JP4052158B2 - IC card system and IC card issuing method - Google Patents

Description

[0001]
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to an IC card and an IC card system using the IC card, and in particular, a multi-application compatible IC card equipped with a CPU (Central Processing Unit), and a card application program for the IC card system using the multi-application compatible IC card. Related to mounting method and execution method.
[0002]
[Prior art]
An IC card is capable of storing a large amount of information and has high security, and thus is expected as a new information recording medium replacing a conventional magnetic card. Furthermore, in recent years, a multi-application compatible IC card using a microcomputer chip as a chip mounted on the card (hereinafter sometimes simply referred to as a multi-application IC card, IC card, or card) has started to appear. A multi-application compatible IC card can be equipped with a plurality of card application programs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as a card AP) on a single IC card, and an application (hereinafter referred to as the following) (In some cases, it may be described as “AP”). Examples of an operating system (OS) that realizes such a multi-application compatible IC card include MULTOS of Mondex International and Open Platform Card of VISA International.
[0003]
Consider the case of building a system that provides services using IC cards. As described above, the IC card can have a high function, but the IC card alone cannot provide a service. The IC card can be realized by connecting to a conventional host computer and exchanging information with the outside. At this time, it is important to ensure security in communication between the card and the host. Specifically, the card and host must be able to authenticate each other's legitimacy. Furthermore, it is necessary to prevent communication data exchanged between the two from leaking to a third party or being tampered with. The following describes an example of IC card business where security is important.
[0004]
First, in a business involving a card issuer, it is necessary to securely carry out a card AP mounting business at the time of card issuance and operation. Specifically, the validity of each other is authenticated between the card AP-equipped terminal AP on the host-side card AP-equipped terminal and the card-side card OS (hereinafter, sometimes referred to as mutual authentication). Then, after the authentication is successful, security is ensured by establishing a safe communication path (hereinafter sometimes referred to as a secure channel) in which a third party cannot perform snooping or tampering.
[0005]
Next, in a service related to a service provider that provides a service using a card AP already mounted on the card, mutual authentication is performed between the card terminal AP on the host-side card terminal and the card AP on the card, Security is ensured by realizing secure communication.
[0006]
In the conventional IC card, the mutual authentication and the secure communication are realized by a cryptographic technique (for details, refer to “Global Platform: Open Platform Card Specification Version 2.0.1 ′, April 2000” and “W. See Rankl: Smart Card Handbook (John Wiley & Sons).
[0007]
Hereinafter, a method for realizing mutual authentication and secure communication using symmetric encryption (common key encryption) will be described in detail. First, the configuration of an IC card system using a multi-function IC card and the realization of mutual authentication and secure communication will be described with reference to FIG.
[0008]
As described above, the IC card system includes the card 110 and the card terminal 100. The card terminal 100 communicates with the card 110 to realize a business service using an IC card. As a typical example of this business service, there is a card AP mounting business in which a card AP is dynamically mounted on an IC card. As another business, there is a service execution business that accesses a card AP mounted on an IC card and performs a general business AP service (for example, a credit card service or an electronic ticket service).
[0009]
In the card terminal 100, a card terminal OS 101 operates. The card terminal OS 101 accesses the application program (AP) stored in the data storage unit 102 via the data path 130 and executes the AP.
[0010]
The AP stored in the card terminal 100 of FIG. 1 will be described. The card AP loading AP 103 is a host-side AP that performs card AP loading work. The card AP mounting AP 103 sends the card AP load format data 104 and the card AP load permit 105 to the card 110 connected to the card terminal 100 via the data path 142 to mount the card AP. Realize.
[0011]
A host-side AP that realizes another business AP service is a service terminal AP106. Similarly, the service terminal AP 106 accesses the card 110 via the data path 142 to realize a business AP service.
[0012]
As described above, the secure communication means that data exchanged through the data path 142 is encrypted (Encode) or data integrity is guaranteed (MAC: Message Authentication Code). It is a function that prevents data tampering by the user. In FIG. 1, the secure communication of the data path 142 is indicated by the cylindrical description method 141.
