TWI672606B - Authorization authentication method based on authentication and key agreement protocol - Google Patents

Abstract

An authentication and authentication method based on an authentication and key agreement protocol, wherein a mobile network registration server is generated according to at least a group private key corresponding to a target network device and a server identity data corresponding to an access server; a seed key corresponding to the access service server and the networked device group to which the target network device belongs; and a mobile network registration server respectively calculates a first authorization token related to a hash function And a second authorization token; the mobile network registration server transmits the seed key, the first authorization token and the second authorization token to the access service server for the access service server and Each networked device in the networked device group to which the target networked device belongs performs mutual authentication.

Description

Authorization authentication method based on authentication and key agreement protocol

The invention relates to an authorization authentication method, in particular to an authorization authentication method based on an authentication and a key agreement protocol.

In the era of Internet of Things (IoT) and social networking applications, billions of connected devices will be added to the Internet. Due to the high coverage of the current mobile network, in order to make full use of this feature, many widely deployed Internet-connected devices will connect with the mobile network system as the backbone; in addition, in the Internet of Things and the social network In the road application, there are many cases where a large number of networked devices communicate frequently and need to be authenticated. Therefore, when deploying a networked device connected to an Internet of Things based on a mobile network system, there are many challenges, for example, There are two important issues that must be resolved when authorizing a certified networked device: First, the large communication burden caused by a large number of networked devices intensive authentication requests and sending authentication requirements will cause the mobile network system to fail. This is the cost of aggregated authentication bandwidth. Second, because various IoT networking devices have different application properties, the traditional authentication key mechanism treats all connected devices as identical and thus cannot be properly applied to different applications. The networked device gives different authorization authentication differences.

In view of this, there is still much room for improvement in the existing authorization authentication method.

Therefore, the object of the present invention is to provide an authentication and key agreement protocol based authentication method, which allows a plurality of Internet of Things connected devices having the same application property to share group characteristics and reduce all individual groups in the same group. The computational and communication costs incurred by the device at the time of certification.

Therefore, the authentication authentication method based on the authentication and key agreement protocol of the present invention is implemented by a plurality of networked device groups connected to each other via a communication network, an access service server, and a mobile network registration server. Each networked device group includes at least one network device, each network device corresponding to one body identity data, and each network device device belongs to a group of network devices corresponding to a group identity data and a group of key pairs, the connection The service server corresponds to a server identity data; the group identity data corresponding to the network device group to which each network device belongs and the group key pair may be determined in advance by the mobile network registration server, and each The group key pair corresponding to the group of connected devices to which the network device belongs corresponds to the group identity data corresponding to the group of connected network devices, and each group key pair includes a group. Private key and a group key. The public key voucher method comprises a step (a), a step (b), a step (c), a step (d), a step (e), a step (f), and a step (g).

The step (a) is when the target networking device of one of the at least one networking device of one of the networked device groups receives an identity request from the access service server, the target networking device is at least Transmitting the corresponding individual identity data and the group identity data to the access service server.

The step (b) is that the pick-up service server transmits the individual identity data, the group identity data and the server identity data from the target network device to the mobile network registration server.

The step (c) is that the mobile network registration server selects a corresponding group key pair according to the group identity data corresponding to the group of network devices to which the target network device belongs, and according to the group identity The data determines a predetermined authentication period indicating an authentication activation time and an authentication deadline for the group of network devices to which the target network device belongs.

The step (d) is that the mobile network registration server generates a sub-key according to at least the group private key corresponding to the target network device and the server identity data, wherein the seed key corresponds to the access service server. And a networked device group to which the target network device belongs.

The step (e) is that the mobile network registration server utilizes a hash function and generates at least the corresponding target connection according to the authentication activation time corresponding to the target network device, the group key and the server identity data. The authentication enable time of the network device, the group key, and a first authorization token of the server identity data.

The step (f) is that the mobile network registration server uses the hash function and generates at least the corresponding target connection according to the authentication deadline corresponding to the target network device, the group key and the server identity data. The authentication deadline of the network device, the group key, and a second authorization token of the server identity data.

The step (g) is that the mobile network registration server transmits the authentication activation time, the authentication deadline, the seed key, the first authorization token, and the second authorization token to the access service server. The two-way authentication is performed by the access service server and each networked device in the group of connected devices to which the target networking device belongs.

The utility model has the advantages of allowing a plurality of Internet of Things networking devices having the same application property to share group characteristic characteristics, and for the same networked device group, only different authorization authentication differences are required for different networked device groups. And the mobile network registration server only needs to calculate the seed key and the first and second authorization tokens once, and reduce the aggregate authentication communication bandwidth required by all the connected devices in the same group.

Before the present invention is described in detail, it should be noted that in the following description, similar elements are denoted by the same reference numerals.

