KR20190068172A - Secure Drone communication protocol - Google Patents

Abstract

According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method for authenticating an unmanned aerial vehicle comprises the steps of: generating an authentication key for authentication of the unmanned aerial vehicle; and authenticating the unmanned aerial vehicle using the generated authentication key. Meanwhile, the step of generating the authentication key may be performed using a predetermined elliptic curve password-based public key algorithm.

Description

Secure Drone communication protocol < RTI ID = 0.0 >

The present specification relates to a protocol for authenticating a drones or unmanned aircraft.

The drones are developed for military purposes for the purpose of reconnaissance and surveillance, or developed by ICT technology, and are applied in various fields such as delivery service, aerial photographing, and life saving. However, while the use of drones has skyrocketed, the threats that can occur with drones are also increasing. For example, there is a possibility of a safety accident due to privacy invasion through unauthorized shooting using drone or collision with existing air vehicles. Therefore, a system is required to authenticate the drones and authorize authorized legitimate drones to manage the drones systematically. However, conventionally there is no authentication technique for authenticating a drones. ADS-B is used as a communication protocol for drones, but it is used for the purpose of preventing collision between drones in flight. Therefore, it is required to develop an authentication protocol capable of authenticating a drones.

The purpose of this specification is to provide a drones authentication protocol to allow legitimate drones to fly and to prevent illegal drones from flying.

The present specification can provide a lightweight certificate design method for a drones. In addition, the present specification can provide a method of managing a drone ID using a designed lightweight certificate. In addition, the present specification can provide a method for designing and implementing a drone flight session key (authentication key) generation protocol. In addition, the present specification can provide a method of implementing a drones communication protocol using a flight session key (authentication key).

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided an authentication method for an unmanned aerial vehicle, including: generating an authentication key for authentication of the unmanned aerial vehicle; And authenticating the UAV by using the generated authentication key, and the step of generating the authentication key may be performed using a predetermined elliptic curve cryptography based public key algorithm.

As an embodiment, the step of generating the authentication key comprises: a base station interchanging a random number with the unmanned aerial vehicle; The base station mutually verifying the certificate with the unmanned aerial vehicle; The base station receiving an encrypted pre-authentication key from the unmanned airplane, wherein the encrypted pre-authentication key includes a pre-authentication key generated by the unmanned air vehicle using the pre-set elliptic curve cryptography- Receiving the encrypted pre-authentication key, which is generated by encrypting with a public key of a base station; Acquiring the pre-authentication key by the base station using the private key of the base station to decrypt the encrypted pre-authentication key; And generating the authentication key using the pre-authentication key, the random number generated by the unmanned aircraft, and the random number generated by the base station based on a preset key generation algorithm of the base station.

In an embodiment, the step of authenticating the UAV using the generated authentication key comprises: receiving, by the base station, a message and a first message authentication code for authenticating the UAV from the UAV, 1 message authentication code is generated by said unmanned air vehicle using said message and an authentication key of said unmanned aircraft based on a predefined hash based message authentication algorithm; The base station generating a second message authentication code using the received message and an authentication key of the base station based on the predefined hash based message authentication algorithm; And verifying that the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are identical.

According to one embodiment of the present disclosure, it is possible to fundamentally block various kinds of threats that may occur due to unauthorized flight by preventing unauthorized drones from flying indiscriminately.

In addition, various effects according to the embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings.

1 shows a master-secret (MS) generation procedure for an unmanned aerial vehicle authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 illustrates an authentication procedure between an unmanned aerial vehicle and a terrestrial base station according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 shows a low-altitude unmanned airplane certificate based on the object Internet according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4 illustrates a session key generation protocol according to an embodiment of the present invention.
5 is a flowchart showing a method of generating a session key by executing a session key generation protocol of FIG. 4 by a drone and a base station.
6 illustrates an authentication protocol using a session key according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing a method for performing authentication by executing an authentication protocol using the session key of FIG. 6 by the drone and the base station.
8 is a flowchart of a method for authenticating an unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As used herein, terms used in the present specification are taken into consideration in considering the function of the present invention. However, this may vary depending on the intention of the person skilled in the art, custom or the emergence of a new technique. Also, in some cases, there may be a term selected arbitrarily by the applicant, and in this case, the meaning will be described in the description of the corresponding embodiment. Therefore, it is intended that the terminology used herein should be interpreted relative to the meaning of the term rather than to the nomenclature of the term, and the entire content of the specification.

