JP4490354B2 - Domain management method - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a network domain management method, and in particular, to create a new subdomain without the need for a trusted third party to prevent domain name conflict and guarantee its uniqueness. It relates to a domain management method that can be used.

In order to realize secure one-to-one communication in the network, a mechanism for uniquely identifying the communication partner and the authentication information of the communication partner are obtained, and it is confirmed that the other party is really the other party who is trying to communicate And a mechanism capable of performing communication with encryption. As such a mechanism, for example, in the Internet, an IP address, a DNS (Domain Name System), a public key certificate, or the like is used (for example, see Non-Patent Document 1).
In other words, by specifying the IP address that is the identification number assigned to each computer connected to the Internet and the host name that is the name assigned to each computer, the computer that is the communication partner is uniquely identified. Is done. The correspondence between the IP address and the host name is stored in a database for computers all over the world by DNS, and the target is obtained by referring to this DNS and obtaining the IP address (or vice versa) from the host name. A communication partner is searched. Furthermore, a public key certificate that proves that each computer's public key is authentic is issued by a trusted certificate authority (CA), and the above-mentioned certified public key is used in actual communication. Security is ensured.
“Basic DNS Specification RFC 1034“ Domain Names—Concepts and Functions ””, [online], [searched August 4, 2005], Internet, <URL: http://www5d.biglobe.ne.jp/ ~ stssk / dns.html>

  By the way, in the ubiquitous society where various things such as home appliances and sensors as well as servers and personal computers are connected to the Internet, information such as names and addresses of those communication nodes, public keys, etc. It would be desirable to have an environment where node managers can register freely and anyone can access them safely by referring to them.

However, in the current Internet operation, host names are managed by ICANN (The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), NIC (Network Information Center) of each country, and registrars under their control. In order to register a name, an application must be made to each of these institutions for approval, and no one can freely register a host name without such approval.
In addition, a public key certificate must be issued through a predetermined authentication procedure by a certificate authority.

  The present invention has been made in view of the above points. The purpose of the present invention is to ensure the uniqueness of names without requiring authorization or authentication by a third party such as ICANN or a certificate authority. Domain management method that allows you to acquire your own domain and freely register information such as the host name, address, and public key of the communication node in that domain, and then refer to the information while verifying whether or not it has been tampered with Is to provide.

  The present invention has been made to solve the above-described problems. The invention according to claim 1 is directed to the first management server regarding the upper domain and the second management server regarding the lower domain. In the network for managing the domain name, the public key in the public key and private key pair created by the second management server is transmitted to the first management server, and the private key corresponding to the received public key is When it is verified that it is owned by the second management server that performed the transmission, a self-authentication domain name created based on the hash value of the public key is given as a domain name, and the second A domain management method characterized in that a self-authentication domain managed by a management server is generated below a domain managed by the first management server related to transmission. It is.

  The invention described in claim 2 is the domain management method according to claim 1, wherein the self-authentication domain name created based on the hash value of the public key created by the second management server is further When it is transmitted to the first management server and it is verified that the hash value calculated from the received public key and the hash value corresponding to the received self-authentication domain name match with the verification The self-authentication domain is generated.

  Further, the invention according to claim 3 is the domain management method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the predetermined host information regarding the host provided in the self-authentication domain is converted to the self-authentication domain by a hash function. The signature is applied using the private key paired with the associated public key, and is transmitted to the first management server together with the host name of the host, and the signature applied to the received host information is The host information and the host name are registered in the first management server when verified by the received public key.

  According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, in the domain management method according to the third aspect, the host information includes at least a second management server that manages the address of the host and a self-authentication domain to which the host belongs. And a public key certificate that certifies the public key of the host itself.

