JP6279182B1 - Multi-car elevator safety control device and safety control method - Google Patents

Abstract

In a safety control device for a multi-car elevator in which a plurality of cars travel on a hoistway, a car position speed measuring device that measures the position and speed of each of the plurality of cars and the opening of a plurality of landing doors on the hoistway are independently provided. When one of the landing doors is opened according to the signals from each of the multiple landing door switches detected, maintenance is performed if the opened floor is the lowest floor and there is no cage in the pit entry area for maintenance. Detecting pit entry, if the opened floor is a floor other than the lowest floor, and if there is a car in the accessible area on the cage when the door is opened, the entry on the car at the time of maintenance is detected. In cases other than the above, when there is no car on the opened floor, the door-open running is detected, and the automatic operation of the car is disabled or the car is stopped.

Description

  The present invention relates to control of a multi-car elevator in which a plurality of cars travels on one hoistway, and more particularly to a safety control device and safety control for a multi-car elevator for protecting the safety of maintenance personnel in a hoistway or the like. It is about the method.

  In recent elevators, there are multi-car elevators in which a plurality of cars travel in the same hoistway. In addition, various devices are installed in the hoistway, and at the time of maintenance of elevator equipment, the frequency of maintenance personnel entering the hoistway and performing maintenance work is increasing.

  For example, when the hoisting machine and the control device are installed in the upper part of the hoistway, the maintenance staff gets on the car and performs maintenance work on the hoisting machine and the control device. In addition, when maintaining the landing door device and various hoistway switches, maintenance personnel get on the car to perform maintenance work. Further, when the hoisting machine and the control device are installed in the lower part of the hoistway, the maintenance staff enters the hoistway pit and performs maintenance work for the hoisting machine and the control device.

  When maintenance personnel enter the pit to perform maintenance work, or get on the car to perform maintenance work, care must be taken that the car travels unexpectedly.

  For example, in a double car elevator that is a conventional multi-car elevator disclosed in Patent Document 1 below, by operating a maintenance operation switch, one car is temporarily put into a resting state, and the other car is retracted to the end of the hoistway. Therefore, maintenance was performed by releasing the hibernation state of one of the cars and enabling maintenance operation.

JP 2003-341951 A

  In the conventional apparatus as described above, when the maintenance staff forgets to operate the switch, the automatic operation of the car may continue during the maintenance work of the elevator.

  The present invention has been made in order to solve the above-described problems. In a multi-car elevator, a multi-car elevator that can reliably detect the movement of a maintenance worker to a hoistway and perform appropriate maintenance operation. It is an object to obtain a safety control device and a safety control method for a car elevator.

The present invention relates to a multi-car elevator in which a plurality of cars travel on one hoistway, a car position / speed measuring device for measuring the position and speed of each of the plurality of cars, and opening of a plurality of landing doors of the hoistway. A safety control processing device that performs safety control in accordance with signals from the car position speed measuring device and the number of landing door switches. When any of the landing doors is opened, the device detects the entrance of the pit during maintenance if the opened floor is not at the maintenance floor pit entry area at the lowest floor, and the floor is opened. Is a floor other than the lowest floor, and if there is a car in the maintenance-accessible area of the opened floor, the entry to the floor during maintenance will be detected. If there is no Detecting the line, respectively stops the invalidation or basket automatic operation of the car, the safety control processor, has, when the safety control processing unit, detects the maintenance time on-car enters, boarded subject car If the car is in the uppermost car, the automatic operation of the uppermost car is invalidated, and when the uppermost car enters the preset overhead work entry prohibition zone, the uppermost car is stopped to reverse the overhead direction. When the top car escapes from the overhead entry prohibition zone, it is allowed to travel in both directions, and when the target car is not the top car, the target car and the top car Automatic operation is disabled, and the target car and the upper car are predetermined above the upper end of the target car or below the lower end of the upper car. When entering the entry prohibition zone when working between cars up to a certain distance, the target car and the immediately above car are stopped and allowed to run only in directions away from each other, and the target car and the immediately above car are In a safety control device for a multi-car elevator that includes an on -car entry control unit that permits traveling in both directions when exiting the interworking entry prohibition zone .

  In the present invention, even in the case of a multi-car elevator in which a plurality of cars travel on the same hoistway, the movement of the maintenance staff to the hoistway can be detected more reliably, and appropriate maintenance operation can be performed. .

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS It is a figure which shows schematic structure of the multi-car elevator provided with the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by this invention. It is a block diagram which shows an example of a structure of the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the process of the whole safety control process of the safety control processing apparatus of the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the safety control mode determination process of the safety control processing apparatus by Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the control processing of the normal monitoring mode of the safety control processing apparatus by Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the control processing of the pit approach detection mode of the safety control processing apparatus by Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the control processing of the on-the-car approach detection mode of the safety control processing apparatus by Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the control processing of the door open travel detection mode of the safety control processing apparatus by Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the return process to the automatic driving | operation of the safety control processing apparatus by Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows an example of a structure of the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by Embodiment 2 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the whole process of the safety control of the safety control processing apparatus of the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by Embodiment 2 of this invention. It is a figure which shows an example of a structure of the driving | operation command output part of the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by this invention. It is a figure which shows schematic structure of the computer at the time of comprising the arithmetic processing part of the safety control processing apparatus of the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by this invention with a computer. It is a functional block diagram of an example of the arithmetic processing part of the safety control processing apparatus of the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by this invention. It is a figure for demonstrating each area | region along the hoistway used with the safety control apparatus of the multi-car elevator by this invention.

