WO2000056009A1

WO2000056009A1 - Internet, intranet and other network communication security systems utilizing entrance and exit keys

Info

Publication number: WO2000056009A1
Application number: PCT/US2000/007174
Authority: WO
Inventors: Gareth Williams; Charles E. Ii Moore; Christopher M. Nichols
Original assignee: Newton, Farrell
Priority date: 1999-03-17
Filing date: 2000-03-17
Publication date: 2000-09-21
Also published as: AU3759600A

Abstract

A method of providing user identification and authentication using ultra long identification key codes and/or ultra large databases of identification key codes in a manner providing secure access to a remote computer terminal to a database or server transaction program stored on a host computer.

Description

INTERNET, INTRANET AND OTHER NETWORK COMMUNICATION SECURITY SYSTEMS UTILIZING ENTRANCE AND EXIT KEYS

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation-in-part of co-

pending application Serial No. 60/100,462 filed September

15, 1998; which is a continuation-in-part of appliction Serial

No. 09/037,297 filed March 9, 1998; which is a continuation-

in-part of application Serial No. 08/570,318 filed December

11, 1995, now U.S. Patent No. 5,771,291.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Most security programs for personal computers and

networks rely upon simple user passwords and they are

therefore vulnerable. There are two common methods for

acquiring unauthorized access to a host computer. In the

first method, the intruder improperly obtains and illegally

uses the user ID and password of a valid user. The second

method is to steal a valid user session in progress by

switching the connection of the user to the thief s terminal.

Without a method to verify the identity of the user, there is little preventing an intruder from obtaining unauthorized

access to the user's account through a purloined user ID

and password.

This lack of security has been a shortcoming of

various corporate and other networks including the Internet

and is one factor that has limited commercial use of these

networks.

One existing authentication system proposes to add a

card reader to personal computers so that users can verify

their identity with a user identification card, as shown in

U.S. Patent 4,438,824, issued on March 27. 1984. to C.

Mueller-Schloer for an invention entitled "Apparatus and

Method for Cryptographic Identity Verification". However,

few users will spend the time and money to install an

expensive card-reader. Furthermore, user identification

cards have very limited storage and usually store a short

identification key. Therefore, the same short identification

key is used during most if not all authentications.

United States Patent 5,371,792, entitled CD-ROM

DISK AND SECURITY CHECK METHOD FOR THE SAME issued on December 6, 1994 to Toshinori Asai and

Masaki Kawahori, relates to CD-ROMs for television game

devices. The purpose of the security check is to prevent

unlicensed CD-ROM disks from being played on a Sega

game machine. The CD-ROM disk identifier disclosed in

this patent is not unique to each individual CD-ROM disk,

but instead merely indicates a kind of the CD-ROM disk.

All CD-ROM disks of the same type have the same disk

identifier. In the patent, two kinds of identifiers,

"SEGADISKSYSTEM" and "SEGABOOTDISC are

described. The security code indicates that the CD-ROM

disk is duly licensed and also contains a program which

generates a message displayed on the user's monitor that

the disk is licensed.

There have been numerous patents issued for

integrated circuit cards and other computerized portable

security devices. For example, Beitel et al., U.S. Patent No.

4,430,728, employs a physical security key which is coupled

into a connector provided for it at a remote terminal. The

key has two access keys which are required to access the central computer. This invention, like the Mueller-Schloer

'824 credit card device, requires special hardware to be

added to computers and requires costly security keys.

Locking the terminal does not prevent intruders from

procuring unauthorized access on public networks, since the

intruder can use another terminal elsewhere.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The object of the present invention is to provide a

practical and effective security system for secure remote

terminal or terminal emulation or computer access to a host

computer. This is accomplished by using ultra long

passwords and/or ultra large databases oi^' identification keys,

i.e., by a CD-ROM disk or other portable large capacity

storage medium containing a database of identification keys,

long identification keys, or a combination thereof. The

subsequent descriptions of the invention will be in terms of

CD-ROM disks, although other portable storage media are

contemplated for use, including Zip disks, floppy disks.

digital versatile disks (DVD disks), Bernoulli disks, portable hard drives (e.g. PCMCIA hard drives), and portable

semiconductor memory units (e.g. PCMCIA memory units).

The authentication system further includes a remote

terminal with a portable large capacity storage medium

reader or connector, and a communications device or system

which connects the remote terminal to a host computer

which has a large capacity storage medium.

A microprocessor or logic circuitry may be added to

the portable memory medium in certain applications to

implement additional security features or user features.

Moreover the system of the present invention may be

incorporated into a portable electronic devices.

In accordance with the invention, the new security

system may utilize one or more CD-ROM disks, other

portable storage media, other storage devices including

redundant arrays of inexpensive disks and hard drives, or

any hybrid thereof containing databases of the user

identification keys.

The invention also contemplates encryption and other

security methods for authenticating the identity of users. Specifically, an enhanced security system entails the use of

separate entrance and exit codes at the beginning and end

respectively of the communication session, along with

multiple authentication codes during each session, as

required for super security. The invention also includes

means for the tagging or identification of attackers who

attempt to penetrate the new system; a programming means

for such tagging or identification may be implemented on

the portable storage media, in the central computers

(servers) of the new system, or both.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of an exemplary

preferred embodiment illustrating the various steps required

to practice the fundamental security system of the present

invention, as well as illustrating the components which

comprise the required hardware and software aϊ one CD-

ROM-based implementation of the fundamental system

itself; and

Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of an alternate

preferred embodiment including a double-sided key or

password. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION

In general, the new and improved security system of

the present invention provides individual users with what are

characterized as "ultra long identification keys" which are

embodied on a physical object such as a CD-ROM disk

which is provided to the authorized individual user. By

"ultra long" it is contemplated that the individual user code

will comprise at least 20 characters or digits (requiring 20 or

10 bytes, respectively) of information as a bare minimum (it

being understood that the typical password employed for

consumer credit cards and the like is 16 characters),

although the use of a CD-ROM disk "key" enables even

passwords of hundreds of characters to be readily employed.

The following describes the use of CD-ROM disks as

the portable storage medium; however, it is to be

understood that the use of other portable storage media in

lieu of CD-ROM disks is within the scope of this disclosure.

The initial step in the new security method is to

generate individual user access codes for each and every contemplated user who is to be granted authorized access to

a network or a database or source or repository of

information which is desired to be protected and which is

stored in or in conjunction with a "home" server or base

computer. The individual user access key codes are

generated using algorithms or circuitry or combinations

thereof which may be optionally provided with means to

generate individual encryption keys as well, in accordance

with well known methods and industry standards tor

generating encryption key codes. It is of course to be

understood that in accordance with the principles of the

present invention, the individual access key code is "ultra

long" and is of a length that is otherwise too long and too

cumbersome to be conveniently typed into a system by an

individual.

A central registry or other compilation of all of the

individualized user access codes is established and is

optionally encrypted for loading on the home or main

computer terminal or server on which the secured database

is to be located or in association with which the server is to function as a security mechanism. As a parallel to this step

of the development of the security system, each of the

individualized user access key codes is separately recorded,

for example by ganged optical recording machines of the

type known to the art for recording information onto CD-

ROM disks. Each disk is in the form of a "CD-ROM key"

which is individualized for a particular end user (for

example, a customer of a catalog sales organization, a user

of a secure database, a customer of a financial institution,

etc.).

At this stage of the establishment of the system there

is a complete registry of "ultra long" identification key codes

stored in a server and there is a distribution of the physical

CD-ROM disk keys to authorized individual users who are

to be provided access to a database.

In order to provide authorized access to an

authorized user of the database or "transaction program",

the user at his remote personal computer terminal which is

equipped with a CD-ROM reader, loads the CD-ROM disk

into his computer and logs onto an access program or user program (which may optionally be recorded on the CD-

ROM disk as well). The user program then transmits the

user's individual access key code (which optionally may be

encrypted) over a communication network or over a

telephone network to the host computer or server, which

will be appropriately programmed to check the user's access

key code against the registry of stored authorized individual

user access key codes. The server program will further

include the requisite steps to interdict and end any attempt

to gain access to the server or transaction program through

a transmitted access code which is not stored in the

database of authorized individual user access key codes.

The server program will disconnect and may optionally

inform the user that an unauthorized key access code has

been transmitted.

Alternatively, and assuming the CD-ROM disk was

proper and contained an authorized access key code, the

communication between the user's remote computer and the

host server will continue with the host computer^'s program

including steps to grant access to the user's program and begin the session. As explained hereinafter, the host

computer program or server program and the user program

may optionally encrypt the session using the user's

encryption key or keys, which are also stored in the server's

database and on the individual user's CD-ROM disk. The

optional encryption might also include encryption keys which

are stored on the user's CD-ROM disk key.

At this stage, access to the secured database or

"secured server transaction program" can proceed with the

authorized user communicating through his own personal

computer with the host server to conduct whatever

"transaction" he may wish to effect, ranging from the simple

ordering of merchandise, to the conduct of financial

transactions, to conduct of research into a secured database,

or any other type of two-way communication which is

capable of being conducted between a remote computer

terminal and a host computer over a communication

network or a telephone network. It is to be understood that

a level of security heretofore unavailable to remote

consumers communicating with a host computer is provided by the new system which utilizes ultra long identification key

codes typically impressed upon or otherwise recorded upon

"large keys" in the form of a CD-ROM disk or the like.

The ultra long identification keys are checked and approved

through databases of such identification keys which are

stored in a remote host computer or server.

Security may also be enhanced by providing multiple

keys or a database or table of keys (which may be a one¬

time pad of keys) on each user's CD-ROM disk.

The user program may provide the keys in sequence

or according to a pre-arranged pattern or algorithm, or from

a location requested by the server. The server might

request the keys in sequence or from random locations: i.e.

in a random order, or according to some other algorithm.

It is important to note also that the user program may

provide or the server may request more than one key or

multiple keys at different times during the session. As

hereinafter described, the use of a one-time pad of keys also

insures that no key is transmitted twice; hence intercepting or decrypting a key will not allow an attacker to gain access

to the system.

In some applications, the key generation algorithm

will run on the server itself or even on the users' computers;

in the latter case, means to avoid generating duplicate keys

is required (e.g. by a randomization function in the key

generation algorithm or circuitry, plus a check for duplicate

keys whenever a new key is added to the database).

Numerous other variants will also readily be. apparent

to those skilled in the art.

In a preferred embodiment, each user is issued a

unique CD-ROM disk containing one or more unique

identification keys. An individual user inserts his CD-ROM

disk "key" into a computer connected via a network or other

communications device to a host computer; also referred to

herein as a server. An access program on the CD-ROM

"key" connects to and forwards the unique identification key

from the CD-ROM disk key to the host computer in

encrypted form. A security authentication program stored

on the server then decrypts the identification key, compares the identification key with an identification key from the

database of user identification keys located on a large

capacity storage device connected to the host computer, and

verifies the user's identity. The host computer or the user's

access program may include a program or routine which will

also demand that the user type in a password. If the

identification key matches the identification key in the host

computer's database of user identification keys and if the

user enters the correct password, the host computer, through

its programming, will grant access to the user.

The host computer (server) may be further

programmed to require or challenge the user^'s remote

access terminal program to re-authenticate itself at regular

intervals or from time-to-time during the communication

session. Or, the user's program may so reauthenticate itself

and the host computer may be programmed to expect such

reauthentication. This helps defend against attackers who

try to capture an identification key en route to the host

computer or who misappropriate or steal a user^'s

connection. Unless an attacker has the user^'s unique CD- ROM "key", he would be unable to use his unauthorized

access for longer than the time between requested re-

authentications. Means to insure that an intercepted

identification key or message cannot be re-used by an

attacker are discussed below.

Similarly, the user's program may require the host

computer (server) to reauthenticate itself at regular intervals

or from time-to-time during a communication session. Or,

the server program may so re-authenticate itself and the

user program may include code to expect such re-

authentication. This helps defend against attackers who

attempt to impersonate the host computer (server).

Alternatively, the host computer and remotely accessed

terminal program may request or expect identification keys

periodically from each other.

It should be noted that such re-authentication may

optionally be required at critical points in a communication

session, e.g. to complete a transaction or to access a

database. Such reauthentication may be required before, to

initiate the action; or after, to validate the action; or both. To insure that an intercepted identification key or

message cannot be re-used by an attacker, defensive

methods have been developed including the use of multiple,

different identification keys; encrypting the identification

keys or messages, ideally by time-dependent means, e.g. by

combining the identification keys with time-of-day

information, then encrypting.

Another defensive method for authenticating a user

to the host computer and the host computer to the user

with the identification keys is the exchange of identification

keys one digit at a time. In a typical implementation of this

method, the user's access program (running on the user^'s

terminal or computer) transmits the first digit of its

identification key to the host. The host computer

determines whether the digit transmitted was correct. If the

digit is correct, the host computer transmits the first digit of

its identification key to the user's terminal or computer.

The user's access program determines whether the digit

returned by the host is correct. This process continues until

either the user program and host computer have given each other all the digits of their respective identification keys or

until an incorrect digit is received by the host computer or

user's access program.

Any attempt by an attacker to mimic either the host

computer or the user terminal or computer most probably

will fail on the first digit; if so, the attacker will get only one

digit of the user password or host computer password.

Thus, this technique provides additional security against

"man in the middle" attacks aimed at illicitly obtaining a

user or host password. Alternatively, several digits of the

identification keys may be exchanged at each iteration, or

single bits can be exchanged at each iteration, etc.

Although individual identification keys are

contemplated, in some applications, some or all of these

identification keys may be shared among a class or subclass

of users.

In another embodiment, the host computer is

programmed to send an encryption key to the remote

terminal. The terminal program executing on the remote

terminal uses the encryption key to encrypt the unique identification key on the CD-ROM disk. Then the

encrypted identification key is sent to the host computer for

verification. If the encryption means is a public key

encryption algorithm with a sufficiently long key, a third

party would have great difficulty extracting the unencrypted

identification. A variation to this method is to have part of

the encryption key contained on the user's CD-ROM "key"

with the other part sent from the host computer. The host

computer always has access to a complete database of all

the encryption keys and identification keys. Without the

portion of the encryption key from the CD-ROM or host

computer, the remote terminal program is unable to decrypt

messages. If the encryption key from the host computer is

varied with time, selected randomly, or unique to each user

session, the user's computer will essentially never transmit

the same encrypted identification key twice.