[0013]
Another important process in realizing secure communication is mutual authentication. Mutual authentication is a process of authenticating each other as a valid communication partner in secure communication. In FIG. 1, a card authentication AP 107 is an AP that is called from the card AP mounting AP 103 or the service terminal AP 106 and performs mutual authentication with the card 110. Specifically, the card authentication AP 107 accesses the terminal authentication AP 117 on the card 110 via the data path 131 and performs mutual authentication using the card master keys Kcm 108 and 118. If the result of mutual authentication is OK, the two authentication APs 107 and 117 derive card session keys Kcs109 and 119 from the card master keys Kcm108 and 118, respectively. The derived session key is used for encryption of communication data on the data path 142, and secures the data path 142 for secure communication. Note that the data path 131 and the data path 142 are data paths that are physically realized by the same data communication path, but the data flowing through the paths are logically different. ) Data path. That is, the double-line data path 131 is a data path through which mutual authentication information flows, and the data path 142 wrapped in the cylindrical sheath 141 is a data path through which a secure message flows. This is the end of the description of the card terminal 100.
[0014]
Next, the card 110 will be described. The card 110 includes a card OS 111 and a data storage unit 116. The communication processing unit 112 in the card OS 111 performs communication processing with the outside via logical data paths 131 and 142. The command received from the outside is sent to the card OS command execution unit 113 via the data path 132. For example, when the received command is a card AP mounted command, the card OS command execution unit 113 sends the card AP load format data stored in the data portion of the command to the data storage unit 116 via the data path 135. , And stored as card AP load format data 120. Further, the card OS command execution unit 113 performs processing 138 such as decryption on the card AP load format data 120, converts it into card AP execution format data 121, and stores it. If the command is a card AP selection command, the card OS command execution unit accesses the card AP management unit 114 and selects the card AP execution format data 121. If a command that is not supported by the card OS is sent from the outside after selecting the card AP. This command is regarded as a command specific to the card AP being selected, and is sent to the card AP execution unit 115 for execution. If the received command is a mutual authentication command, the card OS command execution unit selects the terminal authentication AP 117. The selected card AP authentication AP holds the card master key Kcm 118 and executes mutual authentication with the card terminal 100. Further, the terminal authentication AP 117 holds a card session key Kcs 119 derived from the card master key 118. The card session key Kcs 119 encrypts data exchanged via the data path 142 (in FIG. 1, this encryption is indicated by a broken line 140). With this encryption, the secure channel 141 of the data path 142 is realized. This is the end of the card description.
[0015]
Next, mutual authentication processing and secure message processing in a conventional IC card system will be described with reference to FIGS.
Mutual authentication is realized by mutually verifying that two systems share certain secret information. Specifically, mutual authentication can be performed by mutually verifying that the card terminals 100 and 200 and the cards 110 and 201 hold the common symmetric encryption keys Kcm 108 and 118 in FIGS. Realized. The mutual authentication includes card authentication in which the card terminals 100 and 200 authenticate the cards 110 and 201, and external authentication in which the cards 110 and 201 authenticate the card terminals 100 and 200.
[0016]
First, card authentication will be described. The card terminals 100 and 200 generate a random number called a host challenge (step (1)) and send it to the cards 110 and 201 as a card authentication command via the data path 131 (step 202). The card 201 generates a random number called a card challenge (step (2)), and derives the card session key Kcs119 from the card master key Kcm118 using the host challenge and the card challenge (step (3)). Further, the card 201 creates a card ciphertext by encrypting the host challenge and the card challenge with the card master key Kcm 118 (step (4)). The cards 110 and 201 send the card challenge generated in step (2) and the card ciphertext created in step (4) to the card terminals 100 and 200 as a card authentication command response via the data path 131. (Step 203). The card terminals 100 and 200 derive the card session key Kcs109 from the card master key Kcm108 using the host challenge and the card challenge sent from the cards 110 and 201 (step (5)). Further, the IC cards 110 and 201 create a card ciphertext by encrypting the host challenge and the card challenge with the card master key Kcm108, and compare and verify the card ciphertext sent from the cards 110 and 201 (step ( 6)). If the two match, the card terminals 100 and 200 have confirmed the validity of the cards 110 and 201.
[0017]
Next, external authentication will be described. The card terminals 100 and 200 create a host ciphertext by encrypting the host challenge and the card challenge with the card master key Kcm 118 (step (7)). The card terminals 100 and 200 send the host challenge generated in step (6) to the cards 110 and 201 as an external authentication command via the data path 131 (step 204). The cards 110 and 201 create a host ciphertext by encrypting the host challenge and the card challenge with the card master key Kcm118, and compare and verify with the host ciphertext sent from the card terminals 100 and 200 (step (8)). )). If the two match, the cards 110 and 201 have confirmed the validity of the card terminals 100 and 200. The IC cards 110, 201 are sent to the card terminals 100, 200 as an external authentication command response via the data path 131 (step 205).
