WO2008031301A1 - Procédé d'authentification d'identité en ligne point à point - Google Patents
Procédé d'authentification d'identité en ligne point à point Download PDFInfo
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- WO2008031301A1 WO2008031301A1 PCT/CN2007/000473 CN2007000473W WO2008031301A1 WO 2008031301 A1 WO2008031301 A1 WO 2008031301A1 CN 2007000473 W CN2007000473 W CN 2007000473W WO 2008031301 A1 WO2008031301 A1 WO 2008031301A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
Definitions
- the invention belongs to the field of computer and network information security, and relates to a network identity authentication method, and particularly relates to a peer-to-peer network identity authentication method that does not depend on a public digital certificate. Background technique
- a commonly used identity authentication method is an impact corresponding method: verifying that the applicant sends a random number to the verified party, and the verified party sends the random number and the account password together with the MD5 to generate a summary; The same random number and account password are generated by MD5, and compared with the summary sent back by the verified party. If the identity is the same, the identity is confirmed, and the difference is denied.
- the -MD5 algorithm can be replaced by other higher-intensity algorithms, which can increase the difficulty of decryption.
- this type of authentication method is still easy to be cracked.
- the main reason is that the input of the method is simple and private.
- the information is the account password, the number of digits is short and does not change for a long time, and can not withstand a large number of attacks.
- the hacker program can pretend to be the verification applicant when the authenticated party is online, and send a large number of selected plaintext instead of the random number.
- the response of the verified party is obtained, thereby greatly reducing the difficulty of cracking the limited length password of the verified party. Therefore, at present, this method has been replaced by public digital certificate certification in most of the more demanding situations.
- the security protocols and technologies on the WAN are used to effectively prevent illegal intruders from illegally accessing legitimate users.
- Their network identity authentication relies on digital certificates issued by authorities (including Server certificate, or server certificate plus personal certificate).
- the digital certificate is issued by an authoritative and impartial third-party organization (such as the CA Center).
- the digital certificate-based encryption technology can encrypt and decrypt the information transmitted on the network, digital signature and signature verification, and ensure the confidentiality of information transmitted on the network. Sex, integrity, and the authenticity of the identity of the transaction entity, the non-repudiation of the signature information, thus ensuring the security of the network application.
- the digital certificate uses a public key cryptosystem, that is, a pair of mutually matching keys are used for encryption and solution.
- Secret Each user has a private key (private key) that is only owned by the user, used to decrypt and sign it; and has a public key (public key) that can be publicly available for encryption and verification of signatures.
- private key private key
- public key public key
- the sender encrypts the data using the recipient's public key, and the recipient decrypts it with its own private key, so that the information can arrive at the destination safely, even if intercepted by a third party. Since there is no corresponding private key, it cannot be decrypted.
- the inventors have considered that a large number of service providers, such as online banking, electronic payment platforms, e-government, online games, online education, etc., have obtained information of users receiving services in advance, and such information includes The account number, password, contact information, user identity, etc., are different from the zero-knowledge authentication that the two parties have never had any contact with, and such known information can be fully utilized in these fields to more easily realize identity authentication.
- service providers such as online banking, electronic payment platforms, e-government, online games, online education, etc.
- a peer-to-peer network identity authentication method which is verified by the verified party and The computer of the applicant's computer is realized by peer-to-peer network communication, and the common information is registered between the verified party and the verification applicant, and the code table generation method, the verification operation rule and the algorithm are agreed upon, and the verification party and the verification application party respectively adopt the said
- the agreed code table generation method generates the code table by using the common information, and each time the identity authentication is performed, the following steps are included:
- the verified direction verifies that the applicant sends the identity information, and the verification applicant generates a set of codes as the verification password and sends it to the verified party;
- the verified party obtains the verification answer and sends it to the verification applicant according to the code table and the verification password, using the agreed verification operation rules and algorithms;
- the verification applicant selects the code table corresponding to the verified party according to the identity information of the verified party, uses the agreed verification operation rule and algorithm, obtains the standard response according to the code table and the verification password, and steps (2) The verification answers received in the comparison are compared, the same is confirmed, and the confirmation is rejected.
- the common information may be all or part of information such as a customer account number, a password, a certificate number, and a contact information of the client, or may be information of a service provider, such as a customer information plus a service characterization code, or such information.
- the mapping of the common information may be performed in a secure manner when the account is issued or modified in advance; the code table generating method may be a data extraction or mapping rule, an operation rule or an algorithm.
- the generation of the code table can be performed multiple times after being generated once, until the original material information required to be input as the code table generation is changed in whole or in part; it can also be generated immediately upon verification of the identity each time.
