US6229894B1 - Method and apparatus for access to user-specific encryption information - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for access to user-specific encryption information Download PDFInfo
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- US6229894B1 US6229894B1 US08/891,999 US89199997A US6229894B1 US 6229894 B1 US6229894 B1 US 6229894B1 US 89199997 A US89199997 A US 89199997A US 6229894 B1 US6229894 B1 US 6229894B1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6209—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
- G06F2211/007—Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress
- G06F2211/008—Public Key, Asymmetric Key, Asymmetric Encryption
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2107—File encryption
Definitions
- This invention relates generally to encryption and more particularly to recovering. or accessing, user-specific encryption information.
- Secure transmission of data is known to include encrypting the data using an encryption algorithm and an associated encryption key.
- the encrypted data is then sent to a receiving party who, based on the encryption key and a corresponding decryption algorithm, decrypts the encrypted data to recapture the original data.
- Such an encryption algorithm and corresponding decryption algorithm may be the widely used Data encryption standard (“DES”), which utilizes a symmetric key.
- DES Data encryption standard
- symmetric keys arises in getting the key securely from the sending party to the receiving party.
- One rather effective technique is to encrypt the symmetric key (which is sometimes referred to as a session key) using an encryption public key of the receiving party.
- the sending party can prepare an encrypted message by encrypting the symmetric key with the receiving party, or parties, public key and encrypting the message and/or data using the symmetric key.
- the receiving party receives the encrypted message
- the receiving party decrypts the symmetric key using its private decryption key.
- the sending party may address itself as a virtual recipient by including a copy of the symmetric key encrypted under the sending party's public key such that the sending party may subsequently access the encrypted message.
- a public-private key pair is valid for an extended period of time (E.g., one year or longer).
- a user may accumulate a very large number of files (and/or e-mail messages or EDI [electronic data interchange]), each having a distinct symmetric key. If the user's private decryption key (which is sometimes referred to as a long term private key) is lost, the user is unable to decrypt any of these files and/or e-mail messages securely.
- EDI electronic data interchange
- a hardware token such as a smart card or a PCMCIA Card (“PC Card”)
- PC Card PCMCIA Card
- pass key an encryption key
- the centralized organization solution fails to meet law enforcement agencies' needs because these agencies typically want to monitor, via wire-tap warrants, communications of a user without notice to the user and/or the organization.
- the law enforcement agency will capture encrypted communications to and from a targeted user.
- the law enforcement agency is unable to read the files.
- the organization, or the user would have to provide the key, thus removing the anonymity of the wire-tapping.
- KRA Key Recovery Agent
- a KRA is a trusted third-party which has its own private/public key pair.
- Each legitimate user of the secure system has a copy of the KRA's public key and uses it to encrypt a copy of the session key for the KRA, and include this in a message header, as an additional virtual recipient. If a law enforcement official then sends the header portion of the message to the KRA, the KRA is then able to recover the session key using its private decryption key.
- the session key may then be given to properly authorized law enforcement officials who, assuming they are also in possession of the corresponding ciphertext, can use the session key to recover the plain text message.
- the KRA works well for third-party needs to access a particular communication, it does not work well in the commercial setting where a particular user may have a hundred or more files that have been encrypted based on its public encryption key. To recover the session key for each communication, the user has to make individual requests to the KRA for the respective session keys, which is a cumbersome process. Further, the KRA does not restore the private decryption key to the user, thus, for incoming encrypted messages, the user would have to make individual requests to the KRA for the session keys of these new messages. This, obviously, is impractical for commercial use.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a system that incorporates the present invention
- FIG. 2 illustrates a graphical representation of encrypted data flow which is in accordance with the present invention
- FIG. 3 illustrates a logic diagram which may be used to access user-specific encryption information in accordance with the present invention
- FIG. 4 illustrates a logic diagram which may be used to access user specific encryption information in accordance with the present invention.