Furthermore, the embodiments are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and the accompanying drawings, but are not limited or limited by the embodiments.

Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

In the following, an authentication procedure / protocol in the Internet based low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle management and operation system (IoT based unmanned aerial vehicle management and operation system) proposed herein will be described. Hereinafter, the authentication protocol in the object Internet-based low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle management and operation system proposed herein may be abbreviated as an unmanned aerial vehicle authentication protocol / procedure or an unmanned aerial vehicle communication protocol / procedure.

0. Purpose

The object of the present invention is to provide an authentication process for authenticating an unmanned airplane in a system for managing and operating a low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle based on the Internet of Things, (UAVs) and identify unauthorized UAVs through key management and authentication processes. The UAVs can be used to identify unauthorized UAVs.

1. Summary of main contents

This specification defines an authentication protocol that can authenticate an unmanned airplane in a system for managing and operating a low-altitude unmanned airplane based on the object Internet. First, we outline the authentication procedure and describe the procedures necessary for unmanned aircraft authentication. It also proposes a certificate for unmanned aircraft and defines the security considerations necessary to authenticate the unmanned aircraft. (This specification defines an authentication protocol that allows for the verification of the UAVs based on UAVs. The IoT. This specification provides the overview of the authentication protocol for the authorized UAVs. Also, this standard introduces a new digital certificate format to reduce the message overhead for certificate exchange.).

2. Coverage

The present invention provides an authentication protocol (Authentication Protocol) for authenticating an authorized UAV in a system for managing and operating an UAV based on the Internet of Things. For example, in the present specification, an authentication procedure may be provided for an unmanned aerial vehicle (e. G., A drone) that weighs less than 25 kilograms and travels between 60 and 150 meters from the ground. It is possible to identify unauthorized unmanned aerial vehicles by providing an authentication procedure of an authorized unmanned aerial vehicle and to provide a safe unmanned aerial vehicle management and operation system.

3. Definitions

3.1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

In this specification, an unmanned airplane refers to a small unmanned airplane (for example, a drone) of, for example, 25 kg or less, and may operate between 60 and 150 meters. Such unmanned aircraft are obliged to possess a certificate certified by a legitimate Certificate Authority (CA) and to be informed that it is an unmanned aircraft authorized to the ground base station.

3.2. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)

In this specification, the elliptic curve cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem based on, for example, an elliptic curve theory, in which the length of a key required to provide a similar level of safety as compared with a conventional public key cryptosystem, such as RSA, May be short.

4. Acronyms

UAVs: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

GS: Base station or weather station (Ground Station)

CA: Certificate Authority

RN _C : Random Number generated by UAVs generated by unmanned aircraft.

RN _S : Random Number generated by Ground Station (RN)

PMS: Pre-master secret (random number / random number generated by unmanned aircraft) (Pre Master Secret (Random Number generated by UAVs)). The pre-master secret may be referred to as a pre-session key or pre-authentication key.

MS: Master Secret (authentication key). The master secret may be referred to as a session key or an authentication key.

CERT _C : Certificate of UAVs

CERT _S : Certificate for Ground Station

5. The unmanned aerial vehicle authentication procedure proposed in this specification

Hereinafter, the unmanned aerial vehicle authentication procedure proposed in the present specification will be described. The unmanned aerial vehicle authentication procedure enables the base station to correctly identify and manage the authorized unmanned airplane, thereby efficiently managing the path of a plurality of unmanned airplanes. In addition, unauthorized unauthorized unmanned aircraft can be identified so that they can be prepared for various security threats caused by unauthorized drones.

5.1. Outline of unmanned aircraft certification procedure

Unmanned aerial vehicle authentication procedure is performed between UAV and terrestrial base station, and each role and definition are as follows.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are subject to certification from terrestrial base stations. Unmanned aerial vehicles have devices capable of communicating with terrestrial base stations and have legitimate certificates issued by a certification authority (CA) to prove that they are authorized unmanned aircraft.

