WO1998054943A2 - Universal electronic transaction system and method therefor - Google Patents
Universal electronic transaction system and method therefor Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO1998054943A2 WO1998054943A2 PCT/EP1998/002995 EP9802995W WO9854943A2 WO 1998054943 A2 WO1998054943 A2 WO 1998054943A2 EP 9802995 W EP9802995 W EP 9802995W WO 9854943 A2 WO9854943 A2 WO 9854943A2
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- code
- transaction
- user
- receiver
- signal
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/42—Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/42—Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment
- G06Q20/425—Confirmation, e.g. check or permission by the legal debtor of payment using two different networks, one for transaction and one for security confirmation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
Definitions
- the present invention relates to electronic transaction systems, and particularly, to an electronic money transaction system with high portability and flexibility for enabling user to effect transactions of any kinds or for any purposes.
- the IC credit card is regarded as a comparatively secure means for effecting transactions, and even so, it does have a problem as lacking the capability of providing reliable information of the transaction to be authorised, and as a consequent, there is no guarantee that a transaction being authorised is exactly the transaction being intended by its holder.
- a terminal is necessary to be disposed in the service/product provider for interfacing the IC card and coupling it to a remote central computer responsible for authenticating the IC card, by establishing a communication link.
- the communication link need not be a secure one as far as communication between the IC card and central computer is concerned because when an authentication process takes place, the central computer will generate and send a random number to the IC card through the communication link, and the IC card will encrypt the random number and return the encryption result back to the central computer through the communication link. If the encryption result is correct, the central computer will permit the transaction.
- the communication link has to be secure to ensure the transaction information communicated to the central computer cannot be intercepted and modified.
- the terminal also have to be a secure device in order to provide reliable transaction information, particularly, the transaction amount, to the cardholder by means of , for e.g., a display. These increase the cost of the system and also cause other problems ...
- a IC card holder has to get into close vicinity of the terminal to monitor the transaction procedure handled by the cashier and desirably, should insert and remove the card into and from the terminal on his own.
- an object of the present invention to provide an apparatus to a user, rather than to the services/products providers, for conveying to the user directly reliable information of a transaction to be authorised, and for enabling the user to authorise that transaction; and a method therefor.
- an inexpensive, non-secure communication link such as any existing general purpose communication(s) network system e.g., telephone, internet computer or the like, without modification thereof for the security problems as mentioned above; and a method therefor.
- a pager for receiving a paging signal representative of information of, for e.g., a transaction on a user account, to be authorised, and representative of a one time, non- predictable code for use by the user to authorise that transaction.
- the user of the pager after checking the transaction information including transaction amount and payee's identity, being correct, sends or gives the one time, non-predictable code to the payee who will communicate the one time, non-predictable code to the bank for authorising the transaction.
- a pager with an IC card receiving port therein for receiving an external conventional IC credit card.
- the pager being for receiving a paging signal representative of information of a transaction to be authorised and representative of a random number.
- the IC card being for transforming the random number according to an encryption algorithm specified to the user to a one time, non-predictable code which being for use by the user to authorise that transaction.
- FIGJ is a block diagram of a present paging receiver according to a first embodiment.
- FIG.2 is a flow chart of a method for a present authorisation process. Detailed description of the preferred embodiments
- FIGJ there is shown a block diagram of a paging receiver 1, according to a first embodiment of the present invention, in which comprising :
- an address comparator 25 for determining whether a signal received is assigned to paging receiver 1 and may comprise a plurality of addresses for reception of corresponding different kinds of signals ;
- a CPU 21 for fetching a message following the call signal is determined to be assigned to the receiver 1 by address comparator 25 ;
- a message memory 28 for storing received messages of signals assigned to paging receiver 1 ;
- a cryptographic algorithm memory 27 containing cryptographic ajgorithm(s) for transforming at least a part of the E signals, of which details will be described herein below later ;
- a speaker 33 and led 31 for providing sound and light signal respectively to a user for indicating a paging signal assigned to paging receiver 1 received .
- the paging receiver 1 When in operation, the paging receiver 1 will receive any paging signals transmitted from a base station of the same pager based broadcast system.
