonym allocated to the user in response to the message it receives, and sends a response message to the relative entity in the network, thereby eliminating the potential safety hazard that is resulted from the transmission of permanent identity from the communication terminal to the entities in the network.

Description

Method and device for providing identity confidentiality protection for communication terminal users

The present invention relates to the field of communications, and more particularly to a method, device, and computer for providing confidentiality protection for a communication terminal user, particularly an identity identifier such as an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) for a communication terminal user. program. Background technique

With the development of communication technologies, various communication technologies and applications based on communication technologies have received more and more attention and promotion. At the same time, security issues in communications are receiving increasing attention, and people are placing higher demands on information security in communications. With the development of 3G systems that provide better security protection, the security of user communications has been guaranteed.

Figure 1 shows an example of a SAE/LTE architecture conforming to the 3GPP TS 23.401 standard. Whenever the user wants to access the service provided by the operator, for example, the IMS service, the user equipment UE first needs to be authenticated by the MME (Mobility Management Entity) via the E-UTRAN, and the MME performs the UE according to the related information provided by the HSS. Certification operation. After authentication, an access request from the UE is sent to the PDN gateway via the E-UTRAN and the service gateway. The PDN gateway forwards the user request to the operator's IP service according to a policy obtained in advance or temporarily from the PCRF, such as an access rights policy and a charging policy. Finally, the operator's IP service provides the user with the service he requested. The MME may provide a function of paging, selecting a PDN-GW, and an S-GW for a UE in an MME-IDLE state (ie, a state of staying but no message transmission); the HSS is a database for storing user subscription information, User security information such as user identification, number, network access control information for authentication and authorization, user location information, and the like are stored.

When a mobile user accesses the network, the MME on the network side allocates a GUTI (Globally Unique Temporary Identity) to each mobile user who has an IMSI. The network side MME obtains the IMSI of the user according to the GUTI of the user, and then according to The obtained IMSI is used to authenticate the user. After the authentication succeeds, the UE owned by the user can access the service provided by the operator. However, in some cases, the MME may not be able to identify the user identity IMSI in the user UE based on the user's GUTI. For example, in the LTE/SAE system architecture, the ME USIM is registered for the first time in the service network and does not receive a valid GUTI within a certain period of time, or the GUTI cannot regain the IMSI of the UE user due to a database failure in the service network, or After the UE roams to the new service network, the new service network cannot contact the previous old service network. In the above case, the GUTI cannot effectively identify the UE user. That is, the MME cannot obtain the IMSI of the user according to the GUTI, which causes the MME to send a request to the UE to send its permanent IMSI identity, as shown in FIG. 2 . Subsequently, in the user's response, the UE transmits the IMSI in plaintext so that the MME redistributes the new GUTL according to the IMSI which exposes the user's IMSI on the LTE radio link.

However, IMSI is also commonly referred to as a user identification code, consisting of a country code (MCC), a network code (MNC), and a user identity code (MSIN). From the perspective of user privacy, IMSI uniquely identifies the user. It is the most information that users want to be protected. Moreover, since IMSI is a unique identifier on a global scale, it provides a lot of users' private information, such as the home network and the country to which it belongs. Therefore, transmitting IMSI in plain text is very vulnerable to attackers. By collecting IMSI, attacking The IMSI can be associated with the user identity. Moreover, in the above prior art processing method, the UE also has the possibility of accepting IMSI requests from untrusted entities.

Thus, in the prior art, there is a loophole in providing confidentiality of user identity. On the other hand, the service network originally intended to hide the user's IMSI for any device other than HE (Home Environment), rather than any device that can obtain the user's IMSI as described above.

Meanwhile, although a method based on a public key to pseudo-name is proposed in 3GPP TR33.821, only the overview does not provide a specific mechanism for IMSI confidentiality protection. It can be seen that there is still an improved need to provide better protection for user identity confidentiality. Summary of the invention The present invention avoids the user equipment transmitting in plain text, such as by providing a pseudonym.

