WO2001059728A1 - Method and device for mutual authentication of two data processing units - Google Patents
Method and device for mutual authentication of two data processing units Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2001059728A1 WO2001059728A1 PCT/DE2001/000335 DE0100335W WO0159728A1 WO 2001059728 A1 WO2001059728 A1 WO 2001059728A1 DE 0100335 W DE0100335 W DE 0100335W WO 0159728 A1 WO0159728 A1 WO 0159728A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- bit sequence
- data processing
- processing unit
- data
- algorithm
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method and an arrangement for mutual authentication of two data processing units with the aid of a challenge-response method.
- the authentication of data processing units has gained great economic importance in connection with electronic data transmission, electronic signatures, chip cards, such as telephone cards and cash cards.
- the authentication of a data processing unit is of great importance if only authorized users or data processing units are allowed to read or modify data.
- DES Data Encryption Standard
- RSA Raster Shamer Adelman
- zero-knowledge techniques from Fiat Schamir, Guillou Quisquater or Schnorr.
- the challenge-response method has in common that a random number (challenge) is generated and sent to the data processing unit to be checked.
- the data processing unit to be checked uses a suitable cryptographic method, the data processing unit to be checked generates a response number (response) which is sent back to the checking data processing unit.
- the checking data processing unit uses the challenge and the response to check the authenticity of the data processing unit to be checked.
- the challenge-response method is carried out twice, the roles of the checking data processing unit and the data processing unit to be checked being exchanged in the second procedure, so that each data processing unit checks the other.
- the object is achieved by a method for mutual authentication of a first data processing unit and a second data processing unit with the following method steps: generating a first bit sequence in the first data processing unit; transmitting the first bit sequence to the second data processing unit; generating a second bit sequence and a third bit sequence from the first bit sequence and first data using a first algorithm in the second data processing unit; transmitting the second bit sequence to the first data processing unit; generating a first authentication result and a fourth bit sequence from the first bit sequence, the second bit sequence and second data by means of a second algorithm in the first data processing unit; generating a fifth bit sequence from the fourth bit sequence and third data using a third algorithm in the first data processing unit; transmitting the fifth bit sequence to the second data processing unit; generate a second authentication result from the third bit sequence, the fifth bit sequence and fourth data by means of a fourth algorithm in the second data processing unit.
- the advantage of the method according to the invention is that the first bit sequence is used to authenticate the second data processing unit by the first data processing unit and is used to calculate the third and fourth bit sequences.
- This method makes it possible to provide the second data processing unit without a random generator.
- the random number generator By saving the random number generator, the second data processing unit can be made considerably more compact, simple and therefore more cost-effective. This is crucial, for example, if a secure authentication process is to be used in a mass market application such as chip cards.
- the saving of a random generator means an enormous simplification of the data processing unit, because the random generator is subject to considerable requirements with regard to randomness and insensitivity to external manipulations.
- An advantageous embodiment of the method according to the invention provides that the third bit sequence is transmitted from the second data processing unit to the first data processing unit and is used by the second algorithm to generate the first authentication result and / or the fourth bit sequence. This procedure allows a larger variety of calculation methods to be used in the second algorithm, which can simplify the second algorithm.
- the third bit sequence is an intermediate result of the calculation of the second bit sequence. This procedure means that the first algorithm additional effort avoided, so that the execution of the first algorithm can be carried out faster.
- a further advantageous embodiment of the method provides that the first bit sequence is generated randomly.
- the generation of a random first bit sequence increases the security of the method.
- the first bit sequence is chosen so that it differs from all the first bit sequences already used. This ensures that an attacker can neither predict the first bit sequence nor the second bit sequence calculated from it. This increases the security of the process.
- An arrangement for carrying out the method according to the invention comprises a first data processing unit and a second data processing unit, a bit sequence generator for generating a first bit sequence being arranged in the first data processing unit and a first bit sequence processing unit for generating a second being arranged in the second data processing unit Bit sequence and a third bit sequence from the first bit sequence and first data is arranged, and wherein a second bit sequence processing unit is provided in the first data processing unit for generating a first authentication result and a fourth bit sequence from the first bit sequence, the second bit sequence and second data, and wherein a third bit sequence processing unit for generating a fifth bit sequence is arranged in the first data processing unit and a fourth bit sequence processing is arranged in the second data processing unit It is arranged for the generation of a second authentication result from the third bit sequence, the fifth bit sequence and fourth data.
