KR101934444B1 - A Managing Method Of The Integrity Data of Documents Or Securities - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention is suitable for extracting a hash value by using main information of a concealed document in a two-dimensional bar code and an encryption key and is capable of proving integrity of a document by comparing a sampled hash value with a hash value of a lower part of a two-dimensional bar code or comparing a hash value existing in a block chain. According to the present invention, a method for managing integrity data of a document and securities makes difficult visual identification of an encryption key which encrypts main information of a document by concealing in a two-dimensional bar code and has a lower possibility of forgery because the concealed encryption key is not delivered or is lost partially in copying, and is capable of proving whether a document is not an original copy.

Description

[0001] The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for managing the integrity and data of documents and securities,

The present invention relates to a method for managing integrity data of a document and securities, and a two-dimensional barcode is generated by using an encryption key concealing method, and it is possible to determine whether a document is forged or falsified, And a method for managing integrity data of documents and securities using a block chain that maintains the integrity of the document by maintaining a public book.

In the case of securities such as certificates, transcripts, certificates, contracts (including electronic documents and output documents) and checks, there are many cases in which the content of the securities is forged or altered, or the content of the output document is modified. This results in the loss of personal property of the victim and the problem of the reliability of the market economy system being degraded

 In the case of an apostate, it is signed or stamped in order to prove its authenticity, but it is authenticated after the document through emotions by imitating the signature or forging the seal. In the case of an official document, there is a case where a forgery-proof device such as an authenticity check device is provided using an encrypted two-dimensional bar code (Ex. QR code, etc.). However, the possibility of modulation can not be excluded. In addition, due to the popularization of high-performance office automation equipment, counterfeit currency and counterfeit checks are produced and exercised, causing damage. In order to prevent this, financial institutions are equipped with a forgery and identification device, but it is expensive, and the insecurity of the public can be increased due to the limitation of discrimination between sophisticated modulation and counterfeiting.

In addition, a financial institution that manages an individual's property, or a certification body performing work such as authenticating a document, focuses the financial information and integrity information on a central server so that a third party can not tamper with the information . Because of this feature, data is managed by replication or distributed processing to prevent loss or tamper of information, and thorough security management policy is introduced.

However, the concealment and centralization of such information causes a problem that the subject of information management becomes a single failure point, and soon, when a malicious attack on the central database succeeds, it leads to personal injury immediately.

Therefore, the present invention adopts a block chain technique to solve such a single point of failure, thereby not disclosing and centralizing information but allowing information to be disclosed and created to anyone and forming a chain between the information When some information is tampered with, integrity of other information connected to the chain is broken so as to maintain full integrity.

Korea Patent Office Registration No. 10-1796690 Korea Patent Office Registration No. 10-1680540

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided an information processing method comprising: hiding main information of an original document in a two-dimensional bar code and outputting a slightly different color pattern to a part of an Align Key existing in the two- And to provide an integrity data management method of a document and securities using a block chain which is capable of forming a document integrity verification system using an encryption key concealment so that it is difficult to observe with the naked eye and is not transmitted during copying.

In addition, the present invention introduces a block-chain technique so that information can be disclosed and created to anyone, and when a certain information is modulated in the middle by forming a chain between the information, the integrity of other information connected to the chain is broken The present invention provides a method for managing integrity data of documents and securities using a block chain that maintains integrity of an entire document and verifies the same.

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method of extracting a hash value using key information and an encryption key of a document hidden in a two-dimensional barcode, and extracting the extracted hash value from a hash value at the lower end of the two- Or to compare the hash values present in the block chain to verify the integrity of the document.

In addition, the method of managing the integrity data of the document and the securities is characterized in that integrity can be verified through offline and online.