[0018]
This is the end of the description of the mutual authentication, and the secure message processing will be described next. The card terminals 100 and 200 generate the command data for secure message processing (step (9)), encrypt it with the card session key Kcs109 generated in step (5) (139, 141), and create a secure message target The command 206 is sent to the cards 110 and 201 via the data path 142. The cards 110 and 201 receive the command, execute the command processing (step (10)), encrypt the execution result with the card session key Kcs119 generated in step (3) (140, 141), and create a secure message. The target command response 207 is sent to the cards 110 and 201 via the data path 142. This is the end of the description of secure message processing.
[0019]
As described above, the conventional IC card system is composed of the card 110 and the card terminal 100, realizes a secure communication path by mutual authentication between each other, performs data exchange via the communication path, Provide service. In order to provide services securely with such an IC card system, it is necessary to set a different authentication encryption key for each card when the card is issued. Furthermore, a business operator that issues and operates cards must manage these encryption keys and perform authentication processing in response to the cards even when providing services. That is, it can be seen that the cost of issuing, operating and managing cards increases in proportion to the number of cards. This is the end of the description of the prior art.
[0020]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
In the IC card, since the nonvolatile memory area provided in the card is limited, the number of cards AP that can be mounted on one card is limited. Therefore, the card user has to possess a plurality of cards when using a large number of card APs. For example, in a card having a nonvolatile memory capacity of 32 KB (kilobytes), assuming that the size per card AP is 8 KB, only four card APs can be mounted per card. Therefore, if the card user wishes to use ten card APs, the card user has to possess at least three cards.
[0021]
At this time, in the conventional IC card, since each card operates independently, the card issuer must set and manage the card and personal authentication data for each card. If the card issuer is different for each card, it is natural to think that each card is managed independently. However, when a single card issuer issues multiple cards to a single card user, the card safety for the user is reduced, and the card operating cost increases for the card issuer. There was a point. Hereinafter, these two problems will be described.
[0022]
First, safety issues will be described. In general, the possibility that the card user loses the card is considered to be proportional to the number of cards possessed by the card user. At this time, in the conventional card as described above, since each card has the same personal information, the possibility of losing information or making the personal information known to a malicious third party is proportional to the number of cards. It is thought that it will grow.
[0023]
Next, problems related to operation costs will be described. The card issuer must set card and personal authentication information (usually often an encryption key) for each card and manage the authentication information and card status information. In the conventional card, each card operates independently and it is necessary to set and manage the card and personal authentication data for each card. Accordingly, the cost of card management increases in proportion to the number of cards. For example, taking the card authentication information set for the card as an example, it is necessary to set and manage different authentication information for each card to authenticate the validity of the card. The number increases in proportion to the number of cards. Further, taking a password (PIN: Personal Identification Number) as an example, assuming that the PIN stored in each card is different for a plurality of cards held by a card user, the PIN number to be managed by the card issuer The number of cards increases in proportion to the number of cards. Even if the PIN stored in each card is assumed to be the same value, if the card user changes the PIN, it is necessary to change the PIN for all cards held by the user. There is a problem that the management cost increases in proportion to the number of cards.
[0024]
[Means for Solving the Problems]
To solve the above problem,
Means for holding first authentication information and second authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and results of the mutual authentication A first IC card comprising a secure communication means for generating a session key for establishing a secure communication path with another person based on the information, and using the generated session key;
Means for holding third authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and secure with others based on the result of mutual authentication A second IC card comprising a secure communication means for generating a session key for establishing a communication path and using the generated session key;
Means for holding fourth authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and secure with others based on the result of mutual authentication A session key for establishing a communication path is generated, and an IC card terminal provided with a secure communication means using the generated session key,
A first mutual authentication process is performed between the first IC card and the IC card terminal,
A second mutual authentication process is performed between the first IC card and the second IC card,
Using a first session key generated based on the result of the first mutual authentication process, via a first secure communication path established between the first IC card and the IC card terminal A second session key generated based on the result of the second mutual authentication process is transferred from the first card to the card terminal;
A first IC card system characterized in that a secure communication path is established between the second card and the card terminal using the second session key transferred to the card terminal.