- a paging signal contains 4 fields, namely as, 1) address field for containing an address of the paging receiver assigned for receiving the signal ; 2) type field for indicating whether the signal is a E signal or not ; 3) information field for containing information to be displayed to user ; 4) signal number identity for indicating to the assigned paging receiver that, a signal which being broadcasted by the base station more than one time for ensuring it will be received by the assigned paging receiver, be the same signal, so that the assigned pager receiver will ignore the successively identical signals and will not alert the user unnecessarily.
- the present paging receiver is for authorisation of transactions.
- Fig.2 is a flow chart of a method for the authorisation process.
- an internet computer receives the account number of a user.
- the internet computer has a card reader therein for obtaining the user account number by, for instance, reading a magnetic card or a IC card or the like of the user, otherwise the user account number will have to be entered by hand with the aid of a keyboard.
- the internet computer supplies the account number together with the transaction information, which may be entered into the computer with the aid of a keyboard by the payee/payer and which may include information such as identity of payee, transaction amount, purpose of payment, e.g., deposit or full payment for a particular product or service or the like, identity of product(s) and services concerned etc., to a central computer via a communication link which in this case, the internet.
- the central computer in response thereto, generates a random number which being a random number and searches in a storage thereof the user identity corresponding to the user account number received and then supplies the user identity searched, the transaction information received together with the random number to the base station mentioned above.
- the base station will then search in an address storage thereof an address of the paging receiver, corresponding to the user identity received, and generate a paging E signal, in a format as mentioned above and in which the information field contains the transaction information and the random number, and broadcast the signal.
- the paging receiver 1 after receiving the signal, transforms the random number therein by using an algorithm which being specific to the user and stored in cryptographic algorithm memory 27, the result will be used as a one time, non- predictable code for authorising the transaction. Then, alerts the user and displays the transaction information and the code to the user. The user, after seeing that the transaction information being correct, enters the code read on display 34 into the keyboard of the internet computer which again sends it to the central computer.
- the central computer in response thereto, searches in a cryptographic algorithm storage thereof a cryptographic algorithm corresponding to the user identity and transforms the random number it generated previously by using the cryptographic algorithm searched and compared the result with the a one time, non-predictable code received, and if the comparison result is favourable, the transaction is determined as authorised.
- the cryptographic process in the paging receiver 1 and the central computer may be omitted to simplify the authorisation process and at the same time, it can still provide an acceptable degree of security. This is possible for the reason that although theoretically, the paging signal is receivable by anyone, other people can actually not be able to receive it unless they know the correct address of the paging receiver 1 because nowadays, thousands of similar signals may occur and be receivable at the same instant of time.
- the paging receiver may includes a keypad thereon for receiving, by CPU 21, a password and without it CPU 21 will not perform the cryptographic process.
- CPU 21 will perform the cryptographic process on the random numbers of E signals received within a predetermined period of time thereafter, or will perform the cryptographic process on the random numbers of any E signals until the total transaction amount of authorised transactions exceeds a predetermined value, so that the user need not to enter the password every time a transaction take place.
- the E signal may be modified into 2 separated signals, 1) El signal which being similar to the E signal as mentioned above, except that it contains transaction information but no random number therein ; 2) the random number signal for containing the random number which being disguised as an ordinary telephone number.
- the address comparator 25 may contains a specific address dedicated for receiving the random number signal. In the random number signal, there is no type field for indicating to CPU 21 that it being a part of a E signal or the type field therein will not indicates it as a E signal, instead, the address comparator 25 will interrupt CPU 21 in a specific manner when it detects a received signal having an address in the address field thereof match the specific address, that is, a random number signal, thereby informing CPU 21 of this fact.
- a pager with an IC card receiving port therein for receiving an external conventional IC credit card. Similar to the first embodiment, the pager is also for receiving a paging E signal containing information of a transaction to be authorised on a user's bank account, or the like, and a random number, but in this case, the CPU 21 in the pager will not perform an cryptographic process on the random number, instead, it supplies it to the external IC card in the receiving port.
- the IC card upon reception of the random number, will transform it according to an cryptographic algorithm therein, and the result will be used as a one time, non-predictable code, as mentioned above, and will be communicated to CPU 21 which will cause it, together with the transaction information received, to be displayed in display 34.