The identity of the user such as IMSI overcomes the above-mentioned drawbacks of the prior art.

The present invention provides a method for providing identity confidentiality protection for a user of a communication terminal, including the steps of:

A. The network entity identified by the management user assigns at least two pseudo-names to users of the communication terminal;

B. When the user of the communication terminal cannot be identified, a related entity in the network sends a message requesting the user's permanent identity to the communication terminal to identify the communication terminal user;

C. In response to receiving the message, instead of transmitting the permanent identity, the communication terminal transmits a response message including an inactive pseudonym assigned to the user to a related entity in the network.

The network entity that manages the user identifier allocates a new pseudo-name to the communication terminal according to the pseudo-name usage of the communication terminal or according to a request of a related entity in the network.

When assigning a new pseudo-name to the communication terminal, the network entity managing the user identity sends a new pseudo-name to the communication terminal, or sends the new pseudo-name via a related entity in the network To the communication terminal. Preferably, integrity protection or cryptographic protection is provided for the transmission of the pseudonym.

The related entity in the network has the right to extract the new pseudo-name, or the network entity that manages the user identifier sends the new pseudo-name to the related entity in the network in an encrypted manner, so that When the communication terminal is still in the network where the related entity in the network is located, the related entity in the network does not send the identity request message to the mobile terminal when needed, but directly uses the New pseudonym.

In the step C, integrity protection or cryptographic protection is provided for the transmission of the pseudonym. The present invention also provides an apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection to a user of a communication terminal, comprising:

a pseudo-name distribution device, configured to allocate a pseudo-name to the communication terminal user;

Network interface, used to interact with other network devices; Wherein, when the communication terminal is requested to send the identity of the user, instead of transmitting the identity, the communication terminal sends a pseudo name assigned thereto.

The present invention also provides an apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection for a user of a communication terminal, the apparatus being configured to assign a pseudonym to the communication terminal user, and to transmit the assigned pseudonym To the required network entity, so that when the communication terminal is requested to transmit the identity of the user, instead of transmitting the identity, the communication terminal sends a pseudo name assigned thereto.

The present invention also provides an apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection for a communication terminal user, comprising:

a pseudo-name maintenance device, configured to manage a user pseudo-name received by the communication terminal;

The identity management device, when receiving the message requesting the user to send the permanent identity of the user, instead of sending the permanent identity, sending a response message including the inactive pseudo name in the user pseudo name;

The network interface is used to interact with other network devices.

The present invention also provides an apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection for a user of a communication terminal, the apparatus being configured to manage a user pseudo name received by the communication terminal for receiving a request to send the user When the message of the permanent identity is sent, instead of sending the permanent identity, a response message including the inactive pseudo-name in the user pseudo-name is sent.

The present invention also provides an apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection to a user of a communication terminal, comprising:

a GUTI management device, when receiving a message containing a user pseudo name from the communication terminal, assigning a GUTI to the communication terminal user;

The network interface is used to interact with other network devices.

The present invention also provides an apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection for a user of a communication terminal, the apparatus being configured to send a message requesting a permanent identity to the communication terminal for receiving from the When the communication terminal contains a message of a user pseudo name, the communication terminal user is assigned a GUTI.

Providing the device for providing identity confidentiality protection to the user of the communication terminal to identify the management user The network entity sends a message requesting the assignment of a pseudonym for the communication terminal user for future use by the communication terminal user.

The present invention also provides a computer program comprising instruction code for performing any of the above methods, or instruction code for executing any of the above means.

The present invention also provides a computer system comprising a processor configured to perform the above-described computational ordering.

The present invention also provides a computer readable storage medium having the above computer program stored thereon.

