JPH10326334A - Ic card and authenticating device therefor - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To discriminate a forged IC card when it is used. SOLUTION: A magnetic stripe is formed at a part of an IC card and jitters generated on the magnetic stripe are used as a random pattern. Or, a fault position of a memory cell, which is generated when the IC card is manufacture is used as a random pattern, or the electric analog quantity of the memory cell of the IC card is used as a random pattern, thus providing three methods. Any method codes and records information regarding the random pattern on the IC card and when the IC card is used, a terminal device observes and compares its random pattern with the information obtained by decoding the recorded information, thereby deciding the legitimacy of the card. Consequently, even if IC cards are forged, very few that can be used as legitimate cards, so that an illegal actor can not obtain profit by forgery.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to preventing forgery of an IC card. The present invention relates to an IC card capable of identifying that an IC card is forged when the IC card is used in a forged manner, a terminal device in which the IC card is used, and a plurality of terminal devices connected by communication means. Center device. The present invention relates to a telephone card, a pachinko card, a ticket for transportation such as a railway or a bus, a coupon for an entertainment facility, a prepaid card used for other purposes, or as an ID card including a large amount of information and / or an arithmetic circuit. Can be widely used.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art In recent years, illegal use of forged prepaid cards has become a social problem. In particular, in the case of using a card with a magnetic stripe formed, the fraudster analyzes the data recorded on the magnetic stripe of the genuine card and overwrites new information with a magnetic writer, so A forged card in which information or the like has been tampered with can be created relatively easily. Since overwriting of the magnetic stripe can be performed relatively easily and in large quantities, the damage can be serious if forgery is performed by an unauthorized person. Therefore, when a prepaid card is used, a terminal device that reads the information of the prepaid card, whether it is a genuine prepaid card,
An authentication method that can identify whether the card is a forged prepaid card and that cannot be bypassed by an unauthorized person is required.

In criminal investigations, etc., in order to identify individuals,
Human DNA and fingerprints are used. This is because 1) DNA and fingerprints are information unique to an individual, and different people can be considered to have different DNAs and fingerprints (uniqueness). 2) DNA and fingerprints are intentional by humans. 3) DNA and fingerprints are invariant for a lifetime, and can be confirmed by anyone (reproducibility). This is because the condition is satisfied.

[0004] The same can be set for a prepaid card. If a feature amount equivalent to DNA or a fingerprint can be set inside the prepaid card, the terminal device can detect an illegally forged prepaid card. Can be prevented in advance.

Fernandes is disclosed in US Pat. No. 5,235,516.
No. 6 and No. 5430279 disclose that the jitter generated when writing digital information on a magnetic stripe can be used as information having inherent properties, difficulty in reproducing, and reproducibility. Jitter generated in the magnetic stripe is caused by physical unevenness of the magnetic stripe such as fluctuation of the physical thickness of the magnetic stripe, uneven operation of the magnetic writer,
This occurs as a natural phenomenon due to the unevenness of the voltage and current applied to the magnetic writer, etc. Once a prepaid card is created, its jitter is unique and it is difficult to reproduce the same jitter. Jitter can be read and reproduced any number of times. Then, the jitter generated in a specific portion of the magnetic stripe during the preparation of the prepaid card is observed, a check sum of the jitter (defined by Fernandez) is created, and the digital information is stored in another part of the magnetic stripe of the prepaid card. The invention which is recorded as is disclosed.

In the conventional invention, when a prepaid card is used, information on the amount of money recorded on the magnetic stripe is read, and the jitter of a specific portion of the magnetic stripe is actually observed to prepare the prepaid card. A checksum is calculated by the same logic as that described above, and it is checked whether or not it matches the checksum recorded as digital information. If they match, it is determined that the card is a genuine prepaid card, and if they do not match, it is a counterfeit prepaid card.

For example, a fraudulent person can purchase a genuine prepaid card, prepare another prepaid card of the same format, and copy all the digital information of the genuine prepaid card to a separately prepared magnetic stripe. Suppose you have made a forged prepaid card that looks exactly like a genuine prepaid card. In many cases, a counterfeit prepaid card created in this way cannot be distinguished from a genuine prepaid card by a terminal device using the prepaid card. However, since the jitter of a specific part of the magnetic stripe is unique to each card, the authentic one purchased genuinely and the one created by copying are different, so the checksum obtained from the jitter of the specific part is It does not match the checksum recorded on the prepaid card. In this way, forgeries can be found.