  Hereinafter, a safety control device and a safety control method for a multicar elevator according to the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings according to each embodiment. In each embodiment, the same or corresponding parts are denoted by the same reference numerals, and redundant description is omitted.

Embodiment 1 FIG.
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of a multi-car elevator provided with a multi-car elevator safety control device according to the present invention. FIG. 1 (a) shows the overall configuration of the multi-car elevator, and FIG. 1 (b) shows the configuration of one car and one hoisting machine. In FIG. 1 (a), a plurality of cars 2a, 2b exist in the hoistway 1, and a hoisting machine 5 is installed for each car 2a, 2b in the machine room 3a above the hoistway. . FIG. 1A is a configuration diagram of a so-called double car elevator in which two cars 2a and 2b move, but there may be three or more cars.

  As shown in FIG. 1B, one hoisting machine 5 includes a driving sheave 5a, a hoisting machine motor 5b that rotates the driving sheave 5a, and a hoisting machine brake 5c that brakes the rotation of the driving sheave 5a. And have. Suspension means 6 is wound around the drive sheave 5a. As the suspension means 6, a plurality of ropes or a plurality of belts are used. The cars 2 a and 2 b and the counterweight 7 are suspended in the hoistway 1 by the suspension means 6 and are lifted and lowered by the hoisting machine 5.

  Further, in each of the cars 2a and 2b, a governor rope 8b is installed in the entire hoistway through the governor sheave 8a separately from the suspension means 6 described above, and a part of the governor rope 8b is fixed to the car 2a. . As the car moves in the hoistway 1, the governor sheave 8 a rotates and transmits the rotation to the governor 8.

  The hoisting machine 5 or the speed governor 8 is provided with an encoder that outputs a pulse waveform according to the rotation angle. FIG. 1B shows an encoder 8c provided in the governor 8, for example. The encoder 8c can measure the position and speed of each car. In addition to the encoder, an optical sensor, a magnetic sensor, a radio wave sensor that measures using a radio wave, or the like that installs and reads a code in the entire hoistway may be used. Detection signals from these encoders or various sensors are input to an elevator control device 4 to be described later.

  In the upper part of the hoistway 1 or the machine room 3a, an elevator control device 4 shown as a control panel for controlling the hoisting machine 5 is installed. The elevator control device includes an operation control device 4A that controls the operation of each car, and a safety control device 4B.

  The operation mode of the car by the operation control device 4A includes an automatic operation mode that is a normal operation mode that responds to calls from the landing and the car, and a maintenance operation mode that is a manual operation mode. The safety control device 4B can instruct and set the operation mode to the operation control device.

  The hall entrance / exit on each floor is opened and closed by a hall door 9a. By opening the landing door on the lowest floor, the maintenance staff can move to the pit 3b, which is the lowest part of the hoistway 1. Further, by opening the landing doors other than the lowest floor, it becomes possible for the maintenance staff to move to a car stopped below that floor.

  A landing door switch 9b for detecting the opening state of the landing door is provided on the landing door 9a of each floor. These landing door switches 9b are provided as standard in a general elevator apparatus.

  The detection signals of the landing door switches 9b are independently input to the elevator control device 4. The floors described below are not only the floor where the car stops during normal operation, but also all floors where the car stops and people can get on and off, such as floors with emergency exits and work doors. Refers to that.

  The lowest floor hall is provided with a first reset switch RS1 for resetting the switching of the operation mode to return the operation mode to the automatic operation mode. A landing on a predetermined floor other than the lowest floor is also provided with a second reset switch RS2 for resetting the operation mode and returning the operation mode to the automatic operation mode. In FIG. 1A, the second reset switch RS2 is shown on the second floor as a representative. Detection signals of the first and second reset switches RS1 and RS2 are input to the elevator control device 4. The reset switch RS is provided in each landing 9, the pit 3b, the machine room 3a, and the like.

  The car entrance is opened and closed by a car door 2d provided before and after the cars 2a and 2b. When the car lands in the door zone during normal operation, the car door 2d engages with the landing door 9a on that floor. Thereby, the landing door 9a is opened and closed in conjunction with the car door 2d.

At least one place in each car 2a, 2b and on the car, landing 9, pit 3b, machine room 3a is provided with an operation mode changeover switch and a manual operation button for manually operating the car. The maintenance staff can manually operate the car switched to the manual operation mode which is the maintenance operation mode. The operation mode changeover switch changes the operation mode, and the manual operation button gives an instruction for operations such as running, stopping, raising and lowering the car.
In FIG. 1A, the operation mode changeover switch and the manual operation button are collectively shown as a manual operation operator MO provided at the hall 9 on the lowermost floor.

