JPH10507324A - Loving software license for hardware agents - Google Patents

Loving software license for hardware agents

Info

Publication number
JPH10507324A
JPH10507324A JP8509598A JP50959896A JPH10507324A JP H10507324 A JPH10507324 A JP H10507324A JP 8509598 A JP8509598 A JP 8509598A JP 50959896 A JP50959896 A JP 50959896A JP H10507324 A JPH10507324 A JP H10507324A
Authority
JP
Japan
Prior art keywords
integrated circuit
agent
hardware
circuit component
information
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
JP8509598A
Other languages
Japanese (ja)
Other versions
JP4294728B2 (en
Inventor
デイビス，デレク・エル
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Intel Corp
Original Assignee
Intel Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Intel Corp filed Critical Intel Corp
Publication of JPH10507324A publication Critical patent/JPH10507324A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of JP4294728B2 publication Critical patent/JP4294728B2/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G06F21/109—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM] by using specially-adapted hardware at the client
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • G06F21/445—Program or device authentication by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
    • G06Q20/3552—Downloading or loading of personalisation data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
    • G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
    • G06F12/1408—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by using cryptography
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
    • G06F2211/007—Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2103—Challenge-response
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2153—Using hardware token as a secondary aspect
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/101—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measures for digital rights management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources

Abstract

(57)【要約】 ライセンス供与制限を強制するための集積回路構成要素。前記強制は、ライセンス・プログラムを実行するアクセス特権を集積回路構成要素から他の同様の構成要素に遠隔送信することによって行われる。集積回路構成要素は、固有に指定されたキーの対（１１、１２）、認証装置証明（８０）と、製造業者公開キー（１６）とを暗号アルゴリズムと共に記憶する不揮発性メモリと、集積回路構成要素に入力された情報を処理するために暗号アルゴリズムを実行し、処理された情報を揮発性メモリに送るプロセッサと、固有に指定されたキーの対を集積回路構成要素内で内部的に生成する乱数発生器とを備える。 (57) [Abstract] An integrated circuit component to enforce licensing restrictions. The enforcement is performed by remotely transmitting access privileges to execute the licensed program from the integrated circuit component to other similar components. An integrated circuit component comprising: a non-volatile memory that stores a uniquely specified key pair (11, 12), an authentication device certificate (80), and a manufacturer public key (16) together with a cryptographic algorithm; Executes a cryptographic algorithm to process information entered into the element, and internally generates a uniquely designated key pair within the integrated circuit component and a processor that sends the processed information to volatile memory A random number generator.