The remote terminal program may pad the

identification key with random, null, or nonsense prefixes or

suffixes or interpolated characters. To help insure that the

same identification message is not sent twice, the encryption algorithm is preferably provided with good diffusion

(wherein a change in any character in the plain text changes

many or all of the characters in the encrypted text). The

pad will preferably be specified by the host computer so

that previously used encrypted identification keys do not

repeat.

The pad may vary in a pre-determined manner with

time. For example, the pad may be the day, hour, and

minute clock. The host computer will then be programmed

to check that the pad is correct based upon the day, hour,

and minute. The pad may also vary with each logon.

Additionally, the user ID or user number may be padded as

discussed above.

In another embodiment, the encryption key is

included on the user's CD-ROM key disk and is never

transmitted. The remote terminal program may pad the

identification key as previously discussed. The host

computer will be programmed to look up the encryption key

for the user's claimed identity in a stored database of

encryption and identification keys. Then the host computer will decrypt the unique identification key, remove the

padding, and compare the decrypted key with the key

retrieved from the host computer database, thereby verifying

the user's identity. Again, when the encryption algorithm

has good diffusion, the added characters will insure that the

user's computer will essentially never transmit the same

identification key twice.

In another embodiment, the central server selects the

encryption key of the moment from a table or database or

pad of keys on the user's CD-ROM: a copy of the table

being in the central server. This avoids transmitting the

encryption key over the connection: all that is transmitted is

which entry in the key table is to be used, not the

encryption key itself; alternatively, the key may be selected

by means known both to the server and user programs.

These keys may also optionally be used to encrypt important

information transmitted.

In another embodiment, the user^'s terminal program

encrypts an authentication message, such as the user^'s

identity, plus a varying padding, such as a random padding or a predictably varying padding, such as the date and time,

again using a key or encryption means unique to the user

and stored on the user's CD-ROM or portable storage

medium. The central server program looks up the

appropriate key or encryption means for that user, decrypts

the message, and checks the contents, thereby authenticating

the user. A yet further alternative is for the user's terminal

program to generate the authentication message by

encrypting a predictably varying message, such as the time

and date, again using encryption means unique to the

individual user.

In another embodiment, the remote terminal

transmits to the host computer a plain text or encrypted

user ID or identification key from an identification key

database on the user's CD-ROM key. A second encrypted

identification key is sent from the remote terminal to the

host computer. The first identification key is used by the

host computer to look up a unique encryption key for that

user. The second identification key is then decrypted using

the unique encryption key and the user's claimed identity. If the decrypted identification key is correct, the user's

claimed identity is then verified. The encryption key is

never transmitted since both the remote terminal and the

host computer have the encryption key stored locally.

In addition, other parts of the transmission, or the

entire transmission or session may be encrypted using a

unique user-specific encryption key or keys on the user's

CD-ROM disk. When the server is aware of the user's

identity, it will look up the key in its own table: hence the

key need never be transmitted between user and server or

vice-versa. Again, techniques such as padding would

typically be used. This embodiment not only provides

additional security, it also is another way to authenticate the

user's remote terminal program to the host computer. An

"impostor" computer posing as the user terminal would lack

the user's unique key or database of keys and would be

unable to encrypt the user's messages to the host computer,

and would be unable to decrypt the host computer^'s

messages. In addition, this embodiment also securely

authenticates the host computer to the remote terminal program. An "imposter" server would lack the database of

user encryption keys and would be unable to decrypt the

remote terminal's messages and accordingly would be unable

to respond plausibly to the remote terminal.

Alternatively, a one-time pad stored on both the

user's CD-ROM disk key and the host computer may be

used as the encryption means or key to encrypt the user's

identification key to provide additional security. After

receiving the encrypted identification key, the host. computer

is programmed to look up the one-time pad under the

user's claimed identity in a database of one-time pads.

After decrypting the identification key, the host computer

will authenticate the user's identity.

Alternatively, a one-time pad of unique identification

keys may be stored on each user's CD-ROM key disk. The

central server would then demand a new key every time,

and verify the new key against its own copy of that user's

on-time pad of ID keys. Both one-time pad arrangements also avoid

transmitting the same user authentication key or message

twice.

Furthermore, the one-time pad can be used to

encrypt other important information communicated. For

example, with use of a 250 kilobyte user-specific one-time

pad (e.g. in conjunction with a consumer catalog) to encrypt

the user's credit card number, assuming that one byte is

used to encrypt each digit, then a sixteen digit credit card

number would use 16 bytes of the 250 kilobyte one-time

pad. Assuming the user performed ten transactions a day,

the 250 kilobyte one-time pad would last more than four

years. Note that, optionally, different one-time-pads may

be used for identification keys and for encryption keys.

The central server can keep track of which one-time-

pad keys have been used to prevent re-use. If the user's

portable storage medium is writable, the user terminal

software or access software may be used to keep a usage

record or table or usage sequence number on the portable

storage medium, or the user program may overwrite the keys that have been used or set a flag bit or field associated

with the keys that have been used. If the user only accesses

the server from the one terminal, the user program may

keep a usage record or table on the user terminal, e.g. on

the hard drive.

Preferably, usage records may be kept in both the

central server and on the user's portable storage medium or

terminal, and any discrepancy between the usage records on

the user's portable storage medium or terminal and on the

server would suggest an attempt by a third party to illicitly

gain access. Such a discrepancy will be indicated by any

attempt by either the user program or the server to re-use a

one-time-pad key or one-time-pad entry that has already

been used with the server or user program respectively.

Such a discrepancy will also be indicated by any attempt to

use a key or pad entry out-of-sequence or any other "out-

of-synch episode".

Thus, the server program (or user program) may

assert that a particular key has been used (e.g. during an

attempt by an imposter to gain access) even though the user program (or server program) did not know that that key

had been used. However, an attacker might try to mimic

the server (or user) program, falsely claim that keys have

been used, and thereby deplete the user s (or server s)

one-time-pad of keys. To avoid this, the user (or server)

program may optionally demand that the alleged server s

program (or alleged user s program) provide one or more

of the keys that it claims has been used. Alternatively or

in addition, other authentication means as herein described

or as are well-known to those skilled in the art may be

used.

If the portable storage medium is not writable (as

with conventional read-only CD-ROM disks), the user

program cannot record on the portable storage medium

which keys have been used. If only the central server

keeps track of which keys have been used, an attacker might

attempt to impersonate a server to the user program and

request that the user program utilize a key that has already

been used. There are several ways to eliminate this

potential problem. First, as previously mentioned, if the user only

accesses the server from one terminal or PC or workstation,

the user program may keep a usage record on the user

terminal or PC or workstation; said record might typically be

a small file or cookie or like stored on the hard disk drive.

If the user accesses the server from only a few terminals or

PCs or workstations (e.g. from a PC at the office and a PC

at home), the user program can keep a separate usage

record on each, and operate from different areas of the

one-time-pad of keys, depending on which machine is being

used. Thus, the user program would typically inform the

server program which machine is being used, hence which

area of the key pad is being used.

If the user utilizes his non-writable portable

storage medium to access the server from any number of

terminals or PCs or workstations, it eventually becomes

impractical to allocate an area of the key pad to each.

The user program cannot keep a record of which keys have

been used on the nonwritable medium; therefore, it has no

memory between sessions of which keys have been used. However, it can keep track of which keys have been used

during a session; e.g. it can keep a sequence number during

a session in RAM. Thus, the user program must

authenticate the server at the beginning of the session and

concurrently get a correct sequence number or a pointer to

an unused area of the key pad. (One way to do the latter is

for the server to mathematically combine the sequence

number with the authentication number or with a second

authentication-type number, e.g. by addition. The user

program independently calculates the authentication number

and then obtains the sequence number, in this case by

subtracting.) The main challenge is to authenticate the

server; to do this, the user program typically generates a

request to the server that differs at each sign-on and that

requires the server to have a copy of the user's keypad.

There are many ways to do this.

One of our techniques is to have a table of

different initiation keys for different times. This is doable;

for example, a separate one-time-pad of 20 digit (10 byte)

initiation keys for each 5 minutes over a 3-year period requires 315,360 keys or 3,153,600 bytes, which is less than

0.5% of a 650 Mbyte CD-ROM disk. Providing a different

key for each minute for 3 years would require less than

2.5% of a 650 Mbyte CD-ROM disk. As an aside, the user

program might optionally assert a clock time to the server;

the server might optionally accept it if it is within a

tolerance and does not correspond to a previously used

time. Another option, if the time did not match, would be

for the server to check the keys in the immediate

neighborhood, again staying within a tolerance and rejecting

any key that has been previously used.

Another technique for initial authentication of the

server in the non-writable portable storage medium case is

for the user program to generate a request for a key from a

random location or address in the server^'s copy of the

keypad. A single random number can be generated in any

number of ways; one way is from the exact timing of one of

the user's keystrokes. Alternatively, the user program can

generate an address based on the time and date, or based

on the process identification number (PID) for the program, or from any number of other non-repeating numbers. In a

preferred implementation, we set aside a separate table of

initiation keys; and use a relatively small fraction of them,

so as to minimize the chances of requesting a key that has

been requested before. We derive an address in the key

table from a random number, or we use a hashing function

calculate an address in the table from the time-and-date or

PID. We also allow a second or third (or a very limited

number of) further choices if the server determines that a

key has already been used. We may optionally further

choose to have the user program request more than one

key.

Yet another technique is for the user program to

request a checksum or check-function calculated from a

number of keys from different addresses in the server's copy

of the keypad. Only the checksum or check-function is

transmitted; the actual keys are not transmitted. The user

program uses one or more non-repeating numbers as

described in the previous paragraph to generate the

addresses of the keys requested or to decide which keys to request. In one preferred implementation, we again set

aside a separate table of initiation keys; and use a relatively

small fraction of them. The user program uses several

random numbers derived from the exact timing of several of

the user's keystrokes to select several 20-digit keys to

request. The server sums those keys and forwards the

lowest 20 bits of the sum to the user program. For an

attacker to counterfeit this check-function, two conditions

must be met. First, all of the keys must have been used

before; if even one of them is new, and the keys are

random, the result is a random number. Second, the new

checksum must be calculable from the checksums in which

the keys were previously used. The probability of both

conditions being met can be made vanishing.)' small.

In addition, one may optionally use a check-function

that depends upon the order of its arguments.

Note also that combinations or hybrids of the above

techniques can be used. For example, a check-function

may be calculated from a table entry from the current

time-and-date, plus random or quasi-random keys from the past; note that the present key has never been used and

most of those past keys will also never have been used.

Yet further techniques for initial authentication of

the server in the non-writable portable storage medium case

will readily be apparent to those skilled in the art.

For any of the aforementioned user identification

techniques, the terminal program and/or the host computer

also may optionally be programmed to demand that the

user enter by typing (through a keyboard) a password

previously specified. The individual user s password may

optionally be stored on the user s CD-ROM or other

portable storage medium, in which case the terminal

program compares said stored user password with the

password entered by the user. Essentially, the user

authenticates himself to the portable storage medium and

the user terminal program, which in turn authenticate the

portable storage medium to the host computer.

Alternatively, the user s password may be stored on the

host computer, and the host computer s program compares the user s stored password with the password entered by

the user.

All of the above-described encryption methods can

also be used to encrypt important information transmitted.

All of the above-described authentication methods

can also be used in reverse to authenticate the host

computer to the remote terminal program, as will be readily

understood.

The most secure encryption techniques, such as public

key encryption, can take up to 1000 times longer to process

than more routine encryption methods, unless a

special-purpose processor for the particular algorithm is

added to the user's computer. One method to increase

speed is to use the most secure means to encrypt only the

most sensitive portions of the transmission and use faster

encryption methods for less critical portions of the

transmission. Because of the large capacity and speed of a

CD-ROM, databases or pads of encryption keys for each

encryption method and host computer can be easily stored

and accessed. Portions of the transmission that are common and do not need to be protected can be transmitted as plain

text. Repeated text or graphics which all users will view can

optionally be stored on the CD-ROM to decrease the

amount of information transmitted from the host computer

to the remote terminal.

A special encryption device may be attached to the

host computer in order to expedite encryption and

decryption of transmitted data. Since the host computer will

most likely service many users, the encryption device should

prove economical when amortized over the large number of

users.

The cost of having extremely large keys and

databases of keys is the cost of the space on a CD-ROM

which is not available for other information and the space

needed to store these keys on the computer host. Since the

cost of producing CD-ROM disks is modest, the use of CD-

ROM disks has become quite economical. Thus the new

authentication system of the invention is more economical

and more effective than the prior art systems. The cost of generating the keys is a lesser effect.

Note that one-time-pad entries for either authentication or

encryption can be generated by conventional algorithms, or

by specialized hardware, such as a hardware random

number generator; for the latter, one would typically use a

random physical process, such as thermal noise or circuit

noise or radioactive decay to generate the random bits or

digits or numbers. We also contemplate using one-time-pad

entries or hardware-generated random numbers as an

input or seed to algorithms or hardware to generate keys for

other encryption means. Note also that any key generation

algorithm can be implemented in software or in hardware

(e.g. a special-purpose processor), or in a mixture ot the

two; as some of our implementations require large numbers

of keys for each user, we may optionally implement part or

all of our key generation algorithms in hardware.

A yet further alternative is to generate or store keys

at the central server and transmit them to the users^'

terminal programs only as they are needed, e.g. using

one-time pads or other encryption means on the user^'s portable storage medium; this avoids generating keys that

may never be used. This is of particular utility when (for

example) random numbers for one-time-pads are cheap and

easy to generate, and the keys in question (e.g. using a

product of two large prime numbers) is expensive or more

difficult to generate.

Additionally, a user's CD-ROM key according to the

invention may contain different identification keys or tables

or databases of identification keys for use with different

servers or to provide access to different databases or

services on any individual server. For example, in an

application wherein several catalogs of different vendors are

contained on or accessed by one CD-ROM key, different

databases of identification keys and encryption keys would

be allocated to provide access to each vendor's host

computer or database.

Also, a user's CD-ROM key according to this

invention may contain different identification keys or tables

or databases of identification keys to provide different levels

of access to one or more host computers. Or, the host computer may be programmed to grant different access

privileges to different users or to different classes of users

or different types of users. For example, in a corporate

network, the president's CD-ROM key would grant

maximum access to all information on the host computer,

while a clerk's CD-ROM key would only grant limited access

to specific data. Similarly, in a consumer application,

different consumers might have different credit limits. The

requisite privilege or privilege level might either be encoded

on the CD-ROM or, preferably, would be included in a

database on the host computer.