  The invention according to claim 5 is the domain management method according to claim 3 or claim 4, wherein the first management server that has received a reference request for the registered host information sends a request to the request source. , Sending the host information and a public key associated with the self-authentication domain to which the host related to the host information belongs, and the sent public key has its hash value calculated by the request source, The public key itself is verified by verifying with a hash value corresponding to the domain name of the authentication domain, and is used for verifying a signature applied to the sent host information. .

  The invention according to claim 6 is specific to the administrator of the second management server assigned by a third party in the domain management method according to any one of claims 1 to 5. Is assigned as an alias for the self-authentication domain name.

  The invention described in claim 7 is the domain management method according to claim 6, wherein the ID is an e-mail address, and a correspondence relationship between the e-mail address of the administrator and a self-authentication domain name is declared. A message, a signature applied to the message using a private key for e-mail, and a public key certificate for e-mail issued by a certificate authority and certifying a public key paired with the private key. A signature sent to the first management server that generated the self-authentication domain for the administrator, the e-mail public key certificate is verified with the root CA public key of the certificate authority, and the received message is signed Is verified with a public key associated with the verified public key certificate for email, the email address is given as an alias for the self-authentication domain. And wherein the Rukoto.

According to the present invention, since the domain name (self-authentication domain name) of a new domain (self-authentication domain) is assigned based on the hash value of the public key of the user (second management server), the hash function The uniqueness of the self-authentication domain name can be ensured by the nature of. That is, domain names generated according to this algorithm do not overlap and satisfy basic characteristics for domain management.
In order to generate a new self-authentication domain, the hash value is recalculated on the domain management service provider (first management server) side, and the secret key corresponding to the user who requested the domain generation Therefore, it is possible to ensure that the correspondence between the self-authentication domain and the public / private key pair created by the user is correct. That is, it is verified that there is no error in the self-authentication domain name by recalculating the hash value, and it is verified by a confirmation of the secret key that the request is from a user who has valid authority for the self-authentication domain.

  Thus, according to the present invention, by creating a public / private key pair, the user can acquire his / her own domain, and domain authorization and management authority to guarantee the global uniqueness of the domain name. It is possible to realize a domain management method that does not require the presence of a third party organization (ICANN or the like) that manages the delegation.

  According to the invention described in claim 3 and claim 4, when a user installs a host computer under a self-authentication domain and registers signed host information in the server of the service provider, The signature is made with the private key corresponding to the public key that is the basis of the self-authentication domain name, and this is verified by the public key used when generating the domain. Registration of host information is permitted. Therefore, it is possible to prevent unauthorized registration, and to give the authority to manage the self-authentication domain only to the true user.

  According to the invention described in claim 5, for a person who wants to refer to the host information of the host computer installed under the self-authentication domain, the public key used for generating the host information and the domain Is sent and the contents of the public key and the host information are verified, and the referrer can obtain the desired host information without fear of falsification. That is, since it is confirmed that the public key (owned by the user) correctly corresponds to the self-authentication domain to be referred to by recalculating the hash value, the third party (CA) Regardless of the dependency, the user (second management server) can distribute the correct public key to the referrer, and if the signature of the host information is verified using this public key, the referrer can refer to it. It is possible to obtain the correct address and public key certificate. The acquired public key certificate of the reference destination is issued by the user. That is, the public key certificate of the host computer can be issued without authentication by a third party organization (CA).

  According to the invention described in claim 6 and claim 7, the self-authentication domain name, which is a list of meaningless characters based on the hash value, is generated for the generated self-authentication domain. By substituting with a unique ID (a meaningful character string such as an e-mail address or a telephone number) already possessed by the administrator of the management server), the host computer reference method can be simplified.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.
<< First Embodiment >>
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a network managed in accordance with a domain management method according to an embodiment of the present invention and its components. In the figure, the user U creates a lower domain “.e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1.selfauthdomain.net” in the upper domain “.selfauthdomain.net” managed by the management server 10 operated by the service provider SP. Managed by the management server 20. The user U installs host servers 21a to 21d, assigns host names “www”, “dvr”, “mp3”, and “webcam” to each of them, and operates these hosts in the domain. The host information of each of the host servers 21a to 21d is registered in the management server 10 of the service provider SP and is referred to by the user terminal 30 of the user R.

