TW201630395A - Methods and apparatus for hybrid access to a core network based on proxied authentication - Google Patents

Methods and apparatus for hybrid access to a core network based on proxied authentication Download PDF

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TW201630395A
TW201630395A TW104131750A TW104131750A TW201630395A TW 201630395 A TW201630395 A TW 201630395A TW 104131750 A TW104131750 A TW 104131750A TW 104131750 A TW104131750 A TW 104131750A TW 201630395 A TW201630395 A TW 201630395A
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network
wireless station
lte
node
wolten
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貝那得 摩赫畢
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貝那得 摩赫畢
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/08Access point devices
    • H04W88/10Access point devices adapted for operation in multiple networks, e.g. multi-mode access points
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/40Security arrangements using identity modules
    • H04W12/43Security arrangements using identity modules using shared identity modules, e.g. SIM sharing
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W48/00Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
    • H04W48/02Access restriction performed under specific conditions
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00Connection management
    • H04W76/10Connection setup
    • H04W76/12Setup of transport tunnels
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00Connection management
    • H04W76/10Connection setup
    • H04W76/15Setup of multiple wireless link connections
    • H04W76/16Involving different core network technologies, e.g. a packet-switched [PS] bearer in combination with a circuit-switched [CS] bearer
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W80/00Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W80/00Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
    • H04W80/06Transport layer protocols, e.g. TCP [Transport Control Protocol] over wireless
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/02Terminal devices
    • H04W88/06Terminal devices adapted for operation in multiple networks or having at least two operational modes, e.g. multi-mode terminals
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/08Access point devices

Abstract

Apparatus and methods for hybrid access to a core network. In one embodiment, a wireless station enables a subscriber device to connect to a core network via an intermediate network (e.g., a Wi-Fi network) rather than the network traditionally associated with the core network (e.g., a cellular network). In one implementation, the subscriber device connects to the wireless station at the (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) TCP/IP layers. Methods and apparatus for securely authenticating the subscriber device via the wireless station are disclosed. In one such variant, the subscriber device is a SIM-less device.

Description

基於代理認證以混合存取一核心網路之方法及裝置 Method and device for hybrid accessing a core network based on proxy authentication 【優先權聲明】[Priority statement]

本申請案主張2015年9月23日提出申請且標題為「METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR HYBRID ACCESS TO A CORE NETWORK BASED ON PROXIED AUTHENTICATION」之序號14/863,239之共同擁有、共同待決美國專利申請案的優先權,該申請案主張2014年9月25日提出申請之標題為「METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR HYBRID ACCESS TO A CORE NETWORK」之序號62/071,517之共同擁有、共同待決美國臨時專利申請案的優先權,上述申請案以全文引用的方式併入本文中。 This application claims priority to co-owned, co-pending U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 14/863,239, filed on Sep. 23, 2015, entitled "METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR HYBRID ACCESS TO A CORE NETWORK BASED ON PROXIED AUTHENTICATION. The application claims the priority of the co-owned, co-pending U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/071,517, entitled "METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR HYBRID ACCESS TO A CORE NETWORK", filed on September 25, 2014, The application is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.

相關申請案Related application

本申請案與2014年1月15日提出申請之標題為「METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR A NETWORK-AGNOSTIC WIRELESS ROUTER」的序號14/156,174共同擁有且共同待決美國專利申請案以及2014年1月15日提出申請之標題為「METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR HYBRID ACCESS TO A CORE NETWORK」的序號14/156,339共同擁有共同待決美國專利申請案相關,各該上述申請案以以全文引用的方式併入本文中。 This application is filed on January 15, 2014, entitled "METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR A NETWORK-AGNOSTIC WIRELESS ROUTER", serial number 14/156,174, co-owned and co-pending US patent application, and filed on January 15, 2014. The application is entitled "METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR HYBRID ACCESS TO A CORE NETWORK", which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

本發明大體而言係關於無線通訊及資料網路之領域。更特定而言,在一個實例性態樣中,本發明係針對用於混合存取一核心網路之方法及裝置。 The present invention relates generally to the field of wireless communications and data networks. More particularly, in one exemplary aspect, the present invention is directed to a method and apparatus for hybrid access to a core network.

由所謂的「智慧型手機」技術的出現所加速的行動資料服務的快速成長已導致高速資料傳輸量及行動服務普及性的急遽增加。隨著普及性一併增加的是客戶對更好且更可靠的服務及網路能力的期待。緩解高容量需求的短期解決方案包含諸如「資料速率瓶頸」等不受歡迎的方案,其引入有限且昂貴的收費,且逐步淘汰「非限制資料計劃」。較長期的解決方案需要新的存取技術(例如,長期演進(LTE))以滿足客戶需求,且還需要高成本之基礎設施投資。 The rapid growth of mobile data services accelerated by the emergence of so-called "smartphone" technology has led to a rapid increase in the volume of high-speed data transmission and the popularity of mobile services. With the increase in popularity, customers are expecting better and more reliable service and network capabilities. Short-term solutions to alleviate high-volume demand include unwelcome solutions such as "data rate bottlenecks" that introduce limited and expensive fees and phase out "unrestricted data plans." Longer-term solutions require new access technologies (eg, Long Term Evolution (LTE)) to meet customer needs and also require high-cost infrastructure investments.

初期解決方案之實例包含例如,所謂「小型基地台」(例如,毫微微基地台、微微型基地台及微型基地台)、「HetNet」(異質網路)及「Wi-Fi卸載」。簡而言之,小型基地台技術需要與網路經營者之核心網路之後端連線;當小型基地台可能無法存取充足頻率資源,但仍需要高容量基礎(亦即,必須以更高的每位元成本來提供載波級連線性)時,此可能使配置複雜化。HetNets併入多種不同網路技術,且可經歷大型基地台與基礎基地台間之同頻道干擾。相比而言,利用「Wi-Fi卸載」則不存在頻譜短缺問題,Wi-Fi熱點係以免授權(豁免授權)頻帶操作,在此情形中存在充裕頻譜(工業、科學及醫療(ISM)以及免授權國家資訊基礎設施(U-NII)頻帶可提供接近0.5GHz之頻譜)。因此,Wi-Fi卸載對網路經營者極具吸引力;事實上,某些小型基地台已整合Wi-Fi存取點(AP)功能性(例如,「Wi-Fi ready」)。 Examples of initial solutions include, for example, "small base stations" (eg, femto base stations, pico base stations, and micro base stations), "HetNet" (heterogeneous networks), and "Wi-Fi offload." In short, small base station technology needs to be connected to the back end of the network operator's core network; when a small base station may not be able to access sufficient frequency resources, it still needs a high capacity base (ie, must be higher) This can complicate the configuration when the cost per bit is to provide carrier-level linearity. HetNets incorporates a variety of different network technologies and can experience co-channel interference between large base stations and base base stations. In contrast, there is no spectrum shortage problem with Wi-Fi Offload, and Wi-Fi hotspots operate in an exempted (exempted license) band, in which case there is ample spectrum (Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) and The Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) band provides near 0.5 GHz spectrum). As a result, Wi-Fi offloading is very attractive to network operators; in fact, some small base stations have integrated Wi-Fi access point (AP) functionality (eg, "Wi-Fi ready").

儘管有此等益處,但存在與Wi-Fi卸載系統及網路相關聯之數個根本問題。現有網路經營者將蜂巢式網路與Wi-Fi網路視為單獨操作及管理之二個單獨業務單元。在經營及服務層級上,二個網路亦存在極少之整合及交互工作。舉例而言,Wi-Fi網路並不具有一標準「發現」、「選擇」及「存取」機制及/或程序。此可導致難以進入此等網路及/或不一致的服務品質(QoS)、安全性及策略。然而,蜂巢式網路通常實施用以獲取、註冊、認證及密碼編譯(cipher)通訊之一單一用戶辨識模組(SIM);相比而言,Wi-Fi網路係基於依賴於無線網際網路服務提供者漫遊(WISPr)(或類似變型)之各種「基於web」之認證方法。WISPr要求使用者輸入一用戶名及一密碼後可被認證,該用戶名及密碼例如,一認證、授權及帳務(AAA)/遠端認證撥號使用者服務(RADIUS)伺服器;此步驟既不方便且亦容易出錯。 Despite these benefits, there are several fundamental issues associated with Wi-Fi offload systems and networks. Existing network operators view the cellular network and the Wi-Fi network as two separate business units that operate and manage separately. At the operational and service levels, there are very few integrations and interactions between the two networks. For example, a Wi-Fi network does not have a standard "discovery", "select" and "access" mechanism and/or program. This can make it difficult to access such networks and/or inconsistent quality of service (QoS), security, and policies. However, cellular networks typically implement a single user identification module (SIM) for acquisition, registration, authentication, and cipher communication; in contrast, Wi-Fi networks are based on wireless networks. Various "web-based" authentication methods for Road Service Provider Roaming (WISPr) (or similar variants). WISPr requires the user to enter a username and a password, such as an authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA)/remote authentication dial-up user service (RADIUS) server; this step is Inconvenient and error-prone.

鑒於此等缺點,需要利用其他網路技術來致能存取行動無線(例如,蜂巢式)網路之經改良方法及裝置。理想地,此等改良將提供一整合式解決方案,用於合併例如Wi-Fi網路與蜂巢式網路從而在二個網路中無縫地且類似地進行例如使用者體驗、策略控制、發現、選擇與關聯、認證及QoS。其他益處可包含例如,Wi-Fi漫遊、Wi-Fi中性主機及IP行動性能力,同時提供用於一整合式蜂巢Wi-Fi網路之網路交遞。 In view of these shortcomings, other network technologies are needed to enable improved methods and apparatus for accessing mobile wireless (e.g., cellular) networks. Ideally, such improvements would provide an integrated solution for combining, for example, Wi-Fi networks and cellular networks to seamlessly and similarly perform user experience, policy control, etc. in both networks. Discovery, selection and association, authentication and QoS. Other benefits may include, for example, Wi-Fi roaming, Wi-Fi neutral host and IP mobility capabilities, while providing network handover for an integrated cellular Wi-Fi network.

本發明尤其藉由提供用於混合存取一核心網路之經改良裝置及方法來滿足上述需求。 The present invention satisfies the above needs, inter alia, by providing improved apparatus and methods for hybrid access to a core network.

本發明揭露一種用於無線通訊之方法,包含一第一通訊系統及一第二通訊系統,其中該第一通訊系統具有彼此通訊之至少一第一節點及一第二節點。在一個實施例中,該方法包含:在該第一節點內執行複數 個層之一第一部分,並使該第二節點執行該等層之一第二部分;自該第一節點提供一或多個辨識資訊至該第二節點,該一或多個辨識資訊與該等層之該第二部分之該執行相結合地用以在該第一通訊系統中之至少一個邏輯實體中認證該第一節點,且其中成功認證建立該第二節點與該至少一個邏輯實體間之一連線。 The present invention discloses a method for wireless communication, comprising a first communication system and a second communication system, wherein the first communication system has at least a first node and a second node in communication with each other. In one embodiment, the method includes: performing a complex number within the first node a first portion of one of the layers, and causing the second node to perform a second portion of the one of the layers; providing one or more identification information from the first node to the second node, the one or more identification information and the The execution of the second portion of the equal layer is used in combination to authenticate the first node in at least one of the first communication systems, and wherein the successful authentication establishes the second node and the at least one logical entity One of the connections.

在一個變型中,該在該第二節點內執行該等層之該第二部分包含耦合至該第一節點之一傳輸控制協定/網際網路協定(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol;TCP/IP)層。 In a variant, the second portion of the layer executing the second node comprises a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) coupled to the first node. Floor.

在一第二變型中,該在該第一節點內執行該等層之該第一部分包含耦合至該第二節點之一互補傳輸控制協定/網際網路協定(complementary Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol;TCP/IP)層。 In a second variant, the first portion of the layer performing the first node includes a complementary Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP) coupled to the second node. /IP) layer.

在一第三變型中,該方法包含使該等層之該第二部分導出一或多個認證資訊;以及基於所導出之該一或多認證資訊,該等層之該第二部分更用以對該第二節點與該至少一個邏輯實體間之一第一鏈結之一或多個資料酬載進行加密。在一個此變型中,該方法更包含在該等層之該第一部分處導出該一或多個認證資訊;以及基於所導出之該一或多個認證資訊,在該等層之該第一部分處對該等層之該第二部分之一或多個資料酬載進行加密。 In a third variant, the method includes causing the second portion of the layers to derive one or more authentication information; and based on the derived one or more authentication information, the second portion of the layers is further Encrypting one or more data payloads of the first link between the second node and the at least one logical entity. In one such variation, the method further includes deriving the one or more authentication information at the first portion of the layers; and at the first portion of the layers based on the one or more authentication information derived One or more data payloads of the second portion of the layer are encrypted.

在一第四變型中,該方法包含自不處於該第一節點本地之一用戶辨識模組(SIM)接收該一或多個辨識資訊。在一個此情形中,該自該第一節點向該第二節點提供該一或多個辨識資訊係經由一公共密鑰加密方案執行。在一個實例性變型中,該公共密鑰加密方案包含自一使用者輸入 接收一人工輸入之密碼。在另一變型中,該公共密鑰加密方案包含擷取一預定義公共密鑰。 In a fourth variation, the method includes receiving the one or more identification information from a user identification module (SIM) that is not local to the first node. In one such case, the providing the one or more identification information from the first node to the second node is performed via a public key encryption scheme. In an exemplary variation, the public key encryption scheme includes input from a user Receive a password for manual input. In another variation, the public key encryption scheme includes extracting a predefined public key.

本發明揭露一種用以提供與一核心網路連線之無線台裝置。在一個實施例中,該無線台裝置包含:一網路介面,該網路介面用以連線至與一第二無線電技術相關聯之該核心網路;一無線電介面,該無線電介面用以根據不同於該第二無線電技術之一第一無線電技術提供一開放式無線網路;一處理器;以及一非暫時性電腦可讀取媒體,與該處理器進行資料通訊並包含一或多個指令。在一個實例性實施例中,在由該處理器執行時,該一或多個指令使該無線台裝置回應於該開放式無線網路之一用戶裝置請求存取該核心網路而:自該用戶裝置接收一或多個辨識資訊;基於該一或多個辨識資訊經由該網路介面向該核心網路進行認證,其中該認證之結果會導出一或多個認證密鑰;以及基於該一或多個認證密鑰,經由該開放式無線網路建立與該用戶裝置之一安全鏈結。 The invention discloses a wireless station device for providing connection with a core network. In one embodiment, the wireless station device includes: a network interface for connecting to the core network associated with a second radio technology; a radio interface for using the radio interface Unlike the second radio technology, the first radio technology provides an open wireless network; a processor; and a non-transitory computer readable medium that communicates with the processor and includes one or more instructions . In an exemplary embodiment, when executed by the processor, the one or more instructions cause the wireless station device to request access to the core network in response to a user device of the open wireless network: The user device receives one or more identification information; and performs authentication on the core network via the network based on the one or more identification information, wherein the result of the authentication may derive one or more authentication keys; and based on the one Or a plurality of authentication keys are established to securely link with one of the user devices via the open wireless network.

在一個變型中,該一或多個指令被該處理器執行時,會使該無線台裝置執行與該用戶裝置及該第二無線電技術唯一相關聯之一或多個軟體層。 In one variation, when the one or more instructions are executed by the processor, the wireless station device is caused to perform one or more software layers uniquely associated with the user device and the second radio technology.

在一第二變型中,所執行之該一或多個軟體層模擬與該用戶裝置相關聯之一呼叫堆疊(call stack)之一或多個部分。在某些情形中,模擬至少一個軟體層向該第二無線電技術認證該用戶裝置。 In a second variation, the one or more software layers executed simulate one or more portions of one of the call stacks associated with the user device. In some cases, at least one software layer is simulated to authenticate the user device to the second radio technology.

在一第三變型中,所接收之該一或多個辨識資訊係藉由一公共密鑰加密而接收;其中所建立之該安全鏈結係基於一對稱密鑰加密。 In a third variant, the received one or more identification information is received by a public key encryption; wherein the security link established is based on a symmetric key encryption.

本發明揭露一種用以經由一無線台而與一核心網路進行通 訊之用戶裝置。在一個實施例中,該用戶裝置包含:一無線電介面,該無線電介面用以與一無線台進行通訊,其中該無線台用以與該核心網路進行通訊;一處理器;以及一非暫時性電腦可讀取裝置,包含一或多個指令。在一個實例性實施例中,該一或多個指令用以在由該處理器執行時,使該用戶裝置:提供一或多個辨識資訊至該無線台,其中該無線台用以與該核心網路進行通訊;自該無線台接收一或多個認證資訊;以及基於自該一或多個認證資訊導出之一或多個密鑰來建立與該無線台之一安全連線。 The invention discloses a method for communicating with a core network via a wireless station User device of the news. In one embodiment, the user device includes: a radio interface for communicating with a wireless station, wherein the wireless station is configured to communicate with the core network; a processor; and a non-transitory A computer readable device containing one or more instructions. In an exemplary embodiment, the one or more instructions are configured, when executed by the processor, to cause the user device to: provide one or more identification information to the wireless station, wherein the wireless station is used with the core Communicating with the network; receiving one or more authentication information from the wireless station; and establishing a secure connection with one of the wireless stations based on deriving one or more keys from the one or more authentication information.

在一個變型中,該辨識資訊包含一長期演進(LTE)演進式封包系統(evolved Packet System;EPS)密鑰存取安全性管理實體(Key Access Security Management Entity;KASME)加密密鑰。 In a variant, the identification information comprises a Long Term Evolution (LTE) evolved packet system (EPS) Key Access Security Management Entity (KASME) encryption key.

在一第二變型中,該用戶裝置更用以利用至少一個其他用戶裝置對該用戶裝置之一或多個辨識資訊之使用進行授權。在一個此變型中,該至少一個其他用戶裝置將該安全連線分享予該無線台。在另一變型中,該用戶裝置更用以為該至少一個其他用戶裝置請求一網際網路協定(IP)位址。 In a second variant, the user device is further configured to authorize the use of one or more pieces of identification information by the at least one other user device. In one such variation, the at least one other user device shares the secure connection to the wireless station. In another variation, the user device is further configured to request an Internet Protocol (IP) address for the at least one other user device.

在一第三變型中,該一或多個辨識資訊藉由一公共密鑰加密方案被提供至該無線台。 In a third variant, the one or more identification information is provided to the wireless station by a public key encryption scheme.

所屬領域之通常知識者參照附圖及以下給出之實例性實施例之詳細闡述即可了解到本發明之其他特徵及優點。 Other features and advantages of the present invention will become apparent to those skilled in the <RTIgt;

100‧‧‧3GPP版本8網路架構、現有網路架構 100‧‧‧3GPP Release 8 Network Architecture, Existing Network Architecture

102‧‧‧演進式封閉資料閘道器 102‧‧‧Evolved closed data gateway

104‧‧‧認證、授權及帳務(AAA)伺服器 104‧‧‧Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) Server

106‧‧‧存取網路發現與選擇功能 106‧‧‧Access network discovery and selection

108‧‧‧行動性/控制器閘道器 108‧‧‧Action/Controller Gateway

110‧‧‧本籍用戶伺服器 110‧‧‧Local User Server

112‧‧‧封包資料網路(PDN)閘道器(P-GW) 112‧‧‧ Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway (P-GW)

114‧‧‧使用者設備 114‧‧‧User equipment

116‧‧‧Wi-Fi存取點 116‧‧‧Wi-Fi access point

200‧‧‧網路架構 200‧‧‧Network Architecture

202‧‧‧演進式封包核心 202‧‧‧Evolved packet core

204‧‧‧Wi-Fi AP 204‧‧ Wi-Fi AP

206‧‧‧使用者設備 206‧‧‧User equipment

208‧‧‧安全閘道器 208‧‧‧Safety Gateway

210‧‧‧演進式節點B 210‧‧‧Evolved Node B

212‧‧‧行動性/控制器閘道器 212‧‧‧Action/Controller Gateway

214‧‧‧行動性管理實體 214‧‧‧Action Management Entity

216‧‧‧策略及計費規則功能 216‧‧‧Strategy and Billing Rules Features

300‧‧‧無線台、實例性裝置、裝置、實例性網路獨立無線台 300‧‧‧Wireless stations, example devices, devices, example network independent wireless stations

302‧‧‧基板 302‧‧‧Substrate

304‧‧‧處理子系統、處理系統 304‧‧‧Processing subsystem, processing system

306‧‧‧電力管理子系統 306‧‧‧Power Management Subsystem

308‧‧‧記憶體子系統 308‧‧‧ memory subsystem

310‧‧‧第一無線電數據機子系統、無線無線電子系統、第一無線電子系統 310‧‧‧First Radio Data Machine Subsystem, Wireless Radio Subsystem, First Radio Subsystem

312‧‧‧乙太網交換機、乙太網介面 312‧‧‧Ethernet switch, Ethernet interface

314‧‧‧使用者輸入/輸出 314‧‧‧User input/output

400‧‧‧用戶裝置、實例性裝置、裝置 400‧‧‧User devices, example devices, devices

402‧‧‧一或多個基板 402‧‧‧One or more substrates

404‧‧‧處理子系統、處理系統 404‧‧‧Processing subsystem, processing system

406‧‧‧電力管理子系統 406‧‧‧Power Management Subsystem

408‧‧‧記憶體子系統 408‧‧‧ memory subsystem

410A‧‧‧LTE蜂巢式空中介面、蜂巢式無線電子系統 410A‧‧‧LTE cellular air interface, cellular radio subsystem

410B‧‧‧Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11n空中介面、Wi-Fi無線電子系統、無線網路無線電子系統 410B‧‧ Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11n air intermediation, Wi-Fi radio subsystem, wireless network radio subsystem

410C‧‧‧GPS空中介面 410C‧‧‧GPS Air Intermediary

410D‧‧‧藍芽空中介面 410D‧‧‧Blue Bulk Intermediary

412A‧‧‧螢幕顯示器 412A‧‧‧screen display

412B‧‧‧小鍵盤 412B‧‧‧Keypad

412C‧‧‧麥克風與揚聲器 412C‧‧‧Microphone and Speaker

412D‧‧‧音訊編解碼器 412D‧‧‧Audio codec

412E‧‧‧相機 412E‧‧‧ camera

500‧‧‧IEEE 802.11n PHY(L1)與媒體存取控制(L2)協定堆疊 500‧‧‧IEEE 802.11n PHY (L1) and Media Access Control (L2) protocol stack

502‧‧‧免授權國家資訊基礎設施頻帶 502‧‧‧Exempted National Information Infrastructure Band

504‧‧‧工業、科學及醫療頻帶 504‧‧‧Industrial, scientific and medical bands

506‧‧‧媒體存取控制層 506‧‧‧Media Access Control Layer

508‧‧‧應用程式軟體 508‧‧‧Application Software

602‧‧‧Wi-Fi管 602‧‧ Wi-Fi tube

604‧‧‧第一應用程式 604‧‧‧ first application

606‧‧‧第二應用程式 606‧‧‧Second application

1002‧‧‧對應緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX總成 1002‧‧‧corresponding buffer and MUX/DeMUX assembly

1004‧‧‧對應緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX總成 1004‧‧‧corresponding buffer and MUX/DeMUX assembly

1006‧‧‧Wi-Fi管 1006‧‧‧ Wi-Fi tube

1008‧‧‧虛擬化PHY 1008‧‧‧Virtual PHY

1010‧‧‧使用者設備媒體存取控制 1010‧‧‧User device media access control

1012‧‧‧存取點媒體存取控制 1012‧‧‧Access Point Media Access Control

1302‧‧‧雙向輔助控制頻道、WoLTEN控制頻道 1302‧‧‧Two-way auxiliary control channel, WoLTEN control channel

1304‧‧‧雙向輔助控制頻道 1304‧‧‧Two-way auxiliary control channel

1306‧‧‧WoLTEN應用程式 1306‧‧‧WoLTEN application

1308‧‧‧WoLTEN代理 1308‧‧‧WoLTEN agent

1310‧‧‧緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX 1310‧‧‧Buffer and MUX/DeMUX

1312‧‧‧多使用者緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX、MUX/DeMUX 1312‧‧‧Multiple user buffers and MUX/DeMUX, MUX/DeMUX

1314‧‧‧無線電鏈結控制層至非存取層 1314‧‧‧ Radio link control layer to non-access layer

1316‧‧‧RLC層至網際網路協定 1316‧‧‧RLC to Internet Protocol

1402、1404、1408、1410‧‧‧步驟 Steps 1402, 1404, 1408, 1410‧‧

1502、1504、1506、1508、1510、1512、1514‧‧‧步驟 1502, 1504, 1506, 1508, 1510, 1512, 1514‧‧ steps

1602、1604、1606、1608、1610‧‧‧步驟 1602, 1604, 1606, 1608, 1610‧‧‧ steps

1700‧‧‧外部模組、USIM模組 1700‧‧‧External Module, USIM Module

1702‧‧‧SIM/USIM 1702‧‧‧SIM/USIM

1704‧‧‧處理器 1704‧‧‧ Processor

1706‧‧‧非暫時性電腦可讀取記憶體 1706‧‧‧ Non-transitory computer readable memory

1708‧‧‧電力單元 1708‧‧‧Power unit

1710‧‧‧I/O通訊模組 1710‧‧‧I/O communication module

L1‧‧‧RHY/實體 L1‧‧‧RHY/entity

L2‧‧‧媒體存取控制(MAC) L2‧‧‧Media Access Control (MAC)

第1圖係為一先前技術之第三代夥伴計劃(3GPP)版本8網路架構之一 方塊圖表示。 Figure 1 is a prior art third-generation partnership program (3GPP) version 8 network architecture The block diagram is represented.

