JPH09163469A - Device and method for remote control - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To improve the reliability and theft preventing property of entire device against an illegally imitated signal (key) by switching an enciphering system corresponding to information on change with the lapse of time. SOLUTION: When the information showing the lapse of time as the information to be changed with the passage of time detected by a time measuring part 14 reaches a prescribed value, a command side arithmetic part 12 switches respective enciphering operation storage parts 15-16 storing enciphering operations as enciphering systems through a switching part 18. Since the system for enciphering an identification code is changed at every prescribed time, the imitated spare key is made ineffective and reliability and theft preventing property can be maintained and recovered.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a remote control device and a remote control method suitable for use in, for example, a vehicle door lock, and more particularly to a remote control device and a remote control method having a plurality of types of encryption systems. .

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Generally, as remote control devices and remote control methods, there are known remote control devices such as television receivers and air conditioners, as well as keyless systems for remotely locking or unlocking door locks of automobiles. Has been. Here, for example, when antitheft and crime prevention are required such as door locks for automobiles, the remote key possessed by a legitimate owner and the lock device on the vehicle body are made to correspond one-to-one with each other. It prevents unauthorized theft with a remote key to prevent theft and the like. That is, the unique identification code stored in each remote key is compared with the identification code stored in the lock device on the vehicle body side, and the door lock is released only when both codes match.

If the identification code is transmitted as it is,
Since a third party can easily decrypt and create an imitation key, various techniques have been proposed for encrypting an identification code with a random number or the like and transmitting it, as described below.

That is, as a second conventional technique, for example, in the technique disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 6-339036, etc., plaintext data transmitted by a facsimile machine is encrypted with a secret key,
The other party's facsimile machine is designed to decrypt the encrypted data. Here, in the second conventional technique, in order to prevent the decryption by a third party, the secret key used for encryption is changed at predetermined intervals according to calendar data such as date and time. Therefore, according to the second conventional technique, as long as the time of the sending side facsimile device and the receiving side facsimile device are synchronized within the allowable error, the receiving side facsimile device makes it difficult for a third party to decipher. It is possible to easily decipher with.

Further, as a third conventional technique, an identification code (key) for operating a lock mechanism as an example of a controlled object is referred to as a first identification code, as described in, for example, Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 192970/1990. It is known that the second identification code is divided into the second identification code and the second identification code is transmitted based on the random number returned from the vehicle body side after the completion of the matching of the first identification code. Therefore, according to the third conventional technique, since the unlocking or locking is performed by the communication between the remote key side and the lock device side of the vehicle body, the anti-theft property can be further enhanced.

[0006]

By the way, in each of the above-mentioned prior arts, the secret key used for encryption is changed based on the calendar data, or the identification code is divided, so that a third party can make an unauthorized action. In any case, the encryption method (encryption method or encryption pattern) is determined at the shipping stage of the product, and the encryption method once set is the product life. It doesn't change until it runs out. Therefore, the fixedly set encryption method may be decrypted by a third party in time, and if it is decrypted, a duplicate key is created for other products with different identification codes, and the device is Overall reliability may be reduced.

That is, as a basic method of encrypting the identification code, for example, a plurality of methods such as transposition and substitution are known, but in the prior art, among these plural kinds of encryption methods, Since one of the encryption methods is fixedly set at the design stage or the shipping stage, if the set encryption method is decrypted, even if a unique identification code is given to each product, It is possible to imitate the duplicate key relatively easily. In particular, in a product such as an automobile, which has a relatively high price and is easily subject to theft, etc., a person who imitates a duplication key is under constant threat and is exposed to the threat of reduction of the antitheft property.

The present invention has been made in view of the above problems of the prior art, and an object thereof is to provide a remote control device and a remote control method capable of improving reliability and antitheft.

[0009]

Therefore, according to the present invention, a plurality of encryption methods such as transposition and substitution are set in advance, and the encryption methods are switched and used based on information that changes with time. By doing so, at a certain point a third party imitates and duplicates the duplicated key by automatic switching of the encryption method, thereby maintaining the reliability and anti-theft property of the remote control device and remote control at a high level, I was able to recover.

That is, the remote control device according to the present invention determines that the command code for transmitting a predetermined identification code is encrypted, and the command code from this command machine is decrypted and collated to determine that it is a legitimate code. A remote control device having a transponder that outputs a control signal to a control target to perform a predetermined operation when the device performs a plurality of encryption methods for encrypting the identification code, and changes over time. The plurality of types of encryption methods are switched and used based on the change information with time.

According to the structure of claim 1, the encryption system is switched by the time-dependent change information that changes with the passage of time, so that the commander is imitated at a certain point of time, that is, it is adopted at a certain point of time. Even if a fake command machine that can transmit an encrypted signal according to the encryption method of is manufactured, this fake command machine is disabled at the time of switching to another encryption method based on the change information over time, and then It becomes unusable. Therefore, even if it is not possible to prevent the generation of an unauthorized imitation signal, every predetermined cycle determined by the property of the time-varying information,
The reliability and anti-theft property of the remote control device can be restored.

Here, the "time-dependent change information that changes with time" means that the value changes sequentially with time (including both an increase change and a decrease change, and either an analog change or a digital change). Information), specifically, for example, time such as year, month, day, hour, minute, second, etc., number of operations of commander (or number of operations of responder), number of operations of controlled object, etc. In addition, “a plurality of types of encryption methods” means that two or more methods having different encryption methods are provided, such as transposition and substitution.

Further, according to the second aspect of the invention, both the command device and the responding device respectively detect time-dependent change information and select a specific encryption method from a plurality of types of encryption methods. The commanding device and the responding device are switched so as to always select the same encryption method from among a plurality of encryption methods registered in advance, based on the time-dependent change information. Therefore, the command is accurately transmitted between the authorized commander and the responder to allow the controlled object to perform a desired operation, and the imitated commander switches the encryption method to be performed in due course. Since it is disabled by the selection, it is possible to prevent the unauthorized remote operation from being continuously performed.

According to the third aspect of the present invention, the identification code necessary for the operation of the answering machine is divided into the first identification code and the second identification code, and after the collation of the first identification code ends, the time elapses. Since the second identification code encrypted based on the change information is transmitted, it is possible to improve the anti-theft property more than the second aspect.

According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, the selecting means is provided with a switching order monitoring means for selecting a plurality of types of encryption methods registered in advance in accordance with a predetermined switching order and monitoring the progress of the predetermined switching order. Therefore, even if an imitation commander that duplicates all of the multiple encryption methods stored in the official commander is manufactured, if the switching order is different, the control target by the responder should be operated. Therefore, it is possible to further improve the anti-theft property and the reliability.