Furthermore, in the first IC card system, the first authentication information held by the first IC card and the third authentication information held by the IC card terminal are the same symmetric encryption key. A second IC card system characterized by that.
Furthermore, in the second IC card system, the first session key generated based on the result of the first mutual authentication process is a symmetric type obtained by encrypting a random number with the symmetric type encryption key. A third IC card system characterized by being an encryption key.
Furthermore, in the first IC card system, the second authentication information held by the first IC card and the second authentication information held by the second IC card are the same symmetric encryption key. A fourth IC card system characterized by being.
Furthermore, in the fourth IC card system, the second session key generated based on the result of the second mutual authentication process is a symmetric type obtained by encrypting a random number with the symmetric type encryption key. A fifth IC card system, which is an encryption key.
Or means for holding first authentication information that can authenticate the validity of itself or another person, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with another person, and based on the result of the mutual authentication, Another card that generates a session key for establishing a secure communication path, and creates authentication information of the other card using secure communication means using the generated session key and card identification information of the other card input from the outside A first IC card comprising: authentication information creating means; and other card authentication information managing means for managing the card identification information of the other card and the generated other card authentication information as a pair;
Means for holding its own card identification information, means for holding second authentication information enabling authenticity of itself or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, A second IC card having a secure communication means for generating a session key for establishing a secure communication path with another person based on the result of mutual authentication, and using the generated session key;
Means for holding third authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and secure with others based on the result of mutual authentication A session key for establishing a communication path is generated, secure communication means using the generated session key, card identification information is acquired from the second IC card, and the acquired card identification information is used as the first IC card. An IC card issuing machine comprising card issuing means for requesting generation of authentication information based on the sent card identification information and storing the generated authentication information in the second IC card,
The IC card issuing machine reads card identification information from the second IC card, performs a first mutual authentication process with the first IC card, and obtains a result of the first mutual authentication process. Read from the second IC card in the previous period via the first secure communication path established between the first IC card and the IC card issuer using the first session key generated based on The issued card identifier is sent to the other card authentication information creation means of the first IC card to request creation of authentication information of the second IC card, and the created second IC card 5. A fifth IC card system, wherein authentication information is read from the first IC card, the read authentication information is sent to the second IC card, stored, and issued.
Or means for holding first authentication information that can authenticate the validity of itself or another person, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with another person, and based on the result of the mutual authentication, Other card authentication information management for generating a session key for establishing a secure communication path and managing the secure communication means using the generated session key and the card identification information and authentication information of the other card input from the outside as a pair A first IC card comprising means;
Means for holding own card identification information, means for holding second authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, authentication information stored in means for holding the authentication information, and others A mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with a person, and a secure communication means for generating a session key for establishing a secure communication path with another person based on the result of the mutual authentication and using the generated session key A second IC card,
Means for holding third authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and secure with others based on the result of mutual authentication A session key for establishing a communication path is generated, secure communication means using the generated session key, card identification information and authentication information are acquired from the second IC card, and the acquired card identification information and authentication information are An IC card issuing machine comprising card issuing means for sending to the first IC card and requesting storage;
The IC card issuer reads out card identification information and authentication information from the second IC card, performs a first mutual authentication process with the first IC card, and performs the first mutual authentication. Using the first session key generated based on the result of the process, the second session of the previous period is established via the first secure communication path established between the first IC card and the IC card issuer. A sixth IC card system, wherein the card identifier and authentication information read from the IC card are sent, stored, and issued.
[0025]
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
A first embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 3 shows the configuration of an IC card system that implements the provision of an IC card service using two IC cards. Prior to the description of the embodiments of the present invention, the object of the present invention will be briefly described. The object of the present invention is to secure the card AP 326 on the sub-card 320 in which the card terminal does not have any authentication information in advance through the main card 310 in which the card terminal has authentication information in advance. It is to realize communication. That is, in the card terminal, the main card 310, which is the first IC card, is responsible for realizing card authentication, and the sub card 320, which is the second IC card, is responsible for realizing service AP work using the card AP. On the other hand, it is a feature of the present invention that both services cooperate to enable secure provision of services.
