KR100406009B1 - Method for protecting forgery and alteration of smart card using angular multiplexing hologram and system thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method and a system for preventing and forging a smart card using an angular multiplexing hologram that can prevent forgery and forgery using a multiple encryption technique. Receive a value, calculate a first hash value using the encrypted data, calculate a second hash value using the row data, compare the first hash value and the second hash value, the comparison result Therefore, by including whether the forgery or forgery of the smart card is included, the forgery and forgery of the smart card can be blocked in advance.

Description

METHODS FOR PROTECTING FORGERY AND ALTERATION OF SMART CARD USING ANGULAR MULTIPLEXING HOLOGRAM AND SYSTEM THEREOF}

The present invention relates to a method and system for preventing and forgery of a smart card using an angular multiplexing hologram capable of preventing forgery and forgery of a smart card using a multiple encryption technique.

With the rapid development of communication and computer technology, electronic transactions that conduct electronic transactions such as banking, shopping, etc., which we usually do today, are already commercialized, and this trend is the nature of electronic commerce, which is a commerce carried out electronically in the electronic space. It is due to the advent of the world. In particular, electronic commerce on the Internet is actively being developed due to the rapid spread of the Internet.

Business processing in the knowledge informatization environment is shifted from paper-based and face-to-face business processes to on-line electronic documents, and can quickly provide various information and services on a standardized information technology basis.

In the knowledge and information society, the administrative environment of governments, public institutions, and corporations is shifted from paper-based and face-to-face business processes to non-face-to-face online electronic documents. Various information and administrative services can be provided promptly. However, as the distribution of key data and personal information through the network increases rapidly, infringement is caused by various dysfunctions such as illegal eavesdropping, forgery, forgery, and disguise of the information distributed online. Therefore, the development of a system that can prevent such intrusion is urgently required, but it is not a sure solution.

In order to activate electronic commerce, it is necessary to secure safety and reliability of electronic commerce. At present, there are many limitations in activating e-commerce due to the information protection problem of e-commerce. In order to solve this problem, many departments are aware of the necessity of restructuring current laws and systems.

The beginning of securing the safety and reliability of electronic commerce can be said to be the establishment of an electronic certification system. Electronic certification system refers to the important certification of electronic business such as the identity or function of the parties in related electronic business such as electronic documents and electronic transactions in the virtual space, the protection and integrity of the contents of electronic business content, and the denial of the electronic activity. This is a system that can be verified and verified by a trusted third party (for example, an authentication server). Therefore, the core of the electronic certification system means the safe operation of electronic signature technology, which is a core technology for securing the stability and reliability of electronic commerce.

Digital signature technology uses a public key and a secret key as a public key cryptographic algorithm. The secret key used in the public key cryptographic algorithm is a generating key for generating a digital signature, and the public key serves as a verification key for verifying the digital signature. Therefore, the secure operation of the digital signature technology depends on the secure operation of the signature key (ie, the public key of the public key algorithm) and the verification key (ie, the public key of the public key algorithm). Secure operation of the signature key means safe storage of the secret key, and secure operation of the verification key means secure management of the public key. Therefore, the secure operation of the digital signature technology results in a problem of public key authentication, which is how to solve the problem of public key forgery and alteration since the public key is public information.

It is the public key infrastructure (PKI) that came out to solve the public key forgery and forgery problem.

In other words, in order to secure the safety and reliability of electronic commerce, an electronic authentication system is required, which means the safe operation of the electronic signature technology, and the confidentiality of the secret key of the public key algorithm used for the electronic signature technology. It is necessary to guarantee the integrity of the public key and the public key.

On the other hand, when transmitting and receiving a variety of information on the network, in order to secure the stability and reliability of such distribution information should apply public key cryptography technology to be able to perform identity authentication, information protection, integrity guarantee and denial. Therefore, a smart card can be used as an alternative for securing stability and reliability of distribution information.

Smart cards generally refer to cards with a CPU and memory attached to them that have the ability to store and process information. Magnetic tapes attached to the back of everyday cash or credit cards can hold up to 300 bytes of diary-only data, while recently developed smart cards have more than 20 mips (MIPS) of processing power on a single chip. It has a built-in CPU and the first IBM PC-class chip that can store more than 64KB of data. In addition, memory for smart cards has been considered to adopt FeRAM (Ferro-electric RAM), a nonvolatile memory that has been accessed more than 20 times faster than EEPROM. Significant advances have been made, including the introduction of oriented techniques.