Description

【発明の詳細な説明】 ハードウェア・エージェントに対するロビング・ソフトウェア・ライセンス 発明の背景 発明の分野 本発明は、ライセンス供与ソフトウェアに関する。詳細には、本発明は、第１ のハードウェア・エージェントを有する許可されたノードからライセンス・ソフ トウェア・プログラムを実行するアクセス特権を、特定ユーザ・ライセンスに違 反することなく第２のハードウェア・エージェントを有する非許可ノードに転送 する装置および方法に係わる。本発明に関する背景技術 コンピュータ・システムの発展の初期には、近代化された企業は一般に、メイ ンフレームに接続されたいくつかの「ダム（ｄｕｍｂ）」端末を有する、一部屋 の大きさの集中メインフレームを使用していた。より小型で高速で高性能のコン ピュータの登場と共に、それらの近代化された企業の多くは自社の集中メインフ レームを撤去して、いくつかのスタンドアロン型コンピュータ、またはパーソナ ル・コンピュータの集まりを有し、各ユーザが自分のパーソナル・コンピュータ を管理する分散ネットワーク（たとえばローカル・エリア・ネットワーク）を使 用する方を選んだ。 この非集中化傾向を認めて、多くのソフトウェア開発業者が「ユーザ特有の」 ライセンスと一般に呼ばれる特定のライセンス供与方式に従って自社のソフトウ ェアをライセンス供与している。ユーザ特有のライセンスは一般に、特定のソフ トウェア・プログラムを特定の方式で随時操作することを所定数の個人に許可す る。したがって、ライセンスは特定のノードではなく選択された数の個人に付随 する。本出願の範囲では、「ノード」とは、好ましくは本発明を含む、コンピュ ータ、プリンタ、ファクシミリ機、および同様のものなどの「インテリジェンス 」を有するハードウェア製品であると定義する。ユーザ特有のソフトウェアに付 随する主要な問題は、ソフトウェア開発業者の潜在的ライセンス供与収益をむし ばむライセンス・ソフトウェアの無許可の使用またはコピーあるいはその両方を 間接的に助長することてある。 長年にわたり、ソフトウェア開発業者は、自社のソフトウェアがユーザ特有の ライセンスの条件の範囲を超えて使用およびコピーされないように保護する方法 を探し求めてきたが、企業ライセンス被供与者は自社の従業員によるライセンス ・ソフトウェアの不法な使用またはコピーによる潜在的な代位責任を大幅に軽く しようとしてきた。したがって、ユーザ特有のライセンスの条件を超えたソフト ウェアの拡散を防止することは、ソフトウェア開発業者と企業ライセンス非供与 者の両方に同様に利益がある。 現在、ユーザ特有のソフトウェア・ライセンスの遵守は、「ドングル（ｄｏｎ ｇｌｅ）」と呼ばれる物理的ハードウェア装置の使用によって行われている。ド ングルとは、最初に購入したときにライセンス・ソフトウェアと共にパッケージ されている物理ハードウェア装置である。これは一般には、たとえばパーソナル ・コンピュータなどのノードのパラレル・ポートに接続する。実行中の様々な時 点で、対象ライセンス・ソフトウェア・プログラムはドングル内で使用されてい るアクティブ装置に許可メッセージ（「呼びかけ」と呼ばれる）を送る。ドング ル内のアクティブ装置は、ドングル内部に記憶されている秘密情報（以下、「有 効ライセンス・トークン」と呼ぶ）を使用してその呼びかけを処理し、戻りメッ セージ（「応答」と呼ぶ）を発生する。ソフトウェア・プログラムはこの応答を 期待応答と比較し、その２つの応答が同じである場合にのみそれ以降の実行を許 可する。 したがって、ユーザはライセンス・ソフトウェア・プログラムをコピーし、そ れを複数のパーソナル・コンピュータにロードすることはできるが、そのソフト ウェア・プログラムを実行することができるのはドングルが接続されている第１ のコンピュータのみである。ライセンス・ソフトウェア・プログラムを他のパー ソナル・コンピュータで実行するためには、第１のパーソナル・コンピュータか らドングルを取り外して他のパーソナル・コンピュータに接続しなければならな い。その結果、第１のパーソナル・コンピュータではそのソフトウェアは使用不 能になる。企業ライセンス被供与者に与えられるドングルの数は一般にユーザ特 有のソフトウェア・ライセンス契約を結んだ人数に限定されているため、ライセ ンス・ソフトウェア・プログラムの複数の導人がソフトウェア開発業者にとって 不利な財務上の影響を引き起こさないことは明らかである。 ドングルによってユーザ特有のライセンスの遵守は確保されるが、いくつかの 欠点がある。１つの欠点は、ドングルを顧客に物理的に配布しなければならない ことである。したがって、ソフトウェアの電子配布用システム（「コンテンツ配 布」と呼ぶ）が提案され、実施されて便利さを増し、配布コストを削減している が、物理装置としてのドングルは依然として従来の配布方法とそれに伴う費用と を必要とする。ソフトウェア開発業者の経済的利益を保護するためにドングルを 必要とすることによって、顧客は、（ｉ）選定された場所でドングルを直接入手 し、その後でそのドングルをノードに装着してからでなければライセンス・プロ グラムを使用することができないか、または（ii）意図した使用の前にコンテン ツ配布者が顧客にドングルを郵送する時間を見越してライセンス・ソフトウエア ・プログラムを発注するという煩わしい作業に耐えなければならない。いずれに しても、ドングルはコンテンツ配布の効率と興味を妨げる。 もう一の欠点は、ドングルの取り外しと装着が時間のかかる処理であることで ある。時間を争う企業では、ドングルの交換は企業の業績全体に影響を及ぼす。 他の欠点は、ドングルを絶えず取り外したり装着したりすることによって、ドン グルが損傷し機能不能になる確率が高くなり、企業は新しいドングルを待ってか らでなければ、そのソフトウェア・アプリケーションを再び使用することができ ない。 他の欠点は、ライセンスは個人を対象としているが、ドングルは一般にノード に装着されることである。したがって、ユーザが別の機械（たとえば自宅にある パーソナル・コンピュータ）に移動した場合、そのユーザはドングルを所有して いない限り、ライセンス・ソフトウェア・プログラムを使用することができない 。 発明の簡単な概要 上記に基づき、ノード内に内部実装された集積回路構成要素として、電子ドン グルの機能を備えた暗号装置を作製することが望ましい。したがって、本発明の 目的は、集積回路構成要素を遠隔認証する際に使用する固有ディジタル証明を内 部的に記憶する記憶素子を備えた、集積回路構成要素としての暗号装置を提供す ることである。 本発明の他の目的は、固有の公開キーと私用キーとの対を内部的に生成し、少 なくとも秘密キーを記憶することができ、それによって集積回路構成要素の外部 の使用を防止する固有集積回路構成要素を提供することである。 本発明の他の目的は、あるエンティティによって検証または製造された別の同 様の集積回路構成要素とのセキュリティ保護された通信を可能にするために、そ のエンティティの公開キーを内部的に記憶する集積回路構成要素を提供すること である。 本発明の他の目的は、ハードウェアの物理的操作を頻繁に必要としないロビン グ（ｒｏｖｉｎｇ）・ソフトウェア・ライセンスを与える集積回路構成要素を提 供することである。 この集積回路構成要素を一般にハードウェア・ライセンスと呼び、識別のため の動作を行う処理装置と、（ｉ）固有の公開キーと私用キーの対を記憶する不揮 発性メモリと、（ii）キーの対が認証されたものであるかどうかを検証するディ ジタル証明と、（iii）集積回路構成要素と製造業者によって製造された他の同 様の構成要素との間の通信を可能にする選定されたエンティティ（集積回路構成 要素の製造業者であることが好ましい）の公開キーとを含む記憶素子を備える。 不揮発性メモリは暗号アルゴリズムを記憶するためにも使用することができる。 集積回路構成要素は、処理装置によって処理される情報を記憶する揮発性メモリ と、他の同様の構成要素から通信バスを介して暗号化形式または復号形式の情報 を送受信するためのインタフェースと、固有の公開キーと私用キーの対を生成す るための乱数発生器とをさらに備える。 図面の簡単な説明 本発明の目的、特徴、および利点は以下の本発明の詳細な説明を読めば明らか になろう。 第１図は、双方向対称キー暗号化および復号プロセスを示すブロック図である 。 第２図は、双方向非対称キー暗号化および復号プロセスを示すブロック図であ る。 第３図は、信用権威者からのディジタル証明プロセスを示すブロック図である 。 第４図は、本発明の実施形態を組み込んだコンピュータ・システムのブロック 図である。 第５図は、本発明の実施形態を示すブロック図である。 第６図は、対とディジタル証明を集積回路構成要素に実装する方法を示すフロ ーチャートである。 第７Ａ図〜第７Ｃ図は、ライセンス特権を有する第２のハードウェア・エージ ェントと第１のハードウェア・エージェントとの間で有効ライセンス・トークン を転送するために、第１のハードウェア・エージェントが第２のハードウェア・ エージェントとの通信を確立する操作を示すフローチャートである。 発明の詳細な説明 本発明は、適切に構成されたハードウェア・エージェント間でロビング・ソフ トウェア・ライセンスを転送することができるようにし、それによって配布する 物理ハードウェア装置を不要にする装置および方法に関する。以下の説明では、 本発明を十分に理解することがてきるように多くの詳細を記載する。しかし、当 業者には、本発明の精神および範囲から逸脱することなく、本発明を例示されて いるものとは異なる多くの実施形態を使用して実施することができることが明ら かである。他の場合には、本発明を無用に不明瞭にしないために、周知の回路、 要素、および同様のものについては詳細には記載しない。 詳細な説明では、特定の特性または品質を説明するためにいくつかの暗号関係 の用語を頻繁に使用するが、ここでそれらについて定義する。「キー」とは従来 の暗号アルゴリズムの暗号化または復号あるいはその両方のパラメータである。 具体的には、キーはｎビットの長さの二進データの順次配置（「ストリング」） である（ただし「ｎ」は任意の数である）。「メッセージ」とは、一連のバス・ サイクルで転送される情報（たとえば暗号化キー・アドレスおよびデータ）であ ると一般に定義される。この情報には、呼びかけや戻り応答が含まれる。「ディ ジタル証明」とは、通信を開始するエンティティに関係する情報であると定義さ れ、典型的には広く公開された信用権威者（たとえば銀行、政府機関、同業組合 など）によって私用キーを使用して暗号化されたエンティティの公開キーである 。「ディジタル署名」とは、ディジタル証明と類似しているが、送信者ではなく メッセージ自体の認証に使用される。 ここ数年、１つの場所から他の場所にディジタル情報を送信することがますま す望まれるようになっている。その結果、現在、多くのエンティティが暗号技術 を使用しており、それによって正当な受信者にとっては明瞭であいまいさがない が不正な受信者には理解できない方式で情報が転送される。一般に、暗号技術は ２つの従来の技法のうちの１つに従って機能する。すなわち、対称キー暗号化ま たは非対称（または公開）キー暗号化あるいはそれらの暗号化技術の組合せであ る。 第１図を参照すると、対称キー暗号技法の実施形態が図示されている。この技 法では、同一、すなわち対称な秘密キー（「ＳＫ」と符号が付されている）１を 使用して、第１のノード１０と第２のノード１５の間で転送される原メッセージ ５を暗号化して暗号化された原メッセージ２０を形成し、暗号化された原メッセ ージ２０を復号して原メッセージ５を復元する必要がある。このような暗号化お よび復号は、たとえばデータ暗号アルゴリズム（より一般には「ＤＥＳ」と呼ば れる）などの周知の従来の暗号アルゴリズムを使用して行われる。原メッセージ ５は、（ｉ）第１のノード１０で暗号化され、（ii）電話回線および同様のもの などの公共領域２５を使用して第１のノード１０から第２のノード１５に転送さ れ、（iii）第２のノード１５で復号される。しかし、この技法は秘密キー（「 ＳＫ」）を前もって設定する必要があるため、ユーザ数が多い場合にはサポート するのが困難である。 次に第２図を参照すると、非対称キー技法の実施形態が図示されている。この 技法は、暗号化と復号に別々に使用される２つの別々のキー（「公開キー」およ び「私用キー」と呼ぶ）を使用する。第１のノード１０から第２のノード１５へ の双方向通信を確立するために、第２のノード１５のキーの対のうちの「公開」 キー１６（「ＰＵＫ２」と符号が付されている）が第１のノード１０に記憶され 、一般に第１のノード１０が暗号化の分野で周知の非対称「ＲＳＡ」アルゴリズ ムに基づいて原メッセージ３０を暗号化するために使用する。これによって、第 ２のノード１５に転送される暗号化原メッセージ３５が形成される。第１のノー ド１０の公開キーと私用キーの対１１および１２（［ＰＵＫ１」および「ＰＲＫ １」と符号が付されている）はさらに第１のノード１０に記憶される。 第２のノード１５のキーの対のうちの「私用」キー１７（「ＰＲＫ２」と符号 が付されている）は、第２のノード１５のみが知っており、第２図に示すように ＲＳＡアルゴリズムに基づく第１のノード１０からの暗号化メッセージ３５の復 号を含む多くの目的のために使用する。しかし、この技法は、不正なエンティテ ィ（たとえば商業スパイなど）が正当なエンティティ（たとえば従業員、合弁企 業など）を装おって、仕事の流れを中断させたり機密情報を入手したりするため に他の正当なエンティティに詐欺的メッセージを送信しようとする試みを許しや すい。したがって、一般に付加的なプロトコルを使用して、メッセージの認証を 行い、そのメッセージを送信するエンティティの正当化を行う。 事前には未知である当事者間で最初に通信を確立するときは、送信者の認証（ すなわち公開キーの送信者が実際にその公開キーの真の所有者であることの検証 ）が問題である。この問題は、一般に、送信メッセージ５０内にディジタル証明 ４５を組み込むことによって回避される。ディジタル証明４５は、相互信用権威 者５５（たとえば銀行、政府機関、同業者組合など）が、署名文（「ＳＭ」と符 号が付されている）５８を使用して通信を開始するノードの公開キー（「ＰＵＫ １」）１１を、信用権威者５５の私用キー（「ＰＲＫＴＡ」）５７を使用して暗 号化することによって発行する。したがって、ＰＵＫ２ １６を使用しようとす る不正な試みが行われてもその送信メッセージに対しては受信者には読めない応 答が返されることになるだけてある。選択される信用権威者５５は、関係当事者 によって異なる。たとえば、同じ企業に雇用されている２人の個人は両者とも、 その企業の会社セキュリティ管理局によって発行された証明を信用する。しかし 、 ２つの独立した企業エンティティの従業員は、それぞれのセキュリティ管理局か らの認証だけでなく、たとえばそのような企業エンティティを証明する何らかの 産業組織からの証明も必要とする。 この手法では、複数の操作を並列して実行して送信メッセージ５０を作成する 。１つの操作は、ＤＥＳアルゴリズムを介して対称秘密キー（「ＳＫ」）６０を 使用して原メッセージ４０を暗号化して、ディジタル証明４５と共に送信メッセ ージ５０に入れられる暗号化メッセージ６５を形成することである。原メッセー ジ４０にはハッシュ・アルゴリズム７０（たとえば「ＭＤ５」）も適用されて、 送信メッセージ・ダイジェスト７５が形成される。送信メッセージ・ダイジエス ト７５は、第１のノードの私用キー（「ＰＲＫ１」）１２を使用してさらに暗号 化されてディジタル署名８０を形成し、それが送信メッセージ５０に入れられる 。さらに、対称キー（「ＳＫ」）６０がＲＳＡアルゴリズムに基づいて第２のノ ードの公開キー（「ＰＵＫ２」）１６を使用して暗号化されて「ＳＫｅｎｃ」８ ５となり、さらに送信メッセージ５０に入れられる。 第３図を続けて参照する。第１のノード１０から公共領域２５を介して送信さ れる送信メッセージ５０を受信すると、第２のノード１５は私用キー（ＰＲＫ２ 」）１７を使用してＳＫｅｎｃ８５を復号し、信用権威者５５の発行公開キー（ 「ＰＵＢＴＡ」）を使用してディジタル証明４５を復号し、ＳＫ６０とＰＵＫ１ １１を入手する。このＳＫキー６０とＰＵＫ１キー１１を使用して、暗号化原 メッセージ６５とディジタル署名８０を復号し、送信メッセージ・ダイジェスト ７５と原メッセージ４０をそれぞれ取り出す。次に、原メッセージ４０に第１の ノード１０で行われたのと同じハッシュ・アルゴリズム８５を適用する。その結 果９０（「受信メッセージ・ダイジェスト」と称する）が、送信メッセージ・ダ イジェスト７５と比較される。送信メッセージ・ダイジエスト７５が受信メッセ ージ・ダイジェスト９０と同じ場合、この２つの正当ノード間の通信が維持され る。 第４図を参照すると、本発明を使用するコンピュータ・システム１００の実施 形態が図示されている。コンピュータ・システム１００は、ホスト・プロセッサ １０５と、メモリ装置１１０と、入出力（「Ｉ／Ｏ」）制御装置１１５と、「ハ ードウェア・エージェント」と呼ばれる暗号装置１２とを備える。複数のバス・ エージェントがシステム・バス１３０を介して互いに接続され、それによってこ れらのバス・エージェント間で情報を伝達することができる。 この実施形態ではホスト・プロセッサ１０５しか図示されていないが、コンピ ュータ業界では周知のように、コンピュータ・システム１００内で複数のホスト ・プロセッサを使用することもできるものと企図される。さらに、メモリ装置１ １０はダイナミック・ランダム・アクセス・メモリ（「ＤＲＡＭ」）、読取り専 用メモリ（「ＲＯＭ」）、ビデオ・ランダム・アクセス・メモリ（「ＶＲＡＭ」 ）、および同様のものを含むことができる。メモリ装置１１０には、ホスト・プ ロセッサ１０５が使用する情報が記憶される。 入出力制御措置１１５は、入出力バス１３５とシステム・バス１３０との間の インタフェースであり、システム・バス１３０または入出力バス１３５に結合さ れた構成要素間で情報を転送する通信経路（すなわちゲートウェイ）を提供する 。入出力バス１３５はコンピュータ・システム１００内の少なくとも１つの周辺 装置との間で情報を転送する。これには、画像を表示する表示装置１４０（たと えば陰極線管、液晶表示装置など）、ホスト・プロセッサ１０５に情報およびコ マンド選択を伝達する英数字入力装置１４５（たとえば英数字キーボードなど） 、カーソル移動を制御するカーソル制御装置１５０（たとえばマウス、トラック ボール、タッチ・パッドなど）、情報を記憶する大容量データ記憶装置１５５（ たとえば磁気テープ、ハード・ディスク・ドライブ、フロッピィ・ディスク・ド ライブなど）、コンピュータ・システム１００から他の装置に情報を送信する情 報送受信装置１６０（ファックス機、モデム、スキャナなど）、および情報の有 形の視覚表現を提供するハード・コピー装置１６５（たとえばプロッタ、プリン タなど）が含まれるがこれらには限定されない。第４図に示すコンピュータ・シ ステムはこれらの構成要素または例示したもの以外の構成要素のうちの一部また は全部を使用することができる。 次に、第５図に示す本発明の実施形態を参照すると、ハードウェア・エージェ ント１２０は、ホスト・プロセッサ１０５および、メモリおよび入出力制御装置 （図示せず）との通信経路を確立するシステム・バス１３０に結合されている。 ハードウェア・エージェント１２０は、ダイ１２１を損傷と有害汚染物質から保 護するように集積回路構成要素パッケージ１２２内に、好ましくは密閉されてカ プセル封止されたダイ１２１（たとえばマイクロコントローラ）の形態の単一の 集積回路を含む。ダイ１２１は、記憶素子１２４に結合された処理装置１２３と 、バス・インタフェース１２５と、乱数発生器１２６とを含む。バス・インタフ ェース１２５は、ハードウェア・エージェント１２０から他の装置（たとえばホ スト・プロセッサ、他の装置内の他のハードウェア・エージェントなど）への通 信を可能にする。処理装置１２３は、ダイ１２１の中のセキュリティ保護された 環境内で内部的に計算を行って、許可された受信者との有効な接続を確認する。 そのような計算には、特定のアルゴリズムおよびプロトコルの実行、装置固有の 公開／私用キー対および同様のものを生成する、回路（たとえばランダムな性質 であることが好ましい、乱数発生器１２６など）の起動が含まれる。処理装置１ ２３は、コンピュータ・システムを混乱させてその私用キーおよびその他の情報 を入手する一般的な方法であるウィルス攻撃による私用キーのアクセスを防ぐよ うにダイ１２１内に配置されている。 記憶素子１２４は、「ＲＳＡ」や「ＤＥＳ」などの適切な暗号アルゴリズム、 公開キーと私用キーの対１２７ａ、価値の対が認証されたものであるかどうかを 検証するためのディジタル証明（「ＤＣ」という符号が付されている）１２７ｂ 、および集積回路構成要素とその製造業者によって製造された他の同様の装置と の間の通信を可能にする集積回路構成要素の製造業者の公開キー（「ＰＵＫＭ」 ）１２７ｃを記憶するフラッシュ・メモリなどの不揮発性メモリ素子１２７を含 む（第６図に詳細に記載する）。電源が切断されても内容を保持するため、この 不揮発性メモリ１２７が主として使用される。メモリ装置１２４は、処理装置１ ２３からの特定の結果を記憶するためにさらにランダム・アクセス・メモリ（「 ＲＡＭ」）１２８を含む。 ハードウェア・エージェント１２０は、セキュリティ強化のためにシステム・ バス１３０に接続された周辺装置として実装されているが、ハードウェア・エー ジェント１２０はＰＣプラットフォーム・レベルで他のいくつかの方法（たとえ ば、ハード・ディスクから入出力される情報の自動的な復号または暗号化あるい はその両方を行うディスク制御装置またはＰＣＭＣＩＡカードとしてなど）で実 施することもできるものと企図される。他の代替実施態様は、後述するようにハ ードウェア・エージェントをホスト・プロセッサを含むマルチチップ・モジュー ルの１つの構成要素とすることであろう。さらに、ハードウェア・エージェント についてＰＣプラットフォームと関連して説明しているが、このようなハードウ ェア・エージェントはファックス機、プリンタおよび同様のものなどのノード内 や、コンピュータと入出力周辺装置との間の通信経路上に実施することもできる ものと企図される。 第６図を参照すると、本発明を製作する操作のフローチャートが示されている 。まず、ステップ１００で、任意の従来の公知の半導体製造技法に従ってハード ウェア・エージェントのダイを製作する。次に、ハードウェア・エージェント自 体を形成するようにそのダイを半導体パッケージ内にカプセル封止する（ステッ プ１０５）。証明システム上にハードウェア・エージェントを配置し、それによ ってハードウェア・エージェントと証明システムとの間に電気的および機械的結 合を確立する（ステップ１１０）。証明システムは、ハードウェア・エージェン トの証明のための電気信号の発生と受信を行う、プリント回路基板に結合された キャリヤを備える。証明システムはさらに、固有キー生成を保証するために前に 生成された公開キーの記憶装置（たとえばデータベース）をさらに備える。その 後で、証明システムはハードウェア・エージェントに電力を供給し、ハードウェ ア・エージェントは乱数発生器に電力を供給してハードウェア・エージェント内 で乱数発生器が装置固有の公開キーと私用キーの対を内部的に生成することがで きるようにする。 ハードウェア・エージェント内で公開キーと私用キーの対が生成された後、公 開キーと私用キーの対のうちの公開キーを証明システムに送る（ステップ１２０ ）。その公開キーを、記憶装置に記憶されている前に製造されたハードウェア・ エージェントの前に生成された公開キーと比較する（ステップ１２５）。万一、 その公開キーが前に生成された公開キーの１つと同じである場合（ステップ１３ ０）、証明システムがハードウェア・エージェントに対して別の前記公開キーと 私用キーの対を生成するように通知し（ステップ１３５）、このプロセスをステ ップ１２０から続けて各公開キーと私用キーの対が確実に固有のものになるよう にする。 公開キーが固有である場合は、記憶装置はその固有の公開キーで更新される（ ステップ１４０）。その後、証明システムがステップ１４５で、キーの対が認証 されたものであるかどうかを検証する固有装置証明（以下、「認証装置証明」と 呼ぶ）を作成する。認証装置証明は、秘密私用製造業者キーを使用して「ディジ タル署名」された装置の公開キーを少なくとも含む（すなわち、大ざっぱに言え ば製造業者の私用キーを使用して装置の公開キーを暗号化する）。この認証装置 証明を製造業者の一般に知られた公開キーと共にハードウェア・エージェントに 入力し（ステップ１５０）、ハードウェア・エージェントは固有公開キーと私用 キーの対と認証装置証明と製造業者の公開キーをその不揮発性メモリに永久的に プログラムする（ステップ１５５）。しかし、製造業者の代わりに他のエンティ ティ（たとえば配布業者）の公開キーを使用することもでき、その場合は認証装 置証明の変更も必要になることが企図される。この時点で、ハードウェア・エー ジェントは物理的に固有であり、これで他のハードウェア・エージェントとの通 信を安全に確立することができる。 ハードウェア・エージェントを製作した後、それを第４図に示すコンピュータ ・システムなどの電子装置に実装する。これは、呼びかけ／応答などの認証手続 きとその他の周知の手続きを使用してライセンス供与者とハードウェア・エージ ェントとの間にセキュリティ保護された通信経路を確立することによって行うこ とができる。通信経路が安全に確保された後、セキュリティ保護された通信リン クを介して有効なライセンス・トークンをハードウェア・エージェントのフラッ シュ・メモリにダウンロードする。ハードウェア・エージェント間で転送するの ではなく、ライセンス・トークンが複数のハードウェア・エージェントに組み込 まれて「有効」状態または「無効」状態にあり、それによってライセンス・トー クンを有効化または無効化することもできることがさらに企図される。 第７Ａ図および第７Ｂ図を参照すると、２つのハードウェア・エージェントの 認証の相互遠隔識別の実施形態が示されている。ステップ２００で、第１のハー ドウェア・エージェントが組み込まれた「未許可の」第１のノード（すなわち現 在はライセンス・ソフトウェア・アプリケーションの操作を許可されていないノ ード）と、ライセンス・ソフトウェア・アプリケーションを操作することを許可 された第２のハードウェア・エージェントが組み込まれた許可された第２のノー ドとの間に通信リンクが確立される。この通信リンクは、モデム、ネットワーク などの任意の従来の通信手段を介して確立することができる。第１のハードウェ ア・エージェントはその固有認証装置証明を含むメッセージを第２のハードウェ ア・エージェントに出力する（ステップ２０５）。両方のハードウェア・エージ エントの不揮発性メモリに製造業者の公開キー（「ＰＵＫＭ」）がプログラムさ れているため、第２のハードウェア・エージェントは製造業者の公開キー（「Ｐ ＵＫＭ」）を使用して認証装置証明を復号し、第１のハードウェア・エージェン トの公開キーを入手する（ステップ２１０）。その後、ステップ２１５〜２２０ で、ステップ２０５〜２１０に記載されているものと同様の操作も行われ、それ によって第１のエージェントは第２のハードウェア・エージェントの公開キー（ 「ＰＵＫ２」）を入手する。 その後、ステップ２２５および２３０で、第２のハードウェア・エージェント が、第１のハードウェア・エージェントの導き出された公開キーを使用して、選 定された暗号アルゴリズム（たとえばＲＳＡ）に従って呼びかけメッセージを暗 号化し、その呼びかけメッセージを第１のハードウェア・エージェントに送信す る。ステップ２３５および２４０で、第１のハードウェア・エージェントが、そ の私用キー（「ＰＲＫ１」）を使用して呼びかけメッセージを復号し、次に、復 号した呼びかけメッセージを第２のハードウェア・エージェントの公開キー（「 ＰＵＫ２」）を使用して暗号化することによって応答メッセージを生成し、その 応答メッセージを第２のハードウェア・エージェントに送信する。次に、第２の ハードウェア・エージェントが、前に送信された製造業者の装置証明の復号によ って前に判断したその私用キー（「ＰＵＫ１」）を使用してその応答を復号する （ステップ２４５）。ステップ２５０で、第２のハードウェア・エージエントは 元の呼びかけメッセージを、復号した応答メッセージと比較し、同じでない場合 は通信を終了する（ステップ２５５）。同じ場合は、ステップ２６０〜２９０で ステップ２２５〜２６０と同様の呼びかけ／応答手続きが行われて、第１のハー ドウェア・エージェントから送信された情報を第２のハードウェア・エージェン トが実際に受信していることを検証する。これらのステップ（ステップ２２ ５〜２９０）が成功裏に完了すると、両方のハードウェア・エージェントが認証 されたエージェントであり、両者の間の通信がセキュリティ保護されていること が保証される（ステップ２９５）。 次に第７Ｃ図を参照すると、セキュリティ保護された通信のもとで第２のハー ドウェア・エージェント内の有効なライセンス・トークンを第１のハードウェア ・エージェントに安全に転送するプロセスの実施形態が示されている。安全保護 された通信が確立されると、第１のハードウェア・エージェントは第２のハード ウェア・エージェントに対して有効なライセンス・トークンを所有しているかど うか照会する（ステップ３００）。第２のハードウェア・エージェントが組み込 まれているシステムが有効なライセンス・トークンを持っていない場合（ステッ プ３０５）、ハードウェア・エージェント間の通信は終了する（ステップ３１０ ）。しかし、第２のハードウェア・エージェントが組み込まれたシステムが有効 なライセンス・トークンを持っている場合は、第１のハードウェア・エージェン トにしかるべくメッセージを送信する（ステップ３１５）。 第１のハードウェア・エージェントは、このメッセージを受信すると、第１の ハードウェア・エージェントにライセンス・ソフトウェア・アプリケーションの 操作を許す有効なライセンス・トークンの転送要求を出す（ステップ３２０）。 第２のハードウェア・エージェントは、有効なライセンス・トークンを転送する ことによって転送要求に応答し、それによってそのライセンス特権を失う（ステ ップ３２５）。第１のハードウェア・エージェントはその有効なライセンス・ト ークンを受け取り、そのトークンをその不揮発性メモリに記憶した後、有効なラ イセンス・トークンを受け取ったというメッセージを第２のハードウェア・エー ジェントに送信し、そのライセンス・ソフトウェアのコピーを使用可能にするこ とになる（ステップ３３０）。この時点で、通信が終了する（ステップ３３５） 。 ステップ３２０と３２５の間およびステップ３２５と３３０の間に呼びかけ／ 応答シーケンスを導入することによって、追加のレベルのプロトコル保全性を得 ることができることが企図される。これによって、前のライセンス・トークン転 送事象の「再生」が防止される。 第１と第２のハードウェア・エージェント間の通信と並行して、各ハードウェ ア・エージェントはその送信の内容を監査ログとして不揮発性メモリに記憶する 。したがって、第２のハードウェア・エージェントがそのコピーを使用不能にし た後で第１のハードウェア・エージェントがそのコピーを使用可能にする前に通 信が切断された場合、両方のハードウェア・エージェントは通信が再接続された 後で監査ログを見直してどのハードウェア・エージェント（ある場合）がライセ ンス・ソフトウェア・アプリケーションを操作する許可を持っているかを判断す ることができる。 本明細書に記載の本発明は多くの異なる方法で多くの異なる構成を使用して設 計することができる。本発明について様々な実施態様に関して説明したが、当業 者なら本発明の精神および範囲から逸脱することなく他の実施態様を考えつくで あろう。したがって、本発明は請求の範囲の記載によって判断されるべきである 。DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION   Loving software license for hardware agents                                Background of the Invention Field of the invention   The present invention relates to licensing software. Specifically, the present invention provides the first License software from an authorized node with Access privileges to run software programs to specific user licenses Transfer to an unauthorized node with a second hardware agent without conflict The present invention relates to an apparatus and a method for performing the method.BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION   Early in the development of computer systems, modernized companies generally A room with several "dumb" terminals connected to a frame I was using a centralized mainframe of the size. Smaller, faster and higher performance computers With the advent of pewter, many of these modernized companies have their centralized main Remove the frame and replace it with some standalone computers, or personal Computers, each user owning his or her own personal computer Use a distributed network (for example, a local area network) I chose the one to use.   Recognizing this decentralization trend, many software developers have been "user specific" License your software according to a specific licensing scheme, commonly called a license. License the software. User-specific licenses are generally Allow a specified number of individuals to operate the software program at any time in a specific manner. You. Therefore, the license is not tied to a specific node, but to a selected number of individuals I do. For the purposes of this application, a “node” is a computer, preferably including the present invention. Intelligence, such as data, printers, facsimile machines, and the like "Is defined as a hardware product having". " Includes user-specific software A key issue to follow is the potential licensing revenue of software developers. Unauthorized use and / or copying of licensed software It may be indirectly conducive.   Over the years, software developers have found that their software is user-specific. How to protect against use and copying beyond the terms of the license But the company licensee has been licensed by their own employees. Significantly reduce potential subrogation due to illegal use or copying of software I've been trying. Therefore, software that exceeds user-specific license conditions Preventing the spread of software is not licensed to software developers and companies Both have similar benefits.   Currently, compliance with user-specific software licenses is based on the dongle gle) "is performed by the use of physical hardware devices. Do Is a package with the licensed software when first purchased Physical hardware device that is being used. This is generally -Connect to the parallel port of a node such as a computer. Various times during execution In that respect, the Licensed Software Program is not Send an authorization message (called "call") to the active device. Dong The active devices in the dongle are confidential information stored inside the dongle (hereinafter referred to as “Yes Process the call using a valid license token) and return a message Generate a message (called a "response"). The software program sends this response Compares to the expected response and allows further execution only if the two responses are the same. Yes.   Therefore, the user copies the licensed software program and Can be loaded on multiple personal computers, but the software Can run the hardware program on the first connected dongle Computer only. Copy licensed software programs to other To run on a Sonal computer, the first personal computer Must remove the dongle and connect it to another personal computer. No. As a result, the software cannot be used on the first personal computer. It will work. The number of dongles given to a company licensee is generally user specific. Licenses are limited to those with software license agreements Software software program leaders Obviously, it will not cause any adverse financial impact.   Dongles ensure compliance with user-specific licenses, but some There are drawbacks. One disadvantage is that the dongle must be physically distributed to customers That is. Therefore, systems for electronic distribution of software (“Content distribution Called "cloth") has been proposed and implemented to increase convenience and reduce distribution costs However, the dongle as a physical device still uses traditional distribution methods and associated costs. Need. Dongle to protect software developers' economic interests As required, the customer can (i) get the dongle directly at the selected location Then attach the dongle to the node before licensing Grams cannot be used or (ii) content prior to intended use Licensed software in anticipation of the time distributors will mail dongle to customers ・ Must endure the troublesome work of ordering programs. In any Even so, dongles hinder the efficiency and interest of content distribution.   Another disadvantage is that removing and attaching the dongle is a time consuming process. is there. In companies that compete for time, exchanging dongles can affect the overall performance of the company. Another disadvantage is that the dongle is constantly removed and put on Companies are waiting for a new dongle with a higher probability that the guru will be damaged and inoperable Otherwise, you can use the software application again Absent.   Another disadvantage is that while licensing is for individuals, dongle is generally It is to be attached to. Thus, if the user is on another machine (for example, at home) Personal computer), the user owns the dongle Unable to use licensed software programs unless you .                             BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION   Based on the above, electronic dongle as an integrated circuit component internally mounted in the node It is desirable to produce an encryption device having the function of a guru. Therefore, the present invention The purpose is to include a unique digital certificate used in remote authentication of integrated circuit components. Provided is an encryption device as an integrated circuit component, including a storage element that stores data partially. Is Rukoto.   It is another object of the present invention to internally generate a unique public / private key pair, Without having to store the secret key, thereby saving To provide unique integrated circuit components that prevent the use of   It is another object of the present invention to provide a method for verifying or manufacturing another To enable secure communication with various integrated circuit components. Providing an integrated circuit component that internally stores the public key of another entity It is.   Another object of the present invention is to provide a robin system that does not require frequent physical manipulation of hardware. Providing integrated circuit components that provide a roving software license Is to provide.   This integrated circuit component is commonly referred to as a hardware license and is used for identification purposes. And (i) a non-volatile memory for storing a unique public key / private key pair. And (ii) a key that verifies that the key pair is authentic. Digital certification and (iii) other integrated circuit components and other components manufactured by the manufacturer. Selected entities (integrated circuit configurations) that allow communication between such components (Preferably the manufacturer of the element). Non-volatile memory can also be used to store cryptographic algorithms. The integrated circuit component is a volatile memory that stores information processed by the processing device. And information from other similar components in encrypted or decrypted form via the communication bus Interface to send and receive and generate a unique public / private key pair And a random number generator for generating                             BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES   Objects, features, and advantages of the present invention will be apparent from the following detailed description of the invention. Would.   FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a two-way symmetric key encryption and decryption process. .   FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a two-way asymmetric key encryption and decryption process. You.   FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing the digital certification process from a credit authority. .   FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a computer system incorporating an embodiment of the present invention. FIG.   FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of the present invention.   FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing how a pair and a digital certificate are implemented on an integrated circuit component. It is a chart.   7A to 7C illustrate a second hardware age with license privileges. License token between the agent and the first hardware agent The first hardware agent sends a second hardware 9 is a flowchart illustrating an operation of establishing communication with an agent.                             Detailed description of the invention   The present invention provides a roving software between appropriately configured hardware agents. Transfer software licenses and distribute them accordingly Apparatus and method for eliminating the need for physical hardware devices. In the following description, Many details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. However, Those skilled in the art will be able to exemplify the invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. It can be seen that it can be implemented using many different embodiments than Is. In other instances, well-known circuits have been used in order not to obscure the present invention unnecessarily. Elements and the like are not described in detail.   In the detailed description, some cryptographic relationships may be used to describe a particular property or quality. Are frequently used, but are defined here. "Key" is conventional Parameter of the encryption algorithm or the decryption or both. Specifically, the key is a sequential arrangement of binary data having a length of n bits ("string"). (Where “n” is an arbitrary number). A "message" is a series of buses Information (eg encryption key address and data) transferred in the cycle Is generally defined as This information includes the call and the return response. "D Digital proof '' is defined as information related to the entity that initiates the communication. And typically publicly available credit authorities (eg, banks, government agencies, trade unions) Is the public key of the entity that was encrypted using the private key . A "digital signature" is similar to a digital certificate, except that the sender Used to authenticate the message itself.   In recent years, digital information has been transmitted from one place to another. It is becoming more desirable. As a result, many entities are now , Which is unambiguous and unambiguous for legitimate recipients Is transferred in a manner that cannot be understood by unauthorized recipients. Generally, cryptography is It works according to one of two conventional techniques. That is, symmetric key encryption or Or asymmetric (or public) key encryption or a combination of those encryption techniques. You.   Referring to FIG. 1, an embodiment of a symmetric key encryption technique is illustrated. This technique In the law, the same, i.e., symmetric, secret key (labeled "SK") 1 Using the original message transferred between the first node 10 and the second node 15 5 to form an encrypted original message 20, It is necessary to decrypt the original message 5 by decoding the page 20. Such encryption and And decryption is performed, for example, by using a data encryption algorithm (more commonly referred to as ) Using well-known conventional cryptographic algorithms. Original message 5 is (i) encrypted at the first node 10, (ii) telephone line and the like Transfer from the first node 10 to the second node 15 using a public area 25 such as And (iii) decrypted by the second node 15. However, this technique uses a secret key (" SK ”) must be set in advance, so if there are many users, support Difficult to do.   Referring now to FIG. 2, an embodiment of the asymmetric key technique is illustrated. this The technique consists of two separate keys (“public key” and one used separately) for encryption and decryption. And "private key"). From the first node 10 to the second node 15 "Public" of the second node 15 key pair to establish a two-way communication Key 16 (labeled “PUK2”) is stored in first node 10 , Generally the first node 10 is an asymmetric “RSA” algorithm well known in the encryption arts. It is used to encrypt the original message 30 based on the system. This allows An encrypted original message 35 to be forwarded to the second node 15 is formed. The first no Public key and private key pair 11 and 12 ([PUK1] and “PRK 1 ") are further stored in the first node 10.   The “private” key 17 (signed as “PRK2”) of the key pair of the second node 15 ) Is known only by the second node 15 and as shown in FIG. Decryption of encrypted message 35 from first node 10 based on the RSA algorithm Used for many purposes, including numbers. However, this technique is not (E.g., commercial spies) are legitimate entities (e.g., employees, joint ventures). Work, etc.) to disrupt work flow or obtain confidential information Allow any attempt to send fraudulent messages to other legitimate entities I'm sorry. Therefore, additional protocols are generally used to authenticate the message. And justify the entity that sends the message.   The first time a communication is established between parties that are not known in advance, the sender's authentication ( That is, verify that the sender of the public key is in fact the true owner of the public key ) Is the problem. This problem is typically caused by a digital certificate in the transmitted message 50. It is avoided by incorporating 45. Digital Certificate 45 is a mutual credit authority Party 55 (eg, a bank, government agency, trade union, etc.) signs the signature (“SM”). The public key ("PUK") of the node that initiates communication using the 1 ") 11 is encrypted using the private key (" PRKTA ") 57 of the credit authority 55. Issued by encryption. Therefore, trying to use PUK2 16 Even if an unauthorized attempt is made, the transmitted message will not be readable by the recipient. The answer will just be returned. The selected credit authority 55 is a related party. Depends on For example, two individuals employed by the same company may both have Trust the certificate issued by the company's corporate security authority. However , Employees of the two independent corporate entities may have their own security Not only their authentication, but also some Requires certification from an industrial organization.   In this method, a plurality of operations are executed in parallel to create a transmission message 50. . One operation is to generate a symmetric secret key (“SK”) 60 via the DES algorithm. The original message 40 is encrypted using the Forming an encrypted message 65 that is placed in the page 50. Hara Messe A hash algorithm 70 (eg, “MD5”) is also applied to the An outgoing message digest 75 is formed. Outgoing message 75 further encrypts using the first node's private key ("PRK1") 12. To form a digital signature 80, which is included in the outgoing message 50 . In addition, a symmetric key (“SK”) 60 is used to generate a second key based on the RSA algorithm. Encrypted using the public key (“PUK2”) 16 of the 5 and further included in the transmission message 50.   With continued reference to FIG. Transmitted from the first node 10 via the public area 25; Upon receiving the transmitted message 50, the second node 15 sends the private key (PRK2). )) 17 to decrypt SKenc 85 and issue the public key ( "PUBTA") to decrypt the digital certificate 45, SK60 and PUK1.   Obtain 11. Using the SK key 60 and the PUK1 key 11, the encryption source The message 65 and the digital signature 80 are decrypted, and the transmitted message digest 75 and the original message 40 are respectively extracted. Next, the first message Apply the same hash algorithm 85 as performed at node 10. The result Result 90 (referred to as the "received message digest") Compared to Egest 75. Send message Digest 75 is received message The same as the digest 90, communication between the two legitimate nodes is maintained. You.   Referring to FIG. 4, an implementation of a computer system 100 using the present invention The configuration is shown. The computer system 100 includes a host processor 105, a memory device 110, an input / output (“I / O”) control device 115, And a cryptographic device 12 called a “hardware agent”. Multiple buses Agents are connected to each other via system bus 130, thereby Information can be transmitted between these bus agents.   In this embodiment, only the host processor 105 is shown, but the As is well known in the computer arts, a plurality of hosts -It is contemplated that a processor may also be used. Further, the memory device 1 10 is a dynamic random access memory ("DRAM"), read only Memory ("ROM"), video random access memory ("VRAM") ), And the like. The memory device 110 includes a host program. Information used by the processor 105 is stored.   The input / output control measure 115 is provided between the input / output bus 135 and the system bus 130. Interface, which is coupled to the system bus 130 or the input / output bus 135. Provide a communication path (ie, gateway) for transferring information between specified components . I / O bus 135 is connected to at least one peripheral in computer system 100. Transfer information to and from the device. This includes a display device 140 (for example, (For example, a cathode ray tube, a liquid crystal display, etc.) Alphanumeric input device 145 for transmitting command selection (eg, alphanumeric keyboard) , Cursor control device 150 (for example, mouse, track Mass data storage 155 (such as a ball, touch pad, etc.) For example, magnetic tapes, hard disk drives, floppy disk drives Live), information transmitted from computer system 100 to other devices. Transmission / reception device 160 (fax machine, modem, scanner, etc.) A hard copy device 165 that provides a visual representation of the shape (eg, a plotter, And the like, but are not limited thereto. The computer system shown in FIG. The stem may be a part or other of these or other components. Can be used entirely.   Next, referring to the embodiment of the present invention shown in FIG. The host 120 includes a host processor 105, a memory and an input / output control device. (Not shown) coupled to a system bus 130 that establishes a communication path therewith. Hardware agent 120 protects die 121 from damage and harmful contaminants. In the integrated circuit component package 122 to protect the A single unit in the form of a encapsulated die 121 (eg, a microcontroller) Including integrated circuits. Die 121 includes a processing unit 123 coupled to a storage element 124. , A bus interface 125, and a random number generator 126. Bus interface The hardware 125 transmits data from the hardware agent 120 to another device (for example, Host processor, other hardware agents in other devices, etc.) Enable trust. Processing unit 123 secures die 121 Performs calculations internally within the environment to ensure a valid connection with authorized recipients. Such calculations include the execution of specific algorithms and protocols, device-specific Circuits that generate public / private key pairs and the like (eg, random properties The activation of the random number generator 126, which is preferably Processing device 1 23 confuses the computer system and its private keys and other information Prevent access to private keys by virus attack, a common method of obtaining As shown in FIG.   The storage element 124 may be a suitable cryptographic algorithm such as “RSA” or “DES”, Public key / private key pair 127a, whether the value pair is authenticated Digital certificate for verification (labeled "DC") 127b And integrated circuit components and other similar devices manufactured by the manufacturer thereof. The public key of the manufacturer of the integrated circuit component ("PUKM") that allows communication between ) Includes a nonvolatile memory element 127 such as a flash memory for storing 127c. (Described in detail in FIG. 6). To retain the contents even if the power is turned off, The non-volatile memory 127 is mainly used. The memory device 124 is a processing device 1 23 to store a particular result from the random access memory (" RAM ") 128.   The hardware agent 120 is a system agent for security enhancement. Although implemented as a peripheral device connected to the bus 130, the hardware Gent 120 can be implemented at the PC platform level in several other ways (eg, Automatic decryption or encryption of information coming in and going out of the hard disk, As a disk controller or a PCMCIA card that does both). It is contemplated that it can be applied. Other alternative embodiments are described below. Multi-chip module with hardware agent and host processor It would be one component of the In addition, hardware agents Is described in connection with the PC platform. Software agents are located in nodes such as fax machines, printers and the like. Or on the communication path between the computer and the input / output peripherals Is intended.   Referring to FIG. 6, a flow chart of the operation for making the present invention is shown. . First, at step 100, a hard drive is performed according to any conventional and well-known semiconductor manufacturing technique. Make a wear agent die. Next, the hardware agent Encapsulate the die in a semiconductor package to form a body (step 105). Place hardware agents on the certification system, The electrical and mechanical connection between the hardware agent and the certification system. A connection is established (step 110). The certification system is a hardware agent Coupled to a printed circuit board that generates and receives electrical signals for proof of Equipped with a carrier. The certification system also requires a The storage device further includes a storage device (for example, a database) for the generated public key. That Later, the certification system powers the hardware agent and The agent supplies power to the random number generator and Allows the random number generator to internally generate a device-specific public / private key pair. To be able to   After the public / private key pair is generated in the hardware agent, Send the public key of the open key / private key pair to the certification system (step 120) ). The public key is stored on a storage device, Compare with the public key generated before the agent (step 125). By any chance If the public key is the same as one of the previously generated public keys (step 13 0), the certification system sends another public key to the hardware agent Notify to generate a private key pair (step 135) and continue this process. Ensure that each public / private key pair is unique, continuing from step 120 To   If the public key is unique, the storage is updated with that unique public key ( Step 140). Thereafter, the certification system proceeds to step 145, where the key pair is authenticated. Unique device certificate for verifying whether the device has been authenticated (hereinafter referred to as “authentication device certificate”). Call). Authenticator certificates are created using a private, private manufacturer key. Include at least the public key of the device that has been "signed" (ie, roughly Encrypts the device's public key using the manufacturer's private key). This authentication device Certificate to hardware agent with manufacturer's publicly known public key Enter (step 150) the hardware agent will enter the unique public key and private Permanently store the key pair, authenticator certificate and manufacturer's public key in its non-volatile memory. Program (step 155). However, instead of the manufacturer, other entities (E.g., the distributor's public key), in which case the authentication It is contemplated that a change in the certificate will also be required. At this point, the hardware agent Agents are physically unique, which allows them to communicate with other hardware agents. Trust can be established safely.   After the hardware agent is created, it is shown on the computer shown in FIG. ・ Implement it in an electronic device such as a system. This is an authentication procedure such as calling / response. Licensee and hardware age using the By establishing a secure communication path with the Can be. After the communication path is secured, the secure communication link A valid license token through the hardware agent's flash Download to memory. Transfer between hardware agents License token embedded in multiple hardware agents Rarely in the “enabled” or “disabled” state, It is further contemplated that the token may be enabled or disabled.   Referring to FIGS. 7A and 7B, two hardware agents An embodiment of mutual remote identification of authentication is shown. In step 200, the first hard "Unauthorized" first node (i.e., the current Currently not authorized to operate licensed software applications License) to operate licensed software applications Authorized second node incorporating a second hardware agent A communication link is established with the host. This communication link can be a modem, network And can be established via any conventional communication means. First hardware The agent sends a message containing its unique authenticator certificate to the second hardware. A) Output to the agent (step 205). Both hardware ages Ent's non-volatile memory is programmed with the manufacturer's public key ("PUKM"). The second hardware agent is the manufacturer's public key ("P UKM ") and decrypt the authenticator certificate using the first hardware agent. The public key of the client is obtained (step 210). Thereafter, steps 215 to 220 Then, operations similar to those described in Steps 205 to 210 are also performed. Allows the first agent to use the public key of the second hardware agent ( “PUK2”).   Then, in steps 225 and 230, the second hardware agent Uses the first hardware agent's derived public key to select The challenge message is encrypted according to a specified encryption algorithm (for example, RSA). And sends the challenge message to the first hardware agent. You. In steps 235 and 240, the first hardware agent Decrypts the challenge message using the private key ("PRK1") of the The message is sent to the second hardware agent's public key (" PUK2 ") to generate a response message by encrypting Send a response message to the second hardware agent. Then, the second The hardware agent decrypts the previously transmitted manufacturer's device certificate Decrypts the response using the private key ("PUK1") previously determined (Step 245). In step 250, the second hardware agent Compare the original challenge message with the decrypted response message and if they are not the same Terminates the communication (step 255). If the same, in steps 260 to 290 The same calling / response procedure as in steps 225 to 260 is performed, and the first hardware The information sent from the hardware agent to the second hardware agent. Verify that the client is actually receiving. These steps (step 22 5-290), both hardware agents authenticate Agent and the communication between them is secure Is guaranteed (step 295).   Referring now to FIG. 7C, the second hard drive is secured under secure communications. A valid license token in the hardware agent to the first hardware An embodiment of a process for securely transferring to an agent is shown. Safety protection When the established communication is established, the first hardware agent You have a valid license token for the hardware agent An inquiry is made as to whether or not it is (Step 300). Embedded second hardware agent The licensed system does not have a valid license token (step (Step 305), the communication between the hardware and the agent ends (step 310). ). However, a system incorporating a second hardware agent is effective The first hardware agent if you have a valid license token The message is transmitted accordingly (step 315).   When the first hardware agent receives this message, the first hardware agent Licensed software application to hardware agent A transfer request of a valid license token allowing the operation is issued (step 320). The second hardware agent transfers a valid license token Responds to the transfer request, thereby losing its license privileges (step 325). The first hardware agent has its valid license After receiving the token and storing the token in its non-volatile memory, The second hardware agent sends a message that the license token has been received. Agent to make available a copy of the licensed software. (Step 330). At this point, the communication ends (step 335). .   Interrogation between steps 320 and 325 and between steps 325 and 330 / An additional level of protocol integrity is obtained by introducing a response sequence. It is contemplated that the This allows the previous license token transfer "Replay" of the sending event is prevented.   In parallel with the communication between the first and second hardware agents, each hardware Agent stores the contents of the transmission as an audit log in non-volatile memory . Therefore, the second hardware agent disables the copy Before the first hardware agent makes the copy available If the connection is lost, both hardware agents will reconnect. Review the audit log later to see which hardware agent (if any) That you have permission to operate the license software application Can be   The invention described herein can be implemented in many different ways and using many different configurations. Can be measured. Although the invention has been described with reference to various embodiments, One of ordinary skill in the art will be able to conceive other embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. There will be. Therefore, the present invention should be determined by the appended claims. .