According to the fifth aspect of the present invention, the temporal change information detected by the temporal change information detecting means of either the command device or the responder is notified to the other temporal change information detecting means, and the other temporal change information is notified. Since the detecting means is configured to indirectly detect the time-dependent change information based on the notified time-dependent change information, it is the time-dependent change information detecting means of the commander or the responder that actually detects the time-dependent change information. Only one of them will suffice, and the other will indirectly detect the detected value as its own detected value. Therefore, it is possible to reliably prevent the time-varying information from deviating between the command device and the responder while simplifying the overall structure.

According to a sixth aspect of the present invention, since at least either the time information or the number of times the commander has been operated is used as the time-dependent change information, a plurality of types of encryption methods are used.
It can be easily switched depending on the time information or the number of operations of the command device.

According to a seventh aspect of the present invention, the command device is provided with a compulsory switching signal generating means, and the plural kinds of encryption systems are switched by the switching signal generated by the compulsory switching signal generating means. In addition to the switching of the encryption method according to the change information, the encryption method can be forcibly switched at a desired time, and the anti-theft property can be further enhanced.

In the remote operation method according to claim 8, the encryption method can be automatically switched and selected according to the time-dependent change information, as in the case of claim 1, and by any chance, the commander is forged at some point. Even in this case, the counterfeit commander can be disabled every predetermined cycle.

[0020]

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to FIGS. 1 to 13 by taking as an example the case of being applied to a vehicle door lock system as a remote control device and a remote control method. .

First, FIG. 1 to FIG. 4 are overall configuration diagrams when a remote control device according to a first embodiment of the present invention is adopted in a vehicle door lock system. Outside handle 2A of the installed door 2
Alternatively, a key cylinder 3 for inserting a key (not shown) is provided in the vicinity of the handle 2A, and the key cylinder 3 is connected to the door lock mechanism 4 as a "controlled object". The door lock mechanism 4 drives an actuator such as an electromagnetic solenoid (not shown) when a regular key is inserted into the key cylinder 3 or when a predetermined identification code is transmitted by a command unit 8 described later. The door 2 is locked or unlocked. In addition, this door lock mechanism 4
Is provided with a state detection switch (not shown) for detecting a locked or unlocked state, which includes, for example, a micro switch, a proximity switch, etc., and this state detection switch is connected to a response side calculation unit 7 described later. There is.

The door 2 is provided with a response device 5 for controlling the door lock mechanism 4 by the command device 8.
Outputs the control signal to the door lock mechanism 4 when it determines that the encrypted signal received by the receiving unit 6 is decoded and collated by the response side arithmetic unit 7 and is a proper identification code, Locking or unlocking as "operation of". Here, as the receiving unit 6, for example, a ferrite bar antenna or a superheterodyne receiver may be used when receiving a radio signal, and a phototransistor or the like may be used when receiving an optical signal. The mounting position of 6 is not limited to the door 2.

The commanding device 8 as a remote key possessed by a legitimate owner of the automobile 1 has a substantially card-shaped casing 9
And a manual switch 10 provided on the casing 9.
And a transmission section 11 including a ferrite bar antenna or the like for transmitting an encrypted signal to the outside by operating the manual switch 10, and a command side calculation section 12 and the like to be described later.

Next, the specific structures of the above-described transponder 5 and commander 8 will be described with reference to the block diagram of FIG.

First, the command unit 8 is composed of a CPU, etc., and a command side calculation unit 12 for encrypting an identification code on the basis of an encryption calculation to be described later, and an encrypted signal directed toward the response unit 5 side. I including a transmitter 11 for transmitting and a ROM or the like storing a unique identification code (hereinafter referred to as “ID”)
A D memory 13, a clock unit 14 including a clock or the like for generating time information as aging information, and a plurality of different cryptographic operations f (t) as “encryption methods”,
For example, three cryptographic operation storage units 15, 16, 17 (eg, "cryptographic operation" in the figure) including a ROM storing g (t) and h (t)
And each of these cryptographic operation storage units 15, 16, 17
And a switching unit 18 for selectively switching.

Here, the clock unit 14 is a clock and 1 of N (N> 8) digits which counts up, for example, every 10 ms.
6 binary counters _{(C N, C N-1} , ... C 1: Each digit 0 to F) and a. When the preset predetermined digit is counted up, the timer unit 14 outputs a count-up signal to the command-side arithmetic unit 12 to inform that the cryptographic operation switching time has come (10 ms). If the time is counted every time, the cycle in which the eighth digit of the hexadecimal counter counts up is about 31 days).

The predetermined digit for outputting the count-up signal may be fixedly set at the time of shipment or the like, or may be appropriately set and changed by the command side arithmetic unit 12. Further, the switching time of the cryptographic calculation is determined in consideration of the anti-theft property and the like, and the switching time is not limited to about 31 days, and may be switched, for example, every one hour, one day, or one week. That is, for example, when the cryptographic computation is switched every 100 ms, the cryptographic computation is cyclically switched immediately after the command signal is imitated,
Since the probability that the transponder 5 will respond to the imitation signal increases, the anti-theft property does not improve if the switching cycle is shortened. On the other hand, for example, when the cryptographic calculation is switched every three months, the effective period of the imitation signal becomes long, and thus the possibility that fraudulent acts are performed during the period increases. Therefore, this switching cycle is determined in consideration of the difference between the imitation signal creation timing and the fraudulent activity execution timing. For this reason, for example, it may be set according to the characteristics of the vehicle, such as about one month for a private car that is frequently used on holidays, and set for each week for a commercial car that is used almost every day. .

The clock unit 14 may be composed of a clock, and the command side arithmetic unit 12 may count time information, and the count cycle is not limited to 10 ms. further,
The counter that counts time information may be an integration counter or may be configured as a preset counter that is reset each time a set value is reached.

The switching unit 18 operates in accordance with the switching signal from the command-side arithmetic unit 12 in a predetermined order in the respective cryptographic arithmetic storage units 15,
16 and 17 are switched and selected in order, and each time the time value of the clock unit 14 reaches a predetermined value, the second cryptographic operation storage unit 15 transfers the second cryptographic operation storage unit 16 to the second cryptographic operation storage unit 16, for example. From the cryptographic operation storage unit 16 to the third cryptographic operation storage unit 17, from the third cryptographic operation storage unit 17 to the first cryptographic operation storage unit 15
To switch to (15 → 16 → 17
→ 15 ...). However, the switching order is not limited to the code order of the cryptographic operation storage unit, but may be the reverse order (17 → 16 → 15 → 17 ...) Or any order (for example, 15 → 17 → 1).
6 → 15 ...).

Here, exemplifying a concrete cipher generation method of each of the cryptographic operation storage units 15 to 17, the cryptographic operation f (t) stored in the first cryptographic operation storage unit 15 is "substituted" and the second Cryptographic operation g stored in the cryptographic operation storage unit 16 of
(t) may be “transposed”, and the cryptographic operation h (t) stored in the third cryptographic operation storage unit 17 may be “transposed” after “substitution” processing.