Therefore, smart card is being used in various fields such as electronic money, ID card, telephone loyalty card, transportation, medical care, etc. as the information communication infrastructure is developed. In addition, smart cards are recognized as a basis for securing safety, reliability, and security required for performing user authentication, access control, storage and management of information, and the like.

According to DataQuest, a market specialist, the total market for smart cards was $ 897 million in 1998, an average increase of 31.8 percent, and in 2003 it would be four times that of $ 3.51 billion. Overlooking.

The rapid growth of smart cards is due to the following advantages for both users and suppliers.

Firstly, to enhance security through user authentication and access control, secondly to increase convenience through e-commerce and providing various services, and thirdly, to use a single card for various purposes such as ID card and electronic money. Finally, the cost of providing some level of security and the cost of maintenance and management can be increased.

However, the smart card is recognized as the most secure that can be implemented at the current level of technology, but when hacked, it is possible to extract the personal credit information stored in the card or the electronic signature generation key, so IC (hereinafter referred to as IC) Forgery and alteration of chip-based personal certificates, electronic money, etc. can lead to the misuse of personal information.

This hacking technology has already been identified by US cryptography firm Crypto Research with a hacking technique called Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Therefore, a basis for blocking forgery and forgery by smart card hacking and verifying forgery and forgery is required.

The present invention has been made to solve the above problems, and provides a method and system for preventing and forgery and alteration of a smart card using an angular multiplexing hologram capable of multiple encryption of raw data using an angle value and an encryption key. There is a purpose.

In addition, another object of the present invention is to provide a method and system for preventing and forgery and alteration of a smart card using angular multiplexing holograms capable of recording angular multiplexed encrypted data to a recording medium of a smart card using holograms.

In addition, a smart card forgery and forgery prevention method and system using an angular multiplexing hologram that can determine whether the smart card forgery or forgery by comparing the hash value calculated by decrypting each multiplexed data with the hash value of the raw data There is another purpose to provide.

1 is a block diagram of a system for preventing forgery and alteration of a smart card using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

2 is a block diagram of an encryption device in a smart card forgery and alteration prevention system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

3 is a diagram illustrating a smart card recording encrypted data in a smart card forgery and tamper prevention system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

4 is an exemplary view showing encrypted data recorded on a recording medium in a smart card forgery and alteration prevention system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

5 is a block diagram of a decryption apparatus in a smart card forgery and alteration prevention system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

6 is a flowchart illustrating a method for recording encrypted data on a smart card in a smart card forgery prevention method and system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

7 is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining whether a smart card is forged or forged in a smart card forgery and forgery prevention system using angular multiplexing holograms according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a method of calculating a first hash value and a second hash value for forgery and forgery determination of a smart card in a smart card forgery and forgery prevention system using angular multiplexing holograms according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. Flowchart for you.

<Name of the code for the main part of the drawing>

100: authentication server 120: encryption device

130, 230: laser 140, 250, 260: optical splitter

150, 240: light regulator 155, 255: space modulator

160: recording medium 170: smart card

175 surface 178 IC chip

200: client 220: decryption device

270: light detector 280: user database

According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention for achieving the above object, at least one random angle value and a challenge value is generated in response to an encryption request of the user, and one-time using a user identifier based on the challenge value. Generate a password, and encrypt the raw data using the one-time password to produce encrypted data, wherein the raw data is various information for the user, wherein the encrypted data is stored according to the at least one random angle value. Provided are a method of recording encrypted data using angular multiplexing holograms recorded on a recording medium, and a system or apparatus corresponding thereto.

The method may further include registering the at least one random angle value and the challenge value corresponding to the user identifier, wherein the at least one random angle value and the challenge value may be used to decrypt the encrypted data.

In addition, the user identifier may be an issue number of a certificate.

In addition, the one-time password may be generated using an IDA encryption scheme.

Also, the recording of the encrypted data can be performed by the encryption device.

In addition, the recording medium may be an optical polymer.

According to another preferred embodiment of the present invention, receiving a forgery and forgery request from the user and transmitting to the authentication server, and receives at least one random angle value and challenge value registered in advance corresponding to the forgery and forgery request, The one-time password is generated using the user identifier based on the challenge value, and the decrypted data is calculated by decrypting the encrypted data according to the at least one random angle value using the one-time password as a decryption key. Calculating a first hash value using a hash algorithm, comparing the first hash value with a second hash value calculated from the raw data, and determining whether the smart card is forged or forged according to a comparison result. A forgery / falsification discrimination method of a smart card is provided.