- FIG. 5 illustrates a logic diagram which may be used to access user specific encryption information in accordance with the present invention.
- the present invention provides a method and apparatus for accessing user specific encryption information. This may be accomplished upon receiving a request for access to user specific encryption information from a requesting entity. Based on the identity of the requesting entity and/or the type of request, a server determines the requesting entity's authorized level of access to user specific encryption information. Based on the level of access, the requesting entity is provided with controlled access to the user specific information.
- the present invention provides a technique for recovering lost (E.g., forgotten, destroyed, or otherwise inaccessible) private decryption keys to end-users in a commercially feasible manner and also for providing controlled access to third parties to user specific information that meets both the commercial sector's and law enforcement agencies' needs.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a system 10 that incorporates the present invention.
- the system 10 includes a network 12 , a first area network which may be local or wide, a second area network which may be local or wide, and a third-party 34 .
- the first area network includes a server 14 , a plurality of end-users 18 - 22 , and a system administrator 24 .
- the second area network includes a plurality of end-users 26 - 32 and a server 16 .
- the second area network may further include a system administrator.
- the function of the first and second area networks is substantially equivalent, thus, only one area network will be discussed.
- the germane functionality of the present invention is the same regardless of whether the first and second area networks are local area networks and/or wide area networks.
- the plurality of end-users 18 - 22 are coupled to the system administrator, the server 14 , and the network 12 via the first area network.
- Each of the end-users 18 - 22 may be personal computers, main frame computers, work stations, personal digital assistants (PDA), or any device that processes digital information wherein such processing is required to be at least partially done in a secure manner.
- PDA personal digital assistants
- each of the end-users are equipped with at least one symmetric encryption algorithm, such as DES, and has an asymmetric public/private key pair and an asymmetric (public key) algorithm.
- DES public key
- the sending party encrypts a symmetric key using the public encryption key of the receiving party, or recipient end-user.
- the sending end-user encrypts the message using the symmetric key and transmits the encrypted message and encrypted session key to the recipient end-users, where the recipient end-users may include the sending end-user (Note that by including the sending end-user, it allows the sender to secure locally stored files which might be done without addressing any other recipients).
- the recipient end-user Upon receipt of the encrypted data, the recipient end-user utilizes its private decryption key to decrypt the session key and uses the recovered session key to decrypt the message.
- the system administrator 24 may be a personal computer, a work station, a main frame computer, a network computer, or any other processing device that is capable of manipulating digital information based on programming instructions.
- the system administrator 24 has its own private decryption key and a public encryption key, such that it may communicate securely with any one of the end-users in the secure system 10 .
- the system administrator 24 maintains a record of each end-user affiliated with its security domain which may be any subset of user within a local area network, wide area network, or a world-wide network.
- the system administrator 24 further maintains end-user information such as end-user identification, access privileges, etc. and other system information.
- the system administrator 24 further functions to control the addition or deletion of end-users to the security domain.
- the server 14 which may be personal computer, a work station, a main frame computer, or any other processing device that is capable of manipulating digital information based on programming instructions, maintains encryption public key certificates 36 , signature public key certificates 38 , and private decryption keys 40 for each of the end-users in the particular secured system.
- the server 14 may store this information directly or within a database, which may be referred to as a directory.
- An encryption public key certificate includes the identity of a particular end-user, the public encryption key for the particular end-user, additional information as may be necessary, and the signature of the server.
- a signature key certificate includes the identity of a particular end-user, the signature verification key of this end-user, and the signature of the server.
- the encryption public key certificate and the signature key certificate will be discussed in greater detail with reference to FIG. 2, below.
- the server 14 provides the encryption certificate 36 of an end-user(s) to a sending end-user.
- the sending end-user utilizes the public encryption key of the receiving end-user(s) to prepare a wrapped session key for each of the recipients, i.e., a symmetric key encrypted using the public encryption key of each receiving end-user.