Ground station (GS): It has a certificate issued by a certification authority (CA) to prove that it is a legitimate terrestrial base station. It can verify the certificate of the unmanned airplane and authenticate the unmanned airplane.

5.2. Unauthorized aircraft authentication key generation procedure

The overall authentication process of an unmanned airplane can be divided into two stages: before the operation of the unmanned airplane (authentication key generation process) and after (authentication process). An authentication key (MS, Master Secret) between the UAV and the ground base station can be generated through a legitimate certificate issued by a CA before the operation of the UAV. After the authentication key generation is completed, the unmanned aerial vehicle and the terrestrial base station can perform mutual authentication through the generated authentication key.

Hereinafter, an authentication key generation procedure between the UAV and the terrestrial BS will be described with reference to FIG.

1 shows a master-secret (MS) generation procedure for an unmanned aerial vehicle authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment of FIG. 1, the unmanned aircraft corresponds to a client and the terrestrial base station corresponds to a server.

In the embodiment of FIG. 1, an authentication key (MS, Master Secret) generation procedure used for authentication of the UAV is shown. To authenticate an unmanned airplane, the unmanned airplane can generate an authentication key before starting the flight. The authentication key generation aims at securely generating the same authentication key. The procedure for generating the authentication key may be as follows.

1) The unmanned aerial vehicle can generate an arbitrary number / random number (RN _C ) to generate an authentication key (MS) before starting the flight and then transmit it to the terrestrial base station.

2) The terrestrial base station can generate an arbitrary number / random number (RN _S ) of the base station and transmit it to the unmanned airplane upon receiving the RN _C of the unmanned airplane.

3) When the RN _S is received from the terrestrial base station, the UAV can transmit a legitimate certificate (CERT _C ) certified by the CA to the terrestrial base station.

4) The unmanned aircraft generates a Pre-Master-Secret (PMS) for MS generation after transmitting CERT _C. Here, the PMS is an arbitrary number / random number generated by the unmanned aerial vehicle. A ground station receives the CERT _C can check whether the drone of the CERT _C legitimate certificate.

5) The unmanned airplane can encrypt the generated PMS with the public key of the terrestrial base station, transmit it, and generate the authentication key (MS). The authentication key MS is generated using an arbitrary number of PMSs generated by the UAV, an arbitrary number RN _C generated by the UAV, and an RN _S generated by the terrestrial base station, using the key generation function / algorithm PBKDF2, Can be generated.

6) Upon receipt of the encrypted PMS, the terrestrial BS decrypts it using its own private key and generates an authentication key (MS) in the same way as the unmanned airplane using the acquired PMS.

Through the above process, the unmanned aircraft and the ground base station can securely generate the same MS even in an environment using an unsecured communication channel.

5.3. Unmanned Aircraft Certification Procedure

The unmanned aerial vehicle and the terrestrial base station that securely generate the authentication key can perform mutual authentication using the authentication key (MS). The unmanned airplane can start the operation through the authentication key (MS) and request authentication with an unmanned aircraft authorized to the terrestrial base station.

5.3.1. Unauthorized aircraft - ground station authentication procedure

FIG. 2 illustrates an authentication procedure between an unmanned aerial vehicle and a terrestrial base station according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment of FIG. 2, the UAV may correspond to a client and the terrestrial BS may correspond to a server.

Referring to FIG. 2, the unmanned aerial vehicle that has started the flight can transmit a hash value (HMACms (message 1)) to the terrestrial base station using a message (message 1) and a message authentication code / algorithm. As an example, the message may include an unmanned aircraft ID value that can identify the unmanned airplane and a time stamp to know when to send the unmanned airplane.

Thus, the hash value generated using the HMAC, which is a message authentication code / algorithm, can be transmitted together to prevent the risk of the message being modulated on the unsecure communication channel. As the key used in the HMAC, an authentication key (MS) generated before the operation can be used. The terrestrial base station can confirm the contents of the received message to confirm that it is an authorized unmanned airplane, and verify the integrity of the message to confirm that the message is transmitted from the authorized unmanned airplane.