- the identity information if the authenticated party is a user, may be information such as the user's account number or device number; if the verified party is the service provider, it may be the service provider's service representation code and the like.
- the verification password is a set of codes consisting of numbers or strings, which can be randomly generated according to certain constraints, or generated according to certain rules, or a combination of the two.
- the agreed code table generating method includes at least one one-way function operation step.
- the verification operation rule and the algorithm include at least one one-way function operation step.
- One-way letter commonly used in information security There are two main types of numbers, one-way trapdoor functions (such as RSA algorithm, etc.) and one-way hash functions (also known as hash functions or hash functions such as MD5, SHA-1, etc.).
- the verified party in the step (2), the verified party generates a set of codes as the second verification password, and the verification answer is determined by the combination of the verification password and the second verification password and the code table according to the agreed verification operation rule. And obtaining, by the algorithm, the information sent to the verification applicant is composed of the verification answer and the second verification password; in the step, the combination of the verification password and the second verification password is also used when obtaining the standard response.
- the combination method of the second verification password may be a predefined operation, such as segmentation mixing or the like.
- the verified party in the step (2), after obtaining the verification answer, the verified party makes a digital abstract together with the verification answer, and then uses its own private key.
- the abstract is digitally signed, and the verified party sends the digital signature together with the public key of the verified party to the verification applicant; in the step (3), after confirming the identity, verifying that the applicant uses the verified party
- the public key restores the digital signature to the digital digest to be verified, and generates a digest together with the verified answer public key and the verified answer, and then compares with the received digital digest to be verified. If correct, accepts the verified party's Public key.
- the verified party after obtaining the verification answer, the verified party makes a digital digest together with the verification answer, and the verified party sends the digital digest together with the public key of the verified party.
- Verifying the applicant in the step (3), after confirming the identity, the verification applicant generates a summary together with the verification answer by the verified public key, and then compares with the received digital summary to be verified, if correct, then Accept the public key of the verified party.
- the common information includes private information, including a user account and a password.
- the common information contains variable parts, including the current date.
- the agreed verification operation rule and the algorithm include one or more of a mapping rule, an operation factor, or a private key that are only known by both parties.
- a security hardware device is connected to the computer of the verified party and the verification applicant, and the operation process of the verification answer and the standard response is completed in the security hardware device, and the code table is stored inside the security hardware device.
- the security hardware device is a hardware device designed to implement security processing of passwords and the like in the prior art.
- an external network account anti-theft device is disclosed, which can be used as the present invention.
- Secure hardware device After using a secure hardware device, the information stored in it cannot be read on the client computer, and the operation process is not known.
- the present invention has the following advantages over the prior art:
- the invention constructs a code table by using information shared by the verification applicant and the verified party, and then generates a verification answer together with the verification password to implement identity authentication, thereby being safe, effective and reliable; and adopting the verification operation rule and algorithm
- the public key algorithm and the Hash algorithm which are recognized at the time and cannot be cracked in the effective time
- the number of combinations of the verification forms of the code table is far greater than the normal maximum number of logins in the change period of the code table, due to several times
- the secret language question and the secret answer even if it is recorded and cracked afterwards, can not recover the complete user information, so even if the data communication of the identity authentication is monitored a lot, the authentication method is safe and reliable.
- the common information of the generated code table of the present invention contains private information (such as user account password) and variable factors (such as date, IP address, etc.), the number of combinations of the code table composing the verification answer is much larger than that in the code table.
- the normal maximum number of logins in the period (such as the code table change period is one day, the number of combinations of the code table that constitutes the verification answer is 1 million), especially in the use of a one-way algorithm sensitive to the plaintext bit change and diffusion (Diffusion) ( In the case of processing such as Hash algorithm, it is very safe and reliable.
- the invention adopts a peer-to-peer network identity authentication method, does not depend on public digital certificates, and does not need the assistance of a third-party authentication center, thereby achieving convenience and low cost.
- the present invention can be used in conjunction with the Chinese invention patent application 200610023658.X. Since the user information of the client, the convention rules, the feature segments, and the code table are all in the external hardware device, instead of being exposed to the hard disk of the client computer or In memory, it will not be stolen; due to dynamic encryption, it is difficult to crack; because of the use of service numbers, etc., it is convenient to use multiple network service platforms. DRAWINGS
- Embodiment 1 is a schematic flow chart of Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- Embodiment 2 is a schematic flow chart of Embodiment 2 of the present invention. detailed description
- Embodiment 1 Referring to FIG. 1, a peer-to-peer network identity authentication method is implemented by a peer-to-peer network communication by a computer of a verified party and a verification applicant, and includes the following steps:
- the service provider and the user register in a secure manner (such as in the database of the server and the hardware device issued to the user) when the account is registered and issued, and the common information may be the user of the customer.