  Here, the service provider SP has been delegated management authority regarding the domain “.selfauthdomain.net” from the ICANN that manages the upper domain “.net”, and the host (for example, www.selfauthdomain.net) is assigned to the domain. ), And the creation of subordinate domains and the delegation of subordinate domain management authority to others. Further, it is assumed that the user U has built a home network composed of the management server 20 and the host servers 21a to 21d. The management server 10 and the like are connected to the Internet 60 and can access each other.

  FIG. 2 is a diagram showing the domain configuration of the network. Under the root domain, gTLD (generic Top Level Domain) such as “.net”, “.org”, “.com”, and ccTLD (country code Top Level Domain) such as “.jp” are provided. have. The domain “.selfauthdomain.net” (service domain 40) managed by the service provider SP is a subdomain of “.net”, and the service provider SP is a subdomain dedicated to each user under the service domain 40. A service for creating and managing domains (self-authentication domains 50a, 50b,...) Is provided.

  The self-authentication domain 50a “.e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1.selfauthdomain.net” is a subdomain acquired by the user U. The hosts “www.˜”, “dvr.˜”, “mp3.˜”, “webcam.˜” belong to the self-authentication domain 50a. The character string “e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1” constituting the domain name of the self-authentication domain 50a is obtained by converting the hash value H (pk) in binary notation obtained from the public key pk of the user U into hexadecimal notation ( Details will be described later).

  Next, the domain management method according to the present embodiment is divided into three stages: (1) generation of a self-authentication domain, (2) registration of host information, and (3) reference of host information. This will be described with reference to the flowchart shown in FIG.

(1) Generation of self-authentication domain First, the management server 20 of the user U creates one public key pk and private key sk pair (step S11), and inputs the created public key pk into a predetermined hash function. To calculate the hash value H (pk). The hash function is a function that outputs a fixed-length character string for a given input, and here, MD5 (Message Digest 5) is used. The hash value obtained by the hash function MD5 is a 128-bit character string expressed in binary, but the management server 20 generates a self-authentication domain name by converting this into a character string expressed in hexadecimal. It is assumed that the generated self-authentication domain name is “e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1” (32 digits in hexadecimal notation) (step S12).

  Next, the management server 20 sends the public key and the generated self-authentication domain name to the management server 10 of the service provider, thereby attaching the self-authentication domain name to the domain name of the service domain 40. A request is made to generate “e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1.selfauthdomain.net” as the self-authentication domain 50a dedicated to the user U (step S13).

The management server 10 that has received the request calculates the hash value H (pk) of the sent public key pk and compares it with the self-authentication domain name, so that the requested self-authentication domain name correctly corresponds to the public key. (Step S14).
Further, the management server 10 uses the secret key sk corresponding to the transmitted public key pk to the management server of the user U in order to confirm that it is the user U himself that sent in step S13. 20 (POP; Proof of Possession) is verified (step S15). Specifically, the management server 10 creates a random number and sends it to the management server 20 as a challenge message. The management server 20 makes the management server 20 sign the signature Sig _sk with the secret key sk and return it. If the signature of the returned message can be verified using the public key pk, the POP is confirmed.

  If the verification is successful, the management server 10 generates a self-authentication domain 50a for the request in step S13 below the service domain 40 (step S16). In this way, the user U (management server 20) obtains his / her own domain only by exchanging with the service provider SP (that is, without interposing ICANN or the like).

(2) Registration of Host Information Next, a process in which the user U registers host information of the host server 21d (host name “webcam”) under the generated self-authentication domain 50a will be described. Here, it is assumed that the host server 11d has an IP address “12.34.56.78” and its own public key pk _webcam . The public key pk _webcam is used for encryption communication and authentication by a general public key method performed between the user terminal 30 of the user R and the host server 11d. The purpose is to allow the user terminal 30 to correctly refer to the public key pk _webcam which is the host information of the host server 11d.

