WO1993011646A1 - Appareil de detection et de prevention empechant de trouver par hasard un numero telephonique d'abonne dans un systeme de telephone mobile cellulaire - Google Patents

Appareil de detection et de prevention empechant de trouver par hasard un numero telephonique d'abonne dans un systeme de telephone mobile cellulaire Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO1993011646A1
WO1993011646A1 PCT/US1992/010198 US9210198W WO9311646A1 WO 1993011646 A1 WO1993011646 A1 WO 1993011646A1 US 9210198 W US9210198 W US 9210198W WO 9311646 A1 WO9311646 A1 WO 9311646A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
subscriber
mobile telephone
roaming
telephone switching
roaming subscriber
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1992/010198
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Kenneth W. Sonberg
Original Assignee
Electronic Data Systems Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Electronic Data Systems Corporation filed Critical Electronic Data Systems Corporation
Publication of WO1993011646A1 publication Critical patent/WO1993011646A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning

Definitions

  • This invention relates to cellular mobile telephone systems and, in particular, to apparatus that detects attempts by an unauthorized user to use bogus subscriber numbers, obtained by tumbling subscriber numbers, to originate unauthorized calls.
  • This apparatus operates to verify the authorization of a subscriber number to be used for roaming by scanning a central database of valid subscriber numbers to positively verify the calling mobile subscriber unit. If this unit is not identified in this database the apparatus verifies the authorization of the calling mobile subscriber unit in the cellular mobile telephone system by routing a roamer verification request directly to the home switch of the subscriber. The failure of the home switch to positively validate the roaming subscriber is typically indicative of attempted fraudulent access to the cellular mobile telephone system. In response to the lack of a positive roamer validation, this apparatus identifies the roaming subscriber as a bogus subscriber unit. Once this bogus subscriber unit is identified, the call origination by the bogus subscriber unit is denied and further theft of service prevented. This apparatus can block tumbled subscriber number calls on a per call origination basis, regardless of the tumbling algorithms used.
  • the detection of a bogus subscriber unit is accomplished by routing data relating to a roaming subscriber call origination to a central subscriber verification system that maintains records of all the subscribers presently active or authorized to originate and receive calls in the particular cellular mobile telephone service area.
  • the call origination data is compared to the subscriber status data in the user database to obtain positive verification of the mobile subscriber unit.
  • this apparatus transmits a query to the home switch of the roaming subscriber to request positive validation of the roaming subscriber.
  • the completion of the call origination is delayed by the serving cellular switch until a positive roamer verification is received from the roaming subscriber's home switch.
  • the central subscriber validation system maintains a database that identifies the correspondence between a roaming subscriber number and the home switch of that subscriber number. By providing a data connection to the home switch on each roaming subscriber call origination to validate the roaming subscriber's identity, calling party authorization can be determined on a per call basis.
  • the call origination is not serviced until a positive verification is received from the home switch or database authorizing the roaming subscriber call origination. By verifying roaming subscriber number on a real-time, per call origination basis, this system thwarts all methods of subscriber number tumbling.
  • Figure 1 illustrates in block diagram form the architecture of a typical cellular mobile telephone system
  • Figures 2 and 3 illustrate in block diagram form architectural details of the apparatus of the present invention
  • FIGS. 4 - 6 illustrate in flow diagram form the operational steps taken by this apparatus to detect subscriber units that are tumbled subscriber numbers.
  • Figure 1 illustrates a typical cellular mobile telephone system that includes a plurality of Mobile Telephone Switching Offices (MTSO) 102, 103, each of which is connected via communication facilities 1121- 1124, 1131-1133 to a plurality of cell site transmitters 121-124, 131-133.
  • MTSO Mobile Telephone Switching Offices
  • Mobile subscriber units A, B within each cell site 106, 107 can initiate or receive telephone calls via radio frequency communication with transceiver apparatus 121-124, 131- 133 located in their corresponding cell site 106, 107.
  • a plurality of cell sites 106 are interconnected with a designated Mobile Telephone Switching Office 102 which serves to interconnect the transceivers 121-124 in the various cell sites 106 served by the Mobile Telephone Switching Office 102 with the Public Switched Telephone Network (PTSN) (not shown) to access other Mobile Telephone Switching Offices as well as conventional telephone apparatus.
  • PTSN Public Switched Telephone Network
  • the range of a particular cellular service is determined by the geographic location of the cell sites.
  • cellular mobile telephone systems are not connected on a nationwide basis. Rather, the industry consists of many distinct geographical regions that service a specific "home" base of subscribers.