- the two parties register in a secure manner (such as in the database of the server and the hardware device issued to the user).
- the same rules and methods used by both parties to generate the code table including data extraction or mapping rules, arithmetic rules or algorithms, are generated.
- the rules can be:
- a certain bit information is extracted from each field of the common information in a certain order, and the mixture is shuffled in order to form a 160-byte common information segment, and is divided into four segments.
- the SHA256 algorithm is used to calculate each segment of the common information segment, and the results are linked in sequence to form a 128 byte code table.
- Both parties register by secure means (such as stored in the hardware device issued to the user).
- the calculation rules and algorithms used by both parties to generate a verification answer by verifying the password and the code table may be: Extracting the address information from the verification password (eg M), find the corresponding Mth half-byte in the code table by bit.
- the specified verification password contains 72 address information (40 of which are randomly generated by the verification applicant within 0 ⁇ 255, 32 are randomly generated by the verified party within 0 ⁇ 255), and 72 are obtained by querying the code table according to the above method. Half-byte, ordering the results in order.
- the SHA256 algorithm is used to calculate the above result, and a 32-byte long verification answer is obtained.
- the server presents its identity to the client (sending the service characterization code of the service provider), and the client presents the identity (sending the user account or device number) to the server.
- the verification applicant generates a set of codes (containing 40 address information of 0 ⁇ 255), which is sent as a verification password to the verified party;
- the verified party randomly generates 32 address information of 0 to 255 as the second verification password, and together with the received verification password, constitutes a combined verification password.
- the verified party verifies from the code table according to the combination
- the password is calculated according to the rules specified by the two parties in step (3) to obtain a 32-byte long verification answer; the authenticated party makes its own public key, verification answer, second verification password and other information into a digital digest using the SHA256 algorithm;
- the authenticated party uses the private key to make the digest into a digital signature using the public key algorithm; the authenticated party sends the digital signature, the second verification password, and the verified party's public key together to the verification applicant.
- the verification applicant combines the second verification password and the verification password to form a combined verification password, and from the code table, according to the combined verification password, the same rule as that specified by the two steps in the step (3) is performed, and the result is obtained, and a digital digest is generated.
- both parties After both parties complete the identity confirmation and accept the other party's public key, they can continue the subsequent secret handshake process (such as generating and exchanging a one-time symmetric key), timed handshake, and secure data transmission.
- Embodiment 2 Referring to FIG. 2, a peer-to-peer network identity authentication method is implemented by a peer-to-peer network communication by a computer of a verified party and a verification applicant, and includes the following steps:
- the service provider and the user store the information shared by both parties in the database of the server and the hardware device issued to the user (for example, the user account, password, ID number, contact information, service code of the customer) , date (the date the server was logged in)).
- the SHA-1 algorithm is used to calculate the common information segments, and the results are linked in sequence to form a 40-byte code table.
- the verification password contains 40 bytes (22 of which are randomly generated by the verification applicant, 18 Randomly generated by the verified party).
- Verification Answer SHA1 (Verification Password XOR opad, SHA1 (Verification Password XOR ipad, Code Table)).
- the server presents its identity to the customer (sending the service characterization code of the service provider), and the client presents the identity to the service (send the user account or device number);
- the verification applicant generates a 22-byte random number, which is sent as a verification password to the verified party; the verified party generates a randomly generated 18-byte random number as the second verification password, and together with the verification password constitutes a combined verification password.
- the verified party calculates the password from the code table according to the combination, and operates according to the rules specified by the two parties in step 3 to obtain a verification answer of 20 bytes long;
- the verified party makes its own public key, verification answer, second verification password and other information into a digital abstract with the SHA1 algorithm;
- the verified party uses the private key to make the digest into a digital signature using the public key algorithm; the authenticated party sends the digital signature, the verification answer, the second verification password, and the verified party's public key together to the verification applicant. ;
- the verification applicant combines the second verification password and the verification password into a combined verification password, and from the code table, according to the combined verification password, the same rule as that specified in the step (3) is used to obtain the result, and the result is sent to the verified party.
- the verification answers are the same. If they are the same, they will confirm their identity. If they are different, they will refuse to confirm.
- the verification applicant restores the digital signature to the digital digest with the public key of the verified party, and by verifying the digital digest, it proves that the public key of the verified party is indeed issued by the verified party, and After being tampered with, accept the public key of the verified party. Otherwise refuse to accept.
- the client and the server exchange the verified party and the verification applicant role, and repeat steps (4) to (7).
- both parties After both parties complete the identity confirmation and accept the other party's public key, they can continue the subsequent secret handshake process (such as generating and exchanging a one-time symmetric key), timed handshake, and secure data transmission.