The management server 20 of the user U who has acquired the self-authentication domain 50a first verifies that pk _webcam is the public key of the host server 11d, and public key certificate Cert ^sk with signature Sig _sk with private key ^sk. Create (pk _webcam ). This public key certificate and IP address are host information to be registered.

Next, the management server 20 sends the above-mentioned host information signed with the secret key sk and the signature Sig _sk together with the host name “webcam.e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1.selfauthdomain.net” to be registered to the management server 10 (step S21).
Then, the management server 10 verifies the signature of the sent host information using the public key pk obtained in step S13 above (step S22), and if the verification is successful, registers the host name and the signed host information. Is performed (step S23). Here, since the private key sk used corresponding to the public key pk used when generating the self-authentication domain is used as the private key used for the signature, the above registration can be performed with the private key sk. It is limited to the true owner, that is, the user U.

(3) Referencing Host Information When registration of the host information of the host “webcam” is completed as described above, the user R can refer to the host information. The reference method is as follows.
First, the user terminal 30 of the user R refers to the host information by transmitting the host name “webcam.e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1.selfauthdomain.net” of the host server 21d that is going to refer to the host information to the management server 10 of the service provider. A request is made (step S31). Then, the management server 10 replies to the requesting user terminal 30 with the host information registered in step S23 corresponding to the received host name and the public key pk of the management server 20 used for the registration (step S32). ).

Then, the user terminal 30 first calculates a hash value of the acquired public key pk in order to verify that the sent public key pk is a regular public key of the management server 20, and the requested host name. Is compared with the self-authentication domain name “e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1” included in the password (step S33). If the public key pk is correct, the signature applied to the sent host information is verified with the public key pk (step S34), and the correct IP address “12.34.56.78” of the target host server 11d is verified. And the public key certificate Cert ^sk (pk _webcam ) issued by the management server 20 is acquired (step S35).
The user terminal 30 subsequently accesses the host “webcam” using the IP address and public key certificate thus obtained.

  Thus, according to the present embodiment, a hash value is calculated for the public key pk created by the management server 20 of the user U, and a domain name (self-authentication domain name) based on this hash value is newly added. Domain (self-authentication domain). In the management server 10 of the service provider SP, the correctness of the self-authentication domain name is verified by recalculating the hash value, and the user U is a valid holder of the secret key sk corresponding to the public key pk. Is verified, a self-authentication domain is generated below the domain for which the management server 10 has management authority, and the management authority is delegated to the user U. As a result, it is possible to create a user-specific domain without obtaining authorization from a third-party organization.

Also, when registering host information, the host information is signed with the private key sk corresponding to the self-authentication domain, and the verification is performed with the corresponding public key pk. This makes it possible to give the management authority only to the rightful owner of the self-authentication domain.
Furthermore, when referring to the host information, the hash value of the public key pk is recalculated in the user terminal 30 of the user R (referrer), the correctness of the public key is verified, and the host using the public key is verified. The signature of the information is verified. As a result, it is possible to distribute the host information to users without fear of falsification without depending on a third party organization.

<< Second Embodiment >>
Next, a second embodiment of the present invention will be described using the conceptual diagram shown in FIG. In the present embodiment, the user R can easily refer to the host by using an electronic mail address as the domain name instead of the self-authentication domain name based on the hash value.
First, (1) generation of a self-authentication domain and (2) registration of host information are performed by the same method as in the first embodiment.