  At this time, in order to operate the apparatus arranged in the hoistway, the maintenance person artificially opens the landing door 9a and enters the hoistway.

The safety control device 4B measures the car position of each car 2a, 2b according to the detection signal from the encoder 8c, and detects the opening / closing of the landing door 9a according to the detection signal from the landing door switch 9b. Then, when any of the landing doors 9a is opened, it is determined whether or not there is a car near the landing zone on the floor of the landing door that has been opened. A pit entry is detected if the floor that is opened is the lowest floor that is the pit entry floor, and if there is no car in the preset maintenance available pit entry area where maintenance personnel can enter the pit.
The maintenance possible pit entry area is an area from the bottom surface of the pit or the lowest floor landing position to the upper set distance indicated by A1 and A2 in FIG. And, for example, if the bottom or floor surface of the lowest end of the car is not applied to the maintenance possible pit entry area, the pit entry is detected.
In addition, the floor of the landing door that is opened is one of the floors other than the lowest floor, and there is no car on the opened floor. If there is any car within the preset maintenance possible area on the car that can be boarded above, the entry on the car is detected. That is, for example, if the ceiling surface of any of the cars is within the maintenance possible entry area indicated by B1 and B2 in FIG. B1 indicates a car ceiling surface reference area indicating the upper set distance from the car ceiling surface, and B2 indicates a floor reference area indicating an area between the floor position and the upper and lower set distances.
And each disables automatic driving.
In cases other than the above, if there is no car in the landing zone of the floor of the landing door that has been opened while detecting the opening of one of the landing doors, it will detect the opening of the door and stop all the cars in an emergency stop Let

  In addition, when the automatic operation is once invalidated or when the door operation is detected and the emergency stop is performed, the safety control device has the first reset switch RS1 or the second reset switch RS2 outside the hoistway as maintenance personnel. The automatic operation is continuously disabled until the reset signal is received and all the landing doors 9a and the car doors 2d are confirmed to be fully closed. In addition, when the power is reset due to a power failure or the like, automatic operation is disabled for safety.

  When automatic operation of the elevator is invalidated by the safety control device, the maintenance staff switches the operation mode to the maintenance operation mode by the operation mode switch provided in the manual operation controller MO for the maintenance operation or the inspection operation. Similarly, the car can be manually operated by a manual operation button provided on the manual operation controller MO.

During manual operation, the range of movement of the car is limited. In particular,
For example, entering the pit work entry prohibition zone Z1 shown in FIG. 1 (a), which is from the bottom surface of the pit 3b to a predetermined set distance above the bottom car,
Entering into the overhead work entry prohibition zone Z2, which is from the upper upper end of the hoistway 1 relating to the uppermost car, that is, from the upper upper end of the ceiling surface to a predetermined set distance below,
The distance between adjacent cars, from the upper end of the car during work on the car to a predetermined set distance above or from the lower end of the car immediately above the car to the predetermined set distance below. Entry into the work entry prohibition zone Z3 is prohibited. The lower Z3 in FIG. 1 is the entry prohibition zone for the car directly above the former, and the upper Z3 is the entry prohibition zone for the latter car to be loaded.

  Further, the cars 2a and 2b further detect marks (not shown) indicating the landing zones of the respective floors provided in the hoistway 1 to detect that the car is in a predetermined landing zone. A floor sensor 2c is provided for each.

  And each of two encoders 8c and two landing sensors 2ca, 2cb and two manual operation controllers MO for the cars 2a, 2b, a reset reset switch RS, and a plurality of landing door switches 9b for each floor The signals are independently input to the elevator controller 4.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of the multi-car elevator safety control device according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. In the safety control device 4B, as shown by the first and second control processing units 42a and 42b that perform the same processing in FIG. 2, the processing system is duplicated in order to ensure sufficient reliability of the safety control. It may be made redundant.
Signals from the respective encoders (1) 8ca and encoder (2) 8cb for the two cars 2a and 2b are sent to the first control processing unit 42a and the second control processing unit 42b via the encoder input unit 41a. Are respectively input to both.
Signals from the reciprocal landing door switch 9b for each landing, the two landing sensors (1) 2ca, and the landing sensors (2) 2cb for the two cars 2a and 2b are input to a switch / sensor input unit. The data is input to both the first control processing unit 42a and the second control processing unit 42b via 41b.
Signals from the respective manual operation controllers (1) MOa and manual operation controllers (2) MOb, and the reset reset switch RS for the two cars 2a and 2b are sent via the manual operation input unit 41c. It is input to both the first control processing unit 42a and the second control processing unit 42b.
At this time, the input signals from the encoders 8ca and 8cb, the landing door switches 9b and the landing sensors 2ca and 2cb are also duplicated and compared with each other in the first control processing unit 42a and the second control processing unit 42b. The The encoders (8ca, 8cb), landing sensors (2ca, 2cb), and manual operation controllers (MOa, MO2) are installed for each car, and are input to the safety control device 4B by the number of cars.