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Description
一种点对点网络身份认证方法 技术领域
本发明属于计算机和网络信息安全领域， 涉及一种网络身份认证方法， 具体涉及一种不依赖于公共数字证书的点对点网络身份认证方法。 背景技术
在电子商务、 电子政务的开展过程中， 如何对登录进入系统的用户的身 份进行确认， 以防止非法接入和入侵， 是保证整个系统安全十分关键的 因素之一。 没有安全保障， 就没有电子商务 /电子政务的健康快速的发展。 现有技术中， 一种常用的身份认证方法是冲击相应法： 验证申请方给被 验证方发送一个随机数， 被验证方把随机数和帐户密码一起用 MD5生成 摘要发回； 验证申请方用同样的随机数和帐户密码用 MD5生成摘要， 和 被验证方发回的摘要比较， 相同则身份确认， 不同则拒绝接入。 在该协 议基础上，将 -MD5算法用其他更高强度的算法替代，可以增加解密难度， 但即使如此， 这类身份认证方法仍然容易被破解， 主要原因是， 该方法 的输入组成简单， 私有信息为帐号密码， 位数短并长时间不变， 经不起 大量攻击， 尤其是黑客程序可以在被验证方联机的情况下， 伪装成验证 申请方， 大量发送有选择的明文代替随机数， 取得被验证方的响应， 从 而大大降低破解被验证方的有限长度密码的难度。 因而， 目前， 该方法 在绝大多数要求较髙的场合已被公共数字证书认证所取代。
目前的以 PKI/SSL3.0等为例的广域网上的安全协议和技术， 为了有效防 止非法入侵者仿冒合法用户身份而非法接入， 其网络身份认证都依赖于 权威机构发放的数字证书（包括服务器证书，或服务器证书加个人证书）。 数字证书是由权威公正的第三方机构（如 CA中心）签发的， 以数字证书 为核心的加密技术可以对网络上传输的信息进行加密和解密、 数字签名 和签名验证， 确保网上传递信息的机密性、 完整性， 以及交易实体身份 的真实性， 签名信息的不可否认性， 从而保障网络应用的安全性。
数字证书釆用公钥密码体制， 即利用一对互相匹配的密钥进行加密、 解
密。 每个用户拥有一把仅为本人所掌握的私有密钥 （私钥）， 用它进行解 密和签名； 同时拥有一把公共密钥 （公钥） 并可以对外公开， 用于加密 和验证签名。 当发送一份保密文件时， 发送方使用接收方的公钥对数据 加密， 而接收方则使用自己的私钥解密， 这样， 信息就可以安全无误地 到达目的地了， 即使被第三方截获， 由于没有相应的私钥， 也无法进行 解密。 通过数字的手段保证加密过程是一个不可逆过程， 即只有用私有 密钥才能解密。
然而， 一张证书发出后， 完全可能因为遗失或使用不当而泄密， 需要作 废； 或者证书拥有人身份改变而提前撤锖。 而要求中小服务商和个人消 费者在应用时每次必须去 CA 中心査询证书的有效性 （是否已作废撤销 等），或保证广大中小服务商和个人消费者都实时得到证书有效性已变更 的信息， 也是麻烦或困难的事。 而黑客完全可以利用广大中小服务商和 个人消费者获得证书有效性变更信息的时间差做文章。
另一方面， 证书的发放、 管理、 维护、 CA机构的运行等， 都需要较髙的 费用， 这个费角是需要持续支出的。 对于广大的中小用户来说， 无疑增 加了额外的负担， 不利于推广。
因而， 提供一种不需要第三方服务， 同时能保证身份认证的安全性， 避 免非法接入和窃取信息的身份认证方法， 对于电子商务和电子政务的开 展， 有着重要的意义。 发明内容
本发明目的是提供一种不易破解的点对点的网络身份认证方法， 以易于 实现并降低所需费用。
为达到上述目的， 发明人考虑到， 目前大量的服务供应商， 例如网银、 电子支付平台、 电子政务、 网游、 网络教育， 等等， 事先已经取得了接 受服务的用户的信息， 这类信息包括帐号、 密码、 联系方式、 用户身份 等， 因经， 与双方从来没有过任何联系的零知识身份认证不同， 在这些 领域完全可以利用这类已知信息来更方便地实现身份认证。 由此， 本发 明釆用的技术方案是： 一种点对点网络身份认证方法， 由被验证方和 '验
证申请方的计算机通过点对点的网络通信实现， 在被验证方和验证申请 方分别登记共同信息， 并约定码表生成方法、 验证运算规则及算法， 分 别在被验证方和验证申请方采用所述约定的码表生成方法， 利用共同信 息生成码表， 每次进行身份认证时， 包括如下歩骤：
(1) 被验证方向验证申请方发送身份信息， 验证申请方生成一组代码作为 验证口令， 发送给被验证方；
(2) 被验证方根据码表和验证口令， 采用所述约定的验证运算规则及算 法， 获得验证答案， 发送给验证申请方；
(3) 验证申请方根据被验证方的身份信息， 选择与被验证方对应的码表， 采用所述约定的验证运算规则及算法， 根据码表和验证口令， 获得标准 应答， 与步骤 (2)中接收到的验证答案进行对比， 相同则确认身份， 不相 同则拒绝确认。