第2圖係為長期演進Wi-Fi(WoLTEN)網路架構之一個實例性實施例之一方塊圖表示。 Figure 2 is a block diagram representation of an exemplary embodiment of a Long Term Evolution Wi-Fi (WoLTEN) network architecture.

第3圖係為根據本文中描述之各種原理,用以提供混合存取一核心網路之一個實例性無線台之一邏輯方塊圖表示。 Figure 3 is a logical block diagram representation of an exemplary wireless station for providing hybrid access to a core network in accordance with the various principles described herein.

第4圖係為根據本文中描述之各種原理,用以經由一混合存取方案存取一核心網路之一個實例性用戶裝置之一邏輯方塊圖表示。 4 is a logical block diagram representation of an example user device for accessing a core network via a hybrid access scheme in accordance with various principles described herein.

第5圖係為表示與本發明之各種態樣相結合地使用之一電機電子工程師學會(IEEE)802.11n實體(PHY)(L1)與媒體存取控制(MAC)(L2)協定堆疊之一邏輯方塊圖。 Figure 5 is a diagram showing the use of one of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11n Entity (PHY) (L1) and Medium Access Control (MAC) (L2) protocol stacks in conjunction with various aspects of the present invention. Logical block diagram.

第6圖係為藉由實例性無線台(例如,如第3圖中所闡述)及實例性用戶裝置(例如,如第4圖中所闡述)形成之Wi-Fi管之一邏輯表示。 Figure 6 is a logical representation of one of the Wi-Fi tubes formed by an exemplary wireless station (e.g., as illustrated in Figure 3) and an exemplary user device (e.g., as illustrated in Figure 4).

第7圖係為先前技術LTE無線電架構之數個邏輯頻道、輸送頻道及實體頻道之一邏輯軟體圖表示。 Figure 7 is a logical software representation of one of several logical channels, transport channels, and physical channels of a prior art LTE radio architecture.

第8圖係為一先前技術LTE軟體使用者平面協定堆疊之一邏輯軟體圖表示。 Figure 8 is a logical software diagram representation of a prior art LTE software user plane protocol stack.

第9圖係為一先前技術LTE軟體控制平面協定堆疊之一邏輯軟體圖表示。 Figure 9 is a logical software diagram representation of a prior art LTE software control plane protocol stack.

第10圖係為一邏輯軟體圖,例示根據本發明之各種態樣在使用者設備(UE)與演進式節點B(eNB)之間操作之一LTE無線電使用者平面協定堆疊之一個實例性實施例及其一修改。 10 is a logical software diagram illustrating an exemplary implementation of an LTE radio user plane protocol stack operating between a User Equipment (UE) and an Evolved Node B (eNB) in accordance with various aspects of the present invention. Example and its modification.

第11圖係為一邏輯軟體圖,例示根據本發明之各種態樣在使用者設備(UE)與演進式節點B(eNB)之間操作之LTE無線電控制平面協定堆疊之一個實例性實施例及其一修改。 11 is a logical software diagram illustrating an exemplary embodiment of an LTE radio control plane protocol stack operating between a User Equipment (UE) and an Evolved Node B (eNB) in accordance with various aspects of the present invention and One of its modifications.

第11A圖係為根據本文中描述之原理使用一第二實例性堆疊排列與一Wi-Fi存取點(AP)進行通訊之一個實例性使用者設備(UE)之一邏輯方塊圖。 11A is a logical block diagram of an example user equipment (UE) that communicates with a Wi-Fi access point (AP) using a second exemplary stacked arrangement in accordance with the principles described herein.

第12圖係為一邏輯軟體圖,例示與本發明之各種態樣相結合地使用之LTE MAC之一概念架構之一個實例性實施例。 Figure 12 is a logical software diagram illustrating an exemplary embodiment of one of the conceptual architectures of LTE MAC used in conjunction with various aspects of the present invention.

第13圖係為用於用戶裝置及無線台之一總體協定堆疊架構(使用者平面及控制平面二者)之一邏輯軟體圖表示。 Figure 13 is a logical software representation of one of the overall agreement stacking architecture (both user plane and control plane) for the user device and the wireless station.

第14圖係為用於一行動性管理對話之發現、起始及組態之一個一般化過程之一邏輯流程圖。 Figure 14 is a logic flow diagram of one generalization process for the discovery, initiation, and configuration of an operational management dialogue.

第15圖係為一邏輯流程圖,例示在一用戶裝置上執行之一個實例性WoLTEN應用程式(APP)之一長期演進Wi-Fi(WoLTEN)連線之初始化。 Figure 15 is a logic flow diagram illustrating the initialization of a Long Term Evolution Wi-Fi (WoLTEN) connection of one of the exemplary WoLTEN applications (APPs) executed on a user device.

第16圖係為一邏輯流程圖,例示在一無線台上執行之一個實例性WoLTEN代理之一長期演進Wi-Fi(WoLTEN)連線之初始化。 Figure 16 is a logic flow diagram illustrating the initialization of a Long Term Evolution Wi-Fi (WoLTEN) connection of one of the exemplary WoLTEN agents executing on a wireless station.

第17圖係為與本發明相結合地使用之一個實例性外部用戶辨識模組(SIM/USIM)之一邏輯方塊圖。 Figure 17 is a logical block diagram of an exemplary external subscriber identity module (SIM/USIM) used in conjunction with the present invention.

現在,參照各圖式,其中通篇中相同編號指代相同部件。 Reference is now made to the drawings, in which like reference

簡而言之,用於混合存取一網路(例如,一核心網路)之方 法及裝置揭示於例如2014年1月15日提出申請之標題為「METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR HYBRID ACCESS TO A CORE NETWORK」之序列號14/156,339美國專利申請案以及2014年1月15日提出申請之標題為「METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR A NETWORK-AGNOSTIC WIRELESS ROUTER」之序列號14/156,174美國專利申請案中。如本文中所闡述,一「存取隧道」(例如,一所謂「Wi-Fi管」)致能一用戶裝置經由一中間網路(例如,一Wi-Fi網路)聯繫一核心網路。在一個實施方案中,無線台用以使用類似(或相同)於現有網路實體(例如,演進式節點B(eNBs))之協定直接連線至核心網路。如後文更詳細闡述,一實例性Wi-Fi存取點(AP)提供存取一長期演進(LTE)網路。用戶裝置與無線台係經由Wi-Fi管而連線;無線台執行一轉譯過程(例如,一使用者設備(UE)媒體存取控制(MAC)、虛擬實體層(VPHY)及存取點(AP)MAC),藉此將用戶裝置無縫地連線至LTE核心網路。 In short, the side used for hybrid access to a network (for example, a core network) The method and apparatus are disclosed, for example, in the title of "METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR HYBRID ACCESS TO A CORE NETWORK", which is filed on January 15, 2014, and the title of the application filed on January 15, 2014. It is in the "METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR A NETWORK-AGNOSTIC WIRELESS ROUTER" serial number 14/156,174 US Patent Application. As set forth herein, an "access tunnel" (e.g., a so-called "Wi-Fi pipe") enables a user device to contact a core network via an intermediate network (e.g., a Wi-Fi network). In one embodiment, the wireless stations are used to directly connect to the core network using protocols similar (or identical) to existing network entities (e.g., evolved Node Bs (eNBs)). As explained in more detail below, an example Wi-Fi access point (AP) provides access to a Long Term Evolution (LTE) network. The user device and the wireless station are connected via a Wi-Fi pipe; the wireless station performs a translation process (eg, a User Equipment (UE) Media Access Control (MAC), a Virtual Physical Layer (VPHY), and an access point ( AP) MAC), thereby seamlessly connecting the user device to the LTE core network.

後文中更詳細地闡述所揭示實施例之各種其他優點。 Various other advantages of the disclosed embodiments are set forth in more detail below.

實例性實施例之詳細闡述 Detailed description of the example embodiments

現在,詳細地闡述本發明之各實例性實施例。儘管此等實施例主要係與Wi-Fi熱點(IEEE 802.11n)操作相結合地在第四代長期演進(4G LTE或LTE-A)無線網路之上下文中來闡述,但此項技術之通常知識者將認識到,本發明並非限於此。實際上,本發明之各種態樣用於可自本文中闡述之無線路由受益之任何無線網路。 Various exemplary embodiments of the invention are now set forth in detail. Although these embodiments are primarily described in the context of a fourth generation long term evolution (4G LTE or LTE-A) wireless network in conjunction with Wi-Fi hotspot (IEEE 802.11n) operation, this technique is generally The skilled person will recognize that the invention is not limited thereto. In fact, various aspects of the present invention are applicable to any wireless network that can benefit from the wireless routing set forth herein.

如本文中所使用,術語「無線」意指任何無線訊號介面、資料介面、通訊介面或其他介面,包含Wi-Fi(IEEE 802.11及其衍生物,例如,「b」、「a」、「g」、「n」、「ac」等)、藍芽、3G(例如,3GPP、3GPP2及UMTS)、 4G(LTE、LTE-A、WiMax)、HSDPA/HSUPA、TDMA、CDMA(例如,IS-95A、WCDMA等)、FHSS、DSSS、GSM、PAN/802.15、WiMAX(802.16)、802.20、窄頻帶/FDMA、OFDM、PCS/DCS、類比蜂巢、CDPD、衛星系統、毫米波或微波系統、聲學及紅外線(亦即,IrDA),但不限於此。 As used herein, the term "wireless" means any wireless signal interface, data interface, communication interface or other interface, including Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11 and its derivatives, eg, "b", "a", "g" , "n", "ac", etc.), Bluetooth, 3G (for example, 3GPP, 3GPP2, and UMTS), 4G (LTE, LTE-A, WiMax), HSDPA/HSUPA, TDMA, CDMA (eg, IS-95A, WCDMA, etc.), FHSS, DSSS, GSM, PAN/802.15, WiMAX (802.16), 802.20, narrowband/FDMA , OFDM, PCS/DCS, analog honeycomb, CDPD, satellite system, millimeter wave or microwave system, acoustic and infrared (ie, IrDA), but are not limited thereto.

此外,如本文中所使用,術語「網路」通常係指任何類型之資料網路、電訊網路或其他網路,包含資料網路(包含MAN、PAN、WAN、LAN、WLAN、微型網路、微微網路、網際網路及內部網路)、衛星網路、蜂巢式網路及電訊網路,但不限於此。 Moreover, as used herein, the term "network" generally refers to any type of data network, telecommunications network, or other network, including data networks (including MAN, PAN, WAN, LAN, WLAN, micro network). , but not limited to, piconet, internet and intranet, satellite, cellular and telecommunications networks.

混合存取之現有解決方案-Existing solutions for hybrid access -

過去,後端及室內涵蓋範圍曾係一網路經營者之二個最大「痛點」;而最近,行動網路數據容量已變成挑戰。增加數據容量同時為網路經營者節省時間及資金之解決方案將具有高報酬。儘管,網路經營者抵制在其網路中採用Wi-Fi,但顯而易見,數據容量問題之可行解決方案將需要Wi-Fi整合。 In the past, back-end and indoor coverage were the two biggest "pain points" of a network operator; recently, mobile network data capacity has become a challenge. Solutions that increase data capacity while saving time and money for network operators will be highly rewarding. Although network operators are resisting Wi-Fi adoption in their networks, it is clear that a viable solution to data capacity issues will require Wi-Fi integration.

簡而言之,頻譜(或頻寬)對於網路經營者為一稀有且昂貴之資源成本。儘管多數網路經營者擁有~10-20MHz之頻寬(至多),但Wi-Fi網路係在跨數百MHz之頻譜之免授權頻帶內操作。支援工業、科學及醫療(ISM 2.4GHz)及免授權國家資訊基礎設施(U-NII 5GHz)頻帶之一Wi-Fi系統將存取ISM之約80MHz之頻譜及U-NII頻帶之450MHz(不包含室外頻帶)。最初,網路經營者關心的係一免授權(豁免)頻譜之可用性及品質以及可能對使用者體驗有負面影響;然而,免授權技術(例如,Wi-Fi)即使在擁塞及不利情景中亦提供穩定且有效之連線性。 In short, spectrum (or bandwidth) is a rare and expensive resource cost for network operators. Although most network operators have a bandwidth (up to most) of ~10-20 MHz, Wi-Fi networks operate in an unlicensed band spanning hundreds of MHz of spectrum. Wi-Fi systems supporting one of the Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM 2.4 GHz) and Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (U-NII 5 GHz) bands will access the spectrum of approximately 80 MHz of the ISM and 450 MHz of the U-NII band (excluding Outdoor band). Initially, network operators were concerned about the availability and quality of the exempted (exempted) spectrum and may have a negative impact on the user experience; however, unauthorized technology (eg Wi-Fi) is even in congested and unfavorable scenarios. Provides a stable and effective linearity.

不同於蜂巢技術,大多數現有Wi-Fi產品係基於特設(ad hoc)部署。Wi-Fi網路將載波感測多重存取與經特殊設計以致能特設部署之碰撞避免(CSMA/CA)及無競爭(點協調功能(PCF)或散佈式協調功能(DCF))媒體存取控制(MAC)協定搭配使用。特設部署減少網路經營者之用於網路規劃、部署及維修之負擔。 Unlike hive technology, most existing Wi-Fi products are based on ad hoc deployments. Wi-Fi network media access for carrier sensing multiple access and collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) and non-contention (point coordination function (PCF) or distributed coordination function (DCF)) specially designed to enable ad hoc deployment Control (MAC) protocol is used in conjunction. Ad hoc deployments reduce the burden on network operators for network planning, deployment, and maintenance.

更進一步,蜂巢式技術係初始設計成更多地支援平等商業模式(例如,為大量用戶提供相對低之速率話音能力),而從概念上來說,Wi-Fi技術係設計成支援高通量。現有Wi-Fi裝置通常具備超出300Mbits/sec資料速率之能力;其他版本有望達到Gbits/sec之資料速率。 Furthermore, the cellular technology system was originally designed to support more equal business models (for example, to provide relatively low-rate voice capabilities for a large number of users), and conceptually, Wi-Fi technology is designed to support high throughput. . Existing Wi-Fi devices typically have the ability to exceed 300 Mbits/sec data rate; other versions are expected to achieve Gbits/sec data rates.

Wi-Fi技術及裝置已問世十多年了,且組件已商品化並可以一相對低成本獲得。諸多現有消費裝置已併入有Wi-Fi技術,因此最低設備成本(對於網路經營者與用戶二者)並不會存在任何顯著部署阻礙。 Wi-Fi technology and devices have been around for more than a decade, and components have been commercialized and available at relatively low cost. Many existing consumer devices have been incorporated with Wi-Fi technology, so there is no significant deployment barrier for the lowest equipment cost (for both network operators and users).

基於至少上述原因,所謂「層1」經營者(例如,AT&T®及Verizon®)已請求在最近及未來的標準開發(例如,第三代夥伴計劃(3GPP)之版本12)中整合核心網路與Wi-Fi。具體而言,網路經營者得出結論:Wi-Fi可具有作為用於以下各者之一互補通訊系統之潛在適用性:(a)卸載資料訊務及(b)改良涵蓋範圍。更直接地,Wi-Fi卸載可緩解訊務擁塞,此乃因Wi-Fi之可用頻譜超出網路經營者之頻譜。此外,當與小型基地台解決方案同等地相比時,Wi-Fi更具成本效率且不需要針對「難以涵蓋」區域(例如,室內)之網路規劃及操作。為此,諸多較新小型基地台(所謂用於3G之「節點B」及用於4G LTE之演進式節點B(e節點B或eNB))已併入有Wi-Fi存取點(AP)能力。 For at least the above reasons, so-called "Layer 1" operators (eg, AT&T® and Verizon®) have requested integration of core networks in recent and future standards development (eg, version 3 of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)) With Wi-Fi. Specifically, network operators have concluded that Wi-Fi can have potential applicability as a complementary communication system for one of: (a) offloading data traffic and (b) improving coverage. More directly, Wi-Fi offloading can alleviate traffic congestion because Wi-Fi's available spectrum exceeds the spectrum of network operators. In addition, Wi-Fi is more cost effective and does not require network planning and operation for "difficult to cover" areas (eg, indoors) when compared to a small base station solution. To this end, many newer small base stations (so-called "Node B" for 3G and evolved Node B (eNode B or eNB for 4G LTE) have been incorporated into Wi-Fi access points (APs) ability.

然而,現有解決方案具有多個實施問題。當前,提供Wi-Fi 服務之蜂巢式網路將蜂巢式網路與Wi-Fi網路視為二個單獨業務單元,其中二個網路單獨地操作及管理。自一實施方案觀點而言,在操作及服務層級上,二個網路間幾乎不存在整合及交互工作。另外,Wi-Fi網路具有缺乏一標準「發現」、「選擇」及存取機制及程序之問題。出於此原因,用戶通常很難找到並使用此些網路,且即使找到,服務品質(QoS)服務及策略又不能跨網路連貫或得到保證。提供不一致服務易被用戶察覺到,且會負面地影響客戶滿意度。 However, existing solutions have multiple implementation issues. Currently, Wi-Fi is available The service's cellular network treats the cellular network and the Wi-Fi network as two separate service units, two of which operate and manage separately. From an implementation point of view, there is little integration and interworking between the two networks at the operational and service levels. In addition, Wi-Fi networks suffer from a lack of standard "discovery", "choice" and access mechanisms and procedures. For this reason, it is often difficult for users to find and use such networks, and even if found, quality of service (QoS) services and policies cannot be coherent or guaranteed across the network. Providing inconsistent services is easily perceived by users and can negatively impact customer satisfaction.

如先前所述,Wi-Fi網路係基於web之認證方法,例如,WISPr(或類似變型),而WISPr又基於傳統用戶名/密碼範例。儘管利用Wi-Fi實施用戶辨識模組(SIM)操作存在數個主要障礙(例如,可擴展認證協定認證密鑰協議(EAP-AKA)之支援),但某些經營者(例如,Swisscom®)已使用基於Wi-Fi SIM/USIM之認證。類似地,Cisco®具有專屬解決方案(例如,基於聚合服務路由器(ASR)系列產品,及用於網路管理之Cisco Prime®),如同將Alcatel-Lucent®(例如,輕型無線電,一Wi-Fi/WLAN閘道器)及Ericsson®(例如,服務感知計費與控制(SACC))及其網路整合Wi-Fi解決方案作為一Wi-Fi卸載解決方案)。 As mentioned previously, Wi-Fi networks are web-based authentication methods, such as WISPr (or similar variants), while WISPr is based on the traditional username/password paradigm. Although there are several major obstacles to implementing User Identity Module (SIM) operations using Wi-Fi (for example, the Extensible Authentication Protocol Authentication Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) support), some operators (for example, Swisscom®) Wi-Fi SIM/USIM based authentication has been used. Similarly, Cisco® has a proprietary solution (for example, based on the Aggregation Services Router (ASR) family of products and Cisco Prime® for network management), like Alcatel-Lucent® (for example, light radio, a Wi-Fi /WLAN gateways) and Ericsson® (for example, Service Awareness Accounting and Control (SACC)) and its network-integrated Wi-Fi solution as a Wi-Fi offload solution).

然而,即使在此等解決方案中,Wi-Fi網路亦係一與蜂巢式網路分離之實體。此差別導致不同安全等級及使用者體驗,且通常需要經營者管理二個單獨且不同之網路,為大量網路及交互工作實體投入額外資金。例如,取決於解決方案,可能需要新的或經修改手持機功能實體,例如,用於Wi-Fi及路由演算法之EAP-SIM及EAP-AKA(例如,基於用戶端之IP流行動性及無縫卸載(IFOM))。 However, even in such solutions, the Wi-Fi network is an entity separate from the cellular network. This difference leads to different levels of security and user experience, and often requires the operator to manage two separate and distinct networks, investing additional funds for a large number of network and interworking entities. For example, depending on the solution, new or modified handset functional entities may be required, such as EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA for Wi-Fi and routing algorithms (eg, UE-based IP flow mobility and Seamless Uninstall (IFOM)).