- the sending end-user then encrypts a message and/or file using the symmetric key and transmits both the wrapped key and the encrypted message to the receiving end-user(s).
- the receiving end-user decrypts the wrapped session key using its private decryption key and then decrypts the encrypted message using the recovered symmetric key.
- the sending end-user may transmit its signature for this message to the receiving end-users.
- the receiving end-users via the signature key certificate 38 of the sending end-user, verifies the signature of the sending party.
- two security services are provided; one via the public encryption and private decryption key pair and the second via the signature and verification key pair.
- the server 14 also provides controlled access to user specific encryption information of each of the end-users affiliated with the security domain. For example, server 14 provides controlled access to the user specific encryption information of end-users 18 - 22 , while server 16 provides controlled access to user specific encryption information of end-users 26 - 32 .
- user specific encryption information includes, but is not limited to, the private decryption key, session keys for particular encrypted communications, and plain text conversion of ciphertext, i.e., the ordinary text of a file or message encrypted via a session key.
- the private decryption keys 40 of the end-users may be stored within the server utilizing any appropriate local encryption techniques.
- the server 14 controls access to the user specific encryption information based on the identity of the requesting entity and/or the type of request.
- the third-party 34 may request access to the private decryption key 40 for a particular end-user. If the third-party 34 is a law enforcement official authorized to wire-tap the particular end-user and requesting the private decryption key of the particular end-user, the server 14 may provide the third party with the particular end-user's private decryption key. Alternatively, the server may restrict access to the private decryption key for a specified period, or may grant access to session keys for specific communications of the particular end-user upon presentation of the corresponding wrapped session key.
- the server 14 would, upon being presented with a copy of the encrypted communication including the associated wrapped session key, decrypt the communications and provide the third party with the plain text. If, however, the requesting party is the particular end-user who may have lost access to his/her own private keys, the server 14 would provide it with the private decryption key, or a history of private decryption keys and there would be no need for presenting encrypted communications along with the request. Recall that private decryption keys may be updated on a periodic basis, such as once per year.
- the end-user would want to retrieve the old private decryption key such that it could decrypt old messages.
- a history of private decryption keys may be provided.
- the controlled access provided by the server 14 will depend on local, state, and federal laws, agreements the system administrator has with local governmental agencies, agreements with the end-users, etc.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a graphical representation of encrypted data flow in the secure system of FIG. 1 .
- the sending end-user 18 desires to encrypt data 50 and provide it to end-users A 20 and B 22 .
- the sending end-user 18 requests, and subsequently receives, an end-user encryption certificate of end-users and another one for end-user B from server 16 .
- the end-user encryption certificate of end-user A or B 60 includes the public encryption key of the particular end-user 62 , the end-user's identity, and the signature of the server 64 on this certificate data.
- the sending end-user 18 Upon receiving this information, the sending end-user 18 verifies the signature of the server 64 . Such a verification is done using a verification algorithm and the public key of the server. Once the signature of the server has been verified to be valid, the sending end-user 18 knows that the public encryption keys 62 for end-users A and/or B are valid. Having valid public encryption keys for the targeted end-users A and B, the sending end-user 18 generates and encrypts a symmetric key based on the public encryption keys of end-users A and B to produce two wrapped session keys. A wrapped session key is also created using the encryption public key of the sending end-user 18 , for reasons as explained below. As one skilled in the art will readily appreciate, the sending end-user 18 needs to generate a unique wrapped session key for each of the receiving end-users, but only one copy of the encrypted file or message 58 will only be encrypted using the symmetric key.
- the sending end-user 18 Having generated the wrapped session keys 52 and the encrypted file or message 58 , the sending end-user 18 includes its signature 56 in an encrypted transmission 54 and transmits it to the receiving end-users 20 and 22 . Note a copy of the session key is also wrapped under the encryption public key of the sending end-user 18 . This is done for several reasons: One of which enables the sending end-user 18 to keep a record of the encryption transmissions 54 that it generates. Another reason is for the law enforcement agencies.