上述技术方案中， 所述共同信息可以是客户的用户帐号、 密码、 证件号 码、 联系方式等全部或部分信息， 也可以是客户信息加上服务表征代码 等服务商的信息， 或者是这类信息按一定规律的映射集； 所述共同信息 的登记通常可以事先在帐号发行或修改时通过安全方式进行； 所述码表 生成方法可以是数据抽取或映射规则、 运算规则或算法。 所述码表的生 成既可以一次生成后多次备查， 直到作为码表生成所需要输入的原始资 料信息被全部或部分改变； 也可每次验证身份时即时生成。 所述身份信 息， 如果被验证方是用户， 可以是用户的帐号或设备号等信息； 如果被 验证方是服务商， 则可以是服务商的服务表征代码等信息。 所述验证口 令是由数字或字符串构成的一组代码， 可以符合一定约束条件随机生成， 也可以按照一定规则生成， 或奢两者结合构成。
上述技术方案中， 所述约定的码表生成方法中至少包含有一个单向函数 运算步,骤。
所述的验证运算规则及算法中， 至少包含有一个单向函数运算歩骤。 所谓单向函数， 即这样一种函数 f， 如果它的定义域中的任意 X, 都易于 计算出 f ( X ) = y , 但对于 f 的值域中几乎所有的 y， 即使当 f 为已知时， 要计算 f— 1 ( y ) , 在计算上也是不可行的。 在信息安全中常用的单向函
数主要有两类， 单向陷门函数 （如 RSA算法等） 和单向散列函数 （又称 Hash函数或杂凑函数， 如 MD5、 SHA-1 , 等等）。
进一步的技术方案， 所述步骤 (2)中， 被验证方生成一组代码作为第二验 证口令， 所述验证答案由验证口令和第二验证口令的组合及码表一起根 据约定的验证运算规则及算法获得， 发送给验证申请方的信息由验证答 案和第二验证口令构成； 所述步骤 ( 中， 获得标准应答时同样利用验证 口令和第二验证口令的组合。 其中， 所述验证口令与第二验证口令的组 合方法可以是预先定义的运算， 如分段混合等。
为同时实现公钥的传递， 上述技术方案中， 所述步骤 (2)中， 在获得验证 答案后， 被验证方把自己的公钥与验证答案一起做成数字摘要， 再用自 己的私钥把该摘要做成数字签名， 被验证方把该数字签名和被验证方的 公钥一起发给验证申请方； 所述步骤 (3)中， 在确认身份后， 验证申请方 用被验证方的公钥将数字签名还原成待验证的数字摘要， 并自己把被验 证方公钥与验证答案一起生成摘要， 然后和接收到的待验证的数字摘要 比对， 如果正确， 则接受被验证方的公钥。
或者， 所述步骤 (2)中， 在获得验证答案后， 被验证方把自己的公钥与验 证答案一起做成数字摘要， 被验证方把该数字摘要和被验证方的公钥一 起发给验证申请方； 所述步骤 (3)中， 在确认身份后， 验证申请方把被验 证方公钥与验证答案一起生成摘要， 然后和接收到的待验证的数字摘要 比对， 如果正确， 则接受被验证方的公钥。
上述技术方案中， 所述共同信息中含有私密信息， 包括用户帐号、 密码。 为增加破译难度， 所述共同信息中含有可变部分， 包括当前日期。
上述技术方案中， 所述约定的验证运算规则及算法中包含有仅由双方获 知的映射规则、 运算因子、 或私钥中的一种或几种。
进一步的技术方案， 在被验证方和验证申请方的计算机上连接有保密硬 件装置， 所述验证答案和标准应答的运算过程在保密硬件装置中完成， 所述码表存储于保密硬件装置内部。 保密硬件装置是现有技术中为了实 现密码等的保密处理而设计的硬件装置， 例如， 在中国发明专利申请 CN1808975A中， 公开了一种外接网络帐号防盗装置， 即可用作本发明的
保密硬件装置。 采用保密硬件装置后， 存储在其内部的信息不能在客户 电脑上读出， 运算过程也无从得知。
由于上述技术方案运用， 本发明与现有技术相比具有下列优点：
1 . 本发明利用验证申请方和被验证方共同知道的信息来构建码表， 进而 与验证口令一起生成验证答案， 来实现身份认证， 因而安全有效可靠； 在所述的验证运算规则及算法采用达到当时公认的不能在有效时间内破 解的强度的公开密钥算法、 Hash算法时， 码表组成验证答案的组合的数 目远远大于在码表变化周期内的正常最多登录次数， 由于几次给出的密 语问题和密语答案， 即使被记录和事后破解， 也不能恢复出完整的用户 信息， 所以该身份认证的数据通讯即使被大量监听， 该认证方法也是安 全可靠的。
2. 由于本发明生成码表的共同信息中包含私密信息 （如用户帐号密码） 和可变因素（如日期， IP地址等）， 码表组成验证答案的组合的数目远远 大于在码表变化周期内的正常最多登录次数 （如码表变化周期为一天， 码表组成验证答案的组合的数目为 100万），特别是在使用对明文比特位 变化敏感和扩散 （Diffusion ) 的单向算法 （如 Hash算法等） 处理的情况 下， 是非常安全可靠的。
3. 本发明采用点对点的网络身份认证方法， 不依赖于公共数字证书， 不 需要第三方认证中心帮助， 因而实现方便， 费用低。