Also, terrestrial base stations can be mutually authenticated by transmitting messages through the same method as unmanned aerial vehicles. For example, the terrestrial BS can transmit a hash value (HMACms (message2)) to the terrestrial BS using a message (message2) and a message authentication code. In this case, the UAV can confirm that it is an authorized terrestrial base station by confirming the contents of the transmitted message, verify the integrity of the message, and confirm that the message is transmitted from the authorized terrestrial base station. This enables mutual authentication.

5.4. Unmanned aircraft certificate

In this specification, a new certificate is defined for an unmanned airplane, not an X.509 certificate, which is widely used for a low-altitude unmanned airplane based on the object Internet.

FIG. 3 shows a low-altitude unmanned airplane certificate based on the object Internet according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the present specification, the object Internet-based low altitude unmanned aircraft certificate may be abbreviated as an unmanned aircraft certificate or certificate.

This certificate can be used to create a certificate suitable for use on object Internet-based unmanned aerial vehicles by creating a certificate in bytes. By using this certificate, it is possible to lighten the authentication key generation procedure. The total size of the certificate is 106bytes, and the configuration is as follows. That is, the description of each field / information in the certificate is as follows.

- Version: The version of the certificate you are using

- Issuer: The CA that issued the certificate.

Validity Period: The validity period of the certificate.

- Subject: Unique ID value to identify unmanned aircraft

- Publick-key Information: public key of unmanned aircraft encoded in X.509 format

6. Security Considerations

In this specification, the UAV uses a certificate signed with the CA's private key to prove that it is legitimate, so that the ground station confirms whether the UAV is valid, whether a signature of the correct CA exists, whether it is a valid signature value Should be able to. Also, if an attacker can guess the PMS value, it can not securely authenticate, so a technique that can generate secure random numbers should be used.

## provides a protocol (dron authentication protocol) that can authenticate authorized or legitimate drones and ensure a secure communication channel between terrestrial base stations or drones. This allows legitimate drones to be authenticated, preventing undue drones from flying. Further, authentication between the terrestrial base station and the drone can be performed, so that the drones permitted to fly can be authenticated and allowed to fly.

Hereinafter, the drones authentication protocol will be described with reference to FIGS. 4 to 7. FIG. In the embodiment of FIGS. 4-7, the drones may be unmanned aircraft conforming to the authentication protocol (Unmanned Aircraft Authentication Protocol) in the above-described Internet-based low altitude unmanned aircraft management and operating system. In this case, the drone can perform the authentication procedure by executing the above-mentioned unmanned aerial vehicle authentication protocol. Therefore, this drone authentication protocol can include an authentication protocol / procedure using (1) a session key (authentication key) generation protocol / procedure and (2) a session key (authentication key) have. In the present specification, the dron authentication protocol may be referred to as a drone communication protocol, an unmanned aircraft authentication protocol. In Figs. 4 to 7, the description overlapping with the description of Figs. 1 to 3 will be omitted.

On the other hand, the feasibility of the drones authentication protocol according to an embodiment of the present invention can be verified through experiments. At this time, for example, phyton can be used as an implementation code.

Also, in the drone communication protocol according to an embodiment of the present invention, for example, a socket may be used for communication between the drones and the base station, and an os.urandom () function supported by the internal library may be used .

Also, as a certificate for authentication between the drone and the base station, a newly defined lightweight certificate (for example, a lightweight certificate suitable for dron authentication based on x509 certificate) may be used. By way of example, this lightweight certificate may be of the same or similar form as the unmanned aircraft certificate of FIG. Thus, the lightweight certificate may include all or some of the fields included in the unmanned aerial vehicle certificate of FIG.

As a public key algorithm for certificate signing, for example, an elliptic curve cryptosystem digital signature algorithm (ECC DSA), which is a public key algorithm based on an elliptic curve cryptosystem, may be used. , SECT283R1 can be used.