That is, for example, if the ID code is "I ₁ , I ₂ , I
₃ , I ₄ , I ₅ , I ₆ , I ₇ ", 7 digits of hexadecimal number, and the counting unit 14 outputs a count-up signal each time C ₈ of the 8th digit counts up. The cryptographic operation f (t) of 1 is the exclusive OR (XOR) of each digit of the ID code and the hexadecimal counter value of each digit of the time information, as shown in the following Equation 1, and A ₇ , A ₆ , ... Converts to a new code of A ₁ .

[0032]

## EQU1 ## I ₇ (XOR) C ₇ , I ₆ (XOR) C ₆ , I ₅ (XOR) C ₅ ... I ₁
(XOR) C ₁ → A ₇ , A ₆ , ... A ₁ And after changing the characters as shown in the above equation 1, the command side calculation unit 12
As shown in the following Expression 2, the signal encrypted by substituting for the counter value of the time information is added and transmitted from the transmitter 11 to the responder 5.

[0033]

[Number 2] _{C N, C N-1,} ... C 1, A 7, A 6, also ... A _1, the second cryptographic operation g to perform transposition (t), as shown in the following Table 1, the time counter The value of the least significant digit C ₁ (0 to
F) by the transposition patterns P _{0 to} P _F prepared for each I
The data I _{7 to} I ₁ of the D code are rearranged.
Therefore, the rearrangement patterns P _{0 to} P _F are switched every 10 ms.

[0034]

[Table 1] Then, the command side calculation unit 12 adds the counter value of the time information to this rearranged ID code as shown in the following Expression 3, and transmits it from the transmission unit 11 to the responder 5. ing.

[0035]

## EQU3 ## C _N , C _N-1 , ... C ₁ , I ₂ , I ₄ , I ₇ , I ₃ ,
I ₆ , I ₁ , I _{5 In} addition, the third cryptographic operation h (t), which performs a composite operation, first performs the same substitution processing as the first cryptographic operation f (t) to set the ID code to A. After being converted into _{7 to} A ₁ , the substitution codes A _{7 to} A ₁ are then converted into a predetermined rearrangement pattern determined by the lowest counter value C ₁ in the same manner as the second cryptographic operation g (t). It is arranged to transpose according to P _{0 to} P _F.

In the present embodiment, for the sake of explanation and understanding, the number of types of cryptographic computation is three, but the number of types of cryptographic computation is comprehensive in terms of anti-theft, reliability required level, manufacturing cost, etc. Since it is determined in consideration of the situation, 3
It is not limited to the type. For example, preferably 3 types to 10
Within the range of types, more preferably, about 5 types of cryptographic operations may be set. If set to these ranges,
The counterfeiting cost of the command device 8 can be greatly increased, and the time required to sequentially switch and try the cryptographic operations becomes long and the chances of revealing fraudulent acts also increase. be able to. However, it is also within the scope of the present invention to use two types of cryptographic operations.
Furthermore, although three types of substitution, transposition, substitution and transposition have been given as examples of the encryption method, the present invention is not limited to this, and other encryption methods may be adopted.

On the other hand, the answering machine 5 provided on the automobile 1 side
Is a receiving unit 6 that receives the encrypted signal from the command unit 8,
A response side arithmetic unit 7 including a CPU and the like, and an ID memory 19 including a ROM and the like storing an ID code corresponding to the ID code on the commander 8 side (generally both codes are the same).
And a time memory 20 for updating and storing the counter value measured by the time counting unit 14 of the command unit 8, and each of the cryptographic operation storage units 1
The same cryptographic operations f (t), g (t), and h as 5, 16, 17
Cryptographic operation storage units 21, 22, 2 storing (t) respectively
3 and a switching unit 24 that switches each of the cryptographic operation storage units 21 to 23 according to the time information of the time memory 20, and the response side operation unit 7 is connected to the door lock mechanism 4. Then, the responding machine 5 selectively switches each of the cryptographic operation storage units 21 to 23 in accordance with the counter value of the time information in the signal received from the commanding machine 5, thereby collating the ID code and operating the door lock mechanism 4. Is to control.

Next, the operation of the present embodiment will be described with reference to the flowcharts of FIGS. 3 and 4.

First, FIG. 3 is a flow chart showing a transmission process by the command unit 8, in which the timekeeping section 14 sets a battery (not shown) in step 1 (step is abbreviated as “S” in the figure) 1. The elapsed time from time is measured, and in the next step 2, the state of the manual switch 10 is read to monitor whether or not the manual switch 5 has been operated. If it is determined to be "YES" in this step 2, it means that the operator wants to lock or unlock, so the process moves to step 3, and in this step 3, the ID code is read from the ID memory 13.

Next, in step 4, it is determined whether or not the current time information (counter value) measured in step 1 exceeds a predetermined time (for example, 31 days), that is, C at the 8th digit.
Whether or not ₈ has counted up is determined by the presence / absence of a count-up signal from the timer unit 14. However, as described above, the count-up signal may not be output from the clock unit 14, and it may be determined whether or not the counter value has reached the predetermined value in the command-side arithmetic unit 12.

When it is determined to be "NO" in this step 4, since the predetermined time has not yet passed and there is no need to switch the encryption method, that is, the encryption operation, in step 5, the previously updated and stored encryption is performed. Operation (f (t), g (t), h
One of (t)) is selected by the switching unit 18. In the initial state, for example, the cryptographic operation f (t) of the first cryptographic operation storage unit 15 is set as the initial value. On the other hand, if it is determined to be "YES" in step 4, it means that the elapsed time from the previous cryptographic operation switching has exceeded the predetermined time, so the process proceeds to step 6, and in step 6, the switching unit 17 , The next cryptographic operation storage unit (for example, the second cryptographic operation storage unit 16) is selected, and the next step 7
Then, the newly selected cryptographic operation (g (t)) is updated and stored.

Then, in step 8, the step 5
Alternatively, the ID code is encrypted based on the cryptographic operation selected in step 7, and in the next step 9, time information (counter value) is added to the encrypted ID code, and the transmitter 11 sends it to the responder 5. Send to.

Next, FIG. 4 is a flow chart showing the receiving process on the side of the responding device 5. First, in step 11,
The receiving unit 6 is monitored to determine whether a command signal from the command unit 8 has been received. Then, in step 11, "YE
If it is determined to be “S”, it means that the receiving unit 6 has received the signal from the command unit 8. Therefore, in step 12, the time information included in this signal is taken out, and the time information at the current reception is the time. It is determined whether or not it is ahead of the time information at the previous reception stored in the memory 20. When it is determined to be "NO" in this step 12, when the time information is not ahead of the previous reception, that is, when the forged signal is received, or the signal from the other similar commander interferes. Since it is not necessary to check the encrypted ID code, the received signal is ignored and the process returns to step 11. On the other hand, when it is determined to be “YES” in the step 12, it is a normal case that the time information received in the step 11 is ahead of the time information at the time of the previous reception. Is determined.