4. 本发明可以与中国发明专利申请 200610023658.X配套使用， 由于客户 端的用户信息， 各项约定规则， 特征段， 码表， 都在外界硬件装置内， 而不是暴露在客户端电脑的硬盘或内存中， 所以不会被窃取； 由于动态 加密， 所以难以破解； 由于使用服务号等， 可以方便使用多个网络服务 平台。 附图说明
附图 1为本发明实施例一的流程示意图；
附图 2为本发明实施例二的流程示意图。
具体实施方式
下面结合附图及实施例对本发明作进一步描述：
实施例一： 参见附图 1 所示， 一种点对点网络身份认证方法， 由被验证 方和验证申请方的计算机通过点对点的网络通信实现， 包括如下步骤：
(1)服务商和用户在在帐号登记和发放时， 通过安全方式登记 （如在服务 器的数据库和发放给用户的硬件设备中存储） 双方共同知道的信息， 所 述共同信息可以是客户的用户帐号、 密码、 证件号码、 联系方式， 服务 代码， 登录当时服务器的日期等；
(2)双方通过安全方式登记 （如在服务器的数据库和发放给用户的硬件设 备中存储） 双方使用的生成码表的同样规则和方法， 包括数据抽取或映 射规则、 运算规则或算法， 其生成规则可以是：
从共同信息的各个字段中按一定顺序抽取一定的比特信息， 按次序打乱 混合， 组成 160byte共晓信息片段， 并分成 4段。
用 SHA256算法对每段共晓信息片段运算， 结果依次链接， 组成 128 byte 码表。
(3)双方通过安全方式登记 （如在发放给用户的硬件设备中存储） 双方使 用的通过验证口令和码表生成验证答案的运算规则和算法， 可以是： 从验证口令中取出地址信息 （如 M ) , 按位査得码表中对应的第 M 个 half-byte。
规定验证口令中含 72个地址信息 （其中 40个由验证申请方在 0~255 内 随机生成， 32个由被验证方在 0~255内随机生成），按上述方法査询码表 后取得 72个 half-byte, 将结果顺序排列。
用 SHA256算法对上述结果运算， ·得到 32 byte长的验证答案。
(4)开始验证时， 服务器向客户端出示自己身份 （发送服务商的服务表征 代码）， 客户端向服务器出示身份 （发送用户帐号或设备号）。
(5)验证申请方生成一组代码 （内含 40个 0~255 的地址信息）， 作为验证 口令， 向被验证方发送；
被验证方随机生成 32个 0~255的地址信息， 作为第二验证口令， 和接收 到的验证口令一起构成组合验证口令。 被验证方从码表中根据组合验证
口令， 按步骤 (3)中双方规定的规则运算， 得到 32 byte长的验证答案； 被验证方把自己的公钥、验证答案、第二验证口令和其他信息，用 SHA256 算法做成数字摘要；
被验证方用自己的私钥， 把该摘要用公开密钥算法做成数字签名； 被验证方把该数字签名、 第二验证口令以及被验证方的公钥一起发送给 验证申请方。
(6)验证申请方将第二验证口令和验证口令一起构成组合验证口令， 自己 从码表中根据组合验证口令用步骤 (3)中双方规定的同样规则运算， 得到 结果， 并生成数字摘要。
(7)验证申请方用被验证方的公钥将数字签名还原成数字摘要， 通过验证 数字摘要， 证明被验证方的公钥确实由被验证方发出， 并且中间未被篡 改后， 接受被验证方的公钥。 否则拒绝接受。
(8)如果是双向验证， 则客户端和服务器端交换被验证方和验证申请方角 色， 重复步骤 (4)〜步骤 (7)。 '
双方完成身份确认并接受对方的公钥后，可以继续后续保密握手流程（如 生成和交换一次性的对称密钥）、 定时握手和保密数据传输。
实施例二： 参见附图 2 所示， 一种点对点网络身份认证方法， 由被验证 方和验证申请方的计算机通过点对点的网络通信实现， 包括如下步骤：
(1)服务商和用户在帐号登记和发放时， 在服务器的数据库和发放给用户 的硬件设备中分别存储双方共同知道的信息 （例如客户的用户帐号、 密 码、 证件号码、 联系方式， 服务代码， 日期 （登录当时服务器的日期））。
(2)在服务器的数据库和发放给用户的硬件设备中分别存储双方使用的生 成码表的同样规则和方法 （数据抽取或映射规则、 运算规则或算法）： 从双方共同知道的信息的各个字段中按一定顺序抽取一定的比特信息， 按次序打乱混合， 组成 50 byte共晓信息片段， 并分成 2段。
用 SHA-1算法对共晓信息片段运算， 结果依次链接， 组成 40 byte码表。
(3)在服务器和发放给用户的硬件设备中分别存储双方使用的通过验证口 令和码表生成验证答案的运算规则和算法：
规定验证口令中含 40个 byte (其中 22个由验证申请方随机生成， 18个
由被验证方随机生成）。
用 HMAC-SHA1算法对上述结果运算， 得到 20 byte长的验证答案： ipad = 字节 （0x36) 重复 40次
opad = 字节 （0x5c) 重复 40次