現在呈現Wi-Fi蜂巢式互操作之一簡要演進史。在3GPP版本 6中,交互工作之WLAN(I-WLAN)標準係主要針對與3G網路之Wi-F整合而引入。此早期標準支援經由Wi-Fi網路或3G網路之IP資料,且需要大量新的網路實體(例如,無線區域網路(WLAN)存取閘道器(WAG),封包資料閘道器(PDG),認證、授權及帳務(AAA)伺服器,及本地代理(HA))。儘管此標準並不受網路經營者歡迎,但在3GPP版本8中,I-WLAN與長期演進(LTE)核心網路(亦稱為演進式封包核心(EPC))之整合度甚至更緊密。 A brief evolutionary history of Wi-Fi cellular interoperability is now presented. In the 3GPP version In 6, the interworking WLAN (I-WLAN) standard is mainly introduced for Wi-F integration with 3G networks. This early standard supports IP data over Wi-Fi networks or 3G networks and requires a large number of new network entities (eg, Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Access Gateway (WAG), Packet Data Gateway (PDG), Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) Server, and Local Agent (HA)). Although this standard is not welcomed by network operators, in 3GPP Release 8, I-WLAN is even more integrated with the Long Term Evolution (LTE) core network (also known as the Evolved Packet Core (EPC)).

第1圖繪示先前技術3GPP版本8網路架構100。如所示,3GPP版本8在3GPP核心網路(EPC)中引入三個網路組件,即:演進式封閉資料閘道器(ePDG)102;認證、授權及帳務(AAA)伺服器104;及存取網路發現及選擇功能(ANDSF)106。Wi-Fi網路中之某些現有網路實體亦經修改或調適以併入額外功能(例如,行動性/控制器閘道器108)。如所示,Wi-Fi AP 116係為符合IEEE 802.11n標準之一習用IEEE 802.11n AP。在操作期間,Wi-Fi AP 116連線至行動性/控制器閘道器108且由其控制,行動性/控制器閘道器108經由ePDG 102與EPC整合。UE 114亦可需要對應之功能性以支援用於Wi-Fi卸載之基於用戶端之行動IP及IP流行動性,以及經由Wi-Fi AP 116支援發現、選擇、關聯及基於SIM之認證及加密。 FIG. 1 illustrates a prior art 3GPP Release 8 network architecture 100. As shown, 3GPP Release 8 introduces three network components in the 3GPP Core Network (EPC), namely: Evolved Closed Data Gateway (ePDG) 102; Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) Server 104; And access network discovery and selection function (ANDSF) 106. Certain existing network entities in a Wi-Fi network are also modified or adapted to incorporate additional functionality (e.g., mobility/controller gateway 108). As shown, the Wi-Fi AP 116 is a conventional IEEE 802.11n AP that conforms to one of the IEEE 802.11n standards. During operation, Wi-Fi AP 116 is connected to and controlled by mobility/controller gateway 108, and mobility/controller gateway 108 is integrated with EPC via ePDG 102. UE 114 may also require corresponding functionality to support UE-based mobile IP and IP flow mobility for Wi-Fi offload, as well as support for discovery, selection, association, and SIM-based authentication and encryption via Wi-Fi AP 116 .

第1圖之架構致能所謂「不可信賴的存取」。具體而言,包含AAA伺服器104(其亦連線至本地用戶伺服器(HSS)110)允許借助於EAP-AKA對一Wi-Fi用戶裝置之基於SIM之認證。封包資料閘道器(PDG)(先前已在版本6中引入)在3GPP版本8中被重新定義為一演進式PDG(ePDG)102。如所示,ePDG 102直接連線至封包資料網路(PDN)閘道器(P-GW)112以支援用於Wi-Fi之IP行動性。在第1圖之架構中,一使用者 設備(UE)114用以在其自身與ePDG 102間建立一網際網路協定安全(IPsec)通道(介入網路組件係為不可信賴的實體,因此此方案提供不可信賴的存取)。由於介入網路組件係為不可信賴的,因此一UE 114必須與ePDG 102建立一IPsec通道。此可係為一顯著處理負擔,因為ePDG必須針對每一UE支援並維持一單獨IPsec通道。 The architecture of Figure 1 enables so-called "untrusted access." In particular, the inclusion of an AAA server 104 (which is also wired to a local user server (HSS) 110) allows SIM-based authentication of a Wi-Fi user device by means of EAP-AKA. The Packet Data Gateway (PDG) (previously introduced in Release 6) was redefined in 3GPP Release 8 as an evolved PDG (ePDG) 102. As shown, the ePDG 102 is directly wired to a Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway (P-GW) 112 to support IP mobility for Wi-Fi. In the architecture of Figure 1, a user The device (UE) 114 is used to establish an Internet Protocol Secure (IPsec) channel between itself and the ePDG 102 (the intervening network component is an untrustworthy entity, so this solution provides untrusted access). Since the intervening network components are untrustworthy, a UE 114 must establish an IPsec tunnel with the ePDG 102. This can be a significant processing burden because ePDG must support and maintain a single IPsec tunnel for each UE.

3GPP版本10保留了網路架構100並引入基於S2a之通用封包行動性無線電服務(GPRS)穿隧協定(SaMOG),此致能「可信賴」存取網路操作。不同於版本8,在版本10中,一IPsec通道係設置在Wi-Fi AP 116與P-GW 112之間。此組態緩解ePDG 102處之大(頻寬)IPsec通道;然而,由於IPsec通道並不擴展至Wi-Fi無線電介面,因此空中介面必須由另一機制來保護(例如,熱點2.0(IEEE 802.11i)標準)。 3GPP Release 10 retains Network Architecture 100 and introduces the S2a-based Universal Packet Mobility Radio Service (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol (SaMOG), which enables "trusted" access network operations. Unlike Release 8, in Release 10, an IPsec tunnel is set between Wi-Fi AP 116 and P-GW 112. This configuration mitigates the large (bandwidth) IPsec channel at ePDG 102; however, since the IPsec tunnel does not extend to the Wi-Fi radio interface, the null plane must be protected by another mechanism (eg, Hotspot 2.0 (IEEE 802.11i) )standard).

在第1圖之上下文中,可使用各種卸載演算法來解決針對不同服務及IP行動性之不同服務品質(QoS)要求。二個特徵(多重存取PDN連線性(MAPCON)及IP流行動性(IFOM))在版本10中規定用於基於QoS之卸載;網路經營者可基於例如商業考量等實施任一種方案。 In the context of Figure 1, various offload algorithms can be used to address different Quality of Service (QoS) requirements for different services and IP mobility. Two features (Multiple Access PDN Linked Linearity (MAPCON) and IP Flow Mobility (IFOM)) are specified in Release 10 for QoS-based offloading; network operators can implement either scheme based on, for example, business considerations.

在MAPCON及IFOM二者中,給每一協定資料網路(PDN)指派一唯一IP位址;每一PDN係為當前3GPP架構中之一特定服務網路,包含但不限於:網際網路、IP多媒體子系統(IMS)、IPTV等。每一PDN進一步由一存取點名稱(APN)來辨識。此外,所有PDN被遞交給一Wi-Fi卸載網路或遞交回給蜂巢式網路。MAPCON允許基於PDN QoS要求或網路負載來選擇存取網路。IFOM係為MAPCON之一更先進版本,此乃因其允許一給定PDN具有數個IP流,從而基於QoS進一步精細化及最佳化效能。在版本10中,每一PDN與二個IP位址相關聯,一個用於蜂巢式網路存取且一個用於 Wi-Fi網路存取,從而允許透過二個網路進行同時存取。 In both MAPCON and IFOM, each protocol data network (PDN) is assigned a unique IP address; each PDN is a specific service network in the current 3GPP architecture, including but not limited to: the Internet, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), IPTV, etc. Each PDN is further identified by an Access Point Name (APN). In addition, all PDNs are delivered to a Wi-Fi offload network or submitted back to the cellular network. MAPCON allows access to the network based on PDN QoS requirements or network load. IFOM is a more advanced version of MAPCON, which allows for a given PDN to have several IP streams, further fine-tuning and optimizing performance based on QoS. In Release 10, each PDN is associated with two IP addresses, one for cellular access and one for Wi-Fi network access allows simultaneous access through two networks.

為完成Wi-Fi網路與3GPP蜂巢式網路之整合,需要針對Wi-Fi網路的一標準自動網路「發現」、「選擇」及「關聯」,以及「策略控制」框架。現有網路架構100利用存取網路發現及選擇功能(ANDSF)106以及熱點2.0提供前述功能性。ANDSF提供一基於用戶端-伺服器之策略控制解決方案,熱點2.0利用Wi-Fi網路提供基於EAP-SIM及EAP-AKA之認證(例如,經由Wi-Fi空中介面提供關於網路經營者之發現、選擇及關聯)。 In order to complete the integration of Wi-Fi networks and 3GPP cellular networks, a standard automatic network "discovery", "selection" and "association", and "policy control" framework for Wi-Fi networks are required. The existing network architecture 100 provides the aforementioned functionality using the Access Network Discovery and Selection Function (ANDSF) 106 and Hotspot 2.0. ANDSF provides a client-server-based policy control solution that uses Wi-Fi networks to provide EAP-SIM-based and EAP-AKA-based authentication (for example, providing network operators via Wi-Fi air interface) Discover, select and associate).

實例性長期演進Wi-Fi(WoLTEN)網路架構-Example Long Term Evolution Wi-Fi (WoLTEN) Network Architecture -

儘管先前做出諸多努力,用於組合蜂巢式與Wi-Fi生態系統之現有解決方案仍然存在各種問題。具體而言,用於蜂巢式/Wi-Fi整合之所提議3GPP解決方案並非「全盤性的」,所提議解決方案係為跨越網路元件散佈之專門化及/或經修改功能實體之一拼湊方案。所得解決方案係為複雜的、不完整的、不切實際的且不可縮放的。即使在依此等相對複雜且昂貴解決方案其中之一進行大量投資之後,網路經營者仍必須:(i)操作及維持二個不同網路;及(ii)解決該等網路間之不同使用者體驗(例如,安全性及QoS)。 Despite the many efforts previously made, there are still various problems with existing solutions for combining the cellular and Wi-Fi ecosystems. In particular, the proposed 3GPP solution for cellular/Wi-Fi integration is not "all-in-one" and the proposed solution is a patchwork of one of the specialized and/or modified functional entities spread across network elements. Program. The resulting solution is complex, incomplete, impractical, and non-scalable. Even after making significant investments in one of these relatively complex and expensive solutions, network operators must: (i) operate and maintain two different networks; and (ii) address the differences between these networks. User experience (for example, security and QoS).

另外,存在此等解決方案不能解決的其他問題。舉例而言,版本10提議(例如,SaMOG、MAPCON、IFOM、ANDSF及HotSpot2.0)要求Wi-Fi網路係為一「可信賴網路」。實務實施方案將最可能需要由網路經營者擁有。此些限制(即使在未明確闡明時)不包含所期望特徵(例如,Wi-Fi漫遊、中性主機操作等),且限制Wi-Fi網路之部署情景。特定而言,某些獨立經營者(例如,Boingo®)使用Wi-Fi在免授權頻帶中移交(fram out)網路。 In addition, there are other issues that these solutions cannot solve. For example, version 10 proposals (eg, SaMOG, MAPCON, IFOM, ANDSF, and HotSpot 2.0) require the Wi-Fi network to be a "trusted network." The practical implementation plan will most likely need to be owned by the network operator. Such limitations (even when not explicitly stated) do not include desired features (eg, Wi-Fi roaming, neutral host operations, etc.) and limit the deployment scenarios of Wi-Fi networks. In particular, some independent operators (eg, Boingo®) use Wi-Fi to fram out the network in an unlicensed band.

當前解決方案提供蜂巢式網路(例如,3GPP)與Wi-Fi網路之某種程度之整合及共存;然而,此等解決方案通常係複雜、昂貴且需要經營者對操作及維修部分付出一些努力。實際上,在美國(USA)國內,僅存在一個採用前述網路架構之經營者(AT&T)。 Current solutions provide some degree of integration and coexistence of cellular networks (eg, 3GPP) with Wi-Fi networks; however, such solutions are often complex, expensive, and require operators to pay for operating and maintenance parts. Work hard. In fact, in the United States (USA), there is only one operator (AT&T) using the aforementioned network architecture.

為此,本發明之各種實施例係針對用於混合存取一核心網路之方法及裝置。理想之解決方案將在二個網路中係無縫且功能類似的(例如,使用者體驗、策略控制、發現、選擇、關聯、認證及QoS等)。另外,此些實施例應提供用於Wi-Fi漫遊、Wi-Fi中性主機能力及IP行動性之構件,同時亦支援一整合式蜂巢/Wi-Fi網路之網路交遞。 To this end, various embodiments of the present invention are directed to methods and apparatus for hybrid access to a core network. The ideal solution would be seamless and functionally similar across the two networks (eg, user experience, policy control, discovery, selection, association, authentication, QoS, etc.). In addition, these embodiments should provide components for Wi-Fi roaming, Wi-Fi neutral host capabilities, and IP mobility, as well as network handover for an integrated cellular/Wi-Fi network.

當前Wi-Fi整合方法依賴於現有3GPP及Wi-Fi網路之逐漸改變,例如,藉由增加新功能實體同時修改某些現有功能實體。相比而言,優先解決方案應建立於現有3GPP網路上(亦即,3GPP核心網路(例如,一4G LTE網路中之EPC)不具有改變或具有最小改變),而非在Wi-Fi AP及UE處修改功能性以達成所期望之整合程度。因此,本發明揭露修改Wi-Fi AP功能性以及UE中之中間軟體之各種解決方案,該中間軟體用以在核心網路之最小改變之情形下致能與一3GPP網路之總體Wi-Fi整合(對最終使用者透明)。 Current Wi-Fi integration methods rely on gradual changes to existing 3GPP and Wi-Fi networks, for example, by adding new functional entities while modifying certain existing functional entities. In contrast, the priority solution should be built on existing 3GPP networks (ie, 3GPP core networks (eg, EPC in a 4G LTE network) have no change or minimal change), not Wi-Fi The AP and UE modify the functionality to achieve the desired level of integration. Accordingly, the present invention discloses various solutions for modifying Wi-Fi AP functionality and intermediate software in a UE for enabling overall Wi-Fi with a 3GPP network with minimal changes in the core network. Integration (transparent to the end user).

儘管在一3GPP核心網路之上下文內呈現以下論述,該3GPP核心網路提供以一3GPP經批準FDD授權頻帶操作之一4G-LTE(分頻多工(FDD))網路,但應理解,在給出本發明之內容之情形下,相關技術之通常知識者可容易地將所闡述原理應用於其他網路技術。3GPP網路技術之其他實例包含3G WCDMA/UMTS/HSPA、2G及2.5G GSM-GPRS網路、以及FDD與TDD蜂巢式系統,但不限於此。 Although the following discussion is presented within the context of a 3GPP core network, the 3GPP core network provides one 4G-LTE (Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDD)) network operating in a 3GPP approved FDD licensed band, but it should be understood that Given the teachings of the present invention, one of ordinary skill in the art can readily apply the principles set forth to other network technologies. Other examples of 3GPP network technologies include 3G WCDMA/UMTS/HSPA, 2G and 2.5G GSM-GPRS networks, and FDD and TDD cellular systems, but are not limited thereto.

儘管在IEEE 802.11n存取點(AP)技術之上下文內呈現以下論述,但應理解,在給出本發明之內容之情形下,相關技術之通常知識者可容易地將所闡述原理應用於其他網路技術。適合之存取技術之其他實例包含:例如,IEEE 802.11衍生物,例如,「b」、「g」、「a」、「ac」、跳頻擴展頻譜(FHSS)、直接序列擴展頻譜(DSSS)及紅外線(IR)。 Although the following discussion is presented within the context of the IEEE 802.11n Access Point (AP) technology, it should be understood that the general knowledge of the relevant art can readily apply the principles set forth to others in the context of the present invention. Network technology. Other examples of suitable access technologies include, for example, IEEE 802.11 derivatives, such as "b", "g", "a", "ac", frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS). And infrared (IR).

第2圖繪示網路架構200之一個實例性實施例,後文中稱為一「WoLTEN網路」(長期演進(LTE)Wi-Fi網路)。在所例示實施例中,演進式封包核心(EPC)202中幾乎不需要修改,而是Wi-Fi AP 204及UE 206之軟體功能性用以適應無線電操作之差異(例如,蜂巢式操作與IEEE 802.11操作間之差異)。在所例示WoLTEN網路中,Wi-Fi AP 204直接連線至EPC 202之安全閘道器208且視為具有與網路中之一eNB 210相同之特權及安全性(亦即,其係為一「可信賴」AP)。在其他實施例中(未顯示),安全閘道器208直接連線至一HeNB閘道器或一本地閘道器或等同源閘道器實體。在某些變型中,Wi-Fi AP亦可連線至一行動性/控制器閘道器212以充當一習用Wi-Fi AP(例如,提供對舊有裝置之支援等)。舊有操作類似於現有提議(例如,參見第1圖之網路架構100,且不再進一步闡述)。 FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of a network architecture 200, hereinafter referred to as a "WoLTEN network" (Long Term Evolution (LTE) Wi-Fi network). In the illustrated embodiment, there is little need for modification in the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) 202, but the software functionality of the Wi-Fi AP 204 and the UE 206 to accommodate differences in radio operation (eg, cellular operation and IEEE) The difference between 802.11 operations). In the illustrated WoLTEN network, the Wi-Fi AP 204 is directly connected to the security gateway 208 of the EPC 202 and is considered to have the same privileges and security as one of the eNBs 210 in the network (ie, it is A "trustworthy" AP). In other embodiments (not shown), the security gateway 208 is directly wired to a HeNB gateway or a local gateway or the like gateway entity. In some variations, the Wi-Fi AP can also be wired to a mobility/controller gateway 212 to act as a conventional Wi-Fi AP (e.g., to provide support for legacy devices, etc.). The old operation is similar to the existing proposal (for example, see the network architecture 100 of Figure 1 and will not be further elaborated).

在WoLTEN操作期間,諸多IEEE 802.11n相關聯較低層(稱為實體(PHY)層及媒體存取控制(MAC)層)保持與現有IEEE 802.11n實施方案實質上相同。在某些實施例中,不包含鏈結層控制(LLC)層;在其他變型中,可包含LLC層。然而,本發明之各種實施例致能高於MAC層之LTE特定功能性。具體而言,用戶裝置表現為高於MAC層之一邏輯LTE使用者設備(UE);類似地,Wi-Fi AP表現為高於MAC層之一邏輯LTE演進式節點B(eNB)。藉由自LTE較高層功能性移除對較低層實體功能性之相依 性,Wi-Fi卸載演算法可基於相關考量(例如,連線性、電力消耗、資料要求等)而自由地選擇任一種無線電存取技術(例如,LTE或Wi-Fi)。 During the WoLTEN operation, many of the IEEE 802.11n associated lower layers (referred to as physical (PHY) layers and medium access control (MAC) layers) remain substantially the same as existing IEEE 802.11n implementations. In some embodiments, a link layer control (LLC) layer is not included; in other variations, an LLC layer can be included. However, various embodiments of the present invention enable higher LTE specific functionality than the MAC layer. Specifically, the user equipment appears to be higher than one of the MAC layers, a logical LTE User Equipment (UE); similarly, the Wi-Fi AP appears to be higher than one of the MAC layers, a logical LTE evolved Node B (eNB). Dependency on functionality of lower layer entities by removing functionality from higher layers of LTE The Wi-Fi offload algorithm can freely choose any of the radio access technologies (eg, LTE or Wi-Fi) based on related considerations (eg, connectivity, power consumption, data requirements, etc.).

舉例而言,如後文更詳細闡述,第2圖之WoLTEN網路致能在LTE通用用戶辨識模組(USIM)中之認證(例如,基於可擴展認證協定認證密鑰協議(EAP-AKA))且如此,Wi-Fi網路可在一「開放式系統認證」模式下操作(亦即,Wi-Fi存取不需要用於存取整合式網路之憑證)。由於一單一USIM用於LTE網路及Wi-Fi網路二者,因此Wi-Fi卸載選擇演算法可駐留在UE(基於UE)206中或駐留在網路(例如,MME 214)中或二者,且可基於若干個考量,例如,每一無線電存取單元上之負載及/或無線電條件、所提供服務之服務品質(QoS)等。在一個此實例中,一基於UE之演算法可更喜歡使用Wi-Fi存取,且若Wi-Fi存取不可用,則UE又回到LTE存取。 For example, as explained in more detail below, the WoLTEN network of Figure 2 enables authentication in the LTE Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) (eg, based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol Authentication Key Protocol (EAP-AKA)). And so, the Wi-Fi network can operate in an "open system authentication" mode (ie, Wi-Fi access does not require credentials for accessing the integrated network). Since a single USIM is used for both the LTE network and the Wi-Fi network, the Wi-Fi offload selection algorithm may reside in the UE (based on the UE) 206 or reside in the network (eg, MME 214) or And may be based on several considerations, such as load and/or radio conditions on each radio access unit, quality of service (QoS) of the services provided, and the like. In one such example, a UE-based algorithm may prefer to use Wi-Fi access, and if Wi-Fi access is not available, the UE returns to LTE access.

此外,由於Wi-Fi AP 204被WoLTEN網路實體視為一eNB實體,因此策略及計費規則功能(PCRF)216可將相同策略及計費規則用於eNB承載及適當致能之Wi-Fi AP。在某些實施例中,一經營者可更喜歡針對二個存取單元(LTE eNB及Wi-Fi AP)具有不同策略及計費規則。 In addition, since the Wi-Fi AP 204 is treated as an eNB entity by the WoLTEN network entity, the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) 216 can apply the same policy and charging rules to the eNB to carry and properly enable Wi-Fi. AP. In some embodiments, an operator may prefer to have different policies and charging rules for two access units (LTE eNB and Wi-Fi AP).

實例性無線台-Example wireless station -

如後文更詳細闡述(參見,例如,以下實例性用戶裝置),本發明之各種實施例可與位於用戶UE(UE-S)裝置中之中間軟體相結合地使用。在某些實施例中,中間軟體可係下載的(例如,由使用者);或者,中間軟體可係為在裝置製造期間預載入的。在一些其他實施例中,本發明之各種實施例可與包含專門化硬體以支援適當功能性之用戶裝置相結合地使用。 As explained in more detail below (see, for example, the following example user devices), various embodiments of the present invention can be utilized in conjunction with intermediate software located in a User UE (UE-S) device. In some embodiments, the intermediate software may be downloaded (eg, by a user); or, the intermediate software may be preloaded during device manufacture. In some other embodiments, various embodiments of the invention may be utilized in conjunction with user devices that include specialized hardware to support appropriate functionality.

現在,參照第3圖,呈現用以提供混合存取一核心網路之一個實例性無線台300。 Referring now to Figure 3, an exemplary wireless station 300 for providing hybrid access to a core network is presented.