The second hash value may be calculated using a hash algorithm based on raw data received from an IC chip of the smart card.

Further, the at least one random angle value and the challenge value may be encrypted with a public key at the authentication server and decrypted with a secret key at the client.

In addition, the one-time password may be generated using an IDA encryption scheme.

In addition, the calculation of the decoded data may be performed by the decoding apparatus.

In addition, the user identifier may be an issue number of a certificate.

The method may further include informing the authentication server or the user of the determination result when the raw data of the smart card is forged or forged.

In addition, the client may include one of a computer, a notebook, a mobile phone, and a PDA.

According to another preferred embodiment of the present invention, a program of instructions that can be executed by a digital processing device is tangibly implemented and can be read by the digital processing device to perform a method for discriminating forgery and forgery of a smart card. In the recording medium of the present invention, the method for determining forgery and forgery of the smart card, the method comprising: receiving a forgery and forgery request from a user and transmitting the forgery and forgery request to the authentication server, at least one randomly registered random corresponding to the forgery and forgery request Receiving an angle value and a challenge value, generating a one-time password using a user identifier based on the challenge value, and decrypting the encrypted data according to the at least one random angle value using the one-time password as a decryption key Calculating the decoded data by performing the decoding on the decoded data. Calculating a first hash value using a hash algorithm, comparing the first hash value with a second hash value calculated from the raw data, and determining whether the smart card is forged or forged according to a comparison result. There is provided a recording medium comprising the steps of:

Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

1 is a block diagram of a system for preventing forgery and alteration of a smart card using angular multiplexing holograms according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 1, the system may include an authentication server 100, an encryption device 120, a client 200, and a decryption device 220. Here, the authentication server 100 and the encryption device 120 may be installed in a certification authority. In addition, the encryption apparatus 120 or the decryption apparatus 220 may be embedded in a card read / writer capable of recognizing a smart card. In addition, the encryption apparatus 120 or the decryption apparatus 220 may operate electronically or optically.

The authentication server 100 may generate at least one random angle value and a challenge value in response to the user's request. Here, the at least one random angle value may be generated using a random number generator. In addition, the challenge value may be generated by definition of a ramport scheme. The Ramport method is a known technique, and further description thereof will be omitted.

At this time, the user should have a smart card with an IC chip capable of storing and processing the raw data, including the CPU and memory. The smart card may include a social security card, a bank card, a traffic card, a credit card, an amusement park card, and the like. The smart card must have a recording medium attached to a predetermined position on the surface for separately recording the encrypted data stored in the IC chip. Here, the recording medium is preferably a photopolymer.

In addition, the encrypted data may include various information about the user. For example, when the smart card is a resident registration card, the encrypted data may include a name, a resident registration number, an address, a photo, a jurisdiction, and the like.

The authentication server 100 may store the at least one random angle value and challenge value in a user database corresponding to the user identifier. Here, the stored at least one random angle value and the challenge value may be used when decrypting the encrypted data recorded in the recording medium of the smart card when a request for whether the smart card is forged or forged later.

In addition, the authentication server 100 may generate a one time password using an IDEA algorithm based on the challenge value and the user identifier. Here, the user identifier may be an issue number of a certificate issued for authentication of the user. The certificate means a document consisting of a user's unique name, the user's public key and other information that cannot be forged and encrypted with a private key. Therefore, when issuing a certificate to the user, the authentication server 100 should store the issue number corresponding to the certificate in the user database.

In general, the encryption method can be divided into asymmetric key encryption method and symmetric key encryption method. In the asymmetric key encryption method, the raw data may be encrypted using a public key and then decrypted using a secret key. The asymmetric key encryption method is developed by Diffie-Hellman method of exchanging keys, Ronald Rivest and Adi Shamir of MIT, and Leonardo Adleman of USC. The RSA method, the EIGamal method, which is an algorithm based on a squared method, and a unit calculation, and the DSA method developed by the NSA and adopted as the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) by the NIST. However, the asymmetric key encryption method may be a disadvantage in that the key distribution problem can be easily solved, but the processing speed is slow.