验证答案 = SHA1 (验证口令 XOR opad, SHA1 (验证口令 XOR ipad , 码表））。
(4)服务器向客户出示自己身份（发送服务商的服务表征代码）， 客户端向 服务出示身份 （发送用户帐号或设备号）；
(5)验证申请方生成 22byte随机数， 作为验证口令， 向被验证方发送提出； 被验证方生成随机生成 18byte随机数， 作为第二验证口令， 和验证口令 一起构成组合验证口令。 被验证方从码表中根据组合验证口令， 按步骤 3 中双方规定的规则运算， 得到 20 byte长的验证答案；
被验证方把自己的公钥、 验证答案、 第二验证口令和其他信息， 用 SHA1 算法做成数字摘要；
被验证方用自己的私钥， 把该摘要用公开密钥算法做成数字签名； 被验证方把该数字签名、 验证答案、 第二验证口令以及被验证方的公钥 一起发送给验证申请方；
(6)验证申请方将第二验证口令和验证口令组成组合验证口令， 自己从码 表中根据组合验证口令用步骤 (3)中双方规定的同样规则运算， 得到结果， 并与被验证方发来的验证答案比较是否相同。 相同则确认身份， 不相同 则拒绝确认；
(7)如果被验证方的身份确认， 验证申请方用被验证方的公钥将数字签名 还原成数字摘要， 通过验证数字摘要， 证明被验证方的公钥确实由被验 证方发出， 并且中间未被篡改后， 接受被验证方的公钥。 否则拒绝接受。
(8)如果是双向验证， 则客户端和服务器端交换被验证方和验证申请方角 色， 重复步骤 (4)〜步骤 (7)。
双方完成身份确认并接受对方的公钥后，可以继续后续保密握手流程（如 生成和交换一次性的对称密钥）、 定时握手和保密数据传输。
Claims
1. 一种点对点网络身份认证方法， 由被验证方和验证申请方的计算机通 过点对点的网络通信实现， 其特征在于： 在被验证方和验证申请方分别 登记共同信息， 并约定码表生成方法、 验证运算规则及算法， 分别在被 验证方和验证申请方采用所述约定的码表生成方法， 利用共同信息生成 码表， 每次进行身份认证时， 包括如下步骤：
(1) 被验证方向验证申请方发送身份信息， 验证申请方生成一组代码作为 验证口令， 发送给被验证方；
(2) 被验证方根据码表和验证口令， 采用所述约定的验证运算规则及算 法， 获得验证答案， 发送给验证申请方；
(3) 验证申请方根据被验证方的身份信息， 选择与被验证方对应的码表， 釆用所述约定的验证运算规则及算法， 根据码表和验证口令， 获得标准 应答， 与步骤 (2)中接收到的验证答案进行对比， 相同则确认身份， 不相 同则拒绝确认。
2. 根据权利要求 1所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 所述 约定的码表生成方法中至少包含有一个单向函数运算步骤。
3. 根据权利要求 1所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 所述 的验证运算规则及算法中， 至少包含有一个单向函数运算步骤。
4. 根据权利要求 1所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 所述 步骤 (2)中， 被验证方生成一组代码作为第二验证口令， 所述验证答案由 验证口令和第二验证口令的组合及码表一起根据约定的验证运算规则及 算法获得， 发送给验证申请方的信息由验证答案和第二验证口令构成； 所述步骤 (3)中， 获得标准应答时同样利用验证口令和第二验证口令的组 合。
5. 根据权利要求 1所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 所述 步骤 (2)中， 在获得验证答案后， 被验 ffi方把自己的公钥与验证答案一起 做成数字摘要， 再用自己的私钥把该摘要做成数字签名， 被验证方把该
数字签名和被验证方的公钥一起发给验证申请方； 所述步骤 (3)中， 在确 认身份后， 验证申请方用被验证方的公钥将数字签名还原成待验证的数 字摘要， 并自己把被验证方公钥与验证答案一起生成摘要， 然后和接收 到的待验证的数字摘要比对， 如果正确， 则接受被验证方的公钥。
6. 根据权利要求 1所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 所述 步骤 (2)中， 在获得验证答案后， 被验证方把自己的公钥与验证答案一起 做成数字摘要， 被验证方把该数字摘要和被验证方的公钥一起发给验证 申请方； 所述步骤 (3)中， 在确认身份后， 验证申请方把被验证方公钥与 验证答案一起生成摘要， 然后和接收到的待验证的数字摘要比对， 如果 正确， 则接受被验证方的公钥。
7. 根据权利要求 1所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 所述 共同信息中含有私密信息， 包括用户帐号、 密码。