  • the bold line C-C denotes a boundary between two cellular regions, with Mobile Telephone Switching Office 102 being located in a first of these regions and Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103 being located in a second juxtaposed region.
  • Mobile Telephone Switching Office 102 When cellular subscribers leave their home geographical region they become "roamers".
  • the foreign system that provides service has no way of determining if this roamer is a valid subscriber or a bogus subscriber, since this information is located in the roamer's home system.
  • Obtaining the information from the home switch, and notifying the foreign system of the roamer status is the purpose of the roamer verification system, illustrated in Figure 1.
  • the cellular mobile telephone system generally includes apparatus to maintain data concerning each subscriber authorized to initiate and receive calls within the cellular mobile telephone network. These subscribers include subscribers for whom the local Mobile Telephone Switching Office 102 is their base switch and roa ers who are subscribers from other service areas who have entered or are passing through this service area.
  • the subscriber validation apparatus can be included in each of the Mobile Telephone Switching Offices 102, 103 and coordinated therebetween or may reside in a central clearinghouse location (roamer Verification System 101) to serve a plurality of the Mobile Telephone Switching Office 102, 103.
  • a subscriber validation apparatus is located in roamer verification system 101 which is interconnected via data link or dial up communication facilities 104, 105 with the plurality of Mobile Telephone Switching Offices 102, 103 illustrated in Figure 1 as well as others not shown thereon.
  • the apparatus illustrated in Figure 1 are well known in the cellular mobile telephone industry and represent the basic systems within which the apparatus of the present invention cooperatively operates.
  • the cellular mobile telephone network operates much as a conventional land line telephone switching network with the exception that the subscriber units A, B are mobile and must therefore include a method of uniquely identifying each mobile subscriber unit operational within each service area. Furthermore, these mobile subscriber units A, B are typically in motion during the call connection and the communication between the mobile subscriber unit A and the cell site transmitters 121-124 must be dynamically configured in response to the movements of the particular mobile subscriber unit A.
  • each mobile subscriber unit In order to uniquely identify a mobile subscriber unit as a billable entity, each mobile subscriber unit must be assigned a direct dial telephone number, referred to as the Mobile Identification Number (MIN) , as well as an equipment identification number, referred to as the Electronic Serial Number (ESN) , to enable other subscribers to call this particular mobile subscriber unit and to enable the cell site transmitters to uniquely identify this mobile subscriber unit A among the many that are operational in the service area.
  • MIN Mobile Identification Number
  • ESN Electronic Serial Number
  • the existing cellular telephone systems cannot stop the bogus calls unless a tumbling pattern is detected.
  • This bogus mobile subscriber unit B can then initiate cellular calls using the bogus subscriber numbers and existing cellular mobile telephone systems are unable to identify that this bogus mobile subscriber unit B is not authorized to receive service. Tumbling of subscriber numbers is a significant problem in the cellular communication industry and it accounts for significant lost revenues due to the fact that the common carrier cannot be paid for the calls initiated by the bogus mobile subscriber unit. This theft of service is thwarted by the apparatus of the present invention, which detects bogus subscriber units prior to call completion.
  • FIGS 2 and 3 illustrate in block diagram form the apparatus of the present invention which is used to detect the presence of a mobile subscriber unit B ' that has been programmed with a bogus subscriber number and to disable such bogus mobile subscriber unit B from receiving communication services in this cellular service area.
  • this tumbling detection apparatus is located within the roamer verification system 101 noted above. The installation of this tumbling detection apparatus therein provides a greater areal coverage and therefore enables this tumbling detection apparatus to identify and locate the bogus mobile subscriber unit even though it may roam from one service area to another.
  • This tumbling detection apparatus includes a database that contains information concerning the identity and access telephone number of the plurality of mobile telephone systems located within the service area covered by this particular apparatus.
  • the mobile telephone switching office 102 in response to a call origination from a roaming mobile subscriber unit A, transmits a roaming subscriber validation request to roamer verification system 101 to determine whether the roaming subscriber is authorized to receive service.
  • the mobile telephone switching office 102 does not further process this call origination until receiving a positive roamer validation from roamer verification system 101.
  • the roamer verification system 101 scans its database to determine whether roaming subscriber unit A is a valid user, based on the subscriber number transmitted by roaming subscriber unit A. If the subscriber number is not in this database, roamer validation system 101 must determine whether this is a bogus subscriber unit that is tumbling subscriber numbers to fraudulently receive cellular service.
