RU2419153C2 - Control method of give-away factors of communication system - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: radio engineering.

SUBSTANCE: method involves formation of communication system model, simulation of give-away factors of communication system components on the basis of simulation of various types of operational failures (faults), emergency damages, failures (faults) of software of the main components of communication system; determination of set of the most informative give-away factors of components of communication system, which are subject to control, calculation of values of intelligence protection of prototype communication system, re-configuration of prototype communication system, calculation of values of reliability and completeness of control of prototype communication system, development of real communication system, measurement of values of give-away factors.

EFFECT: reducing detection and identification of give-away factors of components of communication system, reliability and completeness of control of communication system.

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Description

The proposed technical solution relates to the field of radio engineering, namely to the field of control of a communication system.

By communication system (SS) we mean the organizational and technical union of communication facilities deployed in accordance with the tasks to be solved and the adopted management system for the exchange of all types of messages (information) between points (communication centers), bodies and control objects (A.G. Ermishyan Theoretical Foundations of the Construction of Military Communication Systems in Associations, Unions, Part 1. Methodological Foundations of the Organizational and Technical Systems of Military Communications (YOU, St. Petersburg 2005, 741 pp. 71).

Under the elements of the communication system in the proposed method are understood:

communication centers (elements of communication centers, centers);

communication lines and channels formed by means of fiber-optic, wired, radio, radio relay, tropospheric, satellite communications.

A known method for initializing the simulation behavior of a technical installation and a simulation system for a technical installation (Method for initializing a simulation of the behavior of a technical installation and a modeling system for a technical installation. RF Patent No. 2213372, CL G06F 1/00, 1998). The method takes into account the real behavior of a technical object containing many components, and includes determining the circuit characteristics of the elements of the technological structure and establishing their relationship.

The disadvantage of this method is that the operator a priori does not know the unmasking signs (DMF) characteristic of the elements of the technical object, they do not consider the processes of their occurrence, there is no possibility of modeling the processes of opening the technical object and the impact on its elements.

Another method is a method for simulating an accident, diagnosing and restoring the operability of a complex technological structure and an information system for its implementation (Method for simulating an accident, diagnosing and restoring the operability of a complex technological structure and an information system for its implementation. RF patent №2252453, CL G06N 1/00 , 2004). All connections between the elements of the circuit diagram of a complex technological structure (STS) are divided into primary and backup, specify an arbitrary combination of damage to the elements of the STS, determine the value of the accident rate indicator of the state of connections between the elements of the STS, in the event of inequality of the specified indicator to the zero value, restore the operation of the STS, changing it by replacing damaged connections back-up through the active actions of the operator, determine the value of the STS performance recovery indicator and the gain They forecast the state of the altered STS. The system provides the operator with timely information on actions to restore the operability of the STS, based on the use of the existing reserve of the internal capabilities of the STS, the development of a forecast of the state of the STS and recommendations for improving the functioning of the changed STS.

The disadvantage of this method is that only the intended use of the objects is modeled, the processes of the appearance of DMP due to various failures, failures of the main elements of the STS are not considered, the informativeness of the DMP is not determined. The method has a low reliability of determining the technical condition of the STS.

A known method for simulating failures and damage to communication networks (Method for simulating failures and damage to communication networks. RF Patent No. 2351012, CL G06N 5/00, 2009), which consists in the generation of pulses that simulate the occurrence of combat damage to communications (weak, medium, strong and irrevocable), the generation of operational failures, the generation of technical maintenance (TO) communications, simulating the transition of communications in an inoperative state (in the event of failures and combat damage) or termination of work (during In the case of communication facilities), simulating the restoration of communication facilities, numbering of means, communication complexes, communication lines (channels), the communication means and complexes are numbered together from 1 to n, communication lines are numbered from 1 to d, communication channels are numbered from 1 to k. Next, imitation of the intended use of communication means and complexes is carried out, at the same time, the time of occurrence of operational failures, emergency (combat) damage and failures of communication means and complexes is generated, as well as the generation of the start time of suppression of communication lines (channels), the beginning of the next statistical implementation for a while is determined Δt corresponding to the operating time of the communication facility or complex, and a random number ξ corresponding to the number of the failed element is generated, randomly generated ith number λ corresponding to the number of the damaged element for a given distribution law, a random number μ is formed corresponding to the number of the communication medium having a software malfunction, and the beginning of the next statistical implementation for the time Δt corresponding to the start time of suppression of communication lines (channels) is this generates a random number η corresponding to the number of the suppressed communication line (channel), then the degree of damage and the number of damaged means and communication systems are drawn and, the drawing of the duration of suppression and the number of suppressed communication lines (channels), records the time spent by the means and communication systems inoperative, as well as the duration of suppression of communication lines (channels), the fact of failure, damage, failure of the means and complexes of communication and suppression is checked communication lines (channels), fixation of numbers of damaged (failed) means, complexes and numbers of suppressed communication lines (channels), verifies the operability of communication means and complexes, l Nij (channel) connection is fixed total time of finding them in the working condition T _p, and fixed total residence time means, complexes, lines (channels) due to inoperable state T _n, counts the availability factor K _g, carried imitation recovery means, complexes, communication lines (channels).