Referring to FIG. 1, an embodiment of an authentication and key agreement (AKA) authorization authentication method according to the present invention is provided by a plurality of networked device groups 2, 2 connected to each other via a communication network 1. ', a plurality of access service servers 3, 3' and a mobile network registration server 4 are implemented by a system. The communication network 1 can be a 5G (fifth generation mobile communication system) network, but not limited thereto, and can also be other wireless communication technology based networks; each networked device group 2, 2' includes at least one networking device 21, 21', each network device 21, 21' corresponds to a body identity data and its implementation can be an Internet of Things device, but not limited thereto, it can also be a personal computer, a smart phone, or other The device/component of the basic operation processing and communication function; each of the access service servers 3, 3' corresponds to a server identity data, and each of the access service servers 3, 3' is connected by a corresponding one. Provided by an access provider; the mobile network registration server 4 is a third-party public trust platform and is owned by the owners of the network devices 21, 21' and the access service servers 3, 3' The access provider trusts.

First, in the system setting phase, the mobile network registration server 4 connects each of the network devices 21 according to at least one of the device application properties, the device identification information, and the device geographic location information of all the network devices 21, 21'. 21' is summarized/classified to one of the networked device groups 2/2', and determines a group identity data corresponding to each networked device group 2 and a group private key and a group key. a group key pair; wherein, for each network device 21, 21', the group key pair corresponding to the network device group 2/2' belongs to the associated network device group 2/2 The corresponding group identity data, in addition, each networked device group 2, 2' includes a target networking device 21'.

Next, for each networked device 21, 21', when the mobile network registration server 4 receives the registration of the individual identity data represented by the networked device 21/21' on behalf of the networked device 21/21' When requested, the mobile network registration server 4 is based on the individual identity data corresponding to the network device 21/21' and the network device group 2/2' corresponding to the network device 21/21' The group private key generates a body key corresponding to the network device 21/21', and the individual key and the group corresponding to the networked device group 2/2' to which the network device 21/21' belongs The group key is transmitted to the networking device 21/21'.

In addition, the mobile network registration server 4 also generates and transmits a first constant a and a second constant b to each of the network devices 21, 21' of the networked device groups 2, 2'.

In the following, reference will be made to Figures 1 and 2 and to the networked devices of the networked devices 21, 21' of the networked device group 2' of one of the networked device groups 2, 2' in the system. 21' is taken as an example to describe in detail that the target networking device 21' is the first one of the networked device groups 2' to which it is to be accessed by one of the access service servers 3, 3'. 3/3' (in the embodiment, taking the access service server 3' as an example) to establish the same session key, the target networking device 21' in the system, the connection The service server 3' and the mobile network registration server 4 cooperate to perform an authorization authentication procedure. The authorization authentication program includes an authorization subroutine (steps S501 to S508) and an authentication subroutine (steps S601 to S612).

In the authorization subroutine, first, in step S501, when the target network connection device 21' receives an identity request from the access service server 3' (in this case, the target network connection device 21' has been Receiving the service server 3' requesting the access service, the target networking device 21' generates a pair of first challenge values (indicated by R _i in the present embodiment) that should be targeted to the target networking device 21', and The first challenge value, the corresponding identity data of the group, and the group identity data (in the embodiment, represented by ID _G , where G represents the networked device group 2 of the target networking device 21 ′ Transfer to the pick-up service server 3'. In this embodiment, the first challenge value: R _{i =} ,among them, representative Mod p is a shorthand notation known in the art, x _i is a random number generated by the target networking device 21', p represents a prime number, and g represents a generator.

Next, in step S502, the pick-up service server 3' will use the group identity data from the target networking device 21' and the server identity data corresponding to the pick-up service server 3' (in This embodiment is represented by an ID _AP , wherein the AP is transmitted to the mobile network registration server 4 on behalf of the access service server 3'), and the access service server 3' stores the corresponding target networking device 21'. The first challenge value and the identity data of the individual.