It will also be apparent that a single authorization

server or set of authorization servers can be used to

authorize access to many other servers or to may different

databases or services. In this case, the table of what is

authorized for a given user would typically be kept in the

single server or set of servers for ease of updating, although

it could be kept on the users' portable storage media (e.g.

the user's CD-ROM disk) or on the central computer

(server) or divided between the two. If the user program contacts the other servers

directly, the other servers can access the single server or set

of servers to obtain the authorization; alternatively, the user

program might contact the other servers through the single

server or set of servers (e.g. if the authorization server

function is implemented by an Internet service provider's

server).

If a single server or set of servers is used to

authorize access to other servers or to different databases or

servers, new servers or databases or services can be

authorized for a given user by simply updating the table of

what is authorized for the user. Typically, the table or the

portion of the table being updated would be in the single

server or set of servers. However, if the user's portable

storage medium is writable, an authorization table on the

portable storage medium could be updated in the same

fashion. Thus, the user will be able to use an existing CD-

ROM or other portable storage medium to access new

servers, databases or services. It is also desirable to allow existing CD-ROM keys to

be used to access new servers or databases or servers when

the different host computers authorize access, as an

alternative to or in lieu of referring access requests to a

central server or set of servers per above. To do so, each

CD-ROM disk would include identification keys or tables or

databases of identification keys that are initially not assigned

to any server or database or service. These would then be

assigned later to access new servers, computers, programs.

databases or information functions or services. This

arrangement averts the need for distributing new CD-ROM

disks whenever a new server is added.

Information about the new server or database or

service, such as its name,, network address, and telephone

number, along with the identification of the database of keys

on the CD-ROM disk assigned to the new server must be

added to the user's access program. For example, if 200

keys or key tables or one-time-pads of keys are already

assigned to existing servers, the 201st key might be assigned

to a new server. This information would be included (in either encrypted or unencrypted form) on an update floppy

disk or other portable medium, posted on a bulletin board

or server, or updated automatically by the remote terminal

access program during a subsequent communication session.

Such information is typically the same for all users being

granted access to the new server. If the user key

is on a writable portable storage medium, the update

information would typically be written directly to the

portable storage medium.

If the portable storage medium is not writable, as

with a conventional CD-ROM disk, the user's access

program would typically store the update information for the

new servers in a small file on the user's hard drives. If the

users have a writable CD-ROM drive, the information could

be added to the CD-ROM disk key. If the information

about each server comprises no more than 50 characters, a

10 kilobyte disk file could contain information on at least

100 new servers. A file a few megabytes in size would allow

a short description of each server. Eventually, the new servers would be included on

updated CD-ROM disk keys distributed to all users.

Informational, transactional, and promotional

databases and services are all of ever-increasing commercial

interest. Access can be controlled, verified, or tabulated by

the CD-ROM key of the invention. In addition, the

individual CD-ROM disks may be provided with all or

portions of these databases. The portions of the databases

that change infrequently might be encoded on the users^'

CD-ROM disks and updated when new disks are produced,

whereas variable portions might typically be stored on the

server.

The response speed of the user authentication system

may be increased if the server or host computer being

accessed begins the communication session in parallel with

checking the user identification key from the user program

against the database of user identification keys to authorize

the user. This may be advantageous if the database of keys

has a slow response time, e.g. during peak usage hours. It

may also be advantageous if the server or host computer being accessed must take the time to contact another server

or set of servers to check the database and obtain

authorization, as discussed hereinbefore.

In such a case, it may be advantageous for the host

computer being accessed to run a fast key-check algorithm

to check whether the user identification key is a valid key,

and whether or not it belongs to the particular user. In

some applications, the server being accessed could use this

validity check and then grant a provisional or limited access,

pending checking of the user identification key against the

database.

In addition, in certain applications, provisional

initiation of the transaction upon receipt of a valid

identification by the host computer might be permitted, but

the transaction is completed only when the ID is verified in

the server's database. This arrangement further improves

response time for the user and reduces the speed

requirements on the storage means. For example, a credit

card transaction could be started upon receipt of a valid ID but not completed until after the ID has been checked with

the database and approved.

In one such key-check technique, the CD-ROM key

of the invention may contain both unencrypted and

encrypted versions of one or more identification keys. The

encryption is done. before or as the disk is imprinted using a

key and encryption method unknown to the user and using

encryption means that are ideally unknown to the user. For

user authentication purposes, the host computer, which has

the key, would be programmed to demand both the

unencrypted version of the identification key and the

encrypted version of the key. The host computer then

would be programmed to decrypt the encrypted version of

the key and compare it with the unencrypted version. If the

two keys are the same, then the user identification key is

virtually certainly a valid key. For example, if the

encryption were the inverse of a long-key public-key

encryption, the public key would be held by the host

computer only (and the inverse or private key would be

held by the disk maker only). An intruder would have to generate a counterfeit identification with the corresponding

encrypted version, which would require the inverse or

private key. Obtaining the key would be virtually

impossible, even if the would-be counterfeiter obtained huge

numbers of different user disks. Since the server does not

have the private key, even illicitly accessing the server would

not allow a counterfeiter to make new counterfeit user

identification keys. Accordingly, counterfeiting of valid user

identification numbers cannot be done.

A further security measure includes appending the

encrypted version of the identification key to the

unencrypted version to form a single longer key.

Alternatively, the final key may comprise two different

encrypted versions of the unencrypted key. Alternatively,

the final key may be a function of both the unencrypted

version and of a parity, hash, encryption function, or other

function of the unencrypted version.

Such key-validity-check algorithms help protect

against attempts to counterfeit or simulate user disks or

portable storage media; they do not protect against the use of stolen user disks or portable storage media to gain at

least provisional or limited access to the server.

One method to help protect against the use of stolen

user disks or portable storage media to gain at least

provisional or limited access in the above system is to

provide each server with a list or database of known stolen

keys; this database is much smaller than the complete

database of user keys; it also can be checked more rapidly.

Unlike a human user, the computer does not make

mistakes in entering an identification key. Accordingly,

unless line disruption is indicated, the preferred sof tware

implementation will disconnect the user after only one

attempt using any invalid CD-ROM identification key. This

allows speedy rejection of attempts by attackers or other

transgressors and avoids tying up the system with their illicit

attempts. By disconnecting after one attempt, attackers

cannot rapidly try multiple identification keys.

The host computer's database of user identif ication

keys is well protected against attempts to steal or copy it.

Nevertheless, it is advantageous to protect against attempts to steal or copy the server's database of user identification

keys or user access keys and thereby counterfeit or mimic

the users' unique CD-ROMs. Accordingly, the server

database of a preferred implementation of the invention

contains an encrypted or otherwise altered version of the

user identification keys. The server of the invention

employs a trap-door authentication algorithm to compare

the user ID or access key recovered from the incoming data

stream with the altered version in the server's own database

for that user's claimed identity. The trap-door

authentication algorithm authenticates the user if and only if

the encrypted identification key in the server's database

represents the same identification key as the one embedded

or encrypted in the incoming data stream. The trap-door

authentication algorithm is impractical to be used to recover

the actual identification key from the encrypted key in the

host computer's database. Since the server database does

not contain the actual identification keys, and the trap-door

authentication function is of no help in recovering them,

mere possession of the host computer's database is not sufficient to recover the identification keys. Thus, stealing

or copying the host computer's database of identification

keys will not allow a thief to counterfeit the users' unique

CD-ROM key access disks and thus will not allow the thief

to access the system as a legitimate user.

One such trap door authentication algorithm is

implemented as follows. When preparing the users'

CD-ROMs and the database for the host computer, the

users' unique identification keys are encrypted with a

difficult-to-decrypt long-key code. The encrypted key is

copied into the host computer's database and the

unencrypted identification key is written onto the user^'s CD-

ROM key. In use, the host computer takes the

identification key recovered from the incoming data stream

from the user, encrypts it with the same means used to

encrypt the database, and compares the encrypted key with

the database entry for that user. If the keys are identical,

the user is authenticated and access is granted.

Another class of trapdoor authentication algorithms

go directly from the encrypted version of the password embedded in the data stream from the user to the other

encrypted version in the server's database. Accordingly, the

unencrypted version of the password never exists on the

server and cannot be tapped or recorded by any illicit

program or virus on the server.

In a yet further embodiment, each CD-ROM key is

provided with multiple databases of identification and

encryption keys. The server or host computer is

programmed to use or have access only to one database.

The copies of the other databases on the user's CD-ROM

are stored in a vault. If the host computer's identification

keys were ever stolen, the host computer can simply be

loaded with one of the user databases from the vault and

use the new identification keys. Since the user already has

the new database of his new keys on his CD-ROM, there is

no need to provide a new CD-ROM to all the users, and

the thief remains locked out of the host computer. In

addition, if only part of the server's database is copied or

stolen, then only a portion of the database need be changed and only the corresponding users' CD-ROM disks need use

an alternative identification database.

In one implementation, the server then simply

requests the new or different keys from the users' program

rather then requesting the previously used keys: the users'

programs access a different location on the users' CD-ROM

keys or portable storage medium keys. If the users have

individual databases or one-time pads of keys, the users'

programs then access a different database on the users' CD-

ROM keys or portable storage medium keys. The server

might also transmit a re-authentication code to access any

key or database of keys or one-time-pad of keys.

Preferably, a secure means to direct the users^'

computers to use a different database of identification keys

on the CD-ROM is used. Any of the previously described

authentication algorithms can be used for this purpose. One

technique is for the server to encrypt by private key the

message with a time-dependent pad. The user program on

the CD-ROM then uses the public key. which is also stored

on the CD-ROM, to decrypt the message, then checks that the time-dependent pad is correct and switches to an

alternate user ID or identification key database. The

private key and the replacement database are given to the

host computer at the same time.

The host computer may be provided with multiple

databases wherein a specific combination is required to

access any identification keys. For example, in one

embodiment, one database contains a one-time pad and the

other contains the database of identification keys encrypted

using the one-time pad. A thief who stole or copied only

the database would be unable to recover any keys.

In corporate applications, where the user CD-ROM

keys will be used only or primarily on the company's own

computers, the change to another user ID can be made

permanent by recording a word in a small file on the hard

drive. Once the file is altered on all of the company's

computers, the change is complete. This could be done at

the next log-on for each user.

In yet a further implementation, the host computer

can use an array of inexpensive CD-ROM drives to store the database of identification keys. Advantages of this novel

CD-ROM array approach include that the cost per

megabyte is comparable to or less than that of magnetic

disk drives, and that a drive failure almost always leaves the

recorded data intact. The CD-ROM disk can simply be

changed to another drive. In addition, there is the security

advantage that the written data is in permanent form.

As an occasional delay in a transaction is tolerable,

magnetic tape can optionally be used as a back-up means or

as a redundant storage means for use in regenerating data,

or to store user keys or portions of the users^' key tables or

databases that are not yet needed. The storage means then

comprises a fast storage means (e.g. CD-ROM disks or hard

disk drives) that stores data that is apt to he needed in the

near future, and a slow storage means with larger capacity

and lower cost (the magnetic tape) to store keys that are

not yet needed.

The users' CD-ROM disks may also contain a

network access program, encryption routines, and other data

and programs of utility to the users. The portable large storage media may contain a read¬

only portion and a read-write portion, typically a write-once

read-many portion or a write few, read many portion. (For

the case of CD-ROM disks with writable portions, see, for

example, the disks illustrated and described in U.S. patents

5,287,335 and 5,206,063, the disclosure of which is

incorporated by reference herein.) The read-only portion

would typically contain programs or information common to

many users, e.g. network access programs and/or encryption

routines and/or other data or programs of utility to many

users. For example, in consumer applications, the read-only

portion might include catalogs, advertising, or other

commercial information. The read-write portion or write-

once read-many portion would typically contain the unique

user access key codes and unique user encryption keys (if

used) and any other information unique to the particular

user.

In a CD-ROM implementation, the read-only portion

of the users' disks could be imprinted quickly and

economically by pressing. The individualized portion, typically a write-once, read-many portion, would then be

quickly recorded on an appropriate recording CD-ROM

drive. This approach may prove advantageous in a variety

of high-volume applications.

If the user's portable storage medium key according

to the present invention is re-writable, the medium may be

"recharged" with new keys. Examples of such media keys

are semiconductor memory units or cards, rewritable CD-

ROM disks, floppy disks, and the like. In one

implementation, a user key comprising a portable storage

medium with less capacity can be "recharged" from another

user key comprising a portable storage medium of greater

capacity. For example, a user's memory card key could be

re-charged from that user's CD-ROM key. Alternatively, a

portable storage medium key can be re-charged at a secure

computer, workstation, terminal, or facility. A yet further

alternative is an exchange program wherein a user^'s used-

up portable storage medium is exchanged for a re-charged

or fresh storage medium with a new supply ot keys. Other

methods will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art. Conventional authentication means or any of the

authentication means of the invention can be used to insure

that only the proper user with the proper storage key can

re-charge same.

Additionally, if the portable storage medium key of

the invention is also used as a credit or debit disk or unit

or card or the like, it may be re-charged with additional

funds or the like. In addition, transaction information

could be logged onto the portable storage medium, either

as verification, or for later down-loading; e.g. if the card or

portable storage medium is used with systems that do not

contact the server of the secure system of the invention; e.g.

systems that are not connected to a network.

The present invention may also be incorporated in a

portable electronic device. The portable electronic device

may comprise portable storage media for storing the ultra-

long identification keys and/or a database or databases of

identification keys or pads of same, and/or the user s

encryption key or keys or database or databases of

encryption keys, or pads of same. A microprocessor and/or logic circuitry, hereinafter referred to as a microprocessor,

may be incorporated in the portable electronic device. For

many forms of memory IC, a simple microprocessor can be

fabricated on the same IC at small or negligible cost. If

the portable storage medium is a portable hard disk drive,

the microprocessor or logic functions can typically be

implemented by adding additional code or programming to

the microprocessor already present in the hard disk drive.

again the cost would be negligible.