The disadvantages of the method is that it does not consider the processes of the appearance of DMF elements of a communication system that occur due to various operational failures (malfunctions), accidental damage, failures (malfunctions) of the software, detection, recognition of DMF elements and a communication system.

The closest (adopted as a prototype) in technical essence to the proposed technical solution is a method for modeling processes for ensuring technical readiness of communication networks during technical operation (Method for modeling processes for ensuring technical readiness of communication networks for technical operation and a system for its implementation. RF patent №2336566, cl G06N 1/00, 2008). In the prototype method, the circuit characteristics of the elements of a complex technological structure (STS) are determined, their relationships are established, all the connections between all the elements of the STS principle circuit are divided into main and backup, an arbitrary combination of damages to the STS elements is set, values of the accident rate indicator of the state of connections between the STS elements are determined, in the case of inequality of this indicator to a zero value, the STS is restored to operability, changing it by replacing damaged links with backup ones, determining The values of the STS performance recovery indicator are generated and a forecast of the state of the changed STS is developed, the communication network structure is described, the process of technical readiness is provided during the operation of the communication network, they simulate various types of failures, damage and malfunctions of the main elements of the communication networks; levels, and at the first level (operational), technical readiness is modeled by introducing redundant communication lines (channels), n and at the second level (operational-technical), technical readiness is modeled by introducing backup communications, at the third (technical) level, technical preparedness is modeled by recovering failed (damaged) communications, statistics are collected and the technical state of the main network elements is collected Communications, calculate the main indicators of the functioning of communication networks.

The disadvantages of the method is that the restoration (reconfiguration) of communication networks is carried out only after exposure, characteristic unmasking signs of communication network elements and DFM are not modeled due to failures, failures, damage, based on which detection, recognition of DFM and opening of communication network elements are performed, the DMP parameters are not measured on a functioning communication network; the detection, recognition, tampering, and reconnaissance of the communication network are not calculated, reliability and completeness From the control of the communication network and comparing them with the required.

The technical result of the invention is the elimination or significant reduction of the above disadvantages, including the expansion of the functionality of technical solutions to provide modeling of the processes of occurrence characteristic of the elements of the communication system of the DMF and DMP arising from operational failures (malfunctions), accidental damage, failures (failures) of software, detection, recognition of DMP elements of a communication system, increasing intelligence protection of a communication system, reliability and completeness of communication Rola communication system.

The technical result is achieved by the fact that in the known prototype method, which includes a description of the structure of the communication network, imitation of various types of failures, damage and malfunctions of the main elements of the communication system, form a model of the communication system with the characteristic unmasking signs of its elements before the start of operation. Using a model of a communication system, they imitate the occurrence of characteristic unmasking features of elements of a communication system, the processes of their detection and recognition. The appearance of unmasking signs of communication system elements is simulated based on simulating the occurrence of various types of operational failures (malfunctions), emergency damages, failures (malfunctions) of the software of the main elements of the communication system. Based on the simulation results of the communication system, a set of the most informative unmasking features of the elements of the communication system to be controlled is determined, and the value of the reconnaissance index of the modeled communication system is calculated on their basis and compared with the required value. If the intelligence protection indicator does not meet the required value, the simulated communication system is reconfigured and the process of its functioning is again imitated. If the requirements for intelligence protection are met, the values of reliability and completeness of control of the simulated communication system are calculated and compared with the required values. If the reliability and completeness of the control indicators do not meet the required values, the control parameters are changed. If the requirements are met, a real communication system is deployed, on which the values of the parameters of the unmasking features are measured, on the basis of which the reconnaissance protection index of a really functioning communication system is calculated and compared with the required value. In case of failure to comply, reconfigure a functioning communication system. If the requirements are met, the values of the indicators of reliability and completeness of control of the functioning communication system are calculated and compared with the required values. If the reliability and completeness of the control indicators do not meet the required values, the control parameters of the functioning communication system are changed.

Thanks to the new set of essential features in the method, the opportunity is realized: based on the simulation of the processes of the emergence of a DMF arising from the simulation of various operational failures (malfunctions), emergency damages, failures (malfunctions) of the software of the main elements of the communication system; simulation of SS with characteristic DMP of its elements; measuring the values of the DMF parameters on a functioning communication system; determine the most informative SS DMP reconfigure a simulated and functioning communication system, change the SS control parameters, calculate the indicators of detection, recognition of DMP SS elements, opening and reconnaissance of the communication system, the reliability and completeness of control before and during the operation of the communication system, thereby increasing reconnaissance of the communication system, reliability and completeness of control of the communication system.

This will allow you to set quantitative requirements for the detection, recognition, tampering, reconnaissance of SS, reliability and completeness of control (their optimal combination), taking into account the fulfillment of the requirements for the communication system of the older system (control system).

The analysis of the prior art allowed us to establish that analogues, characterized by sets of features that are identical to all the features of the claimed method, are absent. Therefore, the claimed invention meets the condition of patentability "novelty."