If it is determined to be "NO" in this step 13, it means that the time information has not passed the predetermined time, so that the process proceeds to step 14 to select the cryptographic operation updated and stored last time. On the other hand, if "YES" is determined in the above step 13, since the time information in the received signal exceeds the predetermined time, the process proceeds to step 15, and in this step 15, the switching unit 24 follows the predetermined order. The cryptographic calculation is switched by, and in the next step 16, the newly selected cryptographic calculation is updated and stored.

Then, in step 17, the ID code encrypted based on the cryptographic operation selected in step 14 or step 16 is decrypted (decrypted), and in step 18, the ID of the response side is read from the ID memory 19. The code is read, and in step 19, the ID code on the command side and the ID code on the response side are collated to determine whether the two codes match.

If "NO" is determined in this step 19, it means that the signal is a forged signal or that the signal from another similar commander could be accidentally decoded. Therefore, the subsequent processing is performed. Without returning to step 11. On the other hand, when it is determined to be “YES” in step 19, the encrypted ID code in the command signal and the ID code set in the answering machine 5 match, so in step 20, the door lock mechanism 4 is instructed. A control signal is output to lock or unlock the door 2, and in step 21, the time information in the command signal received this time is updated and stored in the time memory 20. Here, in the step 19, it is described that the match or mismatch of both ID codes is determined. However, the present invention is not limited to this.
Whether the normal correspondence is established by setting a predetermined correspondence between the ID code on the commander 8 side and the ID code on the responder 5 side as in the case where the D code is in the complement relation. You may judge whether.

According to the present embodiment configured as described above, the following effects are obtained.

First, three types of cryptographic operations, f (t), g (t), and h (t), are provided for encrypting the ID code, and the three types are based on time information that changes with time. Due to the configuration of switching and using the cryptographic calculation of, the locking or unlocking mechanism can be changed at predetermined time intervals, making it difficult to forge the command signal of the command unit 8 and, in the unlikely event, the command signal was forged. Even in this case, since the counterfeit signal can be neutralized after a predetermined time, the antitheft property and the reliability can be always maintained and restored at a high level.

Secondly, since the cryptographic computation is switched based on the time information, the cryptographic computation can be continuously switched based on the constantly changing time information, and the command unit 8 can be used.
It is possible to easily maintain the reliability and the like of the system regardless of the operation.

Thirdly, the time information as time-dependent change information is measured only by the time measuring unit 8 of the command unit 8, and the time information measured by the time measuring unit 8 is stored in the time memory 20 and used on the responder 5 side. Due to the configuration, the entire structure can be simplified and the manufacturing cost can be reduced, and the "time lag" between the commander 8 side and the responder 5 side can be surely avoided, and a stable locking or unlocking operation can be performed. Can be obtained. That is, when the timers are provided on both sides as in the prior art, not only the parts cost and the assembly cost increase by the amount of the timers, but also the “time lag” between the two cannot be completely avoided. Some measures are required and the control structure becomes complicated. On the other hand, in the present embodiment, the response device 5 does not detect the time information and follows the time information detected by the command device 8, so that the overall structure is simplified and the reliability is enhanced.

Fourthly, on the responder 5 side, it is judged whether or not the time information in the signal received from the commander 8 is ahead of the time information at the time of the previous reception, and the current time information is advanced. The encrypted ID code can be decrypted only when it is in use, so that it is possible to make the command signal more difficult to counterfeit, and to prevent unnecessary decoding in the case of interference or counterfeit signals. It can save consumption.

Fifth, three types of cryptographic operations f (t), g
Since (t) and h (t) are switched in a predetermined order and used cyclically, it is possible to save the memory consumption of each of the cryptographic operation units 15 to 17 and 21 to 23. That is, for example,
The maximum useful life of the automobile 1 is set to 20 years, the cryptographic computation is switched every month, 240 types of cryptographic computations are registered in advance, and the cryptographic computations used once are configured not to be reused. However, this consumes a large amount of memory. However, in the present embodiment, since the cryptographic operations are cyclically switched and used, the memory consumption can be minimized. However, a configuration that uses a new cryptographic operation over the maximum product life described above is also included in the scope of the present invention.

Next, a second embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. In the following embodiments, the same components as those in the above-described first embodiment are denoted by the same reference numerals, and description thereof will be omitted. The feature of the present embodiment is that the number of times the commander is operated is used as the information that changes with time.

That is, FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the remote control device according to the present embodiment.
Like the transponder 5 described in the above-mentioned embodiment, is provided with the receiving unit 6, the response side computing unit 7, the ID memory 19, the respective cryptographic computation storage units 21 to 23, and the switching unit 24. Is connected to the door lock mechanism 4. However, the answering machine 31 is different from the above-described embodiment in that the time memory 20 is replaced with a counter memory 32 for storing counter information transmitted from a commanding machine 33 described later. .

On the other hand, the command unit 33, like the command unit 8 described in the above embodiment, has the casing 9 and the manual switch 1 as well.
0, transmitter 11, command side calculator 12, ID memory 13,
The cryptographic calculation storage units 15 to 17 and the switching unit 18 are provided. However, in the command unit 33, the number of times of operation of the manual switch 10 (command unit 3
3 is different from the above embodiment in that a counter 34 for counting the number of transmissions (3) is provided. That is, the counter 34 is incremented each time the manual switch 10 is operated, and stores the number of transmissions.

Next, the operation of the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 6 and 7. First, FIG. 6 shows a transmission process on the command device 33 side, and the same process as the transmission process described with reference to FIG. 3 is performed except that the number of operations (the number of transmissions) is used instead of the time information.

That is, in step 31, the manual switch 1
It is monitored whether 0 is operated, and when the manual switch 10 is operated, it is determined as "YES", and the counter 34 is advanced in step 32. Next, in step 33,
The ID code is read from the ID memory 13, and in step 34, the counter 3 which is advanced in step 32 is used.
It is determined whether the count value of 4 (counter information) has reached a preset number of times. This step 34
When it is determined to be “NO” in step 35, it means that the number of times the commander 33 has been operated has not reached the predetermined number.
Move to and select the cryptographic operation updated last time. Here, the predetermined number of times is determined in consideration of the frequency of use of the automobile 1, the anti-theft property, etc., similarly to the set value of the time information described in the first embodiment. On the other hand, in step 34, "Y
If it is determined to be “ES”, the number of operations of the command device 33 has reached a predetermined number, so the process proceeds to step 36, the cryptographic calculation is switched by the switching unit 18, and in step 37, the new switching is performed. The cryptographic operation is updated and stored.