Further, Fernandez disclosed an invention relating to an anti-counterfeiting technology in an international patent application PCT / US95 / 17075 for an IC card. However, this is not a technology for authenticating a card using a random pattern, and the invention of the present application. Understands. This does not relate to a technology for authenticating the validity of a card using a random pattern, but to a technology for generating a random number using an IC chip provided in an IC card.

Here, the "random pattern" is a feature amount which is generated by chance when a prepaid card is manufactured, and is a random number parameter which functions as a digest of the card and is difficult to control. The random pattern needs to have uniqueness, reproduction difficulty, and reproducibility. The uniqueness originally means that there is a one-to-one correspondence between patterns and cards, but in reality, the number of cards may be larger than the number of patterns. In that case, it is possible to have uniqueness even when it is physically and computationally difficult to find another card having the same pattern as that of a certain card. Difficulty in reproduction means that it is difficult to intentionally create a specific pattern on another card. Reproducibility is the property that the pattern of a single card is invariant over its lifetime and that a person who verifies the prepaid card can recognize it directly when needed.

The position (or magnitude) of the pulse-like jitter generated in the magnetic stripe of the card is a typical example of a random pattern. In other words, the jitter that occurs in the magnetic stripe occurs accidentally due to the material and thickness of the magnetic stripe, the nature of the magnetic writer to be recorded, the drive speed of the magnetic writer, the drive unevenness, and other causes. The location (and size) of the occurrence is unique. This can be read by a generally used magnetic reader, and specific jitter cannot be written by a general magnetic writer. When information is newly overwritten on the magnetic stripe with a magnetic writer, the previous jitter disappears and new jitter occurs. For this reason, even if the card is forged by copying the magnetic stripe, the position (and size) of the jitter is different, so that the terminal device can determine the authenticity by checking the position (and size) of the jitter. it can. Jitter can be recognized as pulse-shaped noise as amplitude information, and can also be recognized as unevenness in clock frequency or clock timing as frequency information or time information.

[0011]

As semiconductor memory manufacturing technology advances, IC cards can be provided at lower prices. Since an IC card can store a larger amount of information than a card using a magnetic stripe and can not only store information but also process information in the card, the IC card uses a magnetic stripe. It is thought that it will be widely used instead of used cards. The anti-counterfeiting method for a card on which a magnetic stripe is formed by Fernandes is an effective method, but it cannot be applied to an IC card as it is.

[0012] As for an IC card, a technique for immediately determining whether the card is valid when the card is used is extremely important. No matter how good the function of the IC card is, it cannot be widely used until a technology for preventing unauthorized use of the IC card is established to a considerable extent.

The present invention has been made in view of such a background, and an object of the present invention is to provide a forgery identification technique for an IC card by utilizing a jitter on a magnetic stripe and other random patterns. An object of the present invention is to provide an IC card which is difficult to forge, and which can be used to immediately and easily identify a forgery in a terminal device used by the IC card when forged, and an identification device therefor. I do.

[0014]

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION A first aspect of the present invention is as follows.
It is characterized in that a magnetic stripe is provided in a part of an IC card, and jitter generated in the magnetic stripe is used as a random pattern. That is, the present invention is characterized in that a magnetic stripe is formed on a part of a card, and information on jitter generated in the magnetic stripe is recorded on an IC chip of the card and / or the magnetic stripe. It is desirable that the information relating to the jitter is encrypted and recorded. Further, it is desirable that the information on the jitter is encrypted by a secret key of the center device and is recorded by an encryption which can be decrypted by a public key set in a terminal device using the card.

The present invention further relates to an IC card authentication device, which comprises means for reading information recorded on a card to be used and means for judging the validity of the information read from the card. In the device, the IC card is provided with a magnetic stripe in addition to the IC chip, and information on jitter generated in the magnetic stripe is recorded on the IC chip of the card and / or the magnetic stripe, and its validity is determined. The means is characterized by including means for comparing the jitter observed from the magnetic stripe with the jitter obtained by calculating from the information on the jitter recorded on the card to determine whether the card can be accepted.

The device includes a center device including a database for storing information of the issued IC card, a terminal device using the IC card, and a bidirectional device provided between the center device and the terminal device. It is desirable to provide a communication unit so that the center device can strictly manage information on unauthorized use of the IC card.

