WO2002084939A1 - Systeme et procede pour realiser de maniere sure un executable afin de preserver l'integrite de fichiers contre un acces non autorise aux fins de la securite du reseau - Google Patents

Systeme et procede pour realiser de maniere sure un executable afin de preserver l'integrite de fichiers contre un acces non autorise aux fins de la securite du reseau Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2002084939A1
WO2002084939A1 PCT/US2001/011552 US0111552W WO02084939A1 WO 2002084939 A1 WO2002084939 A1 WO 2002084939A1 US 0111552 W US0111552 W US 0111552W WO 02084939 A1 WO02084939 A1 WO 02084939A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
executable
checksum
inode
library file
execution
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2001/011552
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Mark Zielinski
Gabriel Logan
Brian Matthews
Original Assignee
Mark Zielinski
Gabriel Logan
Brian Matthews
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Mark Zielinski, Gabriel Logan, Brian Matthews filed Critical Mark Zielinski
Priority to PCT/US2001/011552 priority Critical patent/WO2002084939A1/fr
Publication of WO2002084939A1 publication Critical patent/WO2002084939A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow

Definitions

  • the following invention relates to a method and system for securing a computer system and, in particular, to a method and system for preserving the integrity of files contained in the computer system thereby securing the computer system from unauthorized access.
  • Computer systems are used to connect people and business worldwide.
  • the Internet which consists of a web of networked computer systems, has become a ubiquitous platform for global communications and commerce. Because of the central role networked computer systems have in today's economy, it is vital that the security of networked computer
  • a common prior art security device is a firewall that consists of hardware and software designed to keep unauthorized network traffic from accessing information within a networked computer system.
  • Firewalls typically examine the source address/source port number, destination address/destination port number, and protocol of packets contained in the traffic and, based on user-defined rules, determine whether the packets should be allowed to pass its boundary in either direction. If a packet contains a source address that is not included in the firewall's authorized list, then that packet will be denied access to the networked computer system.
  • firewall security A significant limitation of firewall security is that because firewalls do not inspect the contents of individual packets for potentially damaging exploit code, firewalls are unable to prevent attacks from more sophisticated security threats such as worms, viruses and Trojan Horse attacks. Furthermore, because all packets entering a networked computer system must be checked by the firewall before passing through, firewalls represent both a single point of failure and a bottleneck, especially as network traffic increases.
  • IDS intrusion detection system
  • intrusion detection systems actively screen the contents of network traffic for malicious activity based on attack signatures
  • an intrusion detection system can only identify attacks having signatures stored in its database but cannot identify any other attacks.
  • intrusion detection systems merely identify that attack has occurred based on signature analysis but cannot prevent attacks from occurring.
  • those skilled in the art continuously devise attacks for defeating intrusion detection systems regardless of whether such attacks are included in the system's database. Thus, intrusion detection systems do not provide networked computer systems with comprehensive protection against malicious attacks.
  • ACL access control list
  • An entry in an ACL may include a particular file stored on the host computer and an indication that user Jeff has permission to read, write and execute the file, user Brian has the right to read the file only while user Mo has no permission to access the file at all.
  • Such unauthorized access to certain system calls allows the user to gain root or administrator control of the computer system with which the user can copy, delete and modify any system files and executablees thereby compromising the system.
  • a host-based access control list is not sufficient to prevent malicious attacks.
  • Tate may be used to identify changes in a file based on a CRC check
  • the Tate mechanism is inadequate for preventing attacks on the computer system.
  • nothing in Tate prevents an attacker from accessing the system and modifying a file, computing the CRC of the modified file and then appending a new file seal containing the CRC of the modified file.
  • the Tate mechanism subsequently compares a recalculated CRC to the CRC now contained in the file seal, the CRCs will match and the modifications made by the attacker to the file will go unnoticed.
  • Such a executable would allow an attacker to modify files for the purpose of compromising the system in a manner that bypasses the security mechanism of Tate.
  • Tate mechanism a comparison between the CRC in the file seal and a recalculated CRC for the file is only performed on startup and periodically during system operation. In between CRC checks, however, the Tate mechanism is unable to prevent an attacker from modifying system files. Thus, the mechanism disclosed in Tate is unable to prevent malicious attacks on a computer system.
  • Tripwire Yet another prior art host-based security mechanism is provided by Tripwire (www.tripwire. com) in which an administrator executes an application on a computer host that creates a baseline database of files and directories contained in the computer host.
  • the baseline includes attributes for each file including the file's size, create-times and checksum.
  • the application executes an application on a computer host that creates a baseline database of files and directories contained in the computer host.
  • the baseline includes attributes for each file including the file's size, create-times and checksum.
  • the application is again executed by the administrator, it compares the files in their current state against this baseline database, and identifies any changes, additions, or deletions made to the file. In this way, the administrator can detect any unauthorized changes made to files contained in the baseline and this information can be used to identify the occurrence and scope of an attack on the computer host.