In addition, a method of managing integrity data using offline includes a main information extraction step (S110) of extracting main information by analyzing an upper side of a two-dimensional code portion of an original document that needs authenticity;

An encryption key extracting step (S120) of extracting information on the encryption key hidden in the Align key by using the key information extracted in the key information extracting step (S110)

A hash value extraction step (S130) of calculating a hash value using the key information and the encryption key extracted in the key information extraction step (S110) and the encryption key extraction step (S120);

A forgery verification code extraction step (S140) of extracting a forgery verification code through a signature located under the photographed two-dimensional code;

And a step S150 of verifying the integrity of the barcode and forging the barcode by comparing the hash value extracted in the hash value extracting step S130 with the hash value extracted in the forbidden verification code extracting step S140.

In addition, the main information extracted in the main information extracting step (S110) is formed in the form of a plain text on the upper side of the two-dimensional code. In the case of the price information, the main information includes a serial number, an amount, .

In the encryption key extracting step (S120), the Align key formed at the corner of the two-dimensional bar code is interpreted in a clockwise direction from the upper left corner. The Align key is a binary code of 0 and 1 And is calculated as a total of 24 digits.

In addition, the Align key is divided into four hexadecimal digits, and the last 4 bits become parity bits so that the Align key can be used for validity verification of the previous 5 digits.

In addition, the forgery falsification confirmation step S150 may verify the integrity of the data by comparing the hash value calculated through the key information extracted from the upper side of the photographed two-dimensional code and the encryption key with the hash value extracted from the lower side of the two- .

Also, the on-line integrity data management method verifies the integrity of data using a block chain provided to a plurality of nodes,

A step (S210) of synchronizing a node containing a whole block chain with a node synchronizing adjacent nodes;

A cryptographic key generation step (S220) of generating a cryptographic key using key information about a two-dimensional barcode inputted from the node;

 A hash value detection step (S230) of detecting a hash value using the cryptographic key extracted in the cryptographic key generation step (S220);

 A hash value in a block for searching an intra-block hash value to search for whether the hash value detected in the hash value detection step S230 exists in the block;

 And a block chain integrity checking step S250 of determining whether the integrity of the document has been verified by determining whether the entire block is searched and the chain is broken in the hash value search step S240 in the block.

In addition, the node transmits the newly generated block information to neighboring nodes, so that even if a newly generated block is added, all nodes can maintain the same block chain.

In the encryption key generation step S220, the encryption key interprets the Align key formed at the corner of the two-dimensional bar code in the clockwise direction from the upper left corner, and the Align key is defined as a fine yellow halftone dot, And a total of 24 digits is calculated as a binary number.

In addition, the Align key is divided into four hexadecimal digits, and the last 4 bits become parity bits so that the Align key can be used for validity verification of the previous 5 digits.

In the hash value retrieving step (S240), the block may store a hash value of document main information of a plurality of users.

The block chain integrity checking step S250 checks the integrity of the block chain using the block hash calculated in the block header,

The block hash may contain a block hash value of a previous block in all blocks except for a genesis block, and when a block is deformed, a block hash is changed. That is, a previous block block hash and a back block block hash So that the integrity of the block can be confirmed.

According to the embodiments of the present invention as described above, it is difficult to visually identify a key for encrypting key information of a document in a two-dimensional barcode, and the hidden encryption key is not transferred to the copy in the copying process, So that the possibility of forgery and falsification is low and it can be used to prove that it is not original.

In addition, when proof of integrity of a document is required, the present invention performs encryption using the encryption key hidden in the two-dimensional bar code and the document key information existing at the upper end of the barcode, extracts the hash value of the encryption key, The barcode integrity can be verified by comparing with the value of the barcode, and this can be performed in offline by means of the software and the app provided without connection of the Internet network.