The present invention further provides a machine-readable recording medium in which software installed on hardware including a computer controlled by a program is recorded so as to be an authentication device for the IC card. It is characterized by.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, a failure of a digital memory on an IC card is used as a random pattern. That is, the present invention is characterized in that information on the location where a memory failure occurred during manufacturing in a digital memory is recorded in a part of the card.
It is a C card. It is desirable that information on the position be recorded in an encrypted form. Further, it is desirable that the information on the position is encrypted by a secret key of the center device and recorded by an encryption which can be decrypted by a public key set in a terminal device in which the card is used.

The present invention further provides an IC card authentication device comprising means for reading information recorded on a card to be used, and means for judging the validity of the information read from the card. In the IC card, information on a failure position occurring during the manufacturing is recorded in the digital memory of the IC chip on the IC chip of the card,
The means for judging the validity compares the fault position obtained by observing the IC chip with the fault position obtained by calculating from the information on the fault position recorded on the card, and judges whether the card can be accepted. An IC card authentication device characterized by including means for determining This device is
A configuration including a center device including a database for storing issued IC card information, a terminal device using the IC card, and two-way communication means provided between the center device and the terminal device. It can be.

Further, according to the present invention, when installed in hardware including a computer controlled by a program, the hardware can be used as a machine reading device in which software serving as an IC card authentication device according to claim 10 or 11 is recorded. It is a possible recording medium.

A third aspect of the present invention is to use an analog value of a digital memory as a random pattern. That is, according to the present invention, with respect to a large number of binary digital memory cells formed on a card, information relating to a value obtained by observing an electric analog value held by the memory cell at a q value level (q value is an integer of 3 or more) is obtained. The hashed digest is recorded on an IC chip of the card. A hash function is a collision-free compression function. It is desirable that information relating to the digest of the value obtained by observing the electric analog value at the q value level be encrypted and recorded as a signature. This can be configured to be encrypted by the secret key of the center device and recorded by encryption that can be decrypted by the public key set in the terminal device in which the card is used. FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining this procedure.

The present invention further provides an IC having means for reading information recorded on a card to be used and means for judging the validity of the information read from the card.
An authentication device for a card, wherein the IC card includes a specific memory cell (preferably a plurality) among a large number of binary digital memories formed on the card.
Information regarding the value obtained by observing the electrical analog value held by the memory cell at the q-value level (q is an integer of 3 or more, and q is preferably 16 or more) is recorded on the IC chip of the card, and The means for judging the property compares the value obtained by observing the electrical analog value held by the specific memory cell at the q-value level with the value obtained by calculating from the information on the electrical analog value recorded on the card. And means for determining whether or not the card can be accepted. This device includes a center device including a database for storing information of an issued IC card, a terminal device using the IC card, and a bidirectional communication means provided between the center device and the terminal device. Can be provided.

Further, the present invention is a machine-readable recording medium in which software installed on hardware including a computer device controlled by a program is recorded so that the hardware becomes the above-mentioned IC card authentication device. is there.

[0024]

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS A magnetic stripe is formed on the surface of or inside an IC card, and the type, identification number, and other digital information of the IC card are recorded on the magnetic stripe. When information is recorded on the magnetic stripe, pulse-like jitter is randomly generated in the magnetic stripe. FIG. 1 schematically shows this state. Although this jitter can be read by an existing magnetic reader, it is not possible to write jitter at a specific position using a magnetic writer. Also, the jitter existing on the magnetic stripe disappears if it is newly overwritten with a magnetic writer.

Therefore, even if a forged card is made by copying a magnetic stripe, the jitter on the magnetic stripe exists at different positions. If the initial jitter position is read, encoded, and recorded in the digital memory of the IC chip or a part of its magnetic stripe, when the prepaid card is used, the terminal device determines the position of the jitter when the prepaid card is used. By checking the jitter position obtained from the record, it is possible to identify whether or not the prepaid card has been rewritten. This utilizes the fact that the reading ability exceeds the writing ability with respect to jitter, and in general, a physical quantity for which such a fact holds is likely to satisfy the requirement as a random pattern.

In the IC card according to the present invention, the random pattern generated in the magnetic stripe attached to the IC card is used to authenticate the validity of the IC card. In each IC card, a random pattern read at the time of manufacture, that is, the position of the jitter on the magnetic stripe is recorded as a digital code. At this time, it is preferable that the position of the jitter on the magnetic stripe be encrypted with the secret key of the center device and recorded as a signature, instead of being simply recorded as a digital code. This is shown in FIG.