在一個實施例中,無線台300係為一獨立裝置,然而,相關技術之通常知識者將認識到,所闡述功能性可併入於以下各項之各種各樣裝置中:一基地台(例如,一長期演進(LTE)演進式節點B(eNB)等)、一可攜式電腦、桌上型電腦等,但不限於此。 In one embodiment, the wireless station 300 is a stand-alone device, however, those of ordinary skill in the relevant art will recognize that the functionality described can be incorporated in a variety of devices: a base station (eg, , a long-term evolution (LTE) evolved Node B (eNB), etc., a portable computer, a desktop computer, etc., but is not limited thereto.

實例性裝置300包含一或多個基板302,該一或多個基板302更包含複數個積體電路,該等積體電路包含:一處理子系統304,例如,一數位訊號處理器(DSP)、微處理器、可程式化邏輯裝置(PLD)、閘陣列或複數個處理組件;以及一電力管理子系統306,提供電力至裝置300;一記憶體子系統308;及一第一無線電數據機子系統310;以及一乙太網交換機312及相關聯乙太網埠。在某些實施例中,亦可存在使用者輸入/輸出(IO)314。 The exemplary device 300 includes one or more substrates 302. The one or more substrates 302 further include a plurality of integrated circuits including: a processing subsystem 304, for example, a digital signal processor (DSP) , a microprocessor, a programmable logic device (PLD), a gate array or a plurality of processing components; and a power management subsystem 306 providing power to the device 300; a memory subsystem 308; and a first radio data machine Subsystem 310; and an Ethernet switch 312 and associated Ethernet network. In some embodiments, there may also be user input/output (IO) 314.

在某些情形中,處理子系統304亦可包含一內部快取記憶體。處理子系統304係連線至包含非暫時性電腦可讀取記憶體之一記憶體子系統308,舉例而言,該非暫時性電腦可讀取記憶體可包含SRAM、快閃及SDRAM組件。記憶體子系統可實施一或多個DMA型硬體以便促進資料存取,如此項技術中眾所周知。在正常操作期間,處理系統用以讀取儲存在記憶體內之一或多個指令,且基於所讀取指令來執行一或多個動作。 In some cases, processing subsystem 304 may also include an internal cache memory. Processing subsystem 304 is coupled to a memory subsystem 308 that includes non-transitory computer readable memory. For example, the non-transitory computer readable memory can include SRAM, flash, and SDRAM components. The memory subsystem can implement one or more DMA type hardware to facilitate data access, as is well known in the art. During normal operation, the processing system is configured to read one or more instructions stored in the memory and perform one or more actions based on the read instructions.

處理系統304具有充足處理能力來同時支援第一無線電子系統310及核心網路連線性。在一個實例性實施方案中,無線台300用以提供在處理子系統304上運行之超出現有無線台功能性(亦即,舊有Wi-Fi操作)之額外功能性(亦即,經修改以支援較高層LTE協定堆疊及控制軟體之Wi-Fi 協定堆疊)。在一個實例性實施例中,處理器子系統304用以執行用於操作及控制無線台之軟體。一個此商用實例係為Broadcom BCM4705處理器晶片(其包含一處理器核心及若干個IO、例如,GPIO、RS232 UART、PCI、GMII、RGMII、以及DDR SDRAM控制器)。 Processing system 304 has sufficient processing power to simultaneously support first radio subsystem 310 and core network connectivity. In an exemplary embodiment, the wireless station 300 is configured to provide additional functionality that operates over the processing subsystem 304 beyond existing wireless station functionality (ie, legacy Wi-Fi operations) (ie, modified to Wi-Fi supporting higher layer LTE protocol stacking and control software Agreement stack). In an exemplary embodiment, processor subsystem 304 is operative to execute software for operating and controlling a wireless station. One such commercial example is the Broadcom BCM4705 processor chip (which includes a processor core and a number of IOs, such as GPIO, RS232 UART, PCI, GMII, RGMII, and DDR SDRAM controllers).

所例示電力管理子系統(PMS)306提供電力至無線台300,且可包含一積體電路及/或複數個離散電組件。電力管理子系統306之常見實例包含:一可充電電池電源及/或一外部電源,例如,來自一壁式插座、電感式充電器等,但不限於此。 The illustrated power management subsystem (PMS) 306 provides power to the wireless station 300 and may include an integrated circuit and/or a plurality of discrete electrical components. Common examples of power management subsystem 306 include: a rechargeable battery power source and/or an external power source, for example, from a wall outlet, an inductive charger, etc., but are not limited thereto.

使用者IO 314包含任何數目個已知IO,包含:LED燈、揚聲器等,但不限於此。舉例而言,在一個此情形中,可使用一組LED來指示連線狀態(例如,「綠色」指示一線上狀態,「紅色」指示一失靈或連線性問題等)。在更複雜實施例中,IO可併入有一小鍵盤、觸控螢幕(例如,多點觸控介面)、LCD顯示器、背光、揚聲器及/或麥克風或其他IO,例如,USB、GPIO、RS232 UART、PCI、GMII、RGMII。 User IO 314 includes any number of known IOs, including: LED lights, speakers, etc., but is not limited thereto. For example, in one such case, a set of LEDs can be used to indicate the status of the connection (eg, "green" indicates a state on the line, "red" indicates a failure or a linear problem, etc.). In more complex embodiments, the IO can incorporate a keypad, touch screen (eg, multi-touch interface), LCD display, backlight, speaker and/or microphone or other IO, such as USB, GPIO, RS232 UART , PCI, GMII, RGMII.

第一無線電子系統310用以產生接受一或多個用戶裝置之一無線網路。在一個實例性實施例中,所產生之無線網路係為一「開放式」網路,亦即,所產生之無線網路不需要任何存取控制措施(例如,認證、授權或帳務等)。儘管本文中闡述了開放式網路操作,但應瞭解,存取控制方案未必係開放式的;使用有限存取及封閉式存取可獲得同等成功。實際上,可經由連線至核心網路之乙太網交換機312及相關聯乙太網埠來輸入及設定用於無線無線電子系統310之憑證(如後文將更詳細闡述)。在某些情形中,開放式網路可併入有所謂「特設」網路、網狀網路等。 The first radio subsystem 310 is configured to generate a wireless network that accepts one or more user devices. In an exemplary embodiment, the generated wireless network is an "open" network, ie, the generated wireless network does not require any access control measures (eg, authentication, authorization, or accounting, etc.) ). Although open network operations are described in this article, it should be understood that access control schemes are not necessarily open; the use of limited access and closed access is equally successful. In effect, the credentials for the wireless radio subsystem 310 can be entered and set via the Ethernet switch 312 and associated Ethernet network connected to the core network (as will be explained in more detail below). In some cases, open networks may incorporate so-called "ad hoc" networks, mesh networks, and the like.

第一無線電子系統310用以產生一無線網路。在一個實例性 實施例中,第一無線電子系統310產生一Wi-Fi網路(基於IEEE,例如,802.11n等)。適合無線技術之其他實例包含藍芽、WiMAX等,但不限於此。 The first radio subsystem 310 is configured to generate a wireless network. In an example In an embodiment, the first radio subsystem 310 generates a Wi-Fi network (based on IEEE, eg, 802.11n, etc.). Other examples suitable for wireless technology include, but are not limited to, Bluetooth, WiMAX, and the like.

如第3圖中所示,存在數個(2或更多個)天線以支援第一網路之多輸入多輸出(MIMO)操作。儘管未明確顯示,但應瞭解,每一RF前端包含裝置之無線電子系統可需要之(例如)濾波器、雙工器、RF交換機、RF信號功率位準監視、LNA(低雜訊放大器)及PA(功率放大器)。在一個實例性實施例中,第一無線電子系統310包含組態及操作一IEEE 802.11n數據機需要之功能性,包含收發器部分、PHY(實體層)及MAC(媒體存取控制器)單元、以及相關聯控制及操作軟體。此一RF前端之一個商用實例係為Broadcom IEEE 802.11n單晶片產品、BCM4322或BCM4323。 As shown in Figure 3, there are several (2 or more) antennas to support multiple input multiple output (MIMO) operation of the first network. Although not explicitly shown, it should be understood that each RF front end includes a device such as a filter, duplexer, RF switch, RF signal power level monitoring, LNA (Low Noise Amplifier) and PA (power amplifier). In an exemplary embodiment, the first radio subsystem 310 includes the functionality required to configure and operate an IEEE 802.11n modem, including a transceiver portion, a PHY (physical layer), and a MAC (Media Access Controller) unit. And associated control and operating software. A commercial example of this RF front end is the Broadcom IEEE 802.11n single-chip product, BCM4322 or BCM4323.

乙太網交換機312及相關聯乙太網埠用以提供存取核心網路(例如,EPC 202)及潛在其他網路實體(例如,eNBs、HeNBs等)。存取之其他常見形式包含:舉例而言,數位用戶線(DSL)、T1、整合式服務數位網路(ISDN)、衛星鏈結、纜線資料服務介面規格(DOCSIS)纜線數據機等。一乙太網交換機312之一個商用實例係為提供高達五(5)個乙太網埠之Broadcom BCM53115晶片。在一個實例性實施例中,無線台用以經由乙太網交換機312直接連線至一網路經營者之核心網路以致能上述WoLTEN操作。 The Ethernet switch 312 and associated Ethernet network are used to provide access to the core network (e.g., EPC 202) and potentially other network entities (e.g., eNBs, HeNBs, etc.). Other common forms of access include, for example, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), T1, Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), Satellite Link, Cable Data Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) cable modem, and the like. A commercial example of an Ethernet switch 312 is a Broadcom BCM53115 chip that provides up to five (5) Ethernet ports. In an exemplary embodiment, the wireless station is configured to directly connect to the core network of a network operator via the Ethernet switch 312 to enable the aforementioned WoLTEN operation.

實例性用戶裝置-Example user device -

現在參照第4圖,一個實例性用戶裝置400用以經由一混合存取方案(經由第3圖之無線台300)來存取一核心網路。在一個實施例中,用戶裝置400係為一專用裝置,然而,相關技術之通常知識者將認識到,所闡述之功能性可併入在以下各項之各種各樣裝置中:一智慧電話、可攜式 電腦、且甚至僅具有一個無線電數據機用於Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11n通訊之獨立裝置等,但不限於此。 Referring now to Figure 4, an exemplary user device 400 is used to access a core network via a hybrid access scheme (via wireless station 300 of Figure 3). In one embodiment, user device 400 is a dedicated device, however, those of ordinary skill in the relevant art will recognize that the functionality described can be incorporated into a wide variety of devices: a smart phone, Portable A computer, and even a single device having only one radio modem for Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11n communication, etc., but is not limited thereto.

實例性裝置400包含一或多個基板402,該一或多個基板402更包含複數個積體電路,該等積體電路包含:一處理子系統404,例如,一數位訊號處理器(DSP)、微處理器、可程式化邏輯裝置(PLD)、閘陣列或複數個處理組件;以及一電力管理子系統406,提供電力至裝置400;一記憶體子系統408;及一或多個無線電數據機子系統。如所示,實例性裝置包含四(4)個無線電數據機子系統:一LTE蜂巢式空中介面410A、一Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11n空中介面410B、GPS空中介面410C及一藍芽空中介面410D。在某些實施例中,亦可存在使用者輸入/輸出(IO)412。如所示,實例性使用者輸入/輸出(IO)412包含:一螢幕顯示器412A、一小鍵盤412B、一麥克風及揚聲器412C、一音訊編解碼器412D及一相機412E。其他周邊裝置可包含外部媒體介面(例如,SD/MMC卡介面等)及/或感測器等。 The exemplary device 400 includes one or more substrates 402, and the one or more substrates 402 further include a plurality of integrated circuits including: a processing subsystem 404, for example, a digital signal processor (DSP) , a microprocessor, a programmable logic device (PLD), a gate array or a plurality of processing components; and a power management subsystem 406 providing power to the device 400; a memory subsystem 408; and one or more radio data Machine subsystem. As shown, the example apparatus includes four (4) radio modem subsystems: a LTE cellular air plane 410A, a Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11n null plane 410B, a GPS air plane 410C, and a Bluetooth air plane 410D. In some embodiments, there may also be user input/output (IO) 412. As shown, the example user input/output (IO) 412 includes a screen display 412A, a keypad 412B, a microphone and speaker 412C, an audio codec 412D, and a camera 412E. Other peripheral devices may include external media interfaces (eg, SD/MMC card interface, etc.) and/or sensors, and the like.

在某些情形中,處理子系統404亦可包含一內部快取記憶體。處理子系統404連線至包含非暫時性電腦可讀取記憶體之一記憶體子系統408,舉例而言,非暫時性電腦可讀取記憶體可包含SRAM、快閃及SDRAM組件。記憶體子系統可實施一或多個DMA型硬體以便促進資料存取,如此項技術中眾所周知。在正常操作期間,處理系統用以讀取儲存在記憶體內之一或多個指令,且基於所讀取指令來執行一或多個動作。 In some cases, processing subsystem 404 can also include an internal cache memory. Processing subsystem 404 is coupled to a memory subsystem 408 that includes non-transitory computer readable memory. For example, non-transitory computer readable memory can include SRAM, flash, and SDRAM components. The memory subsystem can implement one or more DMA type hardware to facilitate data access, as is well known in the art. During normal operation, the processing system is configured to read one or more instructions stored in the memory and perform one or more actions based on the read instructions.

正如無線台300之處理子系統304(參見第3圖),第4圖之處理子系統404(亦稱為「應用程式」處理器」)具有充足處理能力且可存取記憶體組件以至少同時支援Wi-Fi無線電子系統410B及核心網路連線性。處理子系統404之一個商用實例係為Freescale iMX53 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8 處理器或QUALCOMM Snapdragon 800。 As with the processing subsystem 304 of the wireless station 300 (see FIG. 3), the processing subsystem 404 (also referred to as the "application" processor) of FIG. 4 has sufficient processing power and can access memory components to at least simultaneously Support Wi-Fi radio subsystem 410B and core network connectivity. One commercial example of processing subsystem 404 is the Freescale iMX53 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8 Processor or QUALCOMM Snapdragon 800.

所例示電力管理子系統(PMS)406提供電力至用戶裝置400,且可包含一積體電路及/或複數個離散電組件。電力管理子系統406之常見實例包含:一可充電電池電源及/或一外部電源,例如,來自一壁式插座、電感充電器等,但不限於此。 The illustrated power management subsystem (PMS) 406 provides power to the user device 400 and may include an integrated circuit and/or a plurality of discrete electrical components. Common examples of power management subsystem 406 include: a rechargeable battery power source and/or an external power source, for example, from a wall outlet, an inductive charger, etc., but are not limited thereto.

使用者IO 412可包含消費電子裝置共用之任何數目個已知IO,包含:一小鍵盤、觸控螢幕(例如,多點觸控介面)、LCD顯示器、背光、揚聲器及/或麥克風或USB及其他介面,但不限於此。 The user IO 412 can include any number of known IOs shared by the consumer electronic device, including: a keypad, a touch screen (eg, a multi-touch interface), an LCD display, a backlight, a speaker, and/or a microphone or USB and Other interfaces, but not limited to this.

相關技術之通常知識者將瞭解,用戶裝置可具有多個其他組件(例如,多個額外無線電子系統、圖形處理器等),前述幾項僅為例示性的。 Those of ordinary skill in the relevant art will appreciate that a user device can have multiple other components (e.g., multiple additional radio subsystems, graphics processors, etc.), the foregoing being merely illustrative.

蜂巢式無線電子系統410A用以連接由一網路經營者提供之一蜂巢式網路。在一個實施例中,蜂巢式無線電子系統410A係為一第四代(4G)長期演進(LTE)數據機。儘管未明確顯示,但應瞭解,每一RF前端包含裝置之無線電子系統可需要之(例如)濾波器、雙工器、RF交換機、RF信號功率位準監視、LNA及PA。用戶裝置400係與向網路經營者驗證用戶裝置之一辨識模組相關聯。一般而言,辨識模組安全地將用戶裝置(或與裝置相關聯之用戶帳戶)辨識為認證的且經授權以進行存取。辨識模組之常見實例包含用戶辨識模組(SIM)、通用SIM(USIM)、可移除辨識模組(RUIM)、分碼多重存取(CDMA)SIM(CSIM)等,但不限於此。在某些情形中,辨識模組可係為可移除的(例如,一SIM卡)或另外,可係為裝置之一整體部分(例如,其中程式化有辨識模組之一嵌入式元件)。一蜂巢式無線電子系統410A之一個商用實例係為QUALCOMM Gobi MDM9600 以及其相關聯RF及周邊晶片。 The cellular radio subsystem 410A is used to connect to a cellular network provided by a network operator. In one embodiment, the cellular radio subsystem 410A is a fourth generation (4G) Long Term Evolution (LTE) modem. Although not explicitly shown, it should be understood that each RF front end may include, for example, filters, duplexers, RF switches, RF signal power level monitoring, LNAs, and PAs for the radio subsystem of the device. The user device 400 is associated with an identification module that authenticates the user device to the network operator. In general, the identification module securely identifies the user device (or user account associated with the device) as authenticated and authorized for access. Common examples of the identification module include a User Identification Module (SIM), a Universal SIM (USIM), a Removable Identification Module (RUIM), a Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) SIM (CSIM), and the like, but are not limited thereto. In some cases, the identification module can be removable (eg, a SIM card) or, in addition, can be an integral part of the device (eg, where one of the embedded components of the identification module is programmed) . A commercial example of a cellular radio subsystem 410A is the QUALCOMM Gobi MDM9600 And its associated RF and peripheral wafers.

Wi-Fi無線電子系統410B用以連接例如由第3圖之無線台300產生之一無線網路。在一個實施例中,無線網路無線電子系統410B係為一符合IEEE 802.11n標準之數據機。儘管未明確顯示,但應瞭解,每一RF前端包含裝置之無線電子系統可需要之(例如)濾波器、雙工器、RF交換機、RF信號功率位準監視、LNA及PA。在一個實例性實施例中,Wi-Fi無線電子系統410B用以執行用於操作及控制IEEE 802.11n PHY(實體層)及MAC(媒體存取控制器)單元之軟體,以及相關聯控制及操作軟體。一Wi-Fi無線電子系統410B之一個商用實例係為Atheros單晶片IEEE 802.11n產品,AR9285。 The Wi-Fi radio subsystem 410B is used to connect, for example, one of the wireless networks generated by the wireless station 300 of FIG. In one embodiment, the wireless network radio subsystem 410B is a data machine compliant with the IEEE 802.11n standard. Although not explicitly shown, it should be understood that each RF front end may include, for example, filters, duplexers, RF switches, RF signal power level monitoring, LNAs, and PAs for the radio subsystem of the device. In an exemplary embodiment, Wi-Fi radio subsystem 410B is configured to execute software for operating and controlling IEEE 802.11n PHY (physical layer) and MAC (media access controller) units, and associated control and operation software. One commercial example of a Wi-Fi radio subsystem 410B is the Atheros single-chip IEEE 802.11n product, AR9285.

在一個實例性實施方案中,用戶裝置400更用以提供在處理子系統404上運行之額外功能性(亦即,經修改以支援較高層LTE協定堆疊及控制軟體之Wi-Fi協定堆疊)。 In an exemplary embodiment, user device 400 is further configured to provide additional functionality running on processing subsystem 404 (i.e., a Wi-Fi protocol stack modified to support higher layer LTE protocol stacking and control software).

實例性「Wi-Fi管」-Example "Wi-Fi Tube" -

第5圖例示表示與本發明之各種態樣相結合地使用之一IEEE 802.11n PHY(L1)及MAC(L2)協定堆疊500之一邏輯方塊圖。如所示,應用程式軟體508直接在MAC層506以上操作。應瞭解,基於設計考量,其他變型可併入其他軟體層(例如,一邏輯鏈結控制(LLC)及/或IP層)。例示性PHY可以U-NII頻帶502或ISM頻帶504操作,或同時以二者操作。 Figure 5 illustrates a logical block diagram showing one of the IEEE 802.11n PHY (L1) and MAC (L2) protocol stacks 500 used in conjunction with various aspects of the present invention. As shown, the application software 508 operates directly above the MAC layer 506. It should be appreciated that other variations may be incorporated into other software layers (eg, a logical link control (LLC) and/or IP layer) based on design considerations. The exemplary PHY can operate in U-NII band 502 or ISM band 504, or both.

MAC層506可設定成以「競爭」模式或「非競爭」模式操作。在非競爭操作中,MAC使用一點協調功能(PCF);在競爭模式操作期間,MAC使用一散佈式協調功能(DCF)。其他Wi-Fi MAC功能包含註冊、交遞、電力管理、安全性及服務品質(QoS)。在本文中未另外闡明之情形下,現 有Wi-Fi組件及功能性應在相關技術內加以理解且不再進一步論述。 The MAC layer 506 can be set to operate in a "competitive" mode or a "non-competitive" mode. In non-competitive operations, the MAC uses a little coordination function (PCF); during contention mode operation, the MAC uses a distributed coordination function (DCF). Other Wi-Fi MAC features include registration, handover, power management, security, and quality of service (QoS). In the case that is not otherwise stated in this article, Having Wi-Fi components and functionality should be understood within the relevant art and will not be discussed further.

現在參照第6圖,假定實例性無線台300(例如,如第3圖中所闡述及上文所論述)及實例性用戶裝置400(例如,如第4圖中所闡述及上文所論述)。一旦實例性用戶裝置400進入實例性網路獨立無線台300涵蓋區域且在開放式網路內註冊,則用戶裝置400與無線台300間之端對端MAC連線形成一「透明」連線管(或存取隧道),此後此稱為一「Wi-Fi管」602。在某些實施例中,Wi-Fi管隧道自身係為不安全的(例如,其中熱點表現為一「開放式」Wi-Fi網路),且根據針對蜂巢式(LTE)網路端對端或/及在應用程式層處等使用之現有加密方案(例如,在傳統不可信賴網路上使用之彼等加密方案)來保護基本資料酬載。在其他實施例中,Wi-Fi管係經由一封閉式網路來實施且併入本機加密等(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)。 Referring now to Figure 6, assume an exemplary wireless station 300 (e.g., as set forth in Figure 3 and discussed above) and an exemplary user device 400 (e.g., as set forth in Figure 4 and discussed above) . Once the example user device 400 enters the exemplary network independent wireless station 300 coverage area and is registered within the open network, the end-to-end MAC connection between the user device 400 and the wireless station 300 forms a "transparent" connection. (or access tunnel), hereafter referred to as a "Wi-Fi pipe" 602. In some embodiments, the Wi-Fi pipe tunnel itself is unsecure (eg, where the hotspot behaves as an "open" Wi-Fi network) and is based on end-to-end for a cellular (LTE) network Or/and existing encryption schemes used at the application layer (eg, their encryption schemes used on traditional untrusted networks) to protect basic data payloads. In other embodiments, the Wi-Fi system is implemented via a closed network and incorporates native encryption or the like (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2, etc.).