Next, in step S503, the mobile network registration server 4 confirms, at the current date and time, that the access service server 3' is authorized to belong to the networked device group 2' to which the target networking device 21' belongs. a current authorization date (indicated by date in this embodiment) and a current authorization time for the network device 21, 21' to perform mutual authentication, and the mobile network registration server 4 according to the target network connection device 21' The group identity data corresponding to the network device group 2' is selected to select a corresponding group key pair, and a pre-established lookup table is used and the target network device 21' is determined according to the group identity data. During a predetermined authentication period of the networked device group 2, but not limited thereto, the mobile network registration server 4 may also pass each of the networking devices 21, 21' (in this case, the target networking device 21') The predetermined authentication period is dynamically adjusted by using a record, wherein the predetermined authentication period is used to indicate an authentication activation time and an authentication deadline, and the lookup table is recorded in the group identity corresponding to each networked device group 2. Information and the certification is enabled and Corresponding to the stop time of the relationship. In this embodiment, the authentication enable time can be used to indicate a first time slot value, which is represented by sl ₁ in this embodiment, and the authentication cutoff time can be used to indicate a second time slot value (in The present implementation is represented by sl ₂ ), and the current authorization time can be used to indicate a third time slot value (indicated by t in the present embodiment); the predetermined authentication period of each networked device group 2 is based on the device application properties. It varies from one to the other. In addition, when the predetermined certification period is from the month to the month of the current year , the current authorization date: date= " year " (where year is the current authorization year), and the values of sl ₁ , sl ₂ and t The range is: 1≦ sl ₁ ≦ t ≦ sl ₂ ≦12, at this time, the value of the minimum time slot value corresponding to the current authorization time (indicated by min _ sl in this embodiment) is 1, and corresponds to the current authorization. The maximum time slot value (in the present embodiment, represented by max _ sl ) has a value of 12; or, when the predetermined authentication period is from a certain day to a certain day of the month, the current authorization date: date= " Moth/year " (where moth is the current authorization month), and the range of values for sl ₁ , sl ₂ and t is: 1 ≦ sl ₁ ≦ t ≦ sl ₂ ≦ 31, at which point the value of the minimum time slot value is 1 And the value of the maximum time slot value is 31; otherwise, when the predetermined authentication period is some time in the current day to a certain time, the current authorization date: date= " moth/day/year " (where authorization for the current day day), and the sl _1, sl _2, and t is a numerical range _{is: 1 ≦ sl 1 ≦ t ≦} sl 2 ≦ 24, at this time, the minimum groove The value of 1, and the maximum value of the time slot value is 24, and so on, is not limited to the above example, each time slot corresponding to a plurality of values can hours, several days more, month or more and the like.

Next, in step S504, the mobile network registration server 4 is based on the group private key corresponding to the target networking device 21' (in the embodiment, denoted by s _G ), the server identity data, and the current Authorization date to generate a sub-key; wherein the seed key corresponds to the access service server 3', the current authorization date, and the networked device group 2' to which the target network device 21' belongs. In this embodiment, the seed key: Auth _{AP, G, date} = s _G H ( ID _AP ||date ), where " || " is a join operator.

Next, in step S505, the mobile network registration server 4 utilizes a hash function: h () (in the present embodiment, the hash function h () is a cryptographic hash function, and according to the corresponding Receiving the server identity data of the service server 3', the current authorization date, the first time slot value indicated by the authentication enablement and the deadline, and the second time slot value, corresponding to the target networking device 21 The group key (indicated by GK in this embodiment), and the first constant, generates a first authorization token (AT). In this embodiment, the first authorization token : AT _a = ( GK||ID _AP ||date||sl ₁ ||sl ₂ ||a ); It is worth mentioning that when the target networking device 21' is the only network of its associated networked device group 2' At the time of the device, the first authorization token can be calculated by the following formula: AT _a = ( GK||ID _AP ||date||a ).

Next, in step S506, the mobile network registration server 4 uses the hash function: h (), and according to the second constant, the server identity data corresponding to the service server, the current authorization date, and the pair The second authorization token is generated by the group key of the target networking device 21' and the first time slot value and the second time slot value respectively indicated by the authentication activation and the deadline. In this embodiment, the second authorization token: AT _b = ( b||GK||ID _AP ||date||sl ₁ ||sl ₂ ); It is worth mentioning that when the target networking device 21' is the only network of its associated networked device group 2' When the device is used, the second authorization token can be calculated by the following formula: AT _b = ( b||GK||ID _AP ||date ).

Next, in step S507, the mobile network registration server 4 transmits the current authorization date and time, the authentication activation time indicated by the predetermined authentication period, the authentication deadline, the seed key, and the first authorization token. And the second authorization token to the access service server 3', at which time the mobile network registration server 4 authorizes the seed key, the first authorization token and the second authorization token to the connection Take the service server 3'.

Next, in step S508, the receiving service server 3' receives the current authorization date and time, the authentication activation time indicated by the predetermined authentication period, the authentication deadline, the seed key, and the first authorization order. After the card and the second authorization token, storing the current authorization date and time, the authentication activation time indicated by the predetermined authentication period, the authentication deadline, the seed key, the first authorization token, and the second authorization The token can be further authenticated indirectly with each of the networked devices 21, 21' in the networked device group 2' to which the target networking device 21' belongs.

The following is a detailed description in the case that the access service server 3' obtains the seed key, the first authorization token and the second authorization token, and the target networking device 21' does not need to pass through the mobile network. The road registration server 4 is a detailed program that can perform mutual authentication with each other.