The symmetric key encryption method has the advantage of using the same key when encrypting or decrypting, and having a faster processing speed than the asymmetric key encryption method. The symmetric key encryption method uses a ROR13 method that replaces each alphabet with the 13th alphabet from the alphabet, a DES method that can be used publicly using a 56-bit key, and encrypts it with a key of a desired length and a data block of a desired size. RC5, which was developed by James L. Massei and Xuejia Lai of Switzerland in 1990, can be used for IDEA using 128-bit keys.

The present invention uses the IDEA method, which is a symmetric key encryption method, very secure in Differential Crypto Analysis, implemented as a block cipher algorithm, and easily implemented in software or hardware.

In general, the IDEA method can generate a 64-bit ciphertext by converting a 64-bit plain text into eight rounds with a 128-bit key. In other words, a 64-bit plain text can be divided into four gang 16-bit blocks and can be the first round of input. In this case, the IDEA method operates in eight rounds, and four input blocks in each round may be converted through six round key blocks and XOR, addition, or multiplication operations. In this case, the second and third blocks may be replaced with each other after each round output. After 8 rounds, the 64-bit cipher text can be finally output by combining with four round key blocks again.

Thus, the round key may be the user identifier, the 64-bit plain text is the challenge value, and the 64-bit cipher text may be the one-time password.

Meanwhile, the authentication server 100 may encrypt the raw data using the one-time password, and write the encrypted data to the smart card according to the random angle value using the encryption apparatus 120. In this case, the row data may include various types of information about the user as described above. For example, when the smart card is a resident registration, the encrypted data may include a name, a resident registration number, an address, a photo, a jurisdiction, and the like. The encryption device 120 may generate a laser when the encrypted data is generated. The encryption device 120 will be described with reference to FIG. 2.

2 is a block diagram of an encryption device in a smart card forgery and alteration prevention system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 2, the encryption device 120 includes a laser 130 for irradiating light, a light splitter 140 for dividing light into object light and a reference light, a light adjuster 150 for adjusting the angle of light, and A spatial light modulator (SLM) 155 for inputting encrypted data to form an image may be included.

Here, the laser 130 is preferably a He-Ne source. In addition, the light controller 150 is adjusted to correspond to the at least one random angle value of the authentication server 100, and includes an acoustic-optical deflector (AOD), a step motor or a moving window. can do. In addition, the light splitter 140 may be a beam splitter.

Accordingly, the light incident on the light splitter 140 may be divided into reference light and object light, and the object light may modulate the input encrypted data by the spatial modulator 155. The object light and the reference light may cause interference in the recording medium 160 for recording the hologram, and a light induction phenomenon may occur in the recording medium 160 according to the intensity of the interference fringes generated at this time. Through this process, the interference fringe may be recorded. In this case, the light adjuster 150 may be adjusted to correspond to the at least one random angle value preset in order to change the recording position of the encrypted data recorded on the recording medium 160.

The encryption device 120 is an embodiment of the present invention and may be any encryption device for implementing the present invention except this.

3 is a diagram illustrating a smart card recording encrypted data in a smart card forgery and tamper prevention system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 3, the smart card 170 may include an IC chip 178 having a CPU and a memory therein. In addition, the smart card 170 may separately include the encrypted data on a surface 175. A recording medium 160 may be attached to record the recording medium. The recording medium 160 records the encrypted data, and is preferably an optical polymer.

Accordingly, the raw data may be stored in the IC chip 178, and the encrypted data may be recorded in the recording medium 160. Here, the raw data and the encrypted data in the smart card 170 may be the same when the modulation is not modulated. In addition, the raw data may be encrypted in advance when stored in the IC chip 178. The encrypted data recorded in the recording medium 160 is a three-dimensional hologram, which is not visible to the human eye. If a third party makes a copy using a computer, an image processing, a scanner, or a high performance copy machine to forge the smart card 170, the encrypted data is not copied and is not restored later in the restoration process. Since card 170 cannot be used, forgery and forgery can be fundamentally eradicated.

Meanwhile, the encryption apparatus 120 may record a plurality of encrypted data in the recording medium 160 as shown in FIG. 4 according to the at least one random angle value. That is, the recording medium 160 may record multiple encrypted data corresponding to the number of preset angle values.

