KR102111327B1 - Integrity verification system for boot process in linux and update and integrity verification method of managed machine - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to an integrity verification system for a booting process in a Linux environment and a method for update and integrity verification of a terminal for management. An objective of the present invention is to provide a system and a method capable of maintaining integrity for a computing device. According to an embodiment of the present invention, the integrity verification system includes a verification server which is linkable to a terminal for management, and reflects updated information of the terminal for management in integrity verification for a booting process by an integrity management unit. The integrity management unit includes: a storage unit to manage a private key for integrity verification and binary values of a bootloader and a kernel for the terminal for management; an update unit to estimate trusted platform configuration register (t-PCR) values and whitelist values in accordance with the binary values, and store the estimated whitelist values in a database of the verification server; and a kernel generation unit to generate a PCR-signed kernel for integrity verification of the booting process based on the t-PCR values. The terminal for management includes a processor to use the PCR-signed kernel transferred from the kernel generation unit to verify the integrity of the booting process.

Description

INTEGRITY VERIFICATION SYSTEM FOR BOOT PROCESS IN LINUX AND UPDATE AND INTEGRITY VERIFICATION METHOD OF MANAGED MACHINE}

The present invention relates to an integrity verification system for a booting process in a Linux environment and an update and integrity verification method for a management terminal. More specifically, it maintains integrity by reflecting an update of the management terminal, and is hacked by a malicious user. Or, it relates to a system and method for distinguishing modifications from updates so that secure integrity verification can be performed in the entire boot process.

As fatal security attacks such as Specter and Meltdown occur in computer environments, system administrators are continually deploying security updates and patches. Applying security updates protects the system by sharing the same goals as maintaining integrity.

However, the two take a contradictory approach. The integrity-preserving method protects the system by preventing it from making unintended modifications, but security updates attempt to mitigate the vulnerability by modifying the system. Due to this paradox, applying a security update creates a problem that integrity cannot be maintained.

Intel's Trusted Execution Technology (TXT), which is one of the conventional integrity maintenance methods, is difficult to modify the settings for integrity verification when updating the system, and it is possible to bypass integrity verification when attacking Grub, one of the bootloaders. The problem exists.

In addition, Intel's Open CIT verifies the integrity of the system through a third-party authentication remote verification method, but the update itself is not considered, it is vulnerable to direct hacking by malicious users, and there is no configuration for update management function. There is.

That is, using the conventional integrity maintenance methods, it is possible not only to distinguish between the update and the modification by the malicious user, but also a problem that the integrity cannot be verified due to the modification or change of the system according to the update.

In addition, the conventional integrity maintenance methods are suitable for the Windows environment, not the Linux environment, and the integrity and reliability of the entire boot process are improved due to the direct modification and attack on the boot loader, the problem that the boot process proceeds even if the integrity is not guaranteed. There are problems that cannot be secured.

Republic of Korea Patent Publication No. 10-2006-0094171 (2006.08.29)

The present invention is to solve the problems as described above, by remotely managing the security update for the computer device in the Linux environment, and by allowing to reflect the update in the integrity verification process, to maintain the integrity of the computer device It is an object to provide a system and method.

In addition, by comparing the result of measuring the entire boot process using the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and the PCR value included in the digital signature of the kernel, a system that enables robust integrity verification of all boot processes in the Linux environment and The purpose is to provide a method.

The integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention can be interlocked with the management terminal, and is verified by reflecting the update information of the management terminal to the integrity verification for the booting process through the integrity management unit Including the server, the integrity management unit includes a private key for integrity verification and a storage unit that manages the binary values of the kernel and bootloader for the management terminal and the binary values. Estimate the whitelist value and the trusted Paltform Configuration Register (t-PCR) value, and verify the integrity of the boot process based on the update unit and t-PCR value that stores the estimated whitelist value in the verification server database. It includes a kernel generation unit for generating a PCR signature kernel (PCR-signed kernel), the management terminal, the PCR signature kernel delivered from the kernel generation unit Use may include a processor to verify the integrity of the boot process.

The update unit according to an embodiment of the present invention may estimate a white list value and a t-PCR value through an extended operation of a PCR value using a predetermined secure hash algorithm (SHA).

The PCR signature kernel according to an embodiment of the present invention may include a digital signature storing a t-PCR value encrypted with a kernel image and a private key.