- each of the receiving end-users 20 and 22 retrieves their respective private decryption keys 74 and 76 .
- the end-users 20 and 22 typically will store their own private decryption keys either in a hardware format or a software format. If an end-user has lost its private decryption key, it may retrieve it from the server 16 .
- the server 16 may store the private decryption keys 74 and 76 in secure hardware, or in software using an encryption algorithm and a local cryptographic key of the server 16 .
- the receiving end-users 20 and 22 decrypt the wrapped session key 52 to recapture the symmetric key. Having recaptured the symmetric key, the receiving end-users 20 and 22 decrypt the encrypted file or message 58 .
- the communication of the encrypted transmission 54 may be done over an online protocol or using a store-and-forward communication protocol.
- An online protocol is one that has a low-latency bi-directional connection between the sending end-user and the receiving end-users, while a store-and-forward communication protocol does not have a bi-directional connection between the sending and receiving end-users and the latency may be high
- the receiving end-users 20 and 22 further receive an end-user verification certificate 78 .
- this certificate 78 may be appended to the encrypted message by the sending end-user or it may be retrieved from the directory (as shown in FIG. 2) by each recipient end-user.
- the end-user verification certificate includes end-user identity, a public verification key of the sending end-user 80 and the signature of the server 82 .
- the receiving end-users 20 and 22 know that the public verification key of sending end-user 80 is authentic. Having the public verification key of the sending end-user, the signature of the sending end-user 56 may be verified.
- the server 16 is coupled to a directory 68 .
- the directory 68 may be a data base which stores the end-user encryption certificates 70 (and, optionally, end-user signature certificates 72 ) for each of the plurality of end-users in the secure system 10 .
- An end-user encryption certificate 60 includes the public encryption key 62 of one end-user and the signature of the server 64 .
- the end-user verification certificate 78 includes a public signature verification key 80 for one end-user and the signature of the server 82 .
- the private decryption key and the private signature key of an end-user is updated on a periodic basis (E.g. once per year). As such, the end-user encryption certificate 60 and the end-user verification certificate 78 must be updated as well.
- the end-user system To update the end-user encryption certificate 60 , the end-user system first determines that it is time to update its encryption certificate. Having made this determination, the end-user provides a decryption key update request to the server. Upon receiving the request, the server generates a new private decryption key and a public encryption key for the requesting end-user. Alternatively, the end-user system may generate the encryption key pair and securely transmit the decryption private key and the encryption public key to the server. The server 16 then securely provides the new private decryption key to the end-user. Next, the server 16 generates and publishes the new public encryption key in the directory as an updated end-user encryption certificate.
- the end-user system When updating the end-user signature certificate for a particular end-user, the end-user system generates a new signature key pair and provides the public key (i.e., the signature verification key) to the server.
- the server 16 then generates the signature verification certificate, which includes the new verification public key of the requesting end-user.
- the server 16 If the server 16 receives a request for access to user specific encryption information from a requesting entity, the server 16 , via a processing device 90 (and, optionally, with the assistance of a human operator acting at a server user interface), would execute programming instructions stored in memory 92 ; such programming instructions may be for any one, or all, of the processes illustrated in FIGS. 3 through 5.
- the processing device 90 may be a micro-computer, micro-controller, micro-processor, personal computer, work station, or any device that manipulates digital information based on programming instructions.
- the memory may be RAM, ROM, CD ROM, hard drive, floppy disk, and magnetic tape memory, or any means for storing digital information
- the server 16 Upon receiving the request, the server 16 would determine the identity of the requesting entity and the type of access being requested. From this information, the server 16 would determine the requesting entity's authorized level of access to the user specific encryption information and provide the requesting entity with controlled access to the encryption information based on the authorized level of access. For example, if the requesting entity is the end-user, the server 16 , upon verifying the end-user's identity, would provide the end-user system with the end-user's own private decryption key or a history of decryption keys.
