JP2024518959A - Interference with the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles - Google Patents

Abstract

A method for inducing a disturbance to operation of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in communication with a remote controller, the method including determining to induce a disturbance to operation of the UAV and transmitting one or more disturbance commands to the UAV, the one or more disturbance commands, when executed by the UAV, causing a unit of the UAV to malfunction, the malfunction inducing the disturbance to operation of the UAV.

Description

Commercial Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are rapidly becoming more popular. By 2020, over 100 million UAVs are expected to be in use. Until a few years ago, UAVs were purely military aircraft. Today, commercial UAVs are widely available, relatively inexpensive, and feature the highest military-grade capabilities.

While most UAVs are used for legitimate and constructive purposes, many are used irresponsibly or maliciously - to endanger aircraft in airports, smuggle drugs and weapons into prisons, attack or harass powerful politicians, and carry out terrorist acts.

Military counter-UAV technologies, typically based on radar detection, narrow beam RF jamming, or kinetic mitigation (missiles, destructive laser beams), have been successfully deployed in offshore military installations and rural environments.

However, in various scenarios (even military scenarios), these techniques are not appropriate. For example, these techniques may not be suitable for urban environments or airports due to various risks, including but not limited to collateral damage.

There is a growing demand to provide an efficient method to disrupt the operation of UAVs.

As described herein, a system, method, and computer-readable medium may be provided.

Methods may be provided for disrupting the operation of a UAV.

The embodiments of the present disclosure will be more fully understood and appreciated by reading the following detailed description in conjunction with the drawings.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a method. FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a method. FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a method. FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a method. FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a method. FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a jamming system, a UAV, and a remote controller. FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a jamming system, a UAV, and a remote controller. FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a user of a communication link or network.

In the following detailed description, numerous specific details are set forth to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. However, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known methods, procedures, and components have not been described in detail so as not to obscure the present invention.

The subject matter which is regarded as the invention is particularly pointed out and distinctly claimed in the concluding portion of this specification. The invention, however, both as to organization and method of operation, together with its objects, features, and advantages, may best be understood by reference to the following detailed description when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

It will be appreciated that for simplicity and clarity of illustration, elements shown in the figures have not necessarily been drawn to scale. For example, the dimensions of some of the elements may be exaggerated relative to other elements for clarity. Further, where considered appropriate, reference numerals may be repeated among the figures to indicate corresponding or similar elements.

The illustrated embodiments of the present invention may, for the most part, be implemented using electronic components and circuits known to those skilled in the art and therefore will not be described to a greater extent than is deemed necessary as set forth above for the understanding and appreciation of the underlying concepts of the present invention and so as not to obfuscate or distract from the teachings of the present invention.

Any reference herein to a method should apply mutatis mutandis to a device or system capable of performing the method and/or to a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions for performing the method.

Any reference herein to a system or device should be applied mutatis mutandis to methods that may be performed by the system and/or to a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions executable by the system.

Any reference herein to a non-transitory computer readable medium should apply mutatis mutandis to a device or system capable of executing instructions stored on the non-transitory computer readable medium and/or to a method for executing the instructions.

Any combination of any module or unit depicted in any of the figures, any part of this specification, and/or any claim may be provided.

The specification and/or drawings may refer to a processor. A processor may be processing circuitry. The processing circuitry may be implemented as a central processing unit (CPU) and/or one or more other integrated circuits, such as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a fully custom integrated circuit, or the like, or a combination of such integrated circuits.

Any combination of any steps of any method illustrated in this specification and/or the drawings may be provided.

Any combination of the subject matter of any of the claims may be provided.

Any combination of the systems, units, components, processors, and sensors illustrated in this specification and/or drawings may be provided.

Methods, systems, and computer-readable media may be provided.

A UAV may be programmed and/or otherwise configured to accomplish a task and/or mission. This may include reaching a destination and/or performing an action upon reaching a destination. A UAV may similarly be considered to reach a destination when the destination is within range of the UAV. A destination is within range of a UAV when the UAV is positioned in a location that allows it to accomplish a task associated with the destination.

Operations may include searching for targets associated with the destination, delivering a payload (which may or may not be a damaging payload) to the target, implementing electronic countermeasures, obtaining information about the target, targeting precision munitions to the target, etc.

It should be noted that a UAV may be programmed to perform multiple missions and/or reach multiple destinations and/or perform multiple operations related to one or more targets and/or perform any desired flight pattern and/or fly under the control of a remote controller or other control device and/or fly without a predefined target or goal. For simplicity of explanation, the following text will refer to a UAV being assigned a mission that includes a target located at a destination and performing an operation related to the target.

When referring to a "remote controller," this includes a remote controller device as well as any other control device such as a ground station, VR goggles, a smartphone or tablet, a control stick, a telemetry module, a secondary remote controller (e.g., a gimbal controller), etc.

A method may be provided for inducing interference with the operation of a UAV. The interference may prevent the UAV from successfully completing its mission.

Interference with the operation of a UAV:
- Pairing with unauthorized entities;
Detaching the UAV from the remote controller;
Implementing a UAV safety plan (or emergency plan);
Returning to the base station or take-off location or any other default location of the UAV;
- Changing the destination of the UAV;
- Changing the flight pattern of the UAV;
Increasing the visibility of UAVs to countermeasures and/or attacks;
Deactivating or preventing any stealth operation or stealth mode of a UAV;
Deactivating or disrupting any concealment means of the UAV;
- Stopping the progress of the UAV towards its destination;
- Hovering at a given location for at least a predefined period of time;
- Hover in place until power runs out,
Crash landing the UAV;
- Landing the UAV at a designated location;
Preventing UAVs from flying within designated zones (no fly zones), either temporarily (e.g., passing formations) or permanently (restricted structures);
Preventing UAVs from taking off;
Preventing a UAV from ascending above a certain altitude or descending below a certain altitude;
- being replaced by an unauthorized entity;
Executing commands even if not paired,
Sending information (sensing information, status information, debugging information, etc.) - especially in scenarios where sensing information should not be sent or where it would not have been sent within the near time frame;
Activating or operating or disabling any of the modules of a UAV without it being initiated by the pilot - for example releasing the payload of the UAV in a location different from that planned by the pilot or preventing the pilot from releasing the payload or preventing the drone from recording images, etc. [Otherwise interfering with a separate device carried by the UAV]
It may include at least one of the following:

As noted above, more than one disruption of operation can occur. For example, a UAV may first be directed to transmit information and then be directed to crash.