The processor according to an embodiment of the present invention may perform verification of a binary value for the first boot loader using a public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal in a predetermined secure boot environment. have.

The processor according to an embodiment of the present invention measures PCR values for the first boot loader and the second boot loader using a Trusted Platfrom Module (TPM) in a predetermined secure boot environment, and the entire booting process of the management terminal It can generate a chain-of-trust value representing.

The processor according to an embodiment of the present invention may perform decryption on the digital signature of the PCR signature kernel using the public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal, and extract the t-PCR value.

The processor according to an embodiment of the present invention performs integrity verification of the boot process by comparing the extracted t-PCR value with a trust chain value indicating the entire boot process of the management terminal, and performs a t-PCR value and the trust chain You can only allow the kernel to run during the boot process if the values match.

An update method of a management terminal of an integrity verification system for a booting process in a Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention, when an update of a new kernel is requested from a management terminal to a verification server, the verification server Checking the registration information of the management terminal in the storage unit of the integrity management unit, based on the registration information of the management terminal identified in the update unit of the integrity management unit Whitelist value and t-PCR (trusted Paltform) for updating Configuration Register) estimating the value and generating the PCR signature kernel (PCR-signed Kernel) for updating based on the t-PCR value estimated by the kernel generating unit of the integrity management unit, and managing the generated PCR signature kernel It may include the step of passing to.

In the step of estimating the whitelist value and the t-PCR value in the update method of the management terminal of the integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention, the update unit performs a predetermined security hash algorithm (Secure Hash List Algorithm (SHA) can be used to estimate the white list value and t-PCR value through the extended operation of the PCR value.

In the method for verifying the integrity of the management terminal of the integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention, the processor of the management terminal performs firmware of the management terminal in a predetermined secure boot environment. Performing verification of the binary value for the first boot loader using a public key stored in the processor, the processor using a Trusted Platfrom Module (TPM) in a predetermined secure boot environment, the first boot loader and the second Measuring the PCR value for the bootloader and generating a chain-of-trust value representing the entire booting process of the management terminal, the processor signing the PCR using the public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal Decrypting the digital signature of the kernel, extracting the t-PCR value, and indicating the entire booting process of the management terminal and the extracted t-PCR value by the processor Comparing the confidence value chain may include the step of performing integrity verification of the boot process.

In the integrity verification of the booting process in the integrity verification method of the management terminal of the integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention, the processor performs the t-PCR value and the trust chain value. Only if this match can the kernel be run during the boot process.

On the other hand, according to an embodiment of the present invention, it is possible to provide a recording medium readable by a computer recording a program for executing the above-described method on a computer.

According to the system and method provided as an embodiment of the present invention, unlike conventional integrity remote verification, it is possible to distinguish malicious modification or update of a client (ie, a terminal for management), and frequently reflects the update status of the client in real time. The integrity of the client can be maintained and maintained even during updates.

In addition, according to the system and method provided as an embodiment of the present invention, a hardware environment, a basic input output system (BIOS), a boot loader (ex. Shim, Grub, etc.), a command of the executed boot loader and a binary of the operating system kernel By verifying, you can protect the integrity of the entire boot process in the Linux environment and ensure a robust and verified boot environment.

1 is a block diagram of an integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 is a conceptual diagram showing an operation process of a verification server according to an embodiment of the present invention.
3 is a block diagram of a PCR signature kernel according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an update process of a management terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention.
5 is a block diagram showing an operation process of a processor of a management terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention.
6 is a table showing changes in PCR values according to a boot configuration of an integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
7 is a table showing changes in white list values based on an update of the integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
8 is a flowchart illustrating a method for updating a terminal for managing an integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
9 is a flowchart of a method for verifying integrity of a terminal for managing an integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Terms used in the specification will be briefly described, and the present invention will be described in detail.

The terminology used in the present invention has been selected, while considering the functions in the present invention, general terms that are currently widely used are selected, but this may vary according to the intention or precedent of a person skilled in the art or the appearance of a new technology. In addition, in certain cases, some terms are arbitrarily selected by the applicant, and in this case, their meanings will be described in detail in the description of the applicable invention. Therefore, the terms used in the present invention should be defined based on the meanings of the terms and the contents of the present invention, not simply the names of the terms.