Search results for known solutions in this and related fields of technology in order to identify features that match the distinctive features of the claimed invention from the prototypes showed that they do not follow explicitly from the prior art. From the prior art determined by the applicant, the influence of the provided by the essential features of the claimed invention on the achievement of the specified technical result is not known. Therefore, the claimed invention meets the condition of patentability "inventive step". "Industrial applicability" of the method is due to the presence of the element base, on the basis of which devices that implement this method can be made.

The claimed method is illustrated by drawings, which show:

figure 1 - block diagram of the control algorithm of the unmasking signs of a communication system;

figure 2 - structure of a simulated communication system;

figure 3 - connectivity matrix of a simulated communication system;

4 is a table of the category of urgency of transmitted messages;

5 is a table of the probabilities of the occurrence of characteristic DMF elements of a communication system;

6 is a table of the probabilities of detecting DMF elements of a communication system;

Fig.7 is a probability table recognition of the DMF elements of a communication system;

Fig. 8 is a block diagram of an algorithm for simulating the occurrence of DMP based on various operational failures (malfunctions), accidental failures, failures (malfunctions) of the software of the main elements of the communication system;

Fig.9 is a block diagram of a simulation algorithm for SS with characteristic DMF of its elements;

figure 10 - representation of a communication system in the form of a queuing network.

Assessment of the intelligence capabilities of a specific object (SS element) includes two stages:

determination of the possibility of obtaining intelligence about the object (element of the SS) using various technical intelligence tools (TCP) in the given conditions - the detection process;

determining the quality of this data - the recognition process (Menshikov Yu. K. Protection of objects and information from TCP. M.: Russian University for the Humanities, 2002, 399 pp., p. 78).

Under the unmasking signs of objects (elements of the SS) understand the measured (fixed) by means of TCP parameters of the physical fields associated with the operation of the object, their species characteristics, the correspondence (or mismatch) of the material signs of the observed object to the desired, as well as the determination of the received information on the state, location of objects , the dynamics of their actions and movements (Information protection. Are you eavesdropping? Protect yourself! DB Khalyapin. - M.: NOU SHO Bayard, 2004, 432 p., p. 23).

All unmasking signs associated with radio emissions are determined by the technical characteristics of radio signals, which can be divided into the following groups: frequency, time, energy, spectral, space-energy, phase, polarization (Menshikov Yu.K. Protection of objects and information from TCP. M. : Russian University for the Humanities, 2002, 399 p., P. 169).

Under the information value (informativeness) of the DMP, it is customary to understand the totality of the meaningful measure of the information contained in it. Informative is considered DMP, which allows its understanding on the basis of accumulated knowledge. The quantitative characteristic of the information content of a sign is determined by its contribution to the result of the recognition process (opening) of the object. That is, when formulating the task of calculating the informational content of a feature, it is necessary to consider it in conjunction with the recognition of objects of the classes being evaluated (Menshikov Yu. K. Protection of objects and information from TCP. M: Russian Humanitarian University, 2002, 399 pp. 84).

The reliability of the control is understood as the degree of objective compliance of the results of the control with the actual technical condition of the object (absence or presence of DMF).

By completeness of control is meant the degree of detection of all the DMF of the controlled object.

Under the intelligence protection (intelligence protection) of a communications system is understood the property of a military communications system that characterizes their ability to withstand the corresponding types of enemy military intelligence (A. G. Yermishyan. Theoretical foundations of building military communications systems in associations, formations. Part 1. Methodological foundations of organizational and technical systems military communications. YOU, St. Petersburg 2005, 741 p., p. 345). First of all, this relates to radio intelligence. In other words, reconnaissance is a property that characterizes the capabilities of an enemy’s radio reconnaissance in extracting and processing information that describes the level of intelligence accessibility, taking into account the real properties of the radio wave propagation environment.

Real intelligence protection is understood as a property that characterizes the capabilities of the enemy intelligence subsystem to implement the information obtained by its forces and means, the totality of its strike subsystem (defeat) during the duration of the stay of reconnaissance objects in a quasistationary state (A. G. Ermishyan. Theoretical foundations of building military systems communications in associations, formations, Part 1. Methodological foundations of organizational and technical systems of military communications (YOU, St. Petersburg, 2005, 741 pp., p. 345).

Consider the possibility of implementing the claimed method.

A description is made of the structure of the communication system and the formation of a model of the communication system with the characteristic unmasking features of its elements before the start of operation. The occurrence of unmasking features of communication system elements is simulated based on the simulation of various types of operational failures (malfunctions), emergency damages, software failures (malfunctions) of the basic elements of a communication system. Using a model of a communication system, they imitate the occurrence of characteristic unmasking features of elements of a communication system, the processes of their detection and recognition. Based on the results of modeling the communication system, a set of the most informative unmasking features of the elements of the communication system to be controlled is determined, based on them, the value of the reconnaissance indicator of the modeled communication system is calculated and compared with the required value. If the intelligence protection indicator does not meet the required value, the simulated communication system is reconfigured and the process of its functioning is again imitated. If the requirements for intelligence protection are met, the values of reliability and completeness of control of the simulated communication system are calculated and compared with the required values. If the reliability and completeness of the control indicators do not meet the required values, the control parameters are changed. If the requirements are met, a real communication system is deployed, on which the values of the parameters of the unmasking features are measured, on the basis of which the reconnaissance protection index of a really functioning communication system is calculated and compared with the required value. In case of failure to comply, reconfigure a functioning communication system. If the requirements are met, the values of the indicators of reliability and completeness of control of the functioning communication system are calculated and compared with the required values. If the reliability and completeness of the control indicators do not meet the required values, the control parameters of the functioning communication system are changed.