User identity is an important and sensitive message that should be kept confidential in communications. The invention allocates a pseudo-name to the UE user, so that when the UE receives the permanent identity message requesting the user to send the user, the pseudo-name assigned to the UE is carried in the response message instead of the permanent identity of the sending user. Therefore, the invention eliminates the security risk caused by the UE transmitting the permanent identity of the user, provides the UE user with better identity confidentiality, thereby better protecting the privacy of the user and avoiding leakage of the user identity information. DRAWINGS

Figure 1 schematically shows an example of a SAE/LTE architecture conforming to the 3GPP TS 23.401 standard;

Figure 2 is a schematic diagram showing a flow chart of requesting ME/USIM to send IMSI in a 3GPP TS33.401 standard;

Figure 3 is a schematic diagram showing a flow chart of a method according to the invention in a SAE/LTE architecture; Figure 4 is a schematic diagram showing the flow of a method according to the invention in another SAE/LTE architecture;

Figure 5 is a schematic diagram showing the flow of a method in accordance with the present invention in a UMTS network environment;

Figure 6 is a block diagram schematically showing an example of the structure of a device included in an HE according to the present invention;

Figure 7 is a diagrammatic view showing an example of a device structure included in a UE according to the present invention. Block diagram

Fig. 8 diagrammatically shows a block diagram of an example of a device structure included in an MME according to the present invention. Implementation

The basic idea of the present invention is that a network entity that is managed by a user, such as an HE, assigns a pseudo-name to a UE user having an identity such as an IMSI. When the service network cannot identify the user by using the temporary identifier GUTI, the related entity such as the MME sends the UE to the UE. The message, when requesting to send the permanent identity of the UE user, the UE no longer responds to the MME with a message containing its IMSI, but instead sends the pseudo-name assigned to it to the MME in the response message. Thus, the present invention eliminates the risk of user identity leakage when IMSI is sent in clear text.

Figure 3 shows an example of assigning two pseudo names to a user. Wherein, the vertical line below the box indicating UE, MME, and HE represents time, and as the time continues, the above vertical line extends downward. As shown in FIG. 3, the HE allocates two pseudo-names TIMSU and T _{MSI 2} to the UE user to represent the IMSI of the UE user. Wherein, a pseudo-name TIM _SI ^ is used for the current wireless connection, and its status is "active" (active), and another pseudo-name T _IMSI _ ₂ will be used when the MME requests the UE to send a permanent identity, the status of which is "Use in the future". The UE maintains two pseudo names assigned to it. Preferably, the correspondence between the UE user and the two pseudo names assigned thereto is maintained in the UE and the HE, respectively.

When the service network cannot identify the user, that is, the MME cannot obtain the IMSI of the user according to the current GUTI, the MME sends a message requesting the permanent identity to the UE. In response to the received identity request, the UE sends a response message containing the second pseudo-name T _{msi 2} with the "future use" status to the MME. Preferably, the UE stops using the current "active" pseudo-name T _{IMSI 1} and sets its status to "expired" and sets the two pseudo-names TWsi-2 to "active". After receiving the response message, the MME allocates a new GUTI to the user, maintains the association between the GUTI and the 11⁄2 ₈₁ _ ₂ , and informs the UE that the GUTI has been assigned to it. Subsequently, preferably, since the user's first pseudo-name _Tsi1 is no longer available, the MME creates a message to request a new pseudo-name for the user for future use and sends the message to the HE. Roger that After the request from the MME, the HE assigns the user a new pseudo-name TIM _SI _ ₃ whose status is for future use. Preferably, in order to save resources, the HE releases the T!MSU for use by other users, and sets ΤΪΜ _8ι _ ₂ as active. Alternatively, the HE can safely transmit a new pseudo-name TIM _SI _ ₃ in the usual AKA step and improved. For example, the EPS (Evolved Packet System) authentication vector contains the authentication token AUTN (= SQN © AK||AMF||MAC) field. After reuse and improvement, the AUTN field can be changed to _AUTN_TIMSI_3. ( = TIMSI_3 ® AK||AMF||MAC ) to securely send a new pseudonym T _{IMSI 3} . Thereafter, the HE sends a message containing the AUTN_T _{IMSI 3} (containing the third pseudo-name T-slot _{SI 3} ) and other relevant AKA authentication vectors back to the MME. Preferably, the AKA other related authentication vector is not different from the vector generated by the original AKA, so that when the new pseudo-name T _msi _ ₃ is sent, the AKA process is reused, and the only changed field is the authentication token AUTN. SQN (Sequence Number) factor, because the SQN factor in the original AUTN is replaced by T _{si 3} , the purpose is to transmit the new pseudo-name T _{MSI 3} . After receiving the message from the HE, the MME forwards the message to the UE. Thereafter, the UE using the same method as the original AKA, to generate the same authentication vector and the authenticity of the authentication HE network, after successful authentication, the UE in the same method to extract the AKA SQN to extract the new pseudo name TIM _SI _ _3. The UE then replaces _Tsu with the third pseudo-name ΤΪΜ _8ι _ ₃ and sets it for future use.