  The first and second control processing units 42a and 42b perform safety control, for example, the operation command output unit 44a performs an AND operation on the output result relating to whether the automatic operation is valid or invalid, and then the operation control device for the car 2a. (1) Command the 4Aa and the car 2b operation control device (2) 4Ab respectively. For example, as shown in FIG. 12, the operation command output unit 44a is configured by a relay or a series circuit of semiconductor switches (RS). Only when the outputs from the respective control processing units 42a and 42b are separately input to the semiconductor switches (RS) connected in series, for example, both of the semiconductor switches (RS) are turned on to indicate that automatic operation is valid. Command signals are input to the operation control device (1) 4Aa and the operation control device (2) 4Ab so that the automatic operation becomes effective. That is, when either one of the first and second control processing units 42a and 42b outputs a command for invalidating the automatic operation, the automatic operation of the cars 2a and 2b is invalidated.

Further, when an emergency stop determination is made, the first and second control processing units 42a and 42b, via the stop command output unit 43a, the safety circuit 51 that acts on all the cars and the safety of the car 2a. The safety circuit (2) 52b of the circuit (1) 52a and the car 2b is controlled to open and close, and the hoisting machine power (1) 5da which is the power source of the hoisting motor 5b and hoisting machine brake 5c for the car 2a The hoisting machine power source (2) 5db, which is the power source for the hoisting machine motor and hoisting machine brake for the car 2b, is connected and disconnected.
When an emergency stop determination is made, the safety circuit is opened and the power is cut off, thereby cutting off the electric power from the hoisting machine power supply.
In this case, the hoisting machine brake is assumed to have a fail-safe function for braking when the power is cut off.

  The stop command output unit 43a is constituted by a series circuit of relays or semiconductor switches (RS), for example, as shown in FIG. 12, like the operation command output unit 44a, and outputs from the control processing units 42a and 42b are connected in series. The command signal is input to the safety circuit (51, 52a, 52b) and further to the hoisting machine power supply (5da, 5db) so that the operation can be continued only when both are in the ON state and indicate the operation is continued. Is done. That is, if either one of the first and second control processing units 42a and 42b outputs an emergency stop command, the car is emergency stopped.

  At this time, when the safety circuit (1) 52a and the safety circuit (2) 52b corresponding to each of the cars 2a and 2b are shut off, only the corresponding car stops and the entire safety circuit 51 is shut off. , All baskets stop.

  Further, the output result is input again to the first and second control processing units 42a and 42b as indicated by the feedback signal line FB in FIG. 2, and it is diagnosed whether the result is output correctly. Furthermore, the first and second control processing units have a self-diagnosis function for confirming their own soundness. When an abnormality is detected by the self-diagnosis function unit of the control processing units 42a and 42b, the operation of all the cars is stopped and an output for invalidating the automatic operation is performed.

  Each control processing unit 42a, 42b may be configured by a computer including software. This computer may be constituted by a computer different from the computers constituting the operation control devices (4A, 4Aa, 4Ab). Each computer has a central processing unit (CPU), a read only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), and a WDT (watch dog timer) as a self-diagnostic function unit. Then, inspections relating to reading and writing of ROM and RAM and time monitoring by WDT are performed.

  Each of the control processing units 42a and 42b is an analog including an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), an FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array), a CPLD (Complex Programmable Logic Device), a digital circuit using a transistor, or a relay circuit. You may comprise a circuit or the circuit which combined the digital circuit and the analog circuit suitably.

  Further, the stop command output unit 43a and the operation command output unit 44a described above may be configured by a computer or a digital circuit together with the control processing units 42a and 42b.

  A schematic configuration of the computer is shown in FIG. In the computer 400, input / output of external input signals and external output signals are performed via an interface 401. The memory 403 stores or stores in advance data including various function programs described in the specification, information necessary for processing, various setting values, and the like. The processor 402 performs arithmetic processing on a signal input through the interface 401 according to various programs, information, and data stored in the memory 403, and outputs a processing result through the interface 401. Further, the execution of the processor 402 is monitored by the WDT 404, and when no response is obtained from the processor 402 at a specified time, the output of the computer 400 is turned off.

  FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing a cycle process of the entire safety control process including the abnormality confirmation control in the safety control apparatus of FIG. The safety control device 4B repeatedly executes the process of FIG. 3 at a predetermined set cycle.

  In the periodic process of the safety control, first, the arithmetic processing unit including each control processing unit 42a, 42b constituted by a computer or a digital circuit and the input signal are diagnosed (step S1 and step S2). The car is stopped and the automatic operation is invalidated (step S6). When stopping the car, depending on the importance of the abnormality, the nearest floor is stopped if the abnormality is minor, and the emergency is stopped if the abnormality is severe.

  If there is no abnormality, a later-described safety control process is performed (step S3). At that time, the operation results of the redundant control processing units 42a and 42b are collated (step S4). If the calculation results do not match, the process proceeds to step S6 and the above-described processing is performed.