FIG. 1 illustrates a method 100 for inducing a disturbance to the operation of a UAV in communication with a remote controller.

The method 100 may begin by step 110 of determining that a disturbance to the operation of the UAV will be caused.

Step 110 may be triggered by detection of communication between the UAV and the remote controller.

Step 110 may be triggered by detection of a UAV. Detection may be by any sensor or unit - radar, RF sensing unit, acoustic sensor, thermal sensor, optical sensor, visual sensor, etc. The sensor may be an active sensor and/or a passive sensor.

Step 110 may be triggered regardless of (or in the absence of) at least one of (a) detection of a UAV and (b) detection of communication between the UAV and a remote controller.

For example, step 110 may be triggered according to one or more rules, such as randomly, pseudo-randomly, and/or according to a predefined time schedule, or may be triggered in response to an event, etc. The event may include detecting an attempt to jam a system performing method 100.

Detection can be done by any sensor or unit - radar, RF sensing unit, acoustic sensor, heat sensor, optical sensor, visual sensor, etc. The sensor can be an active sensor and/or a passive sensor.

Method 100 may include determining one or more interference commands. This may be included in step 110, in step 120, or in another step of method 100.

Step 110 may be followed by step 120 of transmitting one or more jamming commands to the UAV that, when executed by the UAV, cause one or more units of the UAV to malfunction, the malfunction inducing a disruption to the operation of the UAV. Execution by the drone may include execution by at least one unit of the drone. A unit that executes the one or more jamming commands may malfunction and/or cause another unit to malfunction.

The one or more units of the UAV may be at least one of a communication unit of the UAV, one or more modems of the UAV, a controller of the UAV, a sensor of the UAV, a power unit of the UAV, a telemetry unit of the UAV, a battery module of the UAV, a storage unit of the UAV, an object detection unit of the UAV, a processor of the UAV, or any other unit of the UAV.

The malfunctions are as follows:
-Resetting the unit,
・Restarting the unit,
Skipping one or more steps of a unit;
Skipping one or more authentication steps;
skipping one or more verification steps; skipping one or more configuration steps; skipping one or more initialization steps; skipping encryption and/or decryption steps,
Skipping at least one of the error correction decoding and encoding steps;
Skipping at least one of the scrambling and descrambling steps;
- modifying one or more processing parameters of the unit;
Changing encryption and/or decryption parameters, such as changing passwords, encryption keys, auxiliary keys, handshake keys, challenge keys, encryption protocols, etc.
- modifying at least one of error correction decoding parameters and error correction encoding parameters;
- Changing at least one of the scrambling and descrambling parameters;
- changing one or more configuration parameters of a unit;
- changing one or more authentication parameters of the unit;
- modifying one or more debugging parameters of a unit;
- Changing the execution path of a unit;
- changing the operating mode of the unit;
Executing one or more undocumented commands of the unit;
- executing one or more debugging commands;
When the transmitting occurs, executing one or more commands in an operational mode different from an operational mode of the UAV;
Turning the unit off,
- Slowing down the execution speed of the programs executed by the unit;
Initiating the execution of an infinite loop of instructions;
- modifying one or more communication parameters;
- changing at least one frequency channel;
Changing at least one frequency hopping sequence parameter, such as, but not limited to, starting or stopping a hopping frequency;
- Changing the frequency band used;
- Changing the preamble sequence;
- Changing the error correction function;
- Changing the coding,
- changing the bit rate;
- Changing the baud rate;
- Varying the power of transmission;
- Changing the guard interval;
- Changing the scrambling sequence;
- modifying header bits;
Avoiding transmitting a response to receipt of one or more transmissions from a remote controller of the UAV;
Changing the network address of the remote controller (as seen by the UAV);
- Turn off the GPS unit,
Causing the GPS unit to determine an incorrect GPS location;
- Turn off ADS-B.
causing the ADS-B unit to make incorrect detection or location determinations of aircraft;
Shorting the battery or any other unit of the UAV;
- Turning off the remote control modem,
- Turning off the telemetry modem,
Turning off vital features required for flight, such as gyros, motors, etc.
- Causing false detection of obstacles;
Causing a sensor to falsely detect a target or otherwise trigger a sensor to falsely detect a target;
Having the UAV's battery meter determine a false battery level, e.g., the battery is empty, which can trigger the activation of an emergency plan;
Having the UAV transmit information acquired by the UAV;
- causing the UAV or its storage module to delete images or video recordings captured by the UAV camera;
- causing the UAV or its storage module to delete flight records or flight history;
- causing the UAV or its storage module to delete any files or records stored in its storage unit or removable storage;
- It may include at least one of causing the UAV to transmit or otherwise access any files or records stored in its storage unit or removable storage.