Alternatively, the HE may also directly transmit the newly assigned pseudonym to the MME.

UE„

It should be noted that when the HE transmits a message containing a new pseudo-name assigned to the UE to the MME, it is not limited to use the AKA method described above to protect the new pseudo-name. For example, the original root key between the HE and the UE may also be used to directly encrypt the message to be transmitted, or to use any method known to those skilled in the art to encrypt the data content, such as HE and UE pre-negotiating. The key is encrypted.

Alternatively, the UE may overwrite/replace the old invalid pseudonym with a new pseudonym when a new pseudonym is assigned, instead of stopping the use of the current state as "active" when sending a response message to the MME to the MME. The pseudonym T _{si l} or change its state.

Optionally, the HE may also actively allocate a new pseudo according to the usage of the pseudo-name of the UE end. Name.

Optionally, after the UE sends the second pseudo-name T _{IMSI 2} to the MME, the MME sends the message to the HE for the UE that satisfies a certain condition, for example, a certain i-person authentication mechanism or a UE with certain authority. A message requesting a pseudonym for the user is requested, or the HE spontaneously assigns a new pseudonym to the user.

Preferably, the user is assigned a plurality of pseudo-names, that is, at least three pseudo-names, so that the MME can select an appropriate timing for the user to request the user to use the pseudo for future use according to various factors such as the busyness of the user, the network load, and the like. name. For example, the MME may choose to send a message requesting a pseudonym to the HE upon receiving a message from the UE containing TIMSI_3 instead of T _{msi 2} . In this case, in order to alleviate the load of the HE, the HE may alternatively not maintain the pseudo-name assigned to the UE user. Optionally, pseudo-names assigned to UE users, such as a dedicated database, etc., may also be maintained by dedicated devices in the network.

Optionally, the MME may also not send a message requesting a pseudo-name to the HE, that is, when a pseudo-name is assigned to the user for the first time, a certain number of pseudo-names are allocated, which may further improve security. In this case, when the user's pseudo-name is exhausted, the user can be set to pass a certain authentication mechanism, or set to be a user with certain authority, to further assign more pseudo-names, and a pseudo-name is required. However, if there is no user who has passed the certification or does not have the corresponding authority, it needs to carry out further identity verification. For example, when the UE is a mobile phone, the mobile phone user can obtain more pseudo-names by calling the customer service or going to the business hall.

Optionally, when the HE sends a message including the third pseudo name and the generated vector to the MME, the MME has the right to extract ΤΪΜ _8ι _ ₃ in the message. Preferably, for security reasons, 权限 does not have the right to extract TIMSI_3, so the message containing T _IMSI _ ₃ is encrypted and transmitted by the HE to the MME. After obtaining T _{IMSI 3,} MME maintains the association between the user and both the UE ₃ TIM _SI _. When the UE is still in the current network and the network cannot identify the user, since the MME has maintained the association between the UE user and the TIM _SI _ ₃ , the MME does not have to send an identity request to the UE, and can directly use the T maintained by the MME. ₃ in order to maintain _{the MSI} to the MME, UE, using a pseudo-name for the new GUTIc UE partitioned between three symmetrical HE information, after the allocation of new GUTI MME may notify the UE of the event, it is preferable to use the TIM _SI _ ₃ Love The information related to the pseudonym, the status information, and the like, and the allocation of the new GUTI notify the UE once in one message. After receiving the message, the UE maintains the pseudo-name information it holds and performs corresponding status update. Similarly, the MME also notifies the HE of the event, and the HE maintains its stored pseudonym information for the user accordingly. Preferably, the MME using TIM _SI _ ₃ hour / after sending a request message to the new pseudo name to UE user HE.