Referring to FIG. 1 and FIG. 3, in the authentication subroutine, first, in step S601, the access service server 3' utilizes a bilinear pairing function and at least according to the individual corresponding to the target networking device 21' The identity data, and the seed key, generate a first secret value. In this embodiment, the first secret value: S ₁ = e ( H ( ID _i ), Auth _{AP, G, date} ) = ,among them, For a bilinear pairing function, G ₂ is a cyclic multiplicative group of prime numbers q . It is worth mentioning that, through mathematical derivation, ie, S ₁ = H ( ID _i ) represents xp , H ( ID _AP ||date ) represents yp , and x and y represent unknown numbers. It can be known that the first secret value is based on the BDHP (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem) problem, so the security is And privacy has a certain degree of protection.

Next, in step S602, the pick-up service server 3' utilizes the hash function: h () and at least according to the first secret value, the first authorization token, the second authorization token, the authentication enablement and The first time slot value and the second time slot value respectively indicated by the deadline, and the third time slot value indicated by the current authorization time, generate a first authentication key. In this embodiment, the first authentication key: AK ₁ =h ( S ₁ || ( AT _a ) || ( AT _b )).

Next, in step S603, the pick-up service server 3' generates a second challenge value (indicated by R _AP in this embodiment), and uses the hash function: h (), and according to the first Generating a first verification value by the authentication key, the first challenge value, and the second challenge value; the receiving service server 3' and the current authorization date and time, the authentication activation and deadline, the first The verification value, the server identity data, and the second challenge value are transmitted to the target networking device 21'. In this embodiment, the first verification value Auth _AP =h ( AK ₁ ||R _i ||R _AP ), where R _AP = , x _AP is a random number generated by the pick-up service server 3'.

Next, in step S604, the target networking device 21' utilizes the hash function: h (), and according to the identity information of the server corresponding to the service server 3', the current authorization date, and the corresponding target connection The group key of the network device 21', the first time slot value and the second time slot value respectively indicated by the authentication enable and the cutoff time, and the first constant generate a first hash seed value. In this embodiment, the first hash seed value: Seed _a = h ( GK||ID _AP ||date||sl ₁ ||sl ₂ ||a ); it is worth mentioning that when the target is connected to the network When the device 21' is the only network device to which the networked device group 2' belongs, the first hash seed value can be calculated by the following formula: Seed _a = h ( GK||ID _AP ||date||a ) .

Next, in step S605, the target networking device 21' utilizes the hash function: h (), and according to the second constant, the server identity data corresponding to the service server, the current authorization date, and the corresponding The group key of the target networking device 21', and the first time slot value and the second time slot value indicated by the authentication enable and the cutoff time respectively generate a second hash seed value. In this embodiment, the second hash seed value: Seed _b =h ( b||GK||ID _AP ||date||sl ₁ ||sl ₂ ); it is worth mentioning that when the target is connected to the network When the device 21' is the only network device of the networked device group 2' to which it belongs, the second hash seed value can be calculated by the following formula: Seed _b =h ( b||GK||ID _AP ||date ) .

Next, in step S606, the target networking device 21' generates the bilinear pairing function and generates at least according to the individual key corresponding to the target networking device 21', the server identity data, and the current authorization date. A second secret value. In the present embodiment, the individual key corresponding to the target networking device 21' is represented by SID _i , where S ID _i = s _G H ( ID _i ), wherein It belongs to an admissible encoding function, which is a one-way hash function, and G ₁ is a cyclic addition group of prime order q , which belongs to the GDH algebra group (gap- Diffie-Hellman group), it can be seen that the individual key is based on the CDHP problem and is difficult to be cracked, and the second secret value: S ₂ = e (S ID _i , H ( ID _AP ||date )) = It is worth mentioning that the security and privacy of the second secret value meets the BDHP problem, and it also has a certain degree of security and is difficult to be cracked.

Next, in step S607, the target networking device 21' utilizes the hash function: h () and according to the second secret value, the third time slot value indicated by the current authorization time, and the first hash seed value. And the second hash seed value, generating a second authentication key. In this embodiment, the second authentication key: AK ₂ =h ( S ₂ || ( Seed _a ) || ( Seed _b )).