These actions are implemented in the form of a flowchart of the control algorithm of the unmasking signs of the communication system shown in Fig. 1.

In block 1, the input data is entered. The source data are:

data on the capabilities of TCP complexes - preset probabilities: detection of DMF elements of a communication system P _obn ; recognition of the DMP elements of the communication system R _ra ;

data on the communication system: composition, structure of the communication system; connectivity matrix of a communication system; routing matrix; priority matrix of messages transmitted over the communication system;

the likelihood of the appearance of characteristic DMP elements of the communication system.

In block 2, a model of the communication system is formed with the characteristic unmasking features of its elements. The formation of a model of a communication system is a well-known procedure and is carried out according to the rules set out in the book: Ivanov E.V. Simulation of means and complexes of communication and automation. St. Petersburg: YOU, 1992 .-- 206 p., Pp. 109-124.

The formation of a model of a communication system is as follows.

The communication system is presented in the form of a graph (figure 2). A description is made of the structure of the communication system in the following sequence. Carry out the construction of the connectivity matrix of the communication system (figure 3). To do this, assign numbers to communication nodes (switching nodes), which are the vertices of the graph and communication channels (lines), which are edges of the graph. The connectivity matrix is a square m × m matrix, where m is the number of vertices of the graph describing the communication network. Inside the matrix, the numbers of the channels connecting the communication nodes are recorded.

For the structure of the communication system shown in FIG. 2, the connectivity matrix will be as shown in FIG. 3. In figure 3, zero is recorded if there is no connection.

Using the example of filling the graph and filling the matrix, the simulated channels between communication nodes are duplex. In the general case, the graph can also be oriented.

Next, the routing matrix is constructed, which is a square m × m matrix, where m is the number of graph vertices (communication node number). The number of the route along which communication between the communication nodes is to be recorded is recorded in the matrix. The filling of the matrix is carried out deterministically according to the initial data or including special search procedures on the graph, for example, the procedure according to the criterion "shortest path".

Messages transmitted over a communication system have the following main parameters:

Priorities (PR) or categories of urgency (COP);

the intensity of the input stream of the k-th category of urgency coming from the i-th to the j-th node;

message length L = {l ^k } and their distribution laws F (l ^k ), where l ^k is the average length of messages of the kth category of urgency.

To generate messages, order generators for each urgency category are used and distribution is made from source nodes to recipient nodes.

To simulate the processes of distribution of message flows from source nodes to consumer nodes, tables are constructed for each urgency category of transmitted messages (Fig. 4).

In Fig.4 P ₁ , P ₂ , ..., P _n-1 , P _n - the probability of a message in the i-th node; P ^' ₁ , P ^' ₂ , P ^' _n-1 , P ^' _n - the probability of sending a message to the i-th node.

To simulate the processes of the appearance of the DMF, characteristic of the elements of the SS, a table is constructed of the probabilities of the appearance of the i-th DMP in the j-th element of the SS (Fig. 5).

5, P ₁₁ , P ₁₂ , etc. - the probability of occurrence of the i-th DMP in the j-th element of the SS. In figure 5, zero is recorded in the event that there is no DMP for the CC element.

To simulate the processes of detection and recognition of DMF elements of the SS is built a table of probabilities of detection (Fig.6) and recognition of the i-th element of the SS (Fig.7).

In Fig.6 P _{obn 1} , P _{obn 2} , etc. - the probability of detection of the i-th DMP in the j-th element of the SS; P _{nab 1} , P _{nab 2} , etc. In Fig.7 R _{rasp 1} , R _{rasp 2} , etc. - recognition probabilities of the i-th DMP in the j-th element of the SS.

In block 3, an imitation of the occurrence of failures, failures of the SS elements and the appearance of DMF on their basis occur. The block diagram of the algorithm for simulating the occurrence of failures, failures of the elements of the SS and the appearance on their basis of the DMF is presented in Fig. 8.

Simulations of the occurrence of failures, failures of SS elements and the appearance of DMF on their basis are carried out using well-known generation (simulation) methods that depend on the type of distribution of the played variables that characterize the mathematical expectations of the time of the occurrence of external influences (Simulation modeling of communication and automation systems and complexes. Ivanov E. V. St. Petersburg: YOU, 1992. S. 9-18; System Modeling. GPSS World tools: Textbook. - St. Petersburg: BHV-Petersburg, 2004. - 368 p.).