The microprocessor can provide additional security

functions: additionally, it can optionally implement any ot

the functions that we have discussed as being implemented

by a user terminal program or user access program running

on the user's terminal or PC, and/or as contained on the

user s portable storage medium. These include but are not

limited to authentication, protocol, encryption, and other

security functions. Advantages include ott-loading these

functions from the user's PC and thereby improv ing speed,

simplifying the software, and providing additional assurance

that these functions will be performed and not defeated, e.g. by a rogue program or virus on the user's PC. For

example, the microprocessor may be used to keep track of

which keys have been used, typically by writing to the

portable storage medium, as hereinafter described.

Conversely, any of the tasks described here as being

performed by the microprocessor and/or clock of a portable

electronic device may be performed by the microprocessor

and/or clock of the remote terminal.

Additionally, the microprocessor can be programmed

to "re-charge" the storage medium with new keys, per above,

including the relevant security precautions. Additionally,

the microprocessor can be programmed to log transaction

information, per above, e.g. for stand-alone use in situations

where the user uses the portable electronic device to

conduct transactions without access to a PC. In many

implementations of such portable electronic devices, the

microprocessor will provide additional security to prevent

unauthorized individuals or software from accessing or

copying or using the identification keys on the portable

storage medium. For example, the microprocessor may be programmed

to request a password from the user whenever the user

attempts to access the identification keys on the portable

storage medium. In order to access or use the

identification keys on the portable storage media, the user

must enter his or her appropriate user identification

password. The user may enter the password through the

remote terminal or a keypad on the portable storage media.

In a preferred embodiment, the user s password is stored

on the portable storage medium, in which case, the

microprocessor is typically programmed to compare the

user s stored password with the password entered by the

user.

The microprocessor may refuse access to the

identification keys on the portable storage medium tor a

fixed period of time if an incorrect user password is typed in

or if several incorrect user passwords are typed in

consecutively. For example, the microprocessor may

prevent access to the identification keys on the portable storage media for an hour when three incorrect user

identification passwords are typed in consecutively.

The portable electronic device may further comprise

a clock. The clock could be used, for example, to time the

duration for which the microprocessor refuses access to the

portable storage medium, as described hereinabove.

Alternatively, the duration of refusal could be timed by a

software timing loop or by keeping a running sum of the

(known) execution times of each of the functions executed

by the microprocessor. Clock circuits are inexpensive, and

use little power. They can readily be powered for years by

a small watch battery or the like. If the portable storage

medium is a semiconductor memory, a clock circuit can

readily be incorporated on the same IC as the memory and

microprocessor.

Additionally or alternatively, the microprocessor may

disable access to the portable storage medium if multiple

incorrect user passwords are typed in consecutively. For

example, the microprocessor may disable access when ten

incorrect user passwords are typed in consecutively. Re- enabling the system might require human intervention from

the central server or provision of a special password or

erasure of the contents of the portable storage medium.

Additionally or alternatively, the microprocessor may

limit the number of passwords or one-time-pad entries

accessed from the portable storage device in any pre-

specified amount of time. This would prevent rapid

copying of the identification keys stored on the portable

storage medium. Again, a timing function, such as a clock

or a software timing loop or running sum of execution times

is required.

For example, the microprocessor may be programmed

to limit the number of identification keys or one-time-pad

entries or the like accessed from the portable storage device

in a given number of seconds, minutes, hours or days.

Alternatively, the microprocessor could prevent accessing

identification keys or one-time-pad entries at a rate faster

than they would be used by the user^'s terminal program, or

could prevent accessing one-time-pad keys at a rate faster

than the maximum transmission rate between the remote terminal and the host computer. Other desirable rate

limitations will readily be apparent to those skilled in the

art.

Alternatively or additionally, the microprocessor may

be programmed to output a time-dependent identification

key or one-time-pad entry or the like; i.e. it may output a

number that depends upon the time-of-day (including date)

from the clock as well as upon the contents of the portable

storage device. For example, the memory location or key

accessed might depend upon the time-of-day, rather than

the memory locations or keys being accessed in sequential

order; i.e. the microprocessor selects the appropriate

number or key from the portable storage medium based

upon the current time. If desired, the microprocessor may

combine the entry accessed from the portable storage

medium with time-of-day information. For example, the

keys could be added or concatenated and the result

encrypted by the microprocessor and sent from the portable

electronic device. Other time-dependent key techniques will

readily be apparent to those skilled in the art. For any time-dependent key technique, the host computer (server)

would correspondingly be programmed to expect the result

to be used as an identification key or as an encryption

means; accordingly, the number outputted by the portable

electronic device would be usable only at the time it was

obtained.

The time-dependent key techniques can be used with

any portable storage medium to produce keys that are only

valid when produced; if the portable storage medium does

not have its own local microprocessor, the above algorithms

or similar algorithms can be implemented n the processor

in the user's terminal or PC. They can also be used on the

host computer or server; with the above algorithms or

similar algorithms being implemented by the serv er or an

outboard microprocessor, possibly associated with the key

storage means. Accordingly, the above time-dependent key

techniques can be operated in reverse to authenticate the

server to the user in addition to authenticating the user to

the server. Additionally or alternatively, the microprocessor may

be programmed to access the portable storage medium only

if the user terminal program is running on the user's

machine. For example, the microprocessor can require an

access protocol or password (possibly incorporating time-of-

day information). .

Additionally or alternatively, the microprocessor may

be programmed to access the portable storage medium only

if the user terminal is accessing the host computer. For

example, it might require an encrypted time-of-day function

from the host computer. In addition to limiting access to

the portable storage medium to legitimate requests, this

authentication function would typically be made available to

the user's terminal program.

Additionally, the microprocessor may optionally be

programmed to prevent unauthorized accesses to the

portable storage medium while it is being shipped to the

user or when it is otherwise not in the immediate possession

of the user. One way is to program a time lock function

wherein the microprocessor will not grant access for a given time interval or until a specified date-and-time. If the unit

is received before that time, the user knows that there have

been no accesses and his keys are safe.

Another way is to require a password or

authorization sequence entered either by the user or the

user terminal program or by a central server via a

connection to the user s computer. For example, the card

might be unlocked via an Internet connection to a server.

Additionally, any of the other methods hereinbefore

described may be used.

Note again that the unit may also optionally be

programmed to erase its contents in response to one or

several illicit attempts to obtain access or in response to an

attempt to physically open the unit.

Further, the microprocessor can readily be

programmed to log all accesses, typically on the portable

storage medium or on the server or both.

Note that our portable electronic devices comprising

the above time-lock, authorization-lock or authentication-

lock, or access logging techniques can also be used for secure delivery of one-time-pads or encryption keys, or

private data or information, or the like. The other security

means contemplated for our portable electronic devices may

also be used in this type of application. Note additionally,

one may provide additional security by spreading the

information between two portable electronic devices or

portable storage media in such a way that the contents of

the two must be combined to give the information; for

example one may encrypt the contents of one using a one-

time pad stored in the other. The two are then shipped by

different means or at different times (e.g. the second may

optionally be shipped only after the first has been safely

received).

Note also that our portable electronic devices may be

implemented in a variety of form factors, including but not

limited to any black box form factor or computer peripheral

or computer plugin form factor (including a PCMCIA form

factor or computer card form factor) or a form factor

suitable to an ID card or badge or an access card or

transaction card or credit card or the like. There are many ways to connect peripheral devices

or electronic storage media to a terminal or computer.

Accordingly, an electronic portable storage medium or a

portable electronic device, in accordance with the principles

of the invention, may further comprise a PCMCIA interface

or a serial port or a parallel port or SCSI port or USB

(Universal Serial Bus) port or "Firewire" port or infrared

link or radio link or a "memory reader" or any other port or

communication means capable of enabling it to pass

information to and receive information from the user^'s

terminal or computer. Preferably, for a portable electronic

device or memory medium which communicates with the

remote terminal via an infrared link or radio link, the

transmissions between the portable electronic device and the

remote terminal are encrypted. The processor and/or logic

circuitry in the portable electronic device may also optionally

handle communication with the user's computer or PC.

In another embodiment, the portable electronic-

device may additionally record which identification keys

and/or one-time-pad entries or the like have been previously accessed, hence presumably used; rather than or in addition

to the user's terminal program or access software

performing this function. If the portable storage medium is

rewritable, the identification keys, one-time-pads, and the

like, may be overwritten once used. Alternatively, if the

portable storage medium is writable, a usage sequence

number or a usage record, table or list may be kept on the

portable storage medium. Or a flag bit or field associated

with the keys that have been used may be set or

overwritten. Alternatively, e.g. if the portable storage

medium is read-only, the portable storage device may

further comprise a secondary writable portable storage

medium, and a usage record, table or list may be kept

there. This prevents an identification key or one-time-pad

entry or the like from being used more than once.

Usage records can be alternatively kept in the server

or host computer. Preferably usage records can be kept in

both places and any discrepancy between usage records on

the user's portable storage medium and on the server would

suggest an attempt by a third party to illicitly gain access. Again, such a discrepancy might be indicated by any attempt

by either the user program or the server to re-use a one¬

time-pad key or one-time-pad entry that has already been

used with the server or user program respectively. Such a

discrepancy may also be indicated by any attempt to use a

key or pad entry out-of-sequence or any other "out-of-synch

episode".

Anything that suggests an attempt to gain illicit access

either to the contents of the storage medium or anything

that suggests an attempt to illicitly gain authorization with

the server or anything that suggests a "man in the middle

attack" by either counterfeiting the server to the user or the

user to the server might be detected either by the portable

electronic device or user program or by the server. Such

suggestive incidents include those discussed above: e.g.

repeated incorrect passwords typed in by the user, an

attempt to access too many keys from the portable storage

medium, an attempt to use a time-sensitive key at a later

time, any failure to authenticate the user to the server or

vice-versa, an attempt by either the alleged user or alleged server to re-use a one-time password or any other "out-of-

synch" episode, and the like.

Additionally, any attempt to use a known stolen user

key or invalid or counterfeit user key suggests an attack, as

does a usage pattern that suggests a user key may be stolen.

In one implementation, if the incident is detected by

the portable electronic device or the user program, either or

both may be programmed to contact or otherwise to notify

the server. If the incident is detected by the server, the

server may be programmed to contact the portable

electronic device or user program.

Procedures for dealing with a suspected attack

include but are not limited to: blocking access to the

portable memory medium or portable electronic device for a

set time; disabling access to the portable memory unit or

portable electronic device or erasing the portable memory

unit or portable electronic device (especially if the incident

suggests that the unit or device has been stolen); blocking

access by that device or unit or user to the server, either for

a set time or until the situation is resolved (e.g. by the server operator); notifying the true user (e.g. by E-mail or

telephone to the true user); or notifying the server operator.

These procedures may typically be implemented by

appropriate programming for the portable electronic

device s microprocessor and/or in the user program and/or

in the server(s).

In another embodiment, the portable electronic-

device comprises a portable storage media, a

microprocessor, and a modem. The microprocessor may

handle the authentication protocols with the server.

Additionally, the microprocessor may handle all encryption

of information transmitted by the remote terminal via the

modem and all decryption of information received from the

host computer by the remote terminal via the modem.

Including a modem also allows the microprocessor to be

programmed to allow the user to conduct stand-alone

transactions via the network and without later downloading

when the user does not have access to a regular terminal or

PC. There are a variety of additional techniques and

embodiments of the present invention that can be

implemented using a CD-ROM key or any portable storage

medium key or a portable electronic device key, per above.

For example, in another embodiment of the present

invention, the host computer (server) may request an

identification key from a random location on the user's CD-

ROM or portable storage medium. The remote terminal

or portable electronic device would read the identification

key from the appropriate location in the memory medium

and it would be transmitted to the host computer.

The present security system, in a most preferred

embodiment, entails the use of a "double-sided" key

technique comprising the use of separate entrance and exit

keys at the beginning and end respectively of the

communication session. In this method, the remote

terminal program (or portable electronic device) transmits

an identification key to the host computer (server) at the

beginning of the communication session, thereby

authenticating itself to gain access. The remote terminal (or portable electronic device) transmits a second

identification key to the server at the end of the

communication session; typically, this can be used to validate

the session. For example, the server is programmed such

that it will not process the information transmitted unless

both identification keys are correct; e.g. in a transaction

system, the user transactions would be received by the

server during the session, but not accepted or validated or

processed unless or until a valid exit key is received at the

end of the session. Thus, the first key functions to grant

provisional access; the second key functions to provide the

final authorization for the transactions.

In order to authenticate the server to the user^'s

terminal program (or portable electronic device), the server

would transmit to the user separate entrance and exit keys

in a directly analogous manner; one would typically then

have an exchange of identification keys between the user

program and the server at both the beginning and the end

of the communication session. Additionally, the identification keys may be time-dependent, e.g. using the

techniques described hereinabove.

Authenticating the user and server to each other at

the beginning and end of the session blocks attempts to

simply "hijack" the communication session. However, it

does not block attempts to insert information into or delete

information from otherwise valid sessions. The use of

time-dependent identification keys imposes the further

constraint that any tampering must be done in real time,

and also blocks attempts to obtain valid entrance and exit

keys, e.g. by using "man in the middle" techniques, and use

them later. Thus authentication means to authenticate the

entire session, or at least authenticate critical portions of the

session, such as transaction information or transaction

requests should always be included for maximizing security.

To authenticate a session or the critical portions

thereof, the session or critical portions thereof may be

encrypted. An unbroken encryption technique will serve to

authenticate the encrypted messages or information. Thus,

for example, encrypting the critical portions of the session using a one-time-pad stored on the portable storage medium

key and in the central server will authenticate that

information.

Another technique to authenticate a session or the

critical portions thereof is to calculate one or more check¬

sums or check-functions (hereinafter called check-functions)

using means whereby it is (a) difficult or impossible to

counterfeit the check-functions, and (b) difficult or

impossible to fabricate spurious messages with the same

check-function(s) as intercepted legitimate messages.

With the double-sided key technique, such check-

functions can be included in or combined with the above-

discussed end-of-session key. The end-of-sessioπ key will

not only authenticate the user or server but it will also

authenticate the contents of the session. For example, if

the check-function(s) from the user to the server include the

transaction information from the user, it authenticates that

transaction information; if it includes the relevant messages

from the server as well, it authenticates those as well: thus

confirming that the user received the messages sent by the server. Moreover, if the check-function includes the entire

session, it authenticates the entire session. If the check-

function^) include time-of-day information, either for the

communication session or for individual messages, it

authenticates that time-of-day information as well.