  • the roamer verification system 101 provides the tumbling detection capability by using a data interface and data links 104, 105 to exchange subscriber and call related data with a plurality of mobile telephone switching offices 102, 103.
  • the roamer verification system 101 includes a subscriber status database (SSDB) which is the single repository for roamer status information.
  • SSDB subscriber status database
  • FIGS 2 and 3 illustrate a portion of the architecture of the roamer verification system 101 that pertains to the tumbling detection capability.
  • the roamer verification system 101 includes, in the preferred embodiment, two processor complexes 201, 202 which provide the computing power necessary to manage the validation and billing of the number of roaming subscribers found in the cellular mobile telephone network.
  • the VPC processor 201 typically consists of a VAX/VMS processor complex manufactured by Digital Equipment Corporation of Maynard, Massachusetts.
  • the VPC processor 201 provides many of the existing roamer validation services, such as the Roaming America service 231 and the Positive Roamer Verification service 233 offered by Appex Corporation as well as operator interface and maintenance software.
  • the VPC processor 201 additionally includes intercarrier settlement services software 236 which records all the billing data for the various service entities that are connected to the roamer verification system 101.
  • the FTS processor 202 consists of a Stratus SA 2000 fault tolerant processor complex upon which the tumbling detection software is implemented.
  • the FTS processor 202 includes two transaction processing systems: database server system (DSS) 221 and verification system (VS) 222.
  • the database server system 221 controls access to the subscriber status database 317 and other databases 312 - 316 used by the verification system 222.
  • Verification system 222 provides verification services to mobile telephone switching offices 102, 103 that are served by the roamer verification system 101.
  • the interface between the roamer verification system 101 and the plurality of Mobile Telephone Switching Offices 102, 103 is implemented in the XLI gateway system 203 which is a message handler that simplifies the intercommunication between the various connected entities.
  • the verification system 222 provides roamer verification services for a plurality of mobile telephone switching offices 102, 103.
  • the verification system 222 receives qualification request invokes from Mobile Telephone Switching Offices 102, 103 via an X.25 packet switching network illustrated diagrammatically on Figure l as data links 104, 105. Alternatively, intercommunication can be accomplished using the SS7 networking protocol.
  • the verification system 222 upon receipt of a qualification request, transmits an inquiry to database server system 221 to determine the status of the roaming subscribing unit B which is requesting service in one of the Mobile Telephone Switching Offices (103) .
  • the database server system 221 determines the status of the roaming subscriber unit B by retrieving data associated with that designated subscriber unit B from the subscriber status database 317.
  • the retrieved data is then transmitted by database server subsystem 221 to the verification system 222 wherein a determination is made whether the requesting subscriber unit B is authorized to receive the service it has requested.
  • the verification system 222 accesses routing information from its own internal memory that enables it to respond to the Mobile Telephone Switching Office 102 on either a per NPA-NXX or on a per roaming location basis. Based on the status contained in the subscriber status database, the verification system 222 transmits a qualification request to the Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103 in which the requesting subscriber unit B is presently located. The verification system 222 then determines whether sufficient data is contained in the subscriber status database 317 to make a determination of the authorization of this requesting subscriber unit B.
  • an information request message is transmitted to the home Mobile Telephone Switching Office ex 102 assigned to the requesting subscriber unit B to obtain sufficient subscriber data to make an authorization determination.
  • the verification system 222 transmits an update to the database server system 221 which accordingly updates the subscriber status database 317 for this requesting subscriber unit B. A complete record of all transaction activity is maintained for both daily and online reporting. If the data collected by verification system 222 indicates that the roaming subscriber unit B is authorized to receive the requested service, an authorization request message is transmitted to the Mobile Telephone
  • the Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103 in whose service area the roaming subscriber unit B is presently located.
  • the Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103 provides the requested call connections to subscriber unit B.
  • the database server system 221 provides and controls access not only to the subscriber system database 317 but also to a denial database 313, call detail database 312 and a home switch database 314.
  • the subscriber status database 317 is the single repository of roamer status information for all roaming subscriber units served by the Mobile Telephone Switching Offices 102, 103 connected to the roamer verification system 101. It thereby provides timely access to roamer status information.
  • the database server system 221 also maintains summary statistics on subscriber status database usage for monitoring and reporting purposes. It also maintains a record of all updates made to the subscriber status database 317 on a daily basis.