  If the calculation results match, the output signal is diagnosed (step S5). If there is an abnormality in the diagnosis result of the output signal, the process proceeds to step S6 and the above-described processing is performed. If the calculation results match and there is no abnormality in the signal, the processing of the set cycle is terminated.

  FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing a safety control mode determination process as a part of the safety control process in step S3 of the flowchart of FIG. The safety control process includes four modes, a normal monitoring mode, a pit entry detection mode, an on-car entry detection mode, and a door open running detection mode, and is normally the normal monitoring mode. Once a transition is made to a mode other than the normal monitoring mode, no transition is made to another mode until reset.

  First, it is confirmed from the signal state of the landing door switch 9b whether any of the landing doors 9a has been opened (step S101). If all the landing doors 9a are closed (step S101 “NO”), normal monitoring is performed. The mode is maintained (step S200).

  If any one of the landing doors 9a is opened ("YES" in step S101), the signal from the landing sensors 2ca and 2cb of each car 2a and 2b and the car position measurement based on the signals from the encoders 8ca and 8cb are used. Then, it is confirmed whether or not a car exists in the landing zone of the landing where the landing door 9a is opened (step S102).

  When there is a car in the landing zone (“YES” in step S102), the normal monitoring mode is maintained (step S200). If there is no car in the landing zone (“NO” at step S102), it is checked whether the landing door is the lowest floor that is the pit entry floor (step S103), and if it is the lowest floor (step S103 “ “YES”) shifts to the pit entry detection mode (step S300). In this case, for example, when the lowest car is not in the preset maintenance possible pit entry area, that is, when the lowest car is more than a specific distance from the pit or the lowest floor, the transition to the pit entry detection mode is performed. To decide.

  If the platform that has been opened is not the lowest floor (“NO” in step S103), it is determined whether or not the platform that has been opened is in any of the cage entry ranges, that is, in a preset entry area on the cage for maintenance. Confirmation (step S104). For example, it is confirmed whether or not the upper end of the car that is close to the open door is within a set distance from the open door. Or you may confirm simply whether a cage | basket | car exists in the floor immediately under the doorway which opened the door. Alternatively, it may be determined whether or not there is a door that opens in the on-car entry possible area, with the range of a preset distance above the upper end of the car as the on-car entry possible area for maintenance. If any one of the cars is within the boarding range (“YES” in step S104), the car enters the on-car entry detection mode (step S400).

  If none of the cars are within the boarding range even though the landing doors 9a other than the lowest floor are open (step S104 “NO”), the process proceeds to the door open detection mode (step S500).

FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing the control process in the normal monitoring mode. The safety control device 4B measures the position and speed of each car 2a and 2b from the encoders 8ca and 8cb of each car, and monitors the distance and speed of two adjacent cars. When the distance between the two adjacent cars 2a and 2b approaches a set distance determined according to the speed of the two cars, that is, when the distance is less than the set distance ("YES" in step S201), the safety control device A commander that shuts off the safety circuits 52a and 52b is output from the stop command output unit 43a, and the approached car is emergency-stopped (step S202).
In the above description, the car is stopped when the distance between the two cars is less than a set distance determined in accordance with the relative speed of the two cars. However, the set distance can be obtained from the encoders 8ca and 8cb in the car hoistway 1. The position may be determined in consideration of the position.

  FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing control processing in the pit entry detection mode. First, the operation command output unit 44a causes the operation control device (4Aa or 4Ab) of the lowermost car to output a command for invalidating automatic operation and switching to manual operation (step S301). After switching to manual operation, the input signal from the manual operation button of the manual operation controller MO of the lowest car is transmitted to the operation control device via the safety control device 4B.

  Thereafter, it is monitored whether or not the lowest car has entered the pit work entry prohibition zone Z1 (step S302). For example, it is confirmed whether or not the lowest car has entered within a predetermined distance from the upper end of the pit 3b. When the car enters the pit work entry prohibition zone Z1 ("YES" in step S302), a command to shut off the safety circuit (52a or 52b) of the lowest car is output from the stop command output unit 43a, and the lowest car is Emergency stop is performed (step S303).

  Thereafter, regarding the command from the manual operation button of the manual operation controller MO of the lowermost car, the operation in only the upward direction opposite to the pit 3b is permitted. A signal only in the upward direction and a command are transmitted to the operation control device (4Aa or 4Ab), and the safety circuit (52a or 52b) is reconnected via the stop command output unit 43a (step S304).

  It is monitored whether the lowest car has escaped from the entry prohibition zone during pit work (step S305), and if it has escaped from the zone ("YES" in step S305), the manual operation button on the manual operation unit MO of the lowest car is used. As for the command, the bidirectional operation is permitted, and the bidirectional signal and the command are transmitted to the operation control device (4Aa or 4Ab) (step S306). Then, the process returns to step S302.

  FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the control process in the car entry detection mode. First, it is determined whether the car to be boarded is the top car (step S401). When the car to be boarded is the uppermost car (step S401 “YES”), the operation command output unit 44a instructs the operation control device (4Aa or 4Ab) of the car to be boarded to disable automatic operation and switch to manual operation. Is output (step S402). After switching to manual operation, an input signal from the manual operation button of the manual operation controller MO of the target car is transmitted to the operation control device (4Aa or 4Ab) via the safety control device 4B.

  Thereafter, it is monitored whether or not the target car has entered the overhead work entry prohibition zone Z2 (step S403). For example, it is confirmed whether or not the target car enters within a predetermined set distance from the ceiling surface that is the upper end inside the hoistway. When the car has entered the overhead work entry prohibition zone Z2 (step S403 “YES”), the command to shut off the safety circuit (52a or 52b) of the target car is output to the stop command output unit 43a, and the car that has entered is entered. Emergency stop is performed (step S404).

  Thereafter, with respect to the command from the manual operation button of the manual operation controller MO of the target car, the operation is permitted only in the downward direction, which is the opposite direction to the overhead. A signal only in the downward direction and a command are transmitted to the operation control device, and the safety circuit (52a or 52b) is reconnected via the stop command output unit 43a (step S405).

  It is monitored whether or not the target car has escaped from the overhead work entry prohibition zone Z2 (step S406). If the target car has escaped from the zone ("YES" in step S406), the manual operation button of the manual operation controller MO of the target car is used. As for the command, the bidirectional operation is permitted, and the bidirectional signal and the command are transmitted to the operation control device (4Aa or 4Ab) (step S407). Then, the process returns to step S403.

  On the other hand, when the car to be boarded is other than the top car (step S401 “NO”), the automatic operation is invalidated to the operation command output unit 44a for the car to be boarded and the operation control devices (4Aa and 4Ab) immediately above the car. And outputs a command to switch to manual operation (step S412). After switching to manual operation, the input signal from the manual operation button of the manual operation controller MO of the car directly above the target car is transmitted to the operation control devices (4Aa and 4Ab) via the safety control device 4B.

  Thereafter, it is monitored whether or not the target car and the car immediately above have entered the car entry work prohibition zone Z3 (step S413). For example, it is confirmed whether or not the distance between the outer ceiling surface, which is the upper end of the target car, and the bottom surface, which is the lower end of the car directly above, is within a predetermined set distance. If the target car or the car directly above enters the entry prohibition zone Z3 during inter-car work ("YES" in step S413), a command to shut off the safety circuit (52a and 52b) of the car directly above the target car is sent to the stop command output unit 43a. The car is output and the target car and the car immediately above are emergency-stopped (step S414).

  After that, regarding the command from the manual operation button of the manual operation controller MO of the target car and the car directly above, it allowed to drive in the direction away from each other, that is, the target car was only in the downward direction, and the car just above was allowed to operate in the upward direction Signals and commands for only the direction are transmitted to the operation control devices 4Aa and 4Ab, and the safety circuits (52a and 52b) are reconnected via the stop command output unit 43a (step S415).

  It is monitored whether the car directly above the target car has escaped from the entry prohibition zone Z3 during inter-car work (step S416), and if it has escaped from the zone ("YES" at step S416), the manual operation controller for the car just above the target car With respect to the command from the MO manual operation button, bidirectional operation is permitted, and a bidirectional signal and command are transmitted to the operation control devices 4Aa and 4Ab (step S417), and the process returns to step S413.

The hoisting machine power supplies 5da and 5db may be provided separately for the hoisting machine motor 5b and the hoisting machine brake 5c.
By detecting that the car has entered each entry-prohibited zone and detecting the emergency stop of the target car after the above-mentioned pit entry and on-car entry are detected, the safety circuit for the target car is shut off. The energization to at least one of the hoisting machine motor 5b and the hoisting machine brake 5c is cut off.

  FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing a control process in the door open running detection mode. If the car does not exist on the floor even though the above-mentioned maintenance person's approach to the hoistway is not detected and the landing door 9a is open, the safety control device 4B has safety circuits 52a and 52b for all the cars. Or a command to shut off the entire safety circuit 51 is output to emergency stop all the cars (step S501).

  FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the return processing to automatic operation. The safety control device 4B returns to the automatic operation in the following procedure when the automatic operation is invalidated or when the car is emergency stopped in the normal monitoring mode or the open door detection mode.

  After the safety of the elevator is confirmed by maintenance personnel, the reset switch RS in the hall 9 or the pit 3b or in the machine room 3a is pressed. When the safety control device 4B detects that the reset switch is pressed (“YES” in step S601), it checks whether all the landing doors 9a are closed (step S602). When all the landing doors 9a are closed (step S602 “YES”), a command for returning the operation of all the cars to the automatic operation is output from the operation command output unit 44a to the operation control devices 4Aa and 4Ab of the respective cars. .

  In addition, at the time of a power failure, the automatic operation of all the cars is invalidated, and the operation is returned to the automatic operation by the above-described return processing control to the automatic operation.