───────────────────────────────────────────────────── フロントページの続き (81)指定国 ＥＰ(ＡＴ，ＢＥ，ＣＨ，ＤＥ， ＤＫ，ＥＳ，ＦＲ，ＧＢ，ＧＲ，ＩＥ，ＩＴ，ＬＵ，Ｍ Ｃ，ＮＬ，ＰＴ，ＳＥ)，ＯＡ(ＢＦ，ＢＪ，ＣＦ，ＣＧ ，ＣＩ，ＣＭ，ＧＡ，ＧＮ，ＭＬ，ＭＲ，ＮＥ，ＳＮ， ＴＤ，ＴＧ)，ＡＰ(ＫＥ，ＭＷ，ＳＤ，ＳＺ，ＵＧ)， ＡＭ，ＡＴ，ＡＴ，ＡＵ，ＢＢ，ＢＧ，ＢＲ，ＢＹ，Ｃ Ａ，ＣＨ，ＣＮ，ＣＺ，ＣＺ，ＤＥ，ＤＥ，ＤＫ，ＤＫ ，ＥＥ，ＥＳ，ＦＩ，ＦＩ，ＧＢ，ＧＥ，ＨＵ，ＩＳ， ＪＰ，ＫＥ，ＫＧ，ＫＰ，ＫＲ，ＫＺ，ＬＫ，ＬＲ，Ｌ Ｔ，ＬＵ，ＬＶ，ＭＤ，ＭＧ，ＭＫ，ＭＮ，ＭＷ，ＭＸ ，ＮＯ，ＮＺ，ＰＬ，ＰＴ，ＲＯ，ＲＵ，ＳＤ，ＳＥ， ＳＧ，ＳＩ，ＳＫ，ＳＫ，ＴＪ，ＴＭ，ＴＴ，ＵＡ，Ｕ Ｇ，ＵＺ，ＶＮ────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─── Continuation of front page    (81) Designated countries EP (AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, IE, IT, LU, M C, NL, PT, SE), OA (BF, BJ, CF, CG , CI, CM, GA, GN, ML, MR, NE, SN, TD, TG), AP (KE, MW, SD, SZ, UG), AM, AT, AT, AU, BB, BG, BR, BY, C A, CH, CN, CZ, CZ, DE, DE, DK, DK , EE, ES, FI, FI, GB, GE, HU, IS, JP, KE, KG, KP, KR, KZ, LK, LR, L T, LU, LV, MD, MG, MK, MN, MW, MX , NO, NZ, PL, PT, RO, RU, SD, SE, SG, SI, SK, SK, TJ, TM, TT, UA, U G, UZ, VN