As a library for the ECC DSA, for example, PyElliptic can be used. Also, for example, PBKDF2 may be used as a key generation algorithm / function for generating an MS (Master-Secret) as an authentication key to be used for the HMAC which is a message authentication code. In this case, the random number (RN _C ) generated by the drone and the random number (RN _S ) generated by the base station can be used as a salt, and the PMS (Pre-Master-Secret) MS can be generated by Iteration 1024 times.

Also, for example, SHA-256 (HMAC SHA-1) can be used as a hash algorithm (hash-based message authentication algorithm) using a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).

Hereinafter, a session key generation protocol (authentication key generation procedure) will be described with reference to FIGS. 4 and 5. FIG.

4 illustrates a session key generation protocol according to an embodiment of the present invention. The embodiment of FIG. 4 shows a protocol for generating a session key between a drone, which is a client, and a base station, which is a server. This session key generation protocol can be executed before the drones are operated (before the operation).

Referring to FIG. 4, the protocol / procedure for generating a session key may include the following steps.

First, before beginning a flight, drones can transmit the random number (RN _C) generated, and the generated random number (RN _C) around the base station. The random number (RN _C ) generated by the drones may be referred to as a droning random number (RN _C ).

Drone a base station receives the random number (RN _C) may transmit the random number (RN _S) a random number (RN _S) generated, and to generate a drone. The random number (RN _S ) generated by the base station may be referred to as the base station random number (RN _S ).

The drones receiving the base station random number (RN _S ) may send the drones' certificate (CERT _C ) to the base station. This dron's certificate (CERT _C ) corresponds to a legitimate certificate issued by a drones pre-operation certification authority (CA). The dron's certificate (CERT _C ) can be referred to as a dron certificate (CERT _C ).

The base station receives the drone certificate (CERT _C) can be verified whether or not the issued normally drone certificate (CERT _C) (legitimate) certificate. That is, the base station can perform the verification procedure for the drone certificate (CERT _C ).

If the certificate is OK, the base station can send the base station's certificate (CERT _S ) to the drones. The certificate (CERT _S ) of this base station corresponds to a legitimate certificate issued by a certification authority (CA). Certificate (CERT _S) of the base station may be referred to as a base station certificate (CERT _S).

The drones receiving the base station certificate (CERT _S ) generate a Pre-Master-Secret (PMS), which is any number / random number, and the PMS is based on a pre-established public key algorithm (e.g., ECC DSA based on elliptic curve cryptography) (Epubs (PMS)), that is, encrypted PMS (Epubs (PMS)) to the base station by using the public key of the base station.

The base station receiving the encrypted value / PMS (Epubs (PMS)) can acquire the PMS by decrypting it using its own private key.

The base station that has acquired the PMS can generate or calculate a Master-Secret (MS) using a Duron random number (RNc), a base station random number (RNs), and a PMS based on a preset key generation algorithm (e.g., PBKDF2). At this time, as described above, the PMS (Pre-Master-Secret) can be used as a password, the Duron random number (RN _C ) and the base station random number (RN _S ) can be used as a salt, and the MS can be generated by Iteration 1024 times.

The drones can also generate or compute the MS in the same way. That is, the drones can also generate or calculate a Master-Secret (MS) using a Done RNc, a RNs, and a PMS based on a preset key generation algorithm (e.g., PBKDF2).

Thus, since the drones and the base station have the same MS, session key generation is completed. Through this process, the drones and base stations can securely create the same MS even in environments using unsecure communication channels.

5 is a flowchart showing a method of generating a session key by executing a session key generation protocol of FIG. 4 by a drone and a base station. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method of generating a session key by executing a session key generation protocol of FIG. 4. FIG. 5 (b) is a flowchart of a session key generation protocol of FIG. A flowchart showing how to generate a key is a flowchart. In the embodiment of FIG. 5, the steps of the method in which the drone and the base station execute the session key generation protocol to generate the session key will not be described in conjunction with FIGS. 1 and 4.

Referring to Figure 5 (a), first, drones can transmit the random number (RN _C) generated, and the generated random number (RN _C) to the base station.

Next, the drones can receive the base station random number RN _S from the base station.

When a base station random number (RN _S ) is received, the drones may receive a base station certificate (CERT _S ) from the base station. Alternatively, if the base station random number RN _S is not received, the drones may wait until receiving the base station random number RN _S.

