JP2008099156A - Information leakage prevention system - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an information leakage prevention system capable of preventing fraudulent access to an operation terminal and preventing information leakage by having the operation terminal itself decide whether the operation terminal is stolen, without going through the intermediary of the center and closing and releasing an OS, when the operation terminal is removed. <P>SOLUTION: When the system is carried from a certain spot in a power-off state, a network is connected, each time the OS is activated from the operation terminal. When the network cannot be connected, the operation terminal itself recognizes a network connected state, a closing program incorporated in the operation terminal is activated; and the OS is closed. When the network can be connected, a network connection state is similarly recognized, it is decided that the operation terminal exists within a utilization permitted area, and OS closure release processing is performed by the OS-closing program. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2008,JPO&INPIT

Description

The present invention relates to a movable operation terminal that controls the blockade and release of an OS according to a network connection state and can only be used within an authorized area.

In recent years, the proportion of mobile operation terminals such as mobile PCs that are used in corporate activities has been increasing year by year, and information leakage due to theft or loss has become a major social problem. No matter how much the company strengthens logical security (anti-virus and data encryption) and human security (employee education and training), there is a terminal that can access confidential information. When it is possible to store or record on a medium that can be taken out, it is difficult to avoid the risk of leakage or leakage of information.

Therefore, conventionally, a system for detecting the location of the operation terminal that has not been stolen, a system for notifying the operation terminal of the patrol lamp or message from the center, and a system for deleting the address book data of the lost mobile phone have been developed. However, management and control at the center are mandatory for all systems. In addition, these systems functioned only to the extent that the operation terminal was capable of communication. The following is a specific example.
“The wireless LAN system performs data communication between computers (wireless terminals) connected to a wireless communication adapter via an access point. The access point always generates a signal at a certain interval. The wireless terminal has a function of measuring the strength of a signal from the access point. In the function of measuring the strength, the strength is constantly compared with a preset strength, and when the strength falls below that level, a specific packet including the MAC address of the wireless terminal is transmitted. The access point that has received the transmitted packet stores the MAC address in a storage medium, displays the MAC address on a liquid crystal or the like, or prints it with a printer or the like to notify that it has been stolen. ]
JP 2002-261773 A

Normally, the data in the operation terminal is encrypted so that it cannot be referenced during theft, but if the ID / password is compromised for the operation terminal, there is a possibility that the user can successfully log in and view the information in the operation terminal was there. In addition, when it is stolen, the center automatically detects the state,
Although access was made impossible by controlling through the center, there was a problem that when the operation terminal itself could not be judged whether it was stolen or it was started up in a stand-alone manner, it would lead to information leakage if even a password was obtained.

The object of the present invention is to determine whether the operation terminal is stolen without going through the center when the operation terminal is taken out, and to prevent unauthorized access to the operation terminal and prevent information leakage by blocking and releasing the OS. Suppose you can.

When the power is turned off from a certain base, the operation terminal connects to the network every time the OS is started so that the object of the invention can be fulfilled. When the network connection is impossible, the operation terminal itself grasps the network connection state, the block program incorporated in the operation terminal is activated, and the OS is blocked. Similarly, when the network connection is possible, the network connection state is grasped and it is determined that the operation terminal is in the use permission area, and the OS block release process is performed by the OS block program.

In this case, the operation terminal itself automatically detects that it has been stolen.
Even if the password is stolen, access is disabled, and unauthorized access to the operation terminal is prevented, thereby preventing information leakage.

  The best mode for carrying out the present invention will be described below in detail with reference to the drawings.

FIG. 1 shows an information leakage prevention terminal using login control according to an embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, an input device 101 (keyboard) for inputting a user ID and password, a display device 102 (display) for displaying a login screen thereof, a network I / F 103 connected to the outside, control of each device and calculation / processing of data. CPU 104 for performing network connection, communication device 105 connected to the network, external storage device (HDD) 106, OS 107 for managing the entire computer system, access point connection management table 108 for managing connection information to access point 201, for connecting via the correct path A connection route information table 109 for managing information, a connection route information acquisition result table 110 for registering information obtained from a certain base point, an unauthorized route information result table 111 for registering information connected by an unauthorized route,
An OS block program 112 that performs block and release is configured by an operation terminal 113 that integrates them.

  FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram showing the overall configuration of the implementation method of the present invention.