When a part of the specification "includes" a certain component, this means that other components may be further included instead of excluding other components, unless specifically stated to the contrary. In addition, terms such as "... unit", "module", and "processor" described in the specification mean a unit that processes at least one function or operation, which is implemented in hardware or software, or a combination of hardware and software. Can be implemented.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings so that those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains can easily practice. However, the present invention can be implemented in many different forms and is not limited to the embodiments described herein. In addition, in order to clearly describe the present invention in the drawings, parts irrelevant to the description are omitted, and like reference numerals are assigned to similar parts throughout the specification.

Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

1 is a block diagram of an integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a conceptual diagram showing an operation process of the verification server 100 according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 1, an integrity verification system for a booting process in a Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention is provided through a management terminal 200 and an integrity management unit 110 corresponding to a computer device requiring integrity verification It may include a verification server 100 for reflecting the update information of the management terminal 200 in the integrity verification for the boot process.

That is, the integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention registers the management terminal 200 through the verification server 100 and immediately reflects and manages updates to the registered management terminal 200. At the same time, it is possible to maintain the integrity of the boot process in the Linux environment by performing remote authentication, which enables integrity verification to be performed.

The above-described verification server 100 manages the management terminal 200 through the integrity verification unit, and the integrity verification unit transparently updates the management terminal 200 and unintended verification errors due to the update in the integrity verification process. Can be prevented.

Referring to FIG. 1, another integrity management unit 110 according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a private key for integrity verification and a kernel and bootloader for a management terminal 200. The storage unit 111 manages the binary value of the, whitelist value according to the binary value and estimates the value of the trusted Paltform Configuration Register (t-PCR), and verifies the estimated whitelist value by the server 100 ) Includes an update unit 112 stored in the database 120 and a kernel generation unit 113 generating a PCR-signed kernel for verifying the integrity of the booting process based on the t-PCR value. Can be.

Referring to FIG. 2, the storage unit 111 according to an embodiment of the present invention manages registration information for remote verification of the management terminal 200 and is owned for encryption by the integrity management unit 110 itself The private key and end-of-life (EOL) can manage valid kernel and boot loader binary values that are not specified. That is, since the information on the management terminal 200 registered in the storage 111 and the binary values of the kernel and boot loader are managed, the verification server 100 completely controls the software used in the management terminal 200. can do.

In addition, the storage unit 111 according to an embodiment of the present invention, the update unit 112 and the kernel generation unit 113 for distribution of integrity values for integrity management and integrity verification of the management terminal 200 Provide binary values. The update unit 112 may estimate the white list value and the t-PCR value, which is a reference value of integrity verification, based on the binary value provided from the storage unit 111.

Referring to FIG. 2, the update unit 112 according to an embodiment of the present invention updates the whitelist value by reflecting the update information of the management terminal 200 and estimates the t-PCR value as the integrity value It can be delivered to the kernel generator 113. The white list value referred to herein is data for managing the update of the registered management terminal 200. Referring to FIG. 2, the measurement configuration included in the white list value is the entire management terminal 200. Refers to the manifest of an instruction sequence similar to the boot process. In addition, the t-PCR value is an integrity value that is a criterion for integrity verification of the management terminal 200 and refers to a good integrity value calculated by extending the entire booting process declared in the measurement configuration.

The update unit 112 according to an embodiment of the present invention may estimate the white list value and the t-PCR value, which is a reference value of integrity verification, based on the binary value provided from the storage 111. Estimation of the t-PCR value may be performed through an extended operation of PCR values using a predetermined secure hash algorithm (SHA).

For example, the updater 112 may estimate the white list value and the t-PCR value through the extended operation as shown in [Equation 1] according to the above-described measurement configuration.

[Equation 1]

At this time, the H () function is a hash function of a Trusted Platfrom Module (TPM) device, calculates a SHA-256 hash algorithm, and corresponds to a concatenation operator. Referring to [Equation 1] described above, the expansion operation is performed by using the PCR value of the previous step and the data of the current step to expand the integrity value (ie to derive the t-PCR value reflecting the update information). do.

