JPS63223850A - Ic card with access protecting function - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To improve the security property of an IC card by setting an input route for specific numeric values like identification numbers, ciphers, etc., in a different system and cutting said input route by a wiring extinguishing means after an input is set. CONSTITUTION:When data are written into or read out of a memory element 1, the input/output of data is carried out to the element 1 by a power supply supplying/receiving terminal 5, a data input/output terminal 6 and a command receiving terminal 7 via a control circuit 2. When the specific numeric value is written, a signal is inputted to a ROM 3 via an input terminal 8 for specific numeric value and this signal input route is cut off by a wiring extinguishing means 4 after the input is set. The wiring is cut by a drilling process with laser heating or the magnetic induction energy for the means 4.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to an IC card, and particularly to an IC card having an access protection function to prevent tampering.

*Generally referred to as IC cards, there are memory cards that only contain memory, LSI cards that have a contactless connection for memory access (reading and writing), and cards that have a CPU in addition to memory. There are IC cards for banking purposes, etc. These IC cards are read and written as follows.

Since memory cards are read and written using contacts, anyone can freely read and write them using simple technical means. In addition, with LSI cards, the reading and writing connections are made using coils, which requires special technical means, but since this technical means is widely used as a general-purpose product, anyone can easily tamper with reading and writing using it. can be done. In this respect, it is no different from the memory card described above.

Furthermore, in order to prevent data from being freely tampered with, IC cards used in banking and other applications are equipped with a CPU, and the reading and writing of IC cards is under the control of the CPU (this improves data security). I try to have sex.

Therefore, as a condition for security, it is an absolute condition that the cPU command system is not made public at all. Therefore, in order to prevent unauthorized reading and writing of the IC card, that is, to prevent it from being tampered with, it is absolutely necessary that parties involved in each manufacturing process of the IC card maintain confidentiality.

■ ＜”Shiyo Toruguchi” However, in the past, in the IC card manufacturing industry,
Management to maintain confidentiality is extremely difficult.

Normally, IC cards use the built-in CPU function to prevent unauthorized reading and writing, but this
At C card manufacturers, the parties involved in IC card manufacturing in a wide variety of fields, including CPU manufacturers, IC card manufacturers, and IC card reader/writer manufacturers,
U's command codes and other mechanisms must be kept secret.

Therefore, in order to maintain the secrecy effect of the IC card, a great deal of effort is required in terms of operation related to manufacturing, and its management becomes extremely difficult.

The present invention has been made in view of the above circumstances, and an object of the present invention is to provide an IC card that maintains security and can prevent tampering of card data.

The IC card equipped with the access protection function of the present invention includes a storage element, a control circuit containing the storage element, a power supply path, a data input/output terminal, and a command reception path. , these are integrally molded into a card board, and an input path for a specific numerical value is provided in the card board in a system different from each of the paths, and the input path for the specific numerical value is connected to a specific terminal. A wiring eliminating means is provided between the input path of the control circuit and the memory element built into the control circuit.

After inputting a specific numerical value such as a password to a memory element (ROM) built into the control circuit from an input terminal, the wire erasing means is physically cut off.

The signals set in the memory element (ROM) cannot be rewritten after the wiring erasing means is applied, and since the ROM is built in the control circuit, it cannot be easily read out by normal means.

11 IC cards in the present invention are ICs and LSIs as built-in components.
It is a general term for IC cards, LSI cards, or memory cards that have semiconductor elements such as memory. Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.

FIG. 1 is a schematic perspective view of an IC card showing an embodiment of the present invention. Reference numeral 11 denotes an IC card, and the display portions, signature fields, designs, etc. on the front and back sides are not shown.

Reference numeral 1 denotes a memory element made of a semiconductor, 2 a control circuit made of an LSI such as a gate array, 3 a memory element (ROM) which forms a part of the control circuit 2 and is built in the control circuit 2, and 4 a memory element made of a semiconductor. The wiring disappearing means is molded inside the IC card 11.

The wire erasing means 4 is capable of cutting the wires prepared in advance by means described later. 5 is a power supply terminal, 6 is a data input/output terminal, 7 is a command input/output terminal,
Both are provided on one end surface of the IC card 11. Although these terminals are shown as contact points in the drawings, the terminals are not limited to this, and may be non-contact points using means such as coil coupling or optical coupling. Further, each of the terminals may be individually provided with three elements of power supply, data input, and command input,
Alternatively, the three elements are electrically connected in one circuit, and the IC card 1
It may be possible to branch within one.