- the data processing units can be designed, for example, as computers, laptops, palm tops, cell phones, handhelds, chip cards, cash cards, telephone cards, health cards and a number of other T
- At least one of the data processing units is designed as an integrated circuit. This makes a very compact, space-saving and reproducible data processing unit possible.
- one of the data processing units is mobile. This enables the data processing unit to be easily transported.
- one of the data processing units contains a shift register that is fed back with at least one XOR gate.
- An XOR gate is a logical exclusive or function that is embodied in a component that is referred to as a gate. This arrangement enables a very space-saving, cryptographically secure data processing unit.
- the shift register represents part of the unit in which one of the four algorithms is executed.
- a further advantageous arrangement provides that one data processing unit is a chip card and the other data processing unit is a chip card terminal.
- Figure 1 A first inventive method for mutual authentication of two data processing units
- FIG 2 Another inventive method for mutual authentication of two data processing units.
- FIG. 1 shows a system consisting of a first data processing unit 1 and a second data processing unit 2. Furthermore, a flow diagram is shown in which some method steps are carried out in the first data processing unit 1 and other data processing steps in the data processing unit 2.
- the method begins with the generation of a first bit sequence B1, which is generated in the first data processing unit 1 in this exemplary embodiment with a random generator ZG.
- the first bit sequence B1 is transmitted from the first data processing unit 1 to the second data processing unit 2 and a second bit sequence B2 and a third bit sequence B3 are generated in the second data processing unit 2 with the algorithm AI from the first bit sequence B1 and first data D1.
- the algorithm can be one of the algorithms known from the prior art, such as DES, RSA, etc.
- the data D1 is, for example, a secret key and / or other data required for calculating the second bit sequence B2 and / or the third bit sequence B3.
- the second bit sequence B2 is then transmitted from the second data processing unit 2 to the first data processing unit 1.
- the first data processing unit 1 there is a first authentication result R1 as a result of the authentication of the second data processing unit 2 by the first data processing unit 1 and it becomes a fourth bit sequence B4 with a second algorithm A2 generated from the first bit sequence B1, the second bit sequence B2 and second data D2.
- the second algorithm A2 is selected in accordance with the encryption algorithm used (DES, RSA, etc.) and corresponds to the first algorithm AI.
- the data D2 include, for example, a secret key or a secret master key, from which the secret key can be calculated.
- the RSA is, for example, a private and / or a public key.
- a fifth bit sequence B5 is generated with a third algorithm A3 from the fourth bit sequence B4 and third data D3.
- the fifth bit sequence B5 is transmitted from the first data processing unit 1 to the second data processing unit 2.
- Authentication result R2 as a result of the authentication of the first data processing unit 1 by the second data processing unit 2 with a fourth algorithm from the third bit sequence B3, the fifth bit sequence B5 and fourth data D4.
- the algorithms A3 and A4 can be, for example, an algorithm known from the prior art (DES, RSA, etc.).
- the data D3 and D4 are, for example, secret keys.
- the algorithm AI can, for example, match the algorithm A3.