Then, in step 38, the ID code is encrypted based on the cryptographic operation selected in step 35 or step 36, and in step 39, the counter information is added to the encrypted ID code and the transmission unit is added. 11
Send from.

Next, FIG. 7 shows a receiving process on the side of the responding device 31. In this receiving process as well, instead of the time information, the command device 33 is used.
The same processing as the response processing described above with reference to FIG. 4 is performed, except that the number of times of operations is used.

First, in step 41, it is monitored whether or not the receiving section 6 has received the command signal from the command device 33, and if it is received, it is determined to be "YES" and the process proceeds to step 42. In this step 42, it is determined whether or not the counter information (the number of operations) in the command signal is larger than the counter information at the previous reception stored in the counter memory 32. When it is determined to be “NO” in this step 42,
If the counter information has not advanced from the previous reception, that is, if a counterfeit command signal or a signal from another command machine is received, etc. Is ignored and the process returns to step 41.

On the other hand, if "YES" is determined in the above step 42, it means that the counter information is normal and is larger than that at the time of the previous reception. Therefore, the process proceeds to step 43. It is determined whether or not it has been reached. When it is judged "NO" in this step 43, the cryptographic operation selected last time is continuously used as it is in step 44, and "YE" is selected in step 43.
If it is determined to be "S", the cryptographic operation is switched in step 45, and this new cryptographic operation is updated and stored in step 46.

Next, in step 47, the above step 4
4 or the encrypted ID code in the command signal is decrypted based on the cryptographic operation selected in step 45. Then, in step 48, the ID code is read from the ID memory 19, and in step 49, it is determined whether or not the command side ID code and the response side ID code match, and if they match, “YES”. And moves to step 50. In step 50, a control signal requesting locking or unlocking is output to the door lock mechanism 4, and in step 51, counter information in the counter memory 32 is updated.

Also in this embodiment configured as described above,
It is possible to obtain substantially the same effects as those of the first embodiment described above. In addition to this, in this embodiment, since the number of times the commander 33 is operated is used as the time-dependent change information, it is possible to prevent the switching timing from being fixed and improve the anti-theft property. That is, when the time information is used, the cryptographic computation is regularly switched, for example, every 31 days. Therefore, if this switching cycle is known, the anti-theft property may be reduced, but When the cryptographic calculation is switched by, the switching timing becomes irregular, so that it becomes difficult to estimate the valid period of the imitation signal, and the antitheft property is enhanced. Note that both the time information and the number of operations may be used as the switching timing detection parameter (time-dependent change information), and the cryptographic computation may be switched when either one reaches a predetermined value.

Further, since the cryptographic calculation is switched based on the number of operations, it is not necessary to provide a timer as a time measuring means, the power consumption can be reduced, and the entire structure can be simplified to reduce the manufacturing cost. it can. That is,
When switching the cryptographic calculation based on the time information, it is necessary to separately provide a timer for measuring the time information in addition to the communication timer, which increases power consumption and complicates the structure. In a portable device such as the command device 33 used as a remote key, it is particularly required to prolong the battery life, so reducing the power consumption is an important effect.

Next, a third embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. In the present embodiment, the same components as those in the second embodiment are designated by the same reference numerals,
The description is omitted. The features of the present embodiment are that the switching signal for the cryptographic operation is forcibly output when the battery on the commander side is replaced, and that the responder side follows the cryptographic operation selected on the commander side. And the point.

That is, FIG. 8 is a block diagram of the remote control device according to the present embodiment, in which the responder 41 is the second device.
Similarly to the transponder 31 described in the embodiment,
An ID memory 19, encryption operation storage units 21 to 23, a switching unit 24, and a counter memory 32 are provided. However, as will be described later, the response side computing unit 42 of the responding machine 41 does not positively switch the cryptographic computation based on the counter information in the counter memory 32, but the commanding machine 4 which will be described later.
The difference is that the cryptographic computation is switched according to the cryptographic computation number included in the command signal from 3.

On the other hand, the command unit 43, like the command unit 33 described in the second embodiment, also includes the casing 9, the manual switch 10, the transmission unit 11, the command side calculation unit 12, the ID memory 13, and the ciphers. The calculation switching units 15 to 17, the switching unit 18, and the counter 34 are provided. In addition to this, this commander 4
3 monitors whether or not a battery (not shown) as a power source detachably mounted in the casing 9 is taken out, and when battery replacement is detected, a cryptographic calculation is performed to the command side calculation unit 12. The difference is that a forced switching signal generation unit (indicated as “switching signal generation unit” in the drawing) 44 for outputting a forced switching signal for forcibly switching is provided. The battery as the “power source” may be any type of manganese battery, alkaline battery, lithium battery, etc.
Further, the shape thereof may be any of film type, button type, tubular type and the like.

Next, the operation of this embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 9 and 10. First, FIG. 9 shows the transmission process on the command device 43 side. In step 61, the forced switching signal generation unit 44 monitors the replacement of the battery (whether or not the battery is set), and the battery is newly replaced. If it is set, it is determined to be "YES", and the process proceeds to step 62, where a forced switching signal for requesting switching of the cryptographic operation is generated. Therefore, by replacing the battery, the cryptographic operation number is forcibly switched, such as resetting the cryptographic operation number to the initial value.

Here, the cryptographic operation number is a number for specifying the cryptographic operation currently in use, for example,
The number 1 is set in advance in the first cryptographic operation storage unit 15, the number 2 is set in the second cryptographic operation storage unit 16, and the number 3 is set in the third cryptographic operation storage unit 17, It can be expressed as "a selection number for selecting an encryption method".

The reason why the cryptographic operation number is switched regardless of the size of the counter value when the battery is replaced is to allow the user to easily switch the cryptographic operation at any time. This allows the user to easily switch the cryptographic calculation without waiting for the progress of the counter information (or waiting for the elapse of time) when the false commander may be manufactured. Then, after the cryptographic calculation is forcibly switched in step 62 (for example, after resetting to an initial value), the information of the forced switching is stored in step 63.

Next, at step 64, the manual switch 1
It is determined whether 0 has been operated, and if the manual switch 10 has been operated, the ID code is read from the ID memory 13 in step 65.

Then, in step 66, it is determined whether or not the counter information has reached a predetermined number of times, and if it has not reached the predetermined number of times, it is determined to be "NO", the process proceeds to step 67, and it is updated last time. Select cryptographic operation. Here, when the cryptographic calculation is switched in step 62,
The cryptographic operation forcibly switched is selected. On the other hand, if "YES" is determined in the above step 66, it means that the counter information has reached a predetermined number of times, and therefore, in step 68, the cryptographic calculation is switched through the switching section 18, and in step 69, this new encryption operation is switched. The cryptographic operation is updated and stored.