[0026]
Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail with reference to FIG. First, the configuration of the IC card system of the present invention will be described. The card terminal 300 includes a card terminal OS 301 and a data storage unit 302. The card terminal OS 301 accesses and executes an application (AP) on the data storage unit 302 via the data path 350. Similarly, the main card 310 includes a card OS 311 and a data storage unit 312. The card OS 311 accesses and executes an application (AP) on the data storage unit 312 via the data path 359. Similarly, the sub card 320 includes a card OS 321 and a data storage unit 322. The card OS 321 accesses and executes an application (AP) on the data storage unit 322 via the data path 360.
[0027]
In the following, the operation of the IC card system of the present invention will be described in the order of time with reference to FIG. A main card 310 and a sub card 320 are connected to the card terminal 300. In this initial state, only the main card master key Kc1m304 is stored in the card terminal 300, and only the main card master key Kc1m314 and the sub card master key Kc2m317 are stored in the main card 310. Stores only the sub card master key Kc2m. In other words, it should be noted that the card terminal 300 does not have authentication information about the sub card 320, and the main card 310 has authentication information about the sub card 320.
[0028]
First, the card terminal 300 executes the main card authentication AP 303. The main card authentication AP 303 accesses the terminal authentication AP 313 on the main card 310 via the logical data path 351. The main card authentication AP 303 is set with the main card master key Kc1m304, and executes mutual authentication with the terminal authentication AP 313 of the main card 310. When the mutual authentication is successful, the main card authentication AP 303 and the terminal authentication AP 313 generate session keys Kc1s (305, 315), respectively.
[0029]
Next, the card terminal 300 executes a card cooperation AP 306 which is a characteristic AP of the present invention. The card cooperation AP 306 accesses the sub card authentication AP 316 on the main card 310 via the data path 354 and accesses the main card authentication AP 323 on the sub card 320 via the data path 355. By accessing both of them, the card cooperation AP 306 functions to mediate the mutual authentication using the sub card master keys Kc2m 317 and 324.
[0030]
Here, the sub card authentication AP 316 on the main card 310, which is another feature of the present invention, will be described. The sub-card authentication AP 316 has a function of maintaining a list of sub-cards that the main card 310 can perform authentication processing on, and authenticating sub-cards to be linked with the card terminal 300. Specifically, by managing the card identifier / master key pair of the sub card as a list of sub cards, mutual authentication with the cooperating sub card is enabled.
[0031]
When the mutual authentication is successful, the sub card authentication AP 316 on the main card 310 derives the sub card session key Kc 2 s 318 from the sub card master key Kc 2 m 317, and the main card authentication AP 323 on the sub card 320 receives the sub card session from the sub card master key Kc 2 m 324. Deriving the key Kc2s325.
[0032]
Next, the sub card authentication AP 307 uses the main card session key Kc1s305 generated by the main card authentication AP 303 on the card terminal 300 and the main card session key Kc1s 315 generated by the terminal authentication AP 313 on the main card 310. A data path 356 protected by a secure communication path 357 is realized. The sub card authentication AP 307 reads the sub card session key Kc2s 318 generated in the sub card authentication AP 316 on the main card 310 via the data path 356, and stores it as the sub card session key Kc 2s 308 in its own AP. By reading the session key, the card terminal 300 can safely obtain a session key that can realize secure communication with the sub card 320 through the main card for the sub card 320 that originally had no information. Become. In other words, it is understood that it is not necessary to manage the authentication information of the sub card at the card terminal, that is, the host side.
[0033]
Finally, the card terminal 300 executes the service terminal AP309. Using the sub card session key Kc2s308 acquired by the sub card authentication AP 307 (358), the service terminal AP 309 realizes the data path 362 protected by the card AP 326 on the sub card 320 and the logical secure communication path 363. It becomes possible to do. On the other hand, the card AP 326 on the sub card 320 is protected by the logical secure communication path 363 with the service terminal AP 309 on the main card 300 using the sub card session key Kc2s 325 generated by the main card authentication AP 323 (361). The data path 362 can be realized.
[0034]
This is the end of the description of the first embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the authentication key of each card is a key that corresponds to a card manager key of the Open Platform Card specification of the Global Platform, but it can also be considered as a key that corresponds to a security domain key of the same specification. Similarly, it is obvious that the embodiment can be realized. In the present embodiment, the authentication key of each card has been described as being a symmetric encryption key (common encryption key). However, in the case of an asymmetric encryption key, the embodiment can similarly be realized. it is obvious.