In addition, the present invention can not be falsified by a data management subject because it is the entire participant who generates information / access to information by constructing a block chain of an additional integrity verification information on-line, Since it is stored in the form of a public book and is publicly available to all users who use the system, transparent management of information is ensured, thereby improving the trust of the user and enhancing the reliability of the integrity verification information by a large number of users.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS FIG. 1 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an integrity data management system for a document and a security using a block chain according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram schematically illustrating a verification server included in a document and securities integrity data management system using a block chain according to an embodiment of the present invention.
3 is a view schematically showing a two-dimensional barcode for extracting an encryption key and a hash value from a verification server of a document and securities integrity data management system according to an embodiment of the present invention,
FIG. 4 is a block diagram schematically illustrating a block included in an integrity data management system of a document and a security using a block chain according to an embodiment of the present invention.
5 is a flowchart illustrating an offline integrity verification method using an integrity verification code according to an embodiment of the present invention,
6 is a diagram schematically illustrating an offline integrity verification method using an integrity verification code according to an embodiment of the present invention,
7 is a flowchart illustrating an online integrity checking method using a block chain according to an embodiment of the present invention.

While the invention is susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof are shown by way of example in the drawings and will herein be described in detail. It is to be understood, however, that the invention is not to be limited to the specific embodiments, but includes all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention. Like reference numerals are used for like elements in describing each drawing.

The terms first, second, A, B, etc. may be used to describe various elements, but the elements should not be limited by the terms. The terms are used only for the purpose of distinguishing one component from another. For example, without departing from the scope of the present invention, the first component may be referred to as a second component, and similarly, the second component may also be referred to as a first component. And / or < / RTI > includes any combination of a plurality of related listed items or any of a plurality of related listed items.

It is to be understood that when an element is referred to as being "connected" or "connected" to another element, it may be directly connected or connected to the other element, . On the other hand, when an element is referred to as being "directly connected" or "directly connected" to another element, it should be understood that there are no other elements in between.

The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. The singular expressions include plural expressions unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In this specification, terms related to "comprising "," having ", and the like are intended to specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, parts, or combinations thereof, But do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, or combinations thereof.

Unless otherwise defined herein, all terms used herein, including technical or scientific terms, have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. Terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the contextual meaning of the related art, and are not to be construed as ideal or overly formal, unless explicitly defined herein.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS FIG. 1 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an integrity data management system for a document and a security using a block chain according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG.

1, the integrity data management system includes a plurality of nodes 100, a verification server 200 that extracts key information of an original document, encrypts the extracted information, and provides the extracted hash value to the block, And a block chain (300) for recording the information collected from the mobile terminal (200) in a block chain.

The integrity data management system includes a hash value extractor for extracting a hash value extracted from an encryption key hiding key information of a document and securities connected to each other in a block chain and providing the hash value to a node, And it searches each block in the block chain based on the hash value of the key information and the encryption key, and finds a block that matches the document information hash in the block. Accordingly, if the block is searched and the chain is not in a broken state, the document is judged to be verified as having integrity.

At this time, the block chain inserts the block header value of the "block candidates " into the hash function, and returns the nonce value of the block header until the execution result is less than the " So that integrity can be maintained through the process of changing.

The node 100 refers to a PC or a server, and is connected to a block-chain network to collect all block information.

The node 100 is divided into a full block chain node and a lightweight node. The full block chain node is a node having all the functions. It has all block information up to the newly generated block, and collects and stores all block chain information.

Since the light node does not have all of the block information and does not have all the block information, it is necessary to inform the flow node of the block information To ensure that this transaction is a verified transaction.

The reason for distinguishing between the pool node and the light node is that, in the case of a desktop having a good storage capacity, all data may be stored, but in the case of a mobile, all data can not be stored.

At this time, the node 100 includes a terminal of a personal terminal, a financial institution that manages the property of an individual, or a terminal of a certification authority that performs tasks such as authenticating a document.

The verification server 200 extracts key information of the original document, generates an encryption key, encrypts the information, extracts a hash value of the encrypted result, outputs the key information and the hash value as a two-dimensional barcode, As shown in FIG. 2, the encryption key used in the process hides in the generated barcode, and includes a main information collection unit 210, a cryptographic key generation unit 220, and a hash value calculation unit 230.