When a base station certificate (CERT _S ) is received, the drones can verify the base station certificate (CERT _S ). Alternatively, if a base station certificate (CERT _S ) is not received, the drones may wait until receiving a base station certificate (CERT _S ).

If the base station certificate (CERT _S ) is not verified, the drones may terminate the session key generation process. Alternatively, if the base station certificate (CERT _S ) is verified, the drones may send a drone certificate (CERT _C ) to the base station. The drones may also send a signed certificate (CERT _C ).

Next, the drones can generate the PMS and transmit the encrypted PMS to the base station.

Next, the drones can calculate or generate an MS.

Referring to FIG. 5 (b), a base station can receive a droning random number (RN _C ) from a drones.

If the drone random number (RN _C) is received, the base station can generate the base station the random number (RN _S), and send the base station the random number (RN _S) to the drone. Alternatively, if a Drona random number RN _C is not received, the base station can wait until it receives a Drains random number (RN _C ).

Next, the base station can transmit the base station certificate (CERT _S ) to the drone.

Next, the base station can receive the dron certificate (CERT _C ). In addition, the base station may receive a signed dron certificate (CERT _C ).

When a drone certificate (CERT _C ) is received, the base station can verify the drone certificate (CERT _C ). Alternatively, if a drone certificate (CERT _C ) is not received, the base station may wait until it receives a drone certificate (CERT _C ).

If the dron certificate (CERT _C ) is verified, the base station can verify the signed dron certificate (CERT _C ). Alternatively, if the drone certificate (CERT _C ) is not verified, the base station may terminate the session key generation process.

If the signed dron certificate (CERT _C ) is verified, the base station can receive the encrypted PMS. Alternatively, if the signed dron certificate (CERT _C ) is not verified, the base station may terminate the session key generation process.

If an encrypted PMS is received, the base station can compute the MS. Alternatively, if no encrypted PMS is received, the base station may wait until it receives the encrypted PMS.

Through such a process, since the drones and the base station have the same MS, session key generation is completed. Through this process, the drones and base stations can securely create the same MS even in environments using unsecure communication channels.

In the embodiment of FIG. 5, after the drones verify the base station certificate (CERT _S ), it transmits the dron certificate (CERT _C ) to the base station, but is not limited thereto. For example, as in the embodiment of FIG. 4, the drones may send a drone certificate (CERT _C ) to the base station prior to receipt and verification of the base station certificate (CERT _S ).

In the embodiment of FIG. 5, the drones have transmitted both the dron certificate (CERT _C ) and the signed dron certificate (CERT _C ) to the base station, but are not limited thereto. For example, as in the embodiment of FIG. 4, the drones may send only one dron certificate (CERT _C ) to the base station.

Next, an authentication protocol (authentication procedure) using the session key will be described with reference to Figs. 6 and 7. Fig.

6 illustrates an authentication protocol using a session key according to an embodiment of the present invention. The embodiment of FIG. 6 shows an authentication protocol using a generated session key between a client, a drone, and a server, which is a server. The authentication protocol using the session key can be executed after the drones start flight (navigation) after generating the session key.

Referring to FIG. 6, an authentication protocol / procedure using a session key may include the following steps. In the embodiment of FIG. 6, for example, SHA-256 (HMAC SHA-1) can be used as a Hash algorithm using HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) as described above.

First, after starting the flight, the drones can generate a message to signal that they are legitimate drones. In order to authenticate the generated message, the drone calculates the message authentication code HMAC (MS, Message) using the session key (MS) and transmits the message and the message authentication code HMAC (MS, Message) have. The message generated by the drones may be referred to as a drones message.

The base station receiving the Drones message calculates the message authentication code HMAC (MS, Message) using the received message and its own session key (MS) and verifies whether the value is equal to the value transmitted from the drone, You can authenticate legitimate drones. For example, as described above with reference to FIG. 2, the base station can check the contents of the received message to confirm that the corresponding drones are authorized (legitimate) drones, verify the integrity of the message, Message.