  • the Tripwire mechanism may be able to detect changes in files that would indicate that an attack has occurred, the Tripwire mechanism is inadequate in preventing an attack on a computer host because the Tripwire mechanism only detects changes made to files and directories after they occur at which time an attacker may have already compromised the computer host. In addition, because file changes, and therefore possible intrusions, are only detected when the administrator periodically executes the application, the Tripwire mechanism does not provides intrusion detection at other times.
  • the prior art security architecture that includes firewalls, intrusion detection systems as well as host-based security mechanisms such as access control lists and file monitoring, cannot prevent malicious attacks against networked computer systems.
  • the present invention is directed to overcoming the drawbacks of the prior art.
  • a method for securely executing a program on a computer system and includes the step of calculating a baseline checksum for the executable. Next, a baseline checksum for all libraries the executable depends upon is calculated. The baseline checksum for the executable and the baseline checksum(s) for the respective libraries the executable depends upon are stored in the kernel. A request to execute the executable is then received. A checksum for the executable and checksum(s) for all libraries the executable depends upon are calculated.
  • the executable is executed. If a single baseline checksum for the executable does not equal the checksum for the executable or a single baseline checksum for any one of libraries does not equal the checksum stored in kernel memory, then the executable is not executed.
  • the executable has an inode and the at least one library file has an inode and the inode of the executable is stored into a binary cache if the at least one baseline checksum for the executable equals the at least one execution checksum for the executable.
  • the inode of the library (libraries) is (are) stored into a libary cache if the at least one baseline checksum for the library (libraries) equal(s) the at least one execution checksum for the library (libraries).
  • the inode of the executable is removed from the binary cache if the executable has been modified in any way.
  • the inode of a library is removed from the library cache if the at least one library file has been modified.
  • the another instance of the executable is executed if the inode of the another instance of the executable is equal to the inode of the executable in the first cache and the inode of the another at least one library file equals the inode of the at least one library file in the second cache.
  • the at least one execution checksum for the another instance of the executable is recalculated if the inode of the another instance of the executable is not equal to the inode of the executable in the first cache and the executable is executed if the at least one baseline checksum for the executable equals the at least one execution checksum for the another instance of the executable and the inode of the another at least one library file equals the inode of the at least one library file in the second cache.
  • the at least one execution checksum for the another at least one library file is recalculated if the inode of the another at least one library file is not equal to the inode of the at least one library file in the second cache and the executable is executed if the at least one execution checksum for the another at least one library file equals the at least one baseline checksum for the at least one library file and the inode of the another instance of the executable equals the inode of the executable in the first cache.
  • the at least one execution checksum for another instance of the executable is recalculated if the inode of the another instance of the executable is not equal to the inode of the executable in the first cache
  • the at least one execution checksum for the another at least one library file is recalculated if the inode of the another at least one library file is not equal to the inode of the at least one library file in the second cache and the executable is executed if the at least one execution checksum for the another instance of the executable equals the at least one baseline checksum for the executable and the at least one execution checksum for the another at least one library file equals the at least one baseline checksum for the at least one library file.
  • an operating system kernel executes on the computer system and the secure location is in the kernel.
  • the first cache and the second cache are in the kernel.
  • the at least one baseline checksum for the executable, the at least one execution checksum for the executable, the at least one baseline checksum for the at least one library file and the at least one execution checksum for the at least one library file are selected from the group of MD5, SHA1 and RTPEMD160.
  • the at least one baseline checksum for the executable, the at least one execution checksum for the executable, the at least one baseline checksum for the at least one library file and the at least one execution checksum for the at least one library file includes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160.
  • a system for securely executing an executable on a computer system
  • the computer system includes an operating system kernel for providing services for the executable, and wherein the executable invokes a system call request for receiving services from the kernel.
  • the system includes a checksum list stored in the kernel, the checksum list including at least one baseline checksum for the executable.
  • an enhanced system call receiving the system call request, calculating at least one execution checksum for the executable and comparing the at least one baseline checksum for the executable and the at least one execution checksum for the executable.
  • the enhanced system call allows the system call request and if the at least one baseline checksum for the executable does not equal the at least one execution checksum for the executable, the enhanced system call denies the system call request.
  • the executable includes at least one dynamically linked library file
  • the checksum list includes at least one baseline checksum for the at least one library file
  • the enhanced system call calculates at least one execution checksum for the at least one library file and compares the at least one baseline checksum for the at least one library file and the at least one execution checksum for the at least one library file. If the at least one baseline checksum for the executable equals the at least one execution checksum for the executable and the at least one baseline checksum for the at least one library file equals the at least one execution checksum for the at least one library file, the enhanced system call allows said system call request.