  • the database server system 221 is comprised of seven functional components:
  • the file access component 301 is the entrance and exit point for all messages destined for the above listed database 302 - 307 servers. Access to the databases 312 - 317 within this system occurs directly with the servers 302 - 307 for those files.
  • the file access controller 301 is responsible for receiving messages from other processes within the roamer verification system 101 and forwarding them to the appropriate subscriber status database server.
  • the file access controller 301 is also responsible for returning responses to the process that originated the message. It is obvious that within this system there are a plurality of processes that are not described herein that are standard for a database of this type. These processes include additions to the database, modifications to the database, inquiries and updates. For the purpose of simplifying this description, only details concerning detection of tumbled subscriber numbers is presented.
  • a roaming subscriber unit B When a roaming subscriber unit B originates a call in one of the cell sites 106 served by a Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103, this is accomplished in well known fashion by roaming subscriber unit B interacting with cell site transmitter 124 to establish a radio frequency link therebetween. Once the radio frequency link has been established between cell site transmitter 124 and roaming subscriber unit B, data messages are transmitted over data link 1124 from cell site transmitter 124 to Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103. Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103 recognizes the request for a call origination and the fact that roaming subscriber unit B is not one of the subscriber units whose home base is Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103.
  • control messages are thereby transmitted by this switching office 103 by data link 105 to roamer verification system 101 to obtain information concerning the authorization of roaming subscriber unit B to originate and receive cellular service.
  • This is accomplished by Mobile Telephone Switching Office 103 transmitting a call detail notification message to the roamer verification system 101.
  • This is received by the XLI gateway system 203 and forwarded to the verification system 221 for processing therein.
  • the verification system 222 receives a roamer verification request, it transmits a message to the database server system 221 which message contains the following information:
  • MIN Mobile identification number
  • ESN Electronic Serial Number
  • FIG 4 illustrates in flow diagram form the operational steps taken by this roamer verification system 101 to identify a bogus call originated by a subscriber.
  • the cellular telephone system 103 detects a call origination for a particular cellular subscriber B.
  • a determination is made whether there is presently an the mobile subscriber unit A that originated this call is a roaming mobile subscriber unit. This determination is typically made at the cellular mobile telephone switching office 102 that receives the call origination.
  • This cellular mobile telephone switching office reviews the mobile subscriber identification number with a table of authorized subscribers whose home switch is cellular mobile telephone switching office 102.
  • step 403 If there is a lack of correspondence between the mobile telephone subscriber unit identification number received from subscriber telephone unit A and the database that is stored in the cellular mobile telephone switching office 102, it is indicative that this is a roaming subscriber requesting service and call processing advances to step 403. If the call origination was from a mobile subscriber unit whose home office was mobile telephone switching office 102, call processing would proceed in a normal fashion as is well known in the art and not described herein. The cellular mobile telephone switching office 102 at step 403 notes the call origination status of mobile subscriber unit A and does not proceed with processing this service request until a positive roamer verification is received from roamer verification system 101.
  • roamer verification system 101 Upon receipt: of a roamer validation request, roamer verification system 101 at step 405 scans its internal database tc determine whether the roaming subscribing unit A is a valid user. This is accomplished by roamer verification system 101 switching the received roamer validation request to verification system 222 for processing. Verification system 222 decodes the received message and initiates a priority database request since this operation is of a high priority since the call origination is being held by the mobile telephone switching office 102.
  • Database service system 221 receives the priority database scan request from verification system 222 accesses subscriber status database 317 to determine whether the subscriber identification number transmitted to the roamer verification system 101 by the mobile telephone switching office 102 matches any of the authorized subscriber identification numbers stored in subscriber status database 317 at step 405. At step 406, a determination is made whether the roaming subscriber's identification number is stored in the subscriber status database 317. If it is, the roaming subscriber is a valid user and authorized to receive cellular services as a roaming subscriber. At step 407, database server 222 transmits a response to verification system 221 indicative of a positive verification of the identity of the roaming subscriber who is requesting a call origination.