As shown in FIG. 3, the two-dimensional bar code has secret keys encapsulated at three corners of the left and right upper and lower left corners, main information of the document is inserted in the form of a plain text on the upper side of the two- A confirmation code is inserted to confirm forgery and falsification. If the hash value extracted from the key information and the encryption key is different from the value of the forgery verification code located at the lower side of the two-dimensional bar code, the hash value is judged to be a modulated document.

The main information collecting unit 210 collects important information about securities such as a certificate, a transcript, a certificate, a contract (including an electronic document and an output document) and a check, Use barcodes to collect key information.

The key information is the key information about the document or securities. In case of the price information, it includes the serial number, the amount, the issuing institution, the issuing point, etc. It is a two-dimensional code (QR code, for example) Output.

The encryption key generating unit 220 generates an arbitrary secret key that is hidden in an Align Key used for recognizing the two-dimensional code as the information collected by the main information collecting unit 210, (210).

The cryptographic key is generated using an 18-digit hexadecimal key and converted into a binary number, and the Align Key concealed by the cryptographic key is concealed in three places and the six keys in each Align Key in binary form. Dimensional code is printed in a color similar to the color of the Align Key of the printed two-dimensional code by the configuration of the hidden signature information so that the information is eliminated during copying. In detecting the fine information, the fine brightness difference is detected and calculated using the self- .

For example, as shown in FIG. 3, it can be interpreted as 10011001010110000010 1000 in the clockwise direction from the upper left corner, and it can be converted into hexadecimal and converted into 995828 by dividing by four digits. In this case, the last 4 bits (underlined part, 8) are used for validity of the preceding 5 digits with parity bits. The parity is expressed as 0 when the number of 1s present in 5 digits is odd and 1 when 1 is odd. If the parity bit verification fails, it is treated as a barcode recognition error. If there is no problem with the parity bit, the three alignment keys existing in the entire two-dimensional bar code are connected in the order of left top, right top and left bottom except for the parity bits So that the entire encryption key can be generated.

  In the present invention, a method of concealing information in an Align Key has been described as an example. However, since it is a technique using only a small brightness difference, it can be applied to the inside of a QR code.

The hash value calculation unit 230 calculates the hash value of the key information and signature encrypted using the key information collected in the key information collection unit 210 and the encryption key generated in the encryption key generation unit 220 And stores it.

The hash value calculated by the hash value calculator 230 is provided to a block of the block chain 300 to be described later so that the hash value can be stored in the block.

In addition, the hash value calculated by the hash value calculation unit 230 can be verified by comparing the hash value with the forgery verification code of the document to verify whether the document is forged or falsified, so that the integrity of the document can be verified offline or online .

The block chain 300 includes a plurality of blocks, and the block includes a transaction unit, a header unit, and a block hash. The transaction unit includes a plurality of transaction records. The header unit includes additional data for security. A block hash is created by inserting all the data in the header. Therefore, if there is any change in the header part of the block hashing, the block hash will naturally change.

4, the block header includes a version of the current block chain structure, a block hash of the previous block, a hash of the document key information, a block generation time, a block generation difficulty, and nonce information.

The hash value calculated by the hash value calculation unit 230 of the verification server 200 is received and stored in the document key information hash.

Meanwhile, a hash value of document main information of a plurality of users may be stored in the block. However, in the present invention, it is assumed that a hash value for one document is maintained in one block.

The block hash can be limited to generate only a hash value smaller than a specific value according to the block generation difficulty level. However, since the hash code can not predict what value will be output according to the characteristics of the algorithm, the nonce value is increased from 0 and the block hash is extracted. If the value is larger than the number defined in the block generation difficulty, the nonce value is increased by 1 Then, the hash value is extracted again.

This process is continued and it is calculated to calculate a block hash smaller than the block generation difficulty. However, in case of nonce, it may not be used in some cases.

The hash value is extracted through the SHA-256 algorithm and a double hash structure is used to extract the hash value again for the extracted hash value. The hash value is always extracted as a fixed length, and if the original information is changed by 1 bit, the entire hash value is changed. In addition, the hash value can be extracted from the original text, but the original text can not be restored from the hash value.