- the transaction information may be communicated to an operator of the bank, who will be responsible for the data entry of the transaction information by means of a keyboard.
- both the money payer and receiver to have a respective pager of their own for receiving the transaction information and a different one time, non-predictable code for use by them respectively to authorise the transaction, so as to prevent loss to any one of them should there are errors in data entry.
- the transaction information may be encrypted by the central computer before transmitting to the pager. This can eliminate the possibility of the reception of E signal by the pager be interfered by an extremely strong disturbance signal and the pager be fooled by another fake E signal with the same random number therein but a false transaction information.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CA002331339A CA2331339A1 (en) | 1998-05-12 | 1998-05-12 | Electronic transaction system and method therefor |
JP2000620576A JP2003517662A (en) | 1998-05-12 | 1998-05-12 | Electronic trading system and method |
EP98928306A EP1147497A2 (en) | 1997-05-14 | 1998-05-12 | Universal electronic transaction system and method therefor |
AU80196/98A AU773789B2 (en) | 1998-05-12 | 1998-05-12 | Universal electronic transaction system and method therefor |
HK02103518.5A HK1041962A1 (en) | 1997-05-14 | 2002-05-09 | Universal electronic transaction system and method therefor |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
GB9709748A GB2328310B (en) | 1996-05-15 | 1997-05-14 | Electronic transaction apparatus and method therefor |
GB9709748.9 | 1997-05-14 |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO1998054943A2 true WO1998054943A2 (en) | 1998-12-10 |
WO1998054943A3 WO1998054943A3 (en) | 1999-07-29 |
WO1998054943A8 WO1998054943A8 (en) | 1999-11-18 |
Family
ID=10812275
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP1998/002995 WO1998054943A2 (en) | 1997-05-14 | 1998-05-12 | Universal electronic transaction system and method therefor |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1147497A2 (en) |
CN (1) | CN1322334A (en) |
HK (1) | HK1041962A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO1998054943A2 (en) |
Cited By (11)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1067492A3 (en) * | 1999-06-30 | 2001-01-17 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | Transaction notification system and method |
FR2804264A1 (en) * | 2000-04-19 | 2001-07-27 | Magicaxess | Method and device for electronic payment, uses once only certificate generated by user and validated by return of confidential code sent to user for that transaction by bank |
WO2001073708A2 (en) * | 2000-03-29 | 2001-10-04 | Cma Business Credit Services | Method and apparatus for admistering one or more value bearing instruments |
EP1104921A3 (en) * | 1997-11-04 | 2001-11-14 | Magicaxess | Method for transmitting data and implementing server |
WO2001056352A3 (en) * | 2000-04-19 | 2002-01-10 | Magicaxess | Electronic payment method and device |
EP1182625A1 (en) * | 2000-08-25 | 2002-02-27 | TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (publ) | Introduction of an electronic payment transaction |
WO2002037355A2 (en) * | 2000-11-03 | 2002-05-10 | Tomas Mulet Valles | A method to carry out economic transactions through a telecommunications network |
WO2002039392A2 (en) * | 2000-11-10 | 2002-05-16 | Smart Design | Method and installation for making secure the use of media associated with identifiers and with electronic devices |
EP1313075A2 (en) * | 2001-11-19 | 2003-05-21 | Fujitsu Limited | Electronic money processing method and program |
WO2006023839A2 (en) | 2004-08-18 | 2006-03-02 | Mastercard International Incorporated | Method and system for authorizing a transaction using a dynamic authorization code |
AU2012200393B2 (en) * | 2004-08-18 | 2015-04-02 | Mastercard International Incorporated | Method and system for authorizing a transaction using a dynamic authorization code |
Family Cites Families (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5285496A (en) * | 1992-12-14 | 1994-02-08 | Firstperson, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for providing a secure paging system |
US5483595A (en) * | 1993-09-20 | 1996-01-09 | Seiko Communications Holding N.V. | Paging device including password accessed stored cryptographic keys |