8. 根据权利要求 7所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 所述 共同信息中含有可变部分， 包括当前日期。
9. 根据权利要求 1所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 所述 约定的验证运算规则及算法中包含有仅由双方获知的映射规则、 运算因 子、 或私钥中的一种或几种。
10. 根据权利要求 1 所述的点对点网络身份认证方法， 其特征在于： 在 被验证方和验证申请方的计算机上连接有保密硬件装置， 所述验证答案 和标准应答的运算过程在保密硬件装置中完成， 所述码表存储于保密硬 件装置内部。
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| CN105282154A (zh) * | 2015-09-30 | 2016-01-27 | 山东信通电子股份有限公司 | 在实名认证中身份信息防篡改的方法 |
| CN106209835B (zh) * | 2016-07-08 | 2019-11-22 | 北京众享比特科技有限公司 | 对等网络通讯系统和方法 |
| CN108429726B (zh) * | 2017-07-12 | 2023-09-26 | 深圳市创想网络系统有限公司 | 一种安全wifi证书加密验证接入方法及其系统 |
| CN107682156A (zh) * | 2017-11-16 | 2018-02-09 | 山东渔翁信息技术股份有限公司 | 一种基于sm9算法的加密通信方法及装置 |
| CN110213195B (zh) * | 2018-02-28 | 2022-05-10 | 中国移动通信集团内蒙古有限公司 | 一种登录认证方法、服务器及用户终端 |
| CN115580403B (zh) * | 2022-12-09 | 2023-04-25 | 深圳市永达电子信息股份有限公司 | 一种基于pki的计算节点接入控制方法 |
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| CN1338845A (zh) * | 2001-09-27 | 2002-03-06 | 杨平良 | 基于互联网终端用户身份认证及联接系统 |
| CN1392706A (zh) * | 2002-08-13 | 2003-01-22 | 北京长城鼎兴网络通信技术有限公司 | 一种利用串行总线实现多点通信的方法 |
| JP2004326341A (ja) * | 2003-04-23 | 2004-11-18 | Nri & Ncc Co Ltd | 通信プログラム及び通信方法 |
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2006
- 2006-09-08 CN CN 200610041473 patent/CN100566250C/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
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Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1338845A (zh) * | 2001-09-27 | 2002-03-06 | 杨平良 | 基于互联网终端用户身份认证及联接系统 |
| CN1392706A (zh) * | 2002-08-13 | 2003-01-22 | 北京长城鼎兴网络通信技术有限公司 | 一种利用串行总线实现多点通信的方法 |
| JP2004326341A (ja) * | 2003-04-23 | 2004-11-18 | Nri & Ncc Co Ltd | 通信プログラム及び通信方法 |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN104751042A (zh) * | 2015-01-16 | 2015-07-01 | 西安电子科技大学 | 基于密码哈希与生物特征识别的可信性检测方法 |
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| Publication number | Publication date |
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| CN100566250C (zh) | 2009-12-02 |
| CN1925393A (zh) | 2007-03-07 |
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