  In such a safety control device for a multi-car elevator in which a plurality of cars travels on the same hoistway, for example, maintenance personnel can perform maintenance work while the car is traveling or on a certain floor while the door is closed or open. By detecting that the landing door leading to the car or the pit has been opened to perform and automatically disabling automatic operation, even if the maintenance operator forgets to disable automatic operation The car can be reliably prevented from traveling, and the work space can be ensured even in the manual operation, so that the safety of maintenance personnel can be ensured.

Embodiment 2. FIG.
FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of a multi-car elevator safety control device according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention. In the second embodiment, the landing door switch 9b, encoders 8ca and 8cb corresponding to the cars 2a and 2b, landing sensors 2ca and 2cb, switches including manual operation controllers MOa and MOb, and sensors are the network node NN1-. It is connected to NN4 and connected to safety control device 4BB via serial network NW. In the safety control device 4BB, the input units 41a, 41b, and 41c are connected to the serial network NW via the network interface NNI. Other configurations are the same as those in the first embodiment.

  Signals from the switches and sensors (9b, 8ca, 8cb, 2ca, 2cb, MOa, and MOb) are converted into message data by the network nodes NN1 to NN4, and are periodically transmitted to the safety control device 4BB. At this time, an identifier, a sequence number, an error detection code, and the like are added to the message data, and their consistency is confirmed and a reception interval timing check is performed on the reception side. That is, the message data is data with a management function added.

  FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing a periodic process of the entire safety control process in the safety control apparatus of FIG. The steps other than step S7 are the same as those in the first embodiment shown in FIG. If any abnormality is found in the received message data in step S7, all the cars are stopped and the automatic operation is invalidated (step S6).

  Even with such a configuration, even if the maintenance staff forgets the automatic operation invalidation operation, it is possible to reliably prevent the car from traveling unexpectedly for the maintenance staff, and a multi-car with multiple cars traveling on the same hoistway. Even in the elevator, it is possible to ensure the safety of maintenance personnel. In addition, the signal input of the safety control device can be handled even if the number of cars is increased, and the number of wires in the hoistway can be reduced.

  FIG. 14 shows a functional block diagram of an example of an arithmetic processing portion of the safety control processing device of FIGS. The arithmetic processing part mainly corresponds to the first and second control processing parts 42a and 24b, and may further include these parts when the stop command output part 43a and the operation command output part 44a are configured by a computer. .

  In FIG. 14, safety control processing units 440a and 440b correspond to the first control processing unit 42a and the second control processing unit 24b, respectively, and basically have the same functions. The car interval monitoring control unit 442 executes control processing in the normal monitoring mode of FIG. Hereinafter, the pit entry control unit 443 performs control processing in the pit entry detection mode in FIG. 6, the on-car entry control unit 444 performs control processing in the on-car entry detection mode in FIG. 7, and the door opening travel control unit 445 performs the door opening operation in FIG. 8. The control processing in the travel detection mode and the automatic operation return control unit 446 respectively execute the return processing to the automatic operation in FIG. The calculation abnormality confirmation control unit 441 performs a control process of a part excluding the safety process of the entire safety control process of FIGS. 3 and 11. The storage unit M corresponds to the memory 403. The calculation abnormality confirmation control unit 441 also performs processing of the first and second control processing units 42a and 42b, the stop command output unit 43a, and the operation command output unit 44a.

  In the first and second embodiments, the automatic operation of the car is invalidated when the movement of the maintenance worker to the hoistway is detected, but the operation mode of the operation control device may be switched to the manual operation mode. Further, when the movement of the maintenance worker to the hoistway is detected, the safety circuit (not shown) of the elevator may be shut off. In this case, since the energization to the hoisting machine motor 5b and the hoisting machine brake 5c is interrupted, the car can be stopped without going through the operation control device.

  In the first and second embodiments, the connection from the various switches to the safety control device is performed by wire, but may be performed wirelessly.

  Furthermore, in the first and second embodiments, the hoisting machine and the elevator control device shown by the control panel are arranged at the upper part of the hoistway, but the present invention is not limited to this layout. The present invention can also be applied to an elevator in which a control panel is disposed at a lower part in a hoistway, for example.

  It should be noted that an encoder provided in the hoisting machine 5 for each of the cars 2a and 2b, or a speed governor 8, an encoder 8c provided with the speed governor 8, and a landing sensor 2c are collectively measured for car position speed. Use a vessel.

Industrial applicability

  The multi-car elevator safety control device and the safety control method according to the present invention can be applied to various types of multi-car elevator safety control devices in various fields.