The one or more obstruction commands include:
- be configured to exploit vulnerabilities in the unit;
- may result in denial of service of the unit;
- can be configured to exploit vulnerabilities in communication protocols used by UAVs;
- Capable of causing buffer overflow malfunctions;
- The ability to cause holding of units;
- being able to cause the occurrence of an exception in the execution of the program executed by the unit;
- The ability to cause the UAV to reject packets that can be identified as being sent from the UAV's remote controller;
Ability to have the UAV transmit information from the UAV - as opposed to the transmission constraints imposed by the UAV during non-test flights;
- being able to cause the UAV to fail to detect objects sensed by the UAV;
- may be different from the detachment command, may be different from the detachment command but may induce a malfunction that may detach the UAV from its remote controller;
- the ability to cause at least one further unit of the UAV to malfunction;
- It can be adapted to any protocol layer used by the UAV;
- it can be an application layer command;
- It can be a unit command reset or a unit command restart;
- The ability to have the UAV change what it believes to be the network address of the remote controller;
- allowing the UAV to change what appears to it as the network address of a remote controller to a network address governed by one or more jamming commands;
The decision may be based on the outcome of one or more previous jamming command transmissions;
The decision may be based on feedback regarding the outcome of one or more previous jamming attempts;
The determination can be made based on an evaluation of the result of the transmission of at least one jamming command;
- the root cause of the unit's malfunction can be determined based on knowledge;
The root cause of the unit's malfunction can be determined without knowing it;
- can be determined based on the location of the UAV;
- may be determined based on the location of the remote controller;
may be determined based on one or more spatial relationships between two or more of the UAV, the transmitter, and the base station;
may be determined based on expected reception of base station signals by the UAV;
It may be based on the distance between the remote controller and the UAV;
- may be based on the flight pattern of the UAV;
- communication between the UAV and the remote controller can be distributed across the entire spectrum;
- be able to disperse over a portion of the spectrum;
- can include frequency hopping;
It can include scanning the spectrum or a portion of the spectrum;
- Ability to follow the specific frequencies and transmission times of the specific frequencies used by the UAVs and remote controllers;
- be able to follow the frequency bands used by UAVs and remote controllers and the transmission times of frequencies within the frequency bands;
- may be transmitted continuously during one or more periods;
Can change over time - for example, within the time window or windows in which step 120 is performed
- can be determined in any manner;
- may be determined based on a recent examination of communications between the UAV and the remote controller;
The vulnerability and/or faults of any unit of the UAV or any other aspect of the UAV may be determined;
- decisions can be made based on on-the-fly learning of the communication between the UAV and the remote controller;
- can be determined based on a combination of predefined jamming commands that can be adapted over time based on the success of the jamming commands;
- Capable of accomplishing at least one of being encapsulated and/or formatted and/or included in any type of packet, frame, etc.

The method 100 may include a step 140 of monitoring at least one of the UAV and the remote controller.

Step 140 may be performed before step 110, in parallel with step 110, after step 110, before step 120, in parallel with step 120, after step 120, etc.

For example, the transmission of any jamming commands may follow detection of the location and/or movement of the UAV.

Monitoring may include looking for communications between the UAV and a remote controller and/or detecting the UAV (by a visual sensor or by any other type of sensor), etc.

Step 140 may include, for example, monitoring a response of at least one of the UAV and the remote controller to transmitting one or more jamming commands.

Step 140 may include checking whether the operation of the UAV has been disrupted. Step 140 may include looking for any other items, such as responses that may result in a disruption, such as an attempt to reattach the UAV, a temporary detachment period, etc.

Step 140 may be followed by step 150, which responds to the monitoring.

Step 150 may include jumping to step 120, suggesting and/or indicating changes in step 120, terminating method 100, notifying one or more other systems about the monitoring results and/or about the jamming command sent during step 120, etc.

The modification in step 120 may include determining at least one jamming command, modifying at least one jamming command, removing at least one jamming command, and/or modifying a method of transmitting at least one jamming command.

It should be noted that the jamming commands sent during step 220 can change over time - for example, as events occur, based on a predefined schedule, based on a pseudo-random schedule, based on a random process, etc.

Step 220 can attempt to attack the UAV in a variety of ways - especially when the UAV's response to receiving a jamming command is unknown or difficult to predict.

The method 100 also illustrates communication between the UAV and a remote controller, and illustrates sending a jamming command that causes a unit on the UAV to malfunction.

It should be noted that the UAV may communicate with an authorizing entity, which may be different from the remote controller. Additionally or alternatively, the jamming command may be targeted at the authorizing entity (and not the UAV), or may be targeted at the authorizing entity and the UAV. The authorizing entity's units may be made to malfunction - in addition to or instead of the UAV's units.

FIG. 2 illustrates a method 200 for inducing interference with the operation of a UAV. The UAV communicates with an authorizing entity.

The authorizing entity is authorized in the sense that the authorizing entity is allowed to communicate with the UAV (at least) and/or can control aspects of the operation of the UAV and/or can affect the operation of the UAV in any other way. Authorization can be part of the mission. Authorization can be granted prior to and/or during the mission. Authorization can be granted in various ways - for example, by programming the UAV, by following a pairing process, etc.

The authorizing entity may be the UAV's remote controller, may be different from the UAV's remote controller, may be another UAV, etc.

Method 200 may begin by step 210 determining that a disturbance to the operation of the UAV is to be triggered. Any trigger of step 110 may be applied mutatis mutandis to step 210.

For example, step 210 may be triggered by detection of communication between the UAV and an authorized entity. The authorized entity is authorized to communicate with the UAV.

Step 210 may be followed by step 220 of transmitting to a recipient selected from among the UAV and the authorizing entity one or more disruptive commands that, when executed by the recipient, cause the recipient's unit to malfunction. The malfunction induces a disruption to the operation of the UAV.

Any malfunctions and/or disturbances discussed above (e.g., related to method 100) may be applied mutatis mutandis to step 220. For example, in step 220, the malfunction may be a malfunction of a unit of the authorizing entity.

Malfunctioning of the authorizing entity's units may disrupt the UAV in any way - for example, by causing the authorizing entity to not communicate with the UAV, sending erroneous messages to the UAV, etc.

The recipient may be a UAV. The recipient may be an authorizing entity.

Both the UAV and the authorizing entity may be intended recipients of one or more jamming commands, and the malfunction may occur in one or more units of the UAV, the authorizing entity, or both the UAV and the authorizing entity.

Thus, step 220 involves transmitting to another recipient of the UAV and to the authorizing entity one or more disruptive commands that, when executed by the other recipient, cause the other recipient's unit to malfunction, which in turn induces a disruption to the operation of the UAV. Thus, if the UAV is a recipient, the authorizing entity is the other recipient, and vice versa.

Step 220 may include step 222 of transmitting one or more first jamming commands to the UAV and one or more second jamming commands to the authorizing entity.