In block 1, the input data. In block 2, the generation of the time of occurrence of operational failures (failures) (t _eo ) is carried out, in block 3, the generation of the time of occurrence of emergency damage (t _ap ) is generated; in block 4 - generation of the time of occurrence of software failures (failures) (t _opo ).

In block 5 is carried checking conditions: t _eo (t _ap, t _GCO) = 0. If the conditions for a transition unit 7, otherwise - by block 6, where t _eo (t _ap, t _GRO) is reduced by Δt. Next, go to block 5. In block 7, the condition is checked: "Simulation of the occurrence of DMP based on operational failures (malfunctions)?". If the condition is met, a transition is made to block 9, where the label "M" is assigned a value equal to "1". Otherwise, the transition to block 8 is carried out, where the condition is checked: "Simulation of the occurrence of DMP based on accident damage?" If the condition is met, a transition is made to block 10, where the label "M" is assigned a value equal to "2". Otherwise, the transition to block 11 is made, where the label "M" is assigned a value equal to "3" (Simulation of the occurrence of DMP based on software failures (failures)).

From blocks 9-11, the transition to block 12 is carried out, the time of occurrence of the DMP is generated based on: operational failures (failures) t _{dmp eo} ; accidental damage t _{dmp up} ; bounce software t _{dmp opo} .

In block 13, the conditions are checked: "t _{dmp eo} (t _{dmp ap} , t _{dmp opo} ) 0 =?" If the conditions are met, the transition to block 15, otherwise, to block 14, where t _{dmp eo} (t _{dmp ap} , t _{dmp opo} ) are reduced by Δt _dmp . Next, go to block 13.

In block 15, the occurrence of DMP is recorded due to operational failures, failures (accidental damage, failures, software failures).

In block 16, a cycle is organized to sort out the numbers of the DMP.

In block 17, the information value of the i-th DMP is assigned a random value generated by a random number generator with a uniform distribution law.

In block 18, the value of the loop variable is increased.

In block 19, the condition is checked: "i> N _DMP ?", I.e. the number of the considered DMP is greater than the number of DMP. If the conditions are met, the transition to block 20, otherwise - to block 15.

In block 20, the list of DMP is formed. In block 21, the simulation results are output.

In block 4 of the control algorithm of the unmasking signs of the communication system (Fig. 1), the SS is modeled with the characteristic DMP of its elements. The block diagram of the simulation algorithm SS with characteristic DMF of its elements is presented in Fig.9.

Modeling of a communication system is based on its presentation in the form of a mass service network (SeMO) (Fig. 10).

In block 1 of the simulation algorithm of the SS with the characteristic DMP of its elements (Fig. 9), initial data are set.

In block 2, in a simulated communication system, the transmission of messages of three categories of urgency is simulated with intensities of arrival λ ¹ , λ ² , λ ³ and average length l ₁ , l ₂ , l ₃ . The laws of the distribution of time between the receipt of applications of any category of urgency are selected based on the number of sources (subscribers) modeled in communication systems. The laws of distribution of message lengths are set taking into account their type: telegraph, fax, speech, etc.

In block 3, in the simulated communication system, its elements simulate the appearance of their characteristic DMF with the probabilities of occurrence P _{i, j} shown in Fig. 5, and the exponential law of the distribution of time between the appearance of the DMF.

In block 4, there is a fixation of the occurrence of DMF, characteristic of the elements of the SS.

In blocks 5-8, in the cases of the emergence of DMF, the values of their information content from zero to unity are determined by a random number sensor with a uniform distribution law.

In blocks 5, the DMP number is assigned "1". In block 6, the i-th DMP is assigned a value of information content from zero to unity by a random number sensor with a uniform distribution law. In block 7, the number of DMP is increased by "1". In block 8, the condition is checked: "i> N _DMP ?", I.e. the number of the considered DMP is greater than the number of DMP. If the conditions are met, the transition to block 9, otherwise - to block 6.

In block 9, the list of DMP is formed.

Next, in block 10, in the simulated communication system, the processes of detecting DMF elements of the communication system with detection probabilities are simulated: P _obn (Fig. 6) and the exponential law of the distribution of time between the occurrence of detection requests.

Then, in block 11, in the simulated communication system, the recognition processes of the DMF of the elements of the communication system with recognition probabilities are _simulated : P _dec (Fig. 7) and exponential laws of the distribution of time between the occurrence of recognition applications.

In block 12, the simulation results are output.

Next, in block 5 of the control algorithm of the unmasking signs of the communication system (Fig. 1), the autopsy rate is calculated

where K _{c s e ss} and K _{real e ss} - the number of similar (explored by the acting party) and real elements of the communication system; J is the number of elements of the communication system; R _{autopsy s j} - the probability of exposure by the acting party of the j-th element of the communication system, which is determined by the formula

where K _{c j} and K _{real j} - the number of similar (explored by the acting party) and real DMP of the j-th element of the communication system; I is the number of DMF of the j-th element of the communication system; I _{dmp i} - informativeness of the i-th DMP element of a communication system; R _{obn i} , P _{rasp i} - probabilities of detection and recognition of the i-th DMP element of the communication system by the acting party (Kremenchutsky A.L., Eryshov V.G., Starodubtsev Yu.I. Methodology for assessing the secrecy of the protection system of communication objects and informatization // Proceedings of the 8th All-Russian NPK "Actual Problems of Protection and Security. State Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences. St. Petersburg: Special Materials NGO, 2005, p.176, p.124).