Claims (1)

【特許請求の範囲】 １．集積回路構成要素内で情報を処理する処理手段と、 前記処理手段に結合され、集積回路構成要素の製造業者の固有のキー対と認証 ディジタル証明と公開キーとを記憶する第１の記憶手段と、 前記処理手段に結合され、前記処理手段によって処理された前記情報を記憶す る第２の記憶手段と、 前記処理手段に結合され、前記固有のキー対を生成する手段と、 前記処理手段に結合され、前記集積回路構成要素と第２の集積回路構成要素と の間の通信を可能にするインタフェース手段と を備える前記集積回路構成要素。 ２．前記第１の記憶手段が不揮発性メモリを含むことを特徴とする請求項１に記 載の集積回路構成要素。 ３．前記認証ディジタル証明が、前記製造業者の使用キーによって暗号化された 前記集積回路構成要素の前記製造業者の前記公開キーであることを特徴とする請 求項２に記載の集積回路構成要素。 ４．前記第１の記憶手段が暗号アルゴリズムをさらに含むことを特徴とする請求 項２に記載の集積回路構成要素。 ５．前記第２の記憶手段がランダム・アクセス・メモリを含むことを特徴とする 請求項１に記載の集積回路構成要素。 ６．前記生成手段が乱数発生器を含むことを特徴とする請求項５に記載の集積回 路構成要素。 ７．前記インタフェース手段が、バスに結合されたバス・インタフェースを含み 、集積回路構成要素と第２の集積回路構成要素との間に通信リンクを提供して集 積回路構成要素が前記第２の集積回路構成要素から集積回路構成要素に送信され た情報を復号して記憶し、集積回路構成要素から前記第２の集積回路構成要素に 情報を暗号化して送信するようになっていることを特徴とする請求項６に記載の 集積回路構成要素。 ８．情報の暗号化と復号を行う集積回路構成要素であって、 固有のキー対と、集積回路構成要素の製造業者の装置証明と、前記製造業者の 公開キーとを記憶する不揮発性メモリと、 前記情報を記憶するランダム・アクセス・メモリと、 前記不揮発性メモリと前記ランダムアクセスメモリとに結合され、前記情報を 内部的に処理する処理装置と、 前記処理装置に結合され、前記固有のキー対を生成する乱数発生器と、 前記処理装置に結合され、集積回路構成要素が少なくとも第２の集積回路構成 要素と通信することができるようにするインタフェースと を備える集積回路構成要素。 ９．前記インタフェースが、集積回路構成要素と第２の集積回路構成要素との間 に通信リンクを形成して、集積回路構成要素が集積回路構成要素に送信された情 報を復号して記憶し、前記集積回路要素から前記第２の集積回路要素に送信され る情報を暗号化して送信することができるようにすることを特徴とする請求項８ に記載の集積回路構成要素。 １０．ソフトウェア・プログラムを実行するホスト処理手段と、 前記ソフトウェア・プログラムを記憶する記憶手段と、 前記ホスト処理手段と前記記憶手段とを結合するバス手段と、 前記バス手段に結合され、エージェント手段に入力された暗号情報を内部的に 復号し、前記エージェント手段から出力される暗号情報を内部的に暗号化する前 記エージェント手段と を備えるシステムであって、 前記エージェント手段は、 前記入力暗号情報および出力暗号情報を前記エージェント内で処理する処理 手段と、 前記処理手段に結合され、前記入力暗号情報の復号と前記出力暗号情報の暗 号化に使用される、固有のキー対と、前記エージェント手段の製造業者の装置証 明と、前記製造業者の公開キーとを記憶する第１の記憶手段と、 前記処理手段に結合され、前記入力暗号情報および出力暗号情報を一時的に 記憶する第２の記憶手段と、 前記処理手段に結合され、前記固有のキー対を生成する生成手段と、 前記処理手段に結合され、前記システムと遠隔システムとの間の通信を可能 にするインタフェース手段と を含むシステム。 １１．前記第１の記憶手段が、不揮発性メモリから電力が切断されても前記固有 のキー対を維持する前記不揮発性メモリを含むことを特徴とする請求項１０に記 載のシステム。 １２．前記第１の記憶手段が暗号アルゴリズムをさらに記憶することを特徴とす る請求項１１に記載のシステム。 １３．前期生成手段が乱数発生器を含むことを特徴とする請求項１２に記載のシ ステム。 １４．少なくとも１つの暗号化および復号プログラムを記憶する記憶素子と、 前記暗号化および復号プログラムを実行するホスト・プロセッサと、 前記ホスト・プロセッサと前記記憶素子とを結合するバスと、 前記バスに結合され、内部的に前記遠隔装置からの入力情報を復号し、前記遠 隔装置への出力情報を暗号化するハードウェア・エージェントと を備えるシステムであって、 前記ハードウェア・エージェントは、 前記ハードウェア・エージェント内で前記入力情報と前記出力情報を処理す るプロセッサと、 前記プロセッサに結合され、すべてが前記入力情報の復号と前記出力情報の 暗号化に使用される、固有に指定されたキー対と、認証装置証明と、製造業者公 開キーとを記憶する不揮発性記憶素子と、 前記プロセッサによって処理された前記入力情報と前記出力情報とを一時的 に記憶する揮発性記憶素子と、 前記固有のキー対を生成する乱数発生器と、 前記プロセッサに結合され、前記システムと前記遠隔システムとの間の通信 を可能にするインタフェースと を含むシステム。 １５．前記不揮発性記憶素子が少なくとも１つの暗号アルゴリズムをさらに記憶 することを特徴とする請求項１４に記載のシステム。 １６．１対のハードウェア・エージェントの遠隔識別と認証のための方法であっ て、 第１のハードウェア・エージェントと第２のハードウェア・エージェントの間 に通信リンクを確立するステップと、 前記第１および第２のハードウェア・エージェントを認証するステップと、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントが有効なライセンス・トークンを所有 しているか否かを判断するために、前記第１のハードウェア・エージェントから 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントに照会メッセージを送信するステップと 、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントが前記有効なライセンス・トークンを 所有している場合に前記第１のハードウェア・エージェントから第２のエージェ ントへの転送要求メッセージを生成するステップと、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントから前記第１のハードウェア・エージ ェントに前記有効なライセンス・トークンを転送するステップと、 前記有効ライセンス・トークンを受信した後に前記第１のハードウェア・エー ジェントから前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントへのトークン受信メッセー ジを生成するステップと、 前記通信リンクを終了するステップと を含む方法。 １７．認証ステップが、 前記第１のハードウェア・エージェントに記憶されている固有の装置証明を前 記第２のハードウェア・エージェントに送信するステップと、 前記第１のハードウェア・エージェントと通信し前記第１のハードウェア・エ ージェントを認証するために、前記固有の装置証明を復号して第１のハードウェ ア・エージェントの公開キーを入手するステップを含むことを特徴とする請求項 １６に記載の方法。 １８．認証ステップが、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントに記憶されている固有の装置証明を前 記第１のハードウェア・エージェントに送信するステップと、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントと通信し前記第２のハードウェア・エ ージェントを認証するために、前記固有の装置証明を復号して第２のハードウェ ア・エージェントの公開キーを入手するステップとをさらに含む方法。 １９．認証ステップが、 前記第１のハードウェア・エージェントの前記公開キーによって暗号化される 呼びかけメッセージを生成するステップと、 前記呼びかけメッセージを前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントに送信する ステップと、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントが前記呼びかけメッセージを復号し、 前記呼びかけメッセージに応答するステップと、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントの前記公開キーによって暗号化される 呼びかけメッセージを生成するステップと、 前記第１のハードウェア・エージェントに前記呼びかけメッセージを送信する ステップと、 前記第１のハードウェア・エージェントが前記呼びかけメッセージを復号し、 前記呼びかけメッセージに応答するステップとをさらに含むことを特徴とする請 求項１８に記載の方法。 ２０．転送要求を生成するステップの前に、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントが前記有効なライセンス・トークンを 所有しているか否かを前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントが判断するステッ プと、それによって、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントが前記有効なライセンス・トークン を所有していない場合には前記通信を終了するステップと、 前記第２のハードウェア・エージェントが前記有効なライセンス・トークン を所有している場合には前記照会メッセージに対する応答メッセージを生成する ステップとをさらに含むことを特徴とする請求項１６に記載の方法。[Claims] 1. Processing means for processing information within the integrated circuit component;   A unique key pair and authentication of the manufacturer of the integrated circuit component, coupled to said processing means First storage means for storing a digital certificate and a public key;   Storing the information processed by the processing means, coupled to the processing means; Second storage means,   Means for generating the unique key pair coupled to the processing means;   The integrated circuit component and the second integrated circuit component coupled to the processing means; Interface means for enabling communication between The integrated circuit component comprising: 2. 2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first storage unit includes a nonvolatile memory. On-chip integrated circuit components. 3. The authenticated digital certificate is encrypted with the manufacturer's use key The public key of the manufacturer of the integrated circuit component. An integrated circuit component according to claim 2. 4. The first storage means further includes a cryptographic algorithm. Item 3. An integrated circuit component according to item 2. 5. The second storage means includes a random access memory. An integrated circuit component according to claim 1. 6. 6. The integration circuit according to claim 5, wherein said generation means includes a random number generator. Road components. 7. The interface means includes a bus interface coupled to a bus Providing a communication link between the integrated circuit component and a second integrated circuit component to provide An integrated circuit component is transmitted from the second integrated circuit component to the integrated circuit component; Decrypts the information and stores the decoded information into the second integrated circuit component from the integrated circuit component. 7. The method according to claim 6, wherein the information is transmitted after being encrypted. Integrated circuit component. 8. An integrated circuit component for encrypting and decrypting information,   A unique key pair, a device certificate for the manufacturer of the integrated circuit component, and a A non-volatile memory for storing a public key,   A random access memory for storing the information;   Coupled to the non-volatile memory and the random access memory to store the information A processing device for processing internally;   A random number generator coupled to the processing device to generate the unique key pair;   An integrated circuit component coupled to the processing device, wherein at least a second integrated circuit configuration is provided. An interface that allows you to communicate with the element An integrated circuit component comprising: 9. Said interface between an integrated circuit component and a second integrated circuit component; Form a communication link in which the integrated circuit component transmits information transmitted to the integrated circuit component. Information from the integrated circuit element to the second integrated circuit element. 9. The information according to claim 8, wherein said information can be encrypted and transmitted. An integrated circuit component according to claim 1. 10. A host processing means for executing the software program;   Storage means for storing the software program;   Bus means for coupling the host processing means and the storage means;   The cryptographic information input to the agent means is coupled to the bus means and internally Before decrypting and internally encrypting the cryptographic information output from the agent means The agent means A system comprising:   The agent means,     Processing the input encryption information and the output encryption information in the agent Means,     Coupled to the processing means for decrypting the input encryption information and encrypting the output encryption information. A unique key pair to be used for encryption and a device certificate of the manufacturer of the agent means First storage means for storing the information and the manufacturer's public key;     The input encryption information and the output encryption information are temporarily Second storage means for storing;     Generating means coupled to the processing means for generating the unique key pair;     Coupled to the processing means to enable communication between the system and a remote system Interface means to Including system. 11. The first storage means stores the unique data even when power is disconnected from the nonvolatile memory. 11. The non-volatile memory of claim 10, wherein the non-volatile memory maintains key pairs. On-board system. 12. The first storage means further stores an encryption algorithm. The system of claim 11, wherein 13. 13. The system according to claim 12, wherein said first generation means includes a random number generator. Stem. 14． A storage element for storing at least one encryption and decryption program;   A host processor that executes the encryption and decryption programs;   A bus coupling the host processor and the storage element;   Coupled to the bus and internally decoding input information from the remote device; A hardware agent that encrypts output information to remote devices A system comprising:   The hardware agent comprises:     Processing the input information and the output information in the hardware agent; Processor and     Coupled to the processor, all decoding the input information and decoding the output information. A uniquely specified key pair used for encryption, an authenticator certificate, and a manufacturer certificate A nonvolatile storage element for storing an open key;     The input information and the output information processed by the processor are temporarily stored. A volatile storage element for storing the     A random number generator for generating the unique key pair;     Communication between the system and the remote system coupled to the processor Interface that enables Including system. 15. The non-volatile storage element further stores at least one encryption algorithm The system of claim 14, wherein the system is configured to: 16. A method for remote identification and authentication of a pair of hardware agents. hand,   Between the first hardware agent and the second hardware agent Establishing a communication link with   Authenticating the first and second hardware agents;   The second hardware agent has a valid license token From the first hardware agent to determine if Sending an inquiry message to the second hardware agent; ,   The second hardware agent retrieves the valid license token The first hardware agent to the second agent Generating a transfer request message to the client;   The second hardware agent to the first hardware age Transferring the valid license token to an agent;   The first hardware agent after receiving the valid license token. From the agent to the second hardware agent Generating a page;   Terminating the communication link; A method that includes 17． The authentication step   A unique device certificate stored in said first hardware agent. Sending to the second hardware agent;   Communicating with the first hardware agent and communicating with the first hardware agent; Decrypt the unique device certificate and authenticate the first hardware Obtaining a public key of the agent. The method according to item 16, 18. The authentication step   A unique device certificate stored in said second hardware agent. Sending to the first hardware agent;   Communicating with the second hardware agent and communicating with the second hardware agent; Decrypt the unique device certificate and authenticate the second hardware to authenticate the agent. Obtaining the public key of the agent. 19. The authentication step   Encrypted by the public key of the first hardware agent Generating an invitation message;   Sending the challenge message to the second hardware agent Steps and   The second hardware agent decodes the challenge message; Responding to the challenge message;   Encrypted by the public key of the second hardware agent Generating an invitation message;   Sending the challenge message to the first hardware agent Steps and   The first hardware agent decodes the challenge message; Responding to the challenge message. 19. The method according to claim 18. 20. Before the step of generating a transfer request,   The second hardware agent retrieves the valid license token A step in which the second hardware agent determines whether or not And thereby     The second hardware agent has the valid license token Terminating the communication if the user does not own the     The second hardware agent has the valid license token Generate a response message to the inquiry message if the user owns 17. The method of claim 16, further comprising the steps of:
JP50959896A 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 Robbing software license for hardware agents Expired - Fee Related JP4294728B2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US08/303,084 US5473692A (en) 1994-09-07 1994-09-07 Roving software license for a hardware agent
US08/303,084 1994-09-07
PCT/US1995/011136 WO1996008092A1 (en) 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 Roving software license for a hardware agent

