WO2000063856A1 - Systeme de carte a puce - Google Patents
Systeme de carte a puce Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2000063856A1 WO2000063856A1 PCT/EP2000/002853 EP0002853W WO0063856A1 WO 2000063856 A1 WO2000063856 A1 WO 2000063856A1 EP 0002853 W EP0002853 W EP 0002853W WO 0063856 A1 WO0063856 A1 WO 0063856A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- chip card
- card
- cryptographic
- data
- module
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0806—Details of the card
- G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
- G07F7/082—Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
Definitions
- the invention is related to a chip card system which makes use of a cryptographic module, called Secure Application Module (SAM) , for accepting an electronic transaction, such as an electronic purse payment or a ticketing transaction.
- SAM Secure Application Module
- a cryptographic module can be sensitive for attacks aimed at procuring such a secret cryptographic key. In such an attack, for example, it can be attempted to have the cryptographic module repeatedly execute a cryptographic process on a known set of data -preferably intended for that objective- with the secret key and subsequently to analyse external signals - such as the electric power consumption of the system.
- the prior art systems are sensitive to the said kind of attacks in particular because (1) the possibility of having the cryptographic module execute processes with the most important secret key is unrestricted and (2) the kind of data on which the cryptographic process takes place is also unrestricted.
- the invention seeks to obviate the said disadvantages.
- the invention -based on the observation at the end of the previous paragraph- provides the following measure.
- a system set-up is shown.
- a chip card 1 can be connected to a terminal 2, which comprises a Transaction Control Application Module (TCAM) 3 and a cryptographic Secure Application Module (SAM) 4.
- the SAM 4 comprises a secret key (k) to check the transaction.
- TCAM Transaction Control Application Module
- SAM 4 comprises a secret key (k) to check the transaction.
- FSM finite state machine
- the FSM according to the invention is shown in Fig. 2.
- the use of the secret key (k) is restricted by means of a new, initial state in the FSM, which enforces authenticity checking of the chip card.
- the method for checking the authenticity of the chip card is known per se as Card Authentication Method (CAM) , and makes use of static data authentication, described in the EMV 1 96 specifications [EMV96] .
- CAM Card Authentication Method
- EMV96 static data authentication
- Fig. 2 the improved finite state machine of said SAM 4 is shown.
- State 0 is the initial state. From said state, there are two possibilities: (a) no CAM or (b) CAM. If path (a) is followed -no CAM- the use of the secret key (k) is excluded (disabled) . Only actions defined in fsm 1 can then be executed, no key being required. If path (b) -CAM- is followed, the CAM will be executed. After this is carried out correctly ("card is OK”), state 1 is reached. At that moment it is certain that the chip card, with card number X, concerned is authentic, and the state machine (fsm”) for the actual transaction, in which the use of secret key k is allowed to be used, is allowed to proceed. Since the card number X is known, it can be established that the cryptographic process takes place only on the data of the chip card having card number X.
- EMV96 EMV'96 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment Systems; version 3.1.1; May 31, 1998; Europay-Mastercard-Visa.
Abstract
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU42922/00A AU4292200A (en) | 1999-04-14 | 2000-03-31 | Chip card system |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
NL1011790A NL1011790C2 (nl) | 1999-04-14 | 1999-04-14 | Chipkaartsysteem. |
NL1011790 | 1999-04-14 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2000063856A1 true WO2000063856A1 (fr) | 2000-10-26 |
Family
ID=19769008
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2000/002853 WO2000063856A1 (fr) | 1999-04-14 | 2000-03-31 | Systeme de carte a puce |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
AU (1) | AU4292200A (fr) |
NL (1) | NL1011790C2 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2000063856A1 (fr) |
Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP0574990A2 (fr) * | 1992-06-17 | 1993-12-22 | Philips Patentverwaltung GmbH | Procédé et agencement de circuit pour tester une carte de crédit |
US5528231A (en) * | 1993-06-08 | 1996-06-18 | Bull Cp8 | Method for the authentication of a portable object by an offline terminal, and apparatus for implementing the process |
EP0789336A2 (fr) * | 1996-02-10 | 1997-08-13 | Deutsche Telekom AG | Méthode pour vérifier des transactions avec des systèmes à porte-monnaie électronique |
EP0851396A1 (fr) * | 1996-12-23 | 1998-07-01 | Koninklijke KPN N.V. | Système pour augmenter une valeur d'une carte de paiement électronique |
FR2759833A1 (fr) * | 1997-02-19 | 1998-08-21 | Gemplus Card Int | Procede de protection d'une cle mere destinee a permettre l'authentification de cartes utilisateurs |
-
1999
- 1999-04-14 NL NL1011790A patent/NL1011790C2/nl not_active IP Right Cessation
-
2000
- 2000-03-31 WO PCT/EP2000/002853 patent/WO2000063856A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2000-03-31 AU AU42922/00A patent/AU4292200A/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP0574990A2 (fr) * | 1992-06-17 | 1993-12-22 | Philips Patentverwaltung GmbH | Procédé et agencement de circuit pour tester une carte de crédit |
US5528231A (en) * | 1993-06-08 | 1996-06-18 | Bull Cp8 | Method for the authentication of a portable object by an offline terminal, and apparatus for implementing the process |
EP0789336A2 (fr) * | 1996-02-10 | 1997-08-13 | Deutsche Telekom AG | Méthode pour vérifier des transactions avec des systèmes à porte-monnaie électronique |
EP0851396A1 (fr) * | 1996-12-23 | 1998-07-01 | Koninklijke KPN N.V. | Système pour augmenter une valeur d'une carte de paiement électronique |
FR2759833A1 (fr) * | 1997-02-19 | 1998-08-21 | Gemplus Card Int | Procede de protection d'une cle mere destinee a permettre l'authentification de cartes utilisateurs |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
NL1011790C2 (nl) | 2000-10-17 |
AU4292200A (en) | 2000-11-02 |
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