Wi-Fi管致能運行一第一應用程式604及一第二應用程式606(分別)之二個邏輯端點以直接進行通訊,而無需任何介入轉譯(亦即,不修改資料傳送)。邏輯端點不知曉發生在其相應Wi-Fi介面中的基本實體及資料鏈結交易。在一個實例性實施例中,第一應用程式604係耦合至用戶裝置之軟體堆疊,且第二應用程式606係耦合至無線台之軟體堆疊(未顯示)。換言之,Wi-Fi管致能用戶裝置之堆疊(用戶裝置700上之SIM/USIM卡)以直接連線至無線台之堆疊(在無線台300上)。 The Wi-Fi tube enables two logical endpoints of a first application 604 and a second application 606 (respectively) to communicate directly without any interventional translation (ie, without modifying the data transfer). Logical endpoints are unaware of the underlying entity and data link transactions that occur in their respective Wi-Fi interfaces. In an exemplary embodiment, the first application 604 is coupled to a software stack of user devices and the second application 606 is coupled to a software stack (not shown) of the wireless station. In other words, the Wi-Fi pipe enables the stack of user devices (SIM/USIM cards on the user device 700) to be directly wired to the stack of wireless stations (on the wireless station 300).

如先前所述(例如,如第2圖中所闡述及上文所論述),無線台直接連線至演進式封包核心(EPC)(經由例如安全閘道器208)。在一個實例性實施例中,無線台用以使用所有或某些現有eNB LTE軟體結構及實體(例如,邏輯頻道、協定及軟體堆疊、RRM等)來與LTE EPC及UE進行通 As previously described (e.g., as set forth in FIG. 2 and discussed above), the wireless station is directly connected to an evolved packet core (EPC) (via, for example, security gateway 208). In an exemplary embodiment, the wireless station is configured to communicate with the LTE EPC and the UE using all or some of the existing eNB LTE software structures and entities (eg, logical channels, protocols and software stacks, RRM, etc.)

訊及/或與LTE EPC及UE進行交互。舉例而言,第7圖例示先前技術LTE無線電架構之數個邏輯頻道、輸送頻道及實體頻道,連同相應協定堆疊層。第8圖例示在使用者設備(UE)、演進式節點B(eNB)、伺服閘道器(SGW)及PDN閘道器(PGW)間操作之先前技術LTE無線電使用者平面協定堆疊。第9圖繪示用於在UE、eNB及行動性管理實體(MME)間之先前技術LTE控制平面協定堆疊。再一些其他實體及/或邏輯實體(例如,一無線電資源管理器(RRM)等)可用於eNB操作,在給出本發明之內容之情形下,包含或不包含此些實體皆在相關技術之通常知識者之技能內。 And/or interact with LTE EPCs and UEs. For example, Figure 7 illustrates several logical channels, transport channels, and physical channels of a prior art LTE radio architecture, along with corresponding protocol stack layers. Figure 8 illustrates a prior art LTE radio user plane protocol stack operating between a User Equipment (UE), an Evolved Node B (eNB), a Servo Gateway (SGW), and a PDN Gateway (PGW). Figure 9 illustrates a prior art LTE control plane protocol stack for use between a UE, an eNB, and an Mobility Management Entity (MME). Still other entities and/or logical entities (e.g., a Radio Resource Manager (RRM), etc.) may be used for eNB operations, and where the content of the present invention is presented, including or not including such entities are in the related art. Usually within the skill of the knowledger.

無線台在網路側上與例如SGW及MME進行通訊係為相對簡單的。舉例而言,在操作期間,無線台300組態其乙太網介面作為邏輯eNB來執行一通訊協定,藉此無縫地與現有LTE網路架構進行整合。具體而言,在使用者平面上,無線台300作為一eNB顯現給EPC且使用在eNB與SGW間使用之協定(例如,通用封包無線電服務(GPRS)穿隧協定(GTPU))與SGW進行通訊;通訊係經由使用者資料報協定(UDP)網際網路協定(IP)來執行(經由無線台300之乙太網介面312)。在控制平面側上,無線台300使用在eNB與MME間使用之協定(例如,串流控制傳輸協定(SCTP)S1-AP)來與MME進行通訊;通訊係經由IP來執行。儘管前述實例係關於無線台之乙太網介面而呈現,但在給出本發明之內容之情形下,相關技術之通常知識者應瞭解,可經由其他介面(例如,經由用於無線台與EPC間之骨幹網路的任何MAC(L2)及實體(L1)層)來執行使用者平面通訊及控制平面通訊。 It is relatively simple for the wireless station to communicate with, for example, the SGW and the MME on the network side. For example, during operation, the wireless station 300 configures its Ethernet interface as a logical eNB to perform a communication protocol, thereby seamlessly integrating with existing LTE network architectures. Specifically, on the user plane, the wireless station 300 appears to the EPC as an eNB and communicates with the SGW using an agreement between the eNB and the SGW (eg, the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol (GTPU)). The communication is performed via the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Internet Protocol (IP) (via the Ethernet interface 312 of the wireless station 300). On the control plane side, the wireless station 300 communicates with the MME using a protocol used between the eNB and the MME (eg, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) S1-AP); the communication is performed via IP. Although the foregoing examples are presented with respect to the Ethernet interface of the wireless station, given the content of the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the relevant art will appreciate that other interfaces may be utilized (eg, via for wireless stations and EPCs). Any MAC (L2) and entity (L1) layers of the backbone network to perform user plane communication and control plane communication.

實例性用戶裝置與實例性無線台間之介面(例如,類似於eNB-UE介面,經由Wi-Fi空中介面)需要修改以處理由Wi-Fi數據機操作引 入之差異。舉例而言,第10圖例示根據本文中所闡述之原理在使用者設備(UE)與演進式節點B(eNB)間操作之LTE無線電使用者平面協定堆疊之一個實例性實施例以及支援實例性用戶裝置及實例性無線台之修改。第11圖例示根據本文中所闡述之原理在使用者設備(UE)與演進式節點B(eNB)間操作之LTE無線電控制平面協定堆疊之一個實例性實施例以及支援實例性用戶裝置及實例性無線台之修改。 The interface between the example user device and the example wireless station (eg, similar to the eNB-UE interface, via Wi-Fi null mediation) needs to be modified to handle the operation by the Wi-Fi modem The difference between the two. For example, FIG. 10 illustrates an example embodiment of an LTE radio user plane protocol stack operating between a User Equipment (UE) and an Evolved Node B (eNB) in accordance with the principles set forth herein and supporting example Modification of user devices and example wireless stations. 11 illustrates an example embodiment of an LTE radio control plane protocol stack operating between a User Equipment (UE) and an Evolved Node B (eNB) in accordance with the principles set forth herein, and supporting example user equipment and examples. Modification of the wireless station.

如所示,在第10圖及第11圖二者中,實例性混合Wi-Fi管協定堆疊在無線電鏈結控制(RLC)層之下操作,且其已用對應緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX總成(1002、1004)、Wi-Fi管1006、以及虛擬化PHY 1008、使用者設備(UE)MAC 1010及存取點(AP)MAC 1012替換LTE MAC及L1層。 As shown, in both Figure 10 and Figure 11, an example hybrid Wi-Fi pipe protocol stack operates under the Radio Link Control (RLC) layer, and it has used the corresponding buffer and MUX/DeMUX total The (LTE2, 1004), Wi-Fi pipe 1006, and virtualized PHY 1008, User Equipment (UE) MAC 1010, and Access Point (AP) MAC 1012 replace the LTE MAC and L1 layers.

在一個實施方案中,Wi-Fi管在二側上(例如,在用戶裝置400及無線台300處)耦合至先進先出(FIFO)資料緩衝器以處理抵達時間問題(例如,跳動),這原本可能導致Wi-Fi管或LTE操作之排程問題。在多使用者實施例中,該台可併入對應於每一使用者之多個緩衝器、被分割成用於每一使用者之多個分割區之一單個緩衝器,等。 In one embodiment, the Wi-Fi tube is coupled to a first in first out (FIFO) data buffer on both sides (eg, at user device 400 and wireless station 300) to handle arrival time issues (eg, jitter), which Scheduling problems that could have caused Wi-Fi pipe or LTE operations. In a multi-user embodiment, the station can incorporate a plurality of buffers corresponding to each user, a single buffer divided into one of a plurality of partitions for each user, and the like.

每一無線電承載存在一個RLC實體;此致能多個無線電承載以隔離無線電承載效能。LTE RLC用以將來往於封包資料收斂協定(PDCP)層之資料封包拆解(及再組裝)成用於Wi-Fi管之易管理大小。LTE RLC更用以確保所有所接收封包係為按次序的,此後才將其傳遞至PDCP層。萬一丟失了一封包,LTE RLC層便可藉由起始自動重複請求(ARQ)程序來恢復丟失之封包。 There is one RLC entity per radio bearer; this enables multiple radio bearers to isolate radio bearer performance. The LTE RLC is used to disassemble (and reassemble) data packets destined for the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer into manageable sizes for Wi-Fi pipes. The LTE RLC is also used to ensure that all received packets are in order, after which they are passed to the PDCP layer. In the event that a packet is lost, the LTE RLC layer can recover the lost packet by initiating an automatic repeat request (ARQ) procedure.

每無線電承載存在一個PDCP實體(此確保隔離之無線電承 載效能)。LTE PDCP實體用以提供密碼編譯(及完整性)保護(在不可信賴連線,例如,Wi-Fi管上)。LTE PDCP更用以提供穩健標頭壓縮(ROHC),此可減少傳輸小封包之額外負擔(進一步改良Wi-Fi管效能)。最後,PDCP實體可在交遞操作期間提供再排序及再傳輸。 There is one PDCP entity per radio bearer (this ensures isolated radio bearers) Load performance). The LTE PDCP entity is used to provide cryptographic compilation (and integrity) protection (on untrusted connections, such as Wi-Fi pipes). LTE PDCP is also used to provide Robust Header Compression (ROHC), which reduces the additional burden of transmitting small packets (further improving Wi-Fi pipe performance). Finally, the PDCP entity can provide reordering and retransmission during the handover operation.

即使Wi-Fi管1006以及對應緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX總成(1002、1004)致能實例性用戶與實例性無線台間之一Wi-Fi無線電鏈結,但較高層(例如,RLC、PDCP、RRM等)係利用現有LTE實施方案來處置,因此虛擬化PHY 1008、UE MAC 1010及AP MAC 1012確保基於LTE之較高層不知曉Wi-Fi無線電鏈結操作。更直接地,在無線台300上對UE MAC 1010進行仿真,UE MAC 1010與一虛擬化PHY 1008(VPHY)進行通訊而在最小中介條件下將所仿真之MAC PDU傳遞至無線台之AP MAC 1012。諸多LTE PHY操作並非必須的,且因此VPHY可有效地「回避」或「偽裝」無關PHY操作以便使UE MAC 1010及AP MAC 1012正確地操作。舉例而言,不再需要與實體層操作相關聯之程序,例如,隨機存取頻道(RACH)、時序提前(TA)等。 Even though the Wi-Fi pipe 1006 and the corresponding buffer and MUX/DeMUX assemblies (1002, 1004) enable one Wi-Fi radio link between the example user and the example wireless station, higher layers (eg, RLC, PDCP) , RRM, etc.) are handled using existing LTE implementations, so virtualized PHY 1008, UE MAC 1010, and AP MAC 1012 ensure that higher layers based on LTE are unaware of Wi-Fi radio link operations. More directly, the UE MAC 1010 is simulated on the wireless station 300, and the UE MAC 1010 communicates with a virtualized PHY 1008 (VPHY) to deliver the simulated MAC PDU to the AP MAC 1012 of the wireless station under minimal intermediation conditions. . Many LTE PHY operations are not necessary, and thus the VPHY can effectively "avoid" or "disguise" irrelevant PHY operations in order for the UE MAC 1010 and AP MAC 1012 to operate properly. For example, programs associated with physical layer operations, such as random access channel (RACH), timing advance (TA), etc., are no longer needed.

在某些情形中,VPHY、UE MAC 1010及AP MAC 1012可進一步被最佳化(因為不存在實際實體傳播頻道)為一「精簡MAC」,其執行Wi-Fi管與較高層之成功互操作所需之最小格式化及轉譯功能性。舉例而言,第12圖繪示LTE MAC(UE側)之一概念架構(eNB側上之LTE MAC具有類似功能性)。MAC控制操作,例如,RACH、TA、頻道之排程及不連續接收/傳輸(DRX/DTX)。此等功能完全在VPHY內處置且可停用或忽略(不執行適當訊號或命令)或「偽裝」(在適當時間產生適當訊號或命令來指示成功,藉此致能處理以繼續)。舉例而言,上行及下行資源授予發信可利用 VPHY邏輯來「偽裝」,VPHY邏輯模擬指示資源已可使用之實體發信。當在VPHY內處置資料封包時(此實質上無錯誤及丟失)可忽略下行混合自動重複請求(HARQ)。類似地,當在UE MAC之前(例如,藉由Wi-Fi管)處置資料封包錯誤及丟失時可停用上行HARQ。當MAC服務資料單元(SDU)(或MAC輸出處之協定資料單元(PDU))可經由VPHY在UE MAC與AP MAC之間直接傳遞時,亦可忽略頻道多工及解多工。亦可最佳化及/或忽略其他MAC相關聯之功能,包含:緩衝器狀態報告、功率餘量報告、下行及上行頻道資源排程、邏輯頻道優先化等,但不限於此。 In some cases, VPHY, UE MAC 1010, and AP MAC 1012 may be further optimized (because there is no actual physical propagation channel) as a "streamlined MAC" that performs successful interoperation between Wi-Fi pipes and higher layers. Minimum formatting and translation functionality required. For example, Figure 12 illustrates a conceptual architecture of the LTE MAC (UE side) (LTE MAC on the eNB side has similar functionality). MAC control operations, such as RACH, TA, channel scheduling, and discontinuous reception/transmission (DRX/DTX). These functions are handled entirely within the VPHY and can be deactivated or ignored (without executing appropriate signals or commands) or "disguised" (appropriate signals or commands are generated at appropriate times to indicate success, thereby enabling processing to continue). For example, uplink and downlink resources are granted for use by sending letters. The VPHY logic "disguises" and the VPHY logic emulates an entity that indicates that the resource is ready for use. Downstream Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request (HARQ) can be ignored when handling data packets within the VPHY (which is essentially error free and lost). Similarly, uplink HARQ may be disabled when data packet errors and loss are handled before the UE MAC (eg, via a Wi-Fi pipe). Channel multiplex and multiplex can also be ignored when a MAC Service Data Unit (SDU) (or a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) at the MAC output) can be directly passed between the UE MAC and the AP MAC via the VPHY. Other MAC related functions may also be optimized and/or ignored, including: buffer status report, power headroom report, downlink and uplink channel resource scheduling, logical channel prioritization, etc., but are not limited thereto.

實例性「精簡MAC」及VPHY(「虛擬」PHY)之先前論述係基於使用例如,計數器、密鑰效能指示符(KPI)及自較低層提供至較高層以確保LTE協定堆疊之正確操作之控制資訊。應瞭解,某些實施例可能不需要「精簡MAC」或VPHY仿真(例如,專屬實施方案、現有實施方案之未來增強、極致最佳化之實施方案、專門化使用情形等。)在此情形中,每一端處之RLC實體可經由Wi-Fi管將其訊框直接傳遞至彼此。 The previous discussion of the example "streamlined MAC" and VPHY ("virtual" PHY) is based on the use of, for example, counters, key performance indicators (KPIs), and from lower layers to higher layers to ensure proper operation of the LTE protocol stack. Control information. It should be appreciated that certain embodiments may not require "streamlined MAC" or VPHY emulation (eg, proprietary implementations, future enhancements to existing implementations, highly optimized implementations, specialized use cases, etc.). The RLC entity at each end can pass its frame directly to each other via a Wi-Fi pipe.

實例性Wi-Fi管之其他考量-Other considerations for an example Wi-Fi tube -

儘管先前論述係以MAC層及L1層處之Wi-Fi管功能性來呈現,但應瞭解,其他實施例可在用戶裝置及/或無線台裝置之任何層處實施類似操作。舉例而言,如第11A圖中所例示,Wi-Fi管係在協定堆疊之一較高軟體層內部實施;亦即,在(傳輸控制協定/網際網路協定)TCP/IP層處操作。 While the previous discussion is presented in terms of Wi-Fi pipe functionality at the MAC layer and the L1 layer, it should be appreciated that other embodiments may perform similar operations at any layer of the user device and/or the wireless station device. For example, as illustrated in FIG. 11A, the Wi-Fi pipe is implemented within one of the higher software layers of the protocol stack; that is, at the (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) TCP/IP layer.

相關技術之通常知識者將易於瞭解,在給出本發明之情形下,分裂協定堆疊之較高軟體層可導致LTE系統之基本安全架構之改變。舉例而言,假定一如下實施例:將Wi-Fi管插入在封包資料收斂協定(PDCP) 層內,使得在無線台204(而非在UE 206處)中支援上行加密及下行解密功能,而在UE 206中支援PDCP層之上行及下行穩健標頭壓縮(RHOC)壓縮及解壓縮功能。在此一配置中,會引入二個問題:1)必須將UE之SIM/USIM資訊提供至無線台204,使得無線台204可「代理」UE 206;及2)必須對經由無線電鏈結之Wi-Fi管傳輸進一步進行加密,此乃因由SIM/USIM提供之LTE加密在無線台204處終止。 It will be readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the relevant art that, given the present invention, the higher software layer of the split protocol stack can result in changes to the basic security architecture of the LTE system. For example, assume an embodiment in which a Wi-Fi pipe is inserted in a Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) In the layer, the uplink encryption and downlink decryption functions are supported in the wireless station 204 (not at the UE 206), and the uplink and downlink robust header compression (RHOC) compression and decompression functions of the PDCP layer are supported in the UE 206. In this configuration, two problems are introduced: 1) the SIM/USIM information of the UE must be provided to the wireless station 204 so that the wireless station 204 can "proxy" the UE 206; and 2) must be connected to the Wi via the radio link The -Fi pipe transmission is further encrypted as the LTE encryption provided by the SIM/USIM terminates at the wireless station 204.

關於「代理」,無線台(例如,在此實例性實施例中,為Wi-Fi AP)204可在其中併入有一或數個選用虛擬(亦即,安全記憶體)或實體嵌入式或可移除SIM/USIM模組。SIM/USIM模組可係為靜態程式化的,或在某些情形中,係為動態可再程式化的。SIM/USIM模組允許無線台204代理一或多個所連線UE 206(可經由Wi-Fi管來為該等UE服務)。舉例而言,一或多個辨識模組(例如,USIM)由無線台204來整合且「被附接至」(亦即,代理)駐留在無線台204處之一或多個UE協定堆疊(包含PHY層),各該UE協議堆疊對應於一或多個所連線UE 206。對於動態可再程式化實施例,可接著將UE之SIM/USIM之內容(包含密鑰)傳送至無線台(Wi-Fi AP)204中SIM/USIM模組其中之一。一旦UE 206 SIM/USIM之內容在無線台(Wi-Fi AP)204中複製,便可由無線台(Wi-Fi AP)204向伺服閘道器(S-GW)模擬UE 206之整個UE協定堆疊。 With respect to "proxy", a wireless station (e.g., a Wi-Fi AP in this exemplary embodiment) 204 may incorporate one or more selected virtual (i.e., secure memory) or physical embedded or Remove the SIM/USIM module. SIM/USIM modules can be statically stylized or, in some cases, dynamically reprogrammable. The SIM/USIM module allows the wireless station 204 to proxy one or more connected UEs 206 (which can be served via Wi-Fi pipes). For example, one or more identification modules (eg, USIMs) are integrated by wireless station 204 and "attached to" (ie, a proxy) reside at one or more UE protocol stacks at wireless station 204 ( Including the PHY layer), each of the UE protocol stacks corresponds to one or more connected UEs 206. For a dynamically reprogrammable embodiment, the content of the SIM/USIM of the UE (including the key) can then be transmitted to one of the SIM/USIM modules in the wireless station (Wi-Fi AP) 204. Once the content of the UE 206 SIM/USIM is replicated in the wireless station (Wi-Fi AP) 204, the entire UE protocol stack of the UE 206 can be simulated by the wireless station (Wi-Fi AP) 204 to the Servo Gateway (S-GW). .

一旦無線台(Wi-Fi AP)204已成功連線至S-GW,UE便可經由連線在無線台(Wi-Fi AP)204 UE協定堆疊之TCP/IP層(或一甚至更高層)處之Wi-Fi管來交易資料。 Once the wireless station (Wi-Fi AP) 204 has successfully connected to the S-GW, the UE can connect to the TCP/IP layer (or even higher layer) of the stack in the wireless station (Wi-Fi AP) 204 UE. Wi-Fi tube to trade data.

相關領域之通常知識者將易於瞭解,應經由一完全鏈結來執行SIM/USIM內容自UE 206至無線台(Wi-Fi AP)204之傳送。在一個此實 施方案中,SIM/USIM內容係使用例如,PGP(良好私密性)協定經由Wi-Fi管安全地傳輸的。PGP係為用於安全傳送資料之一眾所周知公共密鑰加密方案。使用其他加密方案可同樣獲得成功,包含對稱密鑰系統、基於可信賴之系統之鏈等,但不限於此。 One of ordinary skill in the relevant art will readily appreciate that the transfer of SIM/USIM content from UE 206 to a wireless station (Wi-Fi AP) 204 should be performed via a full link. In one of this In the scheme, SIM/USIM content is securely transmitted via a Wi-Fi pipe using, for example, a PGP (Good Privacy) protocol. PGP is a well-known public key encryption scheme for securely transmitting data. The same success can be achieved with other encryption schemes, including, but not limited to, a symmetric key system, a chain based on a trusted system, and the like.

現在參照對實例性Wi-Fi管進行加密之第二問題,由於LTE加密在無線台204處終止,因此UE 206與無線台204間之Wi-Fi管需要額外加密以確保安全交易。在一個實施例中,Wi-Fi管加密可係基於現有LTE加密方案之一擴展;舉例而言,在操作期間,可使用LTE對稱密鑰加密資訊在UE 206及無線台204位置二者處產生密鑰以便經由Wi-Fi管擴展對稱密鑰加密。在一個此實施例中,本機Wi-Fi加密演算法及專用HW加速計(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)支援基於事先商定的方案之密鑰傳送,或係為動態協商之空中下載。以此方式,Wi-Fi加密演算法及專用HW加速計可利用(具有修改)及/或與後續產生及相關聯之LTE密鑰相結合,以便致能空中下載Wi-Fi管安全性。最終,可以SW或HW仿真在UE 206中實施本機LTE非存取層(NAS)安全性及完整性保護,因為NAS訊息之資料速率及體積極低。 Referring now to the second problem of encrypting an example Wi-Fi pipe, since LTE encryption is terminated at the wireless station 204, the Wi-Fi pipe between the UE 206 and the wireless station 204 requires additional encryption to ensure secure transactions. In one embodiment, Wi-Fi pipe encryption may be extended based on one of the existing LTE encryption schemes; for example, during operation, LTE symmetric key encryption information may be used to generate both UE 206 and wireless station 204 locations. Key to extend symmetric key encryption via Wi-Fi pipe. In one such embodiment, the native Wi-Fi encryption algorithm and dedicated HW accelerometer (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2, etc.) are supported based on a pre-agreed protocol. Key delivery, or over-the-air download for dynamic negotiation. In this manner, the Wi-Fi encryption algorithm and the dedicated HW accelerometer can be utilized (with modifications) and/or combined with subsequent generation and associated LTE keys to enable over-the-air Wi-Fi pipe security. Finally, native LTE Non-Access Stratum (NAS) security and integrity protection can be implemented in the UE 206 by SW or HW emulation, since the data rate and body of the NAS message are actively low.