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
JPH10507324A true JPH10507324A (en) 1998-07-14
JP4294728B2 JP4294728B2 (en) 2009-07-15

Family

ID=23170470

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
JP50959896A Expired - Fee Related JP4294728B2 (en) 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 Robbing software license for hardware agents

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (2) US5473692A (en)
EP (1) EP0780039A4 (en)
JP (1) JP4294728B2 (en)
AU (1) AU3583295A (en)
RU (1) RU2147790C1 (en)
WO (1) WO1996008092A1 (en)

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2002527781A (en) * 1998-10-06 2002-08-27 コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ Method and system for certificate management of consumer electronic devices
JP2003500923A (en) * 1999-05-21 2003-01-07 インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレーション Method, computer program and device for initializing secure communication and exclusively pairing devices
US6886095B1 (en) 1999-05-21 2005-04-26 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for efficiently initializing secure communications among wireless devices
JP2005535040A (en) * 2002-08-06 2005-11-17 プリヴァリス・インコーポレーテッド Method for secure registration and backup of personal identification to an electronic device
JP2011193477A (en) * 1998-10-30 2011-09-29 Virnet X Inc Agile network protocol for secure communication with assured system availability

Families Citing this family (471)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5870474A (en) 1995-12-04 1999-02-09 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing conditional access in connection-oriented, interactive networks with a multiplicity of service providers
US6292568B1 (en) 1966-12-16 2001-09-18 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Representing entitlements to service in a conditional access system
US7028187B1 (en) 1991-11-15 2006-04-11 Citibank, N.A. Electronic transaction apparatus for electronic commerce
US5453601A (en) 1991-11-15 1995-09-26 Citibank, N.A. Electronic-monetary system
US5557518A (en) * 1994-04-28 1996-09-17 Citibank, N.A. Trusted agents for open electronic commerce
US6122403A (en) 1995-07-27 2000-09-19 Digimarc Corporation Computer system linked by using information in data objects
US6449377B1 (en) 1995-05-08 2002-09-10 Digimarc Corporation Methods and systems for watermark processing of line art images
DE69514908T2 (en) 1994-02-24 2000-07-20 Merdan Group Inc METHOD AND DEVICE FOR ESTABLISHING A CRYPTOGRAPHIC CONNECTION BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEM
US5787172A (en) * 1994-02-24 1998-07-28 The Merdan Group, Inc. Apparatus and method for establishing a cryptographic link between elements of a system
US6088797A (en) * 1994-04-28 2000-07-11 Rosen; Sholom S. Tamper-proof electronic processing device
US6185546B1 (en) * 1995-10-04 2001-02-06 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for providing secured communications
JPH08263438A (en) 1994-11-23 1996-10-11 Xerox Corp Distribution and use control system of digital work and access control method to digital work
FR2727223B1 (en) * 1994-11-23 1997-01-17 Fast France Adv Sys Tech Sarl SECURE MULTIFUNCTIONAL INPUT AND PROCESSING TERMINAL, ESPECIALLY FOR USE IN BANKING, GAMING AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
US6865551B1 (en) 1994-11-23 2005-03-08 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Removable content repositories
US7117180B1 (en) 1994-11-23 2006-10-03 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System for controlling the use of digital works using removable content repositories
US6963859B2 (en) 1994-11-23 2005-11-08 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Content rendering repository
US5943422A (en) 1996-08-12 1999-08-24 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Steganographic techniques for securely delivering electronic digital rights management control information over insecure communication channels
US7133846B1 (en) 1995-02-13 2006-11-07 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Digital certificate support system, methods and techniques for secure electronic commerce transaction and rights management
WO1996027155A2 (en) 1995-02-13 1996-09-06 Electronic Publishing Resources, Inc. Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US5892900A (en) 1996-08-30 1999-04-06 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US7095854B1 (en) 1995-02-13 2006-08-22 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US7133845B1 (en) * 1995-02-13 2006-11-07 Intertrust Technologies Corp. System and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US6658568B1 (en) 1995-02-13 2003-12-02 Intertrust Technologies Corporation Trusted infrastructure support system, methods and techniques for secure electronic commerce transaction and rights management
US6948070B1 (en) * 1995-02-13 2005-09-20 Intertrust Technologies Corporation Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US6157721A (en) 1996-08-12 2000-12-05 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Systems and methods using cryptography to protect secure computing environments
US6937729B2 (en) * 1995-04-03 2005-08-30 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Representing entitlements to service in a conditional access system
US7224798B2 (en) * 1995-04-03 2007-05-29 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Methods and apparatus for providing a partial dual-encrypted stream in a conditional access overlay system
US6560340B1 (en) 1995-04-03 2003-05-06 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Method and apparatus for geographically limiting service in a conditional access system
US8548166B2 (en) 1995-04-03 2013-10-01 Anthony J. Wasilewski Method for partially encrypting program data
US6157719A (en) * 1995-04-03 2000-12-05 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Conditional access system
US6252964B1 (en) 1995-04-03 2001-06-26 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Authorization of services in a conditional access system
US20040136532A1 (en) * 1995-04-03 2004-07-15 Pinder Howard G. Partial dual-encrypted stream utilizing program map tables
US6246767B1 (en) 1995-04-03 2001-06-12 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Source authentication of download information in a conditional access system
US6424717B1 (en) 1995-04-03 2002-07-23 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Encryption devices for use in a conditional access system
US6760463B2 (en) 1995-05-08 2004-07-06 Digimarc Corporation Watermarking methods and media
US5850450A (en) * 1995-07-20 1998-12-15 Dallas Semiconductor Corporation Method and apparatus for encryption key creation
DE69633877T2 (en) * 1995-07-28 2005-11-03 Sony Corp. Control of an electronic system
US5774652A (en) * 1995-09-29 1998-06-30 Smith; Perry Restricted access computer system
US6807534B1 (en) 1995-10-13 2004-10-19 Trustees Of Dartmouth College System and method for managing copyrighted electronic media
US7047241B1 (en) 1995-10-13 2006-05-16 Digimarc Corporation System and methods for managing digital creative works
US6075858A (en) * 1995-10-27 2000-06-13 Scm Microsystems (U.S.) Inc. Encryption key system and method
US5949881A (en) * 1995-12-04 1999-09-07 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for cryptographic companion imprinting
US5826011A (en) * 1995-12-26 1998-10-20 Rainbow Technologies, Inc. Method of metering and protecting computer software
US6219423B1 (en) 1995-12-29 2001-04-17 Intel Corporation System and method for digitally signing a digital agreement between remotely located nodes
EP0872077B1 (en) * 1995-12-29 2009-09-23 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing conditional access in connection-oriented, interactive networks with a multiplicity of service providers
US5835594A (en) * 1996-02-09 1998-11-10 Intel Corporation Methods and apparatus for preventing unauthorized write access to a protected non-volatile storage
US20010011253A1 (en) 1998-08-04 2001-08-02 Christopher D. Coley Automated system for management of licensed software
DE19612999C2 (en) * 1996-03-22 1999-04-01 Wasy Ges Fuer Wasserwirtschaft System for protecting protected software against unauthorized use in computer networks
US6088450A (en) * 1996-04-17 2000-07-11 Intel Corporation Authentication system based on periodic challenge/response protocol
GB9608696D0 (en) * 1996-04-26 1996-07-03 Europ Computer Ind Res Electronic copy protection mechanism
US6272538B1 (en) * 1996-07-30 2001-08-07 Micron Technology, Inc. Method and system for establishing a security perimeter in computer networks
US5835595A (en) * 1996-09-04 1998-11-10 At&T Corp Method and apparatus for crytographically protecting data
US5796941A (en) * 1996-09-06 1998-08-18 Catalyst Semiconductor, Inc. Method for supervising software execution in a license restricted environment
US5844986A (en) * 1996-09-30 1998-12-01 Intel Corporation Secure BIOS
US5828753A (en) * 1996-10-25 1998-10-27 Intel Corporation Circuit and method for ensuring interconnect security within a multi-chip integrated circuit package
US5949059A (en) * 1996-12-09 1999-09-07 International Business Machines Corporation Tamper evident labelling system with embedded storage device
US6144363A (en) * 1996-12-16 2000-11-07 Video Road Digital Inc. Message status display
GB9626241D0 (en) * 1996-12-18 1997-02-05 Ncr Int Inc Secure data processing method and system
US5818939A (en) * 1996-12-18 1998-10-06 Intel Corporation Optimized security functionality in an electronic system
US6021201A (en) * 1997-01-07 2000-02-01 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for integrated ciphering and hashing
US6542610B2 (en) 1997-01-30 2003-04-01 Intel Corporation Content protection for digital transmission systems
US5920861A (en) 1997-02-25 1999-07-06 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Techniques for defining using and manipulating rights management data structures
US6233684B1 (en) 1997-02-28 2001-05-15 Contenaguard Holdings, Inc. System for controlling the distribution and use of rendered digital works through watermaking
US6023763A (en) * 1997-04-23 2000-02-08 Fisher Controls International, Inc. Method of and apparatus for protecting and upgrading software using a removable hardlock
US6385723B1 (en) * 1997-05-15 2002-05-07 Mondex International Limited Key transformation unit for an IC card
US6003135A (en) * 1997-06-04 1999-12-14 Spyrus, Inc. Modular security device
US6088802A (en) * 1997-06-04 2000-07-11 Spyrus, Inc. Peripheral device with integrated security functionality
US6188995B1 (en) * 1997-07-28 2001-02-13 Apple Computer, Inc. Method and apparatus for enforcing software licenses
JP2001513587A (en) * 1997-07-31 2001-09-04 サイエンティフィック−アトランタ・インコーポレーテッド Verification of source of information program in conditional access system
US7515712B2 (en) 1997-08-01 2009-04-07 Cisco Technology, Inc. Mechanism and apparatus for encapsulation of entitlement authorization in conditional access system
US6161180A (en) * 1997-08-29 2000-12-12 International Business Machines Corporation Authentication for secure devices with limited cryptography
US6151678A (en) * 1997-09-09 2000-11-21 Intel Corporation Anti-theft mechanism for mobile computers
WO1999015947A1 (en) 1997-09-19 1999-04-01 Hyo Joon Park Software license control system based on independent software registration server
US6061794A (en) * 1997-09-30 2000-05-09 Compaq Computer Corp. System and method for performing secure device communications in a peer-to-peer bus architecture
US5974143A (en) * 1997-09-30 1999-10-26 Intel Corporation Virus-resistent mechanism for transaction verification to confirming user
US6357004B1 (en) 1997-09-30 2002-03-12 Intel Corporation System and method for ensuring integrity throughout post-processing
US6023684A (en) * 1997-10-01 2000-02-08 Security First Technologies, Inc. Three tier financial transaction system with cache memory
EP1025503A4 (en) * 1997-10-20 2002-03-27 Quickflex Inc Reconfigurable secure hardware apparatus and method of operation
US6073237A (en) * 1997-11-06 2000-06-06 Cybercash, Inc. Tamper resistant method and apparatus
US6112181A (en) 1997-11-06 2000-08-29 Intertrust Technologies Corporation Systems and methods for matching, selecting, narrowcasting, and/or classifying based on rights management and/or other information
US6314521B1 (en) 1997-11-26 2001-11-06 International Business Machines Corporation Secure configuration of a digital certificate for a printer or other network device
US6134659A (en) * 1998-01-07 2000-10-17 Sprong; Katherine A. Controlled usage software
US6560706B1 (en) 1998-01-26 2003-05-06 Intel Corporation Interface for ensuring system boot image integrity and authenticity
US6216230B1 (en) 1998-02-11 2001-04-10 Durango Corporation Notebook security system (NBS)
US6189099B1 (en) 1998-02-11 2001-02-13 Durango Corporation Notebook security system (NBS)
USH1944H1 (en) 1998-03-24 2001-02-06 Lucent Technologies Inc. Firewall security method and apparatus
BE1012292A3 (en) * 1998-03-26 2000-09-05 Int Management Services Afgeko Method for identifying computer data, units to realise this method and the network that uses this method
US6341351B1 (en) * 1998-05-07 2002-01-22 Banctec, Inc. Method for communicating and controlling transactions between unsecured parties
US6724895B1 (en) 1998-06-18 2004-04-20 Supersensor (Proprietary) Limited Electronic identification system and method with source authenticity verification
US6523118B1 (en) * 1998-06-29 2003-02-18 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Secure cache for instruction and data protection
US6105137A (en) * 1998-07-02 2000-08-15 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for integrity verification, authentication, and secure linkage of software modules
US6401208B2 (en) 1998-07-17 2002-06-04 Intel Corporation Method for BIOS authentication prior to BIOS execution
US6320964B1 (en) 1998-08-26 2001-11-20 Intel Corporation Cryptographic accelerator
US6463535B1 (en) 1998-10-05 2002-10-08 Intel Corporation System and method for verifying the integrity and authorization of software before execution in a local platform
US7068787B1 (en) 1998-10-23 2006-06-27 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for protection of digital works
US6609199B1 (en) * 1998-10-26 2003-08-19 Microsoft Corporation Method and apparatus for authenticating an open system application to a portable IC device
US20050060549A1 (en) * 1998-10-26 2005-03-17 Microsoft Corporation Controlling access to content based on certificates and access predicates
US7174457B1 (en) 1999-03-10 2007-02-06 Microsoft Corporation System and method for authenticating an operating system to a central processing unit, providing the CPU/OS with secure storage, and authenticating the CPU/OS to a third party
US6327652B1 (en) 1998-10-26 2001-12-04 Microsoft Corporation Loading and identifying a digital rights management operating system
US7194092B1 (en) * 1998-10-26 2007-03-20 Microsoft Corporation Key-based secure storage
US6820063B1 (en) * 1998-10-26 2004-11-16 Microsoft Corporation Controlling access to content based on certificates and access predicates
US7139915B2 (en) 1998-10-26 2006-11-21 Microsoft Corporation Method and apparatus for authenticating an open system application to a portable IC device
US6330670B1 (en) 1998-10-26 2001-12-11 Microsoft Corporation Digital rights management operating system
IL126988A0 (en) * 1998-11-10 1999-09-22 Elad Barkan Marking system and method
US6272469B1 (en) 1998-11-25 2001-08-07 Ge Medical Systems Global Technology Company, Llc Imaging system protocol handling method and apparatus
GB9827831D0 (en) * 1998-12-17 1999-02-10 Tribeka Ltd Method and apparatus for the distribution of digitised information on demand
US6282650B1 (en) 1999-01-25 2001-08-28 Intel Corporation Secure public digital watermark
US6389533B1 (en) 1999-02-05 2002-05-14 Intel Corporation Anonymity server
US6868497B1 (en) * 1999-03-10 2005-03-15 Digimarc Corporation Method and apparatus for automatic ID management
US7136838B1 (en) * 1999-03-27 2006-11-14 Microsoft Corporation Digital license and method for obtaining/providing a digital license
US6973444B1 (en) 1999-03-27 2005-12-06 Microsoft Corporation Method for interdependently validating a digital content package and a corresponding digital license
US7073063B2 (en) * 1999-03-27 2006-07-04 Microsoft Corporation Binding a digital license to a portable device or the like in a digital rights management (DRM) system and checking out/checking in the digital license to/from the portable device or the like
US7565546B2 (en) 1999-03-30 2009-07-21 Sony Corporation System, method and apparatus for secure digital content transmission
US6697489B1 (en) 1999-03-30 2004-02-24 Sony Corporation Method and apparatus for securing control words
US7730300B2 (en) 1999-03-30 2010-06-01 Sony Corporation Method and apparatus for protecting the transfer of data
US6643374B1 (en) 1999-03-31 2003-11-04 Intel Corporation Duty cycle corrector for a random number generator
US6795837B1 (en) 1999-03-31 2004-09-21 Intel Corporation Programmable random bit source
US6571335B1 (en) 1999-04-01 2003-05-27 Intel Corporation System and method for authentication of off-chip processor firmware code
US7286665B1 (en) 1999-04-06 2007-10-23 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for transferring the right to decode messages
US6937726B1 (en) 1999-04-06 2005-08-30 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for protecting data files by periodically refreshing a decryption key
US7356688B1 (en) 1999-04-06 2008-04-08 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for document distribution
US6859533B1 (en) 1999-04-06 2005-02-22 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for transferring the right to decode messages in a symmetric encoding scheme
US6651171B1 (en) * 1999-04-06 2003-11-18 Microsoft Corporation Secure execution of program code
US6389537B1 (en) * 1999-04-23 2002-05-14 Intel Corporation Platform and method for assuring integrity of trusted agent communications
US7134145B1 (en) * 1999-04-30 2006-11-07 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Registering copy protected material in a check-out, check-in system
FR2793367B1 (en) * 1999-05-03 2004-09-10 Jean Luc Stehle AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY DEVICE FOR A COMPUTER NETWORK
EP1056014A1 (en) * 1999-05-28 2000-11-29 Hewlett-Packard Company System for providing a trustworthy user interface
US6647494B1 (en) 1999-06-14 2003-11-11 Intel Corporation System and method for checking authorization of remote configuration operations
US6633981B1 (en) 1999-06-18 2003-10-14 Intel Corporation Electronic system and method for controlling access through user authentication
GB9914262D0 (en) * 1999-06-18 1999-08-18 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd WIM Manufacture certificate
US6629150B1 (en) 1999-06-18 2003-09-30 Intel Corporation Platform and method for creating and using a digital container
EP1076279A1 (en) * 1999-08-13 2001-02-14 Hewlett-Packard Company Computer platforms and their methods of operation
JP2003507784A (en) * 1999-08-13 2003-02-25 ヒューレット・パッカード・カンパニー Mandatory restrictions on the use of stored data
EP1085396A1 (en) 1999-09-17 2001-03-21 Hewlett-Packard Company Operation of trusted state in computing platform
GB9922665D0 (en) * 1999-09-25 1999-11-24 Hewlett Packard Co A method of enforcing trusted functionality in a full function platform
US7310735B1 (en) * 1999-10-01 2007-12-18 International Business Machines Corporation Method, system, and program for distributing software between computer systems
GB9923802D0 (en) * 1999-10-08 1999-12-08 Hewlett Packard Co User authentication
US6885748B1 (en) 1999-10-23 2005-04-26 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for protection of digital works
US6912513B1 (en) 1999-10-29 2005-06-28 Sony Corporation Copy-protecting management using a user scrambling key
US7039614B1 (en) * 1999-11-09 2006-05-02 Sony Corporation Method for simulcrypting scrambled data to a plurality of conditional access devices
EP1237326A4 (en) * 1999-12-06 2007-09-05 Sanyo Electric Co Data distribution system and recorder for use therein
EP1237323A4 (en) * 1999-12-07 2005-09-07 Sanyo Electric Co Device for reproducing data
US7032240B1 (en) * 1999-12-07 2006-04-18 Pace Anti-Piracy, Inc. Portable authorization device for authorizing use of protected information and associated method
US6757824B1 (en) 1999-12-10 2004-06-29 Microsoft Corporation Client-side boot domains and boot rules
DE19963471B4 (en) * 1999-12-29 2008-10-09 Robert Bosch Gmbh Apparatus and method for preventing piracy of computer programs
US7248693B1 (en) * 2000-01-13 2007-07-24 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Secure network-based system for the distributed printing of documents
US7493497B1 (en) 2000-02-03 2009-02-17 Integrated Information Solutions Digital identity device
US7225164B1 (en) 2000-02-15 2007-05-29 Sony Corporation Method and apparatus for implementing revocation in broadcast networks
US6990579B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2006-01-24 Intel Corporation Platform and method for remote attestation of a platform
US6687721B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2004-02-03 Intel Corporation Random number generator with entropy accumulation
US7013484B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2006-03-14 Intel Corporation Managing a secure environment using a chipset in isolated execution mode
US6792438B1 (en) * 2000-03-31 2004-09-14 Intel Corporation Secure hardware random number generator
US6633963B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2003-10-14 Intel Corporation Controlling access to multiple memory zones in an isolated execution environment
US7013481B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2006-03-14 Intel Corporation Attestation key memory device and bus
US7356817B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2008-04-08 Intel Corporation Real-time scheduling of virtual machines
US6507904B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2003-01-14 Intel Corporation Executing isolated mode instructions in a secure system running in privilege rings
US6934817B2 (en) 2000-03-31 2005-08-23 Intel Corporation Controlling access to multiple memory zones in an isolated execution environment
US7082615B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2006-07-25 Intel Corporation Protecting software environment in isolated execution
US6996710B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2006-02-07 Intel Corporation Platform and method for issuing and certifying a hardware-protected attestation key
US6769058B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2004-07-27 Intel Corporation Resetting a processor in an isolated execution environment
US7111176B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2006-09-19 Intel Corporation Generating isolated bus cycles for isolated execution
US6754815B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2004-06-22 Intel Corporation Method and system for scrubbing an isolated area of memory after reset of a processor operating in isolated execution mode if a cleanup flag is set
US6957332B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2005-10-18 Intel Corporation Managing a secure platform using a hierarchical executive architecture in isolated execution mode
US7073071B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2006-07-04 Intel Corporation Platform and method for generating and utilizing a protected audit log
US7194634B2 (en) 2000-03-31 2007-03-20 Intel Corporation Attestation key memory device and bus
US6795905B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2004-09-21 Intel Corporation Controlling accesses to isolated memory using a memory controller for isolated execution
US6760441B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2004-07-06 Intel Corporation Generating a key hieararchy for use in an isolated execution environment
US6678825B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2004-01-13 Intel Corporation Controlling access to multiple isolated memories in an isolated execution environment
US7089418B1 (en) 2000-03-31 2006-08-08 Intel Corporation Managing accesses in a processor for isolated execution
US20030206631A1 (en) * 2000-06-22 2003-11-06 Candelore Brant L. Method and apparatus for scrambling program data for furture viewing
US6976162B1 (en) 2000-06-28 2005-12-13 Intel Corporation Platform and method for establishing provable identities while maintaining privacy
US6678833B1 (en) 2000-06-30 2004-01-13 Intel Corporation Protection of boot block data and accurate reporting of boot block contents
US7552333B2 (en) * 2000-08-04 2009-06-23 First Data Corporation Trusted authentication digital signature (tads) system
CA2417770C (en) * 2000-08-04 2011-10-25 First Data Corporation Trusted authentication digital signature (tads) system
GB0020441D0 (en) * 2000-08-18 2000-10-04 Hewlett Packard Co Performance of a service on a computing platform
DE50007300D1 (en) * 2000-08-24 2004-09-09 Wibu Systems Ag Process for the protection of computer software and / or computer-readable data and protective device
US7603319B2 (en) 2000-08-28 2009-10-13 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for preserving customer identity in on-line transactions
US7743259B2 (en) 2000-08-28 2010-06-22 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for digital rights management using a standard rendering engine
US6931545B1 (en) 2000-08-28 2005-08-16 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Systems and methods for integrity certification and verification of content consumption environments
US7073199B1 (en) 2000-08-28 2006-07-04 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Document distribution management method and apparatus using a standard rendering engine and a method and apparatus for controlling a standard rendering engine
DE10043499A1 (en) * 2000-09-01 2002-03-14 Bosch Gmbh Robert Data transmission method
US7194759B1 (en) * 2000-09-15 2007-03-20 International Business Machines Corporation Used trusted co-servers to enhance security of web interaction
EP1352307A2 (en) * 2000-09-22 2003-10-15 EDC Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for preventing unauthorized use of digital content
US7237123B2 (en) 2000-09-22 2007-06-26 Ecd Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for preventing unauthorized use of digital content
US7793111B1 (en) 2000-09-28 2010-09-07 Intel Corporation Mechanism to handle events in a machine with isolated execution
US7389427B1 (en) 2000-09-28 2008-06-17 Intel Corporation Mechanism to secure computer output from software attack using isolated execution
US7343324B2 (en) 2000-11-03 2008-03-11 Contentguard Holdings Inc. Method, system, and computer readable medium for automatically publishing content
US7962416B1 (en) * 2000-11-22 2011-06-14 Ge Medical Technology Services, Inc. Method and system to remotely enable software-based options for a trial period
US6938164B1 (en) 2000-11-22 2005-08-30 Microsoft Corporation Method and system for allowing code to be securely initialized in a computer
GB2376763B (en) 2001-06-19 2004-12-15 Hewlett Packard Co Demonstrating integrity of a compartment of a compartmented operating system
US7080406B2 (en) * 2000-12-15 2006-07-18 International Business Machines Corporation Method for transferring privilege access to a resource manager with subsequent loss of privilege by the initiating identity
US7266704B2 (en) 2000-12-18 2007-09-04 Digimarc Corporation User-friendly rights management systems and methods
US8055899B2 (en) 2000-12-18 2011-11-08 Digimarc Corporation Systems and methods using digital watermarking and identifier extraction to provide promotional opportunities
US7073062B2 (en) * 2000-12-19 2006-07-04 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus to mutually authentication software modules
US7215781B2 (en) * 2000-12-22 2007-05-08 Intel Corporation Creation and distribution of a secret value between two devices
US7035963B2 (en) 2000-12-27 2006-04-25 Intel Corporation Method for resolving address space conflicts between a virtual machine monitor and a guest operating system
US7818808B1 (en) 2000-12-27 2010-10-19 Intel Corporation Processor mode for limiting the operation of guest software running on a virtual machine supported by a virtual machine monitor
US6907600B2 (en) 2000-12-27 2005-06-14 Intel Corporation Virtual translation lookaside buffer
US7225441B2 (en) * 2000-12-27 2007-05-29 Intel Corporation Mechanism for providing power management through virtualization
US6948065B2 (en) 2000-12-27 2005-09-20 Intel Corporation Platform and method for securely transmitting an authorization secret
US7117376B2 (en) * 2000-12-28 2006-10-03 Intel Corporation Platform and method of creating a secure boot that enforces proper user authentication and enforces hardware configurations
US6912294B2 (en) 2000-12-29 2005-06-28 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Multi-stage watermarking process and system
US7350083B2 (en) * 2000-12-29 2008-03-25 Intel Corporation Integrated circuit chip having firmware and hardware security primitive device(s)
US20020152393A1 (en) * 2001-01-09 2002-10-17 Johannes Thoma Secure extensible computing environment
US7028009B2 (en) 2001-01-17 2006-04-11 Contentguardiholdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for distributing enforceable property rights
US7774279B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2010-08-10 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Rights offering and granting
US7206765B2 (en) 2001-01-17 2007-04-17 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for supplying and managing usage rights based on rules
US8069116B2 (en) 2001-01-17 2011-11-29 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for supplying and managing usage rights associated with an item repository
US6754642B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2004-06-22 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for dynamically assigning usage rights to digital works
CN101369299B (en) 2001-01-17 2010-06-09 康坦夹德控股股份有限公司 Method and apparatus for managing digital content usage rights
US7310734B2 (en) * 2001-02-01 2007-12-18 3M Innovative Properties Company Method and system for securing a computer network and personal identification device used therein for controlling access to network components
GB2372345A (en) * 2001-02-17 2002-08-21 Hewlett Packard Co Secure email handling using a compartmented operating system
US6662284B2 (en) * 2001-02-20 2003-12-09 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.C. Computer apparatus, method and memory including license key
GB2372595A (en) 2001-02-23 2002-08-28 Hewlett Packard Co Method of and apparatus for ascertaining the status of a data processing environment.
GB2372593B (en) * 2001-02-23 2005-05-18 Hewlett Packard Co Electronic communication
GB2372592B (en) 2001-02-23 2005-03-30 Hewlett Packard Co Information system
WO2002073380A1 (en) * 2001-03-07 2002-09-19 Tan Aureliano Jr Digital identity device
US7096497B2 (en) * 2001-03-30 2006-08-22 Intel Corporation File checking using remote signing authority via a network
US20020144121A1 (en) * 2001-03-30 2002-10-03 Ellison Carl M. Checking file integrity using signature generated in isolated execution
US7272831B2 (en) * 2001-03-30 2007-09-18 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for constructing host processor soft devices independent of the host processor operating system
US8909555B2 (en) * 2001-04-24 2014-12-09 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Information security system
WO2002091146A2 (en) 2001-05-09 2002-11-14 Ecd Systems, Inc. Systems and methods for the prevention of unauthorized use and manipulation of digital content
EP2273342A1 (en) * 2001-05-24 2011-01-12 Sony Corporation Service providing method and integrated circuit