8 is an input terminal for a specific numerical value such as a code password, and IC card 1
Although it is shown as a contact point in the drawing, it may be a non-contact point as described above.

FIG. 2 shows a control block diagram of the IC card 11. Power supply terminal 5, data input/output terminal 6, command input terminal 7
is connected to the control circuit 2, and the input terminal 8 for a specific numerical value is connected to the control circuit 2 via the wire erasing means 4, and the control circuit 2 is connected to the memory element 1. As mentioned above, the ROM 3 is built into the control circuit 2, and the ROM 3 is connected to each of the terminals 5 to 5.
When reading and writing the memory element 1 through the action of 7, first, a specific numerical value such as a cryptographic password is transferred from the data input/output terminal 6 to the ROM 3.
If this value does not match the value stored in the ROM 3, subsequent reading and writing is prohibited.

In the above configuration, writing data to the memory element 1,
Alternatively, when reading data from the memory element 1, the power supply terminal 5, the data input/output terminal 6, and the command input terminal 7 are used.
is used to input and output data to and from the memory element 1 via the control circuit 2.

Next, a method for reading and writing specific numerical values such as the code/password will be explained.

Reading and writing of specific numerical values is from input terminal 8 of specific numerical values to RO.
After inputting and setting a signal to M3, the wiring eliminating means 4 is disconnected by a physical method to be described later.

When reading a specific numerical value, the signal input from the data input/output terminal 6 is sent to the control circuit 2, and the control circuit 2 confirms that the input signal, that is, the specific numerical value matches the specific numerical value stored in the ROM 3. If they match, reading to the storage element 1 is permitted, but if they do not match, reading is not permitted and the reading is protected.

Physical means for cutting (annihilating) the wiring extinguishing means 4 include methods such as mechanically making a hole in the card by heating with a laser or the like and cutting the wiring, or cutting with induction energy such as magnetism. .

However, since the wire erasing means 4 is molded within the IC card 11, it is impossible to restore the cut point from outside the card. Also, ROM 3 is fuse type R
Since it is OM, it cannot be corrected or restored after setting. Furthermore, since ROM 3 is a built-in element of control circuit 2, IC
It would be impossible to dissolve the card 11 with a solvent, take out the control circuit 2, and electrically decode the contents of the ROM 3 because it would require enormous technical means. In any case, data once written cannot be corrected, restored, or deciphered by this means.

Next, the manufacturing process of the IC card 11 according to the present invention will be explained together with its relation to security.

(2) Design and manufacture of elements for storage control, etc. The ROM 3 does not require security because the number of elements remains connected at the time of manufacture.

■Manufacturing and quality control of the IC card 10 The card manufacturer can perform reading and writing tests on the contents of the ROM 3 by recognizing that the number of elements are still connected.

■Production of reading and writing software Only those involved in this are concerned with security, and ROM3
A specific numerical value is written into the input terminal 8 using the specific numerical value input terminal 8.

Then, the wiring erasing means 4 is cut using the method described above.

■Read/write design/manufacturing ROM If the specific value of 3 is not set, RO
The contents of M3 remain connected, and the IC
At the stage of the manufacturing and inspection process of the card 11, it is sufficient to recognize and read/write as described above, so there is no need to worry about security.

The same applies to system design, manufacturing, and maintenance.

As shown in the manufacturing process described above, it is sufficient for the confidentiality of the IC card 11 according to the present invention to be guarded only by those involved in the reading/writing software.

Furthermore, the IC card 11 of the present invention does not use a CPU.

Therefore, there is no relation to anyone related to the CPU, and the manufacturer, read/write design, and manufacturer of the IC card 11 are not kept confidential, making management extremely simple.

As explained above, according to the present invention, the input path for specific numerical values such as passwords and codes is set in a separate system, and after the input is set in the ROM by the wiring erasing means, the said path is disconnected. Therefore, despite the simple configuration, the IC card will not be tampered with by unauthorized reading or writing.

Furthermore, since the ROM is composed of elements such as gate arrays built into the LSI, it cannot be decoded by easy technical means. Furthermore, since only the manufacturer of the read/write software is required to maintain confidentiality during the manufacture of the IC card, it is possible to maintain sufficient security.