  • the enhanced system call denies the system call request.
  • a method and system for preserving the integrity of files executed on a networked computer system thereby preventing attacks against the networked computer system along with backdoors.
  • FIG. 1 is a functional block diagram illustrating a system in which a executable executing on a computer system gains access to system services and resources provided by the computer system and an operating system kernel running on the computer system;
  • FIG. 2 is an intrusion prevention system 2 of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of the intrusion prevention system of FIG. 2.
  • executable 3 may be invoked by a user accessing the computer system from an access device 4 such as, by way of non-limiting example, a personal computer communicating with the computer system over the Internet.
  • an access device 4 such as, by way of non-limiting example, a personal computer communicating with the computer system over the Internet.
  • an access device 4 such as, by way of non-limiting example, a personal computer communicating with the computer system over the Internet.
  • any number of system resources such as, by way of non-limiting example, file access and communications may be required for executable 3 to accomplish its task.
  • executable 3 may be an Apache web server program running on the computer system that must be able to create, access and modify files stores on the computer system's hard disk.
  • executable 3 invokes one of a plurality of system calls 7 that is designed to request from kernel 5 the desired system service.
  • the system call gains access to kernel 5 via a kernel trap 9 that uses an interrupt mechanism to get the attention of kernel 5.
  • Kernel 5 then receives the system call request and executes the request accordingly. For example, if executable 3 requires access to a file named test.html, then an open(test.html) system
  • kernel 5 uses device drivers 13 to retrieve the file test, doc from a hardware device 11, such as a hard disk, and provides executable 3 with access to the file. Similarly, executable 3 may gain access to any other system resources it requires.
  • executable 3 may be modified by an attacker to cause executable 3 to request from kernel 5 any other system call that is not otherwise required by executable 3. The attacker may then gain access to system calls thereby enabling the attacker to compromise the computer system.
  • FIG. 2 there is shown the intrusion prevention system 2 of the present invention.
  • the intrusion prevention system 2 of the present invention. It is known that in most operating systems, there is a single system call that is called by every executable/program in order for the executable/program to receive services from the operating system kernel. For example, in most operating systems, an executable must call an exec system call to gain access to system services. Thus, a program/executable cannot perform required functions, such as open files or writes files, without invoking the exec system call.
  • the exec system call is modified to form an enhanced system call 17 that performs various features and functions of the present invention as well as the functions of the exec system call.
  • System 2 includes an administrator interface module 19 that receives from an administrator operating an administrator access device 6 a list of executables that the administrator desires to protect for unauthorized modifications. Upon receipt of a list of executables to protect, administrator interface module 19 sets a flag indicating to enhanced
  • enhanced system call 17 When intrusion prevention system 2 is initially activated, enhanced system call 17 first accesses administrator interface module 19 to determine which executables the administrator desires to protect. For each executable contained in administrator interface module, enhanced system call 17 calculates a checksum for the executable and stores the checksum, along with a file identifier such as, by way of non-limiting example, the inode of the file, in a checksum list 23 contained in kernel 15. In addition, for all executables that also require library files to execute, enhanced system call 17 also calculates the checksums for those library files and stores the library file checksums, along with a library inode, into checksum list 23. Thus, checksum list 23 contain baseline checksums for all of the executables, and related library files, that the administrator desires to protect.
  • enhanced system call 17 When a user operating access device 4 invokes a particular executable such as, for example, an Apache web server program, in order to access system services the executable calls the exec system call which, in system 2, has been modified to be enhanced system call 17, as described above. Before the executable is allowed to execute and is provided with access to system services, enhanced system call 17 first calculates a checksum on the executable and then compares this checksum to the baseline checksum previously stored in checksum list 23 in kernel 15 for the particular executable. If the baseline checksum in checksum list 23 matches the checksum of the calling executable presently calculated by enhanced system call 17 at execution time, then it is determined that the executable binary file has not been modified and is identical to the executable binary file in existence at the time intrusion prevention mechanism was activated.
  • a particular executable such as, for example, an Apache web server program
  • enhanced system call 17 determines whether the calling executable is a static binary or dynamically linked which would then require dynamically-linked library files for execution. If it is a dynamically linked binary, then enhanced system call 17 retrieves each required library and calculates checksum for each such library. Enhanced system call 17 then compares the calculated checksum for each library file with the baseline checksum for the corresponding library file that is stored in checksum 23. If the calculated execution checksum and the baseline checksum for each library file match, then it is determined that the library file(s) required by the calling executable have also not been modified. Thus, because the executable binary file and the library files required by the calling executable have not been modified, enhanced system call 17 allows the calling executable to execute and gain access to system services provided by kernel 15.