An information leakage prevention system by network connection applied to an embodiment of the present invention includes an operation terminal 113, a communication device 105 for network connection from the operation terminal 113, an access point 201 to be connected to the communication device, an access point 201 and a relay. Router 20
2. Consists of a server 203 that performs user authentication after network connection. When the OS 107 is activated and automatically connects to the network in the area 204, the communication driver acquires 205 the unique information of the access point. Information on the registered access point 201 is detected 206 from the access point connection management table 108 and the corresponding access point 201 is searched. If there is a corresponding access point 201, the connection result is updated 207 in the access point connection management table 108 and connected to the access point 201. If there is no corresponding access point 201, the connection result is updated 207 in the same manner as described above, and the OS is blocked 208 by the blocking program. When the operation terminal 113 is connected to a network in the area, user authentication is performed to a user authentication server 203 installed in a LAN service or the like via a router. After that, information on the router A 202 (A) and the user authentication server 203 is acquired,
Register in the connection route information acquisition result table 110. The information is the connection route information table 10.
If it matches the contents in 9, the connection is completed. If the path information is not applicable, the OS blocking program 112 performs OS blocking processing.

FIG. 3 shows the flow of blockage and release inside and outside the area.
・ Case within the area (in case of accepted connection route)
When the OS 107 is activated (step 301), the network communication device 105 automatically connects to the access point 201 (step 302). The communication driver in the OS receives the access point information (step 303). In the access point connection management table 108, information is listed on the auto scan list so that connection can be made from any access point 201, and a search is performed at the time of connection (step 304). When the operation terminal 113 can connect to the permitted specific access point 201 (step 305), the communication driver updates the connection result to the access point connection management table 108 (step 307). When the operation terminal 113 is connected to the network in the area, user authentication is performed to the user authentication server 203 installed in the LAN service or the like via the router. Thereafter, information on the access point 201, the router A 202, and the user authentication server 203 is acquired and registered in the connection route information acquisition result table 110. The base point information is compared with the connection route information table 109 (step 308). If the contents are the same, the terminal 110 is determined to be permitted to use and the OS 107 login screen is displayed (step 312).
-Cases in the area (in the case of an invalid connection route)
Up to step 308 is the same as the above processing. Thereafter, the base point information is compared with the connection route information table 109, and if the contents are different, it is determined that the operation terminal 113 has connected via an unauthorized route and is registered in the unauthorized route information result table 111. Thereafter, the OS blocking program 112 refers to the unauthorized path information result table 111 (step 309), and the OS blocking program 112 blocks the OS (step 310).
-Case outside area Up to step 304 is the same as the above processing. Thereafter, the access point connection management table 108 is searched for the received information of the access point 201, and if there is no information, the network connection is impossible (step 305). Next, the communication driver updates the connection failure result to the access point connection management table 108 (step 307). The OS blocking program 112 refers to the access point connection management table 108 (step 309) and blocks the OS (step 310).
-Case of connection within the next area after blocking (in the case of permitted connection routes)
If the operating terminal 113 is within the connectable area when the OS 107 is started next time after the OS is shut down, O
The S block program 112 releases the OS block (for example, the OS is automatically restarted and the operation terminal 11
3 is made operable) (step 311). Thereafter, a login screen is displayed (step 307).

FIG. 4 shows a connection management table update flowchart. The network driver 105 automatically connects to the access point 201 (step 401), and the communication driver receives access point information in order to check whether the network connection is possible or not (step 401).
Step 402). Information received by the communication driver is retrieved from the access point connection management table 108 registered in advance in the operation terminal 113 (step 403). In order to update the connection result information in the access point connection management table 108, the communication driver is updated with a value of success 0 or failure 1 (step 404). The OS blocking program 112 refers to the corresponding access point 201 from the connection result of the access point connection management table 108, and performs blocking and release (step 405).

  FIG. 5 shows an example of the access point connection management table 108.

In the access point information 502, fixed information such as an access point identifier is registered. The connection result 503 is a table for updating whether the communication driver is success 0 or failure 1 at any time connection.