In the terminal device using the IC card manufactured as described above, the position of the jitter of the magnetic stripe is actually read from the used IC card, and the read signature is also added to the public key corresponding to the secret key. To decrypt. The decoded data should be a random pattern of the magnetic stripe, that is, a jitter position, and the validity of the IC card can be identified by checking whether or not this is checked. With a valid IC card, the decoded jitter position should match the read jitter position. If the magnetic stripe is overwritten, the jitter position has been changed, so that the read jitter position does not match the jitter position obtained by decoding the signature. Regardless, even if an illegal IC card is manufactured by rewriting the internal information of the used IC card exactly like the internal information of the valid IC card, the jitter of the magnetic stripe provided on the IC card will cause the jitter. Since the information is unique to the card, it cannot be used unless information on the jitter is rewritten according to the inherent jitter. Also, even if you observe the changed jitter position by overwriting the key and try to encrypt it, you can not make a correct signature without knowing the secret key, so for those who do not know the secret key this forgery is Can not.

A terminal device using an IC card includes an interface for connecting the IC card, and a program-controlled computer for transmitting and receiving digital information via the interface. Such a device is configured as a device that is widely used as a device that uses an IC card. By installing unique software for implementing the present invention in such an apparatus, the IC card authentication apparatus of the present invention can be obtained. The software also includes an encryption key for decoding random pattern information relating to the jitter position and the like recorded on the IC card. The software is recorded and sold on a machine-readable recording medium such as a magnetic recording medium or an optical recording medium. The recording medium is covered by the patent of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 3, such a device is provided with one center device for managing the issuance of an IC card for a plurality of terminal devices, which is connected by bidirectional communication means, and which has been issued. It is desirable to record and manage the IC card. With such a configuration, an unauthorized card can be more strictly identified, and unauthorized use of the IC card can be prevented.

Next, the case where the failure rate of the digital memory is used will be described. Digital memories are subject to failure during manufacture. The failed digital memory cell is
The memory information is fixed at 1 or 0. The memory location where the memory failure has occurred is used as a random pattern. At the time of manufacturing a digital memory, if the failure occurrence rate can be controlled by another method of controlling the manufacturing process, the failure rate may be increased to such an extent that it can be used as a random pattern. It is considered that this fault location does not change once it occurs (uniqueness), and it is difficult for a person to arbitrarily set this fault location to generate this faulty difficulty (reproduction difficulty), and the fault location is determined later. However, it can be confirmed by observation separately (reproducibility).

At the time of manufacturing an IC card, the position where the memory failure has occurred is observed, and information relating to the position is encrypted and recorded as digital information on the IC chip of the IC card. When an IC card is used,
The digital information is read from the IC chip, and the location where the memory failure has occurred is actually observed separately for the IC card. The read digital information is decoded to obtain a memory fault position, which is compared with the actually observed fault position. If the collation matches, the IC card is valid, and if the collation does not match, the IC card is rejected as invalid.

In this case as well, a large database is provided in the center device to manage issued IC cards, and a two-way communication means is provided between the center device and the terminal device to use the used IC card. The fraud can be more strictly prevented by performing management of all of the above by the center device.

Further, the terminal device or the center device may be configured so that software is recorded on a machine-readable recording medium and installed on computer-controlled hardware to obtain the device of the present invention. it can.

Next, a description will be given of an invention in which an electric analog value of a digital memory is used as a random pattern.

A specific memory cell in the IC card is set. The number m of memory cells to be set is preferably as large as possible, but there is a physical limit. For example, m = 128
Set the memory cells. Then, after repeatedly recording 1 and 0 several times in the memory cell, information 1 or 0 is recorded according to an arbitrarily set pattern. Then, the value of each memory cell will exhibit a voltage of E volts (5 volts in TTL) or 0 volts according to the information 1, but in practice this is not exactly 5 volts nor 0 volts . This voltage value is measured as a q-value level, for example, a 32-value level, and this is used as a random pattern. That is, 128
A table of 32 voltage levels is obtained for each of the memory cells. The digest of this table is created by a hash function, which is encrypted and recorded in the IC chip of the IC card as a signature for determination. When this IC card is used, an encrypted signature for identification is read from the IC chip and decrypted. On the other hand, the voltage value of the specific memory cell is measured at the q-value level, and this is hashed to create a digest, which is collated with the decrypted information. If this matches, then I
The C card is legitimate, and if it does not match, it is rejected as invalid.

Also in this case, providing a plurality of terminal devices using the IC card and a center device and managing the use status of the issued IC card is an effective method for preventing fraud. .