Then, in step 70, the ID code is encrypted based on the cryptographic operation selected in step 67 or step 68. Next, in step 71, it is determined whether or not the forced switching of the cryptographic calculation has just been performed by referring to the switching information stored in step 63, and if the forced switching has been performed, the step is performed. At 72, a forced switching signal (reset signal) is output to notify the transponder 41 that the forced cryptographic switching has been performed, and at step 73, the forced switching information is erased.

Then, in step 74, as shown in, for example, the following equation 4, the counter information and the cryptographic operation number (the case of 1 is illustrated) are added to the ID code encrypted in step 70 and transmitted. .

[0075]

## EQU00004 ## C _N , C _N-1 , ... C ₁ , A ₇ , A ₆ , ... A ₁ , 1 After the transmission of the encrypted ID code is completed, in step 75, the counter 34 is incremented, and in step 76. Then, it is determined whether or not the battery is removed. If the battery is taken out, step 76 determines "YES" and the process ends.

Next, FIG. 10 shows the receiving process on the side of the responder 41. In step 81, it is monitored whether or not a command signal from the commander 43 is received, and if it is received, "YES".
Then, the process proceeds to step 82. Here, as a result of the battery replacement in the command device 43, when the forced switching signal is received in step 81, the processes of step 82 and step 83 described later are not performed.

Next, at step 82, it is judged whether or not the counter information in the command signal received this time is larger than the counter information at the time of the previous reception. In this step 82, "N
When it is determined to be “O”, it is an imitation signal or another commander 4 of the same type.
If the signal from 1 is received and it is abnormal, the process returns to step 81. On the other hand, if it is determined to be “YES” in step 82, it means that the counter information at the time of this time reception is larger than that at the time of the last time reception. Therefore, the process proceeds to step 83, and the cryptographic operation number in the command signal is predetermined. It is determined whether or not the switching order is met. That is, the answering machine 41 is provided with a history memory (not shown) that stores cryptographic operation numbers at the time of past reception. For example, the predetermined switching order is "1".
"→ 2 → 3 → 1 ...", the contents of the history memory are referenced to determine whether or not the cryptographic operation number received this time matches a predetermined switching order. However, since the same cryptographic operation number is continuously used until the counter information reaches a predetermined number of times, until it is switched,
It is determined whether or not the cryptographic operation number has changed.

If the two switching orders do not match, it is an improper imitation signal or an abnormal reception of another command signal. Therefore, step 83 is judged as "NO" and the subsequent processing is performed. The process returns to step 81 without performing the above. on the other hand,
If the switching order is the same, it means that it is normal. Then, the process proceeds to step 84 to select the cryptographic operation storage unit having the same number as the cryptographic operation number specified in the command signal, and the encryption operation is performed based on this cryptographic operation. The encrypted ID code is decrypted.

Next, at step 85, the ID memory 19
The ID code is read from, and in step 86, it is determined whether the ID code on the response side and the decoded ID code on the command side match. If the two codes match, the determination at step 86 is "YES",
Moving to step 87, in this step 87, a control signal is output to the door lock mechanism 4, and in the next step 88,
The counter information and the cryptographic operation number are stored.

In this embodiment configured as described above,
It is possible to obtain substantially the same effect as that of the second embodiment. In addition to this, the present embodiment has the following effects.

First, the responding device 41 is configured to decode the encrypted ID code in accordance with the cryptographic operation number designated by the command device 43, and therefore determines whether the counter information is a predetermined number of times or more. The processing can be made unnecessary and the control processing can be simplified.

Second, the command unit 43 switches and selects the cryptographic calculation according to a predetermined switching order, and the responding unit 41 determines whether or not the cryptographic calculation number in the received signal matches the predetermined switching order. Therefore, it is possible to determine whether or not the command signal from the command device 43 is legitimate, and it is possible to significantly improve the anti-theft property and the reliability.

Thirdly, when the battery is replaced by the command unit 43, the cryptographic calculation is forcibly switched, so that the user does not have to wait for the counter information to progress, but at the desired arbitrary time The calculation can be easily switched manually. Therefore, for example, when a theft accident caused by a false command machine occurs around the user, regardless of whether or not the battery has reached the end of life, the cryptographic calculation is forced by taking out the battery once and setting it again. It is possible to prevent theft and the like in advance.

In the present embodiment, the case in which the cryptographic operation is forcibly switched by detecting the replacement of the battery has been described as an example, but the present invention is not limited to this.
Alternatively, a changeover switch may be separately provided, or the cryptographic calculation may be changed over by turning on / off the manual switch 10 in a predetermined pattern. However, when the cryptographic calculation is switched by monitoring the battery replacement, there is an advantageous effect that the structure can be simplified and the manufacturing cost can be reduced as compared with the case where a separate switch is provided.
Further, the case where the cryptographic operation number is reset and returned to the initial value at the time of battery replacement has been described as an example, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, when selecting the previous cryptographic operation number, etc.
Various changes are possible.

Next, a fourth embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. The features of this embodiment are:
Two-way communication is performed between the command device and the response device to determine whether the identification code is a proper identification code, and the state information of the automobile 1 is used as the time-dependent change information.

That is, FIG. 11 is a block diagram of the remote control device according to the present embodiment, in which the responding device 51 has the receiving unit 6 and the respective cryptographic operation storage units 21 in the same manner as described in the above embodiments. 23 and a switching unit 24. In addition to this, the responder 51 includes a transmitter 52 that transmits a response signal to a commander 58 described later, and an ID ₁ memory 53 that stores a _first ID (hereinafter abbreviated as “ID ₁ ”) code. , A second ID (hereinafter abbreviated as “ID ₂ ”) code I
A D ₂ memory 54, a state detection unit 55 that detects preset state information of the automobile 1, and a state counter 56 that stores this state information are provided, and bidirectional communication is performed with a commander 58. It is like this.

Here, the state information of the automobile 1 is an example of change information over time. Specifically, for example, the number of times the ignition switch is operated, the number of times the door 2 is opened and closed,
It means state information that changes with time, such as the mileage of the automobile 1, the number of times the winker lamp has been activated, the number of times that the brake has been activated, and the like "state information that changes with time in relation to the controlled object" or "controlled object". Alternatively, it can be expressed as "state information that changes with time in relation to an object related to the controlled object".

On the other hand, the command unit 58 includes the casing 9, the manual switch 10, the transmission unit 11, and the cryptographic operation storage units 15 to 1.
7, a command side calculation unit 63 and a switching unit 18. In addition, the instruction unit 58 includes a receiving unit 59 for receiving a response signal from the responder 51, the ID ₁ memory 60 which stores on ID ₁ code, ID storing ID ₂ Code ₂
A memory 61 and a state memory 62 for storing the state information in the response signal are provided.