  • enhanced system call 17 stores the inode of the executable in a binary cache 25 and the inodes of any associated library files in library cache 21. For example, if it is determined by enhanced system call 17 that an Apache web server program has not been modified, then enhanced system call 17 stores in binary cache 25 the inode of the Apache web server program, for example inode no. 722 (which includes, among other things, the location on the disk that contain the Apache web server program, as is well-known in the art). If another instance of the Apache web server program having an inode no.
  • enhanced system call 17 first checks to see if inode no. 722 is stored in binary cache 25. If it is, this indicates that the integrity of the Apache web server program was previously verified. The inodes of dynamically-linked library files are similarly checked against inodes stored in library cache 21 and, if a match exists, enhanced system call 17 allows the new instance of the Apache web server program to execute.
  • inode number for a calling executable does not match the inode number for the same executable stored in binary cache 25.
  • an inode number of 815 corresponding to an Apache web server program is stored in binary cache 25. If a user creates a new program and names it Apache, this new program may be assigned an inode number of 765.
  • enhanced system call 17 will determine that the inode number (765) of the calling Apache program is different than the inode number (815) stored in binary cache 25 associated with the Apache web server program. Therefore, the calling Apache program will not be allowed to execute based on its inode. As a result, enhanced system call 17 must then calculate the checksum of the calling Apache program to determine whether it matches the baseline checksum for the Apache web server program stored in checksum list 23.
  • the checksum that enhanced system call 17 applies to program binary files and library files is the SHA1 function that calculates a 160-bit cryptographic checksum according to known techniques.
  • the checksum used may be an MD5 128-bit message digest or a RIPEMD160 160-bit cryptographic checksum.
  • enhanced system call 17 may be configured to apply more than one checksum to a executable binary file and/or library file.
  • more than one baseline checksum is stored in checksum list 23 for a given executable binary file and/or library file. In order for execution of the executable to be allowed, enhanced system call 17 must calculate the different checksums for the calling executable binary file and library files and determine that each of the calculated checksums match a corresponding baseline checksum.
  • system 2 includes a log file 27 that is in communications with enhanced system call 17.
  • System 2 may be configured so that any desired event may be logged to log file 27 including, but not limited to, successful executions of executables (and related library files) and/or illegal attempts to execute an executable (and related library files). Furthermore, when an illegal execution is identified, system 2 may be configured to take any
  • the system could likewise be configured to contact a firewall or router device to write a firewall wall rule or acl in the router to terminate the ability of the attacker to continue contact with that or any other server on the network.
  • Step 1 a request for kernel services issued by executable 3 is received by enhanced system call 17.
  • Step 2 it is determined whether the inode of the calling executable equals an inode of the executable contained in binary cache 25. If no matching inode is found then, in Step 9, a checksum of the calling executable is generated and, in Step 10, it is determined whether the calculated checksum equals the checksum for the executable contained in checksum list 23. If the checksums do not match, then execution of the executable is denied in Step 12.
  • Step 11 the inode for the calling executable is placed in binary cache 25 and, in Step 3, it is determined whether the calling executable requires dynamically-linked libraries. If the calling executable does not use any dynamically-linked libraries then execution of the calling executable is allowed in Step 8. If the calling executable does use dynamically-linked library(s) then, in Step 4, it is determined whether the inode(s) of the library file(s) equals the respective inode(s) for the library file(s) contained in library cache 21. If a matching inode is found, then execution of the executable is allowed in Step 8. If no matching inode is found then, in Step 5, a checksum of the library files are generated and, in Step 6, it is determined whether the calculated checksum equals the checksum for the library files stored in checksum list 23. If the checksums do not
  • Step 7 the inodes for the library files are placed in library cache 21 and execution of the executable is allowed in Step 8.
  • a method and system for preventing an intrusion into a networked computer system by preserving the integrity of executables executing on the networked computer.
  • the method and system preserves the integrity of such executables by only allowing an executable to execute if the checksums of the executable binary and any required dynamically-linked library files calculated at the time of execution of the executable equals baseline checksums for the executable and library files previously computed and stored in checksum list 23.
  • the method and system of the present invention prevents an attacker from compromising a networked computer system through the unauthorized modification of executable and library files.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé permettant de réaliser de manière sûre un exécutable (3) sur un système informatique, qui consiste à calculer une somme de contrôle de base pour ledit exécutable (3) et à la stocker en lieu sûr le noyau (5). On reçoit ensuite une demande de réalisation de l'exécutable (3) et on calcule une somme de contrôle de réalisation de l'exécutable (3). Ce dernier (3) est réalisé si la somme de contrôle de base de l'exécutable (3) est égale à la somme de contrôle de réalisation dudit exécutable (3). L'exécutable (3) n'est pas réalisé si la somme de contrôle de l'exécutable (3) n'est pas égale à la somme de contrôle de réalisation dudit exécutable (3).
PCT/US2001/011552 2001-04-10 2001-04-10 Systeme et procede pour realiser de maniere sure un executable afin de preserver l'integrite de fichiers contre un acces non autorise aux fins de la securite du reseau WO2002084939A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