4 is an exemplary diagram showing encrypted data recorded on a recording medium in a smart card forgery and alteration prevention system using angular multiplexing holograms according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 4, the recording medium 160 may store first encrypted data 182, second encrypted data 184, third encrypted data 186, and the like. Here, the first encrypted data 182, the second encrypted data 184, the third encrypted data 186, and the like are all identical encrypted data, and are recorded at different positions of the recording medium so as to correspond to the angle values. Can be.

Accordingly, the present invention can utilize angular multiplexing encryption in which the same encrypted data is recorded at different positions according to at least one angle value. For example, when the at least one angle value is 20 degrees, 40 degrees, and 60 degrees, the first encrypted data 182 is recorded by the angle value of 20 degrees, and the second angle value by the angle value of 40 degrees. When the encrypted data 184 is recorded, the third encrypted data 186 may be recorded by the angle value of 60 degrees.

Referring back to 1, the client 200 may be connected to the authentication server 100 via a wired / wireless network. That is, the client 100 need only be connected to a wired / wireless network regardless of a place such as a government office, a school, a department store, a company, and the like. In addition, the client 200 may include one of a computer, a notebook, a mobile phone, and a PDA.

The present invention may use a public key infrastructure (PKI) when transmitting and receiving data between the authentication server 100 and the client 200. In general, the public key cryptography uses a public key and a private key. Only the specific user can know the secret key, and the public key can be disclosed to anyone. Here, the problem of releasing the public key seems to be very simple at first glance, but since the mechanism (public key directory, bulletin board, etc.) used to disclose the public key in actual implementation is not secure by itself, anyone can easily access the information. Since it can be changed, it can cause the forgery and forgery problem of the public key.

Therefore, the public key infrastructure has emerged to ensure that the public key has not been forged or altered, that is, to guarantee the integrity of the public key. Accordingly, in the public key infrastructure, a certificate that connects the public key and the user of the public key may be disclosed instead of the public key. Since the certificate is a signature of a trusted third party (authentication server), a person who is not a trusted object cannot change the contents of the document.

The client 200 may receive a forgery and forgery request from the smart card 170, and transmit the forgery and forgery request to the authentication server 100. The client 200 may receive at least one random angle value and a challenge value encrypted with the public key from the authentication server 100. Here, the at least one random angle value and the challenge value are used to record on the recording medium 160 of the smart card 170 based on the encrypted data calculated by encrypting the raw data. The authentication server 100 It is stored in the user database of the extracted in response to the forgery and forgery request is transmitted to the client 200.

Then, the client 200 may decrypt the at least one random angle value and the challenge value using a secret key. Here, the secret key can be known only by the user of the smart card 170. The client 200 may generate a one-time password using the challenge value and the user identifier. In this case, the one-time password may be generated using an IDEA method. That is, the IDEA method may calculate the one-time password by converting the challenge value over eight rounds using the user identifier as a key.

The client 200 generates, according to the at least one random angle value, encrypted data recorded in the recording medium 160 of the smart card 170 using the one-time password as a decryption key by the decryption apparatus 220. The decoded data may be input. In addition, the client 200 may calculate a hash value (hereinafter, referred to as a first hash value) using the decrypted data using a hash algorithm.

The hash algorithm is an algorithm that compresses a string of bits of arbitrary length into a hash code that is a fixed length output value and may satisfy the following properties. Firstly it is computationally impossible to find an input for a given output, secondly it is computationally impossible to find the same output or to find another input for a given input, and thirdly any two different input messages that produce the same output. It is impossible to find. The hash algorithm may be divided into a hash algorithm and a dedicated algorithm based on a block cipher algorithm such as DES. Since the speed of the block algorithm is not very fast and the hash algorithm using the basic function is much slower than the block cipher, most of the hash algorithms currently use a dedicated hash algorithm, and the present invention adopts the dedicated algorithm. can do.

The dedicated algorithm can be calculated through the process of addition, division, and iterative operation. The dedicated algorithm can divide the message X of any length into multiples of the input unit and divide it into t input blocks (X1, ... Xt). The hash code is calculated by initializing a chain variable for each block Xi to a given initial value (IV), and then repeatedly applying a compression function, and the processing is as follows.

Here, f is a compression function, and Hi represents an intermediate calculated value of steps i-1 and i, respectively.

Meanwhile, the client 200 may receive raw data encrypted with a public key stored in the IC chip 178 of the smart card 170 and decrypt the raw data using a secret key. The client 200 may calculate a hash value (hereinafter, referred to as a second hash value) using the raw data as a hash function.