Next, in step S608, the target networking device 21' verifies the first according to the second authentication key, the first challenge value, and the second challenge value received from the access server. Verify that the value satisfies h ( ||R _i ||R _AP )(where It is determined whether the access service server 3' has passed the authentication in response to the authentication key of the destination server 3' and the target networking device 21'. In this embodiment, for the current authorization date: date , each networked device 21, 21' of the networked device group 2' to which the target networked device 21' belongs is corresponding to the access service server 3'. The secret value is the same as each other when the BDHP puzzle is not cracked, that is, for the target networking device 21' and the access service server 3', the second secret value is equal to the first secret value. At the same time, the secret value of the corresponding server and the target networking device 21' is determined: = S ₂ = S ₁ ; therefore, under the condition that the second secret value is equal to the first secret value, it can be proved by a simple mathematical derivation that the second authentication key is equal to the first authentication key, and its derivation The process is not described here, and since AK ₂ = AK ₁ , =AK ₂ =AK ₁ .

Next, in step S609, when the target networking device 21' confirms that the access service server 3' has passed the authentication, it indicates that Auth _AP = h ( ||R _i ||R _AP ), then the target networking device 21 ′ uses the hash function: h () and generates a second verification value according to the second authentication key and the second challenge value. In this embodiment, the second verification value is: =h ( AK ₂ ||R _AP ).

Next, in step S610, the target networking device 21' utilizes the hash function: h () and according to the second authentication key, the first challenge value a random number x _i , and the second challenge value received from the access server, generating a conversation key corresponding to the target networking device 21 ′ and the access service server 3 ′ and transmitting the The second verification value is to the access service server 3'. In this embodiment, the conversation key: h ( AK ₂ || ) =h ( || )= , where AK ₂ = And .

Next, in step S611, the pick-up service server 3' verifies whether the second verification value satisfies h according to the second challenge value and the first authentication key. ||R _AP ), to confirm whether the target networking device 21' is authenticated. In this embodiment, if the BDHP puzzle is not cracked, the first secret value is equal to the second secret value, ie, S ₁ = S ₂ = Therefore, it can be proved by simple mathematical derivation that the first authentication key is equal to the second authentication key under the condition that the first secret value is equal to the second secret value, and at this time, AK ₁ =AK ₂ Therefore =AK ₁ =AK ₂ .

Then, in step S612, when the pick-up service server 3' has confirmed that the target networking device 21' has passed the authentication, = h ( ||R _AP ) and the first authentication key is equivalent to the second authentication key and can be used as an authentication key corresponding to the access server and the target networking device 21 ′, and then the access service servo The device 3' utilizes the hash function: h () and generates a corresponding one according to the first authentication key (that is, the authentication key), the first challenge value, and the random number x _AP in the second challenge value. The target networking device 21' and the chat key of the pick-up service server 3'. In this embodiment, the conversation key: h ( AK ₁ || ) =h ( || )= , where AK ₁ = , . Therefore, the access service server 3' and the target networking device 21' establish a shared secret conversation key through the key exchange mechanism, so that the communication parties can use the chat key to secure the communication key. And secret data transmission.

In addition, in the case that the target networking device 21' and the access service server 3' and the mobile network registration server 4 have cooperated to execute the authorization subroutine, the connection to the target networking device 21' Each of the network devices 21 other than the target network device 21' in the network device group 2', when the other network device 21 wants to perform mutual authentication with the access service server 3' to establish a When the chat key is shared, the other network connection device 21 does not need to completely execute the authorization subroutine with the access service server 3' and the mobile network registration server 4, and only needs to access the service at the beginning. The server 3' requests the access service, and can perform step S502 similar to the authorization subroutine (refer to step S502 of FIG. 2), so that the other networking devices 21 generate a pair of other networked devices 21 in random. a first challenge value (indicated by R _j in this embodiment), and transmitting R _j and the individual identity data corresponding to the other networking device 21 (indicated by ID _j in the embodiment) to the interface Take the service server 3' to store.

Next, referring to FIG. 1 and FIG. 3, after the other network connection device 21 transmits R _j and ID _j to the access service server 3 ′, the other network connection device 21 and the access service server are connected. 3' jointly executes the device authentication subroutine (steps S601 to S612), and the repeated portions are not described again.

First, in step S601, the pick-up service server 3' generates a first secret value according to ID _j and Auth _{AP, G, date} using the e() function: S ₁ ' = e ( H ( ID _j ) , Auth _{AP, G, date} ), where Auth _{AP, G, date} = s _G H ( ID _AP ||date ).

Next, in step S602, the pick-up service server 3' generates a first authentication key using the h () function and according to S ₁ ' , AT _a , AT _b , sl ₁ , sl ₂ and t : AK ₁ '=h ( S ₁ ' || ( AT _a ) || ( AT _b )).

Next, in step S603, the access service server 3' random number generates a second challenge value (in the present embodiment, represented by R _AP ' , where R _AP ' = , x _AP ' is a random number generated by the pick-up service server 3', and uses the h () function and generates a first verification value according to AK ₁ ' , R _j and R _AP ' : Auth _AP '=h ( AK ₁ '||R _j ||R _AP ' ), and transfer the current authorization date and time, the authentication enable and expiration time, Auth _AP ' , ID _AP and R _AP ' to the other network Device 21.