Since all block except Genesis Block contains the block hash value of the previous block, it can be regarded as connected chain. If block specific contents of chain are deformed, block hash of deformed block is different The chain is broken because it does not match the hash value of the preceding block of the next block containing the lag. Therefore, in order for a malicious object to transform the intermediate document information, the block hash value of all blocks connected to the rear side must be changed. To obtain the hash value of all blocks connected to the backward part, the hash value smaller than the block generation difficulty needs to be obtained again. This increases the nonce according to the degree of difficulty. It takes many operations and calculation time to derive the hash value satisfying the condition Since blocks are created and added at that moment, if the block chain is long enough, it is almost impossible to change all of them.

A method for managing integrity and data of a document and a security using a block chain having the above-described configuration is characterized in that when an integrity of a document is required to be verified, an encryption key hidden in a 2D barcode and a document key information And the hash value is extracted and compared with the hash value at the lower end of the barcode to verify the barcode integrity. This process is advantageous in that it can be performed offline through software and apps provided without connection to the Internet. On the other hand, on-line integrated integrity verification information is constructed as a block chain and redundantly stored in the form of distributed open books on multiple nodes, and then released to all users using the system to improve the reliability of the integrity verification information by a large number do.

5 is a flowchart illustrating an offline integrity verification method using an integrity verification code according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 5, the confirmation procedure using the integrity verification code in off-line includes a key information extraction step S110, an encryption key extraction step S120, a hash value extraction step S130, a forgery verification code extraction step S140) and a forgery and falsification confirmation step (S150).

The key information extracting step S110 may extract the main information by interpreting the upper part of the two-dimensional code part of the original document, for example, the QR code, which requires authenticity.

First, information on the QR code is collected through a scanner or an imaging device, and the main information collection unit 210 of the verification server 200 collects important information included in the QR code and stores the collected information.

As shown in FIG. 6, the main information is formed in the form of a plain text located on the upper side of the QR code, and the main information includes a serial number, an amount, an issuing authority, a issuing point, etc. in the case of price information. Therefore, the extracted main information provides a function to allow the user to check the main information output to the document or check by a method such as screen output.

The encryption key extraction step S120 is a step of extracting information on the encryption key hidden in the Align key using the main information extracted in the main information extraction step S110.

The method for extracting the encryption key includes extracting a cryptographic key generated using the main information collected by the main information collecting unit 210, and includes a cryptographic key generated through the cryptographic key generating unit 220. [

The cryptographic key generation unit 220 interprets the Align key in a clockwise direction from the upper left corner. The cryptographic key generation unit 220 calculates a total of 24 digits so that it can be read as 1 and 0 using a fine yellow dots. This is converted into a hexadecimal number by dividing it into 4 digits, and the last 4 bits become a parity bit so that it can be used for validity verification of the previous 5 digits.

The parity is represented by 0 if the number of 1s present in 5 digits is an odd number, and by 1 when the number is odd. If there is no problem with the parity bit, the three alignment keys existing in the entire two-dimensional bar code are removed in the order of the upper left corner, the upper right corner, and the lower left corner in the order of excluding the parity bits So that it can be interpreted as a whole encryption key.

The hash value extraction step S 130 calculates a hash value using the key information and the encryption key extracted in the key information extraction step S 110 and the encryption key extraction step S 120, .

The forgery verification code extraction step (S140) extracts a forgery verification code through a signature located under the photographed QR code, which is a hash value.

The forgery falsification confirmation step S150 may verify the integrity of the barcode by comparing the hash value extracted from the upper side of the photographed QR code with the hash value extracted from the lower side of the QR code in the forgery verification code extraction step S140 do.

It is difficult to visually identify the key by hiding the key for encrypting the main information of the document in the two-dimensional barcode by making it possible to check whether the document is forged or falsified by using the two-dimensional barcode in the off- It can be used to prove that it is not transferred to the copy in the copying process, or it can be used to prove that the original is not lost. Also, it is possible to implement the system using only the office automation equipment of the commercially available laser toner output method Effect.