At least one first jamming command can be different from at least one second jamming command. At least one first jamming command can be equal to at least one second jamming command. One, some, or all of the first jamming commands can be equal to or different from one, some, or all of the corresponding second jamming commands.

The at least one first jamming command may be transmitted at least once simultaneously with the transmission of the at least one second jamming command. The at least one first jamming command may be transmitted at least once non-overlappingly in relation to the transmission of any second jamming command.

The first jamming command and the second jamming command may be transmitted in the same manner or in at least partially different manners. The transmission manner may include the transmission path, any part of the transmission path, any transmission parameters (strength, polarity, frequency, modulation, wave shaping, etc.).

Method 200 may include monitoring and/or responding to the monitoring of at least one of the UAV and the authorizing entity. Any monitoring means of step 140 of method 100 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the monitoring of method 200. Any response to the monitoring step of step 150 of method 100 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the monitoring of method 200.

Figure 3 illustrates a method 300 for inducing interference with the operation of a UAV.

The method 300 may begin by step 310 of determining that a disturbance to the operation of the UAV will be caused while the UAV is operating in a current operational mode.

Any trigger for step 110 can be applied mutatis mutandis to step 310.

Step 310 may be followed by step 320 of transmitting one or more jamming commands to the UAV that, when executed by the UAV, cause units of the UAV to operate in a manner consistent with an operating mode of the UAV that is different from the current operating mode.

For example, the current operating mode can be a stealth mode, the current operating mode can be a silent mode, the current operating mode can be different from a debugging mode, the current operating mode can be different from a flight mode, the current operating mode can be different from a test mode, etc.

The goal of step 320 is to put the UAV into a target operating mode, which may be different from a stealth mode, which may be different from a silent mode, which may be a test mode and/or a debug mode. In the target mode, the UAV may transmit information (e.g., status, sensor information, etc.), may be vulnerable to attack, may be less secure than its current operating mode, may fly in a manner that is more detectable to sensors, etc.

Method 300 may include monitoring and/or responding to the monitoring of at least one of the UAV and the remote controller. Method 300 may include monitoring and/or responding to the monitoring of at least one of the UAV and the authorizing entity. Any monitoring means of step 140 of method 100 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the monitoring of method 300. Any response to the monitoring step of step 150 of method 100 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the monitoring of method 300.

FIG. 4 illustrates a method 400 for inducing interference with the operation of a UAV.

The method 400 may begin by step 410, determining that a disturbance to the operation of the UAV will be caused.

Any trigger for step 110 can be applied mutatis mutandis to step 410.

Step 410 may be followed by step 420 of transmitting to the UAV one or more jamming commands that, when processed by the UAV, cause the UAV to communicate with an unauthorized entity.

This can cause the UAV to be controlled by an unauthorized entity, to be fed false information and/or commands from an unauthorized entity, etc.

The method 400 may include monitoring and/or responding to the monitoring of at least one of the UAV and the remote controller.

Method 400 may include monitoring and/or responding to the monitoring of at least one of the UAV and the authorizing entity. Any monitoring means of step 140 of method 100 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the monitoring of method 400. Any response to the monitoring step of step 150 of method 100 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the monitoring of method 400.

Methods may be provided that can cause the UAV to stop sending messages or send messages that do not contain vital information through the active transmission of jamming messages into the UAV's communications network. These jamming messages can cause the UAV to determine that it is not clear or permitted to send packets over the network, or they can monopolize the UAV's resources in a way that would not allow the UAV to process outbound communications. While the methods described herein are applicable in WiFi networks, the methods can work on other types of networks as well where similar commands exist within the protocols of those networks.

Some networks are based on the division of the network's resources (in particular time division) by nodes sending requests informing other nodes that they wish to use such resources for a particular means (e.g., use a channel for a time window).

In some networks, other nodes respond to such a request by acknowledging it. In some networks, a node that receives such an acknowledgment without first receiving a request will follow the acknowledgment. This can be manipulated so that one node in the network (or many nodes in the network) can be prevented from sending out any information due to lack of resources.

Jamming can include sending (e.g., continuously) request to send (RTS) messages that inform the network (or rather users of the network) regarding the intention of the node (network member) to send a request to send a packet of information through the network. If the node sends such messages continuously, other nodes will respond by acknowledging these requests one after the other and therefore will cease to send anything through the same network. Sending such messages continuously can prevent the node from transmitting for a period of time. If the UAV is prevented from sending packets for a period of time, or the remote controller is similarly prevented from sending packets for a period of time, it will cause a decoupling between the UAV and the remote controller.

Sending a Clear To Send (CTS) message (e.g., sending it continuously) is an acknowledgment of the received RTS, so that the node that sent the RTS determines that it can actually use the time resources it requested to send the message. If a node in the network receives such a CTS message, even if it does not receive the original RTS message, it can determine that such an RTS message was actually sent, and will accept and comply with the CTS acknowledgment, ceasing to transmit for the acknowledged period. Thus, sending CTS messages continuously can prevent a node from transmitting for a period of time. If the UAV is prevented from transmitting packets for a period of time, or the remote controller is similarly prevented from transmitting packets for a period of time, it will cause a decoupling between the UAV and the remote controller.

FIG. 5 illustrates a method 500 for disrupting communications over one or more communication links shared by and used by a UAV and one or more other users, using means that the one or more other users have access to and/or are authorized to use, etc.

Method 500 may include step 510 of disrupting communication over the communication link. Any triggers for step 110 may be applied mutatis mutandis to step 510.

Step 510 may be triggered by detecting communication over the communication link between the UAV and another user of the communication link.

Step 510 may be followed by step 520 of transmitting a number of redundant messages over the communication link related to access control of the communication link, thereby disrupting communication over the communication link.

The method 500 may include monitoring and/or responding to the monitoring of at least one of the UAV and the remote controller.

Method 500 may include monitoring and/or responding to the monitoring of at least one of the UAV and the authorizing entity. Any monitoring means of step 140 of method 100 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the monitoring of method 500. Any response to the monitoring step of step 150 of method 100 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the monitoring of method 500.