It is preferable to combine the check-function(s) with

the end-of-session key using a combining function that has

good "diffusion", so that an attacker cannot separate the

check-functions from the end-of-session key and attack them

separately. Note, for example, that simply adding (without

carries or with) the check-function to the end-of-session key

cannot be reversed by an attacker if the latter is from a

one-time key-pad. Other techniques include convolution or

encrypting the combination of the two, using an encryption

algorithm with good diffusion.

It is preferable that the combining function(s) have

good "diffusion" so that it is not possible for an attacker to

discover that some bits involve only the password, some bits

involve only the checksum(s) and some bits only involve the

time-of-day information; a combining function with good diffusion helps scramble them all together. Good diffusion

may be achieved by simply adding the check-sums or

functions to part or all of the exit signature, or convolve

them or use other algorithms that mix the information.

Yet another means would be to encrypt the two together

with an encryption function that has good diff usion.

There are many different ways to calculate check-

functions that are difficult to counterfeit and w here spurious

messages with given check-functions are also difficult to

counterfeit, or equivalently, spurious messages with the same

check-functions as an intercepted message are difficult to

counterfeit. For example, one may assign different parts or

characters or pieces of the transmission different weights;

e.g. depending on a key or random number from our

portable storage medium or from the server.

There are various ways to combine a weight function

with the messages or portions thereof; one way is to binary

add without carrying on a bit-by-bit basis; another way is to

group and multiply or group and add. typically throw ing

away the higher-order bits. One then typically sums the results of these operations. The checksum or check function

typically would either be that sum, or, preferably, the lower-

order digits or bits of that sum.

In addition or alternatively, one may use changing,

unique, or one-time weight functions. For example, one

may have a region of the user's one-time-pad (or a separate

pad) set aside for use as a weight function, and vary the

starting point, or the order in which the entries are taken,

or both from session to session. One way of doing so is to

have the starting point or order or both depend upon a

number taken from a one-time-pad or provided by the

server or user program or calculated from time-of-day

information, etc. Since there are N! orderings for a set, the

same pad can (optionally) be re-used at little risk (especially

if only the lower-order bits of the sum are used, per above).

Yet another way to calculate a checkfunction is to encrypt

the message(s) locally, then calculate the checkfunction on

the encrypted messages.

Alternatively or in addition, the checksum or check-

function may be combined with or include time-of-day information or (better) a function computed from time-of-

day information.

The double-sided key or password technique of the

invention can use keys or passwords from our portable

storage medium, or from an algorithm or from a string sent

out by the server, or by any other means of generating

passwords. For example, the double-sided keys could be

implemented by a unique algorithm for each user: for

example, by encrypting the time-of-day with a key unique to

each user.

The second password can come from the same

database or circuit or algorithm as the first, or from a

separate database or circuit or algorithm than the first.

Note also that we can use two or more passwords, either

from a single portable storage medium, database, circuit or

algorithm, or from two or more algorithms, or two or more

circuits or ICs.

Alternatively, in lieu of a second key or password, the

key or password is divided; one part is sent at the beginning of the session and the second part is sent at the end of the

session.

The double-sided key technique conserves keys and

therefore is particularly suitable for implementations of the

new security system invention using semiconductor memory

keys or portable electronic device keys with semiconductor

memories, and for other implementations of the invention

using portable memory media of limited capacity.

We further contemplate user authentication and/or

encryption means comprising more than one portable

electronic device and/or portable storage medium, or, when

possible, optionally using a single portable electronic device

or portable storage medium to achieve the same ends . As

described above, one implementation of our portable means

to provide separate entrance and exit keys is to have two

separate circuits or portable storage media or portable

electronic devices; one for the entrance key, a second for

the exit key, with both packaged together, e.g. in the same

card-like configuration. Similarly, in an application like an

electronic bank card, we may optionally have two or more different chips, circuits, databases or storage media,

algorithms, or programs; e.g. one that can be accessed by

any merchant, and a second that can only be accessed by

the issuing bank. Analogous applications for this type of

device in other areas of commerce will be readily apparent.

There may also optionally be two or more different

connection means or protocols or keys or passwords or

algorithms or authentication means, to use or access either

or both of the databases or portable storage media.

algorithms, or programs, chips or circuits. Similarly, the

microprocessor in the portable electronic device may be

programmed to provide different access privileges to

different entities or programs or individuals accessing the

device; e.g, in a bank card application, only the bank^'s

program would be allowed to add funds to the total(s)

stored in the card; e.g. doing so would require the bank^'s

password or passwords for accessing a card or tor accessing

that individual's card, while any merchant to whom the user

gave his card would be able to deduct. (For portable

storage media keys or encryption means, the same function would be implemented by an appropriate programming in

the user terminal program.) Additionally, we previously

described means for providing different access privileges or

use privileges to a central server for different users; we

further contemplate using such means to provide different

access or use privileges to a user s portable electronic

device or portable storage medium for different entities or

programs or different authorized individuals. Note that this

includes providing access to different services or functions,

both in the case of the central server and in the case of a

portable electronic device or portable storage medium.

As a special case, note that storing different

passwords in the portable electronic device or portable

storage medium allows us to provide programming to allow

different users to access different authentication means or

keys, different encryption means or keys, different data,

and/or different functions on the same portable electronic

device or portable storage medium.

Additionally, we contemplate the use of two or more

portable storage media or portable electronic devices in the same unit to allow said unit to be accessed by more than

one means or to implement different functions. For

example, it is now possible to buy CD-ROM business cards;

these are read-only CD-ROM disks that have been trimmed

to the size and shape of a business card.

Unfortunately, the prior art does not include writable

CD-ROMS of this type; when one attempts to trim a

writable CD-ROM, the two pieces of plastic separate; the

writable film acts as a parting agent. We have found that it

is possible to produce writable CD-ROM cards by providing

clamping means to hold the top and bottom of the disk

together while cutting off the rest of the disk to leave a

card-shaped writable CD-ROM. (Note that it is expedient

to have one clamping surface at least slightly resilient to

provide an even clamping pressure.) We can then glue or

fuse the exposed edges together, preferably before releasing

said clamping means. (When fusing, it is often expedient to

fuse beyond the writable layer; one way to do this is to use

a slitting saw to remove a little bit of the writable layer, for

example 10 or 20 mils around the outside. Another way is to, when fusing, deform the plastic material outward, with

heat and/or pressure, so as to fuse beyond the outside edge

of the writable layer. Note that if the writable layer should

break up and enter the fused region, one still obtains fusion

between islands of the writable layer.) Said writable CD-

ROM cards can be used as our portable storage media, as

previously described for writable CD-ROMs. We further

contemplate optionally embedding a portable electronic

device, preferably in IC form, in the unused area of the

card or attaching it to the surface of said card, preferably

on the top or unused surface. The resulting device can be

read either by a CD-ROM drive or by electronic means.

We further contemplate optionally including magnetic

storage media, typically on the unused ends of the card; the

resultant device can then also be read by magnetic means.

We further contemplate optionally providing the equivalent

of a one or two-dimensional bar-code pattern, typically again

on the unused ends of the card. Said pattern may either

be printed or may be implemented using the writable CD-

ROM material; the latter may optionally be done in a recording CD-ROM drive. Note further that the two or

more different storage means can store the same or

different information to implement the same or different

functions.

In addition, any of the techniques to detect and toil

an illicit attack, including attempts to break into the system

or steal identification keys or hijack a communication session

may be combined with a program to create an entrapment

session to keep the attacker or intruder linked or on the

line to allow his call to be traced with a view to identifying

or apprehending him. The entrapment session might also

include programming to elicit additional information from

the attacker or intruder or his computer or from servers

along the way.

Additionally, any of the portable storage means of

the present invention, including portable electronic devices,

might also comprise programming to plant a "cookie ' or

information packet or a covert program or "identification

virus" on an attacker's computer to facilitate subsequent

identification of the attacker or at least of the computer he or she used. The cookie or covert program would be

planted upon detection of an illicit attack by any of the

means described above. Such programming may be a part

of any user terminal program or user access program on the

portable storage means or needed to run the portable

storage means; it may also be a part of any software drivers

needed to access same, or of any other user program

included on or with our system. (The only function of the

"identification virus" is detection and identification of

attackers; it is a totally benign virus. It should be

programmed to be non-executing unless queried or

activated, e.g. by a server.)

Alternatively, upon detection of an illicit attack, the

server will plant the cookie or covert program in the

attacker's computer, using means well-known to those skilled

in the art (conventional cookies are normally planted by

central servers and not by programming on the user's

computer).

Alternatively, a service provider's computer may be

programmed to plant such a cookie or covert program upon MISSING AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION

MISSING AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION

attacker's session, plus other sessions immediately after (e.g.

in case the attacker uses the legitimate user's machine for

something else; e.g. to send an E-mail.)

A particular advantage of the "identification virus"

approach is that it is typically attached to an existing

program and is not detectable as a separate file.

Similarly, the tracer cookie of the invention might be

appended to an existing cookie. Alternatively, other means

to hide the covert program or cookie or the like may be

used; these include but are not limited to creating one or

more hidden files, masquerading as a system or application

file, marking it's block on the disk as "unusable" (and

reversing same when one attempts to read it) and the like.

A virus might be non-executing unless queried or except

under other restricted circumstances.

Additionally, such "cookies" or markers or programs

could be planted in any of the intermediate servers or

machines along the way; for example, this would allow the

maintainers or operators of the servers to notify an Internet

service provider that the service is being attacked. We further contemplate encrypted networks or

adding encrypted network functionality to existing networks

or to conventional networks. Thus, authentication and

encryption means such as those discussed hereinbefore can

be implemented between servers or routers or switches as

well as between users and servers. They may also be

implemented between private or corporate WANs or other

relatively secure networks, when messages must be passed

over an insecure network, such as the Internet. For

example, a message may be unencrypted (or lightly

encrypted) between the WAN users and their WAN servers,

with the servers handling the encryption/decryption function

for communication over the Internet between the servers.

We also contemplate encrypted networks (or

encrypted network functionality) wherein the network servers

or routers or switches comprise programming and/or

auxiliary processors and/or hardware means to translate

between one user's encryption and another^'s. This

encryption translation function can also be implemented on

a central server connected to the network, or on any computer connected to the network and accessible to the

users who wish to communicate, or on an auxiliary processor

or hardware connected to said server or computer, or in our

portable electronic devices or in stationary versions of same

or plugin versions of same. This encryption translation

technique enables any two users to communicate without...

knowing each other's encryption means or keys; this avoids

the need for each user to know every other user's

encryption means or keys, which quickly becomes both

cumbersome and, for most cryptosystems, insecure as well.

For example, we contemplate one-time-pad encrypted

networks wherein the central servers or routers or switches

comprise means to translate between any user's

one-time-pad and any other user's one-time-pad. One way

to do this is for the server to use the first user's

one-time-pad to decrypt the message, and then use the

second user's one-time-pad to re-encrypt the message. A

second way to do this is to first calculate a "translation pad"

from the two users' one-time-pads and then use the

translation pad to translate the message from one user's one-time-pad to the other user's one-time-pad. The second

approach has two advantages. First, the message never

exists in decrypted form in the central server or router or

switch. Second, the translation pad can be calculated by an

utterly secure "pad server", then supplied to the network

server or router or switch to translate the message between

the two pads. This means that the message is never in a

network server that also has the information required to

decrypt it.

Similarly, for other encryption means, the translation

processor may either (a) decrypt one user^'s message, then

re-encrypt it using the other user's encryption means, or.

alternatively (b) generate a translation function or algorithm

between the two users' encryptions. The second approach

again has the advantage that the message never exists in

decrypted form while being translated. Similarly, the

translation algorithm, function, or key or the translation

function itself may be calculated or performed in a secure

translation server connected to the network server. In addition, it is desirable to avoid the need for each

network server or router or switch to know every user's

encryption means or keys. Therefore, we contemplate

networks wherein the network servers or routers or switches

comprise means to translate between each of their user's

encryption means and "trunk" encryption means for

communicating with other servers. Thus, when a first user

served by a first network server communicates with a second

user served by a second network server, the first network

server translates from the first user's encryption means or

key to an intermediate encryption means or a "trunk"

encryption means or key which the second network server

translates to the second user's encryption means or key.

Implementing this with one-time-pad systems entails

translation means directly analogous to those described for

translating between two users directly; the main difference is

an extra translation step.

In addition, we contemplate encrypted networks

wherein the network servers or routers or switches comprise

means to send the same encryption means or keys to any two users who wish to communicate. The encryption

means or key or keys may be sent as part ot the call setup

or link initiation, or it may sometimes optionally be sent

ahead-of-time in anticipation of being needed Typically,

the encryption means or key would itself be encry pted, e.g.

using each user's encryption means. It the two users are

on secure networks (e.g. a corporate WAN ) connected via

an insecure network such as the Internet, the encryption

means would be encrypted when being passed over the

insecure network, but might even optionally be unencrypted

when being passed over the secure networks to the users

Note, however, that the secure network mav inc lude its own

encryption, in which case one may optionally translate to

that network s encryption.

More often, each user program or portable storage

medium or portable electronic device will comprise

encryption means or keys known to its network server or

central server, which will use said user^'s encry ption means or

keys to encrypt the means or keys tor communicating with

the other user. Again, the information would most often be passed as part of the call setup or link initiation process;

if further keys are needed, they might be transmitted during

the session.

For example, in a one-time-pad system, each user's

server may use that user's one-time-pad to encrypt a new,

shorter one-time-pad that is sent to both users and used to

communicate between the two. As each one-time-pad

entry can be used to communicate a single one-time-pad

entry, one is effectively turning a portion of each user's

one-time-pad into a small one-time-pad common to the two

users for communication between the two users.

Alternatively, the one-time-pad entries can be conserved by

using each of them to transmit a single key to be used in

one of the conventional mathematical encryption means for

a subset of the session or for the duration of the session.

Further, for small numbers of users, or for

demonstration purposes, it is feasible to provide each user

with a custom CD-ROM or other portable storage means

comprising different tracks or storage areas, each comprising

encryption means or keys for one of the other users. For example, in a one-time-pad system, each user may be issued

a CD-ROM disk with tracks or storage areas comprising

different one-time-subpads for each of the other users.

Preferably, in all cases user "A's track or pad tor user "B" is

the same as user "B's:" track or pad for user "A" and is

different from all other tracks or pad on all ot the disks.