在一個此實施例中,Wi-Fi管加密可係基於相關聯之所導出LTE加密密鑰其中之一或多者,且可使用任何基於安全公共密鑰之協定(例如,前述PGP協定)來傳遞(無一SIM/USIM加密協定)至UE。舉例而言,UE 206將一公共密鑰傳輸至Wi-Fi AP 204,接著由Wi-Fi AP 204用來將適當密鑰(例如,相關聯LTE密鑰其中之一或多者,等)安全地發送至UE 206,此後Wi-Fi管安全性可基於經由Wi-Fi管之本機加密引擎以及可用HW加速器(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)之對稱密 鑰加密。 In one such embodiment, Wi-Fi pipe encryption may be based on one or more of the associated derived LTE encryption keys, and may use any secure public key based protocol (eg, the aforementioned PGP protocol). Pass (without a SIM/USIM encryption protocol) to the UE. For example, UE 206 transmits a public key to Wi-Fi AP 204, which is then used by Wi-Fi AP 204 to secure the appropriate key (eg, one or more of the associated LTE keys, etc.) Is sent to the UE 206, after which the Wi-Fi pipe security can be based on the local encryption engine via the Wi-Fi pipe and the available HW accelerator (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2 Symmetrical Key encryption.

或者,在某些實施例中,UE 206可經由供與本機Wi-Fi管加密引擎搭配使用之一適當軟體使用者介面(UI)應用程式支援一加密密鑰、密碼等之人工輸入。在某些變型中,人工認證亦進一步致能對WoLTEN操作之存取控制。在某些情形中,「人工」輸入之密鑰對應於在Wi-Fi AP 204側上設定(經由一伺服器或儲存於一或多個預設定無線台中,例如,Wi-Fi AP 204)之一預定密鑰。在其他情形中,可使用一公共密鑰加密方案(例如,PGP)根據一頻帶外過程將預定密鑰傳遞至Wi-Fi AP 204。 Alternatively, in some embodiments, the UE 206 can support manual input of an encryption key, password, etc. via a suitable software user interface (UI) application for use with a native Wi-Fi pipe encryption engine. In some variations, manual authentication further enables access control for WoLTEN operations. In some cases, the "manual" input key corresponds to being set on the Wi-Fi AP 204 side (via a server or stored in one or more pre-configured wireless stations, eg, Wi-Fi AP 204). A predetermined key. In other cases, a predetermined key may be passed to the Wi-Fi AP 204 in accordance with an out-of-band process using a public key encryption scheme (e.g., PGP).

相關領域之通常知識者將易於瞭解,由於客戶計帳係基於現有LTE認證授權及帳務(AAA),因此代理之Wi-Fi AP 204 SIM/USIM操作致能網路經營者以辨識在Wi-Fi服務期間(亦即,UE 206之離線用戶使用)交易之資料。離線使用度量可用於例如,直接計帳、辨識缺失服務之蜂巢式涵蓋範圍、辨識使用者習慣及/或使用、確定未實現的收益機會等。 The general knowledge of the relevant art will be easy to understand, since the customer billing is based on the existing LTE certification authority and accounting (AAA), the proxy Wi-Fi AP 204 SIM/USIM operation enables the network operator to identify in Wi- Information on transactions during the Fi service period (ie, offline users of UE 206). Offline usage metrics can be used, for example, to directly bill, identify hive coverage of missing services, identify user habits and/or usage, determine unrealized revenue opportunities, and the like.

先前論述係基於Wi-Fi管資料通量充分大於LTE網路支援涵蓋區域中所有使用者所需之資料通量。儘管先前假設一般而言係真實的,但應瞭解,在LTE網路以快於Wi-Fi介面之一速度操作之情形下,Wi-Fi管可用以向LTE網路指示可用容量,使得LTE網路可對無線電承載做出適當調整(例如,限制對每一UE MAC之資源及頻寬分配)。舉例而言,此些情景可發生在無線台提供蜂巢式網路連線性及同時舊有無線台操作二者;可將二個功能「上限設定」為台站頻寬之某一比例,以確保充分支援二個功能。 Previously, the data throughput based on Wi-Fi pipes was much larger than that required by all users in the LTE network support coverage area. Although the previous assumptions are generally true, it should be understood that in the case where the LTE network operates at one speed faster than the Wi-Fi interface, the Wi-Fi tube can be used to indicate the available capacity to the LTE network, such that the LTE network The path can make appropriate adjustments to the radio bearers (eg, limiting the resource and bandwidth allocation for each UE MAC). For example, such scenarios may occur when the wireless station provides cellular network connectivity and both legacy wireless station operations; the two functions "upper limit" can be set to a certain percentage of the station bandwidth to Make sure you fully support the two features.

實例性「Wi-Fi管」軟體架構-Example "Wi-Fi Tube" Software Architecture -

現在參照第13圖,呈現用戶裝置及無線台之總體協定堆疊架 構(使用者平面及控制平面二者)。雙向輔助控制頻道(1302、1304)以及支援應用程式及代理(1306、1308)統稱為LTE(WoLTEN)協定堆疊Wi-Fi。如所示,WoLTEN APP(應用程式)1306駐留在用戶裝置400中且包含一LTE堆疊,該LTE堆疊支援用於控制平面操作之無線電鏈結控制(RLC)層至非存取層(NAS)1314以及用於使用者平面操作之RLC層至網際網路協定(IP)1316。WoLTEN APP 1306亦包含緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX 1310,以及WoLTEN控制頻道1302以及控制及操作軟體。對應之WoLTEN代理1308駐留在無線台300中且包含LTE UE MAC、VPHY及LTE AP MAC實體,其等處置用於一或多個用戶裝置之對應之控制平面及使用者平面。在一個實施例中,WoLTEN代理亦可包含其他邏輯實體及/或實體(諸如,例如,一無線電資源管理(RRM)等)以處置通常由一LTE eNB提供之額外功能。 Referring now to Figure 13, the overall protocol stacking of the user device and the wireless station is presented. Structure (both user plane and control plane). The two-way auxiliary control channel (1302, 1304) and the supporting applications and agents (1306, 1308) are collectively referred to as LTE (WoLTEN) protocol stack Wi-Fi. As shown, the WoLTEN APP (Application) 1306 resides in the User Equipment 400 and includes an LTE stack that supports Radio Link Control (RLC) Layer to Non-Access Stratum (NAS) 1314 for Control Plane Operation. And the RLC layer to Internet Protocol (IP) 1316 for user plane operations. The WoLTEN APP 1306 also includes a buffer and MUX/DeMUX 1310, as well as a WoLTEN control channel 1302 and control and operating software. The corresponding WoLTEN proxy 1308 resides in the wireless station 300 and includes LTE UE MAC, VPHY, and LTE AP MAC entities that are configured for the corresponding control plane and user plane of one or more user devices. In one embodiment, the WoLTEN proxy may also include other logical entities and/or entities (such as, for example, a Radio Resource Management (RRM), etc.) to handle additional functionality typically provided by an LTE eNB.

WoLTEN APP 1306與WoLTEN代理1308經由WoLTEN控制頻道進行雙向通訊。在一個實施例中,可使用一安全性協定(例如,PGP)開啟WoLTEN控制頻道或對其進行加密以交換密鑰,且將所交換之密鑰與Wi-Fi管之本機加密引擎及可用HW加速計(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)搭配使用以為WoLTEN控制頻道提供安全性。 The WoLTEN APP 1306 and the WoLTEN proxy 1308 perform two-way communication via the WoLTEN control channel. In one embodiment, the WoLTEN control channel can be turned on or encrypted using a security protocol (eg, PGP) to exchange keys, and the exchanged key and the native encryption engine of the Wi-Fi pipe are available. HW accelerometers (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2, etc.) are used in conjunction to provide security for the WoLTEN Control Channel.

在一個實施例中,WoLTEN APP係為一可下載應用程式(例如,購買)及/或在製造期間包含於用戶裝置中。取決於用於固有LTE軟體之第三方支援之軟體實施方案及可存取性之性質,WoLTEN APP可在操作期間全部或部分地替換固有LTE協定堆疊。例如,由於安全性顧慮,WoLTEN APP可具有其自己的相關LTE協定堆疊之複本;在其他實施例中,WoLTEN APP可用於與所支援LTE協定堆疊介接。 In one embodiment, the WoLTEN APP is a downloadable application (eg, purchased) and/or included in the user device during manufacture. Depending on the nature of the software implementation and accessibility for third party support of the native LTE software, the WoLTEN APP may replace the intrinsic LTE protocol stack in whole or in part during operation. For example, due to security concerns, the WoLTEN APP may have its own replica of the associated LTE protocol stack; in other embodiments, the WoLTEN APP may be used to interface with the supported LTE protocol stack.

現在參照緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX 1310,緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX 1310用以將不同發信無線電承載(SRB)、資料無線電承載(DRB)、控制平面、使用者平面之RLC封包與WoLTEN控制頻道封包多工成一單個串流,用於在上行中經由Wi-Fi管遞送。在下行上,緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX 1310用以緩衝傳入資料且將封包解多工成適當之SRB、DRB、控制平面、使用者平面及WoLTEN控制頻道。 Referring now to the buffer and MUX/DeMUX 1310, the buffer and MUX/DeMUX 1310 are used to packetize different transmit radio bearers (SRBs), data radio bearers (DRBs), control planes, user plane RLC packets, and WoLTEN control channels. Multiplexed into a single stream for delivery via the Wi-Fi tube in the uplink. On the downlink, the buffer and MUX/DeMUX 1310 are used to buffer incoming data and to demultiplex the packet into the appropriate SRB, DRB, control plane, user plane and WoLTEN control channel.

類似地,WoLTEN代理之多使用者(MU)緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX 1312用以將不同使用者之MAC封包(其包含SRB及DRB)與來自其對應WoLTEN控制頻道之封包多工成一單個串流,此後才緩衝並將其遞送至Wi-Fi管用於傳輸至用戶。在上行上,MUX/DeMUX 1312用以緩衝及解多工經由Wi-Fi管遞送之封包(來自多個使用者),此後才將其傳遞至對應於用戶之相應LTE MAC及PHY實體。經由WoLTEN代理附接至網路之每一用戶具有一對應WoLTEN協定堆疊之一唯一執行個體。 Similarly, the multi-user (MU) buffer and the MUX/DeMUX 1312 of the WoLTEN proxy are used to multiplex different users' MAC packets (including SRB and DRB) with packets from their corresponding WoLTEN control channels into a single stream. After that, it is buffered and delivered to the Wi-Fi tube for transmission to the user. On the uplink, the MUX/DeMUX 1312 is used to buffer and demultiplex the packets (from multiple users) that are delivered via the Wi-Fi pipe, and then pass them to the corresponding LTE MAC and PHY entities corresponding to the user. Each user attached to the network via the WoLTEN agent has a unique execution individual of one of the corresponding WoLTEN protocol stacks.

方法-method-

WoLTEN APP 1306與WoLTEN代理1308間之實例性Wi-Fi管係為自包含的(self-contained)。在無來自外部實體之輸入之情形下來管理Wi-Fi鏈結。WoLTEN APP與WoLTEN代理經由WoLTEN控制頻道進行雙向通訊,且負責:a)在處於AP 300之涵蓋區域中時進行Wi-Fi管管理,此更可包含:a. 根據無線電鏈結效能來組態Wi-Fi管、監視及維持Wi-Fi管之操作;及b. 獲取及組態與演進式封包核心(EPC)網路之一LTE對話,該 演進式封包核心(EPC)網路用以為Wi-Fi管提供充足通量;b)LTE鏈結管理(以輔助在LTE介面與Wi-Fi介面之間的選擇),此通常包含:a. 系統資訊傳送;b. 尋呼頻道操作;c. 小區(cell)量測及回應小區再選擇及交遞程序;d. 無線電資源控制(RRC);e. 安全性、完整性、存取控制(例如,經由SIM);f. 呼叫控制;c)行動性控制;及d)WoLTEN對話起始;a. 發現、起始及組態WoLTEN對話(例如,針對支援WoLTEN操作及舊有操作二者之熱點)。 An exemplary Wi-Fi pipe between WoLTEN APP 1306 and WoLTEN agent 1308 is self-contained. Manage Wi-Fi links without input from external entities. The WoLTEN APP and the WoLTEN agent perform two-way communication via the WoLTEN control channel, and are responsible for: a) Wi-Fi management while being in the coverage area of the AP 300, which may include: a. Configuring Wi according to radio link performance -Fi management, monitoring and maintaining the operation of Wi-Fi pipes; and b. Acquiring and configuring LTE conversations with one of the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) networks, The evolved packet core (EPC) network is used to provide sufficient throughput for the Wi-Fi pipe; b) LTE link management (to assist in the selection between the LTE interface and the Wi-Fi interface), which typically includes: a. Information transfer; b. paging channel operation; c. cell measurement and response cell reselection and handover procedure; d. radio resource control (RRC); e. security, integrity, access control (eg , via SIM); f. call control; c) mobility control; and d) WoLTEN conversation initiation; a. discovering, initiating, and configuring WoLTEN conversations (eg, for hotspots supporting both WoLTEN operations and legacy operations) ).

在一些其他實體及/或邏輯實體可用於操作,包含或不包含在給出本發明之內容之情形下在相關領域之通常知識者之技能內之此等實體。 Some of the other entities and/or logical entities may be used in the operation, including or not including such entities within the skill of ordinary skill in the relevant art in the context of the present invention.

更詳細地,Wi-Fi管管理控制用戶裝置與無線台間之無線連線性。在一個實施例中,Wi-Fi熱點功能性係基於根據例如現有IEEE 802.11n規範操作之舊有組件;在其他實施例中,Wi-Fi熱點功能性可與WoLTEN APP及/或WoLTEN代理整合以最佳化專用於Wi-Fi管之效能。舉例而言,WoLTEN 代理可監視LTE網路連線性之效能,且使用所監視效能來通知Wi-Fi管操作,以例如改良使用者之資源分配等。藉由協調頻道及頻寬指派,WoLTEN代理可減少緩衝量及/或提供用於服務(例如,VoLTE(LTE話音)或VoIP(IP話音))之較佳品質(例如,低延時及低跳動)鏈結。應瞭解,某些操作可不直接影響無線電鏈結(例如,Wi-Fi註冊、Wi-Fi中交遞、Wi-Fi電力管理及Wi-Fi QoS等);取決於實施方案,此等特徵可在舊有組件及/或WoLTEN APP/代理內處置。 In more detail, the Wi-Fi pipe management controls the wireless connectivity between the user device and the wireless station. In one embodiment, Wi-Fi hotspot functionality is based on legacy components that operate according to, for example, existing IEEE 802.11n specifications; in other embodiments, Wi-Fi hotspot functionality may be integrated with WoLTEN APP and/or WoLTEN agents. Optimized for the performance of Wi-Fi pipes. For example, WoLTEN The agent can monitor the performance of the LTE network with a linearity and use the monitored performance to notify the Wi-Fi pipe to operate, for example, to improve the user's resource allocation and the like. By coordinating channel and bandwidth assignments, the WoLTEN agent can reduce the amount of buffering and/or provide better quality for services such as VoLTE (LTE voice) or VoIP (IP voice) (eg, low latency and low) Bounce) link. It should be appreciated that certain operations may not directly affect the radio link (eg, Wi-Fi registration, Wi-Fi handover, Wi-Fi power management, Wi-Fi QoS, etc.); depending on the implementation, these features may be Legacy components and/or WoLTEN APP/agent handling.

在一個實施例中,LTE網路連線性係基於根據例如現有LTE規範操作之舊有組件;在其他實施例中,LTE鏈結功能性可與WoLTEN APP及/或WoLTEN代理整合以最佳化專用於Wi-Fi管之效能。如先前所提及,可監視LTE鏈結之效能以改良Wi-Fi管操作。類似地,可不直接影響LTE效能之操作可由舊有組件來處置,或併入於WoLTEN代理及/或WoLTEN APP內。常見實例包含:LTE網路獲取(選擇及再選擇)、認證、加密、完整性保護、呼叫控制(呼叫/對話設置/清理)、行動性(LTE中及LTE間交遞)等,但不限於此。 In one embodiment, the LTE network connection is based on legacy components operating according to, for example, existing LTE specifications; in other embodiments, LTE link functionality may be integrated with the WoLTEN APP and/or WoLTEN agent for optimization. Dedicated to the performance of Wi-Fi pipes. As mentioned previously, the performance of the LTE chain can be monitored to improve Wi-Fi pipe operation. Similarly, operations that may not directly affect LTE performance may be handled by legacy components or incorporated within the WoLTEN agent and/or WoLTEN APP. Common examples include: LTE network acquisition (selection and reselection), authentication, encryption, integrity protection, call control (call/conversation settings/cleanup), mobility (inter-LTE and inter-LTE handover), but not limited to this.

關於行動性管理,在第14圖內繪示用於發現、起始及組態一對話之一一般化過程之一個實施例。如所示,WoLTEN APP及/或WoLTEN代理用以發現、起始及組態WoLTEN對話及Wi-Fi管。 With regard to mobility management, one embodiment of a generalization process for discovering, initiating, and configuring a dialog is illustrated in FIG. As shown, the WoLTEN APP and/or WoLTEN agent is used to discover, initiate, and configure WoLTEN conversations and Wi-Fi pipes.

在過程1400之步驟1402處,一用戶裝置發現一致能之無線網路。用戶裝置確定無線網路是否支援WoLTEN操作。發現之常見實例包含:解碼控制廣播、直接查詢等,但不限於此。 At step 1402 of process 1400, a user device discovers a consistent wireless network. The user device determines if the wireless network supports WoLTEN operation. Common examples of discovery include: decoding control broadcast, direct query, etc., but are not limited thereto.

在某些變型中,無線網路係為一「開放式」網路。開放式網路不具有限制性存取控制(例如,認證、授權等)。在其他網路中,網路可 係為封閉的、部分受限的等。舉例而言,可要求用戶裝置針對一密碼提示使用者,或者按壓無線台上之一按鈕等。在再一些其他情形中,可允許用戶裝置經由帶外程序進行存取(例如,由一管理員來允許等)。在給出本發明之內容之情形下,相關技術之通常知識者將瞭解各種其他適合方案。 In some variations, the wireless network is an "open" network. Open networks do not have restrictive access control (eg, authentication, authorization, etc.). In other networks, the network can It is closed, partially restricted, etc. For example, the user device may be required to prompt the user for a password, or press a button on the wireless station or the like. In still other cases, the user device may be allowed to access via an out-of-band program (eg, by an administrator to allow, etc.). Given the content of the present invention, one of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate various other suitable solutions.

在步驟1404處,當用戶裝置確定無線網路支援WoLTEN操作時,WoLTEN APP嘗試經由無線台在用戶裝置與一網路經營者之間建立一存取通道(或Wi-Fi管對話)。在一個實施例中,存取通道包含用戶裝置與無線台間之一Wi-Fi管。在一個此實例中,一WoLTEN APP(或WoLTEN代理)經由一WoLTEN控制頻道傳輸一WoLTEN連線請求;該連線請求包含與連線建立有關之資訊。資訊之常見實例包含例如,軟體版本、一Wi-Fi及LTE相鄰者之清單等。 At step 1404, when the user device determines that the wireless network supports the WoLTEN operation, the WoLTEN APP attempts to establish an access channel (or Wi-Fi pipe session) between the user device and a network operator via the wireless station. In one embodiment, the access channel includes a Wi-Fi tube between the user device and the wireless station. In one such example, a WoLTEN APP (or WoLTEN proxy) transmits a WoLTEN connection request via a WoLTEN control channel; the connection request includes information related to connection establishment. Common examples of information include, for example, a software version, a list of Wi-Fi and LTE neighbors, and the like.

在過程1400之步驟1406處,回應於接收到連線請求,WoLTEN代理確定是否可建立一WoLTEN連線。在某些情形中,WoLTEN代理可由於資源限制(例如,缺乏記憶體、處理能力不足、無法存取網路經營者等)而無法支援連線請求。若WoLTEN代理可支援連線請求,則WoLTEN代理為對應於用戶裝置之資料串流緩衝分配或保留記憶體。在一個實施例中,保留WoLTEN代理之MU緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX緩衝器之一部分或分區並給其頒佈一緩衝器ID(處置器)。緩衝器ID被提供至WoLTEN APP,且此後,用戶裝置WoLTEN APP將使用緩衝器ID來存取/修改其對應WoLTEN連線(WoLTEN代理可同時處置多個不同用戶)。 At step 1406 of process 1400, in response to receiving the connection request, the WoLTEN agent determines if a WoLTEN connection can be established. In some cases, the WoLTEN agent may not be able to support connection requests due to resource limitations (eg, lack of memory, insufficient processing power, inability to access network operators, etc.). If the WoLTEN proxy can support the connection request, the WoLTEN proxy allocates or retains memory for the data stream buffer corresponding to the user device. In one embodiment, a portion or partition of the MU buffer and MUX/DeMUX buffer of the WoLTEN agent is reserved and a buffer ID (processor) is issued to it. The Buffer ID is provided to the WoLTEN APP, and thereafter, the User Equipment WoLTEN APP will use the Buffer ID to access/modify its corresponding WoLTEN connection (the WoLTEN Agent can handle multiple different users simultaneously).

在步驟1408處,若WoLTEN連線請求曾成功過,則WoLTEN代理經由一WoLTEN連線授予將連線參數提供回至WoLTEN APP。在一個實施方案中,連線參數包含緩衝器ID。連線參數之其他常見實例可包含例如, 連線之品質、最大資料速率及/或通量、最小資料速率及/或通量、延時、其他連線限制(例如,QoS)等。 At step 1408, if the WoLTEN connection request has been successful, the WoLTEN agent grants the connection parameters back to the WoLTEN APP via a WoLTEN connection. In one embodiment, the wire parameters include a buffer ID. Other common examples of connection parameters can include, for example, Quality of connection, maximum data rate and/or throughput, minimum data rate and/or throughput, latency, other connection restrictions (eg, QoS), etc.