When the drone message is verified, the base station can also mutually authenticate by transmitting the message in the same way as the drone. For example, when a message is verified, the base station can generate a message of the base station. In order to authenticate the generated message, the base station calculates the message authentication code HMAC (MS, Message) using the session key (MS) and transmits the message and the message authentication code HMAC (MS, Message) have. The message generated by the base station may be referred to as a base station message.

The drones that have received the base station message calculate the message authentication code HMAC (MS, Message) using the received message and the session key (MS) held by the drones, and verify whether the value is equal to the value transmitted from the base station The base station can be authenticated. For example, the drones can check the contents of the received message to confirm that the corresponding base station is an authorized (legitimate) base station, verify the integrity of the message, and confirm that the message is a message transmitted from the base station to which the message is applied.

If the base station message is verified, the drones can determine that the authentication (or mutual authentication) has been successful.

Since the authentication protocol using the session key can encrypt a message using a session key (MS), it has an advantage that efficient and secure communication is possible by using a symmetric key encryption method.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing a method for performing authentication by executing an authentication protocol using the session key of FIG. 6 by the drone and the base station. FIG. 7A is a flowchart showing a method of performing authentication by the drones by executing the authentication protocol using the session key of FIG. 6, and FIG. 7B is a flow chart of the authentication protocol using the session key of FIG. This is a flowchart showing how to execute and perform authentication. In the embodiment of FIG. 7, the steps of the method of performing authentication by executing the authentication protocol using the session key by the drone and the base station will not be described in conjunction with FIG. 2 and FIG. 4.

Referring to FIG. 7 (a), first, the drones can generate a message (MSG) of the drones for authentication.

Next, the drones can calculate the message authentication code HMAC (MS, MSG) for the message (MSG) of the drones.

Next, the drones can transmit the message (MSG) of the drones and the message authentication code HMAC (MS, MSG) thereto. The message of a drone can be called a drone message. In addition, the message authentication code for the Dron message may be referred to as a Dron message authentication code or a first message authentication code.

Next, the drones can receive the message (MSG) of the base station from the base station.

When a message (MSG) is received, the drones can verify the message (MSG). Alternatively, if a message (MSG) is not received, the drones may wait to receive a message (MSG).

When the message (MSG) is verified, the drones can determine authentication success for the base station. Alternatively, if the message (MSG) is not verified, the drones may terminate the authentication procedure.

Referring to FIG. 7 (b), the base station can receive the message (MSG) of the drones from the drones.

When a message (MSG) is received, the base station can verify the message (MSG). Alternatively, if no message (MSG) is received, the base station may wait until it receives a message (MSG).

When a message (MSG) is verified, the base station can generate a message (MSG) of the base station. Alternatively, if the message (MSG) is not verified, the base station may terminate the authentication procedure.

Next, the base station can calculate the message authentication code HMAC (MS, MSG) for the message (MSG) of the base station.

Next, the base station can transmit the message (MSG) of the base station and the message authentication code HMAC (MS, MSG) thereto. The message of the base station may be referred to as a base station message. The message authentication code for the base station message may also be referred to as a base station message authentication code or a second message authentication code.

Since the authentication procedure can encrypt a message using a session key (MS), it has an advantage that efficient and secure communication is possible by using a symmetric key encryption method.

The drones authentication protocol according to an embodiment of the present invention can be utilized as a protocol for authentication between a drone and a base station. In addition, the dron authentication protocol can be used to identify unauthorized / illegal drones. In addition, the dron authentication protocol can be utilized to ensure message integrity between the drone and the base station.

8 is a flowchart of a method for authenticating an unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention. In FIG. 8, the description overlapping with the description of FIGS. 1 to 7 will be omitted.

Referring to FIG. 8, the method for authenticating an unmanned airplane may include generating an authentication key for authenticating an unmanned airplane (S810) and authenticating the unmanned airplane using the generated authentication key (S820). As an embodiment, generating an authentication key (S810) may be performed using a preset elliptic curve cryptography based public key algorithm (e.g., ECC DSA).

As an embodiment, in step S810 of generating an authentication key, the base station can exchange random numbers with the unmanned aerial vehicle. For example, as described above, the base station can exchange the random number with the unmanned airplane by receiving the random number generated from the unmanned airplane from the unmanned airplane and generating and transmitting the random number of the base station to the unmanned airplane.

