US7720221B2 - Privacy-enhanced e-passport authentication protocol - Google Patents

Privacy-enhanced e-passport authentication protocol Download PDF

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US7720221B2
US7720221B2 US11/436,986 US43698606A US7720221B2 US 7720221 B2 US7720221 B2 US 7720221B2 US 43698606 A US43698606 A US 43698606A US 7720221 B2 US7720221 B2 US 7720221B2
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key
correspondent
machine
ciphertext
passport
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US20070122004A1 (en
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Daniel R. L. Brown
Scott A. Vanstone
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Malikie Innovations Ltd
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Certicom Corp
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Publication of US20070122004A1 publication Critical patent/US20070122004A1/en
Priority to US12/752,831 priority patent/US20100189253A1/en
Priority to US12/776,803 priority patent/US8880888B2/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
    • H04W12/47—Security arrangements using identity modules using near field communication [NFC] or radio frequency identification [RFID] modules

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to protocols for restricting access to sensitive information embedded in documents such as passports and identity cards.
  • the existing linkage is not cryptographically strong as substituting a different photograph is relatively easy. Also, the photograph is compared manually to the face of the traveler by the border control inspector, which has certain problems.
  • biometric data is stored in a chip within the document and can be retrieved for examination.
  • the biometric data will be an iris scan, fingerprint or images of the face of the bearer.
  • MRTD machine readable travel documents
  • e-Passport system that authenticates the identity of individuals to border control stations by cryptographically linking the identity of the individual (such as name and nationality) to biometric data for the individual.
  • the cryptographic linkage is obtained by digitally signing the identity data and biometric data of the individual.
  • the resulting signed identity and biometric information is conveyed from the passport to a passport reader.
  • the signature binds the identity of the individual to the biometric identity, which makes faking a passport a cryptographically hard problem. A concern arises however that each individual's biometric information is highly sensitive and should not be inadvertently made available.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of a passport examination station
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic representation of the components of the passport and reader
  • FIG. 3 is a representation of an exchange of data within the station.
  • a passport 10 includes a chip 12 and a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag 14 with an antenna 16 .
  • a reader 20 includes an antenna 22 to communicate with the antenna 16 and a scanner 24 to obtain a reference input from the bearer of the passport 10 .
  • the reference input may be a real time fingerprint scan or iris scan or a facial image.
  • the reader 20 includes a data processing engine 26 to manipulate data received from the passport 10 and scanner 24 and a screen 28 to view the results of such manipulation.
  • An input device 30 such as a keyboard or mouse is included to permit user inputs.
  • the chip 12 contains a memory 32 to store biometric data and personal information such as name, nationality and date of birth.
  • the memory 32 is designed to be tamperproof and communicates with a cryptographic unit 34 and data transmission network 36 connected to the antenna tag 14 .
  • the cryptographic unit 34 includes an arithmetic processor 38 for performing cryptographic operations and a secure memory 40 for storing private keys and certificates.
  • the underlying cryptographic system is an elliptic curve cryptosystem.
  • the cryptographic unit 34 includes the parameters of the underlying system, such as the curve, and the generator G of the points on the curve and has access to the public key Q of the passport.
  • the processor 38 can perform cryptographic operations such as point addition, key derivation and hash functions.
  • the cryptographic unit 34 also includes a random number generator (RNG) 42 to provide integers for use as private session keys.
  • RNG random number generator
  • the data processing engine 26 of the reader 20 also includes a cryptographic unit 50 including a random number generator 52 and an arithmetic processor 54 .
  • the scanner 20 initiates a message transfer by activating the chip 12 through the RFID tag 14 .
  • a message M is assembled consisting of the data required for processing the passport and confirming identity such as the biometric data, bearer's name, nationality and date of birth together with the certificate of the bearer's public key Cert Q.
  • the data utilized will depend on the information required by the passport control.
  • the message M is divided into two parts, M 1 , M 2 , with the sensitive information to be maintained confidential such as the biometric data within the message part M 1 . Less sensitive or publicly available information such as the country of issue or visa is included in the message part M 2 .
  • the value R is used in a key derivation function (KDF) performed in the processor 38 to obtain a session encryption key e.
  • KDF key derivation function
  • Any suitable KDF may be utilized, typically one utilizing a secure hash function.
  • the message part M 1 is checked for a predetermined level of redundancy and, if that is not met, additional data added.
  • the session encryption key e is used to encrypt the message part M 1 to cyphertext C.
  • Data is then transferred through the RFID tag 14 including the signature component s, the public part of the message M 2 , (which includes the certificate of the public key Q) and the cyphertext C.
  • the reader uses the private session key b to compute a value equal to R, namely (b ⁇ 1 mod n) W and then uses the KDF to get the value corresponding to e.
  • the cyphertext C is decrypted and the biometric data in the message part M 2 is recovered. The redundancy of the recovered data is checked and, if above the required level it is accepted.
  • the recovered data is then compared the reference data obtained from the scanner to authenticate the bearer of the passport.
  • the data exchange may also be enhanced by providing for authentication of the reader 20 .
  • the signer can choose whether or not to interact with the verifier.
  • the verifier should authenticate itself to the signer, such as by a digital signature or some symmetric key system.
  • the signer can control to whom the message portion M 1 is revealed. This can be done prior to the initial exchange of data or during the exchange before the value W is transferred.
  • the signature cannot be verified without involvement of the bearer.
  • the cyphertext C cannot be decrypted without the acquiescence of the bearer.