The whitelist value estimated through the above-described calculation process is transmitted to the database 120 of the verification server 100 and updated, so that the verification server 100 manages the update of the management terminal 200 registered in the system. Can be. In addition, the t-PCR value as the integrity value reflecting the update is transmitted to the management terminal 200 through the kernel generation unit 113, so that integrity verification reflecting the update can be performed through the system.

Referring to FIG. 2, the kernel generation unit 113 according to an embodiment of the present invention is a configuration for generating a PCR signature kernel including the t-PCR value generated by the update unit 112. The PCR signature kernel referred to herein refers to a unique kernel containing integrity information of the management terminal 200 registered in the system. The kernel generator 113 includes the t-PCR value in the form of an encrypted signature in the kernel, rather than in the form of a normal digest hash, thereby further enhancing the security of the integrity value and in contrast with the conventional integrity verification method. Alternatively, integrity verification can be performed for the entire boot process.

For example, the kernel generation unit 113 may encrypt the t-PCR value transmitted from the update unit 112 using the private key transmitted from the storage unit 111. The kernel generation unit 113 may combine the encrypted t-PCR value with the digital signature, and add it to the kernel binary value that generates the PCR signature kernel. Through this process, the kernel generation unit 113 may generate a PCR signature kernel in which an encrypted t-PCR value is signed.

3 is a block diagram of a PCR signature kernel according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 3, the PCR signature kernel according to an embodiment of the present invention may include a digital signature storing a t-PCR value encrypted with a kernel image and a private key. The kernel image corresponds to a necessary configuration for the execution of the kernel, and the digital signature corresponds to a signature value including a t-PCR value encrypted with a private key by the kernel generator 113. The PCR signature kernel configured as described above may be transferred from the kernel generation unit 113 to the management terminal 200 and used, and the management terminal 200 may perform t-PCR through duplication of the digital signature of the PCR signature kernel. The value can be extracted and used in the integrity verification process.

Hereinafter, an update process of the management terminal 200 by the verification server 100 will be described in more detail based on the foregoing.

4 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an update process of the management terminal 200 according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 4, first, the storage for the kernel update defined in the management terminal 200 may be set as the storage 111 of the integrity management unit 110 of the verification server 100. Accordingly, when a new kernel is distributed (ie, when an update to the kernel needs to be performed), the storage unit 111 of the integrity management unit 110 transmits a notification about performing the update to the new kernel to the management terminal 200 Can be.

When an update is requested from the management terminal 200 receiving the notification to the verification server 100, the storage 111 of the integrity management unit 110 of the verification server 100 receives registration information of the management terminal 200. Can be confirmed. Through this, it is possible to check whether it corresponds to the true management terminal 200 using the system according to an embodiment of the present invention, and the verification server 100 can transparently recognize the update status of the management terminal 200. have.

After the registration information of the management terminal 200 is confirmed, the update unit 112 of the integrity management unit 110 of the verification server can set the measurement configuration and estimate the t-PCR value. This is performed based on the binary value transmitted from the storage 111, and the whitelist value is updated along with the t-PCR value, so that the verification server 100 maintains the latest update information for the management terminal 200. Can be.

The t-PCR value estimated by the update unit 112 is transmitted to the kernel generation unit 113, and the kernel generation unit 113 encrypts the t-PCR value with a private key to generate a PCR signature kernel, which is wired / wireless network. It can be distributed to the management terminal 200 through.

Through this process, the management terminal 200 may perform an update for the new kernel and acquire a PCR signature kernel that reflects the update information, and perform integrity verification based on the modified information in the boot process even after the update.

Referring to FIG. 1, the management terminal 200 according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a processor 210 that verifies the integrity of a booting process using a PCR signature kernel transmitted from the kernel generator 113 can do. That is, the processor 210 performs integrity verification in the entire boot process using the PCR signature value transmitted from the verification server 100 as shown in FIG. 2, and executes the operating system of the management terminal 200 according to the verification result You can decide whether or not.

5 is a block diagram illustrating an operation process of the processor 210 of the management terminal 200 according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Hereinafter, the integrity verification process by the processor 210 will be described in more detail with reference to FIG. 5.

Referring to FIG. 5, the processor 210 according to an embodiment of the present invention uses a public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal 200 in a predetermined secure boot environment using a public key. You can verify the binary value for the boot loader.