在步驟1410處,此後,用戶裝置可經由WoLTEN連線來交易資料。更一般而言,用戶裝置可執行「存取通道」LTE操作,例如,系統獲取、連線建立、啟動、無線電承載建立及資料流等。 At step 1410, thereafter, the user device can exchange data via the WoLTEN connection. More generally, the user device can perform "access channel" LTE operations, such as system acquisition, connection establishment, initiation, radio bearer setup, and data flow.

第15圖例示用於起始在一用戶裝置平台上執行之一WoLTEN APP之一個實例性實施例之一WoLTEN連線的一實例性邏輯流程。 Figure 15 illustrates an exemplary logic flow for initiating a WoLTEN connection of one of the exemplary embodiments of a WoLTEN APP on a user device platform.

在步驟1502處,當用戶裝置首次通電或重置時,WoLTENAPP初始化並將其內部變量及旗標設定為缺設值(例如,將「LTE旗標」重置為「0」以指示當前無LTE網路可用)。 At step 1502, when the user device is first powered on or reset, the WoLTENAPP initializes and sets its internal variables and flags to a missing value (eg, resets the "LTE Flag" to "0" to indicate that there is currently no LTE. Network available).

在步驟1504處,在初始化之後,WoLTEN APP致能LTE數據機並搜尋可用LTE eNB及網路。在偵測到一所期望網路及eNB時,WoLTEN APP將「LTE旗標」設定為「1」以指示LTE網路存取可用。 At step 1504, after initialization, the WoLTEN APP enables the LTE modem and searches for available LTE eNBs and networks. Upon detecting a desired network and eNB, the WoLTEN APP sets the "LTE Flag" to "1" to indicate that LTE network access is available.

在附接至LTE網路之前,WoLTEN APP嘗試搜尋一Wi-Fi網路來嘗試WoLTEN操作。一般而言,WoLTEN對LTE存取係較佳的,因為WoLTEN操作消耗較少電力及/或支援較高資料速率等。應瞭解,某些其他實施方案可併入有不同優先方案。 Before attaching to the LTE network, the WoLTEN APP attempts to search for a Wi-Fi network to try the WoLTEN operation. In general, WoLTEN is preferred for LTE access because WoLTEN operation consumes less power and/or supports higher data rates. It should be appreciated that certain other embodiments may incorporate different priority schemes.

在步驟1506處,WoLTEN APP致能一Wi-Fi數據機並查找附近的Wi-Fi AP。在某些情形中,WoLTEN APP可具有具體而言用以尋找無線台之一較佳存取模式。 At step 1506, the WoLTEN APP enables a Wi-Fi modem and looks for nearby Wi-Fi APs. In some cases, the WoLTEN APP may have a preferred access mode specifically for finding one of the wireless stations.

在步驟1508處,若尋找到一Wi-Fi存取點(AP),則WoLTEN APP將在該存取點中註冊。在簡單實施方案中,Wi-Fi AP係以一「開放」模 式操作。若WoLTEN APP無法在Wi-Fi AP中註冊,則WoLTEN APP繼續進行,如同未尋找到Wi-Fi AP一般。封閉式Wi-Fi AP仍可經由一替代存取方案來存取(隨後闡述)。 At step 1508, if a Wi-Fi access point (AP) is found, the WoLTEN APP will register in the access point. In a simple implementation, the Wi-Fi AP is an "open" model. Operation. If the WoLTEN APP cannot be registered in the Wi-Fi AP, the WoLTEN APP continues as if the Wi-Fi AP was not found. The closed Wi-Fi AP can still be accessed via an alternate access scheme (described later).

在步驟1510處,若WoLTEN APP已在Wi-Fi AP中成功註冊,則WoLTEN APP將詢問AP以查明其是否具有一適合WoLTEN代理。在一個實施例中,該詢問包含一WoLTEN連線請求/WoLTEN連線授予交易。若WoLTEN詢問係成功的,則「WoLTEN APP」可使用無線台之網路連線(例如,乙太網)經由Wi-Fi管繼續LTE網路獲取/註冊。 At step 1510, if the WoLTEN APP has successfully registered in the Wi-Fi AP, the WoLTEN APP will query the AP to find out if it has a suitable WoLTEN proxy. In one embodiment, the query includes a WoLTEN connection request/WoLTEN connection grant transaction. If the WoLTEN inquiry is successful, the "WoLTEN APP" can continue to acquire/register the LTE network via the Wi-Fi pipe using the wireless network connection (for example, Ethernet).

週期性地,在WoLTEN連線期間,WoLTEN APP將量測效能以確定一較佳Wi-Fi AP或LTE eNB是否可用。在一個實施例中,用戶裝置可週期性地給其自己的LTE蜂巢式介面供電以執行適當量測。此等量測被報告給LTE網路;LTE網路可回應地導致一交遞(HO)。用於HO之實例性量測可包含:接收訊號強度指示符(RSSI)訊號位準量測、訊噪比(SNR)、位元錯誤率(BER)等,但不限於此。其他有用資訊可包含例如,基於由用戶裝置之LTE PHY進行之量測之LTE eNB之相鄰者清單。 Periodically, during the WoLTEN connection, the WoLTEN APP will measure performance to determine if a preferred Wi-Fi AP or LTE eNB is available. In one embodiment, the user device may periodically power its own LTE cellular interface to perform the appropriate measurements. These measurements are reported to the LTE network; the LTE network can responsively result in a handover (HO). Exemplary measurements for HO may include: Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) signal level measurement, signal to noise ratio (SNR), bit error rate (BER), etc., but are not limited thereto. Other useful information may include, for example, a list of neighbors of the LTE eNB based on measurements by the LTE PHY of the user device.

重新參照步驟1514,當無Wi-Fi網路可用,但有一或多個LTE網路可用時,WoLTEN APP將繼續進行以使用LTE網路,同時繼續查找一WoLTEN致能之Wi-Fi AP。 Referring back to step 1514, when no Wi-Fi network is available, but one or more LTE networks are available, the WoLTEN APP will continue to use the LTE network while continuing to look for a WoLTEN-enabled Wi-Fi AP.

第16圖例示用於起始在一無線台上執行之一WoLTEN代理之一個實例性實施例之一WoLTEN連線之一邏輯流程。 Figure 16 illustrates one of the logic flows for initiating one of the WoLTEN connections of one of the exemplary embodiments of a WoLTEN proxy on a wireless station.

在步驟1602處,當無線台首次通電或重置時,WoLTEN APP初始化並將其內部變量及旗標設定為缺設值(例如,「USER」設定為「0」 以指示當前沒有使用者正接受服務,且針對單一使用者操作,MAX_USER設定為「1」),且繼續進行以接通Wi-Fi數據機。 At step 1602, when the wireless station is first powered on or reset, the WoLTEN APP initializes and sets its internal variables and flags to a missing value (eg, "USER" is set to "0") To indicate that no user is currently accepting the service, and for a single user operation, MAX_USER is set to "1"), and proceed to turn on the Wi-Fi modem.

在步驟1604處,回應於接收一WoLTEN連線請求訊息,WoLTEN代理確定是否可服務該連線請求。在一個實例性實施例中,WoLTEN代理遞增USER暫存器並驗證使用者數目尚未超出最大允許使用者數目。若未達到最大允許使用者數目,則WoLTEN代理繼續進行以在一MU緩衝器及MUX/DeMUX緩衝器上分配緩衝器空間,且將一緩衝器ID分配給WoLTEN APP,緩衝器ID係與一WoLTEN連線授予一起傳遞至WoLTEN APP。在後續交易期間,預期WoLTEN APP每當其發送一訊息時使用緩衝器ID;在某些實施方案中,可藉由與一Wi-Fi使用者ID(例如,傳入封包之MAC位址)相關聯來提取緩衝器ID。 At step 1604, in response to receiving a WoLTEN connection request message, the WoLTEN agent determines if the connection request is serviceable. In an exemplary embodiment, the WoLTEN agent increments the USER scratchpad and verifies that the number of users has not exceeded the maximum allowed number of users. If the maximum number of allowed users is not reached, the WoLTEN agent continues to allocate buffer space on a MU buffer and MUX/DeMUX buffer, and assigns a buffer ID to the WoLTEN APP, the buffer ID is associated with a WoLTEN. The connection is passed along to the WoLTEN APP. During subsequent transactions, the WoLTEN APP is expected to use the buffer ID whenever it sends a message; in some embodiments, it may be associated with a Wi-Fi User ID (eg, the MAC address of the incoming packet) Join to extract the buffer ID.

否則,若無法服務連線請求(例如,達到最大使用者數目),則拒絕新使用者進行存取。在某些情形中,發送一資訊訊息以將故障(例如,系統過載)通知新使用者。 Otherwise, if the connection request cannot be serviced (for example, the maximum number of users is reached), the new user is denied access. In some cases, an information message is sent to notify a new user of a failure (eg, system overload).

在步驟1606處,WoLTEN代理為新使用者啟動WoLTEN協定堆疊之一執行個體(每一WoLTEN APP需要一WoLTEN協定堆疊之一執行個體)。 At step 1606, the WoLTEN agent initiates one of the WoLTEN protocol stacks for the new user (each WoLTEN APP requires one of the WoLTEN protocol stacks to execute the individual).

週期性地,WoLTEN代理檢查一使用者是否終止了一連線(步驟1608)。當一使用者已終止一連線時,WoLTEN代理遞減USER暫存器並停止與對應WoLTEN APP相關聯之對應WoLTEN協定堆疊執行個體。 Periodically, the WoLTEN agent checks if a user has terminated a connection (step 1608). When a user has terminated a connection, the WoLTEN agent decrements the USER register and stops the corresponding WoLTEN protocol stack execution entity associated with the corresponding WoLTEN APP.

傳入交遞(Incomming hands-off)具有一類似流程來添加一新使用者(參見步驟1604),因而傳出交遞類似於使用者終止(參見步驟 1608)。 Incomming hands-off has a similar process to add a new user (see step 1604), so outgoing delivery is similar to user termination (see steps) 1608).

無SIM之變型-No SIM variants -

本發明之各種實施例係針對介接至一本地用戶辨識模組(SIM、USIM、UICC、CSIM或RUIM)之使用者設備(UE)。然而,替代實施方案可在所謂無SIM操作中卸載SIM功能性。如本文中所使用,術語「無SIM」通常且無限制地指代關於例如,軟體、硬體及/或韌體操作缺乏一本地用戶辨識模組(SIM、USIM、UICC、CSIM或RUIM)。 Various embodiments of the present invention are directed to user equipment (UE) that interfaces to a local subscriber identity module (SIM, USIM, UICC, CSIM, or RUIM). However, alternative embodiments may offload SIM functionality in so-called SIM-free operations. As used herein, the term "no SIM" generally and without limitation refers to the lack of a local user identification module (SIM, USIM, UICC, CSIM or RUIM) for, for example, software, hardware and/or firmware operations.

在一第一此種實施方案中,將「代理」UE協定堆疊之一部分(用於一相關聯UE 206)之一SIM/USIM模組整合在Wi-Fi AP 204內。如在本發明中所使用,術語「代理」通常係指相對於一較大網路一無線台(或其他中間節點)作為一行動裝置之一經授權替代者來執行之能力。在一個此實施方案中,PDCP層已在功能上分裂且由一Wi-Fi管之WoLTEN協定堆疊來管理。為了支援PDCP層之認證及加密及完整性保護之安全性要求,在Wi-Fi AP 204處執行之代理UE協定堆疊包含所有附屬軟體層(例如,高達且包含PDCP之所有LTE UE層);在此實施方案中剩餘軟體層駐留在使用者平面(其係以一無SIM模式操作)上之UE 206處。此外,在實例性實施方案中,控制平面係在Wi-Fi AP 204處終止。 In a first such embodiment, a SIM/USIM module of one of the "proxy" UE protocol stacks (for an associated UE 206) is integrated within the Wi-Fi AP 204. As used in this invention, the term "agent" generally refers to the ability of a wireless station (or other intermediate node) to perform as an authorized substitute for one of the mobile devices with respect to a larger network. In one such embodiment, the PDCP layer has been functionally split and managed by a Wi-Fi pipe stack of Wi-Fi pipes. In order to support the authentication and encryption and integrity protection security requirements of the PDCP layer, the proxy UE protocol stack executed at the Wi-Fi AP 204 includes all of the affiliate software layers (eg, all LTE UE layers up to and including PDCP); The remaining software layers in this embodiment reside at the UE 206 on the user plane (which operates in a SIM-free mode). Moreover, in an exemplary embodiment, the control plane terminates at Wi-Fi AP 204.

在給出本發明之內容之情形下,相關領域之通常知識者將易於瞭解,使用其他組態可獲得同等成功。舉例而言,一替代變型可將Wi-Fi管設置在PDCP層內部,使得在無線台204中支援上行加密及下行解密功能,而在無SIM之UE中支援PDCP層之上行及下行穩健標頭壓縮(RHOC)壓縮及解壓縮功能。在此等組態下,LTE加密/解密係在Wi-Fi AP 204處處置,因此需要額外加密來保護Wi-Fi管傳輸,因為無SIM之UE與無線台204 間之資料串流不再受到保護。如先前所述,例如,Wi-Fi管加密可基於一或多個相關聯/導出之LTE加密秘鑰,該等加密密鑰可經由例如PGP安全性協定傳遞至無SIM之UE。 Given the content of the present invention, one of ordinary skill in the relevant art will readily appreciate that other configurations can achieve equal success. For example, an alternative variant can set the Wi-Fi pipe inside the PDCP layer to support the uplink encryption and downlink decryption functions in the wireless station 204, and support the uplink and downlink robust headers of the PDCP layer in the SIM-free UE. Compression (RHOC) compression and decompression. Under these configurations, LTE encryption/decryption is handled at the Wi-Fi AP 204, so additional encryption is required to protect the Wi-Fi pipe transmission because the SIM-free UE and the wireless station 204 The data stream between them is no longer protected. As previously described, for example, Wi-Fi pipe encryption may be based on one or more associated/derived LTE encryption keys that may be passed to a SIM-free UE via, for example, a PGP security protocol.

在一第二實施方案中,經由一可用有線(例如,USB)或無線(例如,藍芽)I/O埠將一外部用戶辨識模組(SIM/USIM)耦合至無SIM之UE。外部SIM/USIM本質上係耦合至無SIM之UE之LTE堆疊。 In a second embodiment, an external subscriber identity module (SIM/USIM) is coupled to the UE without SIM via an available wired (eg, USB) or wireless (eg, Bluetooth) I/O. The external SIM/USIM is essentially coupled to the LTE stack of UEs without SIM.

第17圖例示外部模組1700之一個此實例性組態,包含:一SIM/USIM 1702、一處理器1704、一非暫時性電腦可讀取記憶體1706、一電力單元(例如,電池)1708、以及一I/O通訊模組(例如,藍芽、USB等)1710。I/O通訊模組、USIM模組1700及無SIM之UE可經由例如雙向公共密鑰-私密密鑰加密、對稱密鑰加密(例如,人工輸入之密鑰或預安裝之密鑰)來保護安全。 FIG. 17 illustrates one such exemplary configuration of the external module 1700, including: a SIM/USIM 1702, a processor 1704, a non-transitory computer readable memory 1706, and a power unit (eg, battery) 1708. And an I/O communication module (for example, Bluetooth, USB, etc.) 1710. The I/O communication module, the USIM module 1700, and the SIM-free UE can be protected via, for example, two-way public key-private key encryption, symmetric key encryption (eg, a manually entered key or a pre-installed key). Safety.

在正常操作期間,外部模組1700保持經由無SIM之UE致能外部模組1700與LTE網路之行動性管理實體(MME)間之初始認證的LTE演進式封包系統(EPS)KASME(密鑰存取安全性管理實體)加密密鑰在完成初始認證過程之後,使用一現有安全鏈結(例如,經由PGP加密)將後續LTE EPS導出之密鑰(例如,KeNB(演進式節點B密鑰)、CK(密碼編譯密鑰)及CI(完整性檢查))自外部模組1700安全地傳遞至無SIM之UE。可使用例如剩餘LTE安全演算法之一軟體仿真實施方案在無SIM之UE處處置後續加密/解密。或者,對於無SIM之UE之PDCP層由Wi-Fi AP 204代理之實施方案,本機Wi-Fi加密引擎(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)可在Wi-Fi AP 204及無SIM之UE處利用LTE EPS導出之密鑰(例如,KeNB、CK及CI)來保護Wi-Fi管傳輸之安全。關於非存取層 (NAS)安全性及完整性保護,此等功能可在無SIM之UE中(例如,在軟體中)實施,因為NAS訊息之資料速率及體積極低。 During normal operation, the external module 1700 maintains an LTE evolved packet system (EPS) KASME (key) for initial authentication between the external module 1700 and the LTE network's mobility management entity (MME) via the SIM-free UE. Access Security Management Entity Encryption Key After the initial authentication process is completed, a key to the subsequent LTE EPS is derived using an existing security link (eg, via PGP encryption) (eg, KeNB (Evolved Node B Key)) CK (Cryptographic Compilation Key) and CI (Integrity Check) are securely transferred from the external module 1700 to the UE without SIM. Subsequent encryption/decryption can be handled at the SIM-free UE using, for example, one of the remaining LTE security algorithms software emulation implementations. Or, for the implementation of the PDCP layer of the SIM-free UE by the Wi-Fi AP 204, the native Wi-Fi encryption engine (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2, etc. The LTE EPS derived keys (eg, KeNB, CK, and CI) can be utilized at Wi-Fi AP 204 and SIM-free UEs to secure Wi-Fi pipe transmissions. About non-access layer (NAS) Security and integrity protection, these functions can be implemented in SIM-free UEs (for example, in software) because NAS messages have a low data rate and body.

在一些其他實施方案可使用一安全協定將LTE EPS導出之秘鑰自Wi-Fi AP 204傳送至UE 206。另外,某些變型可將一NULL加密(亦即,無加密)用於使用者平面,但將一基於軟體之安全性用於無SIM之UE處之LTE加密/解密及完整性檢查。在此些變型中,本機Wi-Fi加密引擎(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)可與一或多個相關聯/導出之LTE對稱密鑰相結合地用於無SIM之UE內之使用者平面加密/解密。 In some other embodiments, a LTE EPS derived key may be transmitted from the Wi-Fi AP 204 to the UE 206 using a security protocol. In addition, some variants may use a NULL encryption (i.e., no encryption) for the user plane, but use a software-based security for LTE encryption/decryption and integrity checking at SIM-free UEs. In these variations, the native Wi-Fi encryption engine (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2, etc.) may be associated with one or more LTE symmetric keys associated with/derived The key is used in combination for user plane encryption/decryption in a UE without SIM.

在一進一步變型中,一無SIM之UE「附掛」在一所連線UE 206辨識模組(例如,SIM/USIM)上。舉例而言,假定一UE及一SIM/USIM已經由同一Wi-Fi AP 204與LTE網路相關聯之一情景。若相關聯UE係以其RRC_IDLE模式連線,則WoLTEN應用程式可觸發至RRC_CONNECTED模式(亦即,起始一有效對話)之一狀態轉變。此後,無SIM之UE可請求分享(或附掛)有效RRC連線。 In a further variation, a SIM-free UE is "attached" to a connected UE 206 identification module (eg, SIM/USIM). For example, assume that a UE and a SIM/USIM have been associated with an LTE network by the same Wi-Fi AP 204. If the associated UE is connected in its RRC_IDLE mode, the WoLTEN application can trigger a state transition to RRC_CONNECTED mode (ie, initiate a valid session). Thereafter, the UE without SIM can request to share (or attach) a valid RRC connection.

在某些情形中,Wi-Fi AP 204可驗證無SIM之UE被授權附掛在先前相關聯UE上;常見授權方案包含基於密碼之方案、使用者提示(亦即,提示相關聯UE之使用者添加無SIM之UE)等,但不限於此。在附掛變型下,NAS操作及RRC操作二者可由Wi-Fi AP WoLTEN代理(運行在相關聯UE及/或無SIM之UE上)透過專用WoLTEN控制頻道經由WoLTEN APP來控制。 In some cases, the Wi-Fi AP 204 can verify that the SIM-free UE is authorized to attach to the previously associated UE; the common authorization scheme includes a password-based scheme, user prompts (ie, prompting the use of the associated UE) Adding a UE without SIM, etc., but is not limited thereto. In the attached variant, both NAS operations and RRC operations can be controlled by the Wi-Fi AP WoLTEN agent (operating on the associated UE and/or UE without SIM) via the dedicated WoLTEN control channel via the WoLTEN APP.

若附掛操作被授權,則Wi-Fi AP 204可根據多個不同方案來支援無SIM之UE。在一第一方案中,若LTE網路支援雙IP堆疊UE,則Wi-Fi AP 204為同一USIM實體請求一新IP位址(自LTE演進式封包核心(EPC))。在獲取第二IP位址之後,Wi-Fi AP 204可為既定用於無SIM之UE之第二IP位址設置一額外承載,且建立一第二LTE UE堆疊(高達IP層)。第二LTE UE堆疊可使適當IP封包經由Wi-Fi管穿隧至無SIM之UE。如先前所述,可以各種方案來實施Wi-Fi管安全性。相關聯UE之WoLTEN網路完全獨立於無SIM之UE之網路。 If the attach operation is authorized, the Wi-Fi AP 204 can support the SIM-free UE according to a plurality of different schemes. In a first solution, if the LTE network supports dual IP stacking UEs, then Wi-Fi The AP 204 requests a new IP address for the same USIM entity (from the LTE Evolutionary Packet Core (EPC)). After obtaining the second IP address, the Wi-Fi AP 204 can set an additional bearer for the second IP address intended for the SIM-free UE and establish a second LTE UE stack (up to the IP layer). The second LTE UE stack can tunnel the appropriate IP packets to the SIM-free UE via the Wi-Fi pipe. As previously described, Wi-Fi pipe security can be implemented in a variety of scenarios. The WoLTEN network of the associated UE is completely independent of the network of the UE without SIM.

或者,相關聯UE及無SIM之UE可使用同一LTE UE堆疊來服務隨後由Wi-Fi管中繼之二個IP位址。在此等實施方案中,該等IP位址由相關聯UE及無SIM之UE經由Wi-Fi存取來使用。更直接地,IP封包之二個集合係經由Wi-Fi管傳輸至相關聯UE及無SIM之UE。相關聯UE及無SIM之UE二者在內部確定哪些封包定址至其。 Alternatively, the associated UE and the SIM-free UE may use the same LTE UE stack to serve the two IP addresses that are subsequently relayed by the Wi-Fi pipe. In such embodiments, the IP addresses are used by the associated UE and the SIM-free UE via Wi-Fi access. More directly, the two sets of IP packets are transmitted to the associated UE and the SIM-free UE via the Wi-Fi pipe. Both the associated UE and the UE without SIM internally determine which packets are addressed to it.