- the algorithms AI, A2, A3 and A4 are, for example, cryptographic methods.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Detection And Prevention Of Errors In Transmission (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
BR0108090-3A BR0108090A (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2001-01-26 | Process and arrangement for the reciprocal authentication of two data processing units |
MXPA02007602A MXPA02007602A (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2001-01-26 | Method and device for mutual authentication of two data processing units. |
KR1020027010002A KR100542267B1 (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2001-01-26 | Method and device for mutual authentication of two data processing units |
UA2002086590A UA72579C2 (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2001-01-26 | Method and device for mutual authentication of two data processing units |
JP2001558970A JP3676735B2 (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2001-01-26 | Method and apparatus for mutual authentication of two data processing units |
US10/215,131 US7353392B2 (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2002-08-08 | Method and configuration for mutual authentication of two data processing units |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP00102634A EP1124206A1 (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2000-02-08 | Method and assembly for the mutual authentication of two data processor units |
EP00102634.3 | 2000-02-08 |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US10/215,131 Continuation US7353392B2 (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2002-08-08 | Method and configuration for mutual authentication of two data processing units |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2001059728A1 true WO2001059728A1 (en) | 2001-08-16 |
Family
ID=8167801
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/DE2001/000335 WO2001059728A1 (en) | 2000-02-08 | 2001-01-26 | Method and device for mutual authentication of two data processing units |
Country Status (11)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7353392B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1124206A1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP3676735B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR100542267B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN1222915C (en) |
BR (1) | BR0108090A (en) |
MX (1) | MXPA02007602A (en) |
RU (1) | RU2236760C2 (en) |
TW (1) | TW538386B (en) |
UA (1) | UA72579C2 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2001059728A1 (en) |
Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2003088564A1 (en) * | 2002-04-12 | 2003-10-23 | Scm Microsystems Gmbh | Authentication method |
WO2004034321A1 (en) * | 2002-10-04 | 2004-04-22 | Battelle Memorial Institute | A challenged-based tag authentication model |
JP2006041714A (en) * | 2004-07-23 | 2006-02-09 | Sangikyou:Kk | Authentication and authentication response system |
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US7889052B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2011-02-15 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Authorizing payment subsequent to RF transactions |
US7239226B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2007-07-03 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | System and method for payment using radio frequency identification in contact and contactless transactions |
US7172112B2 (en) | 2000-01-21 | 2007-02-06 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Public/private dual card system and method |
US7705732B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2010-04-27 | Fred Bishop | Authenticating an RF transaction using a transaction counter |
US8294552B2 (en) * | 2001-07-10 | 2012-10-23 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Facial scan biometrics on a payment device |
US7735725B1 (en) * | 2001-07-10 | 2010-06-15 | Fred Bishop | Processing an RF transaction using a routing number |
US8284025B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2012-10-09 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Method and system for auditory recognition biometrics on a FOB |
US7493288B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2009-02-17 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | RF payment via a mobile device |
US7746215B1 (en) * | 2001-07-10 | 2010-06-29 | Fred Bishop | RF transactions using a wireless reader grid |
US9454752B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2016-09-27 | Chartoleaux Kg Limited Liability Company | Reload protocol at a transaction processing entity |
US7360689B2 (en) * | 2001-07-10 | 2008-04-22 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Method and system for proffering multiple biometrics for use with a FOB |
US7119659B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2006-10-10 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Systems and methods for providing a RF transaction device for use in a private label transaction |
US7303120B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2007-12-04 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | System for biometric security using a FOB |
US7249112B2 (en) * | 2002-07-09 | 2007-07-24 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | System and method for assigning a funding source for a radio frequency identification device |
US8548927B2 (en) * | 2001-07-10 | 2013-10-01 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Biometric registration for facilitating an RF transaction |
US20040236699A1 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2004-11-25 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Method and system for hand geometry recognition biometrics on a fob |