That is, in the present embodiment, since the switching of the cryptographic calculation is determined based on the state information of the automobile 1, the switching of the cryptographic computation is determined by the transponder 51 provided on the side of the automobile 1, and this determination is made. The command device 58 is informed by a response signal.

Next, the operation of the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. First, FIG. 12 shows the processing on the commander 58 side. In step 91, it is determined whether or not the manual switch 91 is operated, and if it is operated, “YES”.
Then, in step 92, the ID ₁ code is transmitted without being encrypted. When the ID ₁ code is collated and confirmed by the responder 51, the responder 51 detects that the vehicle 1
The cryptographic operation number determined according to the state of is transmitted as a response signal. Therefore, in step 93, this answering machine 51
After receiving the response signal from the receiving unit 59, it is determined whether or not the cryptographic operation number designated by this response signal follows a predetermined switching order. Then, the process proceeds to step 95.

In step 95, the cryptographic calculation storage unit having the designated cryptographic calculation is connected through the switching unit 18 and the cryptographic calculation is set. Then, in step 96, ID ₂ is encrypted based on the set cryptographic calculation,
In step 97, the encrypted ID ₂ is sent to the transmitter 11
Then, in step 98, the cryptographic calculation set in step 95 is updated and stored.

Next, FIG. 13 shows the processing of the answering machine 51. First, in step 100, the number of times the ignition switch has been operated, the distance traveled, the number of times the door 2 has been opened and closed, etc. of the automobile 1 via the state detecting section 55. Detect state information. Here, the state information, it is sufficient to detect any one of the exemplified, but a plurality of types of state information is detected, as described later, when any of the state information reaches a predetermined value, It may be configured to switch the cryptographic calculation.

Next, in step 101, it is judged whether or not the state information detected in step 100 has reached a predetermined value set in advance. "NO" in this step 101
If it is determined that the value of the state information has not reached the predetermined value, the process proceeds to step 102 and the cryptographic operation used last time is continuously selected. On the other hand, if "YES" is determined in the above step 101, it means that the cryptographic operation switching time has come, so the process moves to step 103 to reset the state counter 56, and in step 104, the cryptographic operation is performed according to a predetermined switching order. And a new cryptographic operation is updated and stored in step 105.

Then, in step 106, the commander 58
Performs reception waiting for a signal from, ID ₁ from the command machine 58
When the code signal is received, it is determined to be "YES" and the process proceeds to step 107. In step 107, the ID ₁ read on ID ₁ code from the memory 53, step 108, ID of the transponder 51 with ID ₁ code from the command unit 58 ₁
It is determined whether the code matches. This step 1
If “YES” is determined in 08, it is a normal case where both codes match, so the process proceeds to step 109, and the encryption operation number selected in step 102 or step 105 is instructed from the transmission unit 52 as a response signal. Machine 58.

Then, in step 110, the ID ₂ code encrypted based on the encryption operation number transmitted in step 109 is waited for from the command device 58, and the encrypted ID ₂ code is received. If you do "Y
ES ", the process proceeds to step 111, and the encrypted ID ₂ is decrypted based on the cryptographic operation designated by the user in step 102 or step 104.

Next, in step 112, the ID ₂ code is read from the ID ₂ memory 54, and in step 113,
Determines whether the ID ₂ code stored matches the ID ₂ code and transponder 51 from the command device 58. If it is determined to be “YES” in this step 113, it means that both codes match each other, so that the process proceeds to step 114,
A control signal is output to the door lock mechanism 4, and a cryptographic operation number is stored in a processing step (not shown). On the other hand, if it is determined to be "NO" in step 113, it means that both ID2 do not match, so the process returns to step 100.

Although the case where the encryption is performed only by the cryptographic operation is illustrated, the present invention is not limited to this, and a random number is added to the response signal transmitted in step 109, and the ID ₂ code is obtained by both the random number and the cryptographic operation. It may be configured to perform encryption. In addition, the status information is added to the response signal, and the command device 58
The side may store the state information, and the cryptographic operation may be selected based on this state information. In this case, it is not necessary to transmit the cryptographic operation number.

Also in the present embodiment configured as described above,
Since the cryptographic calculation is switched and selected based on the state information of the automobile 1 that changes with time, the same effects as those of the above-described respective embodiments can be obtained, and the following effects are also exhibited.

First, the identification code required to operate the door lock mechanism 4 as a controlled object is divided into an ID ₁ code and an ID ₂ code, and both the commander 58 and the responder 51 are operated. Since the ID ₂ code is encrypted and transmitted only when the ID ₁ code transmitted earlier matches by performing the destination communication, unless the ID ₁ code as well as the ID ₂ code is obtained. , Imitation signals cannot be generated, and the anti-theft property is significantly improved.

Secondly, the counter information described in the second embodiment is used because the configuration determines the switching timing of the cryptographic calculation based on the state information of the automobile 1 as the time-dependent change information. Similarly, it is possible to improve the anti-theft property and the reliability by making the switching time of the cryptographic operation irregular. Furthermore, this status information has the characteristic that it is generated only on the automobile 1 side, and based on this status information, the answering machine 51 is exclusively used.
Since the cryptographic calculation is designated on the side, it becomes necessary to investigate the answering machine 51 fixed in the automobile 1 in order to create the imitation signal, and the anti-theft property can be further improved.

In each of the above embodiments, the case where the invention is applied to the door lock system for an automobile is illustrated, and the door lock mechanism 4 is mentioned as the control target. However, the invention is not limited to this, and for example, home electric appliances, machine tools, etc. It can also be applied to other items requiring anti-theft property.

Further, the step of monitoring the switching order of cryptographic operations can be applied to the first and second embodiments.

Similarly, the configuration for monitoring the battery replacement and forcibly switching the cryptographic operation can be easily applied to other embodiments.

Further, since the flow charts of the respective processes simply show the main parts thereof, for example, when an error such as a discrepancy between identification codes continues for a predetermined number of times or more, the reception standby state is released and a fixed time is passed. Those skilled in the art can make various improvements, additions, and changes such as rejecting reception during the period, issuing an error message or an alarm, and the like.

In the fourth embodiment, the case where the identification code is divided into two has been described as an example. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and the identification codes are the same when divided into three and four, for example. Those skilled in the art can easily conceive of a configuration for outputting a control signal only in such a case.

In each of the above-mentioned embodiments, steps 1, 12, 32, 42, 75, 82 and 100 are specific examples of "time change information detecting means". Also, step 6,
15, 36, 45, 68, 95, 104 are "selection means"
Is a specific example. Further, steps 8, 38, 70, 9
6 is a specific example of "encryption signal generation means". Further, steps 17, 47, 84 and 111 are specific examples of the "decoding means". Further, steps 20, 50, 87, 11
4 is a specific example of "control signal output means", steps 83 and 9
Reference numeral 4 shows a specific example of the "switching order monitoring means". Further, the step 62 is a specific example of "forced switching signal generating means".