Note also that this technique can be extended to a

moderate number of users, e.g. if the one-time-pad entries

are conserved by using each of them to transmit a single

key to be used in one of the conventional mathematical

encryption means for a subset of a communication session

or for the duration of a communication session.

Finally, we also contemplate translating

authentications and authentication messages between users

as well, typically by means analogous to the means described

above for translating messages between different users^'

encryption systems. For example, if each user has a

one-time-pad of authentication keys, the central translation

program or means might translate each user s authentication

into the next entry on the other user^'s authentication pad. Similarly, any of our means for authenticating a user to a

central server can be used to authenticate two or more

users connected to said central server, e.g. when the users

are authenticated to the central server, the central server

sends an authentication message for each user to the other

user's terminal programs. Similarly, when we use the

central server or other processor or hardware to translate

messages between individual users' encryption means, we

also optionally contemplate appending or including an

authentication message or the translated authentications.

Finally, we contemplated authentication means where the

user programs authenticate themselves to the central sever

by using a key or encryption means unique to the user to

encrypt the user's claimed identity or other identification

message along with a variable padding, such as a random

padding or a predictably varying padding, such as the date

and time. One way of translating these authentication

means between users is to simply translate the encryption

means, e.g. by the means described previously. It is also desirable to use conventional encryption

means or one-time-pad encryption means or other

encryption means to transmit pictures. However, a picture

can use up one-time-pad entries quickly. There are several

ways to deal with this. One way is to conserve the

one-time-pad entries, again, by using each of them to

transmit a single key to be used in one of the conventional

mathematical encryption means for a subset ϊ a picture or

for one or more pictures. Another way is to compress the

picture before encrypting it, e.g. with a one-time-pad: digital

compression tends also to remove redundant information.

thereby making unauthorized decryption more dif ficult.

A second class of techniques is the digital analog of

shredding the picture or painting over it with random

splatters of paint. One "shredding" technique is to divide

the picture into small squares or hexagons or other small

groups of pixels and use a series of random or quasirandom

numbers to scramble their positions and optionally to

randomize their orientations. For example, if a picture is

divided into 100 by 100 small squares, there are 10.000 squares in all; approximately 13 binary bits are needed to

assign each square a random or quasi-random position

within the 100 by 100 array, and another 2 bits may

optionally be used to pick one of (4) random orientations.

The total is 17 bits per square or 170,000 bits in all or

21,000 bytes of random or quasi-random numbers to digitally

shred (and unshred) one picture.

Those random or quasi random numbers can come

from one of our one-time-pads. Alternatively, one of our

one-time-pad entries or some other encryption means can

be used to transmit a "seed value" for a random-number-

generator algorithm or other position-scrambling algorithm.

If the one-time-pad is used, 21,000 bytes per picture means

that one 650Mbyte CD-ROM can be used to shred and

unshred 30,500 pictures.

A functionally similar positional scrambling technique

is to append to each pixel or block of pixels a number or

numbers describing it's location in the picture, then encrypt

said location number, then re-order the pixels or blocks according to their encrypted location numbers. Essentially,

one is encrypting the locations rather than the signal itself.

One digital splatter painting technique is to divide the

picture into small squares or hexagons or other small groups

of pixels and use a series of random or quasirandom

numbers to randomly add to or change each group^'s

chrominance (color) and luminance (brightness). Note that

one bit can optionally be reserved to randomly inv ert or not

invert either the brightness or any of the colors. The

bits-per-picture calculations are similar, and the random or

quasi-random numbers can come from a one-time-pad or

random-number- generator algorithm or other color

scrambling algorithm in a directly analogous manner the

digital shredding technique.

Note that one may also apply an invertible smoothing

or smear function either to the digitally scrambled or

digitally splattered picture on the one hand or to the

scramble function or splatter function on the other. This

will hamper any attempt at applying computerized

edge-matching algorithms. Analogous techniques may be applied to the

compressed picture information; again, one has the choice of

encrypting the picture information or scrambling the

positional information and, for blocks, scrambling the

orientation.

It is also desirable to encrypt voice or audio signals,

e.g. telephone, radio and cellular telephone signals, again

using our user-unique encryption means. Again, one may

elect to encrypt the compressed signal to reduce the amount

of encryption needed or to save one-time-pad entries. A

digital cellular telephone with a user-unique one-time-pad or

encryption key pad on a miniature hard-drive is within the

scope of this invention. Note also that the one-time-pad

can periodically be "recharged" with new numbers or keys

using means we previously discussed.

Alternatively or in addition, one can scramble

sub-blocks or samples in time; equivalently, one may attach

to each sample or block a number denoting its position in

the datastream, encrypt said number, then re-order the

samples or blocks according to the encrypted numbers. Alternatively, one can add a random or pseudo-random

"noise" signal to mask the voice signal. Alternatively, one

may apply these techniques to the compressed signal or to

the signal in the frequency domain instead of the

time-domain..

It is also desirable to encrypt video signals, e.g.

television programs, motion pictures, teleconf erencing, and

the like, again using our user-unique encryption means.

Again, one may elect to encrypt the compressed signal to

reduce the amount of encryption needed or to save

one-time-pad entries. Alternatively or additionally, one may

scramble pixels or blocks of pixels in position or orientation,

as discussed for pictures, or in time (e.g. between frames),

as discussed for voice signals. Alternativ ely or additionally,

one can add a random or pseudo-random ^"noise" signal to

mask the picture, as previously discussed. Again, one may

alternatively apply these techniques to the compressed

signal.

In addition, since many television programs and

motion pictures are publicly available and not secrets, an encryption or scrambling technique that only degrades the

quality so that the program or motion picture is

unwatchable may be sufficient. For example, a single

one-time-pad entry can be used to seed a pseudo-random

number generation algorithm used to generate numbers to

partially or totally scramble or mask or encrypt the picture.

Finally, our user encryption keys or databases or pads

of keys or one-time-pads and our associated systems and

techniques can be used with any conventional means for

encrypting, scrambling or masking digital picture information,

or voice or audio or video information or signals.

The means discussed herein for securing and

controlling access to a host computer or server or network

or communication via a network can also be implemented

on an auxiliary or dedicated processor or computer such as

a "firewall processor", or on a network processor, router, or

switching system, instead of the host computer or server.

An auxiliary or dedicated processor or computer eliminates

the need for the host computer to perform the authentication, decreasing the processing load ot the host

computer.

The CD-ROM or other portable storage medium or

portable electronic device can be used to control access to.

through, or under the control of. any stored-program

processor or computer capable of directly or indirectly

accessing storage capacity sufficient to hold the requisite

database of user key codes. Indirect access may comprise

remote access via a network or may comprise access from

another processor or memory system.

Note also that the novel techniques herein described

can be used in applications where the keypad or key data or

portions thereof are installed or copied onto the hard disk

drive of the user's computer or terminal or otherw ise stored

or installed on the user's computer or terminal. Our

techniques can also be used in applications w herein the

portable electronic device comprises programming means to

act as a user terminal.

The invention also encompasses a method to store

secure versions of documents. In this system, documents or files created by a depositor are transmitted within internal

or external information network and are recorded in a

digitally signed and encrypted format. Such data or files or

documents can be encrypted by either OTP (one time pad)

or other encryption means and recorded on preferably a

write once read only storage device. Once the data is

stored in such a "digitally frozen" state, it may never be

changed or written over; thus it becomes part of a

permanent record which can be stored in third party

network or storage facility. The data is encoded and

digitally locked via a digital signature or the like until

confirmation of the data is needed. The third party storage

can be located either at one or more remote locations or in

a secured, "bonded" or controlled facility at a user location.

The date and time of receipt of the data is preferably

stored with the data. In addition, the storage site preferably

follows physical security procedures to ensure an

uncompromised chain of custody of the storage media.

Once the storage of encrypted documents is completed, they will enable the user to allow confirmation to any authorized

viewer.

The keys necessary to access, decπpt and confirm the

contents of the data can be held solely by the archive

facility, solely by the depositor, or jointly by both the archive

facility and the depositor. In this manner, access to the

data can be controlled as desired. In addition, the keys

necessary to access, decrypt and confirm the data can be

delivered to another party.

In the case where both the depositor and the archive

facility jointly hold the access keys, the archiv al system can

require that the two sets of keys be submitted

simultaneously, or within a predetermined trial period to

grant access to the data.

The above document archival system can be

implemented to record a series ot communications between

two users pertaining to, for example, a contract negotiation.

In this embodiment, each communication in the series is

stored by the archival facility in a digitally tro/.en form, e.g.,

via a digital signature. In addition, the signatures of some or all of the communications can be verified by the archival

facility or another verification source. This verification can

be appended to a final communication which is also digitally

frozen and stored at the archival facility.

Access to the data stored by the archival facility of

any of the above methods can be limited by time of access

and/or delivery and/or by location of the party requesting

access or of the archival facility.

The portable storage media or portable electronic

device can be programmed with biometric data such as

fingerprint or eye retina scan or voice confirmation data to

control access to and to confirm ownership. The device to

which the portable storage media or the portable electronic

device is attached can have programming and sensors to

detect such biometric data. The Portable electronic device

itself can include such sensors.

It will also readily be apparent to those skilled in the

art that the means described herein for providing secure

access to a host computer or server or to databases or

transaction processing systems implemented on same can also be used to control access to other computers, or to

networks, or to databases or transaction processing systems

or other programs or information functions implemented on

or accessed through same. The read-write portion or write-

once read-many portion would typically contain the unique

user access key codes and unique user encryption keys

(when used) and any other information unique to the

particular user.

In a CD-ROM implementation, the read-only portion

of the users' disks could be imprinted quickly and

economically by pressing. The individualized portion,

typically a write-once, read-many portion, would then be

quickly recorded on an appropriate recording CD-ROM

drive. This approach may prove advantageous in a variety

of high-volume applications.

Although the foregoing description has been given by

way of preferred embodiments, it will be understood by

those skilled in the art that other forms ot the invention

falling within the ambit of the following claims is

contemplated. Accordingly, reference should be made to the following claims in determining the full scope of the

invention.

Claims

We claim:

1. A method of providing user identification and

authentication using ultra long identification key codes

and/or ultra large databases of identification key codes in a

manner providing secure access from a remote computer

terminal to a database or server transaction program stored

on a host computer, comprising the steps of:

(a) utilizing key generation algorithms and/or

hardware to generate individual, class specific, or both user

access key codes which may optionally contain indiv idual

encryption keys;

(b) utilizing key generation algorithms to generate

one or more media access codes;

(c) creating a database or otherwise updating an

existing database comprising a compilation of each ot said

individualized and class specific user access key codes which

have been generated for predetermined authorized users of

the server transaction program; (d) recording, on separate individual portable

storage media directly compatible with and readily insertable

and removable from said remote computer terminal, each of

said individualized and class specified user access key codes,

along with the optional individual encryption keys, and the

media access codes;

(e) loading or providing the server serving as the

host computer with a complete registry or compilation of

each individualized and class specified access key code and

any optional individual encryption keys which have been

generated by the key generation algorithms;

(f) providing each authorized user with said

portable storage medium containing the authorized user's

individual or class specified access key code or key codes;

(g) providing the server with computer

programming including steps for comparing individual and

class specified access key codes transmitted over telephone

networks or communication networks from a user's remote

computer terminal against the stored compilation of

authorized access key codes and permitting correct matches to have access to said server transaction program while

denying access to unauthorized access key codes;

(h) providing users' remote computer terminals

with programming including the steps for comparing media

access codes entered by the user against media access codes

stored on the portable storage medium and permitting

correct matches to have access to the individual or class

specified access key codes stored on the portable storage

medium;

(i) providing users' remote computer terminals

with programming to permit connection to said server

through a communication network or telephone network and

to transmit individual and class specific access key codes

through said remote computer terminal utilizing readers for

the portable storage medium to said server for the purposes

of gaining access to said server transaction database: and

(j) conducting a communications session between

the user's remote computer terminal and said server

transaction program through said telephone or

communication network.

2. A method of providing user identification and

authentication using ultra long identification key codes

and/or ultra large databases of identification key codes in a

manner providing secure access from a remote computer

terminal to a database or server transaction program stored

on a host computer, comprising the steps of:

(a) utilizing key generation algorithms to generate

individual, class specific, or both user key codes which may

optionally contain individual encryption keys;

(b) creating a database or otherwise updating an

existing database comprising a compilation of each of the

access key codes which have been generated for predeter-

mined authorized users of the server transaction program;

(c) recording, on separate individual portable

storage media directly compatible with and readily insertable

and removable from said remote computer terminal, each of

said individualized and class specified user access key codes

along with the optional individual encryption keys; (d) loading or providing the server serving as the

host computer with a complete registry or compilation of

each individualized and class specified access key code and

any optional individual encryption keys which have been

generated by the key generation algorithms;

(e) providing each authorized user with said

portable storage medium containing the authorized user's

individual or class specified access key code:

(f) providing the server with computer

programming including steps for comparing individual and

class specified access key codes transmitted ov er telephone

networks or communication networks from a user^'s remote

computer terminal against the stored compilation of

authorized access key codes and permitting correct matches

to have access to said server transaction program while

denying access to unauthorized access key codes

(g) providing users' remote computer terminals

with programming to permit connection to said server

through a communication network tor telephone network and

to repeatedly or periodically transmit individual and class specific access key codes through said remote computer

terminal utilizing readers for the portable storage medium to

said server for the purposes of gaining access to said server

transaction database; and

(h) conducting a communications session between

the user's remote computer terminal and said server

transaction program through said telephone or

communication network.