[0035]
As a second embodiment of the present invention, a sub card issuing method capable of cooperating with the main card will be described. First, the configuration of the IC card (= sub card) issuing machine of the present invention will be described with reference to FIG.
An external operation of the card issuing machine 400 will be described. The card issuing machine 400 receives a sub card issuing instruction 420 from the card user 410. Next, the card issuing machine 400 requests the card user to present the main card 406 (426), and stores the issuance symmetrical sub card authentication information for the sub card authentication AP of the card. Finally, the card issuing machine 400 issues the sub card 408 to the card user (428).
[0036]
The internal operation of the card issuing machine 400 will be described. The card issuing control unit 401 in the card issuing machine 400 receives the sub card issuing instruction via the card issuing instruction input unit 402 (421). The card issuance control unit 401 instructs the unissued sub card storage unit 403 to send an unissued card to the sub card master key setting unit 404 via the data path 422. The unissued sub card sent to the sub card master key setting unit 404 via the transport path 423 stores the master key information sent by the card issuance control unit 401 via the data path 424, and passes through the transport path 425. It is sent to the card carry-out unit 407 and issued as a sub card 408 to the card user 410 (428). In parallel with this, the card issuance control unit 401 accepts the main card 407 of the card user 410 (426) and sends it to the main card registration information setting unit 405 via the data path 427. Store information. This is the end of the outline of the operation of the sub card issuing machine.
[0037]
Two embodiments will be described in detail with respect to a method of generating a master key stored in the sub card by the card issuing machine 400. The first embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. The card issuing machine 500 includes a card issuing machine OS 501 and a data storage unit 502. The card issuing machine OS 501 accesses and executes an application (AP) on the data storage unit 502 via the data path 550. Similarly, the main card 510 includes a card OS 511 and a data storage unit 512. The card OS 511 accesses and executes an application (AP) on the data storage unit 512 via the data path 560. Similarly, the sub card 520 includes a card OS 521 and a data storage unit 522. The card OS 521 accesses and executes an application (AP) on the data storage unit 522 via the data path 561.
[0038]
Hereinafter, the operation of the sub-card issuing method 1 in the IC card system of the present invention will be described according to the temporal order with reference to FIG. In the card issuing machine 500, the main card 510 is connected and the sub card 520 is prepared. In this initial state, only the main card master key Kc1m504 is stored in the card issuing machine 500, only the main card master key Kc1m514 is stored in the main card 510, and only the subcard identifier Id2 is stored in the subcard 520. Is stored.
[0039]
First, the card issuing machine 500 executes the main card authentication AP 503. The main card authentication AP 503 accesses the terminal authentication AP 513 on the main card 510 via the logical data path 551. The main card authentication AP 503 is set with a main card master key Kc1m504, and executes mutual authentication with the terminal authentication AP 513 of the main card 510. When the mutual authentication is successful, the main card authentication AP 503 and the terminal authentication AP 513 each generate a main card session key Kc1s (505, 515).
[0040]
Next, the card issuing machine 500 executes the sub card issuing AP 506. The sub card issuing AP 506 accesses the sub card 520, reads the sub card identifier Id2 (523) unique to the sub card 520 via the data path 554, and stores it as the sub card identifier Id2 (507). Further, the sub card issuing AP 506 implements a secure communication path 559 by using the generated main card session key Kc1s (505, 515), and passes the data path 555 to the sub card master key generation AP 516 on the main card 510. And is stored as the sub card identifier Id2 (517). The sub card master key generation AP 516 on the main card 510 uses the sub card identifier Id2 (517) and the sub card authentication key generation master key Kcm 518 stored therein to use the sub card master key Kc2m519 unique to the sub card 520. Is generated as a derived key. The sub card issuing AP 506 on the card issuing machine 500 implements the secure communication path 557 using the generated main card session key Kc1s (505, 515) and receives the sub card master key Kc2m519 via the data path 556. Read and store it as a sub card master key Kc2m508. Furthermore, the sub card issuing AP 506 accesses the sub card 520 via the data path 558 and stores the sub card master key Kc2m525. This is the end of the description of the operation of the sub card issuing method 1.
Next, the operation of the sub card issuing method 2 in the IC card system of the present invention will be described according to the temporal order with reference to FIG. In the card issuing machine 600, the main card 610 is connected and the sub card 620 is prepared. In this initial state, only the main card master key Kc1m 604 is stored in the card issuing machine 600, only the main card master key Kc1m 614 is stored in the main card 610, and the sub card identifier Id2 is stored in the sub card 520. Only the sub card master key Kc2m625 is stored.