  • the verification system 221 transmits a data message over data link 105 to the cellular mobile telephone switching office 102 serving roaming subscriber A to indicate that this subscriber is a valid user.
  • Cellular mobile telephone switching office 102 in response to the receipt of this message releases the hold placed on this call origination and services this subscriber's request. If, at step 406, this roaming subscriber's identification number is not located in the subscriber status database 317, then either the subscriber is a new roaming subscriber unit or it's possibly a bogus subscriber unit which is using number tumbling as a ethod of fraudulently obtaining services.
  • roamer validation system 101 accesses a database contained therein which lists the identity of each cellular mobile switching office served by roamer validation system 101. Associated with each identified cellular mobile switching office entry is data indicative of the type of system used to implement this switching office as well as the message format required to communicate therewith and access data to identify a communication path from roamer verification system 101 to the identified switching office.
  • verification system 222 translates the subscriber identification number to a cellular mobile switching office identification which is then used to access the data record stored in this database associated with the identified cellular mobile switching office.
  • the retrieved data record is used to formulate a roamer validation request message in the format required by the home switching office of the roaming subscriber.
  • a data connection is originated by verification system 222 over data link 105 to the identified home switching office using the data connection information retrieved from the database.
  • the formatted roamer validation request message is transmitted to this home switching office in order to determine whether this subscriber unit is a valid subscriber.
  • the home switching office upon receipt of the roamer validation request from the roamer verification system 101 scans its subscriber database to determine whether this subscriber identification number is a valid user number or a bogus number.
  • the response is received from the home switching office at roamer verification system 101 and decoded in order to determine whether the home switch has identified this roaming subscriber unit as a valid subscriber.
  • the determination is made whether this roaming subscriber unit is valid or bogus. If a positive determination is made that the roaming subscriber unit is a valid subscriber, the roamer verification system 101 at step 415 transmits a data message to the serving mobile switch 102 to indicate that it is authorized to provide the requested service to the roaming subscribing unit A.
  • a message is transmitted by the roamer verification system 101 at step 414 to the serving mobile telephone switching office indicative of the lack of a positive roamer verification at which point the cellular mobile switching office 102 denies service to this roaming subscriber unit and presumes that this a bogus unit attempting to fraudulently obtain service.
  • the serving cellular mobile telephone switching office 102 therefore denies service to this bogus unit.
  • the speed of operation of the roamer verification system 101 is enhanced by the use of the home switching office look up table which allows the rapid creation, formatting and transmission of data messages between the roamer verification system 101 and the home switching office for each subscriber unit that is not already catalogued in the database contained within the roamer verification system 101.
  • the operation of the roamer verification system 101 is maintained at a high level of responsiveness since the data comparison that must be performed is a matching of the MIN/ESN to entries in the database.
  • the simple existence of a matching subscriber identification number is all that is required to positively identify the mobile subscriber unit as a valid unit. This simple mapping of the input subscriber identification number to table entries without requiring the access to the data record associated with these entries enables the roamer verification system 101 to process a significant number of reguests in real time without delaying the provision of service to the subscriber units.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Pour chaque appel émanant d'une unité (A) d'abonné mobile à portée étendue, le système (102) téléphonique mobile cellulaire de desserte transmet une demande de validation d'abonné à portée étendue au système de vérification hors secteur local (101) qui analyse la base de données (317) d'état de l'abonné pour déterminer si cette unité d'abonné mobile hors secteur local (A) est un utilisateur valide. Si une validation positive n'est pas effectuée, une consultation est tranmise au commutateur domestique (103) de l'abonné hors secteur local afin d'obtenir une validation d'abonné positive. L'émetteur d'appel n'est pas traité jusqu'à ce qu'une validation d'abonné positive ait été reçue soit de la base de données (317) d'état d'abonné soit du commutateur domestique (103). Ce processus élimine l'utilisation de numéros téléphoniques d'abonnés faux, tels que ceux trouvés par hasard lorsqu'un nouveau numéro d'abonné est utilisé pour chaque appel successif pour éviter la détection d'une unité d'abonné frauduleuse.
PCT/US1992/010198 1991-12-03 1992-11-30 Appareil de detection et de prevention empechant de trouver par hasard un numero telephonique d'abonne dans un systeme de telephone mobile cellulaire WO1993011646A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US80195491A 1991-12-03 1991-12-03
US801,954 1991-12-03