Further, regarding the terminal device and the center device,
The device of the present invention can be obtained by installing software for functioning as the device of the present invention on hardware including a computer controlled by each program. A machine-readable recording medium that records software for this purpose is covered by the patent.

[0038]

According to the present invention, forgery identification using a random pattern can be performed for an IC card, and illegal use of the IC card can be prevented.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of an IC card according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a view for explaining a relationship between a random pattern and a signature of the IC card according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating the relationship between the center device and the terminal device according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 4 is a view for explaining a procedure for utilizing an analog value of a digital memory.

Claims (18)

[Claims] 1. An IC card, wherein a magnetic stripe is formed on a part of the card, and information on jitter generated in the magnetic stripe is recorded on an IC chip of the card or the magnetic stripe. 2. The IC card according to claim 1, wherein the information on the jitter is encrypted and recorded. 3. The IC card according to claim 2, wherein the information relating to the jitter is encrypted by a secret key of a center device, and is recorded by a code that can be decrypted by a public key set in a terminal device using the card. . 4. An IC card authentication device comprising: means for reading information recorded on a card to be used; and means for judging the validity of the information read from the card. In addition to the chip, a magnetic stripe is provided, and information relating to the jitter generated in the magnetic stripe is recorded on the IC chip of the card or the magnetic stripe. An IC card authentication device, comprising: means for comparing the jitter obtained by calculating from information on jitter recorded on the card to determine whether the card can be accepted. 5. A center device including a database for storing issued IC card information, a terminal device using the IC card, and a bidirectional communication means provided between the center device and the terminal device. The authentication device for an IC card according to claim 4, comprising: 6. A machine-readable recording in which software installed on hardware including a computer device under program control is used as an authentication device for an IC card according to claim 4 or 5. Medium. 7. An IC characterized in that information relating to the location of a memory failure occurring during manufacturing is recorded in a part of an IC chip of a card in a digital memory of the IC chip.
card. 8. The IC card according to claim 7, wherein the information on the position is encrypted and recorded. 9. The IC card according to claim 8, wherein the information on the position is encrypted by a secret key of the center device and recorded by an encryption which can be decrypted by a public key set in a terminal device in which the card is used. . 10. An IC card authentication device comprising: means for reading information recorded on a card to be used; and means for judging the validity of the information read from the card. Information on a fault location occurring during the manufacturing is recorded in the digital memory of the chip on the IC chip of the card, and the means for judging the validity records the fault location obtained by observing the IC chip and the card. An authentication device for an IC card, comprising means for comparing a fault position obtained by calculating from the information on the fault position obtained and determining whether or not the card can be accepted. 11. A center device including a database for storing issued IC card information, a terminal device using the IC card, and a bidirectional communication means provided between the center device and the terminal device. The IC card authentication device according to claim 10, comprising: 12. A machine-readable recording medium on which software which is installed on hardware including a computer controlled by a program so as to become the IC card authentication device according to claim 10 or 11 is recorded. . 13. A value obtained by observing an electrical analog value held by a specific memory cell at a q-value level (q is an integer of 3 or more) among a large number of binary digital memories formed on a card. An IC card characterized in that information about the card is recorded on an IC chip of the card. 14. The IC card according to claim 13, wherein information relating to the value obtained by observing the electric analog value at the q-value level is encrypted and recorded. 15. The information relating to the value obtained by observing the electric analog value at the q-value level is encrypted with a secret key of a center device and can be decrypted with a public key set in a terminal device using the card. Claim 1 recorded by
4. The IC card according to 4. 16. An IC card authentication device comprising: means for reading information recorded on a card to be used; and means for judging the validity of the information read from the card. For a specific memory cell among a large number of binary digital memories formed on a card, information on a value obtained by observing an electric analog value held by the memory cell at a q-value level (q is an integer of 3 or more) is stored in the card. The means for judging the validity is recorded on an IC chip according to the value obtained by observing the electrical analog value held by the specific memory cell at the q-value level and information on the electrical analog value recorded on the card. An authentication device for an IC card, comprising means for comparing a value obtained by calculation to determine whether or not the card can be accepted. 17. A center device including a database for storing issued IC card information, a terminal device using the IC card, and a bidirectional communication means provided between the center device and the terminal device. The authentication device for an IC card according to claim 16, comprising: 18. A machine-readable recording medium in which software installed on hardware including a computer controlled by a program to be a device for authenticating an IC card according to claim 16 or 17 is recorded. .