The client 200 may compare the first hash value with the second hash value to determine whether the smart data is forged or forged.

The client 200 may be connected to a card lead / writer that extracts the raw data from the smart card 170.

Referring back to FIG. 1, the decryption apparatus 220 may decrypt the encrypted data recorded on the recording medium 160 attached to the surface 175 of the smart card 170. The decoding device 220 will be described with reference to FIG. 4.

5 is a block diagram of a decoding apparatus in a smart card forgery and tamper prevention system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 5, the decryption apparatus 220 may include a laser 230 for generating light, an optical controller 240 for adjusting the angle of light, and a first light for extracting encrypted data recorded in the smart card 170. The splitter 250 may include a second optical splitter 260 that decrypts the encrypted data by using a generated one-time password. The decoding device 220 may further include an optical detector 270 that detects the decoded data passing through the second optical splitter 260. The light adjuster 240, the first light splitter 250, and the second light splitter 260 may be beam splitters.

In addition, the decryption apparatus 220 may control the optical controller 240 according to the at least one angle value so that at least one encrypted data may be decrypted using the one-time password.

Accordingly, light incident on the light adjuster 240 set corresponding to the preset angle value is divided into object light and reference light, and the reference light is incident on the recording medium 160 by the first light splitter 250. The interference fringes in the recording medium 160 can be diffracted. Here, the interference fringe may be encrypted data.

Meanwhile, the object light may modulate the input one-time password by the spatial modulator 255. A checkered pattern consisting of the modulated object light and the original contrast restored by the diffraction may be incident on the second light splitter 260 to output decoded data. The decoded data may be input to the photo detector 270 and sent to the client 200. Here, the photo detector 270 may be a charge coupled device (CCD).

Hereinafter, an operation process of the present invention will be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

6 is a flowchart illustrating a method of recording encrypted data on a smart card in the smart card forgery prevention method and system using angular multiplexing hologram according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 6, the authentication server may check whether an encryption request is received from a user. Here, the encryption request may be generated at the moment when the user inserts the smart card into the card read / writer installed in the authentication server.

The user may visit the authentication server to record the hologram encrypted data to prevent forgery and forgery of the smart card possessed by the user. When the user inserts his smart card into the card lead / writer in the authentication server, the authentication server can record the encrypted data to a predetermined location of the user's smart card using the encryption device according to a predetermined rule. . Here, the surface of the smart card may be provided with a recording medium for recording the encrypted data. Preferably, the recording medium is an optical polymer.

In addition, the predetermined rule means a rule for recording encrypted data in the recording medium of the smart card in the authentication server in response to the user's encryption request, which will be described in detail from now on.

Upon receiving the encryption request from the user, the authentication server may generate a random angle value and a challenge value (step 310). Herein, the random angle value is a value used when repeatedly recording encrypted data on the recording medium, and at least one of the random angle values may be generated according to a preset condition. The random angle value uses a random number generator, and the challenge value may be generated by definition of a ramport scheme.

The authentication server may store the random angle value and the challenge value in the user database 280. The storage of the random angle value and the challenge value will later be sent to the client and used to decrypt the encrypted data.

The authentication server may generate a one-time password using an IDEA algorithm based on the challenge value and the user identifier (step 330). Here, the user identifier may be an issue number of a certificate issued for authentication of the user. As already described, the certificate means a document consisting of a user's unique name, the user's public key, and other information that cannot be forged and encrypted with a private key. Therefore, the authentication server should store the issue number corresponding to the certificate in the user database 280 when issuing a certificate to the user.

The IDEA algorithm may generate the one-time password by converting the challenge value over eight rounds using the user identifier as a key. Since the IDEA algorithm has been described in detail, it will be omitted.

The authentication server may encrypt the raw data using the one-time password. In this case, the row data may include various information about the user (step 350). The encrypted data may be modulated by the object light that is input to the spatial modulator of the encryption apparatus and incident, and the three-dimensional hologram may be recorded on a predetermined recording medium by the contrast caused by the interference between the object light and the reference light. In this case, the encrypted data may be repeatedly recorded at different positions in the recording medium in correspondence with a randomly generated random angle value (step 370).

Therefore, in the smart card possessed by the user, encrypted data may be recorded in a recording medium attached to the surface of the smart card separately from the raw data stored in the IC chip.