在一第二方案中,經由相關聯UE之IP位址(不提供另一IP位址)支援附掛操作。在一個此實施方案中,WoLTEN網路將同一承載用於無SIM之UE及相關聯UE二者,但具有針對無SIM之UE及相關聯UE之唯一埠編號。此後,可經由Wi-Fi管將IP封包路由至既定UE(無SIM之UE或相關聯UE)。或者,在另一此類實施方案中,WoLTEN網路針對無SIM之UE及相關聯UE使用唯一埠編號,且為無SIM之UE設置額外承載。以此方式,無SIM之UE具有高達Wi-Fi AP 204處之IP層級之一單獨協定堆疊,較低層級處置對適當IP封包經由Wi-Fi管至無SIM之UE及相關聯UE之選擇及傳輸。 In a second scenario, the attach operation is supported via the IP address of the associated UE (no other IP address is provided). In one such embodiment, the WoLTEN network uses the same bearer for both the SIM-free UE and the associated UE, but with a unique number for the SIM-free UE and associated UE. Thereafter, the IP packet can be routed to the intended UE (SIM-free UE or associated UE) via the Wi-Fi pipe. Alternatively, in another such embodiment, the WoLTEN network uses a unique number for the SIM-free UE and associated UEs, and sets an additional bearer for the SIM-free UE. In this manner, the SIM-free UE has a single protocol stack up to one of the IP levels at the Wi-Fi AP 204, and the lower level handles the selection of the appropriate IP packet via the Wi-Fi pipe to the SIM-free UE and associated UEs and transmission.

在附掛操作期間,Wi-Fi管安全性可植入有相關聯UE密碼編譯資訊等,如上所述。舉例而言,可基於一PGP協定來實施Wi-Fi管安全性以交換與本機Wi-Fi加密演算法(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)搭配使用之密鑰。亦可能的是,將一NULL加密用於 使用者平面,但將一軟體實施方案用於無SIM之UE處之LTE加密/解密及完整性檢查,同時與用於無SIM之UE內之使用者平面加密/解密之一或多個相關聯LTE對稱密鑰相結合地使用本機Wi-Fi加密引擎(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)。在一些其他實施方案可以不同方式及/或利用自無SIM之UE分割之一不同堆疊來處置與相關聯UE相關聯之承載。 During attach operations, Wi-Fi pipe security may be populated with associated UE cryptographic information, etc., as described above. For example, Wi-Fi pipe security can be implemented based on a PGP protocol to exchange with native Wi-Fi encryption algorithms (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2, etc. ) The key used in conjunction with. It is also possible to use a NULL encryption. User plane, but a software implementation for LTE encryption/decryption and integrity checking at SIM-free UEs, and associated with one or more of user plane encryption/decryption in UEs without SIM The LTE symmetric key uses a native Wi-Fi encryption engine (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2, etc.) in combination. In some other embodiments, the bearer associated with the associated UE may be handled in a different manner and/or utilizing one of the different stacks from the UE without the SIM.

在另一變型中,無SIM之UE使用一虛擬辨識模組來儲存及/或管理一或多個SIM/USIM協定。在此選項中,在無SIM之UE處之一安全記憶體區域中接收並儲存(人工地,經由一頻帶外軟體過程(例如,一使用者應用程式)、經由一外部SIM/USIM模組等)一USIM之KASME密鑰連同預安裝之認證及密鑰產生演算法。在認證之後,可由無SIM之UE使用例如,任何上述過程來處置後續加密及/或解密。舉例而言,可經由LTE演算法之一軟體實施方案及/或具有用於Wi-Fi管之空中下載安全性之一或多個所產生LTE密鑰的本機Wi-Fi加密引擎來處置安全性。如先前所述,由於LTE密鑰在Wi-Fi AP 204及無SIM之UE處係為對稱的,因此此等密鑰可在Wi-Fi管之二端處獨立地產生。或者,可使用一PGP協定將該等LTE密鑰自Wi-Fi AP 204傳送至無SIM之UE。亦可能的是,將一NULL加密用於使用者平面,且將一軟體實施方案用於無SIM之UE處之LTE加密/解密及完整性檢查,同時與用於無SIM之UE內之使用者平面加密/解密之一或多個相關聯LTE對稱密鑰相結合地使用本機Wi-Fi加密引擎(有線等效隱私(WEP)、Wi-Fi受保護存取(WPA)、WPA2等)。另外,某些實施方案可在無SIM之UE軟體中執行NAS安全性及完整性保護,因為NAS訊息之資料速率及體積極低。 In another variation, a SIM-free UE uses a virtual identification module to store and/or manage one or more SIM/USIM protocols. In this option, it is received and stored in one of the secure memory areas at the UE without SIM (manually via an out-of-band software process (eg, a user application), via an external SIM/USIM module, etc. A USIM KASME key along with a pre-installed authentication and key generation algorithm. After authentication, subsequent encryption and/or decryption may be handled by the UE without the SIM using, for example, any of the above processes. For example, security may be handled via a software implementation of one of the LTE algorithms and/or a native Wi-Fi encryption engine with one or more generated LTE keys for Wi-Fi pipe over-the-air security. . As previously described, since the LTE key is symmetric at the Wi-Fi AP 204 and the SIM-free UE, these keys can be generated independently at the two ends of the Wi-Fi pipe. Alternatively, the LTE keys can be transmitted from the Wi-Fi AP 204 to the UE without SIM using a PGP protocol. It is also possible to use a NULL encryption for the user plane and use a software implementation for LTE encryption/decryption and integrity checking at SIM-free UEs, as well as for users in UEs without SIM. The native encryption/decryption one or more associated LTE symmetric keys use a native Wi-Fi encryption engine (Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA2, etc.) in combination. In addition, some embodiments may perform NAS security and integrity protection in a SIM-free UE software because the data rate and body of the NAS message are actively low.

亦可能的是,將UE 206堆疊(例如,包含NAS層)之全部 或大部分放置在存取點(例如,Wi-Fi AP 204)內。在此實例中,UE 206 NAS之負責認證之一部分放置於UE 206 App(其可下載),該UE 206 App經由專用控制頻道(存在於UE 206 App與Wi-Fi AP 204代理之間)連線至UE 206 NAS之駐留在Wi-Fi AP 204內之其他部分。因此,Wi-Fi AP 204中之代理必須具有與駐留在UE 206協定堆疊(駐留在Wi-Fi AP 204中)中之NAS部分之一連線。最後,UE 206 App必須具有與NAS之駐留在UE 206中之部分之一連線。事實上,可將整個UE 206 NAS實體保持在Wi-Fi AP 204內,且使用存在於UE 206 App與Wi-Fi AP 204代理之間的控制頻道將USIM API連線至處在Wi-Fi AP 204代理中之UE 206 NAS。 It is also possible to stack all of the UEs 206 (eg, including the NAS layer) Or most of it is placed in an access point (eg, Wi-Fi AP 204). In this example, one of the UE 206 NAS's responsible authentication is placed in the UE 206 App (which is downloadable), and the UE 206 App is connected via a dedicated control channel (present between the UE 206 App and the Wi-Fi AP 204 agent) The rest of the UE 206 NAS resides within the Wi-Fi AP 204. Therefore, the proxy in Wi-Fi AP 204 must have one of the NAS portions residing in the UE 206 protocol stack (residing in Wi-Fi AP 204). Finally, the UE 206 App must have a connection to one of the portions of the NAS that resides in the UE 206. In fact, the entire UE 206 NAS entity can be maintained within the Wi-Fi AP 204 and the USIM API can be wired to the Wi-Fi AP using a control channel present between the UE 206 App and the Wi-Fi AP 204 agent. 204 UE UE in the proxy.

在一個實施例中,UE更包含駐留在高層級作業系統以上之一使用者介面應用程式。在一個變型中,使用者介面應用程式用以以軟體對用於處理LTE語音(VoLTE)電話呼叫及LTE訊息收發之傳統基於硬體之元件進行仿真。在一個實例性實施例中,使用者介面應用程式併入有基於一或多個軟體之:話音編解碼器、回音消除、撥號墊等。在一個此變型中,使用者介面應用程式用以經由上述WoLTEN網路連線連線至一VoLTE呼叫。 In one embodiment, the UE further includes a user interface application residing on the higher level operating system. In one variation, the user interface application is used to emulate the traditional hardware-based components used to process LTE voice (VoLTE) telephone calls and LTE messaging. In an exemplary embodiment, the user interface application is incorporated with one or more software based: voice codec, echo cancellation, dial pad, and the like. In one such variation, the user interface application is used to connect to a VoLTE call via the aforementioned WoLTEN network connection.

儘管用於無SIM操作之前述實例性實施方案及變型闡述了由相關聯UE、無SIM之UE及Wi-Fi AP 204執行之各種操作,但在給出本發明之內容之情形下,相關技術之通常知識者將另外認識到,諸多LTE特定功能被此操作排除,且因此可忽略、「修正」或以其他方式最佳化。舉例而言,在一個此實施例中,駐留在Wi-Fi AP 204中之UE 206協定堆疊及駐留在Wi-Fi AP 204中之eNB協定堆疊可極大地減少PHY、MAC、RLC及PDCP軟體交易,因為此等軟體層僅用於LTE無線電操作(且因此被Wi-Fi管操作納入)。相關技術之通常知識者將瞭解,可執行此等層之殘留版本以確保LTE Although the foregoing exemplary embodiments and variations for SIM-free operation set forth various operations performed by associated UEs, SIM-free UEs, and Wi-Fi APs 204, in the context of presenting the present invention, related art Those of ordinary skill will additionally recognize that many LTE-specific functions are excluded by this operation and can therefore be ignored, "corrected" or otherwise optimized. For example, in one such embodiment, the UE 206 protocol stack that resides in the Wi-Fi AP 204 and the eNB protocol stack residing in the Wi-Fi AP 204 can greatly reduce PHY, MAC, RLC, and PDCP software transactions. Because these software layers are only used for LTE radio operation (and therefore incorporated by Wi-Fi pipe operation). Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that a residual version of these layers can be implemented to ensure LTE

程序之正確端對端操作,及/或允許軟體堆疊之剩餘部分在最小影響情形下操作。 Proper end-to-end operation of the program, and/or allow the remainder of the software stack to operate with minimal impact.

舉例而言,可最小化UE及eNB軟體堆疊二者上之LTE RRC功能性,此乃因例如,不存在LTE無線電,且因此排除LTE交遞及量測操作。在另一此實例中,PDCP ROHC及/或內部加密未必需要,因此可將一NULL加密用於使用者平面操作。對於控制平面操作,可針對UE 206及Wi-Fi AP 204側二者以軟體來執行任何加密及完整性保護。如先前所闡述,在UE 206及Wi-Fi AP 204側二者上產生之LTE密鑰可在Wi-Fi本機加密引擎中使用以對UE 206與Wi-Fi AP 204之間的使用者及控制平面資料進行加密。存在於UE 206應用程式與Wi-Fi AP 204代理之間的專用控制頻道可係為開放的(未加密的)或透過在應用程式與代理間之PGP密鑰交換來加密。 For example, LTE RRC functionality on both UE and eNB software stacks may be minimized, for example, because there is no LTE radio, and thus LTE handover and measurement operations are excluded. In another such example, PDCP ROHC and/or internal encryption is not required, so a NULL encryption can be used for user plane operations. For control plane operation, any encryption and integrity protection can be performed in software for both the UE 206 and the Wi-Fi AP 204 side. As previously explained, the LTE keys generated on both the UE 206 and Wi-Fi AP 204 sides can be used in a Wi-Fi native encryption engine to authenticate users between the UE 206 and the Wi-Fi AP 204. Control plane data is encrypted. The dedicated control channel present between the UE 206 application and the Wi-Fi AP 204 proxy can be either open (unencrypted) or encrypted via a PGP key exchange between the application and the proxy.

在給出本發明的情況下,熟習此項領域之通常知識者將認識到用於實施混合存取一核心網路之眾多其他方案。 Given the present invention, one of ordinary skill in the art will recognize numerous other schemes for implementing a hybrid access to a core network.

將認識到,儘管依據一方法之一特定步驟順序闡述本發明之某些態樣,但此等闡述僅例示本發明之寬廣方法,且可視特定應用之需要來修改。在某些情況下,某些步驟可係不需要的或任選的。另外,某些步驟或功能性可添加至所揭示實施例,或可變更二個或更多個步驟之執行次序。所有此等變化視為囊括在本文中所揭示及主張之揭示內容內。 It will be appreciated that while certain aspects of the present invention are described in terms of a particular step of the method, these are merely illustrative of the broad methods of the invention and may be modified as needed for the particular application. In some cases, certain steps may be unnecessary or optional. In addition, some steps or functionality may be added to the disclosed embodiments, or the order of execution of two or more steps may be changed. All such variations are considered to be included within the disclosure disclosed and claimed herein.

儘管上述詳細闡述已顯示、闡述並指出應用於各種實施例之本發明之新穎特徵,但將理解,在不違背本發明之情形下,熟悉此項技術者可進行所例示的裝置或過程在形式及細節上的各種忽略、替代及改變。以上闡述係為執行本發明的當前所涵蓋之最佳模式。此闡述不以任何方式意指限制,而是應視為對本發明之一般原理之例示。本發明之範圍應參照 申請專利範圍來確定。 While the above detailed description has shown, illustrated, and illustrated the invention of the embodiments of the present invention, it is understood that the claimed And various neglects, substitutions and changes in details. The above description is the best mode currently covered by the present invention. This description is not intended to be in any way limiting, but rather as an exemplification of the general principles of the invention. The scope of the invention should be referred to Apply for a patent scope to determine.

204‧‧‧Wi-Fi AP 204‧‧ Wi-Fi AP

206‧‧‧使用者設備 206‧‧‧User equipment

S-GW‧‧‧伺服閘道器 S-GW‧‧‧servo gateway

Claims (20)

一種利用至少一第一通訊系統及一第二通訊系統進行無線通訊之方法,該第一通訊系統具有彼此通訊之至少一第一節點及一第二節點,該方法包含:在該第一節點內執行一第一協定堆疊之複數個層之一第一部分,並使該第二節點執行該第一協定堆疊之該等層之一第二部分;以及自該第一節點提供一或多個辨識資訊至該第二節點,其中該一或多個辨識資訊用以與該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第二部分之該執行相結合地在該第二通訊系統中之至少一個邏輯實體中認證該第一節點,該認證致能(enable)該第二節點與該至少一個邏輯實體間之一連線。 A method for wireless communication using at least a first communication system and a second communication system, the first communication system having at least a first node and a second node in communication with each other, the method comprising: in the first node Performing a first portion of a plurality of layers of a first protocol stack, and causing the second node to perform a second portion of the ones of the first protocol stack; and providing one or more identification information from the first node And to the second node, wherein the one or more identification information is used in combination with the execution of the second portion of the layers of the first protocol stack in at least one of the second communication systems The first node is authenticated, and the authentication enables the second node to be connected to one of the at least one logical entity. 如請求項1所述之方法,其中該在該第二節點內執行該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第二部分包含:耦合至該第一節點中該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第一部分之一傳輸控制協定/網際網路協定(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol;TCP/IP)層。 The method of claim 1, wherein the performing the second portion of the layers of the first protocol stack within the second node comprises: coupling to the first layer of the first protocol stack of the first node One of the first parts is a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) layer. 如請求項2所述之方法,其中該在該第一節點內執行該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第一部分包含:耦合至該第二節點之一互補傳輸控制協定/網際網路協定(TCP/IP)層。 The method of claim 2, wherein the first portion of the layer of the first protocol stack executing in the first node comprises: a complementary transmission control protocol/internet protocol coupled to the second node (TCP/IP) layer. 如請求項1所述之方法,更包含:使該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第二部分導出一或多個認證資訊;以及至少基於所導出之該一或多個認證資訊,該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第二部分對該第二節點與該至少一個邏輯實體間之一第一鏈結 (link)之一或多個資料酬載(payload)進行加密。 The method of claim 1, further comprising: deriving the second portion of the layers of the first protocol stack to derive one or more authentication information; and based at least on the one or more authentication information derived, The second portion of the second layer of the first protocol stack is the first link between the second node and the at least one logical entity (link) One or more data payloads are encrypted. 如請求項4所述之方法,更包含:亦在該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第一部分處導出該一或多個認證資訊;以及至少基於亦在該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第一部分處導出之該一或多個認證資訊,在該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第一部分處對該第一協定堆疊之該等層之該第二部分之一或多個資料酬載進行加密。 The method of claim 4, further comprising: deriving the one or more authentication information at the first portion of the layers of the first protocol stack; and at least based on the stack also being in the first protocol stack The one or more authentication information derived at the first portion of the layer, at the first portion of the layers of the first protocol stack, one or more of the second portion of the first stack of the first agreement stack Data payloads are encrypted. 如請求項1所述之方法,更包含自不處於該第一節點本地之一用戶辨識模組(subscriber identity module;SIM)接收該一或多個辨識資訊。 The method of claim 1, further comprising receiving the one or more identification information from a subscriber identity module (SIM) not located at the first node. 如請求項1所述之方法,其中該自該第一節點向該第二節點提供該一或多個辨識資訊係經由至少一公共密鑰加密方案執行。 The method of claim 1, wherein the providing the one or more identification information from the first node to the second node is performed via at least one public key encryption scheme. 如請求項7所述之方法,其中該公共密鑰加密方案包含自一使用者輸入接收一人工輸入之密碼。 The method of claim 7, wherein the public key encryption scheme comprises receiving a manually entered password from a user input. 如請求項8所述之方法,其中該公共密鑰加密方案包含擷取一預定義公共密鑰。 The method of claim 8, wherein the public key encryption scheme comprises extracting a predefined public key. 如請求項1所述之方法,其中該第一通訊系統包含一符合Wi-Fi標準之網路,且該第二通訊系統包含一具有一或多個eNodeB實體之符合長期演進(Long Term Evolution;LTE)標準之網路,該至少一個邏輯實體包含該一或多個eNodeB實體至少其中之一。 The method of claim 1, wherein the first communication system comprises a Wi-Fi compliant network, and the second communication system comprises a Long Term Evolution with one or more eNodeB entities. The LTE) standard network, the at least one logical entity comprising at least one of the one or more eNodeB entities. 一種用以提供與一核心網路之一連線性之無線台裝置,包含:一網路介面,用以連線至與一第二無線電技術相關聯之該核心網路; 一無線電介面,用以根據不同於該第二無線電技術之一第一無線電技術提供一開放式無線網路;一處理器;以及一非暫時性電腦可讀取媒體,與該處理器進行資料通訊並包含一或多個指令,該一或多個指令用以在由該處理器執行時,使該無線台裝置回應於該開放式無線網路之一用戶裝置請求存取該核心網路而:自該用戶裝置接收一或多個辨識資訊;至少基於該一或多個辨識資訊、經由至少該網路介面向該核心網路進行認證,其中該認證之結果會導出一或多個認證密鑰;以及至少基於該一或多個認證密鑰,經由至少該開放式無線網路建立與該用戶裝置之一安全鏈結。 A wireless station device for providing linearity with a core network, comprising: a network interface for connecting to the core network associated with a second radio technology; a radio interface for providing an open wireless network according to a first radio technology different from the second radio technology; a processor; and a non-transitory computer readable medium for data communication with the processor And including one or more instructions for, when executed by the processor, causing the wireless station device to request access to the core network in response to a user device of the open wireless network: Receiving one or more identification information from the user device; performing authentication on the core network via at least the network based on the one or more identification information, wherein the result of the authentication may derive one or more authentication keys And establishing, at least based on the one or more authentication keys, a secure link with one of the user devices via at least the open wireless network. 如請求項11所述之無線台裝置,其中該非暫時性電腦可讀取媒體更包含一或多個指令,該一或多個指令用以在由該處理器執行時,使該無線台裝置執行與該用戶裝置及該第二無線電技術唯一地關聯之一或多個軟體層。 The wireless station device of claim 11, wherein the non-transitory computer readable medium further comprises one or more instructions for causing the wireless station device to perform when executed by the processor One or more software layers are uniquely associated with the user device and the second radio technology. 如請求項12所述之無線台裝置,其中:所執行之該一或多個軟體層模擬與該用戶裝置相關聯之一呼叫堆疊(call stack)之一或多個部分;以及所執行之該一或多個軟體層用以向該第二無線電技術認證該用戶裝置。 The wireless station device of claim 12, wherein: the one or more software layers executed simulate one or more portions of a call stack associated with the user device; and the executed One or more software layers are used to authenticate the user device to the second radio technology. 如請求項12所述之無線台裝置,其中所接收之該一或多個辨識資訊係藉由一公共密鑰加密而接收;且 其中所建立之該安全連結係基於一對稱密鑰加密。 The wireless station device of claim 12, wherein the one or more identification information received is received by a public key encryption; The secure link established therein is based on a symmetric key encryption. 一種用以經由一無線台而與一核心網路進行通訊之用戶裝置,包含:一無線電介面,該無線電介面用以與一無線台進行通訊,該無線台用以與該核心網路進行通訊;一處理器;以及一非暫時性電腦可讀取裝置,與該處理器進行資料通訊並包含一或多個指令,該一或多個指令用以在由該處理器執行時,使該用戶裝置:提供一或多個辨識資訊至該無線台;自該無線台接收一或多個認證資訊;以及至少基於自該一或多個認證資訊導出之一或多個密鑰來建立與該無線台之一安全連線。 A user device for communicating with a core network via a wireless station, comprising: a radio interface for communicating with a wireless station, the wireless station for communicating with the core network; a processor; and a non-transitory computer readable device in communication with the processor and including one or more instructions for causing the user device to be executed by the processor Providing one or more identification information to the wireless station; receiving one or more authentication information from the wireless station; and establishing and communicating with the wireless station based on at least one or more keys derived from the one or more authentication information One of the safe connections. 如請求項15所述之用戶裝置,其中辨識資訊包含一長期演進(LTE)演進式封包系統(evolved Packet System;EPS)密鑰存取安全性管理實體(Key Access Security Management Entity;KASME)加密密鑰。 The user equipment of claim 15, wherein the identification information comprises a Long Term Evolution (LTE) evolved packet system (EPS) Key Access Security Management Entity (KASME) encryption key. key. 如請求項16所述之用戶裝置,更用以利用至少一個其他用戶裝置對該用戶裝置之一或多個辨識資訊之使用進行授權。 The user device of claim 16 is further configured to authorize the use of one or more pieces of identification information by the at least one other user device. 如請求項17所述之用戶裝置,其中該至少一個其他用戶裝置將該安全連線分享予該無線台。 The user device of claim 17, wherein the at least one other user device shares the secure connection to the wireless station. 如請求項17所述之用戶裝置,更用為該至少一個其他用戶裝置請求一網際網路協定(IP)位址。 The user equipment of claim 17 further requests an internet protocol (IP) address for the at least one other user device. 如請求項15所述之用戶裝置,其中該一或多個辨識資訊藉由一公共密鑰加密方案被提供至該無線台。 The user device of claim 15, wherein the one or more identification information is provided to the wireless station by a public key encryption scheme.
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