Preferably, the pseudonym for the user can be implemented by HLR/AuC (Home Location/Authentication Center) or HSS (Home Subscriber Server) of the HE. Alternatively, it may be implemented by other network entities in the network as long as it can obtain user-related information required to assign a pseudonym to the user, such as the user's IMSI, the IMSI-related root key, and the like.

Preferably, the solution provided by the present invention can reuse the messages defined in the existing network protocols to implement the solution of the present invention with minimal modifications to minimize the cost of implementing the present invention. For example, corresponding to the above embodiment, for the existing 3GPP TS33.401, an existing identity request, identity response, etc. message may continue to be used, and a message for assigning a third pseudo name to the user is required. Optionally, the foregoing added message may also be an improvement to an existing message, for example, an authentication data request/response between the MME and the HE, a user authentication request from the MME to the ME USIM of the UE, and the like. Improve.

Figure 4 shows a flow chart for providing integrity protection in the embodiment shown in Figure 3. As shown in FIG. 4, most of the interaction process between the MME, the HE, and the UE in the figure is the same as that shown in FIG. 3. The difference is that, in response to the identity request sent by the MME, when the UE sends the TIM _SI _ ₂ to the MME, it provides integrity protection, that is, in the response message including the T _{si 2} sent by the UE to the MME, and The MME sends a specific verification vector to the message sent by the HE for the user request pseudo-name, and performs verification at the HE. Specifically, the UE sends a response message identity request (T!M _{SI 2} , RAND _M E| |MACTIMSI_2 KSI _AS ME_0 ) to the MME, where the RA D _ME is generated by the ME in the UE, and the KSI _ASME — O is the previous KSI _ASME , MACTIMSI_2== AKASME (T _{msI 2} | | RAND _ME ||IMSI); The message sent by the MME to the HE is an identity request for future use (T _{IMSI 2} , SNID, network type, RAND _ME ||MAC _{TIMSI 2} , KSI _AS ME_0) , Similarly, RAND _ME is generated by the ME in the UE, KSI _ASME — O for Former KSI _ASME . Furthermore, HE generates HEMAC _{TIMSI 2} ( = flK _ASME (TIMSI_2|| AND _M E||IMSI ) and checks if 3(3⁄4Μ _{8ι 2} is equal to MAC _{TIMSI 2} . If equal, it means that T _{IMSI 2 is} in transit has not been tampered with, the MME after receiving the response message from the TIM _SI _ HE include _3, users are assigned GUTI.

Preferably, in addition to providing integrity protection, security policies such as encryption may also be provided in this embodiment to further improve security.

It should be noted that in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4, the process of providing protection for the pseudo name of the UE user is for example only, and those skilled in the art should understand that other various feasible ways may be used to provide integrity. protection. For example, other check vectors are added to the message, or are verified by the MME when receiving a message from the UE, rather than having to be implemented by the HE.

The solution of the present invention has been described above by taking the SAE/LTE system architecture as an example. However, the above embodiments are merely for the purpose of illustrating the solution of the present invention. In fact, the solution of the present invention is not limited to the SAE/LTE architecture.