Next, in step S604, the other networking device 21 uses the h () function and calculates the first hash seed value associated with GK , ID _AP , date , sl ₁ , sl _2, and a : Seed _a = h ( GK ||ID _AP ||date||sl ₁ ||sl ₂ ||a ).

Next, in step S605, the other networking device 21 uses the h () function and calculates the second hash seed value associated with b , GK , ID _AP , date , sl _1, and sl ₂ : Seed _b = h ( b ||GK||ID _AP ||date||sl ₁ ||sl ₂ ).

Next, in step S606, the other networking device 21 utilizes the e () function and at least according to the individual key corresponding to the other networking device 21 (indicated by S ID _j in this embodiment), ID _AP and date. , generating a second secret value: S ₂ ' = e (S ID _j , H ( ID _AP ||date )), where S ID _j = s _G H ( ID _j ).

Next, in step S607, the other networking device 21 generates a second authentication key by using the h () function and according to S ₂ ' , t , Seed _a, and Seed _b : AK ₂ '=h ( S ₂ '| | ( Seed _a ) || ( Seed _b )).

Next, in step S608, the other networking device 21 verifies whether the Auth _AP ' satisfies h according to AK ₂ ' , R _j and R _AP ' ||R _j ||R _AP ' ) to confirm whether the access service server 3' is authenticated. among them, In order to correspond to the authentication key of the server 3' and the other networked device 21.

Next, in step S609, when the other networking device 21 has confirmed that the access service server 3' has passed the authentication, it indicates that Auth _AP '=h ( ||R _j ||R _AP ' ), then the other networking device 21 generates a second verification value by using the h () function and according to AK ₂ ' and R _AP ' corresponding to other networking devices 21: =h ( AK ₂ '||R _AP ' ).

Next, in step S610, the other networking device 21 uses the h () function and generates corresponding network devices 21 and the access service servo according to xxx ₂ ' , x _j , and R _AP ' in R _j . a conversation key for 3': h ( AK ₂ '|| ) =h ( || ) = , where AK ₂ '= And Next to the other networking device 21 and Transfer to the pick-up service server 3'.

Next, in step S611, the access service server 3 ' verifies according to AK ₁ ' and R _AP ' Whether it meets h ( ||R _AP ' ) to confirm whether the other networking device 21 has passed the authentication.

Then, in step S612, when the pick-up service server 3' has confirmed that the other networked device 21 has passed the authentication, = h ( ||R _AP ' ) and AK ₁ ' = AK ₂ '= And then the access service server 3' utilizes the h () function and according to the authentication key, and R _j and R _AP ' , generating the conversation key corresponding to the other network device 21 and the access service server 3': =h ( || ),among them, . Therefore, the pick-up service server 3' and the other networked devices 21 establish a shared secret chat key through the key exchange mechanism, so that the communication partners can use the chat key to securely. Secret data transmission.

In summary, the authentication method of the present invention has the following advantages: (1) allowing a plurality of Internet of Things networking devices 21, 21' having the same application property to share group characteristic characteristics to reduce connection of all individual devices in the group. Authentication calculation and communication cost; (2) For the same networked device group 2, the mobile network registration server 4 only needs to calculate the seed key and the first and second authorization tokens once, but can be the same All the networked devices 21, 21' in the networked device group 2 are shared by multiple connections and thus the calculation cost is flattened; (3) the networked device 21/21' and the access service servo are designed by using the hash function The 3/3' communication multi-party can generate the authentication key with low-cost calculation without the high-wire number and high communication bandwidth of the prior art; (4) for each secret value, each authentication key and each The chat key is generated by its corresponding individual network device 21/21' and its corresponding communication service server 3/3', so when any network device 21 in the network device group 2/2' When /21' is cracked, it does not affect the security of other devices in the group; (5) this Conversation key system produced has a forward / backward secrecy, it can really achieve the object of the present invention.

However, the above is only the embodiment of the present invention, and the scope of the invention is not limited thereto, and all the simple equivalent changes and modifications according to the scope of the patent application and the patent specification of the present invention are still Within the scope of the invention patent.

1‧‧‧Communication network

2, 2'‧‧‧ Networking device group

21‧‧‧ Networking device

21’‧‧‧Target networked device

3, 3'‧‧‧ Receiving service server

4‧‧‧Mobile Network Registration Server

S501~S508‧‧‧Steps

S601~S612‧‧‧Steps

Other features and advantages of the present invention will be apparent from the embodiments of the present invention, wherein: Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating a plurality of networked device groups, multiple implementing the authorization authentication method of the present invention. Receiving a service server and a mobile network registration server; FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating an authorization subroutine of the authorization authentication method of the present invention; and FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an authentication of the authorization authentication method of the present invention Subroutine.