US6876984B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2005-04-05 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for establishing usage rights for digital content to be created in the future
US7152046B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2006-12-19 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for tracking status of resource in a system for managing use of the resources
US8275716B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2012-09-25 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and system for subscription digital rights management
US6895503B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2005-05-17 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for hierarchical assignment of rights to documents and documents having such rights
US7725401B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2010-05-25 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for establishing usage rights for digital content to be created in the future
US6973445B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2005-12-06 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Demarcated digital content and method for creating and processing demarcated digital works
US8001053B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2011-08-16 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for rights offering and granting using shared state variables
US6976009B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2005-12-13 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for assigning consequential rights to documents and documents having such rights
US8099364B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2012-01-17 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Digital rights management of content when content is a future live event
US8275709B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2012-09-25 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Digital rights management of content when content is a future live event
US7222104B2 (en) 2001-05-31 2007-05-22 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for transferring usage rights and digital work having transferrable usage rights
GB2376313A (en) * 2001-06-04 2002-12-11 Hewlett Packard Co Indicating to a user if they are connected to a trusted computer platform
US7350082B2 (en) 2001-06-06 2008-03-25 Sony Corporation Upgrading of encryption
US7124303B2 (en) 2001-06-06 2006-10-17 Sony Corporation Elementary stream partial encryption
US7895616B2 (en) 2001-06-06 2011-02-22 Sony Corporation Reconstitution of program streams split across multiple packet identifiers
US7747853B2 (en) 2001-06-06 2010-06-29 Sony Corporation IP delivery of secure digital content
JP2004530222A (en) 2001-06-07 2004-09-30 コンテントガード　ホールディングズ　インコーポレイテッド Method and apparatus for supporting multiple zones of trust in a digital rights management system
EP1323018A4 (en) 2001-06-07 2004-07-07 Contentguard Holdings Inc Protected content distribution system
US7774280B2 (en) * 2001-06-07 2010-08-10 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. System and method for managing transfer of rights using shared state variables
GB2376764B (en) * 2001-06-19 2004-12-29 Hewlett Packard Co Multiple trusted computing environments
GB2376765B (en) 2001-06-19 2004-12-29 Hewlett Packard Co Multiple trusted computing environments with verifiable environment identities
GB2376761A (en) * 2001-06-19 2002-12-24 Hewlett Packard Co An arrangement in which a process is run on a host operating system but may be switched to a guest system if it poses a security risk
US20030005317A1 (en) * 2001-06-28 2003-01-02 Audebert Yves Louis Gabriel Method and system for generating and verifying a key protection certificate
WO2003009195A1 (en) * 2001-07-16 2003-01-30 Dmitry Alexandrovich Gertner Individual cryptoprotective crafe complex
US7191440B2 (en) 2001-08-15 2007-03-13 Intel Corporation Tracking operating system process and thread execution and virtual machine execution in hardware or in a virtual machine monitor
US7137000B2 (en) 2001-08-24 2006-11-14 Zih Corp. Method and apparatus for article authentication
JP2003122537A (en) * 2001-10-15 2003-04-25 Minolta Co Ltd License management device and management system
US7024555B2 (en) 2001-11-01 2006-04-04 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for unilaterally loading a secure operating system within a multiprocessor environment
US7243230B2 (en) 2001-11-16 2007-07-10 Microsoft Corporation Transferring application secrets in a trusted operating system environment
US7159240B2 (en) * 2001-11-16 2007-01-02 Microsoft Corporation Operating system upgrades in a trusted operating system environment
US7137004B2 (en) 2001-11-16 2006-11-14 Microsoft Corporation Manifest-based trusted agent management in a trusted operating system environment
GB2382419B (en) * 2001-11-22 2005-12-14 Hewlett Packard Co Apparatus and method for creating a trusted environment
US7103771B2 (en) * 2001-12-17 2006-09-05 Intel Corporation Connecting a virtual token to a physical token
US20030126454A1 (en) * 2001-12-28 2003-07-03 Glew Andrew F. Authenticated code method and apparatus
US20030126453A1 (en) * 2001-12-31 2003-07-03 Glew Andrew F. Processor supporting execution of an authenticated code instruction
US7308576B2 (en) * 2001-12-31 2007-12-11 Intel Corporation Authenticated code module
US7218738B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2007-05-15 Sony Corporation Encryption and content control in a digital broadcast system
US7215770B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2007-05-08 Sony Corporation System and method for partially encrypted multimedia stream
US7765567B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2010-07-27 Sony Corporation Content replacement by PID mapping
US7233669B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2007-06-19 Sony Corporation Selective encryption to enable multiple decryption keys
US7155012B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2006-12-26 Sony Corporation Slice mask and moat pattern partial encryption
US7242773B2 (en) 2002-09-09 2007-07-10 Sony Corporation Multiple partial encryption using retuning
US7039938B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2006-05-02 Sony Corporation Selective encryption for video on demand
US7376233B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2008-05-20 Sony Corporation Video slice and active region based multiple partial encryption
US7823174B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2010-10-26 Sony Corporation Macro-block based content replacement by PID mapping
US7302059B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2007-11-27 Sony Corporation Star pattern partial encryption
US7292691B2 (en) 2002-01-02 2007-11-06 Sony Corporation Progressive video refresh slice detection
US7480806B2 (en) * 2002-02-22 2009-01-20 Intel Corporation Multi-token seal and unseal
WO2003073688A1 (en) * 2002-02-22 2003-09-04 Emc Corporation Authenticating hardware devices incorporating digital certificates
US7124273B2 (en) * 2002-02-25 2006-10-17 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for translating guest physical addresses in a virtual machine environment
US7631196B2 (en) 2002-02-25 2009-12-08 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for loading a trustable operating system
US7028149B2 (en) * 2002-03-29 2006-04-11 Intel Corporation System and method for resetting a platform configuration register
US7069442B2 (en) 2002-03-29 2006-06-27 Intel Corporation System and method for execution of a secured environment initialization instruction
US20030191943A1 (en) * 2002-04-05 2003-10-09 Poisner David I. Methods and arrangements to register code
EP1353259B1 (en) * 2002-04-08 2006-06-14 Aladdin Knowledge Systems (Deutschland) GmbH Method of upgrading and licensing computer programs and computer system therefor
US20030196096A1 (en) * 2002-04-12 2003-10-16 Sutton James A. Microcode patch authentication
US7076669B2 (en) * 2002-04-15 2006-07-11 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for communicating securely with a token
US7058807B2 (en) * 2002-04-15 2006-06-06 Intel Corporation Validation of inclusion of a platform within a data center
US20030196100A1 (en) * 2002-04-15 2003-10-16 Grawrock David W. Protection against memory attacks following reset
US7127548B2 (en) 2002-04-16 2006-10-24 Intel Corporation Control register access virtualization performance improvement in the virtual-machine architecture
US7487365B2 (en) * 2002-04-17 2009-02-03 Microsoft Corporation Saving and retrieving data based on symmetric key encryption
US7890771B2 (en) 2002-04-17 2011-02-15 Microsoft Corporation Saving and retrieving data based on public key encryption
US7139890B2 (en) * 2002-04-30 2006-11-21 Intel Corporation Methods and arrangements to interface memory
US7530084B2 (en) 2002-05-28 2009-05-05 Sony Corporation Method and apparatus for synchronizing dynamic graphics
US7478233B2 (en) * 2002-05-30 2009-01-13 Microsoft Corporation Prevention of software tampering
US20030228911A1 (en) * 2002-06-05 2003-12-11 Dernis Mitchell S. DVD-enabling code server and loader for a console-based gaming system
US20050137018A1 (en) * 2002-06-05 2005-06-23 Microsoft Corporation DVD-enabling dongle for a console-based gaming system
US20030229794A1 (en) * 2002-06-07 2003-12-11 Sutton James A. System and method for protection against untrusted system management code by redirecting a system management interrupt and creating a virtual machine container
US6820177B2 (en) 2002-06-12 2004-11-16 Intel Corporation Protected configuration space in a protected environment
US7142674B2 (en) 2002-06-18 2006-11-28 Intel Corporation Method of confirming a secure key exchange
RU2300844C2 (en) * 2002-06-18 2007-06-10 Ооо "Крейф" Personal cryptoprotection system
US7296154B2 (en) * 2002-06-24 2007-11-13 Microsoft Corporation Secure media path methods, systems, and architectures
US7392415B2 (en) * 2002-06-26 2008-06-24 Intel Corporation Sleep protection
US20040003321A1 (en) * 2002-06-27 2004-01-01 Glew Andrew F. Initialization of protected system
US7124327B2 (en) 2002-06-29 2006-10-17 Intel Corporation Control over faults occurring during the operation of guest software in the virtual-machine architecture
US6996748B2 (en) 2002-06-29 2006-02-07 Intel Corporation Handling faults associated with operation of guest software in the virtual-machine architecture
US7454784B2 (en) * 2002-07-09 2008-11-18 Harvinder Sahota System and method for identity verification
US7111171B2 (en) * 2002-07-09 2006-09-19 Kaleidescope, Inc. Parallel distribution and fingerprinting of digital content
US7296267B2 (en) * 2002-07-12 2007-11-13 Intel Corporation System and method for binding virtual machines to hardware contexts
US9349411B2 (en) * 2002-07-16 2016-05-24 Digimarc Corporation Digital watermarking and fingerprinting applications for copy protection
EP1429224A1 (en) * 2002-12-10 2004-06-16 Texas Instruments Incorporated Firmware run-time authentication
CN102737180A (en) * 2002-08-08 2012-10-17 晟碟以色列有限公司 Integrated circuit for digital rights management
NO20023860D0 (en) * 2002-08-14 2002-08-14 Sospita As Procedure for generating and processing data streams containing encrypted and decrypted data
US7770212B2 (en) * 2002-08-15 2010-08-03 Activcard System and method for privilege delegation and control
GB2392262A (en) * 2002-08-23 2004-02-25 Hewlett Packard Co A method of controlling the processing of data
US8818896B2 (en) 2002-09-09 2014-08-26 Sony Corporation Selective encryption with coverage encryption
US8572408B2 (en) 2002-11-05 2013-10-29 Sony Corporation Digital rights management of a digital device
US7724907B2 (en) 2002-11-05 2010-05-25 Sony Corporation Mechanism for protecting the transfer of digital content
US7165181B2 (en) 2002-11-27 2007-01-16 Intel Corporation System and method for establishing trust without revealing identity
US7073042B2 (en) 2002-12-12 2006-07-04 Intel Corporation Reclaiming existing fields in address translation data structures to extend control over memory accesses
US8645988B2 (en) 2002-12-13 2014-02-04 Sony Corporation Content personalization for digital content
US8667525B2 (en) 2002-12-13 2014-03-04 Sony Corporation Targeted advertisement selection from a digital stream
US7318235B2 (en) 2002-12-16 2008-01-08 Intel Corporation Attestation using both fixed token and portable token
US20040117318A1 (en) * 2002-12-16 2004-06-17 Grawrock David W. Portable token controlling trusted environment launch
US7318141B2 (en) 2002-12-17 2008-01-08 Intel Corporation Methods and systems to control virtual machines
US7793286B2 (en) * 2002-12-19 2010-09-07 Intel Corporation Methods and systems to manage machine state in virtual machine operations
US7900017B2 (en) * 2002-12-27 2011-03-01 Intel Corporation Mechanism for remapping post virtual machine memory pages
US20040128465A1 (en) * 2002-12-30 2004-07-01 Lee Micheil J. Configurable memory bus width
US7076802B2 (en) * 2002-12-31 2006-07-11 Intel Corporation Trusted system clock
US7370212B2 (en) 2003-02-25 2008-05-06 Microsoft Corporation Issuing a publisher use license off-line in a digital rights management (DRM) system
US7409702B2 (en) 2003-03-20 2008-08-05 Sony Corporation Auxiliary program association table
US7292692B2 (en) 2003-03-25 2007-11-06 Sony Corporation Content scrambling with minimal impact on legacy devices
US8041957B2 (en) 2003-04-08 2011-10-18 Qualcomm Incorporated Associating software with hardware using cryptography
EA015549B1 (en) * 2003-06-05 2011-08-30 Интертраст Текнолоджис Корпорейшн Interoperable systems and methods for peer-to-peer service orchestration
US7415708B2 (en) 2003-06-26 2008-08-19 Intel Corporation Virtual machine management using processor state information
US7177888B2 (en) 2003-08-01 2007-02-13 Intel Corporation Programmable random bit source
US7286667B1 (en) 2003-09-15 2007-10-23 Sony Corporation Decryption system
US7287197B2 (en) * 2003-09-15 2007-10-23 Intel Corporation Vectoring an interrupt or exception upon resuming operation of a virtual machine
US7424709B2 (en) 2003-09-15 2008-09-09 Intel Corporation Use of multiple virtual machine monitors to handle privileged events
US7739521B2 (en) 2003-09-18 2010-06-15 Intel Corporation Method of obscuring cryptographic computations
US7610611B2 (en) 2003-09-19 2009-10-27 Moran Douglas R Prioritized address decoder
US20050080934A1 (en) 2003-09-30 2005-04-14 Cota-Robles Erik C. Invalidating translation lookaside buffer entries in a virtual machine (VM) system
US7366305B2 (en) * 2003-09-30 2008-04-29 Intel Corporation Platform and method for establishing trust without revealing identity
US7177967B2 (en) 2003-09-30 2007-02-13 Intel Corporation Chipset support for managing hardware interrupts in a virtual machine system
US7237051B2 (en) 2003-09-30 2007-06-26 Intel Corporation Mechanism to control hardware interrupt acknowledgement in a virtual machine system
US8898657B2 (en) * 2003-10-03 2014-11-25 Cyberlink Corp. System and method for licensing software
US7979911B2 (en) 2003-10-08 2011-07-12 Microsoft Corporation First computer process and second computer process proxy-executing code from third computer process on behalf of first process
US7788496B2 (en) 2003-10-08 2010-08-31 Microsoft Corporation First computer process and second computer process proxy-executing code on behalf thereof
US8103592B2 (en) 2003-10-08 2012-01-24 Microsoft Corporation First computer process and second computer process proxy-executing code on behalf of first process
US7263187B2 (en) 2003-10-31 2007-08-28 Sony Corporation Batch mode session-based encryption of video on demand content
US7620180B2 (en) 2003-11-03 2009-11-17 Sony Corporation Preparation of content for multiple conditional access methods in video on demand
US7853980B2 (en) 2003-10-31 2010-12-14 Sony Corporation Bi-directional indices for trick mode video-on-demand
US7343013B2 (en) 2003-12-16 2008-03-11 Sony Corporation Composite session-based encryption of video on demand content
US7346163B2 (en) 2003-10-31 2008-03-18 Sony Corporation Dynamic composition of pre-encrypted video on demand content
US7636844B2 (en) 2003-11-17 2009-12-22 Intel Corporation Method and system to provide a trusted channel within a computer system for a SIM device
US8396216B2 (en) * 2003-11-21 2013-03-12 Howard G. Pinder Partial dual-encryption using program map tables
US8156343B2 (en) 2003-11-26 2012-04-10 Intel Corporation Accessing private data about the state of a data processing machine from storage that is publicly accessible
US8037314B2 (en) 2003-12-22 2011-10-11 Intel Corporation Replacing blinded authentication authority
US7711951B2 (en) * 2004-01-08 2010-05-04 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for establishing a trust framework based on smart key devices
US7849326B2 (en) * 2004-01-08 2010-12-07 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for protecting master secrets using smart key devices
US7802085B2 (en) 2004-02-18 2010-09-21 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for distributing private keys to an entity with minimal secret, unique information
DE102004014435A1 (en) * 2004-03-24 2005-11-17 Siemens Ag Arrangement with an integrated circuit
US7356735B2 (en) 2004-03-30 2008-04-08 Intel Corporation Providing support for single stepping a virtual machine in a virtual machine environment
US7620949B2 (en) 2004-03-31 2009-11-17 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for facilitating recognition of an open event window during operation of guest software in a virtual machine environment
US20060242406A1 (en) 2005-04-22 2006-10-26 Microsoft Corporation Protected computing environment
EP1594316A1 (en) 2004-05-03 2005-11-09 Thomson Licensing Certificate validity checking
US7490070B2 (en) 2004-06-10 2009-02-10 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for proving the denial of a direct proof signature
WO2006012058A1 (en) * 2004-06-28 2006-02-02 Japan Communications, Inc. Systems and methods for mutual authentication of network
US7958546B2 (en) * 2004-06-29 2011-06-07 International Business Machines Corporation Identity access management system
US7305592B2 (en) 2004-06-30 2007-12-04 Intel Corporation Support for nested fault in a virtual machine environment
US7840962B2 (en) 2004-09-30 2010-11-23 Intel Corporation System and method for controlling switching between VMM and VM using enabling value of VMM timer indicator and VMM timer value having a specified time
US8347078B2 (en) 2004-10-18 2013-01-01 Microsoft Corporation Device certificate individualization
US8146078B2 (en) 2004-10-29 2012-03-27 Intel Corporation Timer offsetting mechanism in a virtual machine environment
US20060095454A1 (en) * 2004-10-29 2006-05-04 Texas Instruments Incorporated System and method for secure collaborative terminal identity authentication between a wireless communication device and a wireless operator
US8336085B2 (en) 2004-11-15 2012-12-18 Microsoft Corporation Tuning product policy using observed evidence of customer behavior
US8464348B2 (en) * 2004-11-15 2013-06-11 Microsoft Corporation Isolated computing environment anchored into CPU and motherboard
US8176564B2 (en) 2004-11-15 2012-05-08 Microsoft Corporation Special PC mode entered upon detection of undesired state
US8281132B2 (en) * 2004-11-29 2012-10-02 Broadcom Corporation Method and apparatus for security over multiple interfaces
US8924728B2 (en) 2004-11-30 2014-12-30 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for establishing a secure session with a device without exposing privacy-sensitive information
US7895617B2 (en) 2004-12-15 2011-02-22 Sony Corporation Content substitution editor
US8041190B2 (en) 2004-12-15 2011-10-18 Sony Corporation System and method for the creation, synchronization and delivery of alternate content
US7475247B2 (en) * 2004-12-16 2009-01-06 International Business Machines Corporation Method for using a portable computing device as a smart key device
US7386736B2 (en) * 2004-12-16 2008-06-10 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for using a compact disk as a smart key device
US8051052B2 (en) 2004-12-21 2011-11-01 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Method for creating control structure for versatile content control
US20060242067A1 (en) * 2004-12-21 2006-10-26 Fabrice Jogand-Coulomb System for creating control structure for versatile content control
US20060242066A1 (en) * 2004-12-21 2006-10-26 Fabrice Jogand-Coulomb Versatile content control with partitioning
US20060242150A1 (en) * 2004-12-21 2006-10-26 Fabrice Jogand-Coulomb Method using control structure for versatile content control
US8504849B2 (en) 2004-12-21 2013-08-06 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Method for versatile content control
US20060242151A1 (en) * 2004-12-21 2006-10-26 Fabrice Jogand-Coulomb Control structure for versatile content control
US8601283B2 (en) 2004-12-21 2013-12-03 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Method for versatile content control with partitioning
JP4603350B2 (en) * 2004-12-24 2010-12-22 富士通株式会社 Personal authentication device
US8533777B2 (en) * 2004-12-29 2013-09-10 Intel Corporation Mechanism to determine trust of out-of-band management agents
KR20060081337A (en) * 2005-01-07 2006-07-12 엘지전자 주식회사 Encryption and decryption method using a secret key
US8181266B2 (en) * 2005-01-13 2012-05-15 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method for moving a rights object between devices and a method and device for using a content object based on the moving method and device
US7770205B2 (en) * 2005-01-19 2010-08-03 Microsoft Corporation Binding a device to a computer
US7395405B2 (en) 2005-01-28 2008-07-01 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for supporting address translation in a virtual machine environment
US7890428B2 (en) * 2005-02-04 2011-02-15 Microsoft Corporation Flexible licensing architecture for licensing digital application
US7549051B2 (en) * 2005-03-10 2009-06-16 Microsoft Corporation Long-life digital certification for publishing long-life digital content or the like in content rights management system or the like
US8539587B2 (en) 2005-03-22 2013-09-17 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Methods, devices and data structures for trusted data
US8438645B2 (en) 2005-04-27 2013-05-07 Microsoft Corporation Secure clock with grace periods
US7856404B2 (en) * 2005-04-14 2010-12-21 Microsoft Corporation Playlist burning in rights-management context
US8738536B2 (en) * 2005-04-14 2014-05-27 Microsoft Corporation Licensing content for use on portable device
US8725646B2 (en) 2005-04-15 2014-05-13 Microsoft Corporation Output protection levels
US9363481B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2016-06-07 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Protected media pipeline
US7693280B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2010-04-06 Microsoft Corporation Rights management system for streamed multimedia content
US8290874B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2012-10-16 Microsoft Corporation Rights management system for streamed multimedia content
US9507919B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2016-11-29 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Rights management system for streamed multimedia content
US9436804B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2016-09-06 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Establishing a unique session key using a hardware functionality scan
US8091142B2 (en) 2005-04-26 2012-01-03 Microsoft Corporation Supplementary trust model for software licensing/commercial digital distribution policy
US8375369B2 (en) * 2005-04-26 2013-02-12 Apple Inc. Run-time code injection to perform checks
US20060265758A1 (en) 2005-05-20 2006-11-23 Microsoft Corporation Extensible media rights
US20060272031A1 (en) * 2005-05-24 2006-11-30 Napster Llc System and method for unlimited licensing to a fixed number of devices
US7684566B2 (en) 2005-05-27 2010-03-23 Microsoft Corporation Encryption scheme for streamed multimedia content protected by rights management system
US8353046B2 (en) 2005-06-08 2013-01-08 Microsoft Corporation System and method for delivery of a modular operating system
US7748031B2 (en) 2005-07-08 2010-06-29 Sandisk Corporation Mass storage device with automated credentials loading
US8321690B2 (en) 2005-08-11 2012-11-27 Microsoft Corporation Protecting digital media of various content types
US20070061893A1 (en) * 2005-09-09 2007-03-15 Black Jeffery D Methods and devices for copy protection of software
US7809957B2 (en) 2005-09-29 2010-10-05 Intel Corporation Trusted platform module for generating sealed data
US8407146B2 (en) * 2005-10-28 2013-03-26 Microsoft Corporation Secure storage
US7921303B2 (en) 2005-11-18 2011-04-05 Qualcomm Incorporated Mobile security system and method
US7929703B2 (en) * 2005-12-28 2011-04-19 Alcatel-Lucent Usa Inc. Methods and system for managing security keys within a wireless network
US20100215179A1 (en) * 2006-01-31 2010-08-26 Texas Instruments Incorporated Security Key Method In Semiconductor Manufacturing
US8185921B2 (en) 2006-02-28 2012-05-22 Sony Corporation Parental control of displayed content using closed captioning
US7555464B2 (en) 2006-03-01 2009-06-30 Sony Corporation Multiple DRM management
US8014530B2 (en) 2006-03-22 2011-09-06 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for authenticated, recoverable key distribution with no database secrets
JP2007288254A (en) * 2006-04-12 2007-11-01 Sony Corp Communication system, communication apparatus and method, and program
US20070244824A1 (en) * 2006-04-13 2007-10-18 Bowe Bell + Howell Company Web-based method for accessing licensed products and features
US20070266443A1 (en) * 2006-05-12 2007-11-15 Hitachi Global Storage Technologies Netherlands B.V. Certified HDD with network validation
KR101055712B1 (en) * 2006-06-30 2011-08-11 인터내셔널 비지네스 머신즈 코포레이션 Message handling on mobile devices
US20080010449A1 (en) * 2006-07-07 2008-01-10 Michael Holtzman Content Control System Using Certificate Chains
US20080010452A1 (en) * 2006-07-07 2008-01-10 Michael Holtzman Content Control System Using Certificate Revocation Lists
US8613103B2 (en) 2006-07-07 2013-12-17 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Content control method using versatile control structure
US8639939B2 (en) 2006-07-07 2014-01-28 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Control method using identity objects
US20080010458A1 (en) * 2006-07-07 2008-01-10 Michael Holtzman Control System Using Identity Objects
CN101490688A (en) * 2006-07-07 2009-07-22 桑迪士克股份有限公司 Content control system and method using certificate revocation lists
US20080022395A1 (en) * 2006-07-07 2008-01-24 Michael Holtzman System for Controlling Information Supplied From Memory Device
US8245031B2 (en) 2006-07-07 2012-08-14 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Content control method using certificate revocation lists
KR20090052321A (en) * 2006-07-07 2009-05-25 쌘디스크 코포레이션 Content control system and method using versatile control structure
US8140843B2 (en) 2006-07-07 2012-03-20 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Content control method using certificate chains
US8266711B2 (en) 2006-07-07 2012-09-11 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Method for controlling information supplied from memory device
US20080034440A1 (en) * 2006-07-07 2008-02-07 Michael Holtzman Content Control System Using Versatile Control Structure
WO2008008243A2 (en) * 2006-07-07 2008-01-17 Sandisk Corporation Control system and method using identity objects
WO2008007995A1 (en) * 2006-07-12 2008-01-17 Sergei Vladimirovich Migalev Software and hardware system
US8015409B2 (en) * 2006-09-29 2011-09-06 Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. Authentication for licensing in an embedded system
US20080114689A1 (en) * 2006-11-03 2008-05-15 Kevin Psynik Patient information management method
US7613915B2 (en) * 2006-11-09 2009-11-03 BroadOn Communications Corp Method for programming on-chip non-volatile memory in a secure processor, and a device so programmed
DE102006057197B4 (en) * 2006-12-05 2008-11-20 Dräger Medical AG & Co. KG Licensing system and method for transferring license information
US7971056B2 (en) * 2006-12-18 2011-06-28 Microsoft Corporation Direct memory access for compliance checking
EP1936531A1 (en) 2006-12-20 2008-06-25 Thomson Licensing Methods and device for secure software installation
EP1939784A1 (en) * 2006-12-20 2008-07-02 THOMSON Licensing Methods and a device for secure software installation
US8087072B2 (en) * 2007-01-18 2011-12-27 Microsoft Corporation Provisioning of digital identity representations
US8689296B2 (en) 2007-01-26 2014-04-01 Microsoft Corporation Remote access of digital identities
EP1990971A3 (en) * 2007-05-11 2009-01-21 Thomson Licensing Protecting live content in a network
WO2008143550A2 (en) * 2007-05-18 2008-11-27 Grigoriy Rafailovich Lifshic Trading machine
MX2009014173A (en) 2007-07-05 2010-03-04 Fraunhofer Ges Forschung Device and method for digital rights management.
US8452967B2 (en) * 2007-08-31 2013-05-28 Microsoft Corporation Using flash storage device to prevent unauthorized use of software
US20090092248A1 (en) * 2007-10-04 2009-04-09 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Encryption-based authentication for binding modules
US8156550B2 (en) * 2008-06-20 2012-04-10 Microsoft Corporation Establishing secure data transmission using unsecured E-mail
US9104618B2 (en) 2008-12-18 2015-08-11 Sandisk Technologies Inc. Managing access to an address range in a storage device
US8156540B2 (en) * 2009-01-28 2012-04-10 Dell Products, Lp System and method for managing feature enablement in an information handling system
US20100284539A1 (en) * 2009-03-09 2010-11-11 The Regents Of The University Of Michigan Methods for Protecting Against Piracy of Integrated Circuits
EP3518128B1 (en) * 2011-03-30 2021-04-28 Irdeto B.V. Enabling a software application to be executed on a hardware device
US9270657B2 (en) * 2011-12-22 2016-02-23 Intel Corporation Activation and monetization of features built into storage subsystems using a trusted connect service back end infrastructure
US10728231B2 (en) * 2012-07-09 2020-07-28 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Data security using inter-zone gate circuits
US9633330B1 (en) 2014-04-04 2017-04-25 Seagate Technoglogy LLC Late stage SKU assignment
US9584498B1 (en) 2014-04-04 2017-02-28 Seagate Technology Llc Feature activation using near field communication
US9535676B1 (en) 2014-04-04 2017-01-03 Seagate Technology Llc Remote feature activation
US9838250B1 (en) 2014-04-04 2017-12-05 Seagate Technology Llc Recipient-specific feature activation
US9998914B2 (en) 2014-04-16 2018-06-12 Jamf Software, Llc Using a mobile device to restrict focus and perform operations at another mobile device
WO2016012940A1 (en) * 2014-07-21 2016-01-28 Altech Multimedia (Pty) Limited Streaming a linear broadcast to a tablet-like device
US9647897B2 (en) 2014-08-20 2017-05-09 Jamf Software, Llc Dynamic grouping of managed devices
US10868672B1 (en) 2015-06-05 2020-12-15 Apple Inc. Establishing and verifying identity using biometrics while protecting user privacy
US11140171B1 (en) 2015-06-05 2021-10-05 Apple Inc. Establishing and verifying identity using action sequences while protecting user privacy
US11392716B2 (en) 2017-05-12 2022-07-19 Jamf Software, Llc Mobile device management at a healthcare facility
US10678950B2 (en) 2018-01-26 2020-06-09 Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. Authenticated backplane access
US10833849B2 (en) 2018-03-21 2020-11-10 Clover Network, Inc. Unified secure device provisioning
US10726681B1 (en) 2019-07-26 2020-07-28 Clover Network, Inc. Advanced hardware system for self service checkout kiosk
US11477012B2 (en) 2019-09-24 2022-10-18 Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. Cryptographic feature licensing