- the server 16 would determine whether the particular third party has any access rights to the user specific encryption information. If not, the server would deny the third party's request. If, however, the third party does have access privileges to the user specific encryption information, the server would determine to what degree. For example, the third party may be granted access to the end-user's private decryption key or key history such that it can decrypt any messages received by or transmitted by the end-user at any point in the past or until the next key update. Alternatively, access to the end-user's private decryption key may be limited to a specific period of time. As another alternative, the third party may be granted access to certain session keys for particular communications. As yet another alternative, the third party may be granted access, not to keying material but rather to the plain text corresponding to ciphertext (accompanied by the appropriate wrapped session keys) which the third party provided.
- the lower-right portion of FIG. 2 illustrates the software process of retrieving an end-user's private decryption key 90 using a decryption process 84 which utilizes a password 86 to decrypt an encrypted private decryption key 88 .
- the encrypted private key 88 may be the decryption private key 74 , 76 , provided by server 16 . If the end-user forgets his or her password or its record of the private key becomes lost or destroyed, then the user's copy of the private decryption key 90 is lost. Once the private key is lost the user is no longer able to decrypt stored or incoming messages. This, therefore, provides a need for the present invention, which allows the end-user to recover its private decryption keys.
- FIG. 3 illustrates a logic diagram which may be used to request access to user specific encryption information.
- the process begins at step 100 where a request to access user-specific encryption information is received from a requesting entity.
- the request may be requesting access to the user-specific encryption information such as a private decryption key of a particular end-user, a session key for a particular communication, or clear text from captured ciphertext, while the requesting entity may be a third-party, the particular end-user, or the system administrator.
- a third-party which may be a law enforcement agency, is not affiliated with the secure system in that it is not involved in the normal operations of the system nor is it an end-user or the system administrator.
- step 102 a determination is made as to the authorized level of access the requesting entity has to the information. Such a determination is based on the identity of the requesting entity and/or the details/contents of the request. For example, if the requesting entity is the end-user and the request is to recover its private decryption key history, the server would grant the request. Alternatively, when the requesting entity is a third-party, the request may be to access the private key, access a particular session key for a particular communication, or to obtain clear text of a ciphertext document. Depending on whether the third party has authorization for such a request, the server may or may not grant the request. As one skilled in the art will readily appreciate, the granting of a request and the resulting level of access provided by the server 14 will depend on local, state, and federal laws, agreements the system administrator has with local governmental agencies, agreements with the end-users, etc.
- the process proceeds to step 104 where the requesting entity is provided with controlled access to the user's specific encryption information.
- controlled access limits the requesting entity's access to the user-specific encryption information. For example, if the requesting entity is a third-party, the requesting entity might not be provided with the private decryption key but only a session key for a particular communication that fell within a particular time period.
- the commercial sector's need for limiting third-party's access to sensitive data is obtained.
- a third-party's need to obtain access to particular information (E.g., in accordance with a legal warrant) is achieved.
- the present invention provides a method and apparatus that substantially meet the needs of both governmental agencies and the private sector regarding secured data transmissions. Moreover, this need is met without the introduction of additional infrastructure, such as a third party KRA, which introduces additional business costs and complexities.
- FIG. 4 illustrates a logic diagram that may be used to obtain access to user specific encryption information.
- the process begins at step 110 where a request for access to user-specific encryption information is received from a requesting entity.
- the requests in addition to specifying the identity of the requesting entity and the type of request, also specifies a specific duration of time that access to the user-specific encryption information is being requested.
- the process proceeds to step 112 where a determination is made as to the requesting entity's level of access to the user specific encryption information. Such a determination is based on the identity of the requesting entity and/or the particular request.
- step 116 time-stamped information embedded in encrypted communication of the end-user is interpreted.
- This step assumes that encrypted communications include time-stamped information.