Claims (12)

An authentication and authentication method based on an authentication and key agreement protocol, implemented by a plurality of networked device groups connected to each other via a communication network, an access service server, and a mobile network registration server, each networked device group The group includes at least one network device, each network device corresponds to one body identity data, and the network device group to which each network device belongs corresponds to a group identity data and a group key pair, and the access service server corresponds to a server identity data, the group identity data corresponding to the group of network devices to which each network device belongs and the group key pair may be determined in advance by the mobile network registration server, and the connection of each network device The group key pair corresponding to the network device group corresponds to the group identity data corresponding to the group of connected network devices, and each group key pair includes a group private key and a group Key, the authorization authentication method comprises the following steps: (a) receiving, by the one of the networked device groups, one of the at least one networked device, the networked device from the receiving service server At the request, the target network device transmits at least the corresponding individual identity data and the group identity data to the access service server; (b) the access service server will be from the target network device The group identity data and the server identity data are transmitted to the mobile network registration server; (c) the mobile network registration server is corresponding to the group corresponding to the network device group to which the target network device belongs The identity data is used to select a corresponding group key pair, and according to the group identity data, a predetermined authentication period indicating an authentication activation time and an authentication deadline is determined by the group of network devices to which the target network device belongs. (d) the mobile network registration server generates a sub-key according to at least the group private key corresponding to the target network device and the server identity data, wherein the seed key corresponds to the access service server and a group of network devices to which the target network device belongs; (e) the mobile network registration server utilizes a hash function and at least according to the authentication enable time corresponding to the target network device, the group The key and the server identity data generate a first authorization token related to the authentication activation time corresponding to the target network device, the group key, and the server identity data; (f) the mobile network registration The server uses the hash function and generates an authentication deadline corresponding to the target network connected device according to at least the authentication deadline corresponding to the target network device, the group key, and the server identity data. And a second authorization token of the server identity data; and (g) the mobile network registration server, the authentication activation time, the authentication deadline, the seed key, the first authorization token, and the first The second authorization token is transmitted to the access service server for mutual authentication by the access service server and each networked device in the group of connected devices to which the target network device belongs. The authentication and key agreement protocol-based authorization authentication method according to claim 1, further comprising a step (h) before the step (a), in the network device group to which the target network device belongs Each networked device, when the mobile network registration server receives a registration request transmitted by the network device for the individual identity data of the network device, the mobile network registration server is based on the individual identity data and The group private key generates a body key corresponding to the networked device, and transmits the individual key and the group key to the networked device. The authentication and key agreement protocol based authentication method according to claim 2, before the step (h), further comprising a step (i), the mobile network registration server generates and transmits a first constant and a second constant to each of the networked devices, wherein in the step (e), the mobile network registration server further generates the first authorization token according to the first constant, And the first authorization token is further related to the first constant, in the step (f), the mobile network registration server further generates the second authorization token according to the second constant, and the second authorization order The card is also related to the second constant. The authentication and key agreement protocol-based authorization authentication method according to claim 3, wherein, in the step (a), the target network device receives the identity request from the access service server, the target The network device generates a pair of first challenge values corresponding to the target network device, and the target network device not only corresponds to the individual identity data and the group identity data, but also corresponds to the corresponding A challenge value is transmitted to the pick-up service server, and in the step (b), the pick-up service server stores the first challenge value corresponding to the target network device and the individual identity data. The authentication and key agreement protocol-based authorization authentication method according to claim 4, after the step (g), further includes a step (j) performed by the access service server, the step (j) The following sub-steps are included: (j-1) the pick-up service server stores the authentication enable time, the authentication deadline, the seed key, the first authorization token, and the second authorization token; (j-2) The pick-up service server generates a first secret value by using a bilinear pairing function and at least according to the individual identity data corresponding to the target network device, and the seed key; (j-3) the pick-up service servo Using the hash function and generating a first authentication key based on at least the first secret value, the first authorization token and the second authorization token, the authentication activation time, and the authentication expiration time; (j-4 The picking service server generates a second challenge value by using the hash function, and generates a first verification value according to the first authentication key, the first challenge value, and the second challenge value; and J-5) the pick-up service server at least the first verification value, the service The end identity data and the second challenge value are transmitted to the target networking device. The authentication and key agreement protocol based authentication method according to claim 5, after the step (j), further comprising a step (k) performed by the target networking device, the step (k) comprising The following sub-steps: (k-1) the target networking device uses the hash function and generates a first hash seed value based on at least the group key, the server identity data, and the first constant; The target networking device utilizes the hash function and generates a second hash seed value based on at least the