US9024719B1 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2015-05-05 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | RF transaction system and method for storing user personal data |
US6805287B2 (en) | 2002-09-12 | 2004-10-19 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | System and method for converting a stored value card to a credit card |
CN1774687A (en) * | 2003-04-14 | 2006-05-17 | 松下电器产业株式会社 | Client end server authenticationn using challenge response principle |
US20050058292A1 (en) * | 2003-09-11 | 2005-03-17 | Impinj, Inc., A Delaware Corporation | Secure two-way RFID communications |
JP2005094089A (en) * | 2003-09-12 | 2005-04-07 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | Authentication unit, unit to be authenticated, authentication system, authentication method, method to be authenticated, program and computer readable medium recording that program |
US7617390B2 (en) * | 2004-06-25 | 2009-11-10 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Server authentication in non-secure channel card pin reset methods and computer implemented processes |
US8510225B2 (en) | 2004-09-01 | 2013-08-13 | Research In Motion Limited | Split channel authenticity queries in multi-party dialog |
US8049594B1 (en) | 2004-11-30 | 2011-11-01 | Xatra Fund Mx, Llc | Enhanced RFID instrument security |
CN101194274B (en) * | 2005-06-07 | 2012-07-04 | Nxp股份有限公司 | Method and device for increased rfid transmission security |
FI119530B (en) * | 2005-06-10 | 2008-12-15 | Trackway Oy | Product tag verification |
KR100723862B1 (en) | 2005-11-05 | 2007-05-31 | 한국전자통신연구원 | RFID access contol method and system for the same |
JP4902846B2 (en) * | 2006-03-03 | 2012-03-21 | 三菱電機株式会社 | Information processing apparatus, encryption method, and program |
US7450010B1 (en) * | 2006-04-17 | 2008-11-11 | Tc License Ltd. | RFID mutual authentication verification session |
DE102008021046A1 (en) * | 2008-04-26 | 2009-10-29 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Method of operating a keyboard of a self-service terminal |
US8522027B2 (en) * | 2008-06-16 | 2013-08-27 | France Telecom | Method for authenticating an entity by a verifier |
BR112013007197A2 (en) | 2010-10-04 | 2016-06-14 | Hahn Gmbh & Co Kg Dr | a method for contactless transmission of electrical energy and / or electrical signals between a wall and a sheet attached to said wall, and a device for carrying out the same |
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GB2144564A (en) * | 1983-07-29 | 1985-03-06 | Philips Nv | Authentication system between a card reader and a card exchanger data |
EP0440158A1 (en) * | 1990-01-30 | 1991-08-07 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Mutual authentication system |
EP0782115A2 (en) * | 1995-11-02 | 1997-07-02 | Oki Electric Industry Co., Ltd. | Method of effecting mutual authentication |
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JP3526524B2 (en) * | 1996-10-31 | 2004-05-17 | 松下電器産業株式会社 | One-way data conversion device and device authentication system |
JPH1158732A (en) | 1997-08-13 | 1999-03-02 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | Ink jet head driver |
-
2000
- 2000-02-08 EP EP00102634A patent/EP1124206A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2001
- 2001-01-26 JP JP2001558970A patent/JP3676735B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2001-01-26 BR BR0108090-3A patent/BR0108090A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2001-01-26 KR KR1020027010002A patent/KR100542267B1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2001-01-26 RU RU2002123875/09A patent/RU2236760C2/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2001-01-26 UA UA2002086590A patent/UA72579C2/en unknown
- 2001-01-26 CN CNB018046681A patent/CN1222915C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2001-01-26 MX MXPA02007602A patent/MXPA02007602A/en active IP Right Grant
- 2001-01-26 WO PCT/DE2001/000335 patent/WO2001059728A1/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2001-02-07 TW TW090102597A patent/TW538386B/en not_active IP Right Cessation
-
2002
- 2002-08-08 US US10/215,131 patent/US7353392B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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GB2144564A (en) * | 1983-07-29 | 1985-03-06 | Philips Nv | Authentication system between a card reader and a card exchanger data |
EP0440158A1 (en) * | 1990-01-30 | 1991-08-07 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Mutual authentication system |
EP0782115A2 (en) * | 1995-11-02 | 1997-07-02 | Oki Electric Industry Co., Ltd. | Method of effecting mutual authentication |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2003088564A1 (en) * | 2002-04-12 | 2003-10-23 | Scm Microsystems Gmbh | Authentication method |
WO2004034321A1 (en) * | 2002-10-04 | 2004-04-22 | Battelle Memorial Institute | A challenged-based tag authentication model |
US6842106B2 (en) | 2002-10-04 | 2005-01-11 | Battelle Memorial Institute | Challenged-based tag authentication model |
JP2006041714A (en) * | 2004-07-23 | 2006-02-09 | Sangikyou:Kk | Authentication and authentication response system |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1398386A (en) | 2003-02-19 |
TW538386B (en) | 2003-06-21 |
BR0108090A (en) | 2002-10-29 |
US7353392B2 (en) | 2008-04-01 |
MXPA02007602A (en) | 2003-01-28 |
KR100542267B1 (en) | 2006-01-10 |
UA72579C2 (en) | 2005-03-15 |
US20030018893A1 (en) | 2003-01-23 |
JP3676735B2 (en) | 2005-07-27 |
JP2003523027A (en) | 2003-07-29 |
CN1222915C (en) | 2005-10-12 |
RU2002123875A (en) | 2004-01-27 |
EP1124206A1 (en) | 2001-08-16 |
RU2236760C2 (en) | 2004-09-20 |
KR20030019308A (en) | 2003-03-06 |
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