In relation to any of methods 100, 200, 300, 400, and 500, any reference to sending a disruptive command that, when executed, causes a unit to malfunction may apply mutatis mutandis to any other content (e.g., information) that, when processed, causes the unit to malfunction.

Figures 6-8 show different examples of jamming systems 131 capable of implementing one, some, or all of methods 100, 200, 300, 400, and 500.

Figure 6 is an example of a jamming system 131, a UAV 121, and a remote controller 111.

The UAV 121 and the remote controller 111 can communicate through a bidirectional link or any other link, such as two unidirectional links.

The UAV may include a first plurality (Nd) of units 121(1) to 121(Nd). The remote controller 111 may include a second plurality (Nr) of units 121(1) to 121(Nr).

One or more of the units of the UAV may be attacked, may be malfunctioned, may assist in attacking another unit, etc. Examples of units of the UAV are discussed in various parts of this application. One or more of the units of the remote controller may be attacked, may be malfunctioned, may assist in attacking another unit, etc.

Figure 6 similarly shows a jamming command 140 sent to the UAV.

Jamming system 131 is shown as including an antenna 132, a transmitter 133, a signal generator 134, a receiver 135, a signal analyzer 136, and a controller/processor unit 137.

The antenna 132 may be used to receive signals transmitted from the UAV 121 and/or from the remote controller 111. These signals are transmitted to the receiver 135, which provides the detected signal to a signal analyzer 136, which may analyze the signal. The analysis may be spectrum analysis, timing analysis, demodulation, descrambling, error correction, decoding, etc. The signal generator 134 may generate a jamming signal that is transmitted by the transmitter 133 via the antenna 132.

It should be noted that the jamming system may have one or more transmit antennas separate from one or more receive antennas.

The jamming system 131 may include only some of the units shown in the figure and/or may include other units.

The controller/processor can be a controller and/or a processor. The controller can control the operation of the jamming system, and the processor can receive the analysis results of the received signal from the signal analyzer 136 and determine which jamming commands to send and when to send them.

The controller/processor may perform the functions of the signal analyzer and/or the signal generator 134.

Figure 7 shows an example of a jamming system 131, a UAV 121, and a remote controller 111.

Figure 7 shows the jamming system 131 as transmitting a first jamming signal to the UAV and a second jamming signal 142 to the remote controller.

Figure 8 is an example of a network or communication link 199 shared by users such as the jamming system 131, the UAV 121, another UAV 122, and the remote controller 111.

In FIG. 8, the jamming system 131 includes an antenna array 132, which may include multiple antennas.

A system for UAV detection and mitigation may be provided, wherein the system can detect UAV communications, generate information by classifying the communications as related to a UAV, and determine associated communication parameters and further parameters, which in some cases may include the model of the UAV, the type of modem the UAV is using (e.g., what wireless communication components are used), the type of flight controller (computer, operating system), etc.

The information may be provided through other means, such as an external command sent to the system that has at least a portion of the information. The information may include knowledge of the UAV model stored in a database or library. In some cases, the information may have some degree of freedom (e.g., it is not known which communication module will be used, but the system may try to assume each component in a list of components it can handle and try them one by one to see if there are any results that result).

The system can use various mitigation techniques tailored to the UAV. This will involve using UAV specific information and can determine countermeasures based on UAV specific parameters such as location, altitude, engine load, battery load, flight pattern, etc.

The system can cause the UAV's WiFi modem to be reset. Such a reset to the WiFi modem, in the general case not related to the UAV, will result in the modem only coming back online after a few seconds, or the modem may have some trouble reconnecting to the network. If the WiFi modem is the UAV's means of communication, such a reset can cause the UAV to disconnect from its remote controller, which will cause the UAV to initiate a safety plan for the UAV, which will usually send the UAV's safety plan to its home location, without the remote controller being able to reconnect, or the pilot of the UAV having to manually stop this safety plan to prevent it from terminating.

The system can transmit disruptive content, such as disruptive commands, that can cause any (or any combination) of the following:
(a) causing the modem to reset, turn off, disconnect the client (remote controller) from the communications link, or otherwise malfunction (e.g., go into an infinite loop, hang, halt operation until reset, etc.);
(b) causing the modem to ignore some of the communication filters (e.g., white lists, black lists) that the modem uses to determine which future packets will be allowed through;
(c) causing the modem to skip data processing steps (e.g., disable encryption, disable scrambling);
(d) causing the UAV's main computer/flight controller/remote controller to initiate a pairing sequence or otherwise modify pairing parameters such as the UAV or remote controller identifier;
(e) causing the modem or host computer to change some or all of the communications parameters it is using (e.g., frequency channel, hopping sequence, start/stop hopping frequencies, preamble sequences, error correction capabilities, coding, bit rates, baud rates, bandwidth, guard intervals, scrambling sequences, header bits, etc.);
(f) causing other components of the UAV to act in a way that changes the control that the pilot of the UAV has over the UAV, or causes the UAV or remote controller to transmit information not normally transmitted by them or to not transmit in the manner in which information is normally transmitted;
(g) causing the UAV to activate its emergency plan, or alternatively, an emergency plan that differs from the plan established by the pilot of the UAV.

Option (a) can be obtained by sending a jamming command embedded in an application layer command. This can include sending a jamming command encapsulated within a standard command that causes a reset or disconnect. In some UAV protocols, commands exist that can cause such an effect, and sending the command within an available time slot or at a power that will be received by the UAV as a power stronger than the receiving power of the UAV's remote controller will cause that effect (depending on the relative power of the transmission and the distance of the remote controller and system from the UAV, the link budget).

Option (a) can be obtained by exploiting a protocol weakness at any layer that causes the modem to reset (even if the weakness is unplanned but due to an existing bug).

Option (a) can be achieved by having the modem or main computer block/filter certain communication channels/methods.