3. A method of providing user identification and

authentication using ultra long identification key codes

and/or ultra large databases of identification key codes in a

manner providing secure access from a remote computer

terminal to a database or server transaction program stored

on a host computer, comprising the steps of:

(a) utilizing key generation algorithms to generate

individual, class specific, or both user key codes which may

optionally contain individual encryption keys;

(b) creating a database or otherwise updating an

existing database comprising a compilation of each of the access key codes which have been generated for predeter-

mined authorized users of the server transaction program;

(c) recording, on separate individual portable

storage media directly compatible with and readily insertable

and removable from said remote computer terminal, each of

said individualized and class specified user access key codes

along with the optional individual encryption keys;

(d) loading or providing the server serving as the

host computer with a complete registry or compilation of

each individualized and class specified access key code, the

location on the portable storage media where each

individualized and class specified access key code is stored.

and any optional individual encryption keys w hich hav e been

generated by the key generation algorithms:

(e) providing each authorized user with said

portable storage medium containing the authorized user^'s

individual or class specified access key code:

(f) providing the server with computer

programming including steps for (i) requesting one or more individual and

class specified access key codes from a specific location on

the portable storage media, and

(ii) comparing individual and class specified

access key codes transmitted over telephone networks or

communication networks from a user's remote computer

terminal against the stored compilation of authorized access

key codes and permitting correct matches to have access to

said server transaction program while denying access to

unauthorized access key codes;

(g) providing users' remote computer terminals

with programming to permit connection to said server

through a communication network or telephone network and

to transmit individual and class specific access key codes

through said remote computer terminal utilizing readers for

the portable storage medium to said server for the purposes

of gaining access to said server transaction database;

(h) conducting a communications session between

the user's remote computer terminal and said server transaction program through said telephone or

communication network.

4. A method of providing user identification and

authentication using ultra long identification key codes

and/or ultra large databases of identification key codes in a

manner providing secure access from a remote computer

terminal to a database or server transaction program stored

on a host computer, comprising the steps ot:

(a) utilizing key generation algorithms to generate

individual, class specific, or both user key codes w hich may

optionally contain individual encryption keys:

(b) creating a database or otherw ise updating an

existing database comprising a compilation ot each of the

access key codes which have been generated tor predeter-

mined authorized users of the server transaction program;

(c) recording, on separate individual portable

storage media directly compatible with and readily insertable

and removable from said remote computer terminal, each of said individualized and class specified user access key codes

along with the optional individual encryption keys;

(d) loading or providing the server serving as the

host computer with a complete registry or compilation of

each individualized and class specified access key code and

any optional individual encryption keys which have been

generated by the key generation algorithms;

(e) providing each authorized user with said

portable storage medium containing the authorized user's

individual or class specified access key code;

(f) providing the server with computer

programming including steps for comparing individual and

class specified access key codes transmitted over telephone

networks or communication networks from a user's remote

computer terminal against the stored compilation of

authorized access key codes and permitting correct matches

to have access to said server transaction program while

denying access to unauthorized access key codes;

(g) providing users' remote computer terminals

with programming to permit connection to said server through a communication network or telephone network and

to transmit individual and class specific access key codes

through said remote computer terminal utilizing readers for

the portable storage medium to said server tor the purposes

of gaining access to said server transaction database:

(h) providing users' remote computer terminals

with programming to permit copying ot information or one

or more programs from the server or the portable storage

medium to the remote computer terminals and

(i) conducting a communications session between

the user's remote computer terminal and aid server

transaction program through said telephone or

communication network.

5. A method of providing user identif ication and

authentication as described in claim 2, wherein in said step

of providing users' remote computer with programming,

individual and class specific key codes are transmitted at the

beginning and end of the communications session.

6. A method of providing user identification and

authentication as described in claim 2, further comprising

the steps of:

(a) counting the information transmitted

from the remote terminal to the server according to a pre-

determined algorithm;

(b) transmitting the count to the server

whenever individual and class specific access key codes are

transmitted to the server.

7. A user identification authentication system

using ultra long identification keys and/or ultra large

databases of identification keys for secure remote computer

terminal access to a host computer comprising:

(a) a host computer having a compiled database

of pre-authorized user access key codes of ultra long length;

(b) a series of individual portable storage media

directly compatible with and readily insertable and

removable from said remote computer terminal, each

containing (i) a unique or class unique access key

code distributed among authorized users of a server

transaction program, and

(ii) one or more media access codes:

(d) a remote terminal with programing to compare

entered media access codes with the media access codes

stored on the portable storage media and to deny access to

the access key codes stored on the portable storage media

to any unauthorized media access codes but to permit access

to any user entering an authorized media access code;

(e) a server with programming to compare

received access key codes with stored authorized access key

codes and to deny access to the server transaction program

to any user transmitting an unauthorized key code but to

permit access to any user transmitting an authorized access

key code;

(f) each of said access key codes being ultra long

and comprising at least 20 characters or digits (requiring 20

or 10 bytes, respectively).

8. A method to control access to a resource

connected to a network accessible from a plurality of

communication devices, comprising the steps of:

(a) generating a plurality of sets of unique or class

specific key codes, said key codes being ultra-long and/or

said sets of key codes being ultra-large;

(b) creating a complete key database or otherwise

updating an existing complete key database comprising a

compilation of each of said plurality of sets of unique or

class specific key codes;

(c) providing a host device with said complete key

database, said host device being connected to said network;

(d) recording, on one of said communication

devices or on a unique individual portable storage media

compatible with one of said communication devices, one of

said sets of unique or class specific key codes;

(e) programming said one communication device

to permit connection to said host device through said

network and to transmit or receive individual or class

specific key codes to or from said host; (f) programming said host device to permit

connection to one of said communication devices and to

transmit or receive individual or class specific key codes to

or from said one communication device;

(g) distributing said communication device or said

unique individual portable storage media upon which said

one set of unique or class specific key codes has been

recorded to an authorized user of said resource.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein said keys are

identification keys and further comprising programming said

host device to compare individual or class specific

identification key codes transmitted from said one

communication device against the stored compilation of

identification key codes, and to grant said one

communication device access to said resource if said

transmitted key code matches a key code in said complete

database, while denying such access in the case of an

incorrect match.I.The method of claim 2, wherein said

complete identification key database provided to said host device is stored in encrypted form.II.The method of claim 3,

further comprising programming said host device to employ

a trap door algorithm to compare an identification key

transmitted by said one communication device with an

encrypted identification key provided to said host device.

12. A method to control access to a resource accessible from a plurality of user devices, comprising the steps of: generating a plurality of sets of one or more unique or class specific keys, said keys being ultra-long or said sets of keys being ultra- large; creating a key database comprising a compilation of each of said plurality of sets of unique or class specific keys ; storing said key database on a storage medium connected to a host, said host including one or more programmable devices; programming a user device to communicate with said host and to transmit or receive keys to or from said host; programming said host to communicate with said user device and to transmit or receive keys to or from said user device; and distributing one or more sets of user keys to an authorized user of said resource, each set of user keys comprising one of said sets of unique or class specific keys, and said key database including each of said sets of user keys; and said set of user keys being recorded on a storage medium integral or compatible with said user device prior to or after distribution of said set of user keys to said authorized user.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein said set of user keys is recorded on said storage medium prior to distribution to said authorized user.

14. The method of claim 12, wherein said set of user keys is distributed electronically.

15. The method of claim 13 wherein said storage medium is a portable storage media.

16. The method of claim 12, further comprising: said keys being identification or authentication keys; and transmitting a key from said set of user keys to said host; programming said host device to compare said transmitted key against said key database, and denying said user device access to said resource if said transmitted key does not match a key in said key database.

17. The method of claim 12, further comprising: said keys being identification or authentication keys; and transmitting a key from said set of user keys from said host to said user device; programming said user device to compare said transmitted key against said set of user keys; and terminating a communication session if said transmitted key does not match a key in said set of user keys.

18. The method of claim 16, wherein said set of user keys includes a plurality of groups of keys, each group of keys providing a different level of access to said resource.

19. The method of claim 18, wherein information associating said groups of keys with said different levels of access to said resource is recorded on said storage medium.

20. The method of claim 18, wherein information associating said groups of keys with said different levels of access to said resource is recorded on said host.

21. The method of claim 12, further comprising steps to prevent or detect attempted re-use of a key.

22. The method of claim 12, wherein said set of user keys is a one time pad, each key of said set of user keys being used only once; and further comprising steps to prevent or detect attempted reuse of a key.

23. The method of claim 12 further comprising: said set of user keys is a one time pad, each key of said set of user keys being used only once; programming said user device and said host to use keys of said set of user keys as seeds for a key generation algorithm to generate an encryption key.

24. The method of claim 12, further comprising: programming said user device to encrypt a current time and date known to said user device using a key from said set of user keys and to transmit said encrypted time and date to said host; and programming said host to decrypt said encrypted time and date using a key from said set of user keys and to deny access to said resource if said decrypted time and date is not within a predetermined tolerance of a current time and date known to said host.

25. The method of claim 12, further comprising: programming said host device to encrypt a current time and date known to said host using a key from said set of user keys and to transmit said encrypted time and date to said user device; and programming said user device to decrypt said encrypted time and date using a key from said set of user keys and to terminate a communication session if said decrypted time and date is not within a predetermined tolerance of a current time and date known to said user device.

26. The method of claim 21, wherein: said prevention and detection steps comprise programming said host or said user device to track usage of said user keys .

27. The method of claim 26, further comprising: programming said host to provide a pointer to said user device to a previously unused key; and programming said user device to receive said pointer from said host, by which said user device can select said previously unused key from said set of user keys.

28. The method of claim 21 wherein said storage medium of said user device comprises writable memory, and said method further comprises recording usage of keys on said writable memory.

29. The method of claim 21, wherein said storage medium of said user device comprises writable memory, and said method further comprises erasing or overwriting used keys of said set of user keys.

30. The method of claim 21, wherein said steps to prevent or detect attempted reuse of a key comprise programming said user device and said host with an algorithm by which to select a previously unused key from said set of user keys .

31. The method of claim 30, wherein said algorithm comprises selecting a key from said set of user keys according to a current time and date.

32. The method of claim 31, wherein said keys are identification or authentication keys; and programming said host to deny access to said resource if a time and date associated with a key selected according to said algorithm by said user device is not within a predetermined length of time of a time and date of a key selected by said host according to said algorithm.

33. The method of claim 31, wherein said keys are identification or authentication keys; and programming said user device to terminate a communication session if a time and date associated with a key selected according to said algorithm by said user device is not within a predetermined length of time of a time and date of a key selected by said host according to said algorithm.

34. The method of claim 31, wherein: said keys are identification or authentication keys; programming said user device to transmit a current time and date known to said user device along with an associated key selected from said set of user keys according to said algorithm; and programming said host to allow access to said resource if said time and date transmitted by said user device is within a predetermined amount of time of a current time and date known to said host, and if said associated key transmitted by said user device matches a key stored on said host, which stored key is associated with said time and date transmitted by said user device.

35. The method of claim 31, wherein: said keys are identification or authentication keys; programming said host to transmit a current time and date known to said host along with an associated key selected from said set: of user keys according to said algorithm; and programming said user device to terminate a communication session if said time and date transmitted by said host is not within a predetermined amount of time of a current time and date known to said user device, and if said associated key transmitted by said host matches a key stored on said storage media of said user device, which stored key is associated with said time and date transmitted by said host .

36. The method of claim 21, wherein: said steps to prevent or detect attempted reuse of a key comprises programming said host to track usage of said user keys; and further comprising programming said user device to request, in the event that said host rejects a key selected by said user device as being previously used, that said host transmit another allegedly previously used key.

37. The method of claim 21, wherein: said steps to prevent or detect attempted reuse of a key comprises programming said user device to track usage of said user keys; and further comprising programming said host to request, in the event that said user device rejects a key selected by said host as being previously used, that said user device transmit another allegedly previously used key.

38. The method of claim 30, wherein: said steps to prevent or detect attempted reuse of a key comprises programming said host to track usage of said user keys; and further comprising programming said user device to request, in the event that said host rejects a key selected by said user device as being previously used, that said host transmit another allegedly previously used key.

39. The method of claim 30, wherein: said steps to prevent or detect attempted reuse of a key comprises programming said user device to track usage of said user keys; and further comprising programming said host to request, in the event that said user device rejects a key selected by said host as being previously used, that said user device transmit another allegedly previously used key.

40. The method of claim 12, wherein: said keys are authentication or identification keys; programming said host to prevent reuse of a key of said set of user keys; said user device selects a plurality of keys from said set of user keys at random; said user device transmits a first key from said plurality of selected keys to said host; and if said host rejects said first key, said user device transmits a second key from said plurality of selected keys to said host .

41. The method of claim 12, wherein additional or replacement keys are appended to or written over said set of user keys recorded on said storage medium after distribution of said set of user keys to said authorized user.

42. The method of claim 12, wherein said keys are generated by a random or pseudo-random algorithm.

43. The method of claim 12, wherein said keys are generated by a random physical process.

44. The method of claim 12, wherein said step of storing said key database on said storage medium comprises encrypting said keys.

45. The method of claim 16, wherein said transmitted key is compared to an encrypted key stored on said host by a trap door algorithm.

46. The method of claim 12, wherein a plurality of sets of user keys are distributed to said authorized user, and wherein said host identifies which one of said plurality of sets of user keys is to be used for a communication session.

47. The method of claim 12, wherein said user device must connect to said host to gain access to said set of user keys .

48. The method of claim 12, wherein said keys of said set of user keys are used according to a predetermined algorithm.

49. The method of claim 48, wherein said algorithm comprises selecting a key from said set of user keys according to a current time and date.

50. The method of claim 16, wherein an identification or authentication key transmitted to said host is encrypted prior to being transmitted.

51. The method of claim 50, wherein said transmitted key is encrypted with a selected encryption code selected from a database of encryption codes located on said user device and located on said host .

52. The method of claim 51, wherein said selected encryption code is selected by said host.

53. The method of claim 51, where said selected encryption code is selected by said user device according to a predetermined algorithm.

54. The method of claim 50, wherein said transmitted key is encrypted with a public key encryption code transmitted to said user device from said host.

55. The method of claim 50, wherein said transmitted key is encrypted with an encryption code compiled from a first partial encryption code transmitted to said user device from said host and a second partial encryption code stored on said user device.

56. The method of claim 50, wherein said transmitted key is encrypted with a transmitted encryption code transmitted from said host, said transmitted encryption code being padded by said user device with random, null or nonsense prefixes or suffixes prior to encrypting said transmitted key.

57. The method of claim 56, wherein said transmitted key code is padded according to an algorithm specified by said host .

58. The method of claim 50, wherein said user device transmits a first identification or authentication key to said host, said first transmitted identification or authentication key being unencrypted or relatively lightly encrypted; said user device transmits a second identification or authentication key to said host, said second transmitted idenuification or authentication key being relatively highly encrypted; and said host uses said first identification or authentication key to determine an encryption code to use to decrypt and verify said second transmitted identification or authentication key.

59. The method of claim 17, wherein an identification or authentication key transmitted to said user device from said host is encrypted prior to being transmitted.