7 is a flowchart illustrating an online integrity checking method using a block chain according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The on-line integrity checking method using the block chain according to FIG. 7 includes a synchronization step S210 of the node, a cryptographic key generation step S220, a hash value detection step S230, a hash value search step S240, And block chain integrity verification step S250.

 Distributed public books are accessible to all. In order to protect distributed public books due to malicious attacks, multiple distributed public books with the same contents are constructed and stored in multiple multi-node systems. The block is transmitted to the node when it is created, and the document information registered through the integrity verification system is transmitted to the last idle block registered in the node and stored.

The step of synchronizing the node (S210) is a step of synchronizing the node containing the entire information of the block chain with the adjacent node. Even if the newly generated block is added by transmitting the newly generated block information to the neighboring node, .

The cryptographic key generation step S220 is a step of generating a cryptographic key using the main information extracted from the two-dimensional barcode of the document. The cryptographic key generation step S220 is a step of generating the cryptographic key using the key information extracted using the captured two- And generates a cryptographic key.

The method for extracting the encryption key includes extracting a cryptographic key generated using the main information collected by the main information collecting unit 210, and includes a cryptographic key generated through the cryptographic key generating unit 220. [

The cryptographic key generation unit 220 interprets the Align key in a clockwise direction from the upper left corner. The cryptographic key generation unit 220 calculates a total of 24 digits so that it can be read as 1 and 0 using a fine yellow dots. This is converted into a hexadecimal number by dividing it into 4 digits, and the last 4 bits become a parity bit so that it can be used for validity verification of the previous 5 digits.

The parity is represented by 0 if the number of 1s present in 5 digits is an odd number, and by 1 when the number is odd. If there is no problem with the parity bit, the three alignment keys existing in the entire two-dimensional bar code are removed in the order of the upper left corner, the upper right corner, and the lower left corner in the order of excluding the parity bits So that it can be interpreted as a whole encryption key.

The hash value detection step S230 is a step of detecting a hash value using the cryptographic key extracted in the cryptographic key generation step S220, and can be calculated through the hash value calculation unit 230. [

The step of retrieving the hash value in the block S240 is a step of retrieving an in-block hash value to determine whether the hash value detected in the hash value detection step S230 exists in the block, (Block S230), the blocks corresponding to the in-block document information hash are searched for.

The block chain integrity checking step S250 is a step of determining whether the integrity of the document has been verified by determining whether an integrated block is searched and a chain is broken in the hash value search step S240 in the block.

In other words, the block hash is calculated using the block header. The block hash can be regarded as a connected chain because all the blocks excluding the first block include the block hash value of the previous block.

At this time, if deformation is applied to the contents of a specific block of the chain, the block hash of the modified block is changed, and the chain is broken because it does not match the hash value of the preceding block of the next block

Therefore, in order for a malicious person to modify the intermediate document information, the block hash value of all blocks connected to the back side must be changed. To obtain the hash value of all blocks connected to the backward part, the hash value smaller than the block generation difficulty needs to be obtained again. This increases the nonce according to the degree of difficulty. It takes many operations and calculation time to derive the hash value satisfying the condition Since a block is created and added at that moment, if the block chain is sufficiently long, it is almost impossible to change all of the blocks so that the integrity of the block chain can be verified.

The present invention is advantageous in that it can be performed offline by means of software and apps provided without connection to the Internet network. On the other hand, on-line integrated integrity verification information is formed into a block chain, And it is disclosed to all users using the system after redundant storage so that reliability of the integrity authentication information by a plurality can be improved.

It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and variations can be made in the present invention without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims. It can be understood that it is possible.