[0041]
First, the card issuing machine 600 executes the main card authentication AP 603. The main card authentication AP 603 accesses the terminal authentication AP 613 on the main card 610 via the logical data path 651. The main card authentication AP 603 is set with a main card master key Kc1m 604, and performs mutual authentication with the terminal authentication AP 613 of the main card 610. When the mutual authentication is successful, the main card authentication AP 603 and the terminal authentication AP 613 each generate a main card session key Kc1s (605, 615).
[0042]
Next, the card issuing machine 600 executes the sub card issuing AP 606. The sub card issuing AP 606 accesses the sub card 620, reads the sub card identifier Id2 (623) unique to the sub card 620 via the data path 654, and stores it as the sub card identifier Id2 (607). Further, the sub card issuing AP 606 implements a secure communication path 656 using the generated main card session key Kc1s (605, 615), and passes the data path 655 to the sub card master key registration AP 616 on the main card 610. And is stored as a sub card identifier Id2 (617).
[0043]
Further, the sub card issuing AP 606 accesses the sub card 620, reads the sub card master key Kc2m (625) unique to the sub card 620 via the data path 657, and stores it as the sub card master key Kc2m (609). Further, the sub-card issuing AP 606 implements a secure communication path 659 by using the generated main card session key Kc1s (605, 615), and passes the data path 658 to the sub-card master key registration AP 616 on the main card 610. And store it as a sub card master key Kc2m619. This is the end of the description of the operation of the sub card issuing method 2.
[0044]
【The invention's effect】
According to the present invention, the user of the main card can easily increase the number of IC cards that can be used by the user by receiving issuance of a sub card as necessary. In addition, the sub card does not require special treatment other than being used together with the main card, and convenience is improved. In addition, even if the sub card is lost, the sub card alone does not operate, so it is considered safer in terms of security compared to using a plurality of main cards.
[0045]
Further, for the card issuer, the sub card is simpler to manage than the main card, and the operation management cost can be reduced as compared with the case of issuing a plurality of main cards.
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 shows the configuration of a conventional IC card system.
FIG. 2 is a sequence diagram of mutual authentication processing and secure communication processing in a conventional IC card system.
FIG. 3 shows the configuration of an IC card system according to the present invention.
FIG. 4 shows a configuration of a sub card issuing machine in the IC card system of the present invention.
FIG. 5 shows a sub card issuing method 1 in the IC card system of the present invention.
FIG. 6 is a sub-card issuing method 2 in the IC card system of the present invention.
[Explanation of symbols]
100: Card terminal
101: Card terminal OS
102: Data storage unit
107: Card authentication AP
108: Card master key
109: Card session key
110: Card
111: Card OS
116 data storage unit
117: Terminal authentication AP
118: Card master key
119: Card session key
200: Card terminal
201: Card
300: Card terminal
303: Main card authentication AP
304: Main card master key
305: Main card session key
306: Card linkage AP
307: Subcard authentication AP
308: Subcard session key
309: Service terminal AP
310: Main card
313: Terminal authentication AP
314: Main card master key
315: Main card session key
316: Subcard authentication AP
317: Subcard master key
318: Subcard session key
320: Sub card
323: Main card authentication AP
324: Main card master key
325: Main card session key
400: Card issuing machine
410: Card user
406: Main card
408: Sub card
500: Card terminal
503: Main card authentication AP
504: Main card master key
505: Main card session key
506: AP for issuing sub cards
507: Sub card identifier
508: Subcard master key
510: Main card
513: Terminal authentication AP
514: Main card master key
515: Main card session key
516: Subcard master key generation AP
517: Sub card identifier
518: Subkey authentication key generation master key
519: Subcard master key
520: Sub card
523: Sub card identifier
525: Subcard master key
600: Card terminal
603: Main card authentication AP
604: Main card master key
605: Main card session key
606: Sub-card issuing AP
607: Sub card identifier
609: Sub card master key
610: Main card
613: Terminal authentication AP
614: Main card master key
615: Main card session key
616: Subcard master key registration AP
517: Sub card identifier
619: Subcard master key
620: Sub card
623: Sub card identifier
625: Subcard master key.