[Brief explanation of the drawing]

FIG. 1 is a schematic perspective view of an IC card showing an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a control block diagram. 1...Storage element, 2...Control circuit, 3...
ROM, 4...Wiring erasure means, 8...Specific numerical value input terminal, 11...IC card. Patent Applicant: Koatsu Gas Kogyo Co., Ltd. Patent Applicant: Japan Elnis I Card Co., Ltd. Agent: Patent Attorney Takaharu Ohnishi')')1”1- Figure 2 Procedural Amendment (Method) March 19, 1988 Relationship with the Patent Office Case filed on March 12, 1988 Patent Applicant Address 1-5 Doyama-cho, Kita-ku, Osaka Name (Name)
Kotatsu Gas Kogyo Co., Ltd. (and 1 other person) Representative: Naomi Yanagita 4, Agent address: 17 Matsuya Building 5, 36-36 Hashizume-cho, Uchihonmachi, Higashi-ku, Osaka City, Date of amendment order: Voluntary action 6,? ! Positive object ■ “Claims j” column in the specification ■ “Detailed description of the invention” column in the specification ■ “Brief explanation of drawings j column” in the specification ■ Drawing 70. Contents of amendment ■ “ "Claims" shall be amended as shown in the attached sheet. ■ Change the "input/output terminal" on page 4, line 9 of the specification to "input path J".
Correct to. ■ Correct "input terminal of" on page 4, line 18 of the specification to "input path of specific terminal." - Correct "The wire erasing means is cut by physical means" in line 20 on page 4 of the specification box to "The wire is erased by physical means using the wire erasing means." ■ Correct "r power supply terminal" on the first line of page 6 of the specification to "power receiving terminal j". ■ Correct "input/output terminal" on the second line of page 6 of the specification to "receive terminal".
Correct to. ■Correct "Power supply J" on page 6, line 6 of the specification to "Power supply j." ■Correct "input" on page 6, line 6 to page 6, line 7 of the specification to "Input/output j." ■ Correct the statement on page 6, line 7 of the specification to "receive input J to r." [Phase] "Supply terminal" on page 6, line 14 of the specification is corrected to "receive terminal". ■Correct "input j to r received j" on page 6, line 14 to page 6, line 15 of the specification. ■Correct j of r data on page 7, line 5 of the specification to r data. . ■Correct "supply" to "receipt" on page 7, line 7 of the specification. ■Correct "t input terminal" on page 7, line 8 of the specification to "receive terminal j". ■Correct "read/write j" on page 7, line 12 of the specification section to "write j
Correct to. [Phase] Delete "that is, specific numerical value" from page 7, line 18 to page 7, line 19 of the specification. ■R reading from page 7, line 20 to page 8, line 1 of the specification.”
is corrected to "read/write J from the data input/output terminal 6. [Phase] Correct "r read" on page 8, line 2 of the specification to "r read/write". [Phase] RLC card 10 on page 9, line 3 of the statement
Correct to c card IIJ. [Phase] Figures 1 and 2 are corrected as shown in the attached sheet. 8. Relationship with the case of a person making an amendment other than the above Patent applicant Address: 2-8 Takahigashi, Higashiosaka City, Osaka Prefecture Name (
Name) Yoshiaki Masuya, Representative of Japan Elnis I Card Co., Ltd. (1) Equipped with a memory element, a control circuit with a built-in memory element, a power supply path, a data input/output path, and a command reception path. , these are integrally molded into a card board, and an input path for a specific numerical value is provided in the card board in a system different from each of the paths, and the input path for the specific numerical value is connected to a specific terminal. 1. An IC card having an access protection function, characterized in that the IC card is equipped with a wire erasing means between an input path of the controller and a memory element built into the control circuit. Figure 1 Figure 2

Claims (1)

[Claims] (1) An IC card that is equipped with a memory element, a control circuit containing the memory element, a power supply path, a data input/output terminal, and a command reception path, and these are integrally molded into the card board. In the card board, an input path for a specific numerical value is provided in a system different from each of the paths, and the input path for the specific numerical value is connected to an input path of a specific terminal and a memory element built in the control circuit. An IC card equipped with an access protection function, characterized in that the IC card is equipped with a wire erasing means between them.