Claims (12)

In a multi-car elevator where multiple cars travel on one hoistway,
A car position speed measuring device for measuring the position and speed of each of the plurality of cars;
A plurality of landing door switches that independently detect the opening of the plurality of landing doors of the hoistway;
A safety control processing device for performing safety control in accordance with signals from the car position speed measuring device and the number of landing door switches;
With
When any of the landing doors is opened, the safety control processing device detects a maintenance pit entry if the opened floor is the lowest floor and there is no cage in the maintenance pit entry area. If the opened floor is a floor other than the lowest floor, and there is a car in the accessible area of the car when the door is opened, the car is detected to enter the car at the time of maintenance. When there is no car on the floor, it has a safety control processing unit that detects door opening and disables the automatic operation of the car or stops the car ,
The safety control processing unit is
When entry into the car during maintenance is detected,
When the car to be boarded is the uppermost car, the automatic operation of the uppermost car is invalidated, and when the uppermost car enters a preset overhead work entry prohibition zone, the uppermost car is stopped and Allows traveling in the reverse direction only, and allows the vehicle to travel in both directions when the top car escapes from the overhead entry prohibition zone,
When the car to be boarded is other than the top car,
Disable the automatic operation of the target car and the directly above car, and work between the cars in which the target car and the directly above car are up to a predetermined set distance above the top of the target car or below the bottom of the top car When entering the entry prohibition zone, the target car and the immediately above car are stopped and allowed to run only in directions away from each other, and the target car and the immediately above car escape from the entry prohibition zone during inter-car work. A multi-car elevator safety control device that includes an on -car entry control unit that permits traveling in both directions when the vehicle is driven .   The safety control processing unit normally monitors the position and speed of two adjacent cars, and if the distance between the two cars is less than a set distance determined by the position and the speed, the 2 The safety control device for a multi-car elevator according to claim 1, further comprising a car interval monitoring control unit that stops two cars. When the safety control processing unit detects the pit entry at the time of maintenance , the automatic operation of the lowest car is invalidated, and when the lowest car enters the preset pit work entry prohibition zone, A pit entry control unit that stops the bottom car and permits traveling only in the opposite direction to the pit, and permits the traveling in both directions when the bottom car escapes from the entry prohibition zone during the pit work, The multi-car elevator safety control device according to claim 1, comprising: The safety control of the multi-car elevator according to any one of claims 1 to 3 , including a door-open travel control unit that stops all the cars when the safety control processing unit detects the door-open travel. apparatus. When the reset control (RS) provided in the multi-car elevator is operated and the safety control processing unit confirms the fully closed state of all the landing doors, the automatic operation return control for returning the car to automatic operation The safety control device for a multi-car elevator according to any one of claims 1 to 4 , further comprising a section . The multi-car elevator safety control device according to claim 3, wherein when the pit entry control unit detects the entry of a maintenance worker, the operation mode of the car is switched to a manual operation mode. When the car enters the entry prohibition zone, the pit entry control unit shuts off a safety circuit for the car, thereby lifting and lowering the car, and at least one of a hoisting machine motor and a hoisting machine brake The safety control device for a multi-car elevator according to claim 3, wherein energization of the multi-car elevator is interrupted. The multi-car elevator safety control device according to claim 1 , wherein when the on-car entry control unit detects the entry of a maintenance worker, the operation mode of the car is switched to a manual operation mode. The car entry control unit, when a car enters each entry prohibition zone, shuts off a safety circuit for the car, thereby lifting at least a hoisting machine motor and a hoisting machine brake. The safety control device for a multi-car elevator according to claim 1 , wherein energization to one side is cut off. The plurality of landing door switches are connected to the safety control processing device via a network node for a network, and signals of the landing door switches are input to the safety control processing device as message data having a management function,
The safety control processing device includes:
When an error is detected in the message data, including an operation abnormality confirmation control unit that stops all the cars and invalidates automatic operation,
The safety control device for a multicar elevator according to any one of claims 1 to 9 . The safety control device for a multicar elevator according to any one of claims 1 to 10 , wherein the safety control processing device includes a plurality of control processing units that perform the same processing and is redundant. In a multi-car elevator where multiple cars travel on one hoistway,
A car position speed measuring device for measuring the position and speed of each of the plurality of cars;
A plurality of landing door switches that independently detect the opening of the plurality of landing doors of the hoistway;
According to the signal from
If any of the landing doors open,
If the opened floor is the lowest floor and there is no car in the pit entry area for maintenance, a pit entry for maintenance will be detected.
If the opened floor is a floor other than the lowest floor, and there is a car in the accessible area on the opened floor, maintenance will be detected.
If there is no car on the opened floor in any other case, it will detect the opening of the door,
Disable each car's automatic operation or stop the car ,
When entry into the car during maintenance is detected,
When the car to be boarded is the uppermost car, the automatic operation of the uppermost car is invalidated, and when the uppermost car enters a preset overhead work entry prohibition zone, the uppermost car is stopped and Allows traveling in the reverse direction only, and allows the vehicle to travel in both directions when the top car escapes from the overhead entry prohibition zone,
When the car to be boarded is other than the top car,
Disable the automatic operation of the target car and the directly above car, and work between the cars in which the target car and the directly above car are up to a predetermined set distance above the top of the target car or below the bottom of the top car When entering the entry prohibition zone, the target car and the immediately above car are stopped and allowed to run only in directions away from each other, and the target car and the immediately above car escape from the entry prohibition zone during inter-car work. If you do, allow driving in both directions,
Safety control method for multi-car elevators.

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