FIG. 6 is a connection path diagram. Even if it is the same access point 201 (X), if the connection path ahead is wrong, it is determined that the connection has been made from the operation terminal 113 via an illegal path, and similarly O
The S block program 112 is started. For example, the access point 201, the router 202, and the user authentication server 203 that are always connected on the network are used as the base points. Originally, after connecting to the access point 201, the path connecting to the user authentication server 203 (C) via the router 202 (A) or the router 202 (D) is a normal use case.
If it is an illegal route that goes through the router 202 (B) even if it is 1, after its connection processing,
The OS is forcibly blocked by the OS blocking program 112.

  FIG. 7 shows a flowchart for confirming the connection path.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart embodied in order to explain a part of FIG. 3 (step 307, step 308) in detail.

When the OS 107 is activated (step 701), the network communication device 105 is automatically connected (step 702). At the time of network connection, information on the access point 201, the router A 202, and the user authentication server 203, which are base points of the communication driver, is acquired (step 70).
3) and update the information to the connection route information acquisition result table 110 (step 704).
. The connection route information acquisition result table 110 compares with the connection route information table 109, and if the corresponding route exists, the connection is completed (step 706). If the corresponding route does not exist, it is registered in the unauthorized route information result table 111 (step 707). After that, OS blocking program 1
12 refers to the unauthorized route information result table 111 and performs a blocking process (step 708).

FIG. 8 is an example of the connection route information table 109. Access point 201, router 20
2. Information for the three basic points 803 such as the user authentication server 203 is set in fields 1, 2, and 3. The administrator registers the values based on the IP address 804 and the MAC address 805 in the table in the operation terminal 113 in advance. Only the administrator of the operation terminal 113 can add or delete information on the path 802 and change the setting of the connection path information. Thereby, routes other than the registered information from the operation terminal 113 are not allowed.

  An example of the connection route information acquisition result table shown in FIG. 9 is shown.

Each time the OS 107 is started, the access point 201 from the base point in the network connection,
IP address 902 and MAC address 90 of the router 202 and user authentication server 203
3 is acquired by the communication driver and temporarily registered in the connection route information acquisition result table 110. The information is compared with the connection route information table 109, and if it is the same as the content of the connection route information table 109 registered in advance, it is possible to connect to the Internet. When the corresponding route does not exist in the connection route information table 109, it is determined from the operation terminal 113 that the connection is from an unauthorized route, and when connecting to the base point, the OS blocking program 112 is executed to block the OS.

  FIG. 10 is an example of the unauthorized route information result table 111.

When connected via an unauthorized route, the connection route information acquisition result table 110 is registered in the information field such as the IP address 1004 or MAC address 1005 of the base point 1003 that is not allowed to the unauthorized route management table 111. Information on the route 1002 is used as a history to determine what route the administrator has connected to, and if there is no problem, the connection route information table 109 takes measures. When the next connection is made, the route information acquisition result table 110 is initialized, and the base point information acquired again is compared from the connection route information table 109.

This is an information leakage prevention terminal by the OS blocking program. It is explanatory drawing which showed the whole structure of the implementation method of this invention. It is a system flowchart which shows the operation | movement of operation | movement of this invention. It is a flowchart at the time of a connection management table update. It is an access point connection management table. It is a connection route diagram. It is a flowchart which confirms a connection path | route. It is a connection route information table. It is a connection route information acquisition result table. It is an unauthorized route information result table.

Explanation of symbols

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 101 ... Input device (keyboard), 102 ... Display apparatus (display), 103 ... Network I / F, 104 ... CPU, 105 ... Network communication apparatus, 106 ... External storage device (HDD), 107 ... OS, 108 ... Access point Connection management table 109 ...
Connection path information table, 110 ... Connection path information acquisition result table, 111 ... Unauthorized path information result table, 112 ... OS blocking program, 113 ... Operating terminal, 201 ... Access point, 202 ... Router, 203 ... User authentication server.

Claims (4)

In the network system having an operation terminal and an access point, the operation terminal is configured to automatically connect to the access point, a table for managing information when connection is unsuccessful, and a program for performing control for closing and releasing the OS. Anti-theft system. When the operating terminal receives a specific packet from the access point, it sends unique information such as the IP address, MAC address, and identifier of the access point to the operating terminal,
Anti-theft system for registering tables. A system that prevents information leakage by detecting that an operation terminal whose use place is fixed such as an office is taken out of the communication area when the operation terminal is taken out of the communication area and blocking the OS. A system that automatically releases the OS block when the next connection to the access point is made after the OS blockage in the area where the operation terminal is allowed.

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