In block 6, the condition is checked: "Is a determination of the set of DMP required"? If the condition is met, then go to block 7, if not, then to block 8.

. Такие ДМП считаются наиболее информативными. В результате такого отбора в блоке 7 происходит существенное сокращение количества контролируемых системой контроля параметров (ДМП). При этом обеспечивается сохранение заданного уровня информированности об объекте контроля. Это позволит минимизировать использование сил и средств контроля (измерений) и сохранить заданный уровень информативности параметров о состоянии объекта контроля.In block 7, the determination is made according to the results of the work of blocks 3, 4 of the set of the most informative DMP SS to be controlled. It includes those DMPs that have a threshold value of information value (information content) more

. Such DMPs are considered the most informative. As a result of this selection, in block 7, a significant reduction in the number of parameters controlled by the control system (DMP) occurs. This ensures the preservation of a given level of awareness about the object of control. This will minimize the use of forces and means of control (measurement) and maintain a given level of information content of the parameters about the state of the control object.

In block 8, the value of the probability indicator of reconnaissance of a communication system as a reciprocal of the probability of an autopsy is calculated using the formula (Kremenchutsky A.L., Eryshov V.G., Starodubtsev Yu.I. Methodology for assessing the secrecy of a system for protecting communication objects and informatization // Transactions 8th All-Russian NPK "Actual problems of protection and security. State Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences. St. Petersburg: Special Materials NGO, 2005, p.176, p.124):

where R _{vskr ss} - probability of opening by the acting party of the communication system.

Если условие не выполняется, то осуществляется переход на блок 10, если да, то - переход на блок 11.In block 9, the condition is checked

If the condition is not met, then go to block 10, if so, then go to block 11.

In block 10, a reconfiguration of the simulated communication system is simulated. Reconfiguration of the simulated communication system consists in: changing the structure of the simulated communication system, its topology, operating modes of lines and means of communication, putting into operation the reserve of channels, lines and means of communication, restoring damaged and failed communication means, changing the frequencies of transmission, reception, power, types signal, azimuths and types of antenna devices RES, the use of noise-protected modes, routes and the intensity of message transmission. Next, the transition to block 2.

In block 11, the indicators of reliability and completeness of control of the simulated communication system are calculated.

The calculation of the reliability indicator of the control of a simulated communication system is carried out according to the formula:

where σ _dmp is the standard deviation of the reliability of the control of the simulated communication system; N _{con.dmp.mod.ss} - the number of controlled DMP elements of the simulated communication system; ε _dmp - control accuracy of the simulated communication system by the control system.

The reliability of the control of a simulated communication system (D _{con. Mod. Ss} ) can be calculated by the well-known formula (Ivanov E.V. Simulation of means and complexes of communication and automation. St. Petersburg: VAS, 1992. - 206 p., P. 16) .

The calculation of the standard deviation of the reliability of the control of the simulated communication system is performed according to the formula:

where D _{con ss} - the reliability of the control of the simulated communication system by the control system before modeling the communication system; N _dmp.mod.ss - the number of DMP elements of the simulated communication system.

Calculation of the indicator of completeness of control (probability of control coverage by SS) of the simulated communication system is carried out according to the formula:

where N _dmp.mod.ss - the number of DMP elements of the simulated communication system;

N _{con.dmp.mod.ss} - the number of controlled DMP elements of the simulated communication system.

Если хотя бы одно из условий не выполняется, то осуществляется переход на блок 13, если одновременно выполняются оба условия, то - переход на блок 14.In block 12 there is a check for the simultaneous fulfillment of the conditions:

If at least one of the conditions is not satisfied, then the transition to block 13 is performed, if both conditions are met simultaneously, then the transition to block 14.

In block 13 there is a change in the control parameters, such as: σ _DPM - standard deviation of the reliability of the control of the simulated communication system; N _{con.dmp.mod.ss} - the number of controlled DMP elements of the simulated communication system (due to the optimization of the number of control means); ε _dmp - the accuracy of the control of the simulated communication system by the control system (due to the use of a higher accuracy class when measuring control means). Next, the transition to block 11.

In block 14, the condition is checked: "SS deployed?" If the condition is met, the transition to block 16. If the condition is not met, then the transition to block 15. Block 15 - the deployment of a real SS.

The deployment of a real SS includes the following steps: making a march to a given area; placement of SS elements on the ground, alignment of antenna mast devices, deployment of power supply systems, grounding; inclusion and adjustment of communication equipment; getting in touch; delivery of channels to subscribers. Then the transition to block 16.

Next, the SS operates with the characteristic DMP of its elements, which consists in organizing the process of transmitting, processing, switching and receiving information (messages) between subscribers of the SS with the required quality in the context of TCP reconnaissance, as well as the appearance of the DMP of the SS elements (Block 16).