100: node
200: verification server
210: Main information collecting section
220: Cryptographic key generation unit
230: Hash value calculation unit
300: Block Chain

Claims (13)

The hash value is extracted by using the key information and encryption key of the document hidden in the 2D barcode, the extracted hash value is compared with the hash value at the lower end of the 2D barcode, or the hash value existing in the block chain is compared, To demonstrate integrity;
The integrity and data management methods of the documents and securities enable integrity to be demonstrated both offline and online;
The method for managing integrity data using off-line includes: extracting main information by analyzing an upper side of a two-dimensional code portion of an original document requiring truth or authenticity (S110);
An encryption key extracting step (S120) of extracting information on the encryption key hidden in the Align key by using the key information extracted in the key information extracting step (S110)
A hash value extraction step (S130) of calculating the hash value using the extracted key information and the encryption key in the key information extraction step (S110) and the encryption key extraction step (S120);
A forgery verification code extraction step (S140) of extracting a forgery verification code through a signature located under the photographed two-dimensional code;
And a verification step (S150) of verifying integrity and forgery of the barcode by comparing the hash value extracted in the hash value extraction step (S130) with the hash value extracted in the forgery verification code extraction step (S140) And integrity data management of securities. delete delete The method according to claim 1,
The main information extracted in the main information extracting step (S110) is formed in the form of a plain text on the upper side of the two-dimensional code, and the main information includes serial number, amount, issuing authority and issuing point in the case of price information And how to manage the integrity data of the securities. The method according to claim 1,
In the encryption key extracting step (S120), the Align key formed at the corner of the two-dimensional bar code is interpreted in a clockwise direction from the upper left corner. The Align key is represented by binary numbers of 0 and 1 And calculating a total of 24 digits of the integrity data of the document and the security data. 6. The method of claim 5,
Wherein the Align key is divided into four hexadecimal digits and the last four bits are parity bits so that the Align key can be used for validity verification of the previous five digits. The method according to claim 1,
The forgery falsification confirmation step (S150) is to verify the integrity of the data by comparing the key information extracted from the upper side of the photographed two-dimensional code and the hash value calculated through the encryption key with the hash value extracted from the lower side of the two- Characterized by the integrity and data management of documents and securities. The hash value is extracted by using the key information and encryption key of the document hidden in the 2D barcode, the extracted hash value is compared with the hash value at the lower end of the 2D barcode, or the hash value existing in the block chain is compared, To demonstrate integrity;
The integrity and data management methods of the documents and securities enable integrity to be demonstrated both offline and online;
The on-line integrity data management method verifies the integrity of data using a block chain provided to a plurality of nodes,
A step (S210) of synchronizing a node containing a whole block chain with a node synchronizing adjacent nodes;
A cryptographic key generation step (S220) of generating a cryptographic key using key information about a two-dimensional barcode inputted from the node;
A hash value detection step (S230) of detecting a hash value using the cryptographic key extracted in the cryptographic key generation step (S220);
A hash value in a block for searching an intra-block hash value to search for whether the hash value detected in the hash value detection step S230 exists in the block;
And a block chain integrity check step S250 for determining whether the integrity of the document is verified by determining whether a block is searched and a chain is broken in the hash value search step S240 in the block And integrity data management of securities. 9. The method of claim 8,
Wherein the node transmits the newly generated block information to a neighboring node so that all nodes can maintain the same block chain even if a newly generated block is added. 9. The method of claim 8,
In the encryption key generation step (S220), the encryption key interprets an Align key formed at the corner of the two-dimensional bar code in a clockwise direction from the upper left corner, and the Align key is a binary code of 0 and 1 And calculating a total of 24 digits of the integrity data of the document and the security. 11. The method of claim 10,
Wherein the Align key is divided into four hexadecimal digits and the last four bits are parity bits so that the Align key can be used for validity verification of the previous five digits. 9. The method of claim 8,
Wherein the hash value of the document key information of the plurality of users is stored in the hash value search step of the block (S240). 9. The method of claim 8,
In the block chain integrity check step S250, the integrity of the block chain is verified using the block hash calculated in the block header,
The block hash may contain a block hash value of a previous block in all blocks except for a genesis block, and when a block is deformed, a block hash is changed. That is, a previous block block hash and a back block block hash And the integrity of the block can be verified because they do not match with each other.

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