Next, the base station can mutually verify the unmanned aircraft and the certificate. For example, as described above, the base station can receive and verify the certificate of the unmanned airplane from the unmanned airplane, and transmit the certificate of the base station to the unmanned airplane. The certificate of the base station transmitted to this unmanned aircraft can be verified by an unmanned aerial vehicle. Through this, the certificates can be mutually verified.

Next, the base station can receive the encrypted pre-authentication key (PMS) from the unmanned air vehicle. At this time, the encrypted pre-authentication key can be generated by encrypting the pre-authentication key generated by the unmanned airplane with the public key of the base station using a preset elliptic curve cryptography-based public key algorithm. As an example, the pre-authentication key may be a random number generated by an unmanned aerial vehicle.

Next, the base station can obtain the pre-authentication key by decrypting the encrypted pre-authentication key using the private key of the base station.

Next, the base station can generate an authentication key (MS) using a pre-authentication key, a random number generated by the unmanned aircraft, and a random number generated by the base station based on a preset key generation algorithm (e.g., PBKDF2).

As an embodiment, in step S820 of authenticating an unmanned aircraft, the base station may receive a message and a first message authentication code for authenticating the unmanned aircraft from the unmanned aircraft. At this time, the first message authentication code is a hash-based message authentication code generated by the unmanned airplane, and can be generated by using the message generated based on the pre-defined hash-based message authentication algorithm and the authentication key of the unmanned airplane have. As an example, the above-described HMAC SHA-256 may be used for a predefined hash-based message authentication algorithm.

Next, the base station can generate a second message authentication code using the received message and the base station's authentication key based on a predefined hash-based message authentication algorithm. The second message authentication code may be generated by using the received message and the authentication key of the base station based on a predefined hash-based message authentication algorithm, which is a hash-based message authentication code generated by the base station. As an example, the above-described HMAC SHA-256 may be used for a predefined hash-based message authentication algorithm.

Next, the base station can verify whether the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are identical. This allows the base station to authenticate the unmanned airplane and verify the integrity of the message transmitted from the unmanned airplane.

Although the drawings have been described for the sake of convenience of explanation, it is also possible to combine the embodiments described in the drawings to design a new embodiment. In addition, the display device can be applied to not only the configuration and the method of the embodiments described above as being limited, but the embodiments described above can be applied to a display device in which all or some of the embodiments are selectively combined .

While the present invention has been particularly shown and described with reference to exemplary embodiments thereof, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the disclosed exemplary embodiments, but, on the contrary, It should be understood that various modifications may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Claims (3)

A method for authenticating an unmanned aircraft,
Generating an authentication key for authentication of the unmanned air vehicle; And
Authenticating the unmanned air vehicle using the generated authentication key,
Wherein the generating of the authentication key is performed using a preset elliptic curve cryptography based public key algorithm. The method according to claim 1,
Wherein the generating the authentication key comprises:
Exchanging a random number with the unmanned airplane;
The base station mutually verifying the certificate with the unmanned aerial vehicle;
The base station receiving an encrypted pre-authentication key from the unmanned airplane, wherein the encrypted pre-authentication key includes a pre-authentication key generated by the unmanned air vehicle using the pre-set elliptic curve cryptography- Receiving the encrypted pre-authentication key, which is generated by encrypting with a public key of a base station;
Acquiring the pre-authentication key by the base station using the private key of the base station to decrypt the encrypted pre-authentication key; And
Generating the authentication key using the pre-authentication key, a random number generated by the unmanned aircraft, and a random number generated by the base station based on a key generation algorithm preset by the base station, . The method according to claim 1,
Wherein authenticating the unmanned air vehicle using the generated authentication key comprises:
Receiving, by the base station, a message and a first message authentication code for authenticating the unmanned aircraft from the unmanned airplane, wherein the first message authentication code is generated by the unmanned airplane based on a predefined hash- Message and an authentication key of the unmanned aerial vehicle;
The base station generating a second message authentication code using the received message and an authentication key of the base station based on the predefined hash based message authentication algorithm; And
And verifying that the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are identical.

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