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1993011646A1 true WO1993011646A1 (fr) 1993-06-10

Family

ID=25182451

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US1992/010198 WO1993011646A1 (fr) 1991-12-03 1992-11-30 Appareil de detection et de prevention empechant de trouver par hasard un numero telephonique d'abonne dans un systeme de telephone mobile cellulaire

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO1993011646A1 (fr)

Cited By (21)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1995020300A1 (fr) * 1994-01-21 1995-07-27 Nokia Telecommunications Oy Fourniture de service de desserte dans un systeme de communication mobile
WO1997026769A1 (fr) * 1996-01-18 1997-07-24 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Procede et systeme de reduction de la fraude dans un systeme de telecommunications cellulaire
WO1998031181A2 (fr) * 1997-01-11 1998-07-16 Tandem Computers, Incorporated Procede et appareil permettant d'etablir une mediation de la protection contre les fraudes dans un systeme telephonique mobile
WO1998052370A1 (fr) * 1997-05-14 1998-11-19 Ericsson, Inc. Procede et appareil permettant d'interdire l'acces hors secteur local a la memoire des positions des utilisateurs permanents
EP0788287A3 (fr) * 1996-02-05 1999-07-21 At&T Wireless Services, Inc. Système d'autorisation pour visiteur mobile
US5950121A (en) * 1993-06-29 1999-09-07 Airtouch Communications, Inc. Method and apparatus for fraud control in cellular telephone systems
US6026298A (en) * 1997-01-11 2000-02-15 Compaq Computer Corporation Method and apparatus for providing switch capability mediation in a mobile telephone system
WO2000027159A1 (fr) * 1998-11-05 2000-05-11 Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation Procedes et systemes visant a prevenir sensiblement l'usage frauduleux de l'itinerance d'une unite mobile dans un systeme visite
WO2000027156A1 (fr) * 1998-10-30 2000-05-11 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Procede d'authentification du transfert d'une station mobile d'un central d'ancrage vers un central de desserte
US6097939A (en) * 1997-07-11 2000-08-01 Compaq Computer Corporation Method and apparatus for event data maintenance per MIN/ESN pair in a mobile telephone system
US6157831A (en) * 1997-01-11 2000-12-05 Compaq Computer Corp. Method and apparatus for implementing configurable call forwarding bins in a mobile telephone system
US6181925B1 (en) 1997-04-09 2001-01-30 Cellco Partnership Method and apparatus for fraud control in a cellular telephone switch
US6185416B1 (en) 1993-06-29 2001-02-06 Cellco Partnership Method and apparatus for fraud control in cellular telephone systems
WO2001010109A2 (fr) * 1999-07-31 2001-02-08 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Commande de taxation dans un systeme de telecommunications mobiles
US6256514B1 (en) * 1993-11-04 2001-07-03 Ericsson, Inc. Secure radio personal communications system and method
US6285871B1 (en) 1996-11-27 2001-09-04 Cellco Partnership Cellular fraud prevention using selective roaming
SG83637A1 (en) * 1993-07-01 2001-10-16 Motorola Inc Method of controlling access to a radiotelephone system
CN1090875C (zh) * 1994-08-04 2002-09-11 韩国移动通信株式会社 包括atm扩散网的移动通信系统及其信道建立方法
US6615041B2 (en) 1998-11-05 2003-09-02 Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation Methods and systems for providing information to a home system regarding a wireless unit roaming in a visited system
EP0872146B1 (fr) * 1995-06-19 2003-10-08 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson Dispositif et procede permettant de connecter des clients a des serveurs pendant l'execution dans un reseau distribue
AU767531B2 (en) * 2001-02-05 2003-11-13 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method of providing roaming service for a mobile communication terminal

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0379642A2 (fr) * 1988-09-19 1990-08-01 Gte Telecommunication Services Incorporated Système pour l'extension d'un service de radio-téléphonie mobile cellulaire

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0379642A2 (fr) * 1988-09-19 1990-08-01 Gte Telecommunication Services Incorporated Système pour l'extension d'un service de radio-téléphonie mobile cellulaire