- reliable time stamping of information is dependent on an accurate clock source and that the time stamp be embedded in the communication in a trustworthy manner, i.e., one which precludes subsequent manipulation or modification by an unauthorized party.
- the secure system 10 would require access to an accurate clock source such as the global positioning satellite system or a dedicated clock for the system.
- step 118 a determination is made as to whether all the encrypted communications being requested occurred during the specific duration of time. If yes, the process proceeds to step 120 where controlled access is provided to the encrypted communications, where such controlled access is based on the level of access.
- step 122 a determination is made as to whether any of the communications occurred within the specific time duration. If not, the process proceeds to step 126 where access is denied to the user specific encryption information. If, however, some of the communications occurred within the specific period of time, the process proceeds to step 124 .
- controlled access is provided to the encryption communications that are within the specific period of time. Such control access is based on the authorized level of access. As one skilled in the art will readily appreciate, a third-party, such as a law enforcement official may request access to a particular end-user's encrypted communications that will occur in the future. Such a future requests, which are typically obtained via a warrant, would indicate the particular specific period of time. The process of FIG. 4 would accommodate such future communications by providing the appropriate wrapped session keys.
- FIG. 5 illustrates a logic diagram for obtaining access to user specific encryption information.
- the process begins at step 130 where the server generates an encryption public/private key pair, a public key certificate, and a distinct signature public key certificate for at least one end-user. Such encryption public key certificates and signature public key certificates were discussed previously with reference to FIG. 2 .
- the process then proceeds to step 132 where, from time to time, the server automatically updates and securely transmits to the user, either by online or store-and-forward communication, the encryption public key pair, the distinct public key certificate, and/or the distinct signature public key certificate. This too was discussed with reference to FIG. 2 .
- step 134 a determination is made as to whether a request for access to user-specific encryption information has been received. If not, the process waits until such a request is received. Once a request is received, the process proceeds to step 136 where a determination is made as to whether the requesting entity is the end-user, a third-party, or the system administrator.
- the process proceeds to step 138 where the end-user is provided with at least one long-term private decryption key.
- the end-user may further be provided with a history of long-term private decryption keys such that, if the user has stored encrypted messages that pre-date the current decryption private key, the user may decrypt such old messages.
- the process proceeds to step 140 .
- the system administrator is provided with access to at least one long-term decryption private key of the end-user.
- the system administrator may be provided with a history of decryption private keys for the end-user.
- the process proceeds to step 142 where a determination is made as to whether the level of access of the third-party enables the third-party to access the long-term decryption private key. If so, the process proceeds to step 150 where the third-party is provided with access to the long-term decryption private key.
- the third-party may decrypt any communication using a session key that was wrapped using the public key associated with the private key.
- the end-user system is designed to include a wrapped session key for itself such that it is a recipient of its encrypted messages. This is reflected in FIG. 2 .
- step 144 a determination is made as to whether the request is requesting access to a session key. If yes and such access is authorized, the process proceeds to step 148 where the third-party is provided with access to the session key for a particular communication where the ciphertext (or simply the wrapped key) corresponding to this communication is provided by the third party to the server. Such a particular communication may be an online communication or a store-and-forward communication. If, however, the request was not for access to a session key but for decryption of ciphertext, the process proceeds to step 146 . At step 146 , if such a request by this third party is authorized, the third-party is provided with plain text of a particular communication when the third-party has provided ciphertext and a wrapped key for the particular communication.
- third-party entities which may be law enforcement officials, can obtain authorized access to encrypted data of a particular end-user while the private sector can be assured that the third-party access is limited and within the controls of a commercial organization as authorized by a legal warrant.
- the third-party may obtain access to the user-specific encryption information only from a specific period of time, where requests for access to communications outside the period of time will be denied by the server of the secured system.
- the present invention allows end-users to restore their private decryption keys and/or key histories without the burdens of the KRA system.
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