RU2722925C1 - Method for secure data exchange - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: data processing and transmission.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to data transmission and is intended for secure data communication between electronic devices over non-secure (open) communication channels using a network. Method is as follows: a first user device generates and transmits data to a first trusted device over a short-range wire communication channel or wireless communication, first trusted device receives and converts data using direct algorithmic transformation and encrypts using a symmetric encryption algorithm using a cryptographic key, then first trusted device transmits encrypted data to first user device, which receives and transmits encrypted data to a second user device over an unprotected communication channel; which transmits the received data to a second trusted device which receives, decrypts the encrypted data and transmits the converted data to the second user device in an insecure manner over a wire communication channel or short-range wireless communication.

EFFECT: high security of data transmission.

9 cl, 1 dwg

Description

The invention relates to a method for exchanging data between electronic devices via unprotected (open) communication channels using a network, for example, wireless or wired.

The Known Method for the secure exchange of data and the sharing of resources between anonymous parties [RU No. 23334362, publ. September 20, 2008], which describes a network model without central administration, according to which the transmitting computing device transmits a request to establish a physical channel with a receiving device, provides the establishment of a physical channel for transmitting data to the receiving computing device through many intermediate computing devices, without consulting with the central administering computing device, and the request to establish a physical channel contains an indication of the required quality of service, which is forcibly provided by each computing device in a variety of intermediate computing devices. The disadvantage of this method is that when transmitting data to protect them, it uses: a lot of intermediate computing devices, due to which there is a multiple change in the network structure, identification in the form of a signature, and also that routing requirements are established. In turn, the structure of a data transmission network is understood as mapping, a description of the physical and logical connections between its elements.

The closest known analogue is the method of secure data transfer between two devices [RU No. 2321179, publ. 03/27/2008], where the first device generates the first random number, which is encrypted with a secret key and then transmitted to the second device, in which it is decrypted using the public key. The second device generates a second random number, which is encrypted with the specified public key and then transmitted to the first device, in which it is decrypted using the secret key. The session key used for secure data exchange is generated based on a combination of a symmetric key and random numbers (A, B) generated and received by each of the devices. Where the first device is a security module containing an encryption key called a secret key, the second device is a receiving device containing a second encryption key called a public key, in addition, each of the devices contains a symmetric key. The disadvantage of this method is that one specific protection module can only interact with one specific receiving device, and vice versa, which is not applicable to the implementation of the method using different electronic devices that can both receive and transmit data.

The technical result consists in increasing the security of data transmission in the network via unprotected (open) communication channels between electronic devices.

The technical result is achieved in that the first user device, which is a data source, generates data by means of processor processing and transmits data to the first trusted device via a wired or short-range wireless communication channel; then the first trusted device receives the data, converts the data using the direct algorithmic conversion function by means of processor processing and encrypts it using the symmetric encryption algorithm using a cryptographic key received from the cryptographic key management device and recorded on the first trusted device, which then transfers the encrypted data to a first user device via a wired or near field communication channel; then the first user device receives the encrypted data and transmits it without change to the second user device, which is the data receiver, via an unprotected (open) communication channel; then the second user device transmits without modification the encrypted data received by it to the second trusted device via a wired or near-field communication channel; then the second trusted device accepts the encrypted data, decrypts it using the processor according to the symmetric encryption algorithm using a cryptographic key received from the cryptographic key management device and recorded on the second trusted device, converts the data through the processing means using the inverse algorithmic conversion function, and transmits the data thus transformed to the second user device in an unprotected form via a wired or near-field communication channel; then the second user device receives and processes them by means of processor processing. Moreover, cryptographic keys have a validity and / or validity period of a record specified in the cryptographic key management device, after which they become irrelevant, and the functions of direct and inverse algorithmic conversion are pre-installed and known to trusted devices, and can also be changed by two parties in the process information exchange between them.

At the same time, in order to increase the level of security of information exchange of data, the first and second trusted devices generate and transmit to the cryptographic key management device requests for cryptographic keys using their own digital signatures (descriptors), which in turn are recorded and used by the cryptographic key management device for verification the legitimacy of the first and second trusted device. Moreover, if there is no record in the memory of the cryptographic key management device with a digital signature (descriptor) value of the first and / or second trusted devices, the cryptographic key management device generates and transmits a message refusing to provide the cryptographic key; moreover, the message is sent to both the second trusted device through the second user device and the first trusted device in series through the second user device, the second trusted device, the second user device and the first user device. Moreover, when confirming the authenticity of digital signatures (descriptors) of the first and second trusted devices, the cryptographic key management device transmits a message with the values of the cryptographic keys; moreover, the message is sent to both the second trusted device through the second user device and the first trusted device in series through the second user device, the second trusted device, the second user device and the first user device.

Also, to increase the level of security of information exchange of data, the cryptographic key management device can be configured to determine the validity and / or validity of cryptographic keys due to the algorithm for updating cryptographic keys, namely, upon receipt of requests from trusted devices, the cryptographic key management device by time the relevance and / or validity of the cryptographic keys, specified in any way in the cryptographic key management device, determines the relevance and / or validity of their cryptographic keys. In turn, if the cryptographic keys are not relevant (for example, a certain period of validity and / or relevance has expired), the cryptographic key management device sends messages to the trusted devices with the current cryptographic keys in encrypted form, and the message is sent to the second trusted device through the second user device, and the message to the first trusted device is sent sequentially through the second user device, the second trusted device, the second user device and the first user device.

Thus, the user device can receive encrypted data from another user device via an open communication channel, decrypting it using a trusted device using wired or short-range wireless communication that does not have a connection to the Internet and / or public network, moreover cryptographic keys are recorded in trusted devices with a validity and / or validity period specified in the cryptographic key management device, which allows protecting data from unauthorized interference of third parties.

The method of secure information exchange of data is illustrated by the following drawings:

FIG. 1 Diagram of the process of information exchange,

where C is an unprotected (open) communication channel, A1 is the first user device, A2 is the second user device, B1 and B2 are the first and second trusted devices, respectively, B1 is the cryptographic key management device, Cp.A1 is the means of processing the data source A1 , Wed A2 - means of processing the data receiver A2, Wed B1 - means of processing the first trusted device B1, Wed B2 - means of processing the second trusted device B2, Kan. 1 - channel of wired or near field communication between the first user device A1 and the first trusted device B1, Channel 2 - channel of wired or near field communication between the second user device A2 and the second trusted device B2, Cl. 1 - cryptographic key of the first trusted device B1, Cl. 2 - cryptographic key of the second trusted device B2.

The method of secure information exchange of data is that the first user device A1, which is the data source, generates data by means of processor processing Cx.A1 and transmits data to the first trusted device B1 connected to the first user device A1 via a wired or wireless channel short range channel 1; then the first trusted device B1 receives the data, requests a cryptographic key from the cryptographic key management device B1, then the trusted device B1 converts the data using the direct algorithmic conversion function and uses encryption algorithm using the cryptographic key by means of the processing algorithm Wed. B1, transmits encrypted data to the first user device A1 via a wired or near-field communication channel of Channel 1; then, the first user device A1, which is the source of the data, receives the encrypted data and transmits them without change to the second user device A2, which is the receiver of the data, over an open communication channel; then the second user device A2 transmits, without modification, the encrypted data received by it to the second trusted device B2 via a wired or near-field communication channel Kan.2; then the second trusted device B2 receives the encrypted data, requests a cryptographic key from the cryptographic key management device B1, with which it decrypts the encrypted data by means of the processing means Ср.Б2 using the symmetric encryption algorithm, converts the data by means of the processing unit Ср.Б2 using the inverse function algorithmic conversion and transmits the data thus transformed to the second user device A2, which is the data receiver, in an unprotected form via a wired or short-range wireless channel Kan.2; then the second user device A2, which is the data receiver, receives and processes them by means of processor processing Cp. A2; moreover, cryptographic keys have a cryptographic key validity and / or validity period of cryptographic keys (for example, storage) specified in the cryptographic key management device B1, after which they become irrelevant (in particular, they are destroyed).

At the same time, to increase the level of security of information exchange, the first B1 and second B2 trusted devices generate and transmit requests to the cryptographic key management device B1 for receiving cryptographic keys using their digital signatures (descriptors), which in turn are used by the B1 cryptographic key management device for checking the legitimacy of the first B2 and second B2 trusted devices. Moreover, information about digital signatures can be recorded in the cryptographic key management device, if there is no record in the memory of the cryptographic key management device B1 with the digital signature (descriptor) value of the first B1 and / or second B2 trusted device, the cryptographic key management device B1 generates and transmits a message refusing to provide cryptographic keys to the first B1 and second B2 trusted device; wherein the rejection message is transmitted both to the second trusted device B2 through the second user device A1, and to the first trusted device B1 sequentially through the second user device A2, the second trusted device B1, the second user device A2 and the first user device A1. Moreover, when validating the digital signature of the first B1 and second B2 trusted devices, the cryptographic key management device B1 transmits a message with cryptographic key values to the first B1 and second B2 trusted device; moreover, the message is sent to both the second trusted device B2 through the second user device A2, and the first trusted device B1 sequentially through the second user device A2, the second trusted device B2, the second user device A2 and the first user device A1.

In the case of increasing the level of security of information exchange, the cryptographic key management device B1 checks the legitimacy of the second trusted device B2 by its digital signature (descriptor) received with a request for the provision of a cryptographic key; upon confirmation of the legitimacy of the second trusted device B2, it transfers the current cryptographic key Cl. 2 to the second trusted device B2 in the message encrypted with the current, on the second trusted device B2, cryptographic key Cl. 2; checks the legitimacy of the first trusted device B1 by its digital signature (descriptor) received with a request for a cryptographic key. The legitimacy of the trusted device can be verified by comparing the digital signature of the message received from the trusted device with information about the digital signature stored in the memory of the cryptographic key management device. When confirming the legitimacy of the first trusted device, B1 transmits the current cryptographic key Cl. 1 to the first trusted device B1 in a message encrypted with the current cryptographic key Cl. 1 on the first trusted device B1; moreover, to transfer the actual cryptographic key Cl. 2 of the second trusted device B2 to the second trusted device B2, the cryptographic key management device B1 transmits via an open communication channel a message encrypted with the cryptographic key Cl. 2 on the second trusted device B2, to the second user device A2, including the value of the actual cryptographic key Cl. 2 of the second trusted device B2, then the second user device A2, transmits the encrypted message it received to the second trusted device B2 without change through a wired or near-field communication channel Can 2, then the second trusted device B2 receives the encrypted message and decrypts it using the means of processor processing Ср. B2 according to the symmetric encryption algorithm using the Cl.2 encryption key that it has and saves the value of its current cryptographic key in its memory Key Cl. 2; moreover, for the delivery of the actual cryptographic key Cl. 1 of the first trusted device B1 to the first trusted device B1, the cryptographic key management device B1 transmits via an open communication channel a message encrypted with the cryptographic key Cl. 2 on the second trusted device B2, to the second user device A2, including the value of the actual cryptographic key Cl. 1 of the first trusted device B1 and the value of the cryptographic key Cl. 1 available on the first trusted device B1, then the second user device A2, transmits the encrypted message it received to the second trusted device B2 through the wire communication channel or short-range wireless communication Can.2, then the second trusted device B2 receives the encrypted message and decrypts it using the processor means Ср.Б2 according to the symmetric encryption algorithm using its cryptographic key of Cl. 2, thus extracting from the message and storing in its memory the value of the current cryptographic key of Cl. 1 of the first trusted device B1 and the value of the cryptographic key of Cl. 1 available on the first trusted device B1, then the second trusted device B2 generates a message, which includes the value of the current cryptographic key Cl. 1 of the first trusted device B1, and encrypts it using the processor processing means Wed. B2 according to the symmetric encryption algorithm using the cryptographic key Cl. 1 received from the cryptographic key management device B1 on the first trusted device B1, then the second trusted device B2 transmits the message thus generated to the second user device A2 via a wired or near-field communication channel 2, then the second user device A2 receives the encrypted message and transmits it without modification to the first user device A1 via an open communication channel, then the first user device A1 receives an encrypted message and transmits it without change to the first trusted device B1 via a short-range wire or wireless channel, Channel 1, then the first trusted device B1 receives an encrypted message and decrypts it using the processor processing means Wed. B1 according to the symmetric encryption algorithm using his existing cryptographic key Cl. 1 and saves in its memory the value of its current cryptographic key Cl. 1.

The procedure for checking the relevance of the cryptographic key is performed by means of the cryptographic key management device B1 according to an algorithm based on comparing the time elapsed since the last time the trusted device was contacted with any time specified in the cryptographic key management device B1 for the validity and / or relevance of the cryptographic key, and the control device cryptographic keys B1 generates a new value of the current cryptographic key of the trusted device when the specified validity and / or relevance period, which has passed since the previous request of the trusted device, exceeds the set validity and / or validity period of the cryptographic key. In this case, it is permissible to use other algorithms for checking the relevance of cryptographic keys.

The term of validity and / or validity of cryptographic keys is set in the cryptographic key management device B1 manually or automatically based on algorithms of different logic. After the expiration of the validity and / or validity period, the cryptographic keys can be stored on the first trusted device B1 and the second trusted device B2 until they are replaced when the cryptographic keys are updated. Thus, the first trusted device B1 and the second trusted device B2 cannot independently designate and determine the relevance and / or validity of their cryptographic keys and cryptographic keys of each other.

As a trusted device, hardware can be used to receive, process, and convert the transmitted data, in particular, a terminal or computer can be used as a trusted device.

As an algorithmic conversion of both direct and reverse, a specialized proprietary flexible algorithm stored in the memory of trusted devices can be used, and the flexibility of the algorithm lies in the fact that it can be modified in a coordinated manner by two trusted devices during data transfer using the above-described method of secure information exchange.

Means of processor processing are electronic circuits of standard construction, which includes a processor module that performs information conversion operations. The processor module can be in the form of a programmable logic integrated circuit (FPGA), in the form of a microcontroller or microprocessor of general use with the program code recorded in them, in the form of a specialized proprietary electrical circuit or microcircuit, in the form of computer hardware and software.

The above method demonstrates the case where the data source is the first user device A1 and the data receiver is the second user device A2. Otherwise, the description of the method is identical to the above, given that the data source is the second user device A2, and the receiver is the first user device A1.

Claims (9)

1. The method of secure information exchange of data is that the first user device generates and transmits data to the first trusted device via a wired or near-field wireless channel, the first trusted device receives and converts data using direct algorithmic conversion and encrypts according to the algorithm symmetric encryption using a cryptographic key received from a cryptographic key management device and recorded on a first trusted device that transmits encrypted data to a first user device via a wired or near-field wireless channel; the first user device receives and transmits encrypted data to the second user device via an insecure communication channel; which transmits the received data to a second trusted device via a wired or near field communication channel; the second trusted device receives, decrypts the encrypted data using a symmetric encryption algorithm using a cryptographic key received from the cryptographic key management device and recorded on the second trusted device, converts the data using the inverse algorithmic conversion and transmits the data thus converted to the second user device in an unprotected form via wired or near field communication; the second user device receives and processes the data. 2. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the cryptographic keys have a validity and / or validity period specified in the cryptographic key management device; 3. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the functions of the direct and inverse algorithmic conversion are installed and known to trusted devices and can be changed consistently by the first and second trusted devices. 4. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the first and second trusted devices transmit to the cryptographic key management device requests for cryptographic keys using their own digital signatures. 5. The method according to PP. 1 and 4, characterized in that the cryptographic key management device verifies the legitimacy of the first and second trusted devices by digital signatures. 6. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the cryptographic key management device generates and transmits a message with a cryptographic key or a refusal to provide a cryptographic key to both the second trusted device through the second user device and the first trusted device in series through the second user device , a second trusted device, a second user device, and a first user device. 7. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the cryptographic key management device sets the validity period of the cryptographic keys. 8. The method according to PP. 1 and 7, characterized in that the cryptographic key management device determines the relevance of cryptographic keys. 9. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the cryptographic key management device sends messages to the trusted devices with the current cryptographic keys to the second trusted device through the second user device, to the first trusted device sequentially through the second user device, the second trusted device , a second user device and a first user device.

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