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PCT/US2001/011552 WO2002084939A1 (fr) 2001-04-10 2001-04-10 Systeme et procede pour realiser de maniere sure un executable afin de preserver l'integrite de fichiers contre un acces non autorise aux fins de la securite du reseau

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PCT/US2001/011552 WO2002084939A1 (fr) 2001-04-10 2001-04-10 Systeme et procede pour realiser de maniere sure un executable afin de preserver l'integrite de fichiers contre un acces non autorise aux fins de la securite du reseau

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2007123492A1 (fr) * 2006-04-25 2007-11-01 Khee Seng Chua Procede de protection contre un logiciel malveillant (maliciel)
US20200411047A1 (en) * 2019-06-25 2020-12-31 International Business Machines Corporation Detecting electronic system modification

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US5666411A (en) * 1994-01-13 1997-09-09 Mccarty; Johnnie C. System for computer software protection
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US5950205A (en) * 1997-09-25 1999-09-07 Cisco Technology, Inc. Data transmission over the internet using a cache memory file system
US6026474A (en) * 1996-11-22 2000-02-15 Mangosoft Corporation Shared client-side web caching using globally addressable memory
US6058389A (en) * 1997-10-31 2000-05-02 Oracle Corporation Apparatus and method for message queuing in a database system

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5440723A (en) * 1993-01-19 1995-08-08 International Business Machines Corporation Automatic immune system for computers and computer networks
US5666411A (en) * 1994-01-13 1997-09-09 Mccarty; Johnnie C. System for computer software protection
US5797015A (en) * 1995-04-18 1998-08-18 Pitney Bowes Inc. Method of customizing application software in inserter systems
US6026474A (en) * 1996-11-22 2000-02-15 Mangosoft Corporation Shared client-side web caching using globally addressable memory
US5950205A (en) * 1997-09-25 1999-09-07 Cisco Technology, Inc. Data transmission over the internet using a cache memory file system
US6058389A (en) * 1997-10-31 2000-05-02 Oracle Corporation Apparatus and method for message queuing in a database system

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2007123492A1 (fr) * 2006-04-25 2007-11-01 Khee Seng Chua Procede de protection contre un logiciel malveillant (maliciel)
US20200411047A1 (en) * 2019-06-25 2020-12-31 International Business Machines Corporation Detecting electronic system modification

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