For example, Figure 5 shows a flow diagram of a solution for implementing the present invention in a UMTS network environment. Similarly, the vertical line below the box representing the UE, VLR/SGSN. HSS indicates the time, and as the time continues, the above vertical line extends downward. It can be seen from FIG. 5 that the communication flow of the UE, the VLR/SGSN HSS is similar to that of FIG. 4, except that the entity communicating with the UE is a VLR/SGSN instead of an MME due to different network architectures.

As can be seen from the above-described examples of Figs. 3 to 5, according to the solution of the present invention, a vulnerability that may leak user privacy due to the UE transmitting IMSI to an entity in the network when the network cannot identify the user is eliminated. Moreover, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the present invention can be used with any type of network architecture, and is not limited to mobile networks or mobile devices. As long as the network allocates any information including user privacy to the user, and the user equipment UE needs to send the above information including user privacy to other network entities to identify/recognize the user, the solution provided by the present invention may be used, that is, the user is allocated. A pseudonym, and the user's private information is replaced with the assigned pseudonym in the message sent to other network entities.

FIG. 6 shows an example of a device that can be included in an HE device to assign a pseudo name to a UE user. As shown in FIG. 6, the apparatus includes: a pseudo-name assignment means for having an IMSI such as The identity of the UE user is assigned a pseudo-name. The network interface is configured to interact with other network devices to send the assigned pseudonym to a network entity that requires the pseudo name, such as an HE, a UE, or an MME. Preferably, a storage device, such as a database, is used to maintain information such as a correspondence between the UE user and the pseudo name assigned thereto, a pseudo-name status, and the like. Preferably, the pseudo-name maintenance device may be further included for updating the state of the user pseudo-name (ie, active or future use), preferably, for saving resources, for releasing the pseudo-name that is no longer used. Alternatively, the operations performed by the storage device and the pseudo-name maintenance device may be implemented by an HE in the network, or other devices such as a dedicated pseudo-name database, a pseudo-name server, or the like.

Fig. 7 shows an example of a device that can be included in a UE using a pseudonym. As shown in FIG. 7, the apparatus includes: a pseudo-name maintenance device, configured to maintain a pseudo-name received by the UE and allocated to the user, and preferably, is responsible for updating the status of the pseudo-name. Alternatively, when receiving a new pseudo-name assigned to the user, the pseudo-name maintenance device sets the state of the received pseudo-name to be used in the future, and overwrites/replaces the invalid pseudo-name with it. The identity management device, when receiving the identity request from the MME, sends a response message containing the pseudonym to the MME instead of transmitting the IMSI of the user, preferably stopping using the current "active" pseudonym. The network ^^ port is used to interact with other network devices to obtain pseudo-names assigned to them, or to send their pseudo-names to the required devices. Preferably, a storage device is further included for storing the pseudo name of the received user.

Fig. 8 shows an example of a device included in the MME according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 8, the apparatus includes: a GUTI management apparatus, when receiving a message including a user pseudo name from a UE, assigning a GUTI to the UE user. The network interface is used to interact with other network devices. Preferably, the method further includes user management means for transmitting an identity request message to the UE when the user cannot be identified, preferably sending a message to the HE when needed, in order to request the HE to allocate a new pseudo for the future use of the user. name. Preferably, the storage device is further configured to store the related information of the GTUI, the user's IMSI, and the like. Optionally, when the MME has the pseudo name assigned to the user by the HE, the obtained pseudo name is stored.

The solution of the present invention has been roughly described above. According to the solution of the present invention, it may be implemented by hardware, may be implemented by software, or a combination thereof.

In addition to the methods and devices described above, the present invention also provides a method and apparatus for implementing the above methods. A computer program, and a computer system, including a processor, is configured to execute a computer program for implementing the method or apparatus of the present invention.

Although the present invention takes MME, VLR/SGSN as an example, those skilled in the art should understand that the MME or VLR/SGSN can be replaced with any identifier in the network responsible for maintaining the UE user, or requesting identity when the UE user cannot be identified. The identified network entities, to which the present invention is collectively referred to as related entities in the network.