For example, the processor 210 uses the public key stored in the firmware in the UEFI secure boot environment to identify components (eg, Grub bootloader, OS kernel and Initrd) for booting the Linux environment. The boot loader shim boot loader can be adopted. The first boot loader, the shim boot loader, defines a firmware key verification function called shim lock verification. That is, the processor 210 can verify components for booting the Linux environment with a public key stored in the firmware using shim lock verification.

Here, the public key stored in the firmware corresponds to the private key of the above-described verification server 100, and can be used to decrypt the integrity value transmitted from the verification server 100. At this time, the management terminal 200 may receive the public key from the verification server 100 in advance in the registration process with the system and store it in the firmware database.

The processor 210 according to an embodiment of the present invention measures the PCR values for the first boot loader and the second boot loader by using the TPM in a predetermined secure boot environment, and the entire boot of the management terminal 200 You can create a chain-of-trust value that represents the process.

The TPM is a security module that configures and stores hash values for the integrity information of the software and important system state information that are executed at each critical execution stage from the boot stage. There are a plurality of PCRs that store measurement values for integrity verification in the TPM, and the processor 210 according to an embodiment of the present invention can extend and use PCRs by a predetermined number.

For example, the processor 210 may use PCR0 to PCR12 of the TPM, and values stored through each PCR may be defined as in [Table 1] below.

[Table 1]

Referring to [Table 1], additional TPM measurement for integrity verification may be additionally performed on the first boot loader, the shim boot loader, and the second boot loader, the Grub boot loader. That is, in order to accurately measure the binary value of each of the PCRs described in [Table 1], measurements on initrd, Grub bootloader and kernel included in the shim bootloader can be performed.

Referring to [Table 1], the PCR values for BIOS and hardware configuration are continuously measured from PCR0 to PCR7 in the UEFI secure boot environment through TPM, the first bootloader shim bootloader and the second bootloader Grub boot Measurements of PCR values for the loader can be extended from PCR 8 to PCR 12. Finally, the integrity hash value of the entire boot process by the shim boot loader and the grub boot loader in the UEFI secure boot environment can be stored in PCR12, which corresponds to the trust chain value representing the entire boot process. At this time, the integrity hash value (= confidence chain value) of PCR12 measured through the TPM may be used as a comparison value for integrity verification as shown in FIG. 5.

Referring to FIG. 5, the processor 210 according to an embodiment of the present invention performs decryption on a digital signature of a PCR signature kernel using a public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal 200 and t- PCR values can be extracted. Since the public key corresponds to the private key of the verification server 100, the processor 210 can derive the t-PCR value through decryption of the t-PCR value included in the digital signature of the PCR signature kernel. The derived t-PCR value can be used as a reference value for integrity verification.

Referring to FIG. 5, the processor 210 according to an embodiment of the present invention compares the extracted t-PCR value with a confidence chain value representing the entire booting process of the management terminal 200 to integrity the booting process Verification can be performed. For example, when the t-PCR value matches the confidence chain value (eg, the integrity hash value of PCR12 measured using TPM), the processor 210 may allow the rest of the booting process to proceed. On the other hand, if the t-PCR value does not match the confidence chain value (ex. The integrity hash value of PCR12 measured using TPM), it is determined that a security problem has occurred and it can be controlled to prevent further booting. . That is, the processor 210 may allow execution of the kernel in the boot process only when the t-PCR value and the confidence chain value match.

Hereinafter, with reference to FIGS. 6 and 7, the experimental results for the above-described integrity verification system will be described.

6 is a table showing changes in PCR values according to a boot configuration of an integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention. That is, Figure 6 shows the change of the PCR value according to the hardware, BIOS configuration and the executed kernel.

Referring to FIG. 6, comparison of A and B shows a change in PCR value due to kernel update. As a result of updating the hardware, it can be confirmed that PCR8, PCR11 and PCR12 are changed because the binary contents and the kernel loading command have been modified.

Comparison of B and C shows the change in PCR value due to BIOS modification. Accordingly, it can be confirmed that PCR7 and PCR12 are changed. In addition, as the secure boot environment is turned off, verification of the shim boot loader using the firmware key is deactivated, so it can be confirmed that the measurement for PCR 11 has not been performed.