Therefore, the user can check whether his smart card is forged or altered at any time.

Hereinafter, a method of determining whether the smart card is forged or forged will be described with reference to FIG. 7.

7 is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining whether a smart card is forged or forged in a smart card forgery and forgery prevention system using angular multiplexing holograms according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 7, the client may receive a forgery and forgery request from the user (step 410). The user may insert his smart card into the card lead / light at a place where the client and the card lead / writer connected to the client are installed. When the user inserts the smart card into the card read / write, a forgery / falsification request may be generated from the smart card and sent to the client. Here, the client may include a computer, a notebook, a mobile phone, a PDA, etc., and should be connected to an authentication server through a wired / wireless network.

When the client receives the forgery / modulation request from the user, the client may calculate a first hash value using the encrypted data recorded in the recording medium and a second hash value using the raw data stored in the IC chip (step 420). This will be described in more detail with reference to FIG. 8.

8 illustrates a method for calculating a first hash value and a second hash value for forgery and forgery determination of a smart card in a smart card forgery and forgery prevention system using angular multiplexing holograms according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. It is a flowchart for.

Referring to FIG. 8, the client may transmit the forgery and forgery request to the authentication server (step 420). In this case, the communication between the client and the authentication server may be performed by at least one of wired communication and wireless communication. Then, in response to the forgery / falsification request, the authentication server may extract a random angle value and a challenge value stored corresponding to the user identifier of the user, encrypt it with a public key, and provide it to the client (step 430).

The client may decrypt using the secret key based on the random angle value and the challenge value encrypted with the public key (step 435). As described above, since the authentication server and the client have a public key infrastructure, the authentication server may transmit data after encrypting data such as a certificate with a public key when requested by the client. Then, the client can decrypt the data using a private key that only the client knows.

The client may generate a one-time password using a user identifier as a key based on the challenge value (440). The generation of the one-time password may use the IDEA algorithm as already described. Here, the user identifier may be an issue number of a certificate, and the client needs to know whether it is received from the IC chip or the authentication server.

On the other hand, the client can generate decrypted data from the encrypted data recorded in the recording medium by using the one-time password as the decryption apparatus (step 445). The one-time password may be used as a decryption key for decrypting encrypted data recorded in the smart card. In this case, the encrypted data may be at least one, and the at least one encrypted data may be restored using the random angle value.

The client may calculate a first hash value of the decrypted data using a hash algorithm (step 460). Here, the hash algorithm may be a dedicated algorithm, not a block algorithm, and the dedicated algorithm may be calculated through a process of adding, dividing, and repeating. The dedicated algorithm can divide the message X of arbitrary length into multiples of the input unit and divide it into t input blocks (X1, ... Xt). The hash code may be calculated by initializing a chain variable for each block Xi to a given initial value IV, and then repeatedly applying a compression function.

On the other hand, when the client receives a forgery / modulation request from the user, the client may receive raw data from the IC chip of the smart card (step 455). Here, the row data may be various information about the user.

In operation 460, the client may calculate the second hash value from the raw data using a hash algorithm.

Referring back to FIG. 7, the client may compare the first hash value and the second hash value calculated in step 450 and step 460 (step 480).

The client may determine forgery and forgery of the row data according to a comparison result according to whether the first hash value and the second hash value match (step 490). That is, as a result of the comparison, when the first hash value matches the second hash value, the client may determine that the smart card has no forgery or alteration.

However, if the first hash value does not match the second hash value, the client may determine that the smart card is forged or forged. The result determined in this way may be provided through the display unit of the authentication server or the card lead / writer. Then, the authentication server may control the user's access by denying the user's authentication, and the user may check whether the smart card is forged or forged through the display unit.

In the above, the smart card forgery and alteration prevention method and system using the angular multiplexing hologram of the present invention has been described in detail through the preferred embodiment, but the content is not limited to the field of the invention described in the claims below. In addition, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made within the scope of the present invention.

As described above, according to the method and system for preventing and forgery and alteration of a smart card using the angular multiplexing hologram of the present invention, by separately encrypting the raw data stored in the memory of the smart card using an angular multiplexing technique, When using a 3rd party copy smart card, it is impossible to restore by multiplexing, thus preventing forgery and forgery in advance.