Although the present invention assigns pseudo-names to users by HE, those skilled in the art should understand that, as the network environment is different, the allocation pseudo-name is not limited to be implemented by the HE, which may be obtained by any relevant information of the user and has This is implemented by a network entity that assigns a pseudo-name authority to the user. To this end, the present invention collectively refers to the network entity that manages the user identity.

The network entity of the present invention may be any type of network element, either alone or in combination, such as a server or a router.

Although the present invention is exemplified by IMSI, those skilled in the art will appreciate that any other information including user privacy content may be protected by the solution provided by the present invention. In this regard, since the information containing the user's private content is often difficult to change, the present invention collectively refers to the permanent identity of the communication terminal user. It should be noted that the term "permanent" as used herein is relative, not absolute.

The user equipment UE according to the present invention refers to any communication terminal that can access a service provided by a network access operator, such as a mobile phone, a PDA, a desktop computer, a portable computer or the like.

The network interface of the present invention refers to any software, hardware or combination thereof that can be used to communicate with other network entities, devices, and the like.

The exemplified embodiments of the present invention are intended to be illustrative only and not to limit the invention. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention may be modified, split, and combined without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.

Claims

Rights request

A method for providing identity confidentiality protection to a user of a communication terminal, comprising the steps of:

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the network entity that manages the user identity allocates to the communication terminal according to a pseudo-name usage of the communication terminal, or according to a request of a related entity in the network. New pseudonym.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein, when a new pseudo-name is assigned to the communication terminal, the network entity managing the user identity sends a new pseudo-name to the communication terminal, or via the A related entity in the network sends the new pseudonym to the communication terminal.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein the related entity in the network has the right to extract the new pseudo name, or the network entity managing the user identifier encrypts the new pseudo name Transmitting to a related entity in the network, so that when the communication terminal is still in the network where the related entity in the network is located, the related entity in the network no longer sends the relevant entity to the mobile terminal when needed The identity request message is described, but the new pseudo-name is used directly.

5. A method according to any of the preceding claims, in step C, providing integrity protection and/or cryptographic protection for the transmission of the pseudonym.

6. An apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection for a user of a communication terminal, comprising: a pseudo-name assignment means for assigning a pseudo-name to the communication terminal user;

Network interface, used to interact with other network devices;

Wherein, when the communication terminal is requested to send the identity of the user, instead of sending the An identity identifier, the communication terminal sends a pseudo name assigned to it.

7. An apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection for a user of a communication terminal, the apparatus being configured to assign a pseudonym to the communication terminal user, and to transmit the assigned pseudonym to a desired a network entity, such that when the communication terminal is requested to transmit the identity of the user, instead of transmitting the identity, the communication terminal sends a pseudonym assigned thereto.

8. An apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection for a communication terminal user, comprising: a pseudonym maintenance apparatus, configured to manage a user pseudo name received by the communication terminal;

Network interface, used to interact with other network devices.

9. An apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection to a user of a communication terminal, the apparatus being configured to manage a user pseudo name received by the communication terminal for receiving a permanent identity of the user when receiving the request When the message is identified, instead of sending the permanent identity, a response message including the inactive pseudo-name in the user pseudo-name is sent.

10. An apparatus for providing identity confidentiality protection for a user of a communication terminal, comprising: a GUTI management apparatus, assigning a GUTI to the communication terminal user when receiving a message containing a user pseudo name from the communication terminal ;

The network interface is used to interact with other network devices.

11. A device for providing identity confidentiality protection to a user of a communication terminal, the device being configured to send a message requesting a permanent identity to the communication terminal for receiving a message from the communication terminal When the message containing the user pseudo name is included, the communication terminal user is assigned a GUTL

The device according to claim 10 or 11, wherein the device sends a message requesting to allocate a pseudo name for the communication terminal user to a network entity that manages the user identity, so that the communication terminal user may use.

13. A computer program comprising instruction code for performing any of the methods of claims 1 to 5, or comprising for performing any of claims 6 to 12 Instruction code of a device