Here, the user U who has acquired the self-authentication domain signs an e-mail address “ccc@aaa.com” assigned by an arbitrary Internet service provider and an e-mail sent from the e-mail address. E-mail private key sk _{ccc @ aaa. com} and the corresponding public key pk _{ccc @ aaa. com} . In addition, it is _assumed that a public key certificate Cert ^CA (pk _ccc@aaa.com ) for the public key is issued by a third party called a root CA. This public key certificate can be verified by using a public key pk _CA of a root CA that is available to anyone and whose validity is guaranteed.

After the above (1) and (2), the management server 20 of the user U declares the correspondence between the registered self-authentication domain name “e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1” and the email address “ccc@aaa.com”. The e-mail is changed to the e-mail secret key sk _{ccc @ aaa. The} signature Sig _{sk (ccc@aaa.com)} is added to the service provider SP and transmitted to the management server 10 of the service provider SP to request an alias for the self-authentication domain name. Also, the public key certificate Cert ^CA (pk _ccc@aaa.com ) and the public key pk of the management server 20 itself (used when generating the self-authentication domain) are also sent to the management server 10.

In response to the request, the management server 10 first verifies the correspondence between the sent public key pk and the self-authentication domain name “e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1” and confirms the POP of the management server 20. This is the same as the processing in step S14 and step S15 in the first embodiment described above.
Next, the management server 10 verifies the sent public key certificate Cert ^CA (pk _ccc@aaa.com ) using the public key pk _CA of the root CA obtained in advance, and public key pk. _{ccc @ aaa. com} . The signature of the received e-mail is verified with the public key, and the correct e-mail content is acquired.

  When it is confirmed that the self-authentication domain name “e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1” and the e-mail address “ccc@aaa.com” correspond to each other in this way, the management server 10 registers the registered host name “webcam.e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1.selfauthdomain. Replace the self-authenticated domain name part of “net” with the email address, and set the new host name “webcam.” by separating the host name, email address user name, and email address domain name with “.-.”. -.ccc.-.aaa.com.selfauthdomain.net ”

Next, a method in which the user R refers to the host information of the host server 11d in which the new host name is registered is as follows.
The user terminal 30 transmits a new host name “webcam.-.ccc.-.aaa.com.selfauthdomain.net” (only this host name is disclosed) to the management server 10. When the host information reference request is made, the management server 10 receives the registered host information corresponding to the requested host name and the public key pk of the management server 20 in the user terminal, as in step S32 in the first embodiment. Answer 30. Also, the e-mail used when registering the new host name (the e-mail describing the correspondence between the self-authentication domain name and the e-mail address and signed with the e-mail private key sk _ccc@aaa.com ) And the public key certificate Cert ^CA (pk _ccc@aaa.com ) are also transmitted to the user terminal 30.

The user terminal 30 sequentially performs the following verification on each of the sent data, and finally the IP address “12.34.56.78” and the public key that are correctly verified as in the case of the first embodiment. Obtain the certificate Cert ^sk (pk _webcam ).
First, similar to the management server 10 of the above-mentioned, the public key _{pk ccc @ aaa} to verify public key certificate ^Cert CA the _{(pk ccc@aaa.com)} by the public key _{pk CA} of the root CA that was previously _{available. com} , and verifies the signature of the e-mail with the public key, and obtains a self-authentication domain name “e7de0088726d91aefeb60885452453f1” corresponding to the host name published.

Thereafter, as in steps S33 to S35 in the first embodiment, the hash value is calculated and collated from the obtained self-authentication domain name and the sent public key pk, and the public key pk is The management server 20 verifies that it is a legitimate public key. If the verification is successful, by verifying the transmitted host information with the public key pk, the correct IP address “12.34.56.78” of the target host and the public key certificate Cert ^sk (pk _webcam ) are obtained.

  As described above, according to the present embodiment, the electronic mail address and the self-authentication domain name are associated with each other, and the verification is performed using the signature by the private key for electronic mail. As a result, it is possible to easily refer to the self-authentication domain.