Claims (7)

Means for holding first authentication information and second authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and results of the mutual authentication A first IC card comprising a secure communication means for generating a session key for establishing a secure communication path with another person based on the information, and using the generated session key;
Means for holding third authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and secure with others based on the result of mutual authentication A second IC card comprising a secure communication means for generating a session key for establishing a communication path and using the generated session key;
Means for holding fourth authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and secure with others based on the result of mutual authentication A session key for establishing a communication path is generated, and an IC card terminal provided with a secure communication means using the generated session key,
A first mutual authentication process is performed between the first IC card and the IC card terminal,
A second mutual authentication process is performed between the first IC card and the second IC card,
Using a first session key generated based on the result of the first mutual authentication process, via a first secure communication path established between the first IC card and the IC card terminal A second session key generated based on the result of the second mutual authentication process is transferred from the first card to the card terminal;
An IC card system, wherein a secure communication path is established between the second card and the card terminal using the second session key transferred to the card terminal. The first authentication information held by the first IC card and the third authentication information held by the IC card terminal are the same symmetric encryption key. IC card system. The first session key generated based on the result of the first mutual authentication process according to claim 2 is a symmetric encryption key obtained by encrypting a random number with the symmetric encryption key. IC card system characterized by The second authentication information held by the first IC card and the second authentication information held by the second IC card are the same symmetric encryption key according to claim 1. IC card system. 5. The second session key generated based on the result of the second mutual authentication process according to claim 4, wherein the second session key is a symmetric encryption key obtained by encrypting a random number with the symmetric encryption key. IC card system characterized by Means for holding first authentication information that can authenticate the validity of oneself or another person, a mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with another person, and secure the other person based on the result of the mutual authentication. Other card authentication information that generates a session key for establishing a communication path, and creates authentication information of the other card using secure communication means using the generated session key and card identification information of the other card input from the outside A first IC card comprising: creating means; and other card authentication information managing means for managing the card identification information of the other card and the generated other card authentication information as a pair;
Means for holding its own card identification information, means for holding second authentication information enabling authenticity of itself or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, A second IC card having a secure communication means for generating a session key for establishing a secure communication path with another person based on the result of mutual authentication, and using the generated session key;
Means for holding third authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and secure with others based on the result of mutual authentication A session key for establishing a communication path is generated, secure communication means using the generated session key, card identification information is acquired from the second IC card, and the acquired card identification information is used as the first IC card. An IC card issuing machine comprising card issuing means for requesting generation of authentication information based on the sent card identification information and storing the generated authentication information in the second IC card,
The IC card issuing machine reads card identification information from the second IC card, performs a first mutual authentication process with the first IC card, and obtains a result of the first mutual authentication process. Read from the second IC card in the previous period via the first secure communication path established between the first IC card and the IC card issuer using the first session key generated based on The issued card identifier is sent to the other card authentication information creation means of the first IC card to request creation of authentication information of the second IC card, and the created second IC card An IC card system, wherein authentication information is read from the first IC card, the read authentication information is sent to the second IC card, stored, and issued. Means for holding first authentication information that can authenticate the validity of oneself or another person, a mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with another person, and secure the other person based on the result of the mutual authentication. A secure communication means that generates a session key for establishing a communication path, uses the generated session key, and another card authentication information management means that manages the card identification information and authentication information of the other card input from the outside in pairs A first IC card with
Means for holding own card identification information, means for holding second authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, authentication information stored in means for holding the authentication information, and others A mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with a person, and a secure communication means for generating a session key for establishing a secure communication path with another person based on the result of the mutual authentication and using the generated session key A second IC card,
Means for holding third authentication information enabling authenticity of self or others, mutual authentication means for authenticating mutual validity with others, and secure with others based on the result of mutual authentication A session key for establishing a communication path is generated, secure communication means using the generated session key, card identification information and authentication information are acquired from the second IC card, and the acquired card identification information and authentication information are An IC card issuing machine comprising card issuing means for sending to the first IC card and requesting storage;
The IC card issuer reads out card identification information and authentication information from the second IC card, performs a first mutual authentication process with the first IC card, and performs the first mutual authentication. Using the first session key generated based on the result of the process, the second session of the previous period is established via the first secure communication path established between the first IC card and the IC card issuer. An IC card system characterized by sending, storing, and issuing a card identifier and authentication information read from an IC card.

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