Option (a) can be obtained by exploiting a vulnerability in the implementation of the protocol at any layer that causes the modem to reset (even if the vulnerability is unplanned but due to an existing bug), where reset can mean resetting, turning off, or otherwise malfunctioning (e.g. going into an infinite loop, stopping, halting operation until reset, etc.). For example - assuming WiFi-based communication - the interference can use a set of packets that causes a buffer overflow in one of the standard processes. Some WiFi modems allow sending a message to a process that contains a payload that contains several fields of data. The fields of data include a field length or a starting address that are also sent in the packet. If the packet sent contains an invalid (e.g. too large) field length, and if the modem is not programmed to properly manage the event of an invalid field length, the result can be that the modem tries to access, read from, or write to a memory address that is outside the memory allocated for that packet. This can cause an exception in the operation of the code, and therefore the modem can crash and possibly reset itself to overcome this. This will cause the communication link between the UAV and the remote controller to break, and in many cases prevent them from communicating back. The UAV can then initiate its emergency plan, which may cause the UAV to fly back to its take-off position, land in place, hover in place, or fly to a pre-designated location, all of which may be considered desired outcomes for protection from attack by the UAV.

Exploiting a vulnerability in this way can be made reliable if the same packet is sent multiple times until a result is achieved; we can check if the result has been achieved after such an attack, or we can send a preset number of times or for a preset period of time without checking the result, both of which would increase the reliability of such an attack.

Exploiting vulnerabilities can be applied to any layer of communication.

Option (b) may be accomplished by having the modem ignore some of the communication filters (e.g., white lists, black lists) that the modem uses to determine which future packets to pass. For example, in some cases, communications may be implemented as a network having a network address, and the network command may include a command to cause the UAV to change the expected network address of the remote controller, so that the UAV can ignore communications having the original network address of the remote controller network ID. Thus, the UAV will not process packets received from that remote controller. Additionally, the UAV may process packets sent from the expected new network address of the remote controller, which may allow the system to send control commands to the UAV and thus take over UAV communications.

For example, there may be an additional ID used that is more similar to a communication ID or pairing ID, such as a set of bits used in the data transmitted, for example by being used to scramble the communication, or by simply preceding the actual command field of the communication. There may be a command that can cause the UAV to change this communication ID or pairing ID, which will cause the UAV to ignore future communications from its original remote controller, and may allow the system to send control commands to the UAV, thus taking over UAV communications.

Referring to option (c), often raw messages or data sent from the UAV or from the remote controller go through several processing stages before being sent. Such stages are intended to create a degree of redundancy so that the original message can be decoded (through error correction coding or other methods) on the other side of the communication to be hidden from eavesdropping (e.g., through encryption), to be more balanced, or for other reasons. There may be some system commands that should not be sent or received during normal communication periods that may disable some of these stages of processing. They may be present for engineering, debugging, or monitoring reasons. Such packets, if sent to the UAV or remote controller, may be sent to the UAV or remote controller with these stages disabled during normal flight. In the normal case, this may allow the communication between the UAV and the remote controller to be disconnected or to contribute to the ability to take over the communication, or to command the UAV to perform other actions (e.g., return, land).

Referring to option (d), in many cases, and to prevent cases where the remote controller affects the wrong UAV, the remote controller will only be able to control the UAV after they are "paired." Pairing is the process where the remote controller and the UAV exchange information and usually set up some communication parameters that will later affect the communication itself. This can affect the physical layer (e.g., hopping sequence, etc.), wrapper layer (e.g., error correction, scrambler, etc.), data in the header (e.g., network ID), message payload, etc. The pairing sequence occurs when a user wants to pair a remote controller with a UAV. Usually, the user initiates this by pressing a physical button on the device, but sometimes it is initiated by software or an application, or by moving the device in a particular pattern. In some cases, there are messages that can be packed into packets that will initiate such a sequence, and once the sequence is initiated, a third party can step in and take over the communication channel or prevent the remote controller from responding to the pairing sequence, thus causing the UAV and remote controller to become disconnected from each other.

Referring to option (e), one of the methods that can be used to detach a UAV from its remote controller or take over communication completely is to have the UAV change some of its communication parameters. These communication parameters are predefined between the remote controller and the UAV by user definition or by a pairing or handshaking process, so the UAV and the remote controller expect each other to transmit according to those parameters. However, in many cases, communication commands exist that modify these parameters, and these commands can be transmitted by the system to the UAV. In some cases, there is no protection mechanism against such attacks, and simple transmissions can be used to change those parameters, and other times, the transmission must fully comply with some rules, coding, error correction, encryption, or other layers of rules. When a transmission by the system is received by the UAV, it can change its parameters and therefore expect the remote controller to transmit according to the new parameters. The remote controller will not necessarily be aware of such changes and will continue to transmit according to the old parameters, and therefore its transmissions will not be received or will be filtered out by the UAV. This will cause a disconnect between the remote controller and the UAV. The system can take over the communication of the UAV if it does not transmit control packets according to the new parameters. Any of the above parameters and further communication parameters can be a source of mismatch between the UAV and the remote controller.

In some cases, these commands can be sent when the remote controller is not transmitting. In other cases, there must be a transmission by the system that is received with greater power than the original remote controller received (link budget).

In some cases, there is a cascade of commands, where a first command may cause some mismatch between the remote controller and the UAV, and a later command may cause the UAV to perform a flight (navigation) command.

With reference to option (f), option (f) may be obtained in a manner that may be similar to that described in connection with the above option, but the effect is that the UAV stops sending response packets ("ack"), and the remote controller may determine that the UAV is not receiving the transmission (because there is no response) and subsequently decide to detach. There are many modifications that can cause this effect, some of which may be available in the UAV.

While the above written description of the invention will enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use what is presently believed to be the best mode of the invention, one of ordinary skill in the art will understand and recognize that there are variations, combinations, and equivalents of the specific embodiments, methods, and examples herein. Accordingly, the invention should not be limited by the embodiments, methods, and examples described above, but by all embodiments and methods within the scope and spirit of the invention as claimed.

In the foregoing specification, the invention has been described with reference to specific examples of embodiments thereof. It will, however, be apparent that various modifications and changes can be made therein without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the invention as set forth in the appended claims.