As described above, the embodiment of the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the drawings. However, the specific configuration is not limited to the above, and various design changes and the like can be made without departing from the scope of the present invention. It is possible to
For example, the hash function that can be used is not limited to the MD5 described above, and may be based on other algorithms such as SHA-1.
In the above description, DNS is assumed as a name resolution system related to host information. However, another type of name resolution system may be used.

In the above-described second embodiment, the case where an e-mail address is used as an alias for the self-authentication domain name has been described. However, this is one specific example, and other IDs can be used. That is, an ID assigned with a guaranteed uniqueness by a trusted third-party organization, and the public key certificate certifying the correspondence between the ID and the public key of the person who has been assigned the ID is trusted. In addition to the e-mail address, it may be a telephone number or a subscriber ID related to some service as long as it is issued by a third party that can.
Furthermore, the “.-.” Inserted in the new host name as an alias is used to identify the part of the email address that was replaced, and should be another character that can be used in the host name. You can also.

  The present invention is suitable for use in a network domain management system.

1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a network managed according to a domain management method according to an embodiment of the present invention and its components. FIG. It is the figure which showed the domain structure of the network of FIG. 1, and the concept of the self-authentication domain. It is the conceptual diagram which showed the method of registration and reference of host information in 1st Embodiment. It is a flowchart which shows the domain management method in 1st Embodiment. It is the conceptual diagram which showed the method of registration and reference of host information in 2nd Embodiment.

Explanation of symbols

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10 ... Management server 20 ... Management server 21a-21d ... Host server 30 ... User terminal 40 ... Service domain 50a, 50b ... Self-authentication domain 60 ... Internet

Claims (7)

In the network in which the first management server manages the host name and the domain name with respect to the upper domain and the second management server relates to the lower domain,
The public key in the public / private key pair created by the second management server is transmitted to the first management server;
When it is verified that the private key corresponding to the received public key is owned by the second management server that performed the transmission, the self-authentication domain name created based on the hash value of the public key is A domain management method characterized in that a self-authentication domain assigned as a domain name and managed by the second management server is generated below a domain managed by the first management server related to the transmission. A self-authentication domain name created based on the hash value of the public key created by the second management server is further transmitted to the first management server;
Along with the verification, when it is verified that the hash value calculated from the received public key matches the hash value corresponding to the received self-authentication domain name, the self-authentication domain is generated. The domain management method according to claim 1, wherein: The predetermined host information related to the host provided in the self-authentication domain is signed by using a secret key paired with a public key associated with the self-authentication domain by a hash function, and then the host's Sent to the first management server together with the host name,
The host information and the host name are registered in the first management server when the signature applied to the received host information is verified by the received public key. Domain management method as described in. The host information includes at least an address of the host and a public key certificate issued by a second management server that manages a self-authentication domain to which the host belongs and certifies the public key of the host. The domain management method according to claim 3. The first management server that has received the reference request for the registered host information sends the host information and the public key associated with the self-authentication domain to which the host related to the host information belongs to the request source. Send
The sent public key has its hash value calculated by the request source and verified against the hash value corresponding to the domain name of the self-authentication domain, and then the sent key is verified. The domain management method according to claim 3 or 4, wherein the domain management method is used for verifying a signature applied to the host information. The ID unique to the administrator of the second management server assigned by a third-party organization is assigned as an alias for the self-authentication domain name. 6. Domain management method as described in. The ID is an email address;
A message declaring the correspondence between the administrator's e-mail address and a self-authentication domain name, a signature applied to the message using a private key for e-mail, a certificate issued by a certificate authority, and the private key An e-mail public key certificate that certifies a public key to be paired is transmitted to the first management server that generated the self-authentication domain for the administrator,
The e-mail public key certificate is verified with the root CA public key of the certificate authority, and the signature applied to the received message is verified with the public key associated with the verified e-mail public key certificate The domain management method according to claim 6, wherein, when it is done, the e-mail address is assigned as an alias of the self-authentication domain.

Images