second constant, the group key, and the server identity data; (k-3) the target networking device utilizes the The bilinear pairing function generates a second secret value according to at least the individual key corresponding to the target network device and the server identity data; (k-4) the target networking device utilizes the hash function and at least according to The second secret value, the first hash seed value, and the second hash seed value generate a second authentication key; (k-5) the target networking device verifies the first according to the second authentication key Verify the value to confirm whether the access service server is authenticated; (k -6) when the target networking device has confirmed that the access service server passes the authentication, the target networking device uses the hash function and generates a second verification according to the second authentication key and the second challenge value. The value is transmitted to the access service server; and (k-7) the target networking device utilizes the hash function and generates a corresponding response according to the second authentication key, the first challenge value, and the second challenge value. The target networking device and a conversation key of the receiving service server. The authentication and key agreement protocol-based authorization authentication method according to claim 6, after the step (k), further comprising a step (1) performed by the access service server, the step (1) The following sub-steps are included: (1-1) the access service server verifies the second verification value according to the first authentication key to confirm whether the target networking device passes the authentication; and (l-2) when the connection When the service server has confirmed that the target network device passes the authentication, the first authentication key is equivalent to the second authentication key, and the access service server utilizes the hash function and according to the first authentication key, The first challenge value and the second challenge value generate the conversation key corresponding to the target networking device and the access service server. The authentication and key agreement protocol-based authorization authentication method according to claim 7 further includes a step (m) after the step (1), in the network device group to which the target network device belongs Each of the other networked devices other than the target networked device, when the other networked device receives the identity request from the access service server, the other networked device generates a pair of other networked devices in random numbers The first challenge value and the corresponding identity data and the first challenge value are transmitted to the access service server, so that the access service server stores the first challenge value corresponding to the other networked device And the individual identity data. The authentication and key agreement protocol-based authorization authentication method according to claim 8 further includes, after the step (m), a step (n) performed by the access service server, the step (n) The following sub-steps are included: (n-1) the pick-up service server generates a first secret value by using a bilinear pairing function and based on at least the individual identity data corresponding to the other networked device and the seed key; (n-2) the pick-up service server uses the hash function and generates at least one of the first secret value, the first authorization token and the second authorization token, the authentication activation time, and the authentication deadline. a first authentication key; (n-3) the pick-up service server random number generates a second challenge value, using the hash function and according to the first authentication key, the first challenge value, and the second challenge value Generating a first verification value; and (n-4) the pick-up service server transmits at least the first verification value, the server identity data, and the second challenge value to the other networked device. The authentication and key agreement protocol based authentication method according to claim 9 further includes, after the step (n), a step (o) performed by the other network device, the step (o) including The following sub-steps: (o-1) the other networking device uses the hash function and generates a first hash seed value based on at least the group key, the server identity data, and the first constant; The other networking device utilizes the hash function and generates a second hash seed value based on at least the second constant, the group key, and the server identity data; (o-3) the other networking device utilizes the Bilinear pairing function and generating a second secret value according to at least the individual key corresponding to the other networked device and the server identity data; (o-4) the other networking device utilizes the hash function and at least according to The second secret value, the first hash seed value, and the second hash seed value generate a second authentication key; (o-5) the other networking device verifies the first according to the second authentication key Verify the value to confirm whether the access service server is authenticated; (o -6) when the other networked device has confirmed that the access service server passes the authentication, the other networking device utilizes the hash function and generates a second verification according to the second authentication key and the second challenge value. And transmitting to the access service server; and (o-7) the other networking device utilizes the hash function and generates a corresponding response according to the second authentication key, the first challenge value, and the second challenge value Other networked devices and a conversation key for the service server. The authentication and key agreement protocol-based authorization authentication method according to claim 10, after the step (o), further includes a step (p) performed by the access service server, the step (p) The following sub-steps are included: (p-1) the pick-up service server verifies the second verification value according to the first authentication key to confirm whether the other networked device passes the authentication; and (p-2) when the connection When the service server has confirmed that the other networked device passes the authentication, the first authentication key is equivalent to the second authentication key, and the access service server utilizes the hash function and according to the first authentication key, The first challenge value and the second challenge value generate the conversation key corresponding to the other networked device and the access service server. The authentication and key agreement protocol-based authorization authentication method according to claim 6, wherein in the step (e), the mobile network registration further generates the first authorization token according to the authentication deadline, In step (f), the mobile network registration further generates the second authorization token according to the authentication activation time, and in the step (k-1), the target networking device further activates the time according to the authentication and the authentication. The first hash seed value is generated by the deadline, and in the step (k-2), the target networking device further generates the second hash seed value according to the authentication activation time and the authentication deadline.