In block 17, the condition is checked: "Do the SS stop functioning?" If the condition is met, then the transition to block 25 is carried out, if not, then the transition to block 18.

In block 18 there is a measurement of the values of the parameters of the DMF on a functioning SS. The control system measures the values of such parameters of SS elements (means, complexes, communication nodes), such as:

the envelope shape of the signal (the shape of the peak of the pulse, its leading and trailing edges);

spectrum of signals (the shape of the envelope of the spectrum of the signal, the width of the spectrum is the ratio of the amplitudes of the main and side lobes of the spectrum);

type of radiation, type of modulating signal;

values of signal parameters (carrier frequencies, pulse duration, pulse repetition rate, etc.);

the magnitude of the instability of the signal parameters (carrier frequency, pulse duration, repetition period);

type of polarization (linear, circular, elliptical);

radiation power;

the number of emitted fixed frequencies and the separation between them, the magnitude of the carrier deviation in frequency modulation;

mutual removal of SS elements by bearings (means, complexes, communication nodes);

the area of placement of the elements of the SS (communication nodes).

In block 19, the indicator of real intelligence protection of a functioning SS is calculated according to formulas (1) - (3).

. Если условие выполняется, то осуществляется переход на блок 22, если нет, то переход на блок 21. В блоке 21 происходит реконфигурация функционирующей системы связи, которая заключается: в изменении структуры функционирующей системы связи, ее топологии, режимов работы линий и средств связи, введением в работу резерва каналов, линий и средств связи, восстановлением поврежденных и отказавших средств связи, изменением частот передачи, приема, мощности, видов сигнала, азимутов и видов антенных устройств РЭС, использования помехозащищенных режимов, маршрутов и интенсивности передачи сообщений. Все перечисленные мероприятия направлены на полную (частичную) ликвидацию либо снижение информативности ДМП элементов СС. Далее осуществляется переход на блок 16.In block 20, the condition is checked:

. If the condition is met, then go to block 22, if not, then go to block 21. In block 21, the functioning communication system is reconfigured, which consists in changing the structure of the functioning communication system, its topology, operating modes of lines and means of communication, introducing the operation of the reserve of channels, lines and means of communication, the restoration of damaged and failed communication means, the change of transmission, reception, power, signal types, azimuths and types of antenna devices RES, the use of noise-protected modes , Routes and the intensity of the transmission of messages. All of these measures are aimed at the complete (partial) elimination or reduction of the information content of the SSF elements of the SS. Next, the transition to block 16.

In block 22, the indicators of reliability and completeness of control of a functioning communication system are calculated according to formulas (4) - (6).

In block 23 there is a check for the simultaneous fulfillment of the conditions:

Если хотя бы одно из условий не выполняется, то - переход на блок 24, если одновременно выполняются оба условия, то - переход на блок 17.

If at least one of the conditions is not satisfied, then go to block 24, if both conditions are fulfilled simultaneously, then go to block 17.

In block 24 there is a change in control parameters, such as: σ _dmp - standard deviation of the reliability of the control of a functioning communication system; N _{con.dmp.function.ss} - the number of controlled DMP elements of a functioning communication system; ε _dmp - the accuracy of the control of a functioning communication system by the control system. Next, the transition to block 22.

In block 25, the simulation results are output.

The output is a list of the most informative DMPs and the values of their informativeness of I _DMP ; probabilities: detection of P _obn and recognition of P _dec DMP elements of a communication system; autopsy and reconnaissance of the communication system P _vskr.ss , P _rz.ss , reliability D _{con. function ss} and completeness of control of a functioning communication system P _{ohv. con. function ss}

The scale of the model time is selected.

The number of implementations (runs) of the model (N) is determined:

where p is the value of a priori probability, which can be determined by preliminary tests on the model;

- значение аргумента функции Лапласа, при котором вероятность попадания случайной величины

в интервал (-t_α, t_α) равна α;

- the value of the argument of the Laplace function, at which the probability of a random variable

in the interval (-t _α , t _α ) is equal to α;

;ε is the estimation accuracy equal to

;

- оценка математического ожидания, полученная в результате моделирования;

- assessment of the mathematical expectation obtained as a result of modeling;

M (x) is the mathematical expectation of the desired parameter;

.α is the reliability of the assessment, equal to

.

Consider the possibility of achieving the formulated technical result by example.

The calculation of the degree of increasing the intelligence of the SS, the reliability and completeness of the control of the SS in the claimed method is made for the following initial data: K _{c s s s} = 8 - the number of similar (explored by the acting party) elements of the communication system; K _{peal e ss} = 10 - the number of real elements of the communication system; J = 10 - the number of elements of the communication system; To _{cx j} = 3 is the number of similar (explored by the acting party) DMF of the j-th element of the communication system; To _{real j} = 4 - the number of real DMF of the j-th element of the communication system; I = 4 - the number of DMP j-th element of the communication system; I _{dmp i} = 0.8 - information content of the i-th DMP element of a communication system; P _{obn i} = 0,8 - the probability of detecting the i-th DMP element of the communication system by the acting party; P _{rasp i} = 0,8 - the probability of recognition of the i-th DMP element of the communication system by the acting party.