Abstract

A passport authentication protocol provides for encryption of sensitive data such as biometric data and transfer of the encryption key from the passport to the authentication authority to permit comparison to a reference value.

Description

This application claims priority from U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/682,862 filed on May 20, 2005.
The present invention relates to protocols for restricting access to sensitive information embedded in documents such as passports and identity cards.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
Existing passport security technology links identity of an individual by embedding a photograph within the passport.
The existing linkage is not cryptographically strong as substituting a different photograph is relatively easy. Also, the photograph is compared manually to the face of the traveler by the border control inspector, which has certain problems.
To enhance security, it has been proposed to provide machine-readable passport or identity card in which biometric data is stored in a chip within the document and can be retrieved for examination. Typically, the biometric data will be an iris scan, fingerprint or images of the face of the bearer.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has proposed machine readable travel documents (MRTD), i.e. e-Passport system that authenticates the identity of individuals to border control stations by cryptographically linking the identity of the individual (such as name and nationality) to biometric data for the individual.
The cryptographic linkage is obtained by digitally signing the identity data and biometric data of the individual. The resulting signed identity and biometric information is conveyed from the passport to a passport reader. The signature binds the identity of the individual to the biometric identity, which makes faking a passport a cryptographically hard problem. A concern arises however that each individual's biometric information is highly sensitive and should not be inadvertently made available.
It is therefore an object of the present invention to obviate or mitigate the above disadvantages by making it more difficult for unauthorized parties to obtain the biometric information and other sensitive information from a document such as a passport.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
An embodiment of the invention will now be described with reference to the appended drawings wherein:
FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of a passport examination station;
FIG. 2 is a schematic representation of the components of the passport and reader;
FIG. 3 is a representation of an exchange of data within the station.
 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
Referring therefore to FIG. 1, a passport 10 includes a chip 12 and a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag 14 with an antenna 16. A reader 20 includes an antenna 22 to communicate with the antenna 16 and a scanner 24 to obtain a reference input from the bearer of the passport 10. The reference input may be a real time fingerprint scan or iris scan or a facial image. The reader 20 includes a data processing engine 26 to manipulate data received from the passport 10 and scanner 24 and a screen 28 to view the results of such manipulation. An input device 30, such as a keyboard or mouse is included to permit user inputs.
As shown in FIG. 2, the chip 12 contains a memory 32 to store biometric data and personal information such as name, nationality and date of birth. The memory 32 is designed to be tamperproof and communicates with a cryptographic unit 34 and data transmission network 36 connected to the antenna tag 14.
The cryptographic unit 34 includes an arithmetic processor 38 for performing cryptographic operations and a secure memory 40 for storing private keys and certificates. Preferably, the underlying cryptographic system is an elliptic curve cryptosystem. The cryptographic unit 34 includes the parameters of the underlying system, such as the curve, and the generator G of the points on the curve and has access to the public key Q of the passport.
In the preferred embodiment, the memory 40 includes a private signing key d, the corresponding public key Q=dG, and a certificate, Cert Q, which is issued by a certification authority, such as the passport issuer, which certifies the public key Q. The processor 38 can perform cryptographic operations such as point addition, key derivation and hash functions. The cryptographic unit 34 also includes a random number generator (RNG) 42 to provide integers for use as private session keys.
The data processing engine 26 of the reader 20 also includes a cryptographic unit 50 including a random number generator 52 and an arithmetic processor 54.
In operation, the scanner 20 initiates a message transfer by activating the chip 12 through the RFID tag 14. A message M is assembled consisting of the data required for processing the passport and confirming identity such as the biometric data, bearer's name, nationality and date of birth together with the certificate of the bearer's public key Cert Q. The data utilized will depend on the information required by the passport control.
The message M is divided into two parts, M1, M2, with the sensitive information to be maintained confidential such as the biometric data within the message part M1. Less sensitive or publicly available information such as the country of issue or visa is included in the message part M2.
A random number k is generated by the RNG 42 and a value R=kQ computed. The value R is used in a key derivation function (KDF) performed in the processor 38 to obtain a session encryption key e. Any suitable KDF may be utilized, typically one utilizing a secure hash function.
The message part M1, is checked for a predetermined level of redundancy and, if that is not met, additional data added. The session encryption key e, is used to encrypt the message part M1 to cyphertext C. The cyphertext C is then concatenated with the message part M2 and hashed using a secure hash function H to obtain a value, h, i.e. h=H(C,M2).
A signature component s is then computed using the relationship s=k+dh mod n where n is the order of the generator G.
Data is then transferred through the RFID tag 14 including the signature component s, the public part of the message M2, (which includes the certificate of the public key Q) and the cyphertext C.
The reader 20 captures the data and initially verifies the public key Q from the certificate. It then computes a value V=sG−hQ and generates a private session key b from the RNG 52. A public session key U=bV is then computed and sent to the chip 12 through the RF ID connection. The chip 12 confirms that the point U is a point on the curve and generates a further public key W=dU that is sent back to the reader 20.
The reader then uses the private session key b to compute a value equal to R, namely (b−1 mod n) W and then uses the KDF to get the value corresponding to e. Using the computed value of e, the cyphertext C is decrypted and the biometric data in the message part M2 is recovered. The redundancy of the recovered data is checked and, if above the required level it is accepted.
The recovered data is then compared the reference data obtained from the scanner to authenticate the bearer of the passport.
By separating the message and encrypting the biometric data, its confidentiality may be maintained even to an eavesdropper.
The signing process above is quite efficient for the signer. The computation of R=kQ can be done in advance, or with assistance of fixed pre-computed multiples of Q. The most expensive step for the signer is computing W=dU.
The data exchange may also be enhanced by providing for authentication of the reader 20. In this way, the signer can choose whether or not to interact with the verifier. Ideally, the verifier should authenticate itself to the signer, such as by a digital signature or some symmetric key system. In this way, the signer can control to whom the message portion M1 is revealed. This can be done prior to the initial exchange of data or during the exchange before the value W is transferred.
If the signing is too expensive computationally, then the following modification is possible. The verifier sets b=1. Then W=R, which the signer has already computed during signature generation. To keep M1 confidential, this alternate approach requires that R can be sent to the verifier confidentially. In particular, passive eavesdroppers should not be able to intercept R. This might be accomplished by physical means, such as weak RF signals, or by some form of encryption, such as the e-passport basic access control encryption system.
By utilizing the bearer's public key Q in the computation of R, the signature cannot be verified without involvement of the bearer. In particular, the cyphertext C cannot be decrypted without the acquiescence of the bearer.
It will be noted that once the verifier recovers R, it can compute dQ, which can be seen to enable message recovery from the signature, that is, without the interactive verification process.