Those skilled in the art will recognize that the boundaries between logic blocks are illustrative only, and that alternative embodiments may merge logic blocks or circuit elements, or impose alternative decompositions of functionality on the various logic blocks or circuit elements. As such, it is understood that the architectures shown herein are illustrative only, and that in fact many other architectures may be implemented which achieve the same functionality.

Any arrangement of components to achieve the same functionality is effectively "associated" such that the desired functionality is achieved. Thus, any two components combined herein to achieve a particular functionality may be considered to be ("associated with") one another such that the desired functionality is achieved without the aid of architecture or intermediate components. Likewise, any two components so associated may be similarly considered to be "operably connected" or "operably coupled" to one another to achieve the desired functionality.

Furthermore, those skilled in the art will recognize that the boundaries between operations described above are merely illustrative. Multiple operations may be combined into a single operation, a single operation may be distributed into additional operations, and multiple operations may be performed with at least partial overlap in time. Furthermore, alternative embodiments may include multiple instances of a particular operation, and the order of operations may be changed in various other embodiments.

Also for example, in one embodiment, the illustrated examples may be implemented as circuit portions located on a single integrated circuit or within the same device. Alternatively, the examples may be implemented as any number of separate integrated circuits or separate devices interconnected with each other in any suitable manner.

However, other modifications, variations, and alternatives are possible. Accordingly, the specification and drawings are to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.

In the claims, any reference signs placed between parentheses shall not be construed as limiting the claims. The word "comprising" does not exclude the presence of elements or steps other than those recited in the claim. Furthermore, as used herein, the terms "a" or "an" are defined as one or more. Similarly, the use of introductory phrases such as "at least one" and "one or more" in a claim should not be construed as suggesting that the introduction of another claim element by the indefinite article "a" or "an" limits any particular claim containing the claim element so introduced to an invention containing only one such element, even when the same claim contains introductory phrases such as "one or more" or "at least one" and indefinite articles such as "a" or "an". The same is true for the use of definite articles. Unless otherwise stated, terms such as "first" and "second" may be used to arbitrarily distinguish between elements that such terms describe. As such, these terms are not necessarily intended to indicate a temporal or other prioritization of such elements. The mere fact that certain measures are recited in mutually different claims does not indicate that a combination of these measures cannot be used to advantage.

While certain features of the invention have been illustrated and described herein, many modifications, substitutions, changes, and equivalents will now occur to those skilled in the art. It is therefore understood that the appended claims are intended to cover all such modifications and changes that fall within the true spirit of the invention.

It is recognized that various features of embodiments of the present disclosure that are, for clarity, described in the context of separate embodiments, may also be provided in combination in a single embodiment. Conversely, various features of embodiments of the present disclosure that are, for brevity, described in the context of a single embodiment, may also be provided separately or in any suitable subcombination.

It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the embodiments of the present disclosure are not limited by what has been particularly shown and described above. Rather, the scope of the embodiments of the present disclosure is defined by the appended claims and equivalents thereof.

Claims (96)