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH02112082A (en) * 1988-10-21 1990-04-24 Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd Microprocessor and ic card to use same
JPH04100148A (en) * 1989-10-02 1992-04-02 Sun Microsyst Inc Method of preventing malfeasant usage of software in computer network system
JPH06103058A (en) * 1992-05-15 1994-04-15 Addison M Fischer Data structure for program authorization information

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2536880B1 (en) * 1982-11-30 1987-05-07 Bull Sa MICROPROCESSOR DESIGNED IN PARTICULAR FOR EXECUTING THE CALCULATION ALGORITHMS OF A PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
US4658093A (en) * 1983-07-11 1987-04-14 Hellman Martin E Software distribution system
WO1993011480A1 (en) * 1991-11-27 1993-06-10 Intergraph Corporation System and method for network license administration

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH02112082A (en) * 1988-10-21 1990-04-24 Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd Microprocessor and ic card to use same
JPH04100148A (en) * 1989-10-02 1992-04-02 Sun Microsyst Inc Method of preventing malfeasant usage of software in computer network system
JPH06103058A (en) * 1992-05-15 1994-04-15 Addison M Fischer Data structure for program authorization information

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2002527781A (en) * 1998-10-06 2002-08-27 コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ Method and system for certificate management of consumer electronic devices
JP2011193477A (en) * 1998-10-30 2011-09-29 Virnet X Inc Agile network protocol for secure communication with assured system availability
JP2003500923A (en) * 1999-05-21 2003-01-07 インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレーション Method, computer program and device for initializing secure communication and exclusively pairing devices
US6886095B1 (en) 1999-05-21 2005-04-26 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for efficiently initializing secure communications among wireless devices
JP2005535040A (en) * 2002-08-06 2005-11-17 プリヴァリス・インコーポレーテッド Method for secure registration and backup of personal identification to an electronic device

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP0780039A4 (en) 2002-05-02
US5473692A (en) 1995-12-05
AU3583295A (en) 1996-03-27
RU2147790C1 (en) 2000-04-20
US5568552A (en) 1996-10-22
JP4294728B2 (en) 2009-07-15
EP0780039A1 (en) 1997-06-25
WO1996008092A1 (en) 1996-03-14

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
JPH10507324A (en) Loving software license for hardware agents
US6058478A (en) Apparatus and method for a vetted field upgrade
JP4638990B2 (en) Secure distribution and protection of cryptographic key information
US7899187B2 (en) Domain-based digital-rights management system with easy and secure device enrollment
CN108513704B (en) Remote distribution method and system of terminal master key
US7697691B2 (en) Method of delivering Direct Proof private keys to devices using an on-line service
JP4746233B2 (en) Trusted computing platforms that limit the use of data
JP4240297B2 (en) Terminal device, authentication terminal program, device authentication server, device authentication program
US7877604B2 (en) Proof of execution using random function
US20040088541A1 (en) Digital-rights management system
JP2009529832A (en) Undiscoverable, ie secure data communication using black data
JP2005080315A (en) System and method for providing service
JP2002503354A (en) How to manage access to devices
JP2004013438A (en) Electronic value data communication method, communication system, ic card, and portable terminal
JPH09200194A (en) Device and method for security communication
JPH09261217A (en) Communication equipment and its method
KR100239865B1 (en) Apparatus and method for providing secured communications
JP2005020580A (en) Network system
JP2002135239A (en) Encryption data distribution service system
JP2008306685A (en) Security information setting system, master terminal thereof, general terminal, and program
TW200830833A (en) Network data security system and protection method therefore
JP2002374237A (en) Information providing method
JPH10327144A (en) Method for authenticating agency and system therefor

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
A131 Notification of reasons for refusal

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A131

Effective date: 20050531

A521 Request for written amendment filed

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A523

Effective date: 20050829

A02 Decision of refusal

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A02

Effective date: 20060207

A521 Request for written amendment filed

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A523

Effective date: 20060426

A911 Transfer to examiner for re-examination before appeal (zenchi)

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A911

Effective date: 20060713

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A911

Effective date: 20060713

A912 Re-examination (zenchi) completed and case transferred to appeal board

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A912

Effective date: 20060817

A521 Request for written amendment filed

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A523

Effective date: 20081222

A01 Written decision to grant a patent or to grant a registration (utility model)

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A01

A61 First payment of annual fees (during grant procedure)

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A61

Effective date: 20090409

FPAY Renewal fee payment (event date is renewal date of database)

Free format text: PAYMENT UNTIL: 20120417

Year of fee payment: 3

R150 Certificate of patent or registration of utility model

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: R150

FPAY Renewal fee payment (event date is renewal date of database)

Free format text: PAYMENT UNTIL: 20120417

Year of fee payment: 3

FPAY Renewal fee payment (event date is renewal date of database)

Free format text: PAYMENT UNTIL: 20130417

Year of fee payment: 4

FPAY Renewal fee payment (event date is renewal date of database)

Free format text: PAYMENT UNTIL: 20130417

Year of fee payment: 4

FPAY Renewal fee payment (event date is renewal date of database)

Free format text: PAYMENT UNTIL: 20140417

Year of fee payment: 5

R250 Receipt of annual fees

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: R250

LAPS Cancellation because of no payment of annual fees