Claims (8)

1. A method of transferring information stored in a machine readable document pertaining to a correspondent to a machine for examination, said information including a sensitive portion to be kept confidential during transmission, comprising the steps of:
assembling at said correspondent a message having a primary portion M1 containing said sensitive portion of said information retrieved from said machine readable document, and a secondary portion M2 containing less sensitive portion of said information and including a long term public key of said correspondent,
generating an encryption key e from a session private key and said long term public key of the correspondent,
encrypting said primary portion with said encryption key e to obtain a ciphertext C,
combining said ciphertext C and said secondary portion M2 and generating a signature component s of said correspondent from said combination,
transferring said signature component s, said ciphertext C and said secondary portion of M2 to the machine, said machine
generating a value from said signature component s, said ciphertext C and said secondary portion M2, generating an ephemeral private key, and utilizing said value and said ephemeral private key to generate a public session key from said value and said ephemeral private key,
forwarding said public session key to said correspondent and obtaining from said correspondent a further public key to permit recovery of said encryption key e, and
said machine recovering said primary portion M1 from said ciphertext C using said encryption key e.
2. A method according to claim 1 wherein said machine readable document is a passport and said machine is a verifier of said passport.
3. A method according to claim 2 wherein said primary portion M1 contains biometric information and said machine compares said biometric information to a reference input.
4. A method according to claim 1, wherein said ciphertext C and said secondary portion M2 are combined by hashing to obtain a hash h.
5. A method according to claim 4 wherein said signature component s is obtained from a combination of a long term private key d of said correspondent, a private session key k and said hash h.
6. A method according to claim 5 wherein said private session key k is used to generate said encryption key e.
7. A method according to claim 6 wherein said private session key k and said long term public key are used to generate said encryption key e.
8. A method according to claim 1, further comprising checking redundancy of the primary portion and adding additional data to the primary portion prior to encrypting said primary portion if redundancy is below a pre-determined level of redundancy.
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US11/436,986 US7720221B2 (en) 2005-05-20 2006-05-19 Privacy-enhanced e-passport authentication protocol
US12/752,831 US20100189253A1 (en) 2005-05-20 2010-04-01 Privacy-enhanced e-passport authentication protocol
US12/776,803 US8880888B2 (en) 2005-05-20 2010-05-10 Privacy-enhanced E-passport authentication protocol

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