Comparison of C and D shows the change by hardware having different PCR values for PCR1 and PCR5. Since A, B, C and D all used the same Grub binary and module, it can be confirmed that the measured values of PCR9 and PCR10 are all the same.

Through the above-described comparison, it can be seen that as each boot condition is changed, the values of PCR12 have unique values. That is, it can be confirmed that integrity verification with enhanced security compared to the prior art can be performed through the measurement value of the unique PCR12 indicating the entire booting process.

7 is a table showing changes in whitelist values based on an update of the integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention. That is, FIG. 7 shows a result of verifying whether to update the white list value and the integrity value.

To simplify the verification process, experiments were performed on PCR12 excluding the rest of the PCR, and the measurement configuration was defined according to the booting process of Ubuntu 16.04.

7A is a database 120 of whitelist values before update, B of FIG. 7 is a calculation result of t-PCR values, and C of FIG. 7 is database 120 of updated whitelist values. 7C, it can be confirmed that the estimated t-PCR value is reflected on the database 120 according to the update contents. That is, it can be confirmed that the updated items by the integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention are reflected in the white list value and the integrity value of t-PCR.

8 is a flowchart of a method for updating a terminal 200 for managing an integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 8, an update method of the management terminal 200 of the integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention is performed from the management terminal 200 to the verification server 100. When an update for a new kernel is requested, checking the registration information of the management terminal 200 in the storage 111 of the integrity management unit 110 of the verification server 100 (S110), the integrity management unit ( Estimating the whitelist value for updating and the trusted Paltform Configuration Register (t-PCR) value based on the registration information of the management terminal 200 identified in the update unit 112 of 110 (S120) And a PCR signature kernel for updating based on the t-PCR value estimated by the kernel generation unit 113 of the integrity management unit 110, and the generated PCR signature kernel for the management terminal 200 It may include the step of passing to (S130).

In the step (S120) of estimating the whitelist value and the t-PCR value in the update method of the management terminal 200 of the integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention, the update unit ( 112) may estimate the white list value and the t-PCR value through the extended operation of the PCR value using a predetermined secure hash algorithm (SHA).

9 is a flowchart of an integrity verification method of a terminal 200 for managing an integrity verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 9, in the integrity verification method of the management terminal 200 of the integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention, the processor 210 of the management terminal 200 Performing a verification of the binary value for the first boot loader using a public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal 200 in a predetermined secure boot environment (S210), processor 210 ) Measures a PCR value for the first boot loader and the second boot loader using a Trusted Platfrom Module (TPM) in a predetermined secure boot environment, and a chain of trust indicating the entire booting process of the management terminal 200 Step of generating a value of -of-trust (S220), the processor 210 decrypts the digital signature of the PCR signature kernel using the public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal 200, and t-PCR Step of extracting the value (S230) and the processor It may include the step (S240) of performing integrity verification of the boot process by comparing the extracted t-PCR value with the trust chain value representing the entire boot process of the management terminal 200.

In the step of performing integrity verification of the booting process in the integrity verification method of the terminal 200 for managing the integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment according to an embodiment of the present invention (S240), the processor 210 Only when the t-PCR value and the confidence chain value match can the kernel be executed during the boot process.

With respect to the method according to an embodiment of the present invention, the contents of the above-described system may be applied. Therefore, with respect to the method, descriptions of contents identical to those of the above-described system are omitted.

On the other hand, according to an embodiment of the present invention, it is possible to provide a recording medium readable by a computer recording a program for executing the above-described method on a computer. In other words, the above-described method can be written in a program executable on a computer, and can be implemented in a general-purpose digital computer that operates the program using a computer-readable medium. Further, the structure of the data used in the above-described method can be recorded on a computer-readable medium through various means. It should not be understood that a recording medium that records an executable computer program or code for performing various methods of the present invention includes temporary objects such as carrier waves or signals. The computer-readable medium may include a storage medium such as a magnetic storage medium (eg, ROM, floppy disk, hard disk, etc.) or an optical read medium (eg, CD-ROM, DVD, etc.).

The above description of the present invention is for illustration only, and those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains can understand that the present invention can be easily modified into other specific forms without changing the technical spirit or essential features of the present invention. will be. Therefore, it should be understood that the embodiments described above are illustrative in all respects and not restrictive. For example, each component described as a single type may be implemented in a distributed manner, and similarly, components described as distributed may be implemented in a combined form.