[0107]

As described above in detail, the first aspect of the present invention,
According to the remote operation device or the remote operation method according to claim 2, claim 6, and claim 8, since the encryption method is switched by the time-dependent change information that changes with the passage of time,
Even if the commander is imitated at a certain point in time, it is possible to disable this fake commander at the time when it is switched to another encryption method based on the change information over time. The reliability and anti-theft property of the device can be restored and maintained.

According to the third aspect, the identification code necessary for driving the control signal output means is divided into the first identification code and the second identification code, and the second identification code is used. Is encrypted by an encryption method that can be switched based on time-varying information, so that it is possible to further improve anti-theft property and reliability.

Further, according to the fourth aspect, even if an imitation command device in which all the plural kinds of encryption methods stored in the regular command device are duplicated is manufactured, the switching order may be different. For example, the controlled device cannot be operated by the transponder, so that the antitheft property and the reliability can be further enhanced.

According to the fifth aspect of the present invention, it is sufficient to actually detect the time-dependent change information by only one of the time-dependent change information detecting means of the command device or the response device, and the other of the means.
Since the detected value is indirectly detected as its own detected value, it is possible to reliably prevent the time-dependent change information from being deviated between the command device and the responder while simplifying the entire structure. .

Further, according to the seventh aspect, since the cryptographic computation can be forcibly switched by the compulsory switching signal generating means, the user can easily switch the cryptographic computation at an arbitrary point of time, so that the antitheft can be further prevented. It is possible to improve the property.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a configuration explanatory diagram showing an overall configuration of a vehicle door lock device to which a remote control device according to a first embodiment of the present invention is applied.

FIG. 2 is a specific block configuration diagram of a command device and a response device.

FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing a transmission process by a command device.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing a receiving process by a transponder.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a remote control device according to a second embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing a transmission process by a command device.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing a receiving process by a transponder.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram of a remote control device according to a third embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing a transmission process by a command device.

FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing a receiving process performed by a transponder.

FIG. 11 is a block diagram of a remote control device according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing processing by a command device.

FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing processing by a responder.

[Explanation of symbols]

1 ... Automobile 2 ... Door 4 ... Door lock mechanism (control target) 5,31,41,51 ... Responder 8,33,43,58 ... Commander ID, ID ₁ , ID ₂ ... Identification code

Claims (8)

[Claims] 1. A command device that encrypts and transmits a predetermined identification code, and an identification code from this command device is decrypted and collated, and when it is determined that it is a proper identification code, a control signal is output to a control target. And a response device for performing a predetermined operation, the remote control device having a plurality of encryption methods for encrypting the identification code, and the plurality of encryption methods based on time-dependent change information that changes over time. A remote control device characterized by switching and using different types of encryption methods. 2. A command device for encrypting and transmitting a predetermined identification code and an identification code from this command device are decrypted and collated, and when it is determined to be a proper identification code, a control signal is output to a control target. A remote control device having a response device for performing a predetermined operation, wherein the command device is a change-over-time information detecting unit for detecting change-over-time information that changes over time, and a plurality of pre-registered types. Selection means for selecting a specific encryption method from the encryption methods based on the temporal change information, and encryption signal generation for converting an identification code into an encrypted signal based on the selected specific encryption method And a transmitting means for transmitting the encrypted signal to the responding device, wherein the responding device receives the encrypted signal from the transmitting device, and the time-dependent change information. To detect Time change information detecting means, selecting means for selecting a specific encryption method from the plurality of types of encryption methods registered in advance based on the time change information, and the selected specific encryption method. Decoding means for decoding the encrypted signal based on the above, collating means for collating whether or not the decrypted identification code is a regular identification code, and a regular identification code by this collating means A remote control device comprising: a control signal output means for outputting a control signal to a controlled object to perform a predetermined operation when it is determined. 3. When the responder determines that the identification code of the commander is a proper identification code by transmitting and receiving a signal wave between the commander and the responder, the responder becomes a control target. A remote operation device that outputs a control signal to perform a predetermined operation, wherein the command device changes with time with a first transmission unit that transmits a first identification code toward the responding device. A temporal change information detecting means for detecting temporal change information, a selecting means for selecting a specific encryption method from a plurality of types of pre-registered encryption methods based on the temporal change information, and the selected identification Encrypted signal generating means for converting an identification code into an encrypted signal based on the above encryption method, and a second step of transmitting the encrypted signal to the transponder when a response signal from the transponder is received And a transmission means of The transponder determines first receiving means for receiving the first identification code from the first transmitting means, and whether or not the received first identification code is a proper identification code. A first collating means, a response signal transmitting means for transmitting a response signal to the command device when the first collating means determines that the identification code is legitimate, and the second transmission by the response signal. Second receiving means for receiving the encrypted signal transmitted from the means, time-dependent change information detecting means for detecting the time-dependent change information, and the time-dependent change information from among a plurality of pre-registered encryption methods. Selection means for selecting a specific encryption method based on the above, decryption means for decoding the encrypted signal based on the selected specific encryption method, and the decrypted identification code It is an identification code Second collating means for collating whether or not there is a control signal output means for outputting a control signal to a controlled object to perform a predetermined operation when the second collating means determines that the code is a proper identification code. A remote control device comprising: 4. The selection means includes a switching order monitoring means for selecting a plurality of types of pre-registered encryption methods according to a predetermined switching order and monitoring the progress of the predetermined switching order. The remote control device according to claim 2 or claim 3. 5. The time-dependent change information detected by the time-dependent change information detecting means of either the command device or the responder is notified to the other time-dependent change information detecting means, and the other time-dependent change information detecting means is provided. The remote operation device according to claim 2, wherein the time-dependent change information is indirectly detected based on the notified time-dependent change information. 6. The remote control device according to claim 1, wherein at least one of time information and the number of operations of the commander is used as the time-dependent change information. 7. The commanding device is provided with a compulsory switching signal generating means, and the plural kinds of encryption methods are switched by a switching signal generated by the compulsory switching signal generating means. 7. The remote control device according to any one of 6. 8. A transmitting step, comprising a command device and a responding device, for encrypting a predetermined identification code and transmitting it to the responding device, a decoding step for decrypting this encrypted identification code, and this decoding A collating step of collating the identified identification code to determine whether it is a regular identification code, and a control for outputting a control signal to a control target to perform a predetermined operation when it is determined to be a regular identification code. A remote operation method having a signal output step, wherein a time-dependent change information detecting step of detecting time-dependent change information that changes with time and a plurality of types of pre-registered encryption methods are switched based on the time-dependent change information. A remote operation method comprising a switching selection step of selecting.