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
39TH IEEE VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE vol. 1, 1 May 1989, SAN-FRANCISCO (US) pages 1 - 6 K.W. KACZMAREK 'Cellular Networking: A Carrier's Perpective' *
41ST IEEE VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 19 May 1991, ST. LOUIS (US) pages 393 - 398 J. NGUYEN ET AL 'Personal Communications Service - Concept and Architecture' *

Cited By (38)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6185416B1 (en) 1993-06-29 2001-02-06 Cellco Partnership Method and apparatus for fraud control in cellular telephone systems
US5950121A (en) * 1993-06-29 1999-09-07 Airtouch Communications, Inc. Method and apparatus for fraud control in cellular telephone systems
US6219538B1 (en) 1993-06-29 2001-04-17 Cellco Partnership Method and apparatus for fraud control in cellular telephone systems
SG83637A1 (en) * 1993-07-01 2001-10-16 Motorola Inc Method of controlling access to a radiotelephone system
US6256514B1 (en) * 1993-11-04 2001-07-03 Ericsson, Inc. Secure radio personal communications system and method
AU682919B2 (en) * 1994-01-21 1997-10-23 Nokia Telecommunications Oy Providing service in mobile communication system
CN1084577C (zh) * 1994-01-21 2002-05-08 诺基亚电信公司 移动通信系统及其基站和在其中提供服务的方法
WO1995020300A1 (fr) * 1994-01-21 1995-07-27 Nokia Telecommunications Oy Fourniture de service de desserte dans un systeme de communication mobile
CN1090875C (zh) * 1994-08-04 2002-09-11 韩国移动通信株式会社 包括atm扩散网的移动通信系统及其信道建立方法
EP0872146B1 (fr) * 1995-06-19 2003-10-08 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson Dispositif et procede permettant de connecter des clients a des serveurs pendant l'execution dans un reseau distribue
WO1997026769A1 (fr) * 1996-01-18 1997-07-24 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Procede et systeme de reduction de la fraude dans un systeme de telecommunications cellulaire
US6411807B1 (en) 1996-02-05 2002-06-25 At&T Wireless Service, Inc. Roaming authorization system
EP0788287A3 (fr) * 1996-02-05 1999-07-21 At&T Wireless Services, Inc. Système d'autorisation pour visiteur mobile
US6560455B2 (en) 1996-02-05 2003-05-06 At&T Wireless Services, Inc. Roaming authorization system
US6285871B1 (en) 1996-11-27 2001-09-04 Cellco Partnership Cellular fraud prevention using selective roaming
US6157831A (en) * 1997-01-11 2000-12-05 Compaq Computer Corp. Method and apparatus for implementing configurable call forwarding bins in a mobile telephone system
US6085083A (en) * 1997-01-11 2000-07-04 Tandem Computers, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing fraud protection mediation in a mobile telephone system
WO1998031181A2 (fr) * 1997-01-11 1998-07-16 Tandem Computers, Incorporated Procede et appareil permettant d'etablir une mediation de la protection contre les fraudes dans un systeme telephonique mobile
US6026298A (en) * 1997-01-11 2000-02-15 Compaq Computer Corporation Method and apparatus for providing switch capability mediation in a mobile telephone system
US6112079A (en) * 1997-01-11 2000-08-29 Tandem Computers, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing fraud protection mediation in a mobile telephone system
WO1998031181A3 (fr) * 1997-01-11 1998-12-10 Tandem Computers Inc Procede et appareil permettant d'etablir une mediation de la protection contre les fraudes dans un systeme telephonique mobile
US6421537B1 (en) 1997-01-11 2002-07-16 Compaq Computer Corp. Method and apparatus for providing switch capability mediation in a mobile telephone system
US6181925B1 (en) 1997-04-09 2001-01-30 Cellco Partnership Method and apparatus for fraud control in a cellular telephone switch
WO1998052370A1 (fr) * 1997-05-14 1998-11-19 Ericsson, Inc. Procede et appareil permettant d'interdire l'acces hors secteur local a la memoire des positions des utilisateurs permanents
US5915218A (en) * 1997-05-14 1999-06-22 Ericsson, Inc. Method and apparatus for roamer port HLR barring
US6097939A (en) * 1997-07-11 2000-08-01 Compaq Computer Corporation Method and apparatus for event data maintenance per MIN/ESN pair in a mobile telephone system
WO2000027156A1 (fr) * 1998-10-30 2000-05-11 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Procede d'authentification du transfert d'une station mobile d'un central d'ancrage vers un central de desserte
US8295832B2 (en) 1998-11-05 2012-10-23 Dono Tech Services Llc Method and system for providing information to a home system regarding a wireless unit roaming in a visited system
US6952584B2 (en) 1998-11-05 2005-10-04 Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation Method & systems for providing information to a home system regarding a wireless unit roaming in a visited system
US6615041B2 (en) 1998-11-05 2003-09-02 Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation Methods and systems for providing information to a home system regarding a wireless unit roaming in a visited system
WO2000027159A1 (fr) * 1998-11-05 2000-05-11 Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation Procedes et systemes visant a prevenir sensiblement l'usage frauduleux de l'itinerance d'une unite mobile dans un systeme visite
USRE41075E1 (en) * 1998-11-05 2010-01-12 Robert Andrew Adamany Methods and systems to substantially prevent fraudulent use of a wireless unit roaming in a visited system
US7289785B2 (en) 1998-11-05 2007-10-30 Dono Tech Services Llc Method and systems for providing information to a home system regarding a wireless unit roaming in a visited system
US6735429B1 (en) 1998-11-05 2004-05-11 Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation Methods and systems to substantially prevent fraudulent use of a wireless unit roaming in a visited system
WO2001010109A2 (fr) * 1999-07-31 2001-02-08 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Commande de taxation dans un systeme de telecommunications mobiles
AU767609B2 (en) * 1999-07-31 2003-11-20 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Charging control in a mobile telecommunications system
WO2001010109A3 (fr) * 1999-07-31 2002-10-03 Ericsson Telefon Ab L M Commande de taxation dans un systeme de telecommunications mobiles
AU767531B2 (en) * 2001-02-05 2003-11-13 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method of providing roaming service for a mobile communication terminal