1. A method for inducing a disturbance to operation of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in communication with a remote controller, comprising:
determining that the UAV is causing interference with the operation of the UAV; and
A method comprising: sending one or more jamming commands to the UAV, the one or more jamming commands, when executed by the UAV, causing a unit of the UAV to malfunction, the malfunction inducing the jamming to the operation of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit of the UAV is a communication unit of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit is a modem of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit is a controller for the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit is a sensor of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit is a power supply unit of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit is a telemetry unit of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit is a battery module of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit is a storage unit of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the unit is an object detection unit of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes resetting the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes a restart of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes skipping one or more steps of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes skipping one or more authentication steps. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes skipping one or more verification steps. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes skipping one or more configuration steps. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes skipping one or more initialization steps. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes skipping at least one of the encryption and decryption steps. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes skipping at least one of an error correction decoding step and an error correction encoding step. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes skipping at least one of the scrambling and descrambling steps. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes altering one or more processing parameters of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing at least one of an encryption parameter and a decryption parameter. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing at least one of an error correction decoding parameter and an error correction encoding step. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing at least one of a scrambling parameter and a descrambling parameter. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing one or more configuration parameters of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes altering one or more authentication parameters of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes altering one or more debugging parameters of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing the execution path of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing an operating mode of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes executing one or more undocumented commands of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes executing one or more debugging commands. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes executing one or more commands in an operational mode different from an operational mode of the UAV when the transmitting occurs. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes turning off the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes slowing down the execution speed of a program executed by the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes beginning to execute an infinite loop of instructions. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing one or more communication parameters. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing at least one of a frequency channel, a frequency hopping sequence, and starting or stopping a hopping frequency. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes changing at least one out of: a preamble sequence, an error correction function, a coding, a bit rate, a baud rate, a guard interval, a location of pilots, a scrambling sequence, and header bits. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes avoiding transmitting a response to receiving one or more transmissions from the remote controller of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more jamming commands are configured to exploit a vulnerability of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more disruptive commands result in denial of service to the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more jamming commands are configured to exploit a vulnerability in a communication protocol used by the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction is a buffer overflow malfunction. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction is a holding of the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction is the occurrence of an exception in the execution of a program executed by the unit. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction is rejecting a packet identified as being transmitted from the remote controller of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes transmitting information from the UAV contrary to a transmission constraint imposed by the UAV during a non-test flight. The method of claim 1, wherein the malfunction includes failing to detect an object sensed by the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more interference commands are different from a disconnect command. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more jamming commands are different from a disconnect command and the malfunction is to disconnect the UAV from the remote controller of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the jamming command, when processed by the UAV, causes at least one further unit of the UAV to malfunction. The method of claim 1, wherein the interference with the operation of the UAV includes pairing with an unauthorized entity. The method of claim 1, wherein the disruption to the operation of the UAV includes disconnecting the UAV from the remote controller. The method of claim 1, wherein the interference with the operation of the UAV includes executing a safety plan for the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the interference with the operation of the UAV includes causing the UAV to return to base. The method of claim 1, wherein the interference with the operation of the UAV includes changing the destination of the UAV. The method of claim 1, wherein the interference with the operation of the UAV includes stopping the UAV's progress toward its destination. The method of claim 1, wherein the interference with the operation of the UAV includes hovering at a predetermined location for at least a predefined period of time. The method of claim 1, wherein the interference with the operation of the UAV includes hovering in a predetermined location until it runs out of power. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more disruptive commands are application layer commands. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more disruptive commands are a reset of the unit command or a restart of the unit command. The method of claim 1, comprising transmitting the one or more jamming commands at a transmission power that causes the one or more jamming commands to be received by the UAV at a power level that exceeds a power level of reception of commands transmitted from the remote controller. The method of claim 1, wherein transmitting the one or more jamming commands includes transmitting multiple jamming commands. The method of claim 1, wherein the transmitting the one or more jamming commands includes transmitting multiple identical jamming commands at multiple times. The method of claim 1, wherein the transmitting the one or more jamming commands includes transmitting multiple jamming commands at multiple time points, at least one jamming command being different from at least one other jamming command. The method of claim 1, wherein determining a particular one of the one or more jamming commands includes based on results of one or more immediately preceding jamming command transmissions. The method of claim 1, comprising evaluating a result of transmitting at least one jamming command. The method of claim 1, wherein the disruption to the operation of the UAV includes changing a network address of the remote controller. The method of claim 1, wherein the disruption of the operation of the UAV includes changing a network address of the remote controller to a network address governed by the one or more disruption commands. The method of claim 1, comprising determining the one or more jamming commands based on knowledge of a root cause of the malfunction of the unit. The method of claim 1, comprising determining the one or more disturbance commands without knowing a root cause of the malfunction of the unit. The method of claim 1, comprising determining the one or more interdiction commands based on a location of the UAV. The method of claim 1, comprising determining the one or more jamming commands based on a location of the remote controller. The method of claim 1, comprising determining the one or more jamming commands based on a distance between the remote controller and the UAV. The method of claim 1, comprising determining the one or more jamming commands based on a flight pattern of the UAV. A non-transitory computer-readable medium for disrupting operation of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in communication with a remote controller, the non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions for detecting communication between the UAV and the remote controller, and instructions for transmitting one or more disruption commands to the UAV that, when executed by the UAV, cause a unit of the UAV to malfunction, the malfunction inducing the disruption to the operation of the UAV. A method for inducing a disturbance to the operation of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in communication with a remote controller, the method comprising: determining to induce the disturbance to the operation of the UAV while the UAV is operating in a current mode of operation; and transmitting one or more disturbance commands to the UAV that, when executed by the UAV, cause units of the UAV to operate in a manner consistent with an operating mode of the UAV that is different from the current mode of operation. A non-transitory computer-readable medium for disrupting operation of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in communication with a remote controller, the non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions for determining to induce the disruption to the operation of the UAV while the UAV is operating in a current mode of operation, and instructions for transmitting one or more disruption commands to the UAV that, when executed by the UAV, cause units of the UAV to operate in a manner consistent with an operating mode of the UAV that is different from the current mode of operation. A method for inducing interference with operation of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), comprising: determining to induce interference with the operation of the UAV; and transmitting one or more interference commands to the UAV that, when processed by the UAV, cause the UAV to communicate with an unauthorized entity. 80. The method of claim 79, wherein the communication with the unauthorized entity includes pairing with the unauthorized entity. A method for disrupting communications over a communications link used by an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), comprising: detecting communications over the communications link between the UAV and another user of the communications link; and transmitting a plurality of redundant messages over the communications link related to access control of the communications link, thereby disrupting the communications over the communications link. The method of claim 81, wherein the redundant message includes a redundant request to gain access to the communication link. The method of claim 81, wherein the redundant message comprises a redundant acknowledgment of receipt of a request from a user of the communication link to gain access to the communication link. 82. The method of claim 81, wherein the disruption of the communication subsequently includes decoupling the UAV from a remote controller of the UAV, the remote controller of the UAV using the communication link to communicate with the UAV. The method of claim 81, wherein the redundant messages include (a) one or more redundant requests to gain access to the communication link, and (b) one or more redundant acknowledgments of receipt of a request from a user of the communication link to gain access to the communication link. The method of claim 81, wherein the extra message comprises a request to send (RTS) message. The method of claim 81, wherein the extra message comprises a clear to send (CTS) message. The method of claim 81, wherein the communication link is a time-division communication link. The method of claim 81, wherein the communication link is a time-division communication link. 1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium for jamming communications over a communications link used by an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), comprising: instructions for detecting communications over the communications link between the UAV and another user of the communications link; and
A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions for transmitting a plurality of extra messages over the communications link related to access control of the communications link, thereby disrupting the communications over the communications link. 1. A method for inducing interference with operation of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) configured to communicate with an authorized entity, comprising:
determining that the UAV is causing the interference with the operation of the UAV; and
The method includes transmitting to a recipient selected from among the UAV and the authorizing entity one or more disruptive commands that, when executed by the recipient, cause the recipient's unit to malfunction. The method of claim 91, wherein the authorizing entity is a remote controller of the UAV. The method of claim 91, wherein the authorizing entity is different from a remote controller of the UAV. The method of claim 91, wherein the authorizing entity is another UAV. 92. The method of claim 91, further comprising transmitting to another recipient of the UAV and to the authorizing entity the one or more disruptive commands that, when executed by the other recipient, cause a unit of the other recipient to malfunction, the malfunction also inducing the disruption to the operation of the UAV. A non-transitory computer-readable medium for inducing interference with the operation of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communicating with an authorized entity, the non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions for detecting communications between the UAV and the authorized entity authorized to communicate with the UAV, and instructions for transmitting to a recipient selected from among the UAV and the authorized entity one or more interference commands that, when executed by the recipient, cause a unit of the recipient to malfunction, the malfunction inducing the interference with the operation of the UAV.