In addition, according to the method and system for preventing and forgery and alteration of a smart card using the angular multiplexing hologram of the present invention, even if the raw data information stored in the memory of the smart card is leaked, the smart card is not present if the angular multiple encryption data recorded in the optical polymer does not exist The inability to authenticate can essentially block the use of smart cards.

Claims (17)

A method for encrypting raw data using angular multiplexing holograms and recording the raw data in a recording medium of a smart card, wherein the raw data is various information about a user. Generating at least one random angle value and a challenge value in response to the encryption request of the user; Generating a one-time password using a user identifier based on the challenge value; Calculating encrypted data by encrypting the raw data using the one-time password; And Recording the encrypted data in the recording medium according to the at least one random angle value. Encrypted data recording method using the angular multiplexing hologram comprising a. The method of claim 1, Registering the at least one random angle value and the challenge value corresponding to the user identifier Include more, And said at least one random angle value and a challenge value are used to decrypt said encrypted data. The method of claim 1, And the user identifier is an issue number of a certificate. The method of claim 1, The one-time password is encrypted data recording method using each multiplexing hologram, characterized in that generated using the IDA (IDEA) encryption method. The method of claim 1, Recording of the encrypted data is performed by an encryption device. The method of claim 1, And the recording medium is an optical polymer. In the client connected to the public key infrastructure (PKI) authentication server and the wired / wireless network, forgery and forgery of the smart card is performed using raw data stored in the IC chip of the smart card and encrypted data recorded in the recording medium. In the method of determining, Receiving a forgery / falsification request from a user and transmitting the request to the authentication server; Receiving at least one random angle value and a challenge value registered in advance corresponding to the forgery / modulation request; Generating a one-time password using a user identifier based on the challenge value; Calculating decrypted data by decrypting the encrypted data according to the at least one random angle value using the one-time password as a decryption key; Calculating the first hash value of the decrypted data by using a hash algorithm; Comparing the first hash value with a second hash value calculated from the row data; And Determining whether the smart card is forged or forged according to the comparison result Method for determining the forgery and alteration of a smart card comprising a. The method of claim 7, wherein And the second hash value is calculated using a hash algorithm based on raw data received from an IC chip of the smart card. The method of claim 7, wherein And the at least one random angle value and the challenge value are encrypted with a public key at the authentication server and decrypted with a secret key at the client. The method of claim 7, wherein The one-time password is forgery and forgery determination method, characterized in that generated using the IDA (IDEA) encryption method. The method of claim 7, wherein And calculating the decrypted data by a decoding device. The method of claim 7, wherein And the user identifier is an issue number of a certificate. The method of claim 7, wherein Notifying the authentication server or the user of the determination result when the raw data of the smart card is forged or forged Forgery and forgery determination method of the smart card, characterized in that it further comprises. The method of claim 7, wherein And the client comprises one of a computer, a notebook computer, a mobile phone, and a PDA. A memory in which a program is stored; A processor coupled to the memory to execute the program Including, The processor by the program, Generating at least one random angle value and a challenge value in response to a user's encryption request; Generating a one-time password using a user identifier based on the challenge value; Calculating encrypted data by encrypting the raw data using the one-time password; Recording the encrypted data in the recording medium according to the at least one random angle value; And Providing the client with the at least one random angle value and challenge value in response to a forgery / modulation request. System to be executed. In the recording medium tangibly embodied and readable by the digital processing device, a program of instructions that can be executed by the digital processing device is implemented to perform a method for discriminating forgery and alteration of a smart card. The method for determining the forgery and alteration of the smart card, Receiving a forgery / falsification request from a user and transmitting the request to the authentication server; Receiving at least one random angle value and a challenge value registered in advance corresponding to the forgery / modulation request; Generating a one-time password using a user identifier based on the challenge value; Calculating decrypted data by decrypting the encrypted data according to the at least one random angle value using the one-time password as a decryption key; Calculating the first hash value of the decrypted data by using a hash algorithm; Comparing the first hash value with a second hash value calculated from the row data; And Determining whether the smart card is forged or forged according to the comparison result Recording medium comprising a. An apparatus for recording encrypted data using angular multiplexing holograms, Means for generating at least one random angle value and a challenge value in response to a user's request for encryption; Means for generating a one-time password using a user identifier based on the challenge value; Means for encrypting the raw data using the one-time password to produce encrypted data; And Means for recording the encrypted data in the recording medium according to the at least one random angle value Encrypted data recording apparatus using each multiplexing hologram comprising a.