The scope of the present invention is indicated by the following claims rather than the detailed description, and all changes or modifications derived from the meaning and scope of the claims and their equivalent concepts should be interpreted to be included in the scope of the present invention. .

100: verification server 110: integrity management
111: storage unit 112: update unit
113: kernel generation unit 120: database of the verification server
200: management terminal 210: processor

Claims (12)

In the integrity verification system for the boot process in the Linux environment,
It is possible to interwork with the management terminal, and includes a verification server that reflects the update information of the management terminal to the integrity verification for the boot process through the integrity management unit,
The integrity management unit,
A storage unit that manages a private key for integrity verification and a binary value of a kernel and a bootloader for the management terminal;
An update unit for estimating a whitelist value and a trusted Paltform Configuration Register (t-PCR) value according to the binary value, and storing the estimated whitelist value in a database of the verification server; And
And a kernel generation unit generating a PCR-signed kernel for verifying the integrity of the booting process based on the t-PCR value.
The management terminal,
And a processor for verifying the integrity of the boot process using the PCR signature kernel delivered from the kernel generator.
According to claim 1,
The update unit,
An integrity verification system characterized by estimating the whitelist value and t-PCR value through an extended operation of PCR values using a predetermined secure hash algorithm (SHA).
According to claim 1,
The PCR signature kernel,
And a digital signature in which a t-PCR value encrypted with the kernel image and the private key is stored.
According to claim 1,
The processor,
Integrity verification system, characterized in that for performing a verification of the binary value for the first boot loader using a public key (Public Key) stored in the firmware (Firmware) of the management terminal in a predetermined secure boot environment.
According to claim 1,
The processor,
Chain-of-trust indicating the entire booting process of the management terminal by measuring PCR values for the first boot loader and the second boot loader using a Trusted Platfrom Module (TPM) in a predetermined secure boot environment. ) A system for verifying integrity characterized by generating a value.
According to claim 1,
The processor,
Integrity verification system, characterized in that decrypting the digital signature of the PCR signature kernel using the public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal, and extracting the t-PCR value.
The method of claim 6,
The processor,
Integrity verification of the boot process is performed by comparing the extracted t-PCR value with a trust chain value representing the entire boot process of the management terminal,
An integrity verification system characterized in that the kernel is allowed to be executed in the booting process only when the t-PCR value and the trust chain value match.
In the method of updating the terminal for managing the integrity verification system for the booting process in the Linux environment,
When an update for a new kernel is requested from the management terminal to a verification server, checking registration information of the management terminal in a storage unit of the integrity management unit of the verification server;
Estimating a whitelist value and a trusted Paltform Configuration Register (t-PCR) value for the update based on the identified registration information of the management terminal in the update unit of the integrity management unit; And
Generating a PCR signature kernel (PCR-signed Kernel) for the update based on the estimated t-PCR value in the kernel generation unit of the integrity management unit, and passing the generated PCR signature kernel to the management terminal Kernel update method comprising a.
The method of claim 8,
In the estimating the white list value and t-PCR value,
Kernel update method, characterized in that the update unit estimates the white list value and the t-PCR value through an extended operation of a PCR value using a predetermined secure hash algorithm (Secure Hash Algorithm, SHA).
In the integrity verification method of the management terminal of the integrity verification system for the boot process in the Linux environment,
The processor of the management terminal performs verification of the binary value for the first boot loader using a public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal in a predetermined secure boot environment;
The processor measures PCR values for the first boot loader and the second boot loader using a Trusted Platfrom Module (TPM) in a predetermined secure boot environment, and a chain of trust indicating the entire booting process of the management terminal (Chain- generating a value of-trust);
A step in which the processor decrypts the digital signature of the PCR signature kernel using a public key stored in the firmware of the management terminal, and extracts a t-PCR value; And
And comparing the t-PCR value extracted by the processor with the trust chain value representing the entire booting process of the management terminal, and performing integrity verification of the booting process.
The method of claim 10,
In the step of performing integrity verification for the boot process,
And the processor allows execution of the kernel during the boot process only when the t-PCR value and the trust chain value match.
A computer-readable recording medium in which a program for implementing the method of any one of claims 8 to 11 is recorded.

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