60. The method of claim 59, wherein said transmitted key is encrypted with a selected encryption code selected from a database of encryption codes located on said user device and located on said host .

61. The method of claim 60, wherein said selected encryption code is selected by said user device.

62. The method of claim 60, where said selected encryption code is selected by said host according to a predetermined algorithm.

63. The method of claim 59, wherein said transmitted key is encrypted with a public key encryption code transmitted to said host from said user device .

64. The method of claim 59, wherein said transmitted key is encrypted with an encryption code compiled from a first partial encryption code transmitted to said host from said user device and a second partial encryption code stored on

65. The method of claim 59, wherein said transmitted key is encrypted with a transmitted encryption code transmitted from said user device, said transmitted encryption code being padded by said host with random, null or nonsense prefixes or suffixes prior to encrypting said transmitted key.

66. The method of claim 65, wherein said transmitted key code is padded according to an algorithm specified by said user device.

67. The method of claim 59, wherein said host transmits a first identification or authentication key to said user device, said first transmitted identification or authentication key being unencrypted or relatively lightly encrypted; said host transmits a second identification or authentication key to said user device, said second transmitted identification or authentication key being relatively highly encrypted; and said user device uses said first identification or authentication key to determine an encryption code to use to decrypt and verify said second transmitted identification or authentication key.

68. The method of claim 12, further comprising: said keys including identification or authentication keys ; a first device comprising one of said host or said user device; a second device comprising one of said user device or said host; programming said first device to transmit an initial portion of a first identification or authentication key from said set of user keys; programming said second device to compare said initial portion of said first identification or authentication key transmitted by said first device with an initial portion of a comparison key recorded on a storage medium of said second device; and programming said second device to transmit, in the event of a correct comparison, an initial portion of a second identification or authentication key from said set of user keys to said first device.

69. The method of claim 68, further comprising: programming said first device to compare said initial portion of said second identification or authentication key transmitted by said second device with an initial portion of a comparison key recorded on a storage medium of said first device; and programming said first device to transmit, in the event of a correct comparison, an further portion of said first identification or authentication key to said second device .

70. The method of claim 69, further comprising: programming said second device to compare said further portion of said first identification or authentication key transmitted by said first device with a further portion of said comparison key recorded on said storage medium of said second device; and programming said second device to transmit, in the event of a correct comparison, a further portion of said second identification or authentication key to said first device .

71. The method of claim 70, further comprising programming said first and second devices to repeatedly transmit and compare portions of an identification or authentication key, until either all portions of said key have been transmitted, or an incorrect portion is transmitted.

72. The method of claim 12, further comprising said keys being identification or authentication keys; programming said user device or said host to transmit a checksum number related to a selected plurality of keys to said host device or user device, respectively.

73. The method of claim 72 wherein said selected plurality of keys is selected according to a predetermined algorithm.

74. The method of claim 12, further comprising said keys including encryption keys; establishing a communication session between said user device and said host; and encrypting data transmitted between said host and said user device using as least one of said keys.

75. The method of claim 74 , wherein an encryption key used to encrypt data transmitted between said host and said user device is padded with null or nonsense prefixes or suffixes chosen according to a predetermined algorithm.

76. The method of claim 74, wherein said set of user keys is a one time pad, each key being used to encrypt a partial sequence of said data.

77. The method of claim 74, wherein said user keys are used once .

78. The method of claim 74 wherein a key of said set cf user keys is used to encrypt a limited or partial sequence of data in said communication session.

79. The method of claim 74, wherein a relative strength of an encryption level of said communication session is changed during said communication session.

80. The method of claim 12, wherein a plurality of sets of user keys is recorded on said storage medium; a first set of user keys provided to said user being associated with a predetermined resource; and said user device not permitting access to said sets of user keys other than said first set thereof absent authorization from said host.

81. The method of claim 12 further comprising a portion of said resource being stored on said user device.

82. The method of claim 12, further comprising preforming a transaction with said user device, and storing information associated with said transaction on said user device.

83. The method of claim 82, wherein said transaction information stored on said user device is transmitted to said host .

84. The method of claim 16, further comprising establishing a communication session between said user device and said host; conducting a transaction process in parallel with and at the same time as an identification or authentication process .

85. The method of claim 84, wherein during said identification or authentication process, said user device transmits a first and a second identification or authentication key to said host; said host performs a relatively rapid confirmation of said first key; upon confirmation of said first key, said host allows said transaction process to commence; said host performs a confirmation of said second key; said host terminating said transaction process if said second key is not confirmed.

86. The method of claim 85, wherein said first key is an encrypted form of said second key, said second key being encrypted according to a predetermined algorithm.

87. The method of claim 86, wherein said first and second keys are stored on said storage medium.

88. The method of claim 87, wherein said user device does not contain said predetermined encryption algorithm.

89. The method of claim 85, wherein pending confirmation of said second key, said host grants provisional limited access to said resource to said one user device.

90. The method of claim 12, wherein said user device is a portable electronic device having a memory and a processor, said set of user keys being recorded on said memory.

91. The method of claim 90 wherein said set of user keys recorded on said portable electronic device comprises an ultra- long database of keys, which keys are 25 characters or greater in size.

92. The method of claim 90, further comprising said keys including identification or authentication keys ; and said portable electronic device including means to transmit said identification or authentication keys to said host .

93. The method of claim 90, further comprising said keys including encryption keys; and said portable electronic device including means to encrypt and decrypt data using said encryption keys and to transmit and receive encrypted data to and from said host.

94. The method of claim 90, wherein said portable electronic device includes means to prevent unauthorized access to said set of user keys recorded thereon.

95. The method of claim 12, wherein said user device includes means to prevent unauthorized access to said set of user keys recorded thereon.

96. The method of claim 94, wherein said means to prevent unauthorized access to said keys recorded on said portable electronic device comprises means to disable said portable electronic device after a predetermined number of unauthorized attempts to access said user keys.

97. The method of claim 94, wherein said means to prevent unauthorized access to said keys recorded on said portable electronic device comprises means to disable said portable electronic device if keys are requested faster than a predetermined rate.

98. The method of claim 97, wherein said predetermined rate is based on a maximum transmission speed between said portable electronic device and said host.

99. The method of claim 94, wherein: said portable electronic device is distributed to said authorized user after said set of user keys is recorded thereon; and said method further comprises activating means to prevent access to said set of user keys stored on said portable electronic device during a time when said portable electronic device is being distributed to said authorized user.

100. The method of claim 99, wherein said portable electronic device includes a clock and wherein said portable electronic device deactivates said means to prevent access to said keys at a predetermined time and date.

101. The method of claim 99 , wherein said means to prevent access to said set of user keys is deactivated only after said portable electronic device establishes a communication session with an activation host and said activation host transmits a deactivation key to said portable electronic device .

102. The method of claim 90, wherein said portable electronic device includes means to control the rate of use of the keys of said set of user keys stored thereon. /56009

₁₀3. _The metnod of claim 90, wherein said portable electronic device includes means to monitor usage of keys recorded thereon.

₁₀4. The method of claim 103, wherein said means to monitor usage of keys recorded on said portable electronic device comprises writable memory and programming to track usage of or to erase used keys .

105. The method of claim 12 further comprising programming said host or said user device to detect an unauthorized attempt to access said host, resource or user device by an unauthorized user, to transmit a marker to said unauthorized user, and to record said marker on a system used by said unauthorized user.

106. The method of claim 105, wherein said marker includes information about said unauthorized user or information unique to said unauthorized attempt to access said host, resource or user device.

107. The method of claim 105, further comprising said host or said user device includes programming to detect markers on other devices.

108. The method of claim 105, further comprising storing markers on a plurality of systems used by said unauthorized attacker during the unauthorized attempt to access said host, resource or user device whereby a route used by said unauthorized user can be retraced.

109. The method of claim 105, further comprising, upon the detection of an unauthorized attempt to access said host, resource or user device, said unauthorized user is connected to a substitute host, which substitute host establishes a simulated communication session with said unauthorized user by simulating access to said host, resource or user device to which said unauthorized user attempted to gain access; and steps to identify and locate said unauthorized user during said simulated communication session.

110. The method of claim 16, further comprising establishing a communication session between said user device and said host to conduct a transaction; said host or said user device transmitting a second identification or authentication key to said user device or said host, respectively, during or upon termination of said communication session.

111. The method of claim 110, wherein said host or said user device transmits a plurality of identification or authentication keys to said user device or said host, respectively during a communication session, said transmissions being made at predetermined points in said communication session.

112. The method of claim 110, wherein said second key is transmitted after said transaction is consummated and wherein said transaction is held in abeyance until said second identification or authentication key is verified.

113. The method of claim 110, wherein said second identification or authentication key is transmitted by said user device or said host upon request of said host or said user device, respectively.

114. The method of claim 110, further comprising transmitting a check function related to data transmitted prior to said transmission of said second identification or authen- tication key, whereby the integrity of the data transmitted between authentication events can be verified.

115. The method of claim 12, further comprising said keys including encryption keys; transmitting data between said user device and said host, said transmitted data representing static images or video images; locations, orientations, chominance or luminance of individual pixels or groups of pixels of said static or video images being altered according to said encryption keys prior to transmission of said data.

116. The method of claim 115, wherein said set of user keys is a one time pad, each key of said set of user keys being used once to encrypt a predetermined amount of data.

117. The method of claim 16, wherein said user device is a telecommunication device.

118. The method of claim 12, further comprising said keys including encryption keys; said user device being a telecommunication device; transmitting data between said telecommunication device and said host; values or time locations of said data being altered according to said encryption keys prior to transmission of said data.

119. The method of claim 118, wherein said values of said transmitted data is altered by adding random noise to said data, said random noise being related to said encryption keys .

120. The method of claim 118, wherein said values of said transmitted data is altered in the frequency domain, said alterations being related to said encryption keys.

121. A method to control access to a resource accessible from a plurality of communication devices, comprising the steps of : generating a plurality of sets of unique or class specific keys, said keys being ultra-long and/or said sets of keys being ultra-large; programming first and second user devices to permit connection to said host device and to transmit or receive keys to or from said host; programming said host device to permit connection to said first and second user devices and to transmit or receive keys to or from said first and second user devices ; distributing first and second sets of user keys to first and second authorized users, each set of user keys comprising one of said sets of unique or class specific keys ; said first and second sets of user keys being recorded on first and second storage media, respectively, said first and second storage media being integral to or compatible with said first and second user devices, respectively; establishing a communication session between said first and second user devices through said host; and encrypting data transmitted by said first and second user devices using said first and second sets of user keys, respectively.

122. The method of claim 121, further comprising: creating a key database comprising a compilation of said first and second sets of user keys; providing said host device with said key database; and programming said host to decrypt data transmitted from said first and second user device using said first or second set user keys, respectively, and to encrypt said decrypted data using said second or first set of user keys, respectively.

123. The method of claim 121, further comprising: creating a translation key database comprising a set of keys suitable to translate data encrypted with said first or second set of keys directly to data encrypted with said second or first set of keys, respectively; recording said translation key database on a storage medium connected to said host; and programming said host to translate data transmitted from said first or second communication device using said translation key database.

12 . The method of claim 123 wherein said data is translated directly between an encryption for said first or second user device into an encryption for said second or first user device, respectively, without an unencrypted version of said data existing on said host.

125. The method of claim 121 further comprising: programming said host to create a translation key suitable to translate data encrypted with a key from said first or second set of user keys directly to data encrypted with a key from said second or first set of user keys, respectively; programming said host to translate data transmitted from said first or second communication device using said translation key.

126. The method of claim 125 wherein said translation key is created during or immediately prior to said communication session.

127. The method of claim 121 further comprising: programming said host with a translation function to translate data encrypted with a key from said set of user Sey-ECθfd-BEadt-fjrtH-li d__t&e3X__z p±s_ύt:wit_. a key from said set of user keys of said second or first user device, respectively said translation function using a key from each of said sets of user keys of said first and second user devices .

128. A method to control access to a resource accessible from a plurality of communication devices, comprising the steps of : generating a plurality of sets of unique or class specific keys, said keys being ultra-long and/or said sets of keys being ultra-large; programming first and second user devices to permit connection to said host device and to transmit or receive individual or class specific keys to or from said host; programming said host device to permit connection to said first and second user devices and to transmit or receive individual or class specific keys to or from said first and second user devices; establishing a communication session between said first and second user devices; said host transmitting a common set of keys to said first and second communication devices, said common set of keys comprising a set of said unique or class specific keys ; and encrypting data transmitted by said first and second user devices using said common set keys.

129. The method of claim 128, further comprising: recording, on a first user device, a first set of user keys comprising a set of said individual or class specific keys ; recording, on a second user device, a second set of user keys comprising a set of said individual or class specific keys; said common set of keys is encrypted using said first and second sets of user keys prior to transmission to said first and second user devices, respectively.

130. The method of claim 129 wherein said first and second user devices are distributed to said first and second users, respectively.

131. A portable electronic device, comprising: a storage medium a processor a database of unique or class specific keys, said database being ultra-large or said keys being ultra-long; and means to connect said portable electronic device to an external resource .

132. A portable electronic device as in claim 131, wherein said keys are at least one 25 characters or greater in length.

133. A portable electronic device as in claim 131, further comprising first and second means to connect to first and second external resources, respectively.

134. A portable electronic device as in claim 133, further comprising first and second processors, said first and second processors being connected to said first and second means to connect to first and second external resources, respectively.

135. A portable electronic device as in claim 134, wherein said first means to connect to an external resources further comprises means to interface with a media reader of a first type and wherein said second means to connect to an external resources further comprises means to interface with a media reader of a second type, different than said first type of media reader.

136. A portable electronic device as in claim 134, wherein said first and second processors are connected to said storage medium.

137. A portable electronic device as in claim 133, wherein said first and second means to connect to said first and second external resources further comprises first and second electronic circuits.

138. A portable electronic device as in claim 133, wherein said first and second means to connect to said first and second external resources further comprises first and second databases recorded on said storage medium.

139. A portable electronic device as in claim 133, wherein said first and second means to connect to said first and second external resources further comprises first and second storage media.

140. A portable electronic device as in claim 133, wherein said first and second means to connect to said first and second external resources further comprises said portable electronic device being programmed with first and second identification or authentication algorithms.

141. A portable electronic device as in claim 133, wherein said first and second means to connect to said first and second external resources further comprises said portable electronic device being programmed with first and second communication protocols.