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US5335265A (en) Apparatus for detecting and preventing subscriber number cloning in a cellular mobile telephone system
WO1993011646A1 (fr) Appareil de detection et de prevention empechant de trouver par hasard un numero telephonique d'abonne dans un systeme de telephone mobile cellulaire
US5978669A (en) Method of detecting fraud in a radio communications network by analyzing activity, identification of RF channel data for mobile stations in the network
US5335278A (en) Fraud prevention system and process for cellular mobile telephone networks
US5953653A (en) Method and system for preventing mobile roaming fraud
US5420908A (en) Method and apparatus for preventing wireless fraud
US5467382A (en) Method and apparatus for clone detection in a communication system
JP3054225B2 (ja) 無線電話サービスアクセス方法
US6058301A (en) Cellular fraud prevention using selective roaming
USRE41075E1 (en) Methods and systems to substantially prevent fraudulent use of a wireless unit roaming in a visited system
JP2552065B2 (ja) 不正に識別された移動局を検出する方法およびそのための移動通信交換センタ装置
US20010044295A1 (en) Communication control apparatus and radio communications system
US5517554A (en) Apparatus and method for locking a mobile communication unit
US9031557B2 (en) Method and apparatus for steering of roaming
US5226073A (en) Telephone network credit card calling apparatus and method of telephone network operation with credit card companies
WO1999049688A1 (fr) Systeme et procede d'authentification d'une identite de station mobile et gestion des problemes d'authentification dans un reseau de radiotelecommunication
WO1998000956A2 (fr) Procede et dispositif interdisant l'utilisation frauduleuse de la telephonie cellulaire
CA2288698A1 (fr) Procede de controle ameliore de l'etablissement d'une communication provenant d'une station mobile
EP0493894B1 (fr) Appareil d'appel téléphonique à cartes de crédit dans un réseau de télécommunication et procédé de fonctionnement
US20010027528A1 (en) Enhanced pin-based security method and apparatus
AU753530B2 (en) Fraud detection in radio communications network
CA2600574C (fr) Detection de fraude dans un reseau de radiocommunications
AU753671B2 (en) Fraud detection in radio communications networks
SE523227C2 (sv) Metod för detektering av bedrägeri i ett radiokommunikationssystem
SE524385C2 (sv) Metod för bedrägeridetektering i ett radiokommunikationsnät

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): CA FI JP NO

AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AT BE CH DE DK ES FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE

DFPE Request for preliminary examination filed prior to expiration of 19th month from priority date (pct application filed before 20040101)
122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase
NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: CA