US5521966A (en) * | 1993-12-14 | 1996-05-28 | At&T Corp. | Method and system for mediating transactions that use portable smart cards |
US5708422A (en) * | 1995-05-31 | 1998-01-13 | At&T | Transaction authorization and alert system |
-
1998
- 1998-05-12 CN CN98814026A patent/CN1322334A/en active Pending
- 1998-05-12 WO PCT/EP1998/002995 patent/WO1998054943A2/en active IP Right Grant
- 1998-05-12 EP EP98928306A patent/EP1147497A2/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2002
- 2002-05-09 HK HK02103518.5A patent/HK1041962A1/en unknown
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
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None |
Cited By (22)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1103935A3 (en) * | 1997-11-04 | 2001-11-14 | Magicaxess | Method for data transmission and server to carry out such method |
EP1107203A3 (en) * | 1997-11-04 | 2001-11-14 | Magicaxess | Method for data transmission and implementing server |
EP1104921A3 (en) * | 1997-11-04 | 2001-11-14 | Magicaxess | Method for transmitting data and implementing server |
EP1067492A3 (en) * | 1999-06-30 | 2001-01-17 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | Transaction notification system and method |
WO2001073708A3 (en) * | 2000-03-29 | 2003-08-28 | Cma Business Credit Services | Method and apparatus for admistering one or more value bearing instruments |
WO2001073708A2 (en) * | 2000-03-29 | 2001-10-04 | Cma Business Credit Services | Method and apparatus for admistering one or more value bearing instruments |
WO2001056352A3 (en) * | 2000-04-19 | 2002-01-10 | Magicaxess | Electronic payment method and device |
FR2804264A1 (en) * | 2000-04-19 | 2001-07-27 | Magicaxess | Method and device for electronic payment, uses once only certificate generated by user and validated by return of confidential code sent to user for that transaction by bank |
EP1182625A1 (en) * | 2000-08-25 | 2002-02-27 | TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (publ) | Introduction of an electronic payment transaction |
WO2002017253A1 (en) * | 2000-08-25 | 2002-02-28 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Initiation of an electronic payment transaction |
WO2002037355A3 (en) * | 2000-11-03 | 2002-07-11 | Valles Tomas Mulet | A method to carry out economic transactions through a telecommunications network |
WO2002037355A2 (en) * | 2000-11-03 | 2002-05-10 | Tomas Mulet Valles | A method to carry out economic transactions through a telecommunications network |
WO2002039392A3 (en) * | 2000-11-10 | 2003-02-13 | Smart Design | Method and installation for making secure the use of media associated with identifiers and with electronic devices |
FR2816736A1 (en) * | 2000-11-10 | 2002-05-17 | Smart Design | Method of secure transaction between buyer and merchant using handheld devices by to transmitting to payment terminal secondary identification (ISA), amount of transaction and merchant account ID associated to merchant terminal |
WO2002039392A2 (en) * | 2000-11-10 | 2002-05-16 | Smart Design | Method and installation for making secure the use of media associated with identifiers and with electronic devices |
EP1313075A2 (en) * | 2001-11-19 | 2003-05-21 | Fujitsu Limited | Electronic money processing method and program |
EP1313075A3 (en) * | 2001-11-19 | 2005-07-13 | Fujitsu Limited | Electronic money processing method and program |
WO2006023839A2 (en) | 2004-08-18 | 2006-03-02 | Mastercard International Incorporated | Method and system for authorizing a transaction using a dynamic authorization code |
EP1810243A2 (en) * | 2004-08-18 | 2007-07-25 | Mastercard International, Inc. | Method and system for authorizing a transaction using a dynamic authorization code |
EP1810243A4 (en) * | 2004-08-18 | 2012-05-02 | Mastercard International Inc | Method and system for authorizing a transaction using a dynamic authorization code |
AU2012200393B2 (en) * | 2004-08-18 | 2015-04-02 | Mastercard International Incorporated | Method and system for authorizing a transaction using a dynamic authorization code |
US9911121B2 (en) | 2004-08-18 | 2018-03-06 | Mastercard International Incorporated | Method and system for authorizing a transaction using a dynamic authorization code |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1322334A (en) | 2001-11-14 |
WO1998054943A8 (en) | 1999-11-18 |
EP1147497A2 (en) | 2001-10-24 |
HK1041962A1 (en) | 2002-07-26 |
WO1998054943A3 (en) | 1999-07-29 |
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