.Based on the results of the simulation, the following characteristics of the simulated SS were calculated: the probability of exposure of the j-th element of the communication system by the acting party (formula (2) - Р _{opening ms s} = 0.48; probability of opening the SS (formula (1) - Р _opening = 0.384; the probability of intelligence protection (formula (3) - P _{rz ss} = 0.616, which is less than the required value -

.

After reconfiguration of the simulated communication system (Fig. 1, block 10), the following characteristics of the simulated SS were obtained: I _{dmp i} = 0.7 - information content of the i-th DMP element of the communication system; P _{obn i} = 0,7 - the probability of detecting the i-th DMP element of the communication system by the acting party; P _{rasp i} = 0,7 - the probability of recognition of the i-th DMP element of the communication system by the acting party. The probability of opening the j-th element of the communication system by the acting party is calculated (formula (2) - P _{opened ss j} = 0.322; probability of opening the SS (formula (1) - P _{opened ss} = 0.257; probability of reconnaissance (formula (3) - P _{rz .ss_rec} = 0.743, which is greater than the required value -

The calculation of the degree of increase of SS intelligence in the claimed method is made according to the formula:

Thus, the reconnaissance of the communication system in the claimed method after reconfiguration of the SS increased by 17.1%.

The calculation of the degree of increasing the reliability and completeness of monitoring the SS in the claimed method was performed for the following initial data: D _cons = 0.9 - the reliability of the control of the simulated communication system by the monitoring system before the simulation of the communication system; N _dmp.mod.ss = 40 - the total number of DMP elements of the simulated communication system; N _{con.dmp.mod.ss} = 25 - the number of controlled DMP (the most informative) elements of the simulated communication system; ε _dmp = 0.1 - the accuracy of the control of the simulated communication system by the control system.

; вероятность охвата контролем моделируемой системы связи (формула (6)): P_{охв кон мод сс}=0,625 меньше требуемой

.As a result of the calculation, we obtained: ε _dmp = 0.2 — standard deviation of the reliability of the control of the simulated communication system (formula (5)); reliability of control of a simulated communication system (formula (4)): D _{con mode ss} = 0.84 less than required

; probability of control coverage of the simulated communication system (formula (6)): P _{coverage con mode ss} = 0.625 less than required

.

; вероятность охвата контролем моделируемой системы связи (формула (6)): Р_{охв кон мод сс}=0,875 больше требуемой

After changing the control parameters (Fig. 1, block 13), the following control parameters were obtained: ε _dpm = 0.3; σ _dpm = 0.6 - standard deviation of the reliability of the control of the simulated communication system (formula (5)); N _{con.dmp.mod.ss} = 35 - the number of controlled DMP elements of the simulated communication system; reliability of the control of the simulated communication system (formula (4)): D _{con mode ss} = 0.886 more than required

; the probability of control coverage of the simulated communication system (formula (6)): P _{OHM con mode ss} = 0.875 more than required

The calculation of the degree of increasing the reliability and completeness of control of the SS in the claimed method is made according to the formulas:

Thus, the reliability of the control of the communication system in the claimed method after changing the control parameters of the SS increased by 5.16%, the completeness of the control of the SS increased by 28.57%.

The method has a high reliability of determining the technical condition of a communication system. Thus, the technical result of the claimed method is achieved.

Claims (1)

A method for controlling the unmasking signs of a communication system, including a description of the structure of the communication network, simulating various types of failures, damages and malfunctions of the main elements of the communication system, characterized in that they form a model of the communication system with unmasking signs of its elements before operation, using the model of the communication system imitate the occurrence unmasking signs of elements of a communication system, the processes of their detection and recognition, model the appearance of unmasking signs of elements of a communication system, such as communication nodes, communication lines and communication channels formed by fiber-optic, wire, radio-relay, tropospheric, satellite communications, based on simulating the occurrence of various types of operational failures (malfunctions), emergency damages, failures (malfunctions) of the software of communication system elements, by the results of modeling a communication system determine the set of the most informative unmasking features of the elements of the communication system to be monitored, and based on them, calculate the value of the intelligence index of the simulated communication system and compared with the required value, if the intelligence index does not match the required value, reconfigure the simulated communication system and re-simulate the process of its functioning, if the requirements for intelligence are met, the values of reliability and completeness of control of the simulated communication system are calculated and compared with the required values , in case of discrepancy of indicators of reliability and completeness of control to the required values, change the param If the requirements are met, deploy a real communication system, on which the parameters of the unmasking features are measured, on the basis of which the reconnaissance index of a really functioning communication system is calculated and compared with the required value, if the requirements are not met, reconfigure the functioning communication system, if they are met, calculate values of indicators of reliability and completeness of control of a functioning communication system and compare them with the required values, in s In the event of a mismatch of reliability and completeness